Review of a new translation of Shadal's perush on Chumash

Someone emailed me this recently:

I haven't visited you blog much lately but I saw this and couldn't help but think of you,

It says it was just published, have you heard about it yet?

I hadn't heard of it. This is what "it" is: Shadal's Torah Commentary, translated into English. It is available on Amazon here: Torah Commentary, by Samuel David Luzzatto. The publisher's summary:

Luzzatto’s Torah commentary presents the reader with the work of an accomplished and highly respected Bible Commentator of the 19th century, a leading Bible scholar at the university of Padua, who tackled the well worn theories of Bible critics who deny the Divinity of the Torah, both Gentile and Jewish.

His commentary preceded, by 40 years, that of Dr. David Hoffman, head of the Berlin Rabbinical seminary, which first appeared in 1904 and also addressed Bible critics.

Luzzatto’s credentials as an expert in all the languages that could have had an influence on the text of the Torah are beyond question, including, for the first time, Syriac.

Doing all this work in a country that was thoroughly Catholic, and taking issue with ancient as well as recent critics, was an act of fearlessness and integrity, and displayed peerless scholarship. 

His highlighting the moral superiority of the Torah to any competing classic work on morality is most refreshing.

The translator, Eliyahu Munk, was born in Frankfurt on Main, where he received his education at the Samson Rafael Hirsch Realschule, and the Yeshiva of the late Rabbi Joseph Breuer, of blessed memory. He continued his education at the Yeshiva in Gateshead, England. He served in Jewish education (primarily as a teacher) for almost 30 years in Toronto, Canada. He lives in Jerusalem and has translated over a dozen classic Torah Commentaries.

On Amazon, it is selling for $112 for four volumes, which cover all five Chumashim. Pretty neat, and indeed something I would want, given how often I refer to Shadal, and use his innovative commentary as a jumping-off point. (Also available here at SeforimCenter for more money.) I would recommend it, though with caution. Buy it, read it, but don't trust it, for reasons that should become clear below.

There is, of course, the earlier translation by Daniel Klein, which only covered Bereishit, but still had a lot going for it. To cite Fred's (of On The Main Line) review:

Daniel Klein's fine translation of Samuel David Luzatto's commentary to Genesis is philologically precise. The introduction is illuminating, his notes are well researched and untangle some of the more obscure comments and personalities cited therein. Klein also did something unique, as a translator, which is that he did not neglect Luzzatto's Italian translation of the Pentateuch, and translated the translation into English! This is especially helpful as often the Italian sheds light as much light on Luzzatto's understanding of the text as his Hebrew commentary does. In addition, in selected cases the translation does not agree with the comment and one can use it to make inferences about Luzzatto's progression of thought. Finally, the original was printed only twice, in 1871, and in 1965. The 1965 edition is badly censored, omitting the names of countless scholars whom Luzzatto scrupulously cited by name. Klein restored all these names accurately.

The author's translation of Exodus is nearly complete.

I hope that the release of this competing translation (by Rabbi Eliyahu Munk) does not interfere with the release of Daniel Klein's Shadal on sefer Shemot.

Different works have different characteristics, though. Will this translation refer to the gentile scholars Shadal refers to, or does it rely on the censored version? Will there be extensive footnoting? Will religiosity get in the way of an accurate translation? How accessible is the translation, for the non-scholarly, and scholarly reader? What of the Italian translation? What of trup symbols, and an analysis of them. (I don't know if Klein's does that; I should borrow it again.)

Luckily, at SeforimCenter, there is a short excerpt from parashat Kedoshim, so we can analyze it.

Unfortunately, while in general I am somewhat impressed with the translation, the first three translations leave me somewhat underwhelmed. Let us see each in turn:

Compare with Shadal's actual commentary:

He renders hashchasas hapeah as "destruction of part of the beard". I come away not knowing whether this is a more severe or less severe act than giluach, rendered as "shaving".

Where Shadal says "hashchasas hapeah is mentioned next to a cutting for a deceased individual", he is referring to the very next pasuk, 19:28, which reads veseret lenefesh lo sitnu bivsarchem. As this translation gives it, the reader believes that Shadal was only referring to the distant pasuk, in Vayikra 21:5.

Shadal said "and so too for kohanim", and only then mentions Vayikra 21:5, with a similar juxtaposition. As this translation gives it, one does not know that that pasuk refers to kohanim, while locally it is only referring to yisrealim.

Shadal tells us to look to Ibn Ezra there. This translation helps us out, by summarizing what exactly Ibn Ezra said there, namely that "he confirms Nachmanides's reference to pagan rites". However, this is absolutely not what Shadal intended by his reference. Not to pagan rites, but rather, specifically that this is an act of mourning. Here is what Ibn Ezra wrote on 21:5, on ופאת זקנם:

לא יקרחה קרחה בראשם -על המת.

ופאת זקנם -על המת כמנהג מקומות בארץ כשדים והנה התברר פירוש את פאת זקנך.
וטעם שרטת –
אפילו אחת וכבר נזהרו ישראל על אלה. 
וטעם הזהירם כי ראש מוקרח וזקן מגולח ובשר שרוט, לא ישמש לפני השם.

While Ibn Ezra indeed mentions the minhag mekomot be'eretz kasdim, the reason Ibn Ezra is relevant is that Shadal is trying to argue that in all these cases, it is a forbidden act of mourning.

Further, for the editorial note to say that Ibn Ezra confirms Ramban (Nachmanides) seems strange, given that Ibn Ezra died in 1164 and Ramban was born in 1194.

Finally, Shadal says that Israelies are forbidden to do hashchasas peas hazakan because of mourning, while Kohanim are forbidden even in giluach, which is also for a deceased. This is a major point in Shadal, that both of these prohibitions for shaving are acts of mourning. The translation, alas, gives it as "Priests are even forbidden to shave themselves, as this would be interpreted as a sign of mourning." I don't see anything in Shadal's words that would give this impression, that Shadal would prohibit (under peshat) a Kohen from shaving for a non-mourning purpose, because of impression. Shadal says just the opposite, that there it is explicitly an act of mourning.

(Giluach can mean cutting rather than shaving; are we certain as to what Shadal is referring to here?)

