What in the world does נַחְשִׁרְכָן mean?

Summary: in all of its variants.

Post: In parashat Toledot, the following pasuk and Targum (cia mechon-mamre).

כה,כז וַיִּגְדְּלוּ, הַנְּעָרִים, וַיְהִי עֵשָׂו אִישׁ יֹדֵעַ צַיִד, אִישׁ שָׂדֶה; וְיַעֲקֹב אִישׁ תָּם, יֹשֵׁב אֹהָלִים.

וּרְבִיאוּ, עוּלֵימַיָּא, וַהֲוָה עֵשָׂו גְּבַר נְחַשׁ יִרְכָן, גְּבַר נָפֵיק חֲקַל; וְיַעֲקוֹב גְּבַר שְׁלִים, מְשַׁמֵּישׁ בֵּית אֻלְפָנָא.

Note that יֹדֵעַ צַיִד is rendered נְחַשׁ יִרְכָן.

In our Mikraos Gedolos, it as rendered as a single word: נַחְשִׁרְכָן.

At Temanim.org, they render it just as mechon mamre does -- as might be expected. But they include the following note:

The Rashba writes in a teshuva, siman 164:

So do we give the Targum: גְּבַר נַח שַׁדְכָן, from the language of כשדכא which they say in Yesh Nochalin [the 8th perek of Bava Basra]. And its meaning is an idle man who has no work, but rather like one of the princes, where they rest [נחים; thus the נַח] and engage in hunt for enjoyment. And [similarly, in sefer Shofetim perek 3, 5 and 8] ותשקוט הארץ, 'and the land was quiet', ושדוכת ארעא. And there are of the gedolim who are gores שרכא with a ר [rather than a ד] and they give a Targum for ותשקוט as ושרוכת, and so too יֹדֵעַ צַיִד as נַח שִׁירְכָן.

End quote.

See Bava Batra 139a for שדכא for 'one at ease', 'retired from business'. This strikes me as strange, though, because while Esav might well have been at ease and therefore hunting for sport, nothing within the Targum explicitly targets the words יֹדֵעַ צַיִד. Yes, man of leisure, but therefore, it should go on, sporting for pleasure. At least Targum Yonasan continues with  למיצוד עופן וחיוון, 'a נַחְשִׁרְכָן to hunt birds and beasts'. Furthermore, this is a bit too midrashic for Onkelos, to diverge so drastically from the literal meaning for little cause. Unless he means that this is a secondary meaning developed from this original, primary meaning of the word.

We can see this Teshuvat HaRashba inside here:

I spot two interesting things here. First, those Gedolim are גדולים נוחי נפש. Second, the Rashba responds with his girsa and explanation in response to a different girsa and explanation forwarded to him by his questioner. And he writes:

You asked further how we translate (Bereishit 25) אִישׁ יֹדֵעַ צַיִד, and you said that you heard in it a לשון {rendering} and they explained it to you. And I say that that language and that which they explained to you, we have never ever heard of it, and they are things which are not appropriate.

This makes me wonder just what this other girsa was, and what the explanation was, that the questioner had.

Here is what Shadal has to say in Ohev Ger:

אִישׁ יֹדֵעַ צַיִד -- in all the seforim [Shadal looked at], נַחְשִׁירְכָן with a ר, and according to the words of the Metargeman [=Rabbi Eliyahu Bachur], it is a complete error, and the girsa is with a ד. And I have not find a meaning to either this one or that one. And Shmuel Leclerc says that perhaps the girsa is נחשירבן with a ב [rather than a כ], and it would be a Persian word, for he says that in the Persian language, they call a hunter כגירואן, and the fricative ghimel by them is close to a shin in pronunciation, and it is also the same by them to terminate some of their nouns with a ואן or with a בן. And blessed be he who knows the truth!

Dr. Marcus Jastrow has perhaps the same way, or perhaps another way, at arriving at the desired meaning of hunter, also from Persian:

He refers to Theodor Nöldeke's Mandaean Grammar, or Mandische Grammatik, page 63, for this. It is available at Amazon (see sidebar), or perhaps at your local library, so if you want to check it out and let me know, that would be great.

He refers us to Bereishit Rabba parasha 63 and Tanchuma Toledot 8, presumably to justify the shrewdness of Esav, in capturing people with his speech ("Who were your accomplices

One last point. I still wonder at the girsa and explanation of the Rashba's questioner. I suspect that the girsa might be that found in Teimani manuscripts. The theory would be that some scribe did not know what to make of the strange word נַחְשִׁירְכָן, as a single word, and instead of separating it into נַח שִׁירְכָן, as in the Rashba's girsa, they separated into נְחַשׁ יִרְכָן. As for inappropriate interpretations, nechash can mean diviner/whisperer/enchanter, and yarchan is the feminine plural of thigh. If so, Esav can be a different sort of hunter. And we can compare with one of the three sins attributed to Esav as he came in from the field.

Avraham did not consume pas akum or stam yeinam, redux

A while back, in 2006, I considered a dvar Torah that grappled with how Avraham could have eaten pas akum and stam yeinam from the hands of Malkitzedek, and dismissed this sort of concern.

Now I see that this idea was already put forth, in a slightly different form, in Or HaChaim. He considers the question of the interjection of Malkitzedek between the King of Sodom coming out and the relating of his words to Avraham. He gives an answer, about the difference between the conduct good and bad people. (See the first paragraph in the Hebrew below.) Then, he writes (second paragraph in the Hebrew):

"Furthermore this is desired based on what Chazal said, that Avraham Avinu kept the entire Torah, even eruvei tavshilin which was a rabbinic ordinance. And therefore the Scriptures informed us that Avraham was an honored and great prince in everyone's eyes; and when the king of Sodom went out to him, naturally he would have greeted him with a present of bread for him his servants, and his warriors. And since Avraham kept away from food -- from the bread, because of pas akum, and from the wine because of stam yeinam, therefore, the king of Sodom he was clever and endeavored to make the gift of food via a trustworthy person, who was Shem [=Malkitzedek]. And from the hand of Shem to the hand of Avraham. And the Scriptures are informing us of a novelty, that even bread and wine, which was only Rabbinic, Avraham was insistent upon. And certainly, the other matters which have a worry of a Biblical prohibition."

