Is One An Apikores For Thinking That Kohelet 2:8 Does Not Refer To Demons?

As a quick followup to an earlier post on parshablog, how can one deny the reality of sheidim and still not be an apikores? After all, the gemara understands from Kohelet 2:8 that there were demons in play, which Shlomo haMelech apparently used to construct the Beis HaMikdash?

One possible answer is that that midrash was intended allegorically, or intended to teach moral lessons rather than literal history. Indeed, I have learned through that particular midrash, and I think this is more than plausible. Another possible answer is that whether Kohelet 2:8 refers to sheidim as demons is actually a matter of dispute among Chazal, between the sages in Bavel and the sages in Eretz Yisrael.

The pasuk in question reads:

ח כָּנַסְתִּי לִי גַּם-כֶּסֶף וְזָהָב, וּסְגֻלַּת מְלָכִים וְהַמְּדִינוֹת; עָשִׂיתִי לִי שָׁרִים וְשָׁרוֹת, וְתַעֲנֻגוֹת בְּנֵי הָאָדָם--שִׁדָּה וְשִׁדּוֹת.

8 I gathered me also silver and gold, and treasure such as kings and the provinces have as their own; I got me men-singers and women-singers, and the delights of the sons of men, women very many.

To cite Gittin 68a:

קוהלת ב) עשיתי לי שרים ושרות ותענוגות בני האדם שדה ושדות שרים ושרות אלו מיני זמר ותענוגות בני האדם אלו בריכות ומרחצאות
שדה ושדות הכא תרגימו שידה ושידתין
במערבא אמרי שידתא
אמר רבי יוחנן שלש מאות מיני שדים היו בשיחין ושידה עצמה איני יודע מה היא

Thus, there is a difference between the way they translated it in Bavel (hacha) and in Eretz Yisrael (be-Maarava). Looking at Rashi on the daf, in Bavel, it refers to male and female demons. While again according to Rashi on the daf, in Eretz Yisrael, they explained it as wagons, to convey women and sarim {?or perhaps sharim, given the context?}.

Now perhaps one can say one is on the level of pshat and the other on the level of drash, but the way it is being cast is as a machloket between targumim. (Rabbi Yochanan, of Eretz Yisrael, talks about demons, but does not know who Shidah is, strongly implying he understands this pasuk akin to his colleagues in Bavel.)

So how does Rashi decide to present it in his perush on Kohelet? He writes:

wagons and coaches Heb. שִּׁדָה וְשִּׁדוֹת beautiful coaches, covered wagons, and in the Gemara, [we find] a coach (שִּׁדָה) , a chest, and a closet.

Is he an apikores for reading the pasuk as referring to coaches rather than to demons? I would hope not!

How about Rabbi Yeshaya di Trani? How does he explain the pasuk? He writes that according to pshat, they are musical instruments. Thus:

ח. שרים ושרות: מיני זמר, שידה ושידות: גם אלו הן מיני כלי-זמר, לפי הפשט;

Since he labels it pshat, he is allowing room for the midrash to still stand in place.

And Rashbam? He says like Rashi, that it means a coach.

Seforno writes וכמו כן עשיתי מהם שדה לסגלת מלכים: ושדות. לזהב ולכסף. He is clearly not taking it as referring to demons. See inside.

The Targum refers to מרזבין דשדין מיא פשורי מרזבין דשדין מיא חמימי, thus pipes and not demons.

Alshich indeed explains it as referring to demons, but he is a darshan rather than a pashtan, and he, among some notable others, hold that one is not allowed to divert from derashot of Chazal on aggadah as well -- something up for dispute (see e.g. Shmuel haNagid for a contrary position).

So we need not say that the pasuk in Kohelet must be translated as meaning demons, thus reinforcing a particular aggada which we then insist on taking absolutely literally.

May One Buy An Lulav/Esrog From A Minor?

According to Reb Gutman Locks at Mystical Paths, if you do so, you did not own the lulav and esrog, and since there is a requirement of lachem, this is an impediment to fulfilling the mitzvah, at least the first day. And if you buy from a katan, well, he was able to acquire it in the first place and now is in possession of it, but he is not able to be makneh it.

Yet I bought my lulav/etrog set from a kid, and I did not bother to ask if he was 13 years old yet, instead relying on the common Jewish practice. Why did I not refrain from purchasing it from him, or at least ask him if he had attained majority?

I would say, first off, that the question never gets off the ground. As I understand it, these children do not buy the lulavim and etrogim and then go and sell it. Rather, they work for a gadol as salesmen. If I go into Macy's and buy an item, I am not buying it from the cashier. Rather, I am purchasing it from the store. The cashier is there to tally up the price, collect my money and perhaps remove the security tag, and make sure that people are not just walking off with merchandise.

Similarly, I am fairly certain that these children are simply cashiers. When you buy a lulav set, you are taking it into your possession from the gadol's possession. And his mind is made up that when you give the salesperson the predefined price (or however low he allows them to go), that you should be koneh the item from him when you do hagbahah. The children are just there to ensure against theft of lulav sets or the money, and to encourage people to purchase the sets.

So there is no question of kinyan from a katan in the first place.

But let us say there is. If so, they are peutot, and it seems that Rabbinically, children in the class of peutot can buy, sell, and give gifts. And if they can do so Rabbinically, then under the principle of hefker bet din hefker, the item is legally yours even on a Biblical level. (There is what to argue about this, and people do argue, but there is certainly upon what to rely.)

Where does this discussion occur? In the gemara in Gittin, and it is brought lehalacha in the Rif. From my Rif Yomi blog:

הפעוטות מקחן מקח כו'.
ועד כמה מחוי רב יהודה לרב יצחק בריה כבר שית כבר שבע
רב כהנא אמר כבר שבע כבר תמני
במתניתא תנא כבר תשע כבר עשר
ול"פ כל חד וחד לפום חורפיה

"THE YOUNG CHILDREN, THEIR PURCHASE IS A VALID PURCHASE...":
And until when {is the youngest age}?
Rav Yehuda pointed out to Rav Yitzchak his son: About six or seven.
Rav Kahana said: About seven or eight.
In a brayta it was taught: About nine or ten.
And they do not argue. Each of them in accordance with his intelligence.

וטעמא מאי א"ר אבא בר יעקב א"ר יוחנן משום כדי חייו
ואמרי' עלה בפ' מציאת האשה
אמר רפרם ל"ש אלא שאין שם אפוטרופוס אבל יש שם אפוטרופוס אין מקחן מקח ואין ממכרן ממכר

And what is the reason {that it is effective}?
R' Abba bar Yaakov cited Rabbi Yochanan: for the provision of his livelihood.
And we say upon it {this Mishna} in perek Metziat HaIsha {Ketubot 70a}:
Rafram said: They only learned this where there is no guardian, but if there is a guardian, their purchase is no purchase and their sale is no sale.

We might think this only applies to an orphan, from the reference to the apitrupis in Ketubot, and from the fact that it is a provision for his livelihood (though lehalacha it seems that this was the reason for the takana but extends even past where it is for his livelihood), but this is not explicit in the gemara, or in Tur, or Beis Yosef, or Shulchan Aruch, in the relevant siman in Choshen Mishpat. Aruch Hashulchan does start out discussing it in terms of a yatom, but later also gives as a reason a child whose father is in a far away place where he did not appoint an apotropus, a guardian.

Yet, in Orach Chaim, in Siman TarNach, Aruch Hashulchan discusses it in the context of matana al menas lehachzir and notes a problem in regard to a katan. He could acquire it, but then could not give it away. But then, the tenai should not work and so it was never his, so it is no problem? True, the condition cannot take effect, but that would have the effect of nullifying the condition but not the gift. In which case the next person, or the first person, could not take it back, and so there is an issue that it is not lachem.

But then Aruch Hashulchan notes that this should only apply to children who have not reached the age of peutot. Which means from 6 and up, if they know enough to conduct business, they are empowered to do so. And he does not restrict to orphans. Thus, even he would say that this is across the board. However, he notes that Tur just says katan and does not make a distinction, such that for some reason Tur might not take peutos out of this class. {Why, who knows? I could come up with some plausible suggestions.} But then a note that it is possible to argue with this diyuk. See inside.

