How can we explain Hevel's sacrifice?

In a previous post on Vayikra, I noted how Rabbi Yosef Ibn Caspi didn't offer any commentary on the korbanot, because what Rashi and Ibn Ezra wrote already sufficed, and because

I have seen this parasha and many of those [parshiyot] which follow it encircling the details of the zevachim and thekarbonot, which was written by Moshe Rabbenu in his sefer compelled and against his will, for there is no desire to Hashem in olot and zevachim [seeTehillim 51:18], but rather this was compelled by the practice of all the nations in that time which brought them to this.

The Rambam holds similarly as to the purpose of the korbanot. In the comment section, a commenter recently asked:

How do [Ibn] Caspi and the Rambam account for Cain and Abel's sacrifices.

This is a great question, because Kayin and Hevel were very early in the history of mankind, and therefore before the idolatrous practices of the nation. (Indeed, the generation of Enosh is where idolatry began.) If so, why would Kayin have brought korbanot from the plants and why would Hevel have brought korbanot from the flock? And Hashem liked Hevel's korban!

It turns out that this is one of the objections in the Ramban I linked to there:

והנה נח בצאתו מן התיבה עם שלשת בניו אין בעולם כשדי או מצרי הקריב קורבן וייטב בעיני ה' ואמר בו (בראשית ח כא): וירח ה' את ריח הניחוח. וממנו אמר אל לבו לא אוסיף עוד לקלל את האדמה בעבור האדם (שם). והבל הביא גם הוא מבכורות צאנו ומחלביהן, וישע ה' אל הבל ואל מנחתו (שם ד ד), ולא היה עדיין בעולם שמץ ע"ז כלל. 

We could check out what Ibn Caspi has to say in the incident of Kayin and Hevel. I am not sure how informative it is, exactly. He writes in one sefer:

וראוי שתרגיש ג״כ שקין והבל כל אחד מהם היה מכוין להתקרב אל השם במלאכתו, כי כל דרך איש ישר בעיניו.

"And it is appropriate to realize as well that Kayin and Hevel, each of them, intended to draw close to Hashem in his respective work, for all paths of man are right in his eyes."

So perhaps while Hevel's sacrifice was of similar form to later sacrifices, it took this form as a way of drawing close to Hashem within his chosen profession."

In another sefer, Ibn Caspi explains וישע  as less than full desire, רצוי, found by korbanot in general.
וישע. אינו ריצוי גמור וירצה, כמו שיבא עוד בענין קרבנותינו
"וישע -- it is not complete ritzuy like vayeratzeh, like we find in the matter of our own korbanot"

So perhaps there is a sense here that the korban is not entirely appropriate even here. Neither of these is really a satisfying answer.

As I was listening to various shiurim on YUTorah.org this week, I came across this hour-long shiur from last year by Rabbi Netanel Wiederblank:


The shiur is titled: Rambam's controversial reason for the reason for korbanos. That reason is the one mentioned above, that it was modeled after the idolatrous practice of the surrounding nations, as a way of directing that drive.

At approximately the 5 minute mark, he mentions a series of question by the Ramban, and this question about Hevel's korban is one of them.

At the 35 minute mark, he addresses this Hevel question specifically. The Ritva (in sefer Zikaron, which you can read here) answers the question by saying that one needs to know the secret about what the Rambam writes about Kayin and Hevel. But unfortunately, the Ritva doesn't tell us what that secret it. The footnotes on the Ritva's sefer Zikaron send you to Moreh Nevuchim volume 2 perek 30. There, the idea is developed that neither Kayin nor Hevel were the ones to continue on humanity, but rather Shet was. And we see that Kayin was more physical and Hevel more non-physically oriented. But not in a good way. And their korbanot reflected their natures. So the takeaway is that even Hevel's korban was non-optimal.

But the summary I provided was third-hand. That is, my summary of Rabbi Wiederblank's understanding of the cryptic Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim, where it was already labeled a secret. And which is likely philosophical / mystical, and thus requires the necessary background intellectual background as well as an understanding of the rest of the chapter, as explained by the commentators of the Rambam.

The reference is to this in Moreh Nevuchim:

.וממה שצריך שתדעהו ג״כ ותתעורר
עליו׳ אופני ההנמה בקריאת בני אדם קין והבל והיות
קין הוא ההורג להבל בשדה, ושהם יחד אבדו אף על פי
שתאריך לרוצח,ושלא תתקיים המציאות אלא לשת כי שת לי אלהים זרע אהר הנה כבר התאמת זה

One should listen to the shiur directly. And one should see the Rambam inside.

The Torah obligation to love one's wife

Sometimes, a deep understanding of how midrash works is necessary to understand what it is that Chazal are saying. Case in point is a post, and discussion, at the Daat Torah blog about the obligation to love one's wife.

Let us start with a pasuk in Shir Hashirim, 5:2:

ב  אֲנִי יְשֵׁנָה, וְלִבִּי עֵר; קוֹל דּוֹדִי דוֹפֵק, פִּתְחִי-לִי אֲחֹתִי רַעְיָתִי יוֹנָתִי תַמָּתִי--שֶׁרֹּאשִׁי נִמְלָא-טָל, קְוֻצּוֹתַי רְסִיסֵי לָיְלָה.