An interesting approach, though one I disagree with. Still, even within this disagreement, there is a slight difference in attitude between this dvar and the previous one -- between insisting that Avraham could not have done X because it goes against a derabbanan, and then finding a solution; and noting a textual irregularity and answering it as another instance or proof of Avraham keeping even derabbanans.

I don't think that, historically, Avraham kept all relevant Biblical commandments, let alone Rabbinic institutions. There are midrashim that assert that he did. It is possible that the authors of these midrashim believed this to be historically true, just like Or HaChaim and plenty of other people, rabbanim. It is also possible that the authors of these midrashim were speaking homiletically, and did not really believe that Avraham kept all the mitzvos. As such, they would dismiss as irrelevant instances of Avraham serving milk and meat, or Yaakov marrying two sisters, and so on.

There is a famous teshuva of the Rashba (1:94) that the Avos kept the Torah. But it is more nuanced that that, I think. Let us examine the words of the Rashba, at the end of that teshuva:

"And in terms of what they [, Chazal,] said, that Yaakov kept the 613 commandments, and that this is hinted in the words (Bereishit 32) עם לבן גרתי, and it is difficult to you how he kept them, when he was not yet commanded; and further, that Yaakov married two sisters.


Know that they, za'l, said that Avraham kept even the eruvei techumin as is written (Bereishit 27) וישמר משמרתי מצותי חקתי ותורותי. And do not be astonished, for you have already been awakened to know that there is not, in all the details of the commandments, a commandment which does not hint to matters of chochma, such that the chochma should come {?} so that the shefeilim should be found in actions, and in the hints that they hint to the chochma, so that it comes out that the chochma compels the action and the inaction. And the action and inaction inform what is hinted to them from the chochma.


And the patriarchs reached, with their great wisdom, to these fundamentals, just as Chazal said regarding Avraham that his two kidneys expressed to him chochma like two teachers. And so too all the patriarchs, such that Yehuda, who received from his fathers, kept the commandment of yibbum, even though he was not yet commanded upon it, and he commanded it to his son in that language itself that the Torah commands it, and this is via the aspect I have spoken.


And regarding that which Yaakov married two sisters, know that the Torah stands on three pillars:

1. time
2. place
3. vessels

The time, that not all days are forbidden in labor as on Shabbat and Yom Tov. And one is not prohibited in chametz like on Pesach. And one is not obligated in Succah and lulav like on Succot.


And the place, that not every place is obligated in terumah and maaser, and is prohibited in untithed foods, as in the land of Israel. And one is not obligated in sacrifices as in the Bet HaMikdash.


And vessels, that not with every possible item can one fulfill, in exchange for the lulav and etrog, and not every thing can one offer, like cattle and sheep, turtledoves and doves, and not everyone is fit to offer like a kohen. And I am not able to explain further, and one who contemplates the matter will find."

Now, just because the Rashba endorses the idea -- or R' Eliyahu Mizrachi, or Gur Aryeh -- do we need to agree. Or even find it (or a simplified version of it) convincing, or non-silly.

But note that it is not, according to the Rashba, a simple anachronism. Since the mitzvos in the Torah are rooted in spiritual fundamentals, by spiritual knowledge, one could recreate or intuit the details of the mitzvos. And he seems to be saying that not everything will be applicable to every time, place, or situation. He is dealing in general, but mentions the particular of Yaakov marrying two wives, and this is reminiscent of Ramban's distinguishing keeping the Torah based on place.

One could ask: How could Avraham or Yaakov have descended to Egypt, when it is an issur of traveling to Egypt? One could say that it was a prohibition of returning to Egypt. Or rather, that the time for this issur had not yet set in.

It is more than that. Before mattan Torah, in this different place, time, and available vessels, the spiritual principles could yield different appropriate actions. In terms of mitzvos, obviously it was crystalized in its specific form, but beforehand, not so. And so you won't find an exact match to every single commandment, Biblical and Rabbinic.

If so, I would expect that even Rashba would not be so bothered by every single "problem" that bothered later meforshim, ad hayom hazeh, in trying to put the square peg of the patriarchal narrative into the round hole of Rabbinic Judaism.

Thus, I don't believe that Rashba would have had to find a kvetch to account for how Avraham could have married Hagar (as I've seen in others). For Hagar, recall, was a maidservant to Sarah. And she stayed a maidservant, which was why she could revert to Sarah's control later. And one can only give a maidservant to a manservant, whether an eved kenaani or an eved ivri. (Such as saying that Sarah was a prophet and he was following her as a horaas shaah.) I would guess that he would likely find an "out" based on his three conditions, rather than figuring out a specific halachic way that it would have worked out, and advancing that as peshat.

Chizkuni on Rashi, and "You are not *able* to eat"

In parshat Re'ei, a commandment that we must eat certain foods only in Yerushalayim. Devarim 12:17:

יז לֹא-תוּכַל לֶאֱכֹל בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ, מַעְשַׂר דְּגָנְךָ וְתִירֹשְׁךָ וְיִצְהָרֶךָ, וּבְכֹרֹת בְּקָרְךָ, וְצֹאנֶךָ; וְכָל-נְדָרֶיךָ אֲשֶׁר תִּדֹּר, וְנִדְבֹתֶיךָ וּתְרוּמַת יָדֶךָ.