Therefore, even if one is actually acquiring from the katan -- which I doubt -- it should not be a problem according to many opinions. Because they are clearly of age to conduct business. They are actively engaged in it! (And from 10 and up, if we do not hold like Rambam, so long as they are not shoteh they are certainly fine. Earlier than that, it is up to their individual business acumen.) And then, since they can acquire and sell mideRabbanan, under hefker bet din hefker it is in my possession. And so I can fulfill the mitzvah even on a Biblical level.

Please note: Do not pasken or act in accordance with a pesak on a blog. This is true for both this blog and Mystical Paths, or almost any other blog on the internet. It is an interesting question and you should consult your local Orthodox rabbi before taking any action, perhaps first printing out whatever halachic discussions you find online. But in the end, it should be evaluated by someone well versed in the issues and in the method of pesak, and someone willing to take responsibility to issue a definitive ruling to you.

Daf Yomi Gittin 90a -- The ethnic joke

On the last daf of Gittin, we have a brayta that finds expression even today in an ethnic joke:

תניא היה ר"מ אומר כשם שהדעות במאכל כך הדעות בנשים

יש לך אדם שזבוב נופל לתוך כוסו וזורקו ואינו שותהו וזו היא מדת פפוס בן יהודה שנועל דלת בפני אשתו ויוצא
ויש לך אדם שזבוב נופל לתוך כוסו וזורקו ושותהו זו היא מדת כל אדם שרואה את אשתו מדברת עם כל שכניה ועם קרוביה ומניחה
ויש לך אדם שזבוב נופל לתוך התמחוי מוצצו ואוכלו וזו היא מדת אדם רע שרואה את אשתו יוצאת וראשה פרוע ופרומה משני צדדיה ורוחצת עם בני אדם
עם בני אדם סלקא דעתך אלא במקום שבני אדם רוחצין
ואינו חושש
זו מצוה מן התורה לגרשה שנאמר
כי מצא בה ערות דבר
וכתיב ויצאה מביתו

They learnt {in a brayta}: Rabbi Meir would say: Just as there are different attitudes in consumption of food, so are there different attitudes towards women.
There is a man where, if a fly falls into his cup, he throws it out and does not drink it. And this is the trait of Papus son of Yehuda, who locked his wife indoors before leaving.
And there is a man where, if a fly falls in his cup, he throws it {the fly} out and then drinks it. This is the trait of any man who sees his wife speaking with all her neighbors and all her relatives and leaves her to do it.
And there is a man where, if a fly falls into the plate, he crushes it and eats it. And this is the trait of a bad man who sees his wife go out with her head uncovered {Rif leaves out: and spins cloth in the market},
{Gittin 90b}
and open on both sides {Rashi: that he underarms are exposed} and that she bathes with the men.
{Gemara interjects: } With the men, does it enter your mind? Rather, in a place where men bathe.
And he does not worry. This is a precept in the Torah to divorce her, for it is stated {Devarim 24:1}

א כִּי-יִקַּח אִישׁ אִשָּׁה, וּבְעָלָהּ; וְהָיָה אִם-לֹא תִמְצָא-חֵן בְּעֵינָיו, כִּי-מָצָא בָהּ עֶרְוַת דָּבָר--וְכָתַב לָהּ סֵפֶר כְּרִיתֻת וְנָתַן בְּיָדָהּ, וְשִׁלְּחָהּ מִבֵּיתוֹ.

1 When a man taketh a wife, and marrieth her, then it cometh to pass, if she find no favour in his eyes, because he hath found some unseemly thing in her, that he writeth her a bill of divorcement, and giveth it in her hand, and sendeth her out of his house,

and it is written

ב וְיָצְאָה, מִבֵּיתוֹ; וְהָלְכָה, וְהָיְתָה לְאִישׁ-אַחֵר.

2 and she departeth out of his house, and goeth and becometh another man's wife,

The ethnic joke:

One day an Englishman, a Scotsman, and an Irishman walked into a pub together.

They proceeded to each buy a pint of Guinness. Just as they were about to enjoy their creamy beverage three flies landed in each of their pints, and were stuck in the thick head.

The Englishman pushed his beer away from him in disgust.

The Scotsman fished the offending fly out of his beer and continued drinking it as if nothing had happened.

The Irishman too, picked the fly out of his drink, held it out over the beer and then started yelling, "SPIT IT OUT, SPIT IT OUT YOU BASTARD!!!!"

Please note I am not endorsing the ethnic stereotypes in this joke, but rather simply citing it to demonstrate the clear parallel.

I would note that matzatz means to press, to suck, to drain, so the last example is perhaps even closer. Perhaps he is sucking out the wine from the fly, or squeezing it out from the fly. Except if so, why the change to the tamchui instead of remaining by the cup? {Soncino defines this as soup rather than a plate, and that he crushes and eats it.}

Daf Yomi Gittin daf 90: Al Tacharosh Al Re'echa

From yesterday's daf Yomi {Gittin daf 90}:

Rav Mesharshia said to Rava: If he decided in his heart to divorce her, yet she is still living with him and waits upon him {ומשמשתו}, what? {The reply:} We apply to him the verse {Mishlei 3:29}:

כט אַל-תַּחֲרֹשׁ עַל-רֵעֲךָ רָעָה; וְהוּא-יוֹשֵׁב לָבֶטַח אִתָּךְ.

29 Devise not evil against thy neighbour, seeing he dwelleth securely by thee.

I would suggest that as a matter of the mechanics of the derash, and the way this pasuk in Mishlei is being understood: רֵעֲךָ could be understood in the sense of רעיתי, beloved, as in Shir Hashirim. And תַּחֲרֹשׁ in the sense either of "plowing" or remaining silent.

Daf Yomi Gittin 89a: On nursing in public

I saw an interesting source in today's daf yomi (Gittin 89a).It makes it fairly clear that nursing in public was not considered proper behavior by the Tannaim.

It reads:

אמר רבא יצא לה שם מזנה בעיר אין חוששין לה

כתנאי אכלה בשוק גרגרה בשוק הניקה בנה בשוק על כולן אמר ר"מ תצא רבי עקיבא אומר משישאו ויתנו בה מוזרות בלבנה אמר לו רבי יוחנן בן נורי א"כ לא הנחת בת לאברהם אבינו שיושבת תחת בעלה והתורה אמרה כי מצא בה ערות דבר ולהלן הוא אומר על פי שנים עדים או על פי שלשה עדים יקום דבר מה להלן דבר ברור אף כאן דבר ברור:

Rava said: If there was a report about her in town that she had illicit intercourse, we are not concerned with this.
This is a matter of Tannaitic dispute. 'If she ate in the market, if she quaffed {as per Jastrow; Rashi: walked with outstretched neck} in the market, if she suckled in the market -- upon all of them Rabbi Meir says she must leave {her husband}. Rabbi Akiva says: {She must leave} as soon as gossips who spin in the moon begin to talk about her. Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri said to him: If so, you will not leave our father Abraham a single daughter who can stay with her husband; ; and the Torah said {Devarim 24:1}

א כִּי-יִקַּח אִישׁ אִשָּׁה, וּבְעָלָהּ; וְהָיָה אִם-לֹא תִמְצָא-חֵן בְּעֵינָיו, כִּי-מָצָא בָהּ עֶרְוַת דָּבָר--וְכָתַב לָהּ סֵפֶר כְּרִיתֻת וְנָתַן בְּיָדָהּ, וְשִׁלְּחָהּ מִבֵּיתוֹ.

1 When a man taketh a wife, and marrieth her, then it cometh to pass, if she find no favour in his eyes, because he hath found some unseemly thing in her, that he writeth her a bill of divorcement, and giveth it in her hand, and sendeth her out of his house,

{and the word davar is there}
And elsewhere it states {Devarim 19:15}

טו לֹא-יָקוּם עֵד אֶחָד בְּאִישׁ, לְכָל-עָו‍ֹן וּלְכָל-חַטָּאת, בְּכָל-חֵטְא, אֲשֶׁר יֶחֱטָא: עַל-פִּי שְׁנֵי עֵדִים, אוֹ עַל-פִּי שְׁלֹשָׁה-עֵדִים--יָקוּם דָּבָר.

15 One witness shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity, or for any sin, in any sin that he sinneth; at the mouth of two witnesses, or at the mouth of three witnesses, shall a matter be established.