2 I sleep, but my heart waketh; Hark! my beloved knocketh: 'Open to me, my sister, my love, my dove, my undefiled; for my head is filled with dew, my locks with the drops of the night.'

We see that in Biblical Hebrew, ra'yati can mean beloved, not just merely a friend. Chazal make a wonderful derasha in two places on the pasuk of veahavta lerei'acha kamocha, which appears in Vayikra 19:18.

יח  לֹא-תִקֹּם וְלֹא-תִטֹּר אֶת-בְּנֵי עַמֶּךָ, וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ:  אֲנִי, ה.

18 Thou shalt not take vengeance, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself: I am the LORD.

On a peshat level it means your neighbor, your fellow man. But Chazal darshen the word lerei'acha to mean 'your beloved', as in Shir Hashirim. 'You should love your beloved as yourself.' If they do so, it is not a simple application of the peshat version of the pasuk, but is rather a specialized derasha, on the midrashic level. And then 'love' can plausibly also take a slightly different meaning than it does on a peshat level.

Daat Torah does not realize this and so, in reply to this comment:

DT: "Where does it say that there is a command to love one's wife?"

Have you excluded "ואהבת לריעך כמוך"?

He replies:

if you want to go that route then there is nothing unique about the emotional connection between husband and wife - she is no worse then Joe the barber or any strangers one meets during the day. The Rambam is clearly basing himself on the gemora in Yevamos - as all commentaries acknowledge. 

Rav Zilberstein does raise this question - the answer is not very satisfying - but I'll get to the translation soon.

Where is the source for the imperative - the gemora does not say or imply that there is?

Bottom line - according to your approach we need to translate the word ahava - not as love but rather "being concerned for another's welfare."

He asserts that if one gets it from  וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ, then there is no distinction from Joe the barber. But this assertion ignores the distinction between peshat in a pasuk and Chazal's derash of a pasuk.

Here is the contradiction he discusses in the main body of the post:

In the discussion about the nature of marriage - the prime question is the role or necessity for love between husband and wife. It is important to note there is an apparent contradiction between the language of the Talmud and the language of the Rambam and subsequent authorities. The Rambam clearly states that the obligation to love  one's wife as oneself is rabbinic. However if he is basing himself on Yevamos (62b) - which the commentaries state is his source - there is no assertion of a rabbinic obligation. It simply says that if one does love one's wife as oneself and a bunch of other things  - there will be peace in his tent. At most it is a wise suggestion. An additional problem is that the Rambam in his commentary to the Mishna (Kiddushin 2:1) clearly states that the obligation is from the Torah command to love your fellow as yourself. That is the language of the gemora Kiddushin 41a. So is the Rambam basing his  obligation of love on a Torah command or rabbinic? Is he basing himself on Yevamos 62b or Kiddushin 41a? Are there two obligations of love as Rav Zilberberg suggests below? Finally it seems from the following sources that love is refering to caring or not hating or not doing negative things to another person . It is not referring to the emotion that we call love.

Yevamos (62b): Our  Rabbis taught: If a man loves his wife as himself and honors her more than himself and guides his sons and daughters on the straight path and has them married close to the age of puberty - the verse (Job 5:24) is applied to him, And you shall know that your tent is in peace.

Rambam(Hilchos Ishus 3:19): Similarly a man should not marry of a child nor should he marry a woman until he has seen her and she is acceptable in his eyes. That is because if he doesn’t see her first it might turn out that she doesn’t find favor in his eyes when he does see her.

 Kiddushin (41a): Rav said that it is prohibited for a man to marry a woman until he has seen her because when he does see her he might notice something which disgusts him and the Torah (Vayikra 19:18) has commanded, “You shall love your fellow as yourself.”

Rambam (Hilchos Ishus 15:19): Our Sages have commanded that a man should honor his wife more then himself and love her as himself.

Rambam(Commentary Kiddushin 2:1): It is correct that each man marry directly rather than through an agent, since we have a general rule that a man should not marry a woman until he has seen her. That is because we are concerned that she won’t find favor in his eyes and yet he will remain married to her in spite of not loving her. Such a thing is prohibited since there is a rule, “You should love your fellow as yourself.” Therefore it is important that the man marries directly rather than through an agent.

It certainly does seem correct that the yellow Rambam passage is based primarily on the yellow gemara and the green Rambam passage is based primarily on the green gemara.

The green passages reflect the explicit derasha, by Rav, of וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ. It is possible that Rambam would consider this to be a rabbinic command rather than a Biblical command, since it is a derasha made on a pasuk, rather than the peshat meaning of the pasuk itself. So even though the Rambam attributes it to וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ, that does not necessitate that this is Biblical, in contradistinction to his statement in Hilchos Ishus that "our Sages have commanded". The green passages, which deal with being married to a person despite not loving them, can carry the connotation of romantic love.