17 Thou mayest not eat within thy gates the tithe of thy corn, or of thy wine, or of thine oil, or the firstlings of thy herd or of thy flock, nor any of thy vows which thou vowest, nor thy freewill-offerings, nor the offering of thy hand;

Upon this, Rashi writes:

You may not eat within your cities the tithe of your grain]:Scripture comes to attach a negative commandment to this matter [i.e., eating the firstborn, tithes, etc., outside the walls of Jerusalem, in addition to the positive command (stated in verse 6)]. You may not [eat]: [Heb. לֹא תוּכַל lit., “you cannot eat.”] Rabbi Joshua the son of Korchah said: You are able, but you are not permitted [to do so]. Similar to this, in the verse “As to the Jebusites, the inhabitants of Jerusalem, the children of Judah could not drive them out” (Josh. 15:63), they were [physically] able to do so but they were not so permitted, since Abraham had made a [non-aggression] treaty with them when he bought the cave of Machpelah from them. [In fact,] they were not Jebusites [of the Jebusite nation] but Hittites. They were, however, called Jebusites after the city, named Jebus. So it is explained in Pirkei d’Rabbi Eliezer (chapter 36). And this is what is stated [when David was about to drive out the Jebusites. They said to him], “Unless you take away the blind and the lame [you shall not come in here]” (II Sam. 5:6), [referring to] the images [that stood at the gates] upon which the oath [that Abraham had taken regarding the Jebusites] was written.		לא תוכל: בא הכתוב ליתן לא תעשה על הדבר. רבי יהושע בן קרחה אומר יכול אתה, אבל אינך רשאי, כיוצא בו (יהושע טו, סג) ואת היבוסי יושבי ירושלים לא יכלו בני יהודה להורישם, יכולים היו, אלא שאינן רשאין, לפי שכרת להם אברהם ברית כשלקח מהם מערת המכפלה. ולא יבוסים היו אלא חתיים היו, אלא על שם העיר ששמה יבוס [נקראים יבוסים]. כך מפורש בפרקי דרבי אליעזר. והוא שנאמר (שמואל ב' ה, ו) כי אם הסירך העורים והפסחים, צלמים שכתבו עליהם את השבועה:

Chizkuni points out a contradiction in Rashi. If we look in II Shmuel 5:6, Rashi says that the Yevusites were descendants of Avimelech, rather than the descendants of the Chitti with whom he made a treaty upon the purchase of the mearat hamachpela. Chizkuni explains that this is not in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha.

To expand on this just a bit, in sefer Yehoshua, we are told that they were not able to conquer the Yevusi. And later on, in II Melachim 5:6, King David conquers the Yevusi:

ו וַיֵּלֶךְ הַמֶּלֶךְ וַאֲנָשָׁיו יְרוּשָׁלִַם, אֶל-הַיְבֻסִי יוֹשֵׁב הָאָרֶץ; וַיֹּאמֶר לְדָוִד לֵאמֹר, לֹא-תָבוֹא הֵנָּה, כִּי אִם-הֱסִירְךָ הַעִוְרִים וְהַפִּסְחִים לֵאמֹר, לֹא-יָבוֹא דָוִד הֵנָּה.	6 And the king and his men went to Jerusalem against the Jebusites, the inhabitants of the land, who spoke unto David, saying: 'Except thou take away the blind and the lame, thou shalt not come in hither'; thinking: 'David cannot come in hither.'
ז וַיִּלְכֹּד דָּוִד, אֵת מְצֻדַת צִיּוֹן--הִיא, עִיר דָּוִד.	7 Nevertheless David took the stronghold of Zion; the same is the city of David.
ח וַיֹּאמֶר דָּוִד בַּיּוֹם הַהוּא, כָּל-מַכֵּה יְבֻסִי וְיִגַּע בַּצִּנּוֹר, וְאֶת-הַפִּסְחִים וְאֶת-הַעִוְרִים, שנאו (שְׂנוּאֵי) נֶפֶשׁ דָּוִד; עַל-כֵּן, יֹאמְרוּ, עִוֵּר וּפִסֵּחַ, לֹא יָבוֹא אֶל-הַבָּיִת.	8 And David said on that day: 'Whosoever smiteth the Jebusites, and getteth up to the gutter, and [taketh away] the lame and the blind, that are hated of David's soul--.' Wherefore they say: 'There are the blind and the lame; he cannot come into the house.'

On this, Rashi explains that:

to the Jebusites: Mezudath Zion is called Jebus. Now they (the inhabitants of the area) were of the seed of Abimelech, and they were in possession of two statues, one blind and the other lame, symbolizing Isaac (who was blind in his latter years. See Gen. 22:1) and Jacob (who turned lame as a result of his bout with the angel. See Gen. 32:26), and in their mouths was the oath that Abraham had sworn to Abimelech (Gen. 22:23). For this reason they (the Israelites who had conquered the land) did not drive them out, for when they took Jerusalem they failed to take the stronghold, as it is stated: “And the Jebusites, the inhabitants of Jerusalem, the people of Judah were unable, etc.” (Josh. 15:63) - it was learned: R. Joshua b. Levi said: They were indeed able but were not permitted.

and he spoke to David: the one who spoke

the blind and the lame: these were their idols.

This is thus a slightly different origin. And Chizkuni asserts that what Rashi says in sefer Shmuel, that they were descendants of Avimelech, rather than saying that it was the Chiti, is not like Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha.