{and the word davar is there}
Just as elsewhere the "matter" {davar} must be clear, so too here the "matter" must be clear.

It seems pretty clear that the Tannaim did not look favorably on nursing in public.

Daf Yomi Gittin 86/88 -- Is Ktav Yado On The Resha Really Obvious??

I have a few posts I've accumulated on daf Yomi Gittin, but haven't gotten around to fleshing them out. We will have to see about them.

In the meantime, this is pretty short, so I will quickly develop the idea. As such, it is somewhat off the cuff. On Gittin daf 86, we have (relying on my translation of the Rif):

{Gittin 86a}

כתב בכתב ידו ואין עליו עדים

"IF THE HUSBAND WROTE IT WITH HIS OWN HAND BUT IT WAS ATTESTED BY NO WITNESSES":

אמר רב כתב ידו שנינו
אהייא אילימא ארישא פשיטא כתב ידו קתני
אלא אמציעתא הרי יש עליו עדים
אלא אסיפא יש בו זמן ואין בו אלא עד אחד וקתני שלשה גיטין פסולין ואם נשאת הולד כשר
אמר רב דוקא כתב ידו ועד אבל כתב סופר ועד אין הולד כשר
וכי קתני כתב סופר ועד כשר חתם סופר ועד הוא אבל כתב סופר לא מהני ולא מידי
וכן א"ר יוחנן כתב ידו שנינו
וכן הלכתא:

Rav said: We have learned "with his own handwriting."
Upon what {is this statement}? If you say on the resha, then it is obvious! It states {explicitly} in the Mishna "with his own handwriting." Rather, on the middle portion, behold it has witnesses! Rather, on the sefa -- "IF IT HAS A DATE BUT THE SIGNATURE OF ONLY ONE WITNESS," and it {=the Mishna} teaches "THE FOLLOWING THREE BILLS OF DIVORCE ARE INVALID BUT IF A WOMAN MARRIES ON THE STRENGTH OF THEM THE CHILD [BORN OF SUCH MARRIAGE] IS LEGITIMATE."
{Gittin 86b}
Rav said {in his earlier statement} that this is specifically his handwriting and a witness, but the handwriting of the scribe, plus a witness, the child would not be legitimate.
And where it taught that the handwriting of the scribe plus a witness is valid, this means the signature of the scribe and a witness, but the handwriting of the scribe does not help at all.
And so did Rabbi Yochanan say: We learnt "with his own handwriting."
And so is the halacha.

But as applied to the resha, it Rav and Rabbi Yochanan's statement really so obvious, such that the setama digmara should discard that possibility and apply it to the sefa?

I have my doubts.

Specifically, Rav and Rabbi Yochanan are both early Amoraim, and could be said to be quasi-Tannaim. Rather than making a diyuk into what is said, making a distinction in that it said ktav yado and not the ktav yad of the sofer, we should say that they are establishing the correct girsa of the Mishna.

Because on the Mishna in Gittin daf 88, we have a similar situation arise:

{Gittin 88a}
Gemara:

כתב סופר ועד כשר.
א"ר ירמיה חתם סופר שנינו.
ההיא כתובת חתנים דאתאי לקמיה דרבי אבהו דהוה ידע ליה לטופסא דשטרא ולחתימות ידיה דחד סהדא סבר לאכשורה
א"ל ר' ירמיה חתם סופר שנינו:

"WRITTEN BY A SCRIBE AND SIGNED BY ONE WITNESS IS VALID":
Rabbi Yirmeyah said: We learnt "the signature of the scribe."
There was a certain marriage ketuba which was brought before Rabbi Abahu, in which it was known to him the {handwriting of} the text {tofes} of the document and the signature of one of the witnesses. He thought to validate it. Rabbi Yirmeyah said: The signature {rather than handwriting} of the scribe we learnt.

Thus, in this other Mishna, despite the fact that our girsa of the Mishna as printed has ktav sofer, it is corrected to chatam sofer. And this has halachic impact.

Given this other rewriting of a Mishna, replacing ktav with chatam, it makes sense for Rav and Rabbi Yochanan to establish the girsa of the earlier Mishna and declare that the text of our Mishna is true, that it is ktav yado, the handwriting of the husband, and not the signature of the husband.

That is, we could imagine a hypothetical in which the husband writes a get, but he never intended to deliver it, just yet. If so, his affixing of his signature at the bottom makes it clear that he meant to empower it. And that might be the implication of this alternate girsa, if it would exist. Therefore Rabbi Yochanan and Rav come to establish the text of our Mishna correctly.

The diyuk made by the setama de-gemara might still be true -- and indeed it is convincing as true -- even if this was not a diyuk intended by either Rav or Rabbi Yochanan.

Is Hatarat Nedarim A Sham? pt iv (paskening like Rav Pappa because Rav Huna concurs)

In the first post of this series, a question: how could hatarat nedarim on erev Rosh haShanah work, if it specifically avoided pirut haneder, and halachah requires this even bedieved? And other questions.

In the second post of this series, a proposed answer: that when the gemara and Rishonim say that bedieved it does not work without pirut haneder, they were not speaking of the case where the judges know that the neder is not being specified.

In the third post in this series, I explained Rosh's reasoning for paskening like Rav Pappa, and questioned the first of those reasons, by showing that Rav Pappa was not actually batrai.

Now, in this fourth post, I tackle the second of Rosh's reasons.

As a reminder, Click on the picture to see it very large. You want the first column, d"h kasavar.

Rosh gives three reasons we should hold like Rav Pappa over Rav Nachman:

1) Rav Pappa is later than Rav Nachman, so he is batrai, and hilcheta kebatrai.

2) Rav Huna holds like him.

3) The Yerushalmi seems to conclude like Rav Pappa that there is such an obligation.

To now address the second point:

We have the fact that Rav Huna rules like Rav Pappa and against Rav Nachman. Each of these people was the heads of an academy:

Rav Huna: Head of Sura.
Rav Nachman bar Yaakov (plain Rav Nachman): Nehardeah
Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak: Pumbedita
Rav Pappa: Nehardeah

But Rav Huna does not explicitly rule like Rav Pappa. Rather, the setama de-gemara proposes a reason for Rav Huna's statement, asks on it, and proposes its own explanation. Thus, we see:

התקין רבן גמליאל הזקן שתהא נודרת כו': אמר רב הונא לא שנו אלא בשלא ניסת אבל ניסת אין מדירין אותה ניסת מאי טעמא דמיפר לה בעל כי לא ניסת נמי לכי מנסבא מיפר לה בעל אין הבעל מיפר בקודמין וניחוש דלמא אזלה לגבי חכם ושרי לה קסבר צריך לפרט את הנדר רב נחמן אמר אפי' ניסת ניסת ודאי מיפר לה בעל דמדרינן לה ברבים

But all Rav Huna said was that אמר רב הונא לא שנו אלא בשלא ניסת אבל ניסת אין מדירין אותה. Why should only a non-married woman take the vow, but not a married woman? The setama de-gemara proposes that this is because the husband can simply annul her vow. But this need not be so. If we say like Amemar, as the setama de-gemara proposes for Rav Nachman, that דמדרינן לה ברבים, and such a vow, the husband is not able to annul. This is such a ready solution that it is perhaps questionable why Rav Huna would say not to impose the vow.

I would suggest an alternative. We see in the parallel Yerushalmi on the Mishna, on Yerushalmi Gittin 21b, the reason for imposing this vow:

בראשונה היו נשבעות לשקר וקוברות את בניהם שנאמר

ירמיהו ב) לשוא הכיתי את בניכם. ועוד שאימת נדרים עליהן יותר מן השבועות.

Thus, they would swear falsely and as Divine penalty, their children, who they were stealing from, would die.

What would compel a widow to steal from the orphans and swear falsely? Profit motive, though even that is hard to understand. But the situation is not so dire if she is married and thus being supported, or if she does not have to worry about being a good catch with money coming into the marriage. Therefore, the extremity of the vow is not called for, according to Rav Huna. But Rav Nachman says that the impose the vow even if she is married.

I am not arguing forcefully that this need be so, but rather that this seems to be a valid alternative to the setama de-gemara's suggestion. If so, Rav Huna was never talking about the new husband's hafarah, and would then not be compelled to channel Rav Pappa in explaining why a chacham's hatarah would not work.