The yellow passages might implicitly reflect the same derasha. This is a brayta, which is Tannaitic, rather than a statement by Rav, an Amora. Yet it states 'if a man loves his wife as himself'. The choice of language clearly reflects the pasuk of  וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ. This may or many not refer to romantic love, but it is a reading off of the pasuk.

Why would Rambam summarize the yellow gemara as "our Sages commanded" rather than "the Torah commanded"? Because this is a derasha based on a pasuk, rather than the peshat meaning of the pasuk itself. Or alternatively, because of the continuation of the statement in both the gemara and Rambam, "honors her more than himself", which is a rabbinic extension.

Why would Rambam summarize the yellow gemara as "our Sages commanded" rather than "our Sages recommended"? Because the recommendation (with positive results) is based on a derasha of a pasuk, so clearly Chazal themselves regarded it as an obligation. Indeed, we could turn to Rav's statement in Kiddushin to reveal how Chazal midrashically interpreted the pasuk, and then apply that knowledge to the brayta in Yevamot. Or alternatively, just because Chazal mentioned a positive result of following their directives does not mean that they considered (or Rambam considered) their statement to be only a wise recommendation.

A literal eye for an eye

Summary: according to Ibn Caspi, Ibn Ezra, Rambam, and Shadal. Plus, what is morally called for?

Post: Consider the following pasuk from parashat Emor, perek 24:

19. And a man who inflicts an injury upon his fellow man just as he did, so shall be done to him [namely,]		יט. וְאִישׁ כִּי יִתֵּן מוּם בַּעֲמִיתוֹ כַּאֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה כֵּן יֵעָשֶׂה לּוֹ:
20. fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth for tooth. Just as he inflicted an injury upon a person, so shall it be inflicted upon him.		כ. שֶׁבֶר תַּחַת שֶׁבֶר עַיִן תַּחַת עַיִן שֵׁן תַּחַת שֵׁן כַּאֲשֶׁר יִתֵּן מוּם בָּאָדָם כֵּן יִנָּתֶן בּוֹ:

Thus, if we interpret this most literally, a literal eye for a literal eye. He inflicted an injury upon a person, so that precise injury should be inflicted upon him.

Rashi cites Chazal on this pasuk:

so shall be done to him: Heb. כֵּן יִנָּתֵן בּוֹ. Our Rabbis explained that this does not mean the actual infliction of a wound, but payment of money. [And how is an injury estimated? The victim] is evaluated as a slave [if he would not have had the injury, and how much with the injury, and the difference is the compensation]. This is why Scripture uses the expression נְתִינָה, “giving,” [thereby alluding to] something that is “handed over (הַנָתוּן)” from hand to hand. — [B.K. 84a]

כן ינתן בו: פירשו רבותינו, שאינו נתינת מום ממש אלא תשלומי ממון, שמין אותו כעבד, לכך כתוב בו לשון נתינה, דבר הנתון מיד ליד:

The word yinaten is the nif'al, that is, the passive. So if it does not mean 'so shall be inflicted upon him [the injurer]', it would mean here 'so shall he [the injuree] be given [monetary payment].' I've discussed this in the past, but let us see what Ibn Caspi has to say here:

It is possible I misunderstand him here, but it certainly seems as if he adopts the more literal explanation as the plain meaning, perhaps even without any modification! He points us to Ibn Ezra and the Rambam. Here is what Ibn Ezra says:

כד, כ]
כן ינתן בו -יש בי"ת תחת על כמו: אשר אני רוכב בה ורבים כן. 
או פירושו כן ינתן בו, אם לא יפדה.

That is, regarding the ב of בו, 'there is a ב which functions in place of על' and thus this means עליו, such that it means "so shall he be given for it", 'as we see in Nechemiah 2:

יב  וָאָקוּם לַיְלָה, אֲנִי וַאֲנָשִׁים מְעַט עִמִּי, וְלֹא-הִגַּדְתִּי לְאָדָם, מָה אֱלֹהַי נֹתֵן אֶל-לִבִּי לַעֲשׂוֹת לִירוּשָׁלִָם; וּבְהֵמָה, אֵין עִמִּי, כִּי אִם-הַבְּהֵמָה, אֲשֶׁר אֲנִי רֹכֵב בָּהּ.

12 And I arose in the night, I and some few men with me; neither told I any man what my God put into my heart to do for Jerusalem; neither was there any beast with me, save the beast that I rode upon.

and many others like it.


Alternatively, its explanation is "so shall it be inflicted upon him" -- if he does not redeem.'

Related, see Ibn Ezra on cutting off a woman's hand, towards the end of parashat Ki Teitzei. Thus, we see Ibn Ezra ready to establish this literal reading as the true meaning of the pasuk, but letting it be superseded by the concept of kofer.