I am not convinced that this is so. I don't see any reference to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha in Pirkei deRabbi Eliezer. And on the relevant pasuk in sefer Yehoshua, what appears to be a quote by Rashi from Sifrei seems to put both the inability and the descending from Avimelech in the mouth of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha:

the children of Judah could not drive them out: We learned in Sifrei : Rabbi Joshua the son of Korha says: They really could, but they were not permitted, because of the oath which Abraham had sworn to Abimelech. Now these Jebusites were not of the Jebusite nation, but the Tower of David which was in Jerusalem, was called Jebus, and the inhabitants of that section were of the Philistines. And when the children of Judah conquered Jerusalem, they did not drive out the inhabitants of that section.

So Rashi seems to see this as working well together with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha's position, whether Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha actually said it or not. I would note that the Sifrei does not actually mention why they were unable, at least in parshat Re'eh:

ל א תוכל לאכול בשעריך • ר׳ יהושע בן קרחת אומר יכול (אני) אבל איני רשאי •

כיוצא בו אתה אומר (יהושע טו) ואת היבוסי יושבי ירושלים לא יכלו להורישם

יכולים היו אבל אינן רשאים :

So it can work either way.

Regardless, if this oath was in place in the time of Yehoshua such that they were unable to conquer, why was David able to conquer? Was he not violating the oath here? Rashi does not give an answer.

But Chizkuni offers it. He notes that there was a restriction on the oath. In Bereishit 21:23:

כג וְעַתָּה, הִשָּׁבְעָה לִּי בֵאלֹהִים הֵנָּה, אִם-תִּשְׁקֹר לִי, וּלְנִינִי וּלְנֶכְדִּי; כַּחֶסֶד אֲשֶׁר-עָשִׂיתִי עִמְּךָ, תַּעֲשֶׂה עִמָּדִי, וְעִם-הָאָרֶץ, אֲשֶׁר-גַּרְתָּה בָּהּ.	23 Now therefore swear unto me here by God that thou wilt not deal falsely with me, nor with my son, nor with my son's son; but according to the kindness that I have done unto thee, thou shalt do unto me, and to the land wherein thou hast sojourned.'
כד וַיֹּאמֶר, אַבְרָהָם, אָנֹכִי, אִשָּׁבֵעַ.	24 And Abraham said: 'I will swear.'

{As as aside, I wonder if הִשָּׁבְעָה לִּי בֵאלֹהִים הֵנָּה in Bereishit was the basis for the idea of the oath inscribed on idols, of course paired with the lame and the blind local to sefer Shmuel.}

Chizkuni notes that the oath was to his son and his son's son. But by the time of David, Avimelech's grandchildren were no longer around. If so, why would the Yevusi think they were protected by the lame and the blind, that is the oath? The answer Chizkuni offers is that they were mistaken in their assumption.

I am not certain I agree with this assumption, for those generations should have passed already by the time of Yehoshua. This was made at the end of Avraham's life, and yet the oath was in place. Perhaps one can say that such an oath was conditional, and some condition was violated? Perhaps this is why David wanted to get rid of the statues of the blind and the lame?

Indeed, looking in sefer Shmuel, the assumption seems to be that so long as the statues are present (with the oaths), David is unable. And thus the intent to eliminate them. Citing Rashi there:

Whoever smites the Jebusites and reaches the tower: Whosoever kills the Jebusites and is first to capture the city.

and the lame: and he also smites the lame and the blind and those despised by the soul, etc.

wherefore they say: On (account of) that which they say,

The blind and the lame (etc.: So long as the blind and the lame be here… he shall not, etc.

You can read the Pirkei deRabbi Eliezer online here at HebrewBooks.org, starting at the last line of this page (199) and continuing on to the next pages. Indeed, looking at Pirkei deRabbi Eliezer, it is clear that David was also bound by this oath so long as those idols bearing Avraham's oath was there, and that was why he commanded to get rid of those idols.

So I will have to argue with Chizkuni on that count as well.

Of course, on a peshat level, the meaning of the "were not able" in sefer Yehoshua is that they were physically not able. And the lame and the blind in sefer Shmuel, I would guess, are indeed idols, and the Yevusi thought incorrectly that their deities would protect them. And David wished to uproot and destroy idolatry, and that is why he wanted them eliminated.

Where is the kohen's wife mentioned?

On a peshat level, I do not believe she is... but reasonable people disagree.

The beginning of Emor lists the relatives a kohen may become impure for. Why should we assume the kohen's wife is included? Besides on a human level, that we should expect this, for who else will bury her, there are two textual cues. In pasuk 3:

ג וְלַאֲחֹתוֹ הַבְּתוּלָה הַקְּרוֹבָה אֵלָיו, אֲשֶׁר לֹא-הָיְתָה לְאִישׁ--לָהּ, יִטַּמָּא.

3 and for his sister a virgin, that is near unto him, that hath had no husband, for her may he defile himself.

Specifying the unmarried, virgin sister, thus excluding the married sister, naturally the question arises of what is to happen to the woman who marries a husband, especially if she married a kohen, when "wife" is not listed in the pasuk earlier.

Secondly, in pasuk 4, the word baal is used, and this sometimes means husband.

ד לֹא יִטַּמָּא, בַּעַל בְּעַמָּיו--לְהֵחַלּוֹ.

4 He shall not defile himself, being a chief man among his people, to profane himself.

If so, the plain meaning could be read as that a husband should not make himself ritually impure to bury his wife. But then who buries her? Not that this reading is necessarily correct, or is an answer, but that these two pesukim bring up the topic in the mind of the reader.