A second possibility is that Rav Huna actually intended it just as the setama de-gemara proposed. But that does not mean that hatarah from a chacham was something he considered. And even if he considered it, it does not mean that he dismissed it for the reason the gemara gave -- that there is a requirement for pirut haneder. I would propose the following alternatives.

a) Rav Huna holds that a neder which involves other people cannot be annulled, even bedieved, as deduced by various Rishonim as halacha in general, and this is a neder which was entered into because of other people.

b) Even if we say that potchin bacharata, the regret needs to be real. And it is not real here, because the widow had the option not to enter into the neder in the first place. If she enters into the vow with intent to have it annulled, then she is not really regretting taking the vow.

c) And then the chacham can only operate by finding a petach, which requires knowing the whole circumstances of the vow. And then the chacham would decide not to annul it.

So we do not need to say that Rav Huna is saying that we require pirut haneder, and that absent such specification, the annulment is invalid even bedieved. This is then no support for Rav Pappa over Rav Nachman.

A third possibility is that Rav Huna even agrees with the conclusion the setama de-gemara proposes, and so requires pirut haneder even bedieved. But should we care? As we will see when addressing the Yerushalmi, the dispute between Rav Nachman and Rav Pappa about whether pirut haneder is required is actually a Tannaitic dispute, with one brayta like Rav Nachman and one brayta like Rav Pappa. So it stands to reason that different Amoraim would hold like different braytot. And if Rav Huna indeed holds one way, there may well be other Amoraim who hold the other way. Just because the setama de-gemara was able to attribute Rav Pappa's position to one named Amora, via logic, does not mean that many other Amoraim did not stand in line with Rav Nachman.

Indeed, as mentioned earlier, based on the Rif's girsa, Rav Pappa's disputant is Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak, his contemporary. But Rav Huna's disputant may well be plain Rav Nachman, who is Rav Nachman bar Yaakov, and that Rav Nachman need not subscribe to Rav Pappa's view. (On the other hand, we cannot pin him down to any position.) Is this really a way of determining halacha, based on a majority of Amoraim we can manage to pin down, without getting a representative sample of Amoraim? For all we know, many others may hold like the other brayta and thus with Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak.

Furthermore, if Rav Pappa's disputant is indeed Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak, his contemporary, then both of them are batrai compared with Rav Huna. Such that they knew the competing braytas, they knew that in an earlier generation of Amoraim there was Rav Huna who held one way, and yet, they divided, with Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak willing to state the halacha was not in accordance with Rav Huna. Shouldn't the batrai aspect compel us to ignore the earlier staked position of Amoraim, and just treat it as a straight machlokes? I don't know, and I am no master in kelalei horaah, but I believe a valid argument can be made here. And that Rosh did not make that argument firstly because he would not argue with the setama de-gemara, but secondly because his assumption, based on his girsa, is that Rav Nachman is Rav Nachman bar Yaakov, such that only Rav Pappa is batrai.

Note: Not intended halacha lemaaseh. Consult your local Orthodox rabbi.

Is Hatarat Nedarim A Sham? pt iii (paskening like Rav Pappa because he is later)

In the first post of this series, a question: how could hatarat nedarim on erev Rosh haShanah work, if it specifically avoided pirut haneder, and halachah requires this even bedieved? And other questions.

In the second post of this series, a proposed answer: that when the gemara and Rishonim say that bedieved it does not work without pirut haneder, they were not speaking of the case where the judges know that the neder is not being specified.

Now, in the third post in this series, I wish to address whether Rif, Rosh, etc., are correct in ruling in accordance with Rav Pappa over Rav Nachman. This is important because only according to Rav Pappa is pirut haneder required as protocol. According to Rav Nachman, it should not be done.

Pictured to the right is a scan of the Rosh. Click on the picture to see it very large. You want the first column, d"h kasavar.

Rosh gives three reasons we should hold like Rav Pappa over Rav Nachman:

1) Rav Pappa is later than Rav Nachman, so he is batrai, and hilcheta kebatrai.

2) Rav Huna holds like him.

3) The Yerushalmi seems to conclude like Rav Pappa that there is such an obligation.

And so, we shall have to address each of these three in turn. Here, we will address the first point, and declare:

1) Rav Pappa is not actually batrai.

We have two ways of accomplishing this.

a) Rav Pappa is batrai when compared with plain Rav Nachman, who is Rav Nachman bar Yaakov. (See here.) But what if the Rav Nachman in this dispute is Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak? (See here.) Rav Nachman bar Yaakov was a disciple of Shmuel and so is of an earlier generation than Rav Pappa, who was a student of both Abaye and Rava. But if it is Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak, then he is of the same generation of Rav Pappa, for he was also a student of both Abaye and Rava. Then, neither is batrai. And it makes more sense for there to be a dispute between the two.

I do not make this suggestion idly. In fact, the Rif has a girsa of this gemara in which he explicitly has Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak rather than just plain Rav Nachman. Thus, in Nedarim, on 21b in the pages of Rif:

גרסינן בפרק השולח
צריך לפרט הנדר או לא
רב פפא אמר צריך
רב נחמן בר יצחק אמר אין צריך
דאי אמרת צריך זמנין דגייז וחכם מה דשמע מיפר
ורב פפא אמר צריך דלמא אמילתא דאיסורא משתבע
והלכתא כרב פפא:

We learn in perek haSholeach {=the 4th perek of Gittin, daf 35b}:
Does one need to spell out the vow {when asking absolution} or not?
Rav Pappa said: He needs to.
Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said: He does not need to.
For if you say that he needs, there are times that he will cut off his words, and the sage will only annul that which he hears.
And Rav Pappa said: He needs to, for perhaps he swore about something which was forbidden.
And the halacha is like Rav Pappa.

Rif still says the halacha is like Rav Pappa, but his reason does not need to be that Rav Pappa is batrai. Indeed, he specifies no reason, though the reason may well be that Rav Huna holds like Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak, rather than that Rav Pappa is later. Meanwhile, Rosh has the girsa of just plain Rav Nachman, and so he cites this as a reason.

This is really enough for me. Lectio difficilior dictates that "bar Yitzchak" is more likely to be dropped than added to a text, and so the most likely original is Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak.

Of course, a bit earlier in the gemara, we have Rav Nachman arguing with Rav Huna. This would presumably be the earlier Rav Nachman, namely Rav Nachman bar Yaakov. This could also explain the reason for the dropping of "bar Yitzchak" a bit later in the gemara, when a Rav Nachman argues with Rav Pappa.

b) But I could propose another solution, if I wished. Namely, that Rav Nachman is indeed Rav Nachman bar Yaakov, who is a student of Shmuel, but his disputant is not Rav Pappa, but rather Rav Pappi, who some say was of an earlier generation. Indeed, we have Rav Pappi visit Mar Shmuel's house, and so some then distinguish Shmuel from Mar Shmuel, but I believe others say that Rav Pappi was of an earlier generation. Since he visited Shmuel's house, he would be of the same generation as Shmuel's student, Rav Nachman bar Yaakov.

While I did not look, and thus certainly have no manuscript evidence to support me in this bold assertion, I do have the fact that this is not the only time "Rav Nachman" and "Rav Pappa" disagree. We also have a dispute between Rav Nachman and Rav Pappa elsewhere. (See here for a partial list.) We really need to sit down and see whether we can figure out a rule for this.

Thus, for example, from my transaltion in the Rif:

Rav Nachman said: People do not make a son the agent in the place of his father. And Rav Pappa {our gemara: Rav Pappi} said: People do make a son the agent in the place of his father.
And the halacha is that people to make a son an agent in place of his father.

And in this dispute, we have a girsological variant between Rav Pappa and Rav Pappi. Lectio difficilior would argue in favor of the less well-known Rav Pappi, but then again, if one scribe writes פפ' מ instead of פפא, the shmitchik could be reinterpreted by the next scribe as a yud.

But other gemaras (e.g. this) make me favor the identification of Rav Pappa rather than Rav Pappi. Thus, I would reject option (b) but would promote option (a).

All in all, we have this compelling variant in the words of the Rif that Rav Nachman is Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak, and so he is a contemporary of Rav Pappa. Rosh's first argument in favor of ruling like Rav Pappa is thus readily dismissed.