Ibn Caspi says that Rambam hints at his opinion in this. Perhaps he is referring to the following from Mishneh Torah, hilchos chovel umazik, perek 1:

ג  זֶה שֶׁנֶּאֱמָר בַּתּוֹרָה "כַּאֲשֶׁר יִתֵּן מוּם בָּאָדָם, כֵּן יִנָּתֶן בּוֹ" (ויקרא כד,כ)--אֵינוּ לַחְבֹּל בְּזֶה כְּמוֹ שֶׁחָבַל בַּחֲבֵרוֹ, אֵלָא שְׁהוּא רָאוּי לְחַסְּרוֹ אֵבֶר אוֹ לַחְבֹּל בּוֹ כְּמוֹ שֶׁעָשָׂה; וּלְפִיכָּךְ מְשַׁלֵּם נִזְקוֹ.  וַהֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר "וְלֹא-תִקְחוּ כֹפֶר לְנֶפֶשׁ רֹצֵחַ" (במדבר לה,לא), לָרוֹצֵחַ בִּלְבָד הוּא שְׁאֵין כֹּפֵר; אֲבָל לְחֶסְרוֹן אֵבָרִים אוֹ לְחַבְלוֹת, יֵשׁ כֹּפֶר.ש

ד  וְכֵן זֶה שֶׁנֶּאֱמָר בַּחוֹבֵל בַּחֲבֵרוֹ וּמַזִּיקוֹ "לֹא תָחוֹס, עֵינֶךָ" (דברים כה,יב), שֶׁלֹּא תָחוֹס בַּתַּשְׁלוּמִין:  שֶׁמֶּא תֹּאמַר עָנִי הוּא זֶה, וְשֶׁלֹּא בְּכַוָּנָה חָבַל בּוֹ; אֲרַחֲמֶנּוּ.  לְכָּךְ נֶאֱמָר "לֹא תָחוֹס, עֵינֶךָ".ש

"This that the Torah stated {in Emor, the pasuk above}, 'Just as he inflicted an injury upon a person, so shall it be inflicted upon him.' -- this is not to inflict upon him {the actual injury} that he inflicted upon his fellow, but rather that he is fitting to lose a limb or to get inflicted upon as he did. And therefore, he should pay his damages. And behold, it states in Bemidbar 35:31 'and you shall not take kofer for the life of the murderer'. For a murderer alone is there no kofer, but for loss of limbs or injuries, there is kofer.


And so too this is stated by one who injures his fellow and damages him {in the aforementioned pasuk in Ki Teitzei, Devarim 25:12, about a woman who crushes a man's testicles}, 'your eye shall not spare', that you should not have mercy in the payment, lest you say 'he is a pauper', or 'he did not injure him intentionally, and therefore I will have mercy on him'. Therefore it is stated, 'your eye shall not spare.' "

(And Shadal says on the pasuk in Bemidbar 35:31, upon 'and you shall not take kofer for the life of the murderer', the comment that "they said well in Shas: but you shall take kofer for matters of limbs, an eye  for an eye." Shadal intends the same.)

There was a case recently in the news about an Austrian dentist who removed all of her ex-boyfriend's teeth. Her punishment was three years in prison. I would imagine that in addition, the ex-boyfriend could sue her civilly for monetary compensation. But imagine it was just money. Is that really justice, that someone can ruin someone's life in this manner and walk away with such a minor penalty? Viscerally, emotionally, there does seem to be some merit to 'an eye for an eye'. On the other hand, are you truly going to take the most horrific actions that sick, twisted or evil people do and, in a civilized society, appoint an agent for the people to act in precisely the same manner? Here is a case from Iran from last year, where a spurned suitor threw acid in a woman's face, blinding her in both her eyes. The punishment was to blind one of his eyes, since a man is worth two women. In the end, right before the court was to impose this punishment, she pardoned him and spared him this penalty.

The Rambam on timtum halev

Summary: Did he really endorse the kabbalistic understanding of timtum halev?

Post: Towards the end of Shemini, we read:

43. You shall not make yourselves abominable with any creeping creature that creeps, and you shall not defile yourselves with them, that you should become unclean through them.

מג. אַל תְּשַׁקְּצוּ אֶת נַפְשֹׁתֵיכֶם בְּכָל הַשֶּׁרֶץ הַשֹּׁרֵץ וְלֹא תִטַּמְּאוּ בָּהֶם וְנִטְמֵתֶם בָּם:

44. For I am the Lord your God, and you shall sanctify yourselves and be holy, because I am holy, and you shall not defile yourselves through any creeping creature that crawls on the ground.

מד. כִּי אֲנִי ה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם וְהִתְקַדִּשְׁתֶּם וִהְיִיתֶם קְדֹשִׁים כִּי קָדוֹשׁ אָנִי וְלֹא תְטַמְּאוּ אֶת נַפְשֹׁתֵיכֶם בְּכָל הַשֶּׁרֶץ הָרֹמֵשׂ עַל הָאָרֶץ:

This is the basis for a rather famous derasha about timtum halev, on Yoma 39a:

תנא דבי רבי ישמעאל עבירה מטמטמת לבו של אדם שנאמר (ויקרא יא, מג) ולא תטמאו בהם ונטמתם בם אל תקרי ונטמאתם אלא ונטמטם

They taught in the academy of Rabbi Yishmael: a sin dulls {from the root טמם} the heart of man, as it states לֹא תִטַּמְּאוּ בָּהֶם וְנִטְמֵתֶם בָּם.