A reader would walk away with a thorough misimpression of Shadal's interpretation of the prohibition of shaving.

On the next pasuk, the translation is:

However, the words "both of which mean 'making holes of some kind'" is not from Shadal, but from Rabbi Munk. Maybe there is good scholarship to support this interpretation, but I would prefer that this insertion be placed in an editorial note in brackets, as it was in his translation on the previous verse. שקע can refer to a depression and תקע to thrust or stick into. Not necessarily does Shadal mean to say it has to do with making holes.

On the next pasuk:

I am fairly happy with the characterization. It is slightly reworded to make it flow more nicely. However, I am rather unhappy with the last sentence: "Our author ridicules Ibn Ezra's comment on this verse."

Is this from frumkeit that the translator refrains from letting us know what Ibn Ezra says, and just how Shadal ridicules Ibn Ezra's comment? This is milchamta shel Torah!

Here is what Shadal says, when ridiculing:

That is, Ibn Ezra had written:

[יט, כט]וטעם להזכיר אל תחלל את בתך - בעבור שרט לנפש, שלא תתגלה לעיני הכל, כי קול שבאשה ערוה ואף כי שרט.

And earlier, Ibn Ezra wrote this:

יש אומרים: 
שהוא דבק עם ושרט לנפש, כי יש מי שירשום גופו בצורה הידועה באש על המת, ויש עוד היום רושמים בנערותם בפניהם להיות נכרים. 

ומלת קעקע –כפולה, כמו רוקע הארץ וצאצאיה והוא מגזרת והוקע אותם. 
ועל דעת המתרגם, גם היא מלה זרה גם הוא הנכון.

Thus, a tattoo and a seret lenefesh are possibly identical. It is making a mark on the flesh, perhaps by burning. And, so, Ibn Ezra suggests, the chillul for the maiden is not making her a harlot, but making a seret; and the reason not to make a seret in her skin is that, to display it, she would have to expose that skin. And that is simply not tznius! Kol be'isha erva, and all the more so a seret.

Yes, it is pretty funny. Ibn Ezra can suggest it, and people can take his idea seriously. And Shadal can mock it. But the reader should ideally know what Shadal is mocking; he need not be protected from such knowledge!

Next:

This translation is fine. There are a few liberal insertions, such as "or caste" (which arguably makes sense in context of the pasuk, but which Shadal does not say) and that whole sentence starting with "The Torah... not acceptable is inserted."

And Shadal makes a somewhat careful interpretation of kamocha, as "act with him as you would wish others to act with you, if you were a ger." It would be nice if the "if you were a ger" were more explicitly in the translation.

Next up (and in the image I juxtapose the translation with Shadal's words):

The translator, instead of giving us the words of the pasuk in Melachim, helpfully summarizes it for us, about how Eliyahu tried to revive the child by spreading his own body on top of the dead body of the boy.

Unfortunately, the reader is left wondering what the heck this has to do with מדד and the measuring of areas. Because the translator obliterated Shadal's statement that shoresh MDD moreh shetichat davar al davar, the root מדד refers to spreading of one thing on top of another thing. Instead, the translator had helpfully mis-rendered it as that the root מדד originally referred to the measuring of areas. Yes, but what does that have to do with Eliyahu spreading himself over someone else? Actually copying the pasuk in Hebrew, with the word ויתמודד would also have been incredibly helpful here. The typical reader is not going to check up the pasuk, and will walk away confused.

The translation on 19:35 continues into another paragraph:

Shadal wrote in Hebrew this:

The first (slight) problem is that the translation neglects the transition from spreading X on Y to spreading rope of cubit-rod upon the body being measured.

More critically, the translator leaves us confused as to what Rashi said, what Wessely said, and so on. We should start with Rashi:

liquid measures: Heb. וּבַמְּשׂוּרָה. This refers to liquid measures. — [see Torath Kohanim 19:85 and B.M. 61b]

ובמשורה: היא מדת הלח והיבש:

Note how the Hebrew text in this version of Rashi mentions both liquid and dry measurements, while the English translation was based on some variant text which only mentioned liquid measures.

Wessely complained about Rashi, that Rashi only mentioned liquid measurements and not dry measurements. Shadal defends Rashi by saying that Wessely did not ידע, know, that Rashi actually did mention dry measures. The translator claims that "Wessely takes issue with Rashi, forgetting that Rashi also mentioned measures used to measure." Emphasis always my own. Forgetting gives the reader the false impression that this was surely the text before Wessely, and he just forgot the text before him. As well, the end of the statement "also mentioned measures used to measure" probably was originally intended as something like "also mentioned measures used to measure dry", and this typographical error makes it even more difficult to understand what is going on here.

This would be an ideal place for the translation to contain a footnote and an extensive discussion. Perhaps a citation of Rashi's words, Wessely's words, the gemara in Bava Metzia, and so on.

The sample goes on into Vayikra perek 20. Maybe I'll consider those translations in a follow-up post. Maybe I will like some of those translation a bit better.

Having this accessible English translation, to read alongside the Hebrew of Shadal, is a good thing. It is a good start, and makes Shadal in Hebrew more accessible to an active reader who might otherwise have difficulties with the nuace of some of the Hebrew. However, if the reader will not consult Shadal in the original, and take pains to carefully compare, then I fear that the reader of this translation will misunderstand a good portion of Shadal's meaning.

Nature's Wealth on the seven species of Israel

Shirat Devorah has an interesting excerpt from a book called Nature's Wealth, about the seven species of Eretz Yisrael, in honor of Tu BeShvat. She writes at the bottom her source:

Source: "Nature's Wealth" -  Rabbi Moshe Cohen Shaouli and Rabbi Yaakov Fisher - based on the teachings of the Rambam

Also available here, perhaps for a bit less. It does look rather nice, and an interesting idea, though I wonder whether it is indeed based on the teachings of the Rambam. The Rambam's son said that we need not believe and defend every medical statement mentioned by Chazal:

…We are not obliged, on account of the great superiority of the sages of the Talmud, and their expertise in their explanations of the Torah and its details, and the truth of their sayings in the explanation of its general principles and details, to defend them and uphold their views in all of their sayings in medicine, in science and in astronomy, or to believe them [in those matters] as we believe them regarding the explanation of the Torah… we find that they made medicinally related statements in the Gemara which have not been justified or validated...

and the Rambam himself made a statement about Chazal relying on contemporary science, such that it may not be correct:

You must, however, not expect that everything our Sages say respecting astronomical matters should agree with observation, for mathematics were not fully developed in those days; and their statements were not based on the authority of the Prophets, but on the knowledge which they either themselves possessed or derived from contemporary men of science. 