One possibility is that a wife is indeed listed as one of the relatives to whom a kohen may make himself ritually impure in order to bury. Thus, Rashi on the opening pesukim:

א וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה אֶל-מֹשֶׁה, אֱמֹר אֶל-הַכֹּהֲנִים בְּנֵי אַהֲרֹן; וְאָמַרְתָּ אֲלֵהֶם, לְנֶפֶשׁ לֹא-יִטַּמָּא בְּעַמָּיו.	1 And the LORD said unto Moses: Speak unto the priests the sons of Aaron, and say unto them: There shall none defile himself for the dead among his people;
ב כִּי, אִם-לִשְׁאֵרוֹ, הַקָּרֹב, אֵלָיו: לְאִמּוֹ וּלְאָבִיו, וְלִבְנוֹ וּלְבִתּוֹ וּלְאָחִיו.	2 except for his kin, that is near unto him, for his mother, and for his father, and for his son, and for his daughter, and for his brother;

writes:

ב) כי אם לשארו -
אין שארו אלא אשתו:

except for his relative: [The expression שְׁאֵרוֹ] “his relative” refers only [here] to his wife. — [Torath Kohanim 21:5; Yev. . 22b]

This is derived from a midrash, something Rashi often does. This does not necessarily mean that he does not consider this peshat. But it might be on the level of midrash only.

I would claim that this is a reparsing of the pasuk. In the standard parse, כִּי אִם-לִשְׁאֵרוֹ הַקָּרֹב אֵלָיו is a general description of the relatives, the kelal, and the perat goes on to specify just who is considered close relatives. And so, the etnachta is a colon. In the new parse, she'eiro hakarov elav is one of the list. This is then his relative who is close(st) to him, which would be his wife; or his flesh who is a relative of him, which would be his wife.

Aharon ben Yosef the Karaite reacts against sheiar meaning wife, feeling that the lack of the vav in the word leImo which follows prevents this reading/parsing. I think such a reading is still possible, but I do not believe it is peshat.

What is the meaning of shei'ar? Literally, it means flesh, as in meat. Thus, in Tehillim 78:

כז וַיַּמְטֵר עֲלֵיהֶם כֶּעָפָר שְׁאֵר; וּכְחוֹל יַמִּים, עוֹף כָּנָף.

27 He caused flesh also to rain upon them as the dust, and winged fowl as the sand of the seas;

and in Michah 3:

א וָאֹמַר, שִׁמְעוּ-נָא רָאשֵׁי יַעֲקֹב, וּקְצִינֵי, בֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל: הֲלוֹא לָכֶם, לָדַעַת אֶת-הַמִּשְׁפָּט.	1 And I said: Hear, I pray you, ye heads of Jacob, and rulers of the house of Israel: is it not for you to know justice?
ב שֹׂנְאֵי טוֹב, וְאֹהֲבֵי רעה (רָע); גֹּזְלֵי עוֹרָם מֵעֲלֵיהֶם, וּשְׁאֵרָם מֵעַל עַצְמוֹתָם.	2 Who hate the good, and love the evil; who rob their skin from off them, and their flesh from off their bones;
ג וַאֲשֶׁר אָכְלוּ, שְׁאֵר עַמִּי, וְעוֹרָם מֵעֲלֵיהֶם הִפְשִׁיטוּ, וְאֶת-עַצְמֹתֵיהֶם פִּצֵּחוּ; וּפָרְשׂוּ כַּאֲשֶׁר בַּסִּיר, וּכְבָשָׂר בְּתוֹךְ קַלָּחַת.	3 Who also eat the flesh of my people, and flay their skin from off them, and break their bones; yea, they chop them in pieces, as that which is in the pot, and as flesh within the caldron.

by extension, it means relatives. Thus, in Vayikra 18, in various places in the perek:

ו אִישׁ אִישׁ אֶל-כָּל-שְׁאֵר בְּשָׂרוֹ, לֹא תִקְרְבוּ לְגַלּוֹת עֶרְוָה: אֲנִי, יְהוָה. {ס}

6 None of you shall approach to any that is near of kin to him, to uncover their nakedness. I am the LORD. {S}

"The meat of your flesh," and thus "relative."

Aharon ben Yosef the Karaite reacts against a prooftext from Mishlei 11:17:

יז גֹּמֵל נַפְשׁוֹ, אִישׁ חָסֶד; וְעֹכֵר שְׁאֵרוֹ, אַכְזָרִי.

17 The merciful man doeth good to his own soul; but he that is cruel troubleth his own flesh.

Apparently some read this she'eiro as referring to his wife. Aharon ben Yosef notes Biblical parallelism and the nafsho in the first portion, and thus it means gufo. I don't consider this conclusive proof, either. It is quite possible that the mashal is intending to refer to relatives, who should be to him like his own soul. And ishto kegufo. Regardless, while local to Vayikra it is a good midrashic derivation, I do not think it is a valid derivation on a peshat level.

What about pasuk 4? Does that refer to a husband, and rule out a husband burying his wife? Actually, Rashi uses this as a derivation of a husband indeed burying his wife, and takes pains to label this as peshat!

ד) לא יטמא בעל בעמיו להחלו -
לא יטמא לאשתו פסולה שהוא מחולל בה בעודה עמו.
וכן פשוטו של מקרא לא יטמא בעל בשארו בעוד שהוא בתוך עמיו, שיש לה קוברין, שאינה מת מצווה.
ובאיזה שאר אמרתי?
באותו שהוא להחלו, להתחלל הוא מכהונתו

[But] a husband shall not defile himself for [a wife who causes] his desecration, [while she is] among his people:He may not defile himself for his [deceased] wife who was unfit for him, and by whom he was desecrated [from his status,] while she was with him. — [Torath Kohanim 21:10; Yev.. 22b] And this is the simple meaning of the verse: “A husband shall not defile himself” for his relative [i.e., his wife], while she is still “among his people,” i.e., while she has [non- kohen] relatives who can attend to her burial, for she is therefore not under the category of an unattended deceased. And which relative [i.e., wife] are we dealing with here? [With a wife] “through whom he becomes desecrated (לְהֵחַלּוֹ),” i.e., [because she was unfit to marry him,] he subsequently becomes desecrated from his kehunah [and is unfit to perform the Holy Service].