The basis of the derasha seems to be the krei vs. ketiv, leading to an al tikrei. That is, we should have expected an aleph in the word וְנִטְמֵאתֶם. Indeed, the Samaritans have that aleph. Since it is missing, the second ת is read as if it were a ט, and thus we have ונטמטם, 'and you will be dulled'.

Rashi explains there:
מטמטמת - אוטמת וסותמת מכל חכמה:

Now, there are two plausible readings of this gemara. One is that the gemara means specifically eating maachalos asuros, forbidden foods. After all, the prooftext is drawn from Shemini, where the peshat context was eating forbidden foods. Then, this is the basis of, or else is linked to, the (later) kabbalistic concept of timtum halev. And then, even accidental consumption of forbidden foods would have a deleterious spiritual effect on a person.

A second plausible reading is that the gemara is talking about any sin. After all, despite how it is often misquoted, the gemara actually says עבירה מטמטמת לבו של אדם, and aveira, not specifically eating a forbidden food. And the idea, perhaps from a rationalist perspective, is that acting in such a manner, deliberately, will have this negative effect on a person. He starts with one sin, thus making himself impure, and the consequence is this negative intellectual or spiritual effect. If so, it does not stand as the Talmudic basis or support for the kabbalistic idea, but is rather another example, which falls into a general pattern, of kabbalists retrojecting their ideas onto Chazal.

With this as background, I was surprised to see the following in Ateres HaMikra:

"Q: Is there an example how eating tereifos and neveilos has an impact on the soul of a talmid chacham?
 A: (The Gaon, Rav Chaim Soleveitchik of Brisk) (brought in the michtav yado of the Maggid of Ritteveh, HaGaon Rav Yissacher Ber {=a Rebbe, a student of the Chozeh of Lublin}:

"When the Rambam visited Yemen, he met a certain gaon of the geonim of the time. And after the Rambam returned home, this gaon would regularly write him questions and answers. One time, a letter reached him from the gaon, and on the page was a deep question in philosophy. The Rambam was much astounded at this question, and he said, 'I don't understand how this is so, that a question like this could arise in the mind of a Jew... for questions such as this do not arise in the Jewish mind until his soul is an impure soul. And the Rambam refrained from answering him regarding his question.

After some length of time, this fellow continued sending many letters, until the Rambam felt that he had to answer him. And his answer to the gaon was: Go and check the slaughterers and the inspectors in your community.

 Upon receipt of the letter, the gaon followed the instructions of the Rambam. And then was revealed that for thirteen years, they had fed him and the entire city neveilos and tereifos, such that even a gaon such as himself came up with a question of minus and apikorsus."

This story is just too perfect. Brought by a Rebbe, citing a scholar of Rambam, it presents the uber-rationalist Rambam endorsing, in a practical instance, the kabbalistic idea of timtum haleiv. Thus, it had an impact even though it was not consumed knowingly, and it was specifically maachalos asuros, as opposed to any sin.

There is the possibility of broken telephone at play here. Ideally, I would like to see this directly from  Rav Chaim Brisker (to see whether he said it, and if so if he was repeating a story he had heard or something he had seen directly), and more ideally, I would like to see this in an exchange from the Rambam and the gaon in Yemen directly. Otherwise, it is just too perfect a story, and seems apocryphal.

With some slight Googling, I see that this story is mentioned in a post at Havolim and discussed in this post at Rationalist Judaism about Tylenol and timtum halev.

From the Havolim post:

The sefer Mishuchan [sic] Gavo’ah here brings from the Ramban (discussed above) that the ma’acholim that the Torah assered were assered because they are bad for our health, and brings the Abravenel (discussed above) says that the Torah is not a medical book, and that these dinim are to protect our neshamos, not our bodies. He brings from the Magid from Ritteveh, Reb Yissochor Ber, that he heard from Reb Chayim Brisker that once the Torah made them assur, they are indeed mazik the body, as we see the din of timtum halev. He brings from the Brisker Rov that according to Reb Chaim, the timtum is only where al pi din the thing is assur to eat, but not for a choleh. He brings a story from the Briskers that the Rambam once visited Teiman, and met a great Gaon there, with whom he began a correspondence. Once he got a question from him that showed apikursus, and he refused to continue the correspondence. When the Teimani kept sending him inquiries, the Rambam told him to be bodeik the local kashrus. He later got a letter from the Gaon that he did investigate, and found that one local shochet had been ma’achil neveilos and treifos to the community for the past 13 years.

So there certainly is this tension here between an uber-rationalist reading of Rambam, and a more kabbalistic reading. It seems that Rav Chaim Brisker was harmonizing the two and brought the story as support.

In the comment section on Rationalist Judaism, Rabbi Natan Slifkin writes:

A "story from the Briskers" about Rambam which goes entirely against Maimonidean philosophy in several ways, does not have very much credibility.