If so, it might not be wise, or within the shitta of the Rambam, to cite statements from Chazal about the medicinal properties of various foodstuffs as if this is Torah miSinai, especially if any such statement is not also backed by present-day science.

To give two examples from Shirat Devorah's excerpt, first we will consider what it has to say about figs:

Our ancestors found figs to be of great medicinal value. The Bible mentions dried whole figs as a cure for boils. Rabbi Abraham Ibn Ezra writes that "fresh or dried figs stimulate blood circulation, and thus preserve life". Our Sages said that "one gripped with a powerful hunger should be given figs to eat" because they increase the flow of blood and are rejuvenating.

I am not sure where Ibn Ezra writes this. However, as we have seen several times in the past, Ibn Ezra repeats many things we find in Galen, presumably via Avicenna. This is not Torah miSinai but rather ancient Greek medicine. And often, the now-discredited theory of the four humours is the basis of certain statements. And note that he talks about stimulating blood circulation, where blood is one of the four humours.

Indeed, we find the following statement by Galen on the properties of foodstuffs:

So call it Ibn Ezra and it is suddenly kosher and divine revelation about the nature of these figs.

Further, what does it mean that

 The Bible mentions dried whole figs as a cure for boils. 

? Presumably, this is a reference to 2 Melachim 20:7, where Chizkiyahu had boils, and Yeshayahu instructed how to cure him:

ז  וַיֹּאמֶר יְשַׁעְיָהוּ, קְחוּ דְּבֶלֶת תְּאֵנִים; וַיִּקְחוּ וַיָּשִׂימוּ עַל-הַשְּׁחִין, וַיֶּחִי.

7 And Isaiah said: 'Take a cake of figs.' And they took and laid it on the boil, and he recovered.

These were not mere boils, but Chizkiyahu was near death at this point. But see what Rashi and Radak say about this, citing Chazal:

"In the words of Chazal, is it not that if you place fig sap upon flesh, immediately the flesh is smitten? Rather, this is a miracle within a miracle. Similarly, 'and Hashem showed him wood'. It was bitter wood. Such is the way of Hashem -- with bitter, he sweetens the bitter."

If so, this is not proof that the Biblle mentions dried whole figs as a general cure for boils. This was in fact a miracle.

Even Ralbag does not think it is a cure for boils, though as a rationalist, he sees this as Hashem performing the miracle in a way that one can point out other, quasi-natural causes:

"It is known that Hashem, when He performs wonders, seeks for them some causes, as it is possible, so that it is slightly less strange via the rule of nature. And therefore he commanded to take a cake of figs. For even though it does not have the power to effect this, behold, there is in it some effect in healing abscesses and in their בישול {?}."

And so the statement stands on slightly firmer ground, though it is still a bit shaky. The book might well give its sources, but I am not sure where the statement

Our Sages said that "one gripped with a powerful hunger should be given figs to eat" because they increase the flow of blood and are rejuvenating.

comes from, other than Yoma 83b, or whether this explanation, outside quotes, about increasing the flow of blood is in the Talmud or is the authors' interjection.

Second, in terms of barley, they write:

The Talmud warns that barley may cause intestinal worms. Also, because it is difficult to digest, barley should be avoided by those with gastrointestinal problems.

I don't think the authors mean to conflate the two. But the idea that it causes intestinal worms is find in Berachot 36a:

Over raw cabbage and barley-flour we say the blessing 'by whose word all things exist', and may we not infer from this that over wheat-flour we say 'who createst the fruit of the ground'? — No; over wheat-flour also we say 'by whose word all things exist'. Then let him state the rule for wheat-flour, and it will apply to barley-flour as a matter of course?⁷  — If he had stated the rule as applying to wheat-flour, I might have said: That is the rule for wheat-flour, but over barley-flour we need say no blessing at all. Therefore we are told that this is not so. But is barley-flour of less account than salt or brine, of which we have learnt:⁸  Over salt and brine one says 'by whose word all things exist'? — It was necessary [to lay down the rule for barley-flour]. You might argue that a man often puts a dash of salt or brine into his mouth [without harm], but barley-flour is harmful in creating tapeworms, and therefore we need say no blessing over it. We are therefore told that since one has some enjoyment from it he must say a blessing over it.

If it indeed means that barley-flour causes tapeworms, then this would, in all likelihood, be based on Chazal's belief in spontaneous generation. (The phrase used in the gemara, BTW, is that it is 'difficult for kukyanei'. This in turn is related to the anasakis worms found in fish. And it makes sense that it means that it causes them to exist, similar to how certain other activities are kasha for davar acher, meaning tzaraas.) One could plausibly explain that the tape-worm eggs were laid in the barley flour, and so ingesting it uncooked would allow those tapeworm eggs to hatch inside one's body. But if so, wouldn't the same be true for uncooked wheat-flour?

But one should not simply repeat the Talmudic advice as if it were a certainty. And even more so, one should not malign barley in general, where the Talmud only spoke about barley-flour causing this.

So I don't know that I would rely on this book to accurately and completely tell me about what Chazal said, or to learn practical information from Chazal about the medicinal properties of these foodstuffs. As a coffee-table book, an/or as a place to start (especially if they do have footnotes), it looks nice.

However, it looks like this book might be intended to offer practical medical advice, based on outdated medicine from the time of the Rambam an earlier. Thus:

Nature's Wealth is a unique treasure, discussing Health and Healing plants, based on the teachings of the Rambam! This book is recommended by Professors of Science and Medicine. It features many preventions of illnesses and their care. Compiled by: Rabbi Moshe Cohen Shaouli and Rabbi Yaakov Fisher.