Thus, it does refer to a husband, but with a twist in the parse, it is only amav leheichalo, a relative {=wife} through whom he has become desecrated by marrying. But any other wife, namely a regular wife, of course he would become impure in order to bury her.

As with the previous post on Emor, I believe that the truth is with Ramban. He writes:

ד): וטעם בעל בעמיו -
כמו מבעלי יהודה (ש"ב ו ב), בעלי גויים (ישעיה טז ח), הנכבדים בהם, או האדונים, מלשון בעליו אין עמו (שמות כב יג), בעל הבית (שם פסוק ז), כי הנכבדים יקראו אדונים. יאמר, לא יטמא נכבד בעמיו להחל את כבודו, יפרש הכתוב כי למעלת הכהן בעבור שהוא ראוי להיות הגדול והנכבד בעמיו יזהירנו שלא יחלל מעלתו בטומאת המתים.

ויתכוון הכתוב בזה, שלא יעלה על דעתנו לומר שאין האזהרה אלא בבואם אל אהל מועד לשרת בקדש. וכן בכל הפרשה יזהיר כי הכל למעלתם, את אביה היא מחללת (פסוק ט), ולא יחלל זרעו (פסוק טו).
וכן תרגומו של אונקלוס:

לא יסתאב רבא בעמיה לאחלותיה.

ובת"כ (אמור פרשה א טו):

נדרש בבעל באשתו, כמו שכתב רש"י.

Thus, it means one who is honored. And it refers to the general kohen, who is rauy to be nichbad. This is then a general summary on what was before. And so says Onkelos, as (correctly, IMHO) interpreted by Ramban. He politely described Rashi as citing the Torat Kohanim, which is correct, but Rashi does not mean this only as derash; rather, he explicitly labels it peshat.

Ibn Ezra gives two explanations, one that it is forbidding a husband becoming ritually impure for his wife, and the second, which nullifies the first, as Ramban above.

וטעם בעל בעמיו –
שלא יטמא הבעל באשתו וכאשר ראינו שהעתיקו רבותינו כי יטמא לאשתו ושמו לשארו, כדרך אסמכתא כאשר פירשתי במלת לעם נכרי.
ואמרו: כי פירוש בעל גדול שהעם ברשותו, כמו: בעליו אין עמו בטל הפירוש הראשון.

Rashbam writes as with the first peshat in Ibn Ezra, that it forbids every kohen husband on his wife, though he notes how Chazal distinguish:

לא יטמא בעל בעמיו -
שום בעל בעם הכהנים לא יטמא לאשתו.

להחלו -
שהרי מתחלל מכהונתו (ולפי דברי חכמים, לא מטמא לאשתו פסולה וחללה, אבל מטמא לאשתו כשירה.

Shadal has a different explanation of baal, and interprets Onkelos along those lines, and against Ramban's interpretation of Onkelos:

בעל בעמיו : הכהן הגדול ( אנקלוס ורנ"ה וייזלI

I don't like the sudden shift to just the kohen gadol, a topic which is only picked up once again in pasuk 10. Rather, I would read the pasuk in context, and suggest that this is a bridge, connecting the ritual impurity from above (for all kohanim) as profanation to the theme of profanation for all the other forbidden activities in the pesukim up to pasuk 9. Alternatively, perhaps this is no bridge but an introduction, with יִטַּמָּא being metaphorical, and encompassing the following activities. I prefer the former reading.

Those who say that the pesukim either do not include, or else explicitly exclude, a husband from burying his wife, who buries her? Well, if she is really a meis mitzvah, then anyone. But Shadal makes an interesting point, where the pasuk discusses the sister who is a virgin and unmarried:

ג אשר לא היתה לאיש : שאם בעולה , מסתמא יש לה בנים והם יעסקו בקבורתה , והתורה לא דיברה אלא בהווה , כי רוב הבעולות יש להן בנים ; ואם אין לה בנים , אולי ייטמא לה בעלה כמת מצווה או ישכור קוברים .

If she has had intercourse, she probably has children. If so, the children would bury her, since she falls under imo. Then, if she does not have children, perhaps we can consider he meis mitzvah, or else that he can hire people to bury her.

At the end of the day, I am not even fully convinced that the husband was really excluded, explicitly or implicitly. I would read

ג וְלַאֲחֹתוֹ הַבְּתוּלָה הַקְּרוֹבָה אֵלָיו, אֲשֶׁר לֹא-הָיְתָה לְאִישׁ--לָהּ, יִטַּמָּא.

3 and for his sister a virgin, that is near unto him, that hath had no husband, for her may he defile himself.

and say that firstly, this is only for the brother, but the mother and father would still of course bury her, assuming they are still alive; and further, that the reason the brother is excluded is that she has gone out of one reshus into another reshus, and so he does not bury her because she has a husband to bury her. And a wife is implicit. Of course the husband buries her. And she is not considered "relative", because she is not a blood-relative, and was anyway never under discussion.

Vayelech: And I Am Not Able

The second pasuk in Vayelech:

ב וַיֹּאמֶר אֲלֵהֶם, בֶּן-מֵאָה וְעֶשְׂרִים שָׁנָה אָנֹכִי הַיּוֹם--לֹא-אוּכַל עוֹד, לָצֵאת וְלָבוֹא; וַה' אָמַר אֵלַי, לֹא תַעֲבֹר אֶת-הַיַּרְדֵּן הַזֶּה.

2 And he said unto them: 'I am a hundred and twenty years old this day; I can no more go out and come in; and the LORD hath said unto me: Thou shalt not go over this Jordan.