Note: This is all not intended halacha lemaaseh.

Daf Yomi Gittin 62a: ואין כופלין שלום לעובדי כוכבים

An interesting gemara in today's daf (available in Rif Yomi here):

ואין כופלין שלום לעובדי כוכבים
רב חסדא הוה מקדים יהיב להו שלמא
ר"נ בר יצחק אמר להו שלמא למר
תניא לא יכנס אדם בביתו של עובדי כוכבים ביום אידו ויתן לו שלום מצאו בשוק נותן לו בשפה רפה ובכובד ראש

'Nor to give double greeting to heathens' --
Rav Chisda would give them greeting first.
Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak {our gemara: Rav Kahana} used to say: Peace {to you,} sir.

They learnt {in a brayta}: A man should not enter the house of a heathen on his feast day and give him greeting. Should he meet him in the street, he should greet him in a mumbling tone and with downcast head.'

I did not look far -- anywhere past the actual daf, but I had a thought that I did not see in Rashi or Tosafot. We know from other languages that there is sometimes a pattern in which one responding to a greeting gives a greeting that is stronger. Thus, in Yiddish, in response to "gut morgen," one would say "gut yohr."

Thus, I would suggest that Rav Chisda giving heathens greeting first is not showing his leniency in this regard, but rather a strategy in avoiding giving the double greeting of "shalom shalom." For in response to a shalom, one would double the shalom. And similarly, perhaps we can interpret Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak, of Rav Kahana's statement of shelama lemar not as Rashi gives it, that he says this and really has in mind Hashem -- something Tosafot objects is geneivas daas -- but rather also something that he says in response. That is, say that the heathen greeted Rav Kahana with shalom first, but rather than saying shalom, shalom, he one-upped it in a different way, by saying shalom leMar, calling him "master" as a way of respect.

Gittin 62b: A Woman Conveying Her Own Get, And Begging The Question

I was troubled by the following gemara, but haven't researched it deeply enough to see if there is a resolution offered by Rishonim/Acharonim, or if my question is really a question. So all this might really be amaratzus.

The following translation pulled from my Rif Yomi blog, on Gittin 62b:

פשיטא: איש הוי שליח להולכה שכן בעל מוליך גט לאשתו
אשה הויא שליח לקבלה שכן אשה מקבלת גיטה מיד בעלה
איש לקבלה ואשה להולכה מאי
ופשטינן דאיש הוי נמי שליח לקבלה שכן אב מקבל גט לבתו קטנה ואשה נמי הויא שליח להולכה שכן אשה עצמה מביאה גיטה
כדתנן האשה עצמה מביאה גיטה ובלבד שתהא צריכה למימר בפני נכתב ובפ"נ
ואוקימנא בהולכה

It is obvious that a man may be an agent for conveying, for a husband may convey a get to his wife; and that a woman may be an agent for receiving, for a woman may receive her get from the hand of her husband.
A man for receiving and a woman for conveying, what?
And we resolve that a man may also be an agent for receiving, for a father may indeed receive a get for his minor daughter. And a woman may also be an agent for conveying, for a woman may indeed herself bring her get, as we learn {in a Mishna}, "the woman herself may bring her get, except she needs to say 'before me it was written and before me it was signed."
And we establish this as conveying.

I would read the basis of the question of the gemara as follows: A person cannot be a shliach for something that he himself cannot do. And so, how could a man be an agent to receive the get? After all, Biblically, the man does the divorcing, and he is not the recipient of a get given by his wife. If so, how can he act as an agent? And the answer is that there is a paradigm for a man receiving a get, so since he can receive a get Biblically, in general he can act as an agent for this.

There is an alternative, that this is not a question of whether a man ever is the actual recipient of the get, but rather whether he can act as an agent for receiving. And in the case of accepting the get for his minor daughter, he is acting as her stand-in. Thus, we have Biblical precedent, which we can extend to other cases.

But I would favor the former reading of the question, at least for now. And assuming the former reading, I have the following issue: The gemara asks whether women can act as shliach leholacha. And the answer is that a woman can, based on the Mishna which states that the wife may bring her own get.

But that seems to be begging the question -- proving something only by assuming as axiomatic the very thing you are trying to prove. After all, a woman bringing her own get would seem to be agency, rather than a din in and of the woman herself. As we see for example in Gittin 5a:

ותנן האשה עצמה מביאה גיטה ובלבד שצריכה לומר בפ"נ ובפ"נ שלא תחלוק בשליחות

Is there any basis for saying otherwise? If this is agency, where she is the shliach of the husband until she reaches her destination, then this is an instance of a woman working as a shliach. But we have not proven that can do it as a primary actor, for a get she is using to divorce someone else. So one can cite the Mishna, but what is the basis of that Mishna?

Perhaps we can say as above, that this is rather a matter of precedent, rather than one of whether the person is beTorat holacha of a get.

Another related issue which might also resolve it is what the definition of holacha and shliach leholacha is. Is this just traveling with a get under your control? If so, why should we need any kind of diyuk? This is a glorified postman, but one who must make sure that no one tampers with it. To coin an idiom (wink), the question should not be how we know a man, or a woman, can be a shliach leholacha. A monkey should be able to do it, or a parrot. Why not?

If, on the other hand, the shliach leholacha is also a shliach for giving the get -- such that one person or his agent, the shliach leholacha gives, and another person or her agent, the shliach lekabbalah receives -- then we are speaking of agency for giving a get. If I recall correctly, in the Jewish colony of Elephantine, women could initiate divorce. However, according to halacha, the man divorces the woman and not the other way around. If a woman cannot give a get, how could she be an agent to give a get?

I also wonder at the reason for needing to prove a man or a woman can be a shliach lekabbalah or a shliach leholacha/nesina in the first place. Why assume that they need to be betoras nesinas gittin or betoras kabbalas gittin in the first place? A woman's chatzer is koneh for her, and it is not betoras. Rather, it acquires property, and that property in this case is the get, which then has the effect of making the woman divorced. And we know from elsewhere that both men and women can acquire and transfer ownership. Let them be shluchim for this transfer of ownership, empowered by the husband or the wife, and once they are koneh or makneh, the divorce takes effect!

Perhaps we can combine all of this, and suggest that this was the question of the gemara. What is the nature of this shlichus? Do they need to be betoras nesinas/kabbalas gittin? Or even if not, such as a man for kabbalah and a woman for nesina? And the answer is given by showing precedent in all these ways, such that we know that they do not need to be betoras. And so we rely on precedent in these cases.

It may work, but I have reservations about this. Specifically, the focus on the man bringing his own, and the women bringing her own, seems to strongly suggest that the idea is agency only if you yourself can do it. Please let me know in the comment section what I am missing.

Daf Yomi Gittin 58a-b: Does ארצי ליה זוזי mean that the buyer gives money, or that the recipient counts out the money given to him?

From my Rif blog:

{Gittin 58a}
Gemara:

לקח מסיקריקון כו'. אמר רב לא שנו אלא דאמר ליה לך חזק וקנה אבל בשטר קנה
ושמואל אמר אף בשטר לא קנה עד שיכתוב לו אחריות

"IF A MAN BUYS FROM THE SICARICON...":
Rav said: They only learned this where he {the original owner} said to him {the buyer} "Go and take possession {via chazaka, by working the land} and acquire it." But with a written deed, he acquires.
And Shmuel said: Even with a deed he does not acquire until he writes for himself responsibility {for reimbursing him if the title proves invalid}.

{Gittin 58b}

ואותבינן עליה דרב מהא דתניא
רבי שמעון בן אלעזר אומר לקח מן האשה בכתובתה וחזר ולקח מן האיש מקחו קיים מן האיש וחזר ולקח מן האשה מקחו בטל עד שיכתוב אחריות
ופריק מאי אחריות נמי שטר
והלכתא כשמואל דקי"ל דכל היכא דפליגי רב ושמואל ולא איתמר הלכתא כחד מינייהו הלכתא כשמואל בדיני ועוד דתניא מסייעא ליה
ופירוקא דרב שינויא הוא ולא סמכינן אשינויא

And they object to Rav from this that they learnt {in a brayta}:

Rabbi Shimon ben Eleazar says: If one buys [a married woman's property] from the wife and then buys it again from the husband, his purchase is effective. But if he first buys from the husband and then from the wife the purchase is invalid, unless he {our gemara: she} writes responsibility.