If it is indeed practical advice, I would warn people to stay away. We are commanded by the Torah (Devarim 4:15) "And you shall guard yourselves very well...". Following medical advice from people using medieval medicine, and who even seem to misunderstand / accidentally misrepresent some basic sources in the Torah and Chazal, would not be keeping with that Biblical commandment, IMHO.

Unlocking the Torah Text: Vayikra -- A Review

A few weeks back I received a review copy of Unlocking the Torah Text: Vayikra, by Rabbi Shmuel Goldin. (Available for purchase here.) And I have held off a review until I finished the book, which was a few weeks ago. You can read all about the author here. An excerpt of his bio:

Rabbi Shmuel Goldin has served as spiritual leader of Congregation Ahavath Torah in Englewood, New Jersey, since 1984. With a membership of over 700 families, Ahavath Torah is the largest orthodox synagogue in Northern New Jersey.

He is an instructor of Bible and Philosophy at the Isaac Breuer College and the James Striar School of Yeshiva University; the founding director of and lecturer at The Eve Flechner Torah Institute-an institute of Torah study located in the Bergen County community; and has served on the faculty of numerous other institutes. Rabbi Goldin is past President of Rabbinic Alumni of Yeshiva University, past President of the Rabbinical Council of Bergen County and former Chairman of its Kashruth Committee. He is a member of other various prominent Jewish organizations and is the founder and chairman of Shvil Hazahav...

Here is a photo of him, to the left. On to my review...

It is difficult to write an engaging book on sefer Vayikra, and the author discusses this in the introduction. To put it in my own words and thoughts, and to expand on the idea quite a bit, Vayikra is very detail-oriented. And these details repeat over and over, with slight variations. And while kohanim in the Beit Hamikdash may have readily understood and applied these laws, such that practical experience would open up the sefer and render it both useful and easily understood, we do not have a Beit Hamikdash or Mishkan before us to make this entirely comprehensible. This repetition of now-arcane detail makes the text of Vayikra simultaneously dense and boring.

And that which we can partly understand, and have the will to consider, we have difficulty relating to. Living in the Western World, in the 21st century, can we really relate to korbanot? It is something we might grapple with. Why should Hashem want us to kill and tear up a poor defenseless animal, and burn its parts and fats on the mizbayach? Why should a non-corporeal, all-powerful God demand this of us? What are we to make of the strange rituals for the leper? There are answers, good ones, but many a modern reader still has difficulty relating to this, and understanding the deep meaning.

And even without all these difficulties, to put it plainly, narrative is usually much more interesting than law. And while one is relatively unconstrained in offering interpretation of narrative (though whether one may argue with midrashim is perhaps a good, modern debate), one is (usually) extremely constrained in interpreting the Torah's legal codes. The end result is that if an Orthodox author offers interpretation, it is a rehash of the midrash halacha and the gemara on these matters. And this material is already out there, and does not truly engage a typical modern reader. The types of derashot -- kelal ufrat, gezeira shava, miut achar miut, etc., might excite lawyers, but not the Jewish reader at large.

Different authors take different approaches to Vayikra. For example, midrash halacha will simply analyze the text. Rashi will present a consistent traditional interpretation, based on midrash halacha, but will also include a bit of homiletic material. Certain midrashim, which are usually narrative midrashim, may find the deep homiletic meanings inherent in the laws, or else tie in other Biblical incidents into the laws. Some meforshim may try to explain how the halacha is peshat, despite other possibilities, when fighting with Karaites. Some (e.g. Rashbam) may provide alternate interpretations of law codes, under the label of peshat, though of course one should not act on it. Some (e.g. Ibn Caspi) may simply side-step many of the tough and boring areas entirely, pointing out that for a good traditional interpretation, one may simply consult with Rashi. Some, such as myself, may focus on a tangential matter, such as matters of trup and masorah, and thus find material that is interesting to some. Yes, Vayikra is different, and an author must grapple with this.

Rabbi Goldin's goal appears to be to create an engaging text on Vayikra by sidestepping the discussions of arcane and intricate details, for the most part, and focusing instead on the deep questions raised by the text. These deep questions are precisely what would otherwise make the text difficult to relate to. How can a transcendent God demand physical korbanot? What, then, is the meaning of korbanot? Is it not unfair to exclude a disfigured person from serving as a kohen? How come there are different castes of Israelites -- regular Yisraelim, Leviim, and Kohanim? "Is there any rhyme or reason to the laws of kashrut"? What is the import of shogeg?

In all of these, he does not initially try to innovate. Rather, his goal is to present to the reader the classic opinions on these matters, in a clear and orderly fashion. Ibn Ezra and Chizkuni take this approach. Rambam and Abarbanel take this other approach. His presentation often involves some elaboration, developing the ideas further than they might exist explicitly in the text. And at the close of each chapter, he includes a section called "Points to Ponder", which is a further developed idea, and a take-away message / thought, often with an illustrative story.

All in all, very nice. And I think he accomplished his goal, which was to present an array of opinions within traditional Jewish thought on a number of "difficult" topics, and to tie these in to the parashat hashavua such that it provides an engaging and entertaining commentary on each week's Torah portion.

That was the "good". Now, for the slight critique.

I usually learn parashat hashavua with Junior, my five-year-old. And when I sat down one Shabbos morning to read this book, Junior requested that I learn it with him, and read it aloud to him. I wasn't sure it was age-appropriate, but I agreed. We began with the portion of Vayikra, and the question of why Hashem demands korbanot. Junior raised a number of objections, among them wondering just what the difficulty was. I explained, if Hashem is non-physical, and All-Powerful, then why does He need korbanot? Junior explained patiently that there is a difference between "want" and "need". Hashem does not require korbanot. He just desires korbanot! But why, I asked? Well, answered Junior, because he likes the sweet smell. It is a pasuk, that it is a reach nichoach isheh laHashem.

Now, I will not deny that the question is a deep one: What is the purpose of korbanot? After all, many a Rishon grapples with this question. Rambam suggests it was a requirement because of a society which had yet to be weaned off idolatry. If this were not a difficult question, it would not have sparked such discussion throughout the ages.