The most simple implication of this is that because of his age, Moshe can not more go out and come in. There is an apparent contradiction between this declaration of Moshe and the declaration at the end of parshat Vezot Haberacha that at 120 years old, Moshe retained his vigor:

ז וּמֹשֶׁה, בֶּן-מֵאָה וְעֶשְׂרִים שָׁנָה--בְּמֹתוֹ; לֹא-כָהֲתָה עֵינוֹ, וְלֹא-נָס לֵחֹה.

7 And Moses was a hundred and twenty years old when he died: his eye was not dim, nor his natural force abated.

How to resolve this contradiction? Off the cuff, one could say that one of the two is slight exaggeration, either Moshe in describing his aches and pains, or the verse, in eulogizing Moshe. (Obviously the latter is more difficult because it attributes a "lie" to the Creator.) But there are other possibilities to resolving this, and this contradiction is the basis of an interesting conversation amongst the commentators.

Thus, Rashi opens things up by noting that in Vayelech, in the pasuk:

ב וַיֹּאמֶר אֲלֵהֶם, בֶּן-מֵאָה וְעֶשְׂרִים שָׁנָה אָנֹכִי הַיּוֹם--לֹא-אוּכַל עוֹד, לָצֵאת וְלָבוֹא; וַה' אָמַר אֵלַי, לֹא תַעֲבֹר אֶת-הַיַּרְדֵּן הַזֶּה.

2 And he said unto them: 'I am a hundred and twenty years old this day; I can no more go out and come in; and the LORD hath said unto me: Thou shalt not go over this Jordan.

we can bind the middle phrase, לֹא-אוּכַל עוֹד, לָצֵאת וְלָבוֹא, in one of two ways. If we connect it to "I am a hundred and twenty years old this day" then it is a contradiction, because it connotes lack of vigor. However, if we bind it to "and the LORD hath said unto me: Thou shalt not go over this Jordan," then that last phrase is an explanation of lo uchal, rather than an additional point. Then, Moshe cannot go out or come in, to take the Jews into Canaan, only because of Hashem's command. But of course he retained his vigor. Another explanation Rashi offers, on a more midrashic level, and based on Sotah 13b, is that the channels of transmission of Torah were closed to him, and that it what לָצֵאת וְלָבוֹא means. Indeed, we would have to look more closely at it, but this apparent contradiction may in part be a source for that midrash.

Ibn Ezra appears to maintain that it refers to strength, but a particular kind of strength:

לצאת ולבוא -
במלחמה.
והטעם: כי אילו לא הייתי מת עתה, אין בי יכולת להלחם ואין לכם צורך למי שיעזור אתכם, כי השם ישמיד הגוים גם יהושע, והעד מה שראיתם בעיניכם במלחמת סיחון ועוג

Thus, now is his time to pass away, for if he did not, he does not have the ability to battle. But meanwhile, Hashem can help them via Yehoshua, as they have already seen.

Perhaps his intent by making this about battle is that this is a different kind of vigor than the one described in Zos Habracha. And it certainly is plausible.

Seforno makes this about vigor (it would seem), but still manages to disconnect it from the 120 years old. He writes:

בֶּן מֵאָה וְעֶשְׂרִים שָׁנָה אָנכִי הַיּום. וְאֵין לְהִתְעַצֵּב עַל מִיתָתִי, שֶׁלּא הָיִיתִי רָאוּי לִחְיות עוד בַּטֶּבַע.

לא אוּכַל עוד לָצֵאת וְלָבא. וְגַם אִם הָיִיתִי חַי, לא הָיִיתִי יָכול לָצֵאת וְלָבא לִפְנֵיכֶם בְּזִקְנוּתִי.

וַה' אָמַר אֵלַי לא תַעֲבר. וְגַם אִם הָיִיתִי יָכול לָצֵאת וְלָבא, הִנֵּה "ה' אָמַר אֵלַי לא תַעֲבר", וְאִם כֵּן טוב לָכֶם שֶׁאָמוּת כְּדֵי שֶׁתּוּכְלוּ לַעֲבר

Thus, there are three points. He is 120, and thus his years have run out; even if he would live further, he would not be able לָצֵאת וְלָבא before them in his old age; and finally, even if he would have the ability, Hashem has decreed otherwise.

The addition of לפניכם might well connote "in battle." But also, perhaps we can read this as that up to this point, he did have the vigor. But going forwards, if he would continue to live, he would not.

(Aharon ben Yosef the Karaite (here, page 249, but you need a plugin to view these pages) has something similar to Seforno and Ibn Ezra. He says "if I would continue to live, I would not have the strength to go out in battle.)

Ramban writes:

ב): ויאמר אלהם בן מאה ועשרים שנה אנכי היום -
וזה לנחם אותם על ענינו, כלומר אני זקן ואין לכם עוד תועלת ממני, ועוד כי השם ציוני שלא אעבור שם. ואל תפחדו ואל תיראו, כי ה' יעבור עמכם לא יסלק שכינתו מכם בעבורי, ויהושע הוא העובר לפניכם במקומי. ואע"פ שמשה רבנו היה בתקפו ובבריאותו, כאשר העיד הכתוב (להלן לד ז): לא כהתה עינו ולא נס לחה, אמר להם כן לנחמם.

ורש"י כתב:

לא אוכל עוד לצאת ולבוא לפי שה' אמר אלי לא תעבור את הירדן.

ואינו נכון.

ועל דעת ר"א:

לצאת ולבוא למלחמה כי חלשו כוחותיו בזקנותו.

וגם זה איננו נכון.

ורבותינו אמרו (סוטה יג ב):

מלמד שנסתתמו ממנו מעיינות חכמה.