Proximate vs. ultimate cause in the sending of Yosef

Summary: How Ibn Caspi understands Moreh Nevuchim. I think...

Post: In parashat Vayigash:

7. And God sent me before you to make for you a remnant in the land, and to preserve [it] for you for a great deliverance.

ז. וַיִּשְׁלָחֵנִי אֱ־לֹהִים לִפְנֵיכֶם לָשׂוּם לָכֶם שְׁאֵרִית בָּאָרֶץ וּלְהַחֲיוֹת לָכֶם לִפְלֵיטָה גְּדֹלָה:

8. And now, you did not send me here, but God, and He made me a father to Pharaoh, a lord over all his household, and a ruler over the entire land of Egypt.

ח. וְעַתָּה לֹא אַתֶּם שְׁלַחְתֶּם אֹתִי הֵנָּה כִּי הָאֱ־לֹהִים וַיְשִׂימֵנִי לְאָב לְפַרְעֹה וּלְאָדוֹן לְכָל בֵּיתוֹ וּמֹשֵׁל בְּכָל אֶרֶץ מִצְרָיִם:

Of course, the brothers did sell Yosef, and thus did send him to Egypt. But that was just the unwitting fulfillment of the Divine plan.

Ibn Caspi makes an interesting diyuk on וַיִּשְׁלָחֵנִי אֱ־לֹהִים לִפְנֵיכֶם. He writes:

"וַיִּשְׁלָחֵנִי אֱ־לֹהִים לִפְנֵיכֶם; and afterwards, לֹא אַתֶּם שְׁלַחְתֶּם אֹתִי הֵנָּה. May that tzaddik, Rabbenu Moshe [=Rambam] be blessed for good, who enlightened our eyes in this, for he made from these two pesukim two parts (in perek 48 from the second volume [of Moreh Nevuchim, here, the very end of the second volume]). And the explanation of this will be written in another place, and you, understand it, if you are able."

A footnote directs us to Ibn Caspi's remarks in Tiras Kesef:

"Regarding וַיִּשְׁלָחֵנִי אֱ־לֹהִים לִפְנֵיכֶם, behold the Moreh Nevuchim mentions it in one way, and mentions in another way לֹא אַתֶּם שְׁלַחְתֶּם אֹתִי הֵנָּה. And I have already promised you that I would not repeat the words of the kadmonim, but I am hinting regarding this to you because of its greatness and because most people don't understand it. And know that the difference between these two statements are based on the word לפניכם, for this is like the meaning of {Bereishit 46:28}:

28. He sent Judah ahead of him to Joseph, to direct him to Goshen, and they came to the land of Goshen.

כח. וְאֶת יְהוּדָה שָׁלַח לְפָנָיו אֶל יוֹסֵף לְהוֹרֹת לְפָנָיו גֹּשְׁנָה וַיָּבֹאוּ אַרְצָה גֹּשֶׁן:

Understand in this what you are able."

And here is Moreh Nevuchim:

And Ibn Caspi writes regarding this, in his commentary on Moreh Nevuchim:

"For Yosef's brothers sent him to Egypt by their choice, for they sold him to merchants who were traveling to Egypt, etc. Yet after this, the Rambam mentions another verse about Yosef that it is from that which is 'happenstance'. And this is because there is written לפניהם [sic; should be לפניכם], for this combines with another, and behold, הנה {?} its intent is to the send him before them [as a forerunner], and that they would come after him, etc."

I don't have enough of a grounding in Greek philosophy and medieval Jewish philosophy to claim that I can fully understand the import. I suppose we should look at Abarbanel on this point, or in the commentary of the Ephodi to Moreh Nevuchim on this point.

But there is a difference in philosophy between proximate and ultimate cause:

In philosophy a proximate cause is an event which is closest to, or immediately responsible for causing, some observed result. This exists in contrast to a higher-level ultimate cause (or distal cause) which is usually thought of as the "real" reason something occurred.

And Aristotle distinguishes between four causes, two of which are efficient cause and final cause:

"Cause" means: (a) in one sense, that as the result of whose presence something comes into being—e.g. the bronze of a statue and the silver of a cup, and the classes which contain these [i.e., the material cause]; (b) in another sense, the form or pattern; that is, the essential formula and the classes which contain it—e.g. the ratio 2:1 and number in general is the cause of the octave—and the parts of the formula [i.e., the formal cause]. (c) The source of the first beginning of change or rest; e.g. the man who plans is a cause, and the father is the cause of the child, and in general that which produces is the cause of that which is produced, and that which changes of that which is changed [i.e., the efficient cause]. (d) The same as "end"; i.e. the final cause; e.g., as the "end" of walking is health. For why does a man walk? "To be healthy," we say, and by saying this we consider that we have supplied the cause [the final cause]. (e) All those means towards the end which arise at the instigation of something else, as, e.g. fat-reducing, purging, drugs and instruments are causes of health; for they all have the end as their object, although they differ from each other as being some instruments, others actions [i.e., necessary conditions].