But perhaps, where we are uncomfortable with Biblical theology, it is are own fault. The Torah will often come into conflict with modern culture, mores, ethics, and attitudes. In case of such a conflict, there are at least, and approximately, four possibilities.

(A) The Torah's morality and approach is the correct one, and we live in a krum, corrupt society. (Feminism? Feh!)
(B) Our modern approach is the correct one, and that the Torah differs betrays a fault in the Torah. (How can a Divine Torah not be feminist? The Torah must be not of Divine origin! How can a Divine Torah not be Marxist, which is obviously the correct approach? It must not be from the Divine! How can a Divine Torah not be Democratic? Socialist? Fascist?)
(C) The Torah was one expression, and was appropriate given the existing ancient society. Dibra Torah kileshon benei Adam. And it is misguided to judge the Torah unfavorably by modern standards. (Given that the alternative was starvation for the poor, and given the protections afforded her and the possibility of emerging from pauper-status, the laws of amah ivriya are actually quite positive and progressive.)
(D) We must interpret the Torah in light of our modern knowledge and morals. Since we believe in Communism, we will show how the Torah really promotes Communist ideals. Or it is really a feminist tract. And so on and so forth.

All these difficult things Rabbi Goldin grapples with, and which several Rishonim and Acharonim preceded him in grappling with -- perhaps one should not grapple. And in adopting approach (D), one may really be perverting the Torah's ideals. (In one chapter, "A Decades-Old Bar Mitzvah Challenge", Rabbi Goldin admits that his discomfort with the disqualification of a blemished kohen is not shared by Rashi and other Rishonim, and considers why that might be.)  But the values of the next generation will not equal that of the present generation, just as the values of the present generation was not equal to that of the previous generation. We consider this progress, but perhaps it is simply difference. Perhaps Junior's approach is the better one.

Despite this difference of opinion, I should note that Junior enjoyed what I read him of the book. I week after reading the initial chapter, I posted a link to a Hirhurim mention of it a while back, which included a cover image, and Junior saw the thumbnail and excitedly said, "Hey, it is Unlocking the Torah Text! That must be the one one Sefer Bamidbar, or on Sefer Devarim!" (He likes the idea of complete sets.)

My second critique is a bit harsher, but I should stress up front that it is not directed at the author, but at his whole system of Biblical exegesis. My beef is not with Rabbi Goldin, but with Nechama Leibovitch. And asking me to review this book is then a bit like asking Bet Shammai to review Bet Hillel.

The problem goes to a deep issue, which is the very definition of pshat and drash. Rabbi Goldin indeed agrees that there is a distinction between them, and that making this distinction is critical. Thus, in his introduction, Rabbi Goldin writes:

Thus, he does make the distinction, and decries those who conflate these two approaches to text. As he writes, "when we ignore the pshat and instead offer drash as the literal interpretation of the text -- we end up understanding neither of these interpretive realms. In our studies, therefore, we will make every attempt to distinguish between pshat and drash and to present each approach appropriately."

However, I emphatically disagree with his definitions of pshat and drash. As described in the excerpt above, pshat is the concrete, ("true") meaning of the text, together with deep analysis which reveals deep, unexpected meaning. Whereas, (following "many authorities") drash is never "meant to be taken literally, nor is it meant to be seen as an attempt to explain the factual meaning of a specific Torah passage.

My own approach to peshat and drash is somewhat different. There are not only two distinct approaches, but three or more. (I write his pshat and drash without using e for the shva na, while my own I write peshat and derash with an e

Derash -- is result of the application of a set of particular midrashic analytical methodologies to discover hidden meaning which is not apparent on simple, the surface level of the text. Thus, e.g., a gezeira shava, or a reinterpretation of a distant text, or understanding gam to be inclusive of something else. Also, it involves playing extreme attention to details and nuance, past where one usually pays attention. And it involves a sort of hyper-literalism, in which the literal meaning of a word is taken to its extreme, often ignoring context or usual patterns of speech in natural language.  The result of such derash might be something entirely believable to the modern reader, or perhaps not. But derash is discovered meaning, by applying midrashic methods.


Peshat, on the other hand, is the simple, consistent meaning of the text without application of these midrashic methods. I am extremely hesitant to use the word "literal", because while it is indeed the literal meaning, midrash is often more literal than peshat. For example, in terms of the "nefesh" that they (=Avraham and Sarah) "made" (asu) in Charan, on a peshat level it means something along the lines of acquiring many servants. But hyper-literally, one might assume that they "made" (rather than acquired) "souls". And this could involve creating golems via Sefer Yetzira; or it could involve converting people to monotheism, Avraham the men and Sarah the women. Which is peshat and which is derash? The peshat is often NOT the most literal interpretation, but a realization that dibra Torah kilshon bnei Adam and trying to find the interpretation that makes the least waves and the most sense in context.

Derush -- is interpreting the Biblical text in order to arrive at some homiletic lesson. Often, in this type of midrash, the texts are not prooftexts to the thesis, but rather pre-texts.

That is my set of definitions. Rabbi Goldin, or rather the general school to which he appears to subscribe, does not make these distinctions. If so, I believe that certain types of interpretations are assigned to the wrong categories. Namely, since pshat had been defined as things that are true and the result of close reading, then midrash aggadah we believe to be true, and derived from close reading is pshat! (I would label it derash.) Further, any aggadah which we do not believe to be true, we assume was meant allegorically (instead of sometimes saying that we differ with Chazal as to the plausibility of the matter), and so it is drash (=my derush). There is no middle ground of midrash which we would consider fantastic but was meant as historically true. It is either pshat or drash, where the latter = derush.

I often decry both approaches. The latter, about assuming every midrash we disagree with must be allegorical, I complained about, for example, in this post. But the former is also extremely problematic, because the end result is that one often conflates derash, or worse, derush, with peshat. An example of this, from Unlocking the Torah Text: Vayikra. This, from parashat Vayikra. Rabbi Shmuel Goldin writes:

Alas, his "question" is based on a close reading, and presents a deep meaning of the text -- perhaps something that is now "unlocked' -- and so he appears to believe that this is peshat. The pasuk states asher nasi yecheta, rather than ki nasi yecheta. That implies a certainty that he will sin. It is when a leader will sin, rather than if a leader will sin.