And it resolves: What is "responsibility?" It is also a written deed.
And the halacha is like Shmuel, for we establish that wherever Rav and Shmuel argue, and the halacha is not stated like one of them, the halacha is like Shmuel in laws {dinei, such as monetary matters}. And furthermore, that there is a brayta which supports him, and resolution of Rav {that Rav could offer} is a mere shinuya {a weak retort and a way of reading his position into the brayta with difficulty}, and we do not rely on a shinuya.

ואי קשיא לך ההיא דגרסינן בחזקת הבתים אמר רב הונא תליוה וזבין זביניה זביני
ואותיב רב המנונא עליה דרב הונא מהא מתני' לקח מסיקריקון וחזר ולקח מבעל הבית מקחו בטל
ואמאי התם נמי נימא אגב אונסיה גמר ומקני
ופריק הא איתמר עלה אמר רב לא שאנו אלא דא"ל לך חזק וקנה אבל בשטר קנה
ואקשינן ולשמואל דאמר אף בשטר לא קנה מאי איכא למימר
ופריק מודה שמואל היכא דיהיב זוזי
ואסיקנא והלכתא בכולהו זביניה זביני ואפי' בשדה זו בין ארצי ליה זוזי בין לא ארצי ליה זוזי אלא בשטר בלבד קנה וכי אמר ליה בתר הכין תא שקול זוזך לא מצי למהדר ביה
למימרא דהלכתא כרב דאמר לא צריכינן לכתיבת אחריות
ההיא לא קשיא מידי דהא אמרינן מודה שמואל היכא דיהיב זוזי
ואע"ג דאיפסיקא הלכתא בין ארצי ליה זוזי בין לא ארצי ליה זוזי התם גבי תליוה וזבין דעתיה למיתן ליה זוזי ודעתיה דמוכר למישקל מיניה זוזי
אבל הכא גבי אשה וסיקריקון ליכא מאן דיהיב להו זוזי הילכך לא מהניא כתיבת שטר עלייהו עד דכתיבי אחריות:

And if it is difficult to you this that we learned in Chezkat HaBatim {the third perek of Bava Batra}:

{Bava Batra 47b}
Rav Huna said: If someone is threatened {with physical violence} and he sells, his sale is valid.
{Bava Batra 48a}
And Rav Hamnuna objects to Rav Huna from this Mishna {local to Gittin}:

'If a man buys a field from a sicarius and then buys it again from the original owner, the purchase is void.'

But why? There {in the Mishna} as well, let us say that because of compulsion he decided to sell it ?
And it resolves: Behold, Rav said upon it {=the Mishna, as we see local to Gittin}: They only learned this in the case where he said "take hold {chazaka} and acquire," but with a {written} deed, he does acquire.
And we ask: But according to Shmuel who said that even with a {written} deed, he does not acquire, what is there to say?
And they resolve: Shmuel admits in the case where he gives money.
And we conclude {Bava Batra 48b}: And the halacha in all of these is that his sale is a valid sale, even for {threats to sell} "this field" {rather than just "a field"}, and whether he counted out for him the money or did not count out for him the money -- but rather just did the acquisition with a {written} deed, and when he says to him after this "come, take your money," he is not able to retract.

That is to say that the halacha is like Rav who said that we do not require the writing of responsibility.

{This is difficult because Rif would like to rule in accordance with Shmuel, for the reasons given above. And so:}

This is no question at all, for we say that Shmuel admits in the case where he gave money. And even though we rule the halacha is whether he gives him money or does not give him mother, there, where he was pressured and sold, his intent was to give him money and the intent of the seller was to take money from him. But here, by the woman and the sicarius, there is none who gives them money. Therefore, the writing of the deed does not help them until they write responsibility.

End quote from the Rif.

The portion marked in red above is not in our gemara and seems to be Rif's gloss. Also, in our gemara we have ארצי זוזי instead of ארצי ליה זוזי. Rif, and Tosafot who happens to have ארצי ליה זוזי, understand this as giving over the money as payment. Therefore, the alternative, which Rif offers as a gloss, is that he did not give money but only had a shtar. In contrast, see Rabbenu Gershom, who understands this phrase as the recipient counting out the money after he is given it, to make sure that all is there. If so, this is different from דיהיב זוזי. And if so, this hilchesa is certainly in agreement with Shmuel, such that there is no question. Indeed, the assumption is that money was given, for otherwise, there would not be two alternatives of counting out the money or not counting it. But Rif interprets this as simply giving money, and it is valid even if no money is given, but only a shetar.

Daf Yomi Gittin 39;42;

Two interesting (to me, at least) points I mentioned while learning through Rif on daf Yomi.

1) From yesterday's post at my Rif blog:

{Gittin 39b}

א"ר זירא א"ר אסי א"ר חנינא אמר רבי עבד שנשא אשה בת חורין בפני רבו יצא לחירות

ולא עוד אלא שכופין את רבו וכותב לו שטר שחרור

Rabbi Zera cited Rabbi Assi who cited Rabbi Chanina who cited Rabbi: A slave who married a free woman in the presence of his master {Gittin 40a} goes out to freedom.

But our gemara has a different order, and a different identification of one of the Amoraim:

Rabbi Zera cited Rabbi Chanina who cited Rav Ashi who cited Rabbi.

On our version, Soncino notes in footnote 20:

The mention of R. Ashi in this connection is very strange.

And indeed, this is so, for Rabbi Zera is earlier than Rav Ashi, and would we really place him one step before Rabbi, the Tanna? With the Rif's girsa, the train of tradition becomes much better.

Also, from Rif on Gittin 42b (to be posted two days from now):

דגרסינן בפ' כירה דילמא ה"מ במתני' אבל בברייתא לא
וכבר ביררנו זה הענין בקידושין:

For we learn in perek Kirah, "perhaps these words are for Mishnayot, but not for braytot." And we have already elucidated this matter in Kiddushin.

The implication of וכבר ביררנו is that Rif has Gittin after Kiddushin. This would follow the order of Yerushalmi rather than the order in Bavli.

Update: I was wrong. I spoke too soon. It looks like Yerushalmi also has Gittin before Kiddushin.

Daf Yomi 28a: Passing or Tarrying

I'm not sure if this is an interesting point or not. But Rabba bar bar Chana, who says on 28a that it is specifically passing by, rather than tarrying, is echoing the position of Rabbi Yochanan in Yerushalmi Gittin 16b. (See here for snunit text, and here for HebrewBooks.org, which has the meforshim on the side.)

In that gemara, we see an incident in which Rabba bar bar Chana was himself conveying the get, lost it, and then recovered it. And Rabbi Yochanan was the one who ruled on the case, and the validity of the get:

רבי יוחנן אמר כל שלא עבר שם ברייה. ר' יעקב בר אידי רבי שמעון בר אבא בשם רבי יהושע בן לוי כל שלא עברו שם שלשה בני אדם. עבר גוי נישמעינה מן הדא אבא בר בר חנה אייתי גיטא ובד מיניה ואשכחיה חד בירקיי. אתא עובדא קומי רבי יוחנן ואכשרון. הדא אמרה עבר גוי כשר

Daf Yomi Gittin 28b: How Do We Know "Asher Pihem Dibber Shav" Refers to Nochrim?

Citing from my Rif Yomi blog, about Gittin 28b:

Gemara:

תניא שמע מבית דין שהיו אומרים איש פלוני מת איש פלוני נהרג ישיאו את אשתו
מקומנטריסין של עובדי כוכבים איש פלוני מת איש פלוני נהרג לא ישיאו את אשתו
ואע"ג דקי"ל דכל מסיח לפי תומו הימוני מהימן ה"מ במילתא דלא שייך בה אבל במילתא דשייך בה לא מהימנא דכתיב אשר פיהם דיבר שוא וגו':ש

They learnt {in a brayta}: If he heard {a report} from Bet Din that they were saying "a man, Ploni, died"; "a man, Ploni, was killed"; they allow his wife to marry.
If from heathen jailers that "a man, Ploni, died"; "a man, Ploni, was killed", they do not allow his wife to marry.