— Metaphysics, Book 5, section 1013a, translated by Hugh Tredennick^[9]

I would understand this as follows. Yes, Yosef's brothers did cause him to go to Egypt. They were the efficient cause, or the proximate cause. If so, what does it mean that וְעַתָּה לֹא אַתֶּם שְׁלַחְתֶּם אֹתִי הֵנָּה כִּי הָאֱ־לֹהִים? That you should not confuse this efficient cause with the final, or ultimate, cause, which was the Divine plan. Thus, it was really Hashem who sent him.

Of course there are proximate causes, and agents which act whether accidentally or with will. Thus, Hashem tells Eliyahu in I Melachim 17:9:

ט  קוּם לֵךְ צָרְפַתָה אֲשֶׁר לְצִידוֹן, וְיָשַׁבְתָּ שָׁם; הִנֵּה צִוִּיתִי שָׁם אִשָּׁה אַלְמָנָה, לְכַלְכְּלֶךָ.

9 'Arise, get thee to Zarephath, which belongeth to Zidon, and dwell there; behold, I have commanded a widow there to sustain thee.'

Yet from the description there, it was not a command from Hashem but the widow's choice. And so too by Shimi ben Gera, in II Shmuel 16:10:

יא  וַיֹּאמֶר דָּוִד אֶל-אֲבִישַׁי וְאֶל-כָּל-עֲבָדָיו, הִנֵּה בְנִי אֲשֶׁר-יָצָא מִמֵּעַי מְבַקֵּשׁ אֶת-נַפְשִׁי; וְאַף כִּי-עַתָּה בֶּן-הַיְמִינִי, הַנִּחוּ לוֹ וִיקַלֵּל--כִּי אָמַר-לוֹ, ה.

11 And David said to Abishai, and to all his servants: 'Behold, my son, who came forth of my body, seeketh my life; how much more this Benjamite now? let him alone, and let him curse; for the LORD hath bidden him.

Shimi ben Gera was not a prophet, but rather acting of his own volition. But if it happened, it happened because Hashem willed it to happen. These are some of the examples the Rambam brings in Moreh Nevuchim. And so, it does not matter if, from a human perspective, the humans acted deliberately or accidentally, and whether it was seeming random chance and a multitude of contributory factors. Despite all this, it was ultimately the ratzon Hashem at work.

What of וַיִּשְׁלָחֵנִי אֱ־לֹהִים לִפְנֵיכֶם in the earlier pasuk? This would refer (again) to the final or ultimate cause. Does that mean that Hashem sent him in the same sense of the brothers sending him? Or, does that mean that sent Yosef from before his brothers, such that they indeed sent him? Ibn Caspi understands the pattern of שלח ... לפניו as sending a forerunner to prepare the way. And if so, this is a different kind of שלח than in the later pasuk.

That is all for now, for my limited time. You can read Abarbanel at length here, starting in the middle of the first column, beginning with the words ואמנם כח טענת יוסף.

A question for the Taliban women

Summary: What are they doing out of their homes? We see from Rashi, Ralbag, and Rambam, that it is a breach of tznius for a woman to leave her home. And an analysis and response to this, of why this is not obligatory or even a good idea for present-day women.

Post:


Important note: The beginning of this post is written tongue-in-cheek. Don't take this as a real suggestion.

In this week's parasha, we read of Dinah's "going out", and her eventual rape. Rashi cites Midrash Rabba which is not in favor of her 'going out'.

1. Dinah, the daughter of Leah, whom she had borne to Jacob, went out to look about among the daughters of the land.		א. וַתֵּצֵא דִינָה בַּת לֵאָה אֲשֶׁר יָלְדָה לְיַעֲקֹב לִרְאוֹת בִּבְנוֹת הָאָרֶץ:
the daughter of Leah: And not the daughter of Jacob? However, because of her going out she was called the daughter of Leah, since she (Leah) too was in the habit of going out, as it is said: “and Leah came forth toward him” (above 30:16). [from Tanchuma Vayishlach 7] (And concerning her, they devise the proverb: Like mother like daughter.) - [Gen. Rabbah 80:1]		בת לאה: ולא בת יעקב, אלא על שם יציאתה נקראת בת לאה, שאף היא יצאנית היתה, שנאמר (ל טז) ותצא לאה לקראתו (ועליה משלו המשל (יחזקאל טז מד) כאמה כבתה):

The Ralbag lists on each parasha a series of תועלות, which are benefits/purposes/lessons we can glean from the parasha, whether in דעות of מדות. Among those for middos, he writes the following:

"The fourth toeles is in middos, and this is that it is not fitting for a woman to go out of her house. Do you not see what negative results happened to Dinah when she went out to look among the daughters of the land, until this was almost a cause for the destruction of her entire father's house, were Hashem not aiding them?"

(That is, that the nations might have taken revenge for the destruction of Shechem by Shimon and Levi.)