This need not be the peshat. Nor must it be intended as peshat rather than as derush. The first one to make this connection, that I know of, is Rabbi Moshe de Leon, in late 13th century. In Zohar (III, 23a) adds, vadai yecheta. He is followed in this idea by Rabbenu Bachya (d. 1340). And also, by Seforno (1475-1550). (However, perhaps it appears earlier, if Ibn Ezra and Chizkuni take steps to counter it.)


Now, this might well be derush, not even derash. Certainly, the point of the Torah text, on a peshat level, is to detail the korbanot a nasi must bring in the event of sinning. The idea that he will sin is meant to be commentary on human nature, and is entirely orthogonal to the main peshat point of the text. It strikes me as homiletic, and as pre-text rather than prooftext. So I would label it derash. (The difference between ki and asher is of no consequence; natural language varies, and a speaker can sometimes use one term and sometimes use a synonym.)


Yet this derasha is "famous", and it seems to be a deep insight that the Torah is trying to convey to us. Furthermore, pshat is literal, and there is surely a difference between the common word  If so, goes the school of thought, it must be peshat. And if famous pashtanim do not advance it, then we must explain why they do not do so.


Rashi writes as follows:

כב) אשר נשיא יחטא - לשון אשרי, אשרי הדור שהנשיא שלו נותן לב להביא כפרה על שגגתו, קל וחומר שמתחרט על זדונותיו:

Happy is the generation whose prince sets his heart to bring atonement upon his accidental sin, and (/for) all the more so, that he regrets his intentional sin. This is a citation of Horayot, daf 10, where it is the words of Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakai.


Why does Rashi not cite this derasha found in Zohar? Well, first demonstrate to me that Rashi knew the Zohar. Even if it was around in his time, there seems to be little evidence that Rashi was one of the yechidei sugulah who knew of it.


Furthermore, it is Rashi's general approach to cite midrashim to explain pesukim; this, although everyone considers him the pashtan, who only comes to give the peshuto shel mikra. And what Rashi cites here is most certainly derush, not derash.


So, the question amounts to why Rashi preferred a derush he knew to a derush he did not know, and might not have even existed in his time. Yet see how Rabbi Goldin summarized this:

"A number of commentators are unwilling to take this phrase at face value... The Ibn Ezra and the Chizkuni... 

There are scholars, however, who are willing to embrace the pshat {emphasis mine} of this phrase and the troubling philosophical message it conveys. This straightforward approach is mirrored in the comments of the Sforno"

But this is absolutely NOT peshat, and Rashi's non-citation of this should not be read as reluctance.

So too Ibn Ezra. Ibn Ezra writes:

[ד, כב]
אשר נשיא יחטא -הפוך.
וכן הוא אשר יחטא הנשיא והוא דבק באשר למעלה: ואם כל עדת ישראל כאילו אמר: ואם אשר יחטא הוא נשיא שבט או נשיא בית אב:

That is, asher means im. This may be motivated by the existence of the derasha, which Ibn Ezra is trying to oppose. Or, there may be more grammatical concerns at play. See Mechokekei Yehuda. Since nasi is a noun, it does not seem to make grammatical sense to say asher nasi. And so, it is hafuch, the equivalent of the reverse, and going on the verb, that which sins the nasi. And to show that this is the meaning, he takes a verse with parallel meaning, such that above was one situation, and this is another situation. Or some explanation of this sort. Ibn Ezra might not even be responding to the derasha as it appears in the Zohar, that asher conveys "when" as opposed to "if".

But even if Ibn Ezra is countering the derasha, this is not because he regards it as peshat, yet he is unwilling to embrace the peshat because of the uncomfortable philosophical message! Who says this is good peshat?! Over and over on parshablog, I have demonstrated how Ibn Ezra argues on midrashim, even rather famous midrashim, such as Arami Oved Avi, because he is interested in peshat and not derash. This heightened focus upon asher rather than ki strikes me as hyper-literal. And Ibn Ezra, when discussing the differences between the language of the first and second luchos (in his "short" commentary), writes at length that the meanings of words are comparable to the spirit, while the overt lexical form of the words are comparable to the spirit. Who cares whether one says Shamor and one says Zachor? The meaning is the same, and the enlightened scholars of language will focus on the neshama and not the guf. And so, he opposes many a derasha based on a slight divergence in word form. (Though this parasha, parashat Emor, is an exception, as I discuss in another post about karet vs. ibud.) If so, Ibn Ezra would not consider ki vs. asher to be a peshat-based concern, and so the question is no question. So too the hyper-literalism on the word asher. That is a midrashic concern. In context, of course the word means "if", and that is its spirit. For Ibn Ezra, then, the better peshat is what he presents. And it is not due to discomfort with the philosophical message that he rejects the peshat.

One would only think so if one has already wrongfully conflated the realms of peshat and derash and derush. Then one is bothered why an uber-pashtan like Ibn Ezra would not present the derush as the peshat.

What about Chizkuni? He writes:

It seems to me that his concern is grammatical, in terms of the order of the words, just like Ibn Ezra, and he follows in Ibn Ezra's recommendation of swapping about the words. He points us to Megillat Esther, and the verse 6:8:

ח  יָבִיאוּ לְבוּשׁ מַלְכוּת, אֲשֶׁר לָבַשׁ-בּוֹ הַמֶּלֶךְ; וְסוּס, אֲשֶׁר רָכַב עָלָיו הַמֶּלֶךְ, וַאֲשֶׁר נִתַּן כֶּתֶר מַלְכוּת, בְּרֹאשׁוֹ.

8 let royal apparel be brought which the king useth to wear, and the horse that the king rideth upon, and on whose head a crown royal is set;

where the meaning is not "that the royal crown is set on his head," but rather the reverse, "the crown that is set upon his head. This too, is the laws about the nasi who sins, the nasi asher yecheta.

Perhaps Chizkuni is motivated by "if" vs. "when", but it is harder to see this here. Rather, the focus may well be on dikduk, as well as setting up different parallel cases -- when all the congregation sins, where the kohen gadol sins, where the nasi sins.