And even though we establish that any time one is speaking in all innocent, they are believed, these words are by something with which they did not participate. But with something which which they participated, they are not believed, for it is written {Tehillim 144:8}

ח אֲשֶׁר פִּיהֶם, דִּבֶּר-שָׁוְא; וִימִינָם, יְמִין שָׁקֶר.

8 Whose mouth speaketh falsehood, and their right hand is a right hand of lying.

This derasha appears in the Rif, but not in our version of the gemara. How do we know it refers to nachrim? The derasha does not make it explicit, but this is why it is so important to look up every pasuk used for a derasha. The context of the previous pasuk, I believe, provides the context:

ז שְׁלַח יָדֶיךָ, מִמָּרוֹם: פְּצֵנִי וְהַצִּילֵנִי, מִמַּיִם רַבִּים; מִיַּד, בְּנֵי נֵכָר.	7 Stretch forth Thy hands from on high; rescue me, and deliver me out of many waters, out of the hand of strangers;
ח אֲשֶׁר פִּיהֶם, דִּבֶּר-שָׁוְא; וִימִינָם, יְמִין שָׁקֶר.	8 Whose mouth speaketh falsehood, and their right hand is a right hand of lying.

While it does not appear in our version of the gemara, the pasuk does appear in two other gemaras. The first is one of the solutions the stama digmara applies to a contradiction between Chazal's science and the testimony of Justinia, a non-Jewish woman, about the age a woman can safely give birth.
Niddah 45a:

ת"ר מעשה ביוסטני בתו של אסוירוס בן אנטנינוס שבאת לפני רבי אמרה לו רבי אשה בכמה ניסת אמר לה בת ג' שנים ויום אחד ובכמה מתעברת אמר לה בת י"ב שנה ויום אחד אמרה לו אני נשאתי בשש וילדתי בשבע אוי לשלש שנים שאבדתי בבית אבא ומי מעברה והתני רב ביבי קמיה דרב נחמן ג' נשים משמשות במוך קטנה מעוברת ומניקה קטנה שמא תתעבר ותמות מעוברת שמא תעשה עוברה סנדל מניקה שמא תגמול את בנה וימות ואיזוהי קטנה מבת י"א שנה ויום אחד ועד י"ב שנה ויום אחד פחות מכאן או יתר על כן משמשת והולכת דברי ר"מ וחכ"א אחת זו ואחת זו משמשת כדרכה והולכת ומן השמים ירחמו שנאמר (תהילים קטז) שומר פתאים ה' איבעית אימא (יחזקאל כג) אשר בשר חמורים בשרם ואיבעית אימא (תהילים קמד) אשר פיהם דבר שוא וימינם ימין שקר

The two (not three, it should be stressed) solutions given are that non-Jewish women are more sturdy, or that Justinia was lying, as it states in that pasuk in Tehillim.

The other gemara which makes reference to the pasuk makes it a derasha about וימינם ימין שקר rather than about אשר פיהם דבר שוא. Thus, in Bava Batra 45a:

האי בר ישראל דזבין ליה חמרא לישראל חבריה וקא אתי {נכרי} ואניס ליה מיניה דינא הוא דמפצי ליה מיניה ולא אמרן אלא שאינו מכיר בה שהיא בת חמורו אבל מכיר בה שהיא בת חמורו לא ולא אמרן אלא דלא אניס ליה לדידיה ולאוכפא אבל אניס ליה לדידיה ולאוכפא לא אמימר אמר אפי' ליכא כל הני לא מאי טעמא מידע ידע דסתם {נכרי} אנס הוא שנא' (תהילים קמד) אשר פיהם דבר שוא וימינם ימין שקר:

"Anis" in this case means "grabber," and the idea is that their right hand grabs not in truth. So this does not really have anything to do with our derasha, though of course the context of the previous pasuk also is important for this derasha.

We see this derasha made explicitly in reference to heathen jailers in Yerushalmi Pesachim 51b, an excellent parallel to our gemara:

דף סא, ב פרק ח הלכה ו משנה האונן והמפקח בגל וכן מי שהבטיחוהו להוציאו מבית האסורין החולה והזקן שהן יכולין לוכל כזית שוחטין עליהן ועל כולן אין שוחטין עליהן בפני עצמן שלא יביאוהו את הפסח לידי פסול לפיכך אם אירע בהן פסול פטורין מלעשות פסח שני חוץ מן המפקח בגל שהיה טמא מתחילתו:
דף סא, ב פרק ח הלכה ו גמרא ר' יוסי בי ר' בון אבא בר בר חנה בשם ר' יוחנן מתניתא בשחבשוהו ישראל אבל אם חבשוהו עכו"ם (תהילים קמד) אשר פיהם דבר שוא וימינם ימין שקר. בנתון חוץ לירושלם אבל בנתון בתוך ירושלם אפילו לא הבטיחו כמי שהבטיחו

Thus, if Jewish jailers promise to release him, we can shecht with him in mind. But not if they are heathen jailers.

Daf Yomi Gittin 21a/23a: Does Rabbi Yochanan Contradict Himself?

Translation taken from my Rif Yomi blog:

{Gittin 21b}
Mishna:

אין כותבין במחובר לקרקע
כתבו על המחובר תלשו וחתמו ונתנו לה כשר
ר' יהודה פוסל עד שתהא כתיבתו וחתימתו בתלוש
רבי יהודה בן בתירה אומר אין כותבין לא על נייר מחוק ולא על הדיפתרא מפני שהוא יכול להזדייף
וחכמים מכשירין

[A GET] MUST NOT BE WRITTEN ON SOMETHING STILL ATTACHED TO THE SOIL.
IF, HOWEVER, IT WAS WRITTEN ON SOMETHING STILL ATTACHED TO THE SOIL AND THEN DETACHED AND SIGNED AND GIVEN TO THE WIFE, IT IS VALID.
RABBI YEHUDA DECLARES IT INVALID UNLESS IT IS BOTH WRITTEN AND SIGNED ON SOMETHING NOT ATTACHED TO THE SOIL.
RABBI YEHUDA BEN BETEIRA SAYS THAT [A GET] MUST NOT BE WRITTEN ON A SHEET FROM WHICH WRITING HAS BEEN ERASED, NOR ON DIFTERA {=a certain kind of skin}, BECAUSE WRITING ON IT CAN BE ALTERED [WITHOUT BEING NOTICEABLE].
THE SAGES, HOWEVER, DECLARE SUCH A GET VALID.

Gemara:
כתבו על המחובר
והא אמרת רישא אין כותבין
אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל והוא ששייר מקום התורף
וכן אמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר רבי יוחנן והוא ששייר מקום התורף
ורבי אלעזר היא דאמר עידי מסירה כרתי
והכי קאמר אין כותבין טופס במחובר גזירה שמא יכתוב תורף כתבו לטופס ותלשו וכתבו לתורף ונתנו לה כשר:

"IF IT WAS WRITTEN ON SOMETHING STILL ATTACHED TO THE SOIL":
But the resha {in the preceding statement} said that we do not write!
Rav Yehuda cited Shmuel: And this was where he left the place of the toref {which consists of their names, the date, and the words harei at muteres lechol adam, such that this would be filled in once detached}.
And so did Rabba bar bar Chana cite Rabbi Yochanan: And this is where he left the place of the toref.
And it is Rabbi Eleazar, who maintains that witnesses to the handing over are what effects it. And this is what it means to say: We do not write the tofes {the main, standard, part of the get} upon what is attached, as a decree lest he write the toref {on attached as well}. If he wrote the tofes and separated it, and then wrote the toref and gave it to her, it is valid.

A point worthy of consideration is that despite this statement attributed to Rabbi Yochanan here in Bavli, it would seem in Yerushalmi that the Mishna is in disagreement with Rabbi Yochanan, and possibly that Rabbi Yochanan should not be the one to advance what he advances here. And compare with Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, here (in the continuation of the gemara, not given above, that what is missing is the signatures, and that is what the gezeira is for -- see inside) and there.

That gemara, Yerushalmi Gittin 14a, states:

דף יג, א פרק ב הלכה ד משנה אין כותבין במחובר לקרקע כתבו במחובר תלשו וחתמו ונתנו לה כשר ור' יהודה פוסל עד שתהא כתובתו וחתימתו בתלוש ר' יהודה בן בתירה אומר אין כותבין לא על הנייר המחוק ולא על הדיפתרא מפני שהוא יכול להזדייף וחכמים מכשירין:
דף יג, א פרק ב הלכה ד גמרא לית הא פליגא על רבי יוחנן דר' יוחנן אמר כתב תרפו בטופס כשר. ר"ל אמר אם כתב תרפו בטופס פסול.