והיה זה במעשה נס, שלא ידאג לתת גדולה ליהושע בפניו:

Thus, besides giving his own interpretation, he lists the other interpretations of Rashi, Ibn Ezra, and declared them incorrect. He has a bit more respect for the midrash from Sotah 13b which Rashi cited -- he cites it separately, and says this was bemaaseh nes, but he does not declare it incorrect, as he did to Rashi and Ibn Ezra. The midrash, perhaps, sits on a different plane. It does not contradict his words, and can be said to be a midrash simulaneously true with whatever peshat one decides upon. Also, perhaps it would be disrespectful (heretical?) to declare to midrash incorrect.

At any rate, we see from this that Ibn Ezra indeed intended the vigor of battle to be a harmonization, and we see that Ramban dismisses it.

Instead, Ramban declares that it is indeed a contradiction, but this was Moshe comforting the people, and so he was not entirely truthful in the nechama. And as I suggested before, Ramban is not about to say the Narrator was lying in the eulogy. Ramban makes good sense on a peshat level -- understand the words within the context of their role, and in terms of the general theme of the verses.

Shadal does not really offer a resolution to the apparent contradiction. Though he does take sides in the Ibn Ezra / Ramban debate. Thus:

לא אוכל וגו ': לא אמר : להוציאכם ולהביאכם , או : לצאת לפניכם ולבא לפניכם , אלא : לצאת ולבוא סתם , והוא כמו וצאתך ובואך ידעתי ( מ"ב י"ט כ"ז וישעיה ל"ז כ"ח ), ענינו להתנועע ולפעול בזריזות .

Thus, the pasuk does not state לפניכם, as in the words used by Seforno. And it does not state "to take you out and to bring you in" (as a transitive, where Moshe is taking them), but rather plainly, to go in and out. He gives examples of this usage in Melachim Bet and Yeshaya.

In Melachim Bet:

כז וְשִׁבְתְּךָ וְצֵאתְךָ וּבֹאֲךָ, יָדָעְתִּי; וְאֵת, הִתְרַגֶּזְךָ אֵלָי.

27 But I know thy sitting down, and thy going out, and thy coming in, and thy raging against Me.

And in Yeshaya:

כח וְשִׁבְתְּךָ וְצֵאתְךָ וּבוֹאֲךָ, יָדָעְתִּי; וְאֵת, הִתְרַגֶּזְךָ אֵלָי.

28 But I know thy sitting down, and thy going out, and thy coming in, and thy raging against Me.

See these pesukim in context. Shadal therefore says that this does not mean going in and coming out in battle, but rather to move about and act with vigor.

This would reinstate the contradiction. But then we could apply some other method of resolution, such as that this is going forward, or Ramban that this is for the purpose of nechama.

The Authenticity of Kabbalah pt xvi

Shadal continues his Vikuach al Chochmat haKabbalah. (See previous segment.) The author suggests that the author of Masaot Binyamin mocks gilgul because it he did not know the truth that it was a secret traditional Jewish belief. The guest wonders why they would conceal it them, and also posits that it contradicts the words of Chazal in Talmud. Then, he notes that Rabbi Yedaya haPenini writes to the Rashba in defense of philosophy that it will help disprove gilgul. The text of the Vikuach follows:

The author: Have I not told you that the kabbalah in the early days was only transmitted in secret from the mouth of one kabbalist sage to the ear of an intelligent kabbalist?! Perforce, it is not farfetched that the belief in gilgul was a secret which was hidden from Rabbi Binyamin the author of the Masaot.

The guest: I do not see any reason to conceal the belief in gilgul from the common folk. And behold, in these generations it is well-known among the ignorant folk, and it does not harm their faith at all, but rather aids them in certain ways.

Do you think that the later kabbalists were wiser than their earlier teachers? That they {=the early kabbalists} thought that there was some danger to the common folk in promulgating this belief, and those these {in our generation} understand that its promulgation is good and helpful.

And still, my master, behold I see that this belief was also held back and hidden from our teachers, the sages of the Talmud.

Is it not so that in many places they said "the son of David {=Mashiach} will not come until all the souls in the body finish, and if it entered their minds that the souls which descend into the bodies which are born are not entirely new, how did they not understand that there is no substance in their statement at all? For if the souls transmigrate time after time from one body to the next body, when will the souls in the body end, and when will the son of David come? And is it not possible that the souls will transmigrate generation after generation, and the son of David will still not come in all the days of the earth's existence. And how did they encourage the nation to engage in being fruitful and multiplying in order to bring the redemption closer, for the reason that the son of David will not come until all the souls in the body finish? And is it not so that since most of those born are partial sinners and require gilgul to fix that which they perverted. It thus occurs that one who establishes a single son in fact delays the redemption and does not hurry it; for this son who is born will come to close the door for two new souls who were prepared to leave from the body, and are not able to leave, in order to make room for the sinful soul to return to dwell on earth until the end of its filth.

See how the belief in gilgul contradicts and casts down to earth the words of our teachers, the Sages of the Talmud.

The author: There is no doubt by those upright in their hearts that these matters are encompassed within those hidden things of the All-Merciful, extremely deep such that who will find them, and they are acquired via faith in the Sages and not in pilpul {casuistry} of students such as you and me, who have not even reached to be shepherds.

The guest: Another one I will please relate to you, that so new is this belief within the children of Israel, and so distant is it from being a traditional belief in our nation from days of old, that the magnificent advocate {? -- melitz} Rabbi Yedaya haPenini, the author of Bechinat Olam, when he came to advocate on behalf of philosophy in a written apologetic which he sent to the Rashba (since he {=the Rashba} placed under a ban anyone who learned that wisdom before he was 25 years old) was not ashamed nor afraid from mentioning before that Rav (who was a kabbalist) that one of the purposes of the wisdom of philosophy is that it contradicts and makes a lie the belief in gilgul. Take to me the sefer Teshuvot haRashba, and I will show you the language, for it is lengthy.