But even if he is motivated by the "if" vs. "when" question, that does not mean that he disregards that interpretation because of discomfort with the philosophical repercussions. Nothing in his words indicates that. Rather, it could well be because he is functioning as a pashtan, and not a darshan, and the Zohar's explanation of the pasuk is solidly in the realm of derush.

Indeed, both Ibn Ezra and Chizkuni surely know the explanation of Rashi, who cited Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai! One could more readily ask why Ibn Ezra and Chizkuni did not give Rashi's explanation. And the answer is that Rashi's explanation is solidly derush. Well, the same goes for the explanation in the Zohar.

I will close this critique with a note that while I focused on just this short excerpt from the book, I could have similarly focused on many other sections, to similar effect. And this is because of this disagreement as to the definitions of peshat and derash. Too much in the book strikes me as derash and derush, but seems presented as if it is peshat.

This is enough for a critique. I hope I have not been too harsh. As Hirhurim posted recently, this is how not to write a review:



Despite this strong methodological disagreement with the author about peshat and derash, overall, it is a worthy book. Clearly a lot of time, effort, and thought went into its construction, and as I wrote earlier, it has its many merits, and it is a welcome addition to my bookshelf.

You can purchase the sefer via the link below:

Introducing Absolut Genesis, 2009 Edition

From the same anonymous folks who brought you the Absolut Haggadah, here is Absolut Genesis.

Written in an engaging style and punctuated with relevant jokes and comics, this 27-page book discusses the first three perakim of Sefer Bereishis, which is the Biblical cosmogony, the creation of man, and the events in the Garden of Eden. They analyze text, form, and structure and come out with a nice running perspective on the Biblical text. And it is free.

It is the results of the discussions of an anonymous chaburah which has met over the past few years, focused on learning peshat in sefer Bereishit. I know they have discussed a whole lot more than the first three perakim -- they have gotten at the least past all the events involving Yitzchak -- and so I don't know what their long term plans are.

I agree with a lot of the ideas in here, though some of it is too philosophical for my own personal preferences. But I can analyze and post more about things I disagree with. So don't take my disagreement here as a condemnation of the entire work. Here is an excerpt from the book, to give you a taste:

The second account of creation can be divided into two sections of 22 verses each. The first section 2:4-25 speaks of God’s creation of man, the physical characteristics of the garden and the command. The second section 2:25-3:2 1 speaks of man’s choices in the garden. Both sections share the central verse which serves as both the end of the story of creation and the beginning of human history. This second section starts with “And Adam and his wife were naked” and ends with “and God made garments of skin and clothed them.” What is so significant about nakedness and clothing? We are also told in 3:7 that Adam and his wife already sewed clothing for themselves and yet the clothed Adam, when explaining why he is hiding says (3:10) “I was afraid because I was naked.”

Later, in verse 3:21, we find out that God also makes leather garments for the couple.

Why two sets of clothing? Was the woman reading Vogue?

The two sets tell us that man and woman destroyed two relationships when they violated God’s command; two trusts were broken. The first set of clothing is because now man and woman have placed distance between them. They must critically evaluate the other’s words and deeds. They are no longer one flesh, one organism. Man blames his wife for his problems, (what else is new), and now sees his wife as the “other.” Man must find a name for his wife since she is no longer an extension of his being.

The second relationship that was broken was the one between man and God. Before they ate from the forbidden tree, man had nothing to hide. Now man now is ashamed and must cover up his guilt and hide his breach of trust. Man is not hiding from God because he is physically naked. At this point he already has clothing. Rather, man is hiding from God because he has ruined his relationship with his creator. God provides man with a second set of clothing to allow their relationship to continue.

Whether I agree with the particular conclusions, I do think that the different (and sometimes somewhat conflicting) accounts do serve two different purposes, having to do with the relationship of God to the universe, God to man, man to God, and man to universe. And that the dual Creation in the first and second perek serve different purposes.

Still, though there are two incidents of man getting clothing, I don't think that these are necessarily complementary, or that they serve parallel roles ("two trusts were broken" -- between man and man, and between man and God).

Rather, even in terms of the world of the narrative, both sets of clothing are needed. The clothing within the garden is indicative of man's loss of innocent. Originally there were naked (ערום) and did not know it, unlike the crafty (ערום) snake who would know this. After eating from the tree of Knowledge, they knew it, and so had to modify their behavior. They made lousy clothing out of fig-leaves -- loincloths. But this is indicative of their change from innocence to maturity.

Yet they hid themselves from Hashem's presence, because they are ashamed of what they did, or else because they are naked. And Adam gives either the excuse or the reason for his hiding, that he is naked. This might well be a contradiction of the likes of Bereishit I and Bereishit II, as the Absolut Genesis hints at (We are also told in 3:7 that Adam and his wife already sewed clothing for themselves and yet the clothed Adam, when explaining why he is hiding says (3:10) “I was afraid because I was naked”) but might do better to make more explicit.

It is understandable that mere girdles or loincloths are not necessarily sufficient for standing before the Melech Malchei Hamelachim, Hakadosh Baruch Hu! Indeed, over Simchas Torah I was reading through Orach Chaim siman 91, and about how besides not having the heart see the erva, there may well be addition requirements for Shemoneh Esrei of more clothing because of הכין לקראת אלהיך ישראל. (I have a post planned.)

While their leaf-clothing is indicative of their loss of innocence, Hashem's giving them this clothing may reflect Hashem's changed attitude towards them, and His recognition of their changed status.

More than that, within the story, leaf-girdles may be sufficient for the pleasant climate in the Garden of Eden, but Hashem is about to drive them out of there. If so, clothing made of animal skin would be much better suited for the colder climate.

And allegorically, this is placed just before He drives them out of Gan Eden, and right after He curses them. One shouldn't think that Hashem has entirely distanced himself from man. This doesn't show man's distance from God; it shows man's closeness to God! Despite driving him out, Hashem still cares for Adam and Chava. (Indeed, see Rabbi Meir's sefer Torah where עור was spelled with an aleph.)