To understand what this gemara means, and to see three different interpretations and approaches (that of Pnei Moshe, Korban HaEdah, and Ridvaz), click on this link to the Yerushalmi Gittin over at HebrewBooks.org. The link will take you directly to the correct page.

The correct resolution to this (at least so far -- I still have what to grapple with) is that this is indeed a contradiction to Rabbi Yochanan in Yerushalmi, but that we are relying here in Bavli on another Amora who is citing Rabbi Yochanan. And thus the apparent contradiction. Indeed, a bit later, in Gittin 23a, a gemara on another Mishna, this point is made explicitly, when Rav Zerika cites Rabbi Yochanan as going against Shmuel, and arguing against the Mishna, saying that it is not Torah, and that it is Rabbi Meir rather than Rabbi Eliezer -- and this is contrasted with the statement attributed to Rabbi Yochanan earlier in our gemara.

Rab Judah said in the name of Samuel that [a deaf-mute etc. is qualified to write] only if he leaves the formal part a blank. So too said R. Haga in the name of 'Ulla: [A deaf-mute etc. is qualified to write] only if he leaves the formal part a blank. [The Mishnah thus] follows R. Eleazar. R. Zerika, however, said in the name of R. Johanan: This is not Torah. What does he mean by saying, 'This is not Torah'? — Said R. Abba: Here [the Mishnah] makes known to us that there is no force in [the ruling that the Get should be written with] 'special intention', and it follows the view of R. Meir who said that it is the signatures of the witnesses which make [the Get] effective. But did not Rabba b. Bar Hana say in the name of R. Johanan that [the Mishnah] follows Rabbi Eleazar? — Two Amoraim report R. Johanan differently.

Now, once we have the Yerushalmi in accordance with the R' Zerika's attributed statement of Rabbi Yochanan, it would seem that he is correct, and that indeed, the Mishna argues on Rabbi Yochanan.

Daf Yomi Gittin 9a: To Whom Did Rabbi Yossi Apply The Words In Mishlei?

A bit late, because I let it sit as a draft a bit too long.

Gittin 9a.

והאמר רב יוסף בר מניומי אמר רב נחמן אע"פ שקילס רבי יוסי את רבי שמעון הלכה כר' מאיר דתניא כשנאמרו דברים לפני ר' יוסי קרא עליו המקרא הזה (משלי כד) שפתים ישק משיב דברים

To whom did he apply this pasuk?

Soncino:
[But can Raba then rule thus, Seeing that] R. Joseph b. Manyumi said in the name of R. Nahman: Although R. Jose commended R. Simeon, the halachah follows R. Meir. For it has been taught: When the discussion was reported to R. Jose, he applied to him [R. Meir] the Scriptural words, He shall be kissed upon the lips that giveth a right answer.

But where, then, is the commendation of Rabbi Shimon? Is this commendation simply left out?

Rashi says on "Although R. Jose commended R. Simeon" the words כדמפרש ואזיל, making it clear that the praise it to come in the gemara, and thus the praise in the brayta is praise of Rabbi Shimon, not Rabbi Meir.

Tosefta Peah:

א,טז הכותב נכסיו לעבדו יצא בן חורין שייר קרקע כל שהוא לא יצא בן חורין ר"ש אומר האומר כל נכסי נתונין לפלוני עבדי חוץ מאחד [מרבוא שבהן לא אמר כלום חוץ מעיר פלונית חוץ משדה פלונית אף על פי שאין שם אלא אותה שדה ואותה העיר זכה עבד זה בנכסים וקנה עצמו בן חורין וכשנאמרו דברים לפני ר' יוסי אמר (משלי כד) שפתים ישק משיב דברים נכוחים.

and Rif makes this even clearer, by moving about the brayta, in to the middle of the quote:

והאמר רב יוסף בר מניומי אמר רב נחמן אע"פ שקילס ר' יוסי את ר"ש
דתניא כשנאמרו דברים לפני רבי יוסי קרא עליו המקרא הזה שפתים ישק משיב דברים נכוחים
הלכה כר"מ

{Thus, this statement of Rava was in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, it seems.}
But Rav Yosef bar Minyumi cited Rav Nachman: Even though Rabbi Yossi praised Rabbi Shimon, for they learnt {in a brayta}:

When these words were said before Rabbi Yossi, he applied to him {=Rabbi Shimon} this verse {Mishlei 24:26}:

כו שְׂפָתַיִם יִשָּׁק; מֵשִׁיב, דְּבָרִים נְכֹחִים.

26 He kisseth the lips that giveth a right answer.

The halacha is like Rabbi Meir {=the Tanna Kamma}.

Also, it occurred to me that perhaps what is happening here is that the pasuk in Mishlei is applied to Rabbi Shimon in light of his position. That is, perhsps מֵשִׁיב דְּבָרִים נְכֹחִים is a way of describing palginan diburah. Nochach means the one opposite, or opposing. And see in the gemara how this would work out.

Hilchos Rav Alfes

I've been spending a lot of time recently on HebrewBooks.org. What is nice is that besides allowing downloads of full PDFs, they also allow browsing of individual pages online. And in a way that supports direct links to that page. Therefore, if there is some source I want to link to, I can link to it, and people could read the context -- the text before and after, as well as any commentaries on the side, and so on.

And I came across this pdf, הלכות רב אלפס, on Gittin. I think has different pagination that the Rif in our gemaras, but it strikes me as useful. You get to compare our text with their text, to see that it is the same or different; there are sometimes gaps indicating change of topic; and you have convenient access to the Ran while sitting in front of the computer. And this is useful to me, as I post to my Rif Yomi blog.

Here is the first page of the Rif on Gittin. I am not sure who made the emendations -- the printer, or perhaps some shnook, so this is something to keep in mind. But anyway, there are some interesting features just on this first page.

The emendation on the bottom of the page is no doubt correct. While Rava sometimes switches for Rabba, our girsa in the gemara, and our girsa in the Rif in our gemara (see here), has Rabba. And indeed, this is a machlokes, and on the next page in the Rif (even in this printing) Rava argues with this first speaker. So it must be Rabba.

The emendation in the middle of the page is more interestin. There is a gap, followed by והמוליך והמביא ממדינה למדינה במדינת הים. Though there seems not to be a vav there in והמביא, such that it is simply המביא. This gap might indicate a new statement. But note the mark after והמוליך to mark it off. But then, someone inserted a two-letter word in between והמביא and ממדינה. It is hard to make out. The first letter seems to be a gimmel while the second letter seems to be an aleph. But this makes no sense. I would guess the second letter is really a tes. Then, the inserted word is get.

But why should that word get be inserted? The answer, I think, lies in the (accidental) gap, or in the lack of vav in והמביא.

The way one is supposed to read the Mishna (and so does e.g. Rashi read) is with והמוליך as attached to the previous sentence. Thus, not only one who brings from an overseas country (to Eretz Yisrael), but also one who takes it (from Eretz Yisrael to an overseas country). Meanwhile, והמביא (or perhaps without the vav) is the beginning of a separate statement. This may or may not be part of the statement of the Chachamim.

And, as the beginning of a separate statement, one might expect to have get there to explain what is being brought. Indeed, looking to the Yerushalmi Gittin 4b, I would point out the following statement from Rabbi Leizer, which does not have the vav in hameivi, and does indeed have the word get:

מתיב רבי לעזר לרבנן כמא דאית לכון המביא גט ממדינה למדינה במדינת הים צריך שיאמר בפני נכתב ובפני נחתם. אף אנא אית לי המביא ממדינה למדינה בא"י צריך שיאמר בפני נכתב ובפני נחתם.

This is not in the Mishna as printed in our Yerushalmi, but it might well have been in the Mishna back then.

If so, this would imply that this is not some accidental emendation by some shnook, but rather making the text comply with a version of the Mishna as reflected in the Yerushalmi. Indeed, the Rif's girsa of the Mishna is (often?) the girsa of the Geonim, and often reflects the Mishna as found in the Yerushalmi.