Taking a quasi-Documentary Hypothesis approach here, just like we have Bereishit I and Bereishit II (and Adam I and Adam II from Lonely Man of Faith), we have two interwoven stories. (We see these often as the macro-level and micro-level of Hashem's interaction with the world.) And the "contradiction" is not just that two sets of clothing are given, but two names are given to Chava. True, one is the name of her kind and the other is a personal name, but still, two names are assigned.

If we try to separate out the threads of the two stories, we might conclude that Hashem's giving them clothes has nothing to do with the so-called Fall of Man. That is, if I were to divide the stories, I might divide it as such:

The "sin" eating from the Etz HaDaas. From perek 2:

טז וַיְצַו יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים, עַל-הָאָדָם לֵאמֹר: מִכֹּל עֵץ-הַגָּן, אָכֹל תֹּאכֵל.	16 And the LORD God commanded the man, saying: 'Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat;
יז וּמֵעֵץ, הַדַּעַת טוֹב וָרָע--לֹא תֹאכַל, מִמֶּנּוּ: כִּי, בְּיוֹם אֲכָלְךָ מִמֶּנּוּ--מוֹת תָּמוּת.	17 but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it; for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die.'

Then, the creation of woman, and the Naming of all the Animals in one strand. From perek 2:

יח וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים, לֹא-טוֹב הֱיוֹת הָאָדָם לְבַדּוֹ; אֶעֱשֶׂה-לּוֹ עֵזֶר, כְּנֶגְדּוֹ.	18 And the LORD God said: 'It is not good that the man should be alone; I will make him a help meet for him.'
יט וַיִּצֶר יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים מִן-הָאֲדָמָה, כָּל-חַיַּת הַשָּׂדֶה וְאֵת כָּל-עוֹף הַשָּׁמַיִם, וַיָּבֵא אֶל-הָאָדָם, לִרְאוֹת מַה-יִּקְרָא-לוֹ; וְכֹל אֲשֶׁר יִקְרָא-לוֹ הָאָדָם נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה, הוּא שְׁמוֹ.	19 And out of the ground the LORD God formed every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air; and brought them unto the man to see what he would call them; and whatsoever the man would call every living creature, that was to be the name thereof.
כ וַיִּקְרָא הָאָדָם שֵׁמוֹת, לְכָל-הַבְּהֵמָה וּלְעוֹף הַשָּׁמַיִם, וּלְכֹל, חַיַּת הַשָּׂדֶה; וּלְאָדָם, לֹא-מָצָא עֵזֶר כְּנֶגְדּוֹ.	20 And the man gave names to all cattle, and to the fowl of the air, and to every beast of the field; but for Adam there was not found a help meet for him.
כא וַיַּפֵּל יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים תַּרְדֵּמָה עַל-הָאָדָם, וַיִּישָׁן; וַיִּקַּח, אַחַת מִצַּלְעֹתָיו, וַיִּסְגֹּר בָּשָׂר, תַּחְתֶּנָּה.	21 And the LORD God caused a deep sleep to fall upon the man, and he slept; and He took one of his ribs, and closed up the place with flesh instead thereof.
כב וַיִּבֶן יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים אֶת-הַצֵּלָע אֲשֶׁר-לָקַח מִן-הָאָדָם, לְאִשָּׁה; וַיְבִאֶהָ, אֶל-הָאָדָם.	22 And the rib, which the LORD God had taken from the man, made He a woman, and brought her unto the man.
כג וַיֹּאמֶר, הָאָדָם, זֹאת הַפַּעַם עֶצֶם מֵעֲצָמַי, וּבָשָׂר מִבְּשָׂרִי; לְזֹאת יִקָּרֵא אִשָּׁה, כִּי מֵאִישׁ לֻקְחָה-זֹּאת.	23 And the man said: 'This is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called Woman, because she was taken out of Man.'
כד עַל-כֵּן, יַעֲזָב-אִישׁ, אֶת-אָבִיו, וְאֶת-אִמּוֹ; וְדָבַק בְּאִשְׁתּוֹ, וְהָיוּ לְבָשָׂר אֶחָד.	24 Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife, and they shall be one flesh.

Then, back to the first strand, the separate story of the "sin" of eating from the Etz HaDaat. Despite it being the very last pasuk of perek 2, I would say that it resumes the story:

כה וַיִּהְיוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם עֲרוּמִּים, הָאָדָם וְאִשְׁתּוֹ; וְלֹא, יִתְבֹּשָׁשׁוּ.

25 And they were both naked, the man and his wife, and were not ashamed.

This strand continues through their entire sin, and the curses, up until the naming of Chava:

כ וַיִּקְרָא הָאָדָם שֵׁם אִשְׁתּוֹ, חַוָּה: כִּי הִוא הָיְתָה, אֵם כָּל-חָי.

20 And the man called his wife's name Eve; because she was the mother of all living.

Then, back to the other strand, of Hashem having created Adam and Chava, and their being of one flesh. Hashem continues to take care of them:

כא וַיַּעַשׂ יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים לְאָדָם וּלְאִשְׁתּוֹ, כָּתְנוֹת עוֹר--וַיַּלְבִּשֵׁם. {פ}

21 And the LORD God made for Adam and for his wife garments of skins, and clothed them. {P}

Then, back to the other strand, of them being driven out of the garden of Eden.

These stories do not necessarily contradict one another, but they serve entirely different purposes. And they would be put together based on the requirements of maintaining a chronological order.

(Of course, this is my own division, based on themes that appear to me.)

But if so, then Hashem clothed them with clothes made of animal skins, right after Adam has shown mastery of the animals by giving them names, and recognizing that Woman is like him, and distinct from the animals. And if so, it has nothing whatsoever to do with the fall of man due to eating from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil. Rather, it has everything to do with Hashem's providing for mankind, and Hashem's recognition of man as a distinct entity from the animals -- indeed, He shows how man is to use animals for his own needs.

And if so, focus on the giving of both sets of clothing as a reaction to Adam and Chava's sin, and thus on creating distances, might not be the correct approach here.

Of course, these are my own theories, and their theories are nice and have merit as well. And the rest of the book is nice as well.

Anyhow, check out the e-book, and give them feedback, either in the comment section here, or by emailing them at AbsolutHaggadah@gmail.com.