We see similar sentiments in Midrash Tanchuma. Besides the yatzanis aspect, we have:

ותצא דינה בת לאה זה שאמר הכתוב: כל כבודה בת מלך פנימה (תהלים מ"ה).ו

אמר ר' יוסי: 
כשהאשה מצנעת את עצמה בתוך הבית ראויה להינשא לכהן גדול ותעמיד כוהנים גדולים, שנאמר: כל כבודה וגו'. 
אם תכבד עצמה בתוך הבית, ממשבצות זהב לבושה, תינשא למי שכתוב בהן: ושבצת הכתונת שש. 

א"ר פנחס הכהן בר חמא: 
בזמן שהיא צנועה בתוך הבית, כשם שהמזבח מכפר, כך היא מכפרת על ביתה, שנאמר: (תהלים קכ"ח) אשתך כגפן פוריה בירכתי ביתך, ואין ירכתי, אלא מזבח, שנאמר: ושחט אותו על ירך המזבח (ויקרא א'). 

"And Dinah the daughter of Leah went out: This is what Scriptures (Tehillim 45) states, 'All glorious is the king's daughter within the palace...'

Rabbi Yossi said: When she keeps herself hidden [tzanua] in the house, she is worthy of marrying the Kohen Gadol, and to bear Kohen Gadols, as is stated, 'All glorious is the king's daughter within the palace...' If she honors herself in the house, [the pasuk continues], 'her raiment is of chequer work inwrought with gold,' [meaning that] she will be married to the one about whom is written [Shemot 28:39], 'And thou shalt weave the tunic in chequer work of fine linen...'

Rabbi Pinchas HaKohen bar Chama said: At the time she is tzenua within the house, just as the altar atones, so does she atone for her house, as is written [Tehillim 128], 'Thy wife shall be as a fruitful vine, in the innermost parts of thy house...', and there is no yarkesei, 'innermost parts' except for the altar, as is stated [Vayikra 1], 'and he shall slaughter it on the yerech of the altar'.

We might also bring in the Rambam, in Hilchos Ishus, 13:11:

יג  [יא] מְקוֹמוֹת שֶׁדַּרְכָּן שֶׁלֹּא תֵצֵא אִשָּׁה בַּשּׁוּק בְּכֻפָּח שֶׁעַל רֹאשָׁהּ בִּלְבָד, עַד שֶׁיִּהְיֶה עָלֶיהָ רָדִיד הַחוֹפֶה אֶת כָּל גּוּפָהּ כְּמוֹ טְלִית--נוֹתֵן לָהּ בִּכְלַל הַכְּסוּת, רָדִיד הַפָּחוּת בְּכָל הָרְדִידִין; וְאִם הָיָה עָשִׁיר--נוֹתֵן לְפִי עָשְׁרוֹ, כְּדֵי שֶׁתֵּצֵא בּוֹ לְבֵית הָאֵבֶל אוֹ לְבֵית הַמִּשְׁתֶּה:  לְפִי שֶׁכָּל אִשָּׁה יֵשׁ לָהּ לָצֵאת וְלֵילֵךְ לְבֵית אָבִיהָ לְבַקְּרוֹ, וּלְבֵית הָאֵבֶל וּלְבֵית הַמִּשְׁתֶּה לִגְמֹל חֶסֶד לְרֵעוֹתֶיהָ וְלִקְרוֹבוֹתֶיהָ, כְּדֵי שֶׁיָּבוֹאוּ הֶם לָהּ--שְׁאֵינָהּ בְּבֵית הַסֹּהַר, עַד שֶׁלֹּא תֵצֵא וְלֹא תָבוֹא. 

יד  אֲבָל גְּנָאי הוּא לָאִשָּׁה שֶׁתְּהֶא יוֹצְאָה תָּמִיד, פַּעַם בַּחוּץ פַּעַם בָּרְחוֹבוֹת; וְיֵשׁ לַבַּעַל לִמְנֹעַ אִשְׁתּוֹ מִזֶּה, וְלֹא יַנִּיחָהּ לָצֵאת אֵלָא כְּמוֹ פַּעַם אַחַת בְּחֹדֶשׁ אוֹ פַּעֲמַיִם בְּחֹדֶשׁ, כְּפִי הַצֹּרֶךְ:  שְׁאֵין יֹפִי לָאִשָּׁה אֵלָא לֵישֵׁב בְּזָוִית בֵּיתָהּ, שֶׁכָּךְ כָּתוּב "כָּל-כְּבוּדָּה בַת-מֶלֶךְ פְּנִימָה" (תהילים מה,יד).ש

"Places where it is the women's custom not to go out to the market with only a kupach upon her head, until she has upon her a radid which covers her entire body like a talis, this he gives her among the garments [he is obligated to give his wife], the least of all radids; and if he is wealthy, he gives her in accordance with his wealth, so that she may go out in it to the house of the mourner or the house of feasting. For each woman may go and come to her father's house to visit him, and to the house of mourning and the house of feasting in order to perform deeds of kindness for her friends and relatives, and so that they will come to her -- for she is not in prison, such that she cannot come and go. 

However, it is a reproach for a woman to be always coming and going, sometimes outside, sometimes in the streets, and a husband should prevent his wife from doing this, and not permit her to go out except such as one or two times per month, in accordance with the need. For it only beautiful for a woman to sit in the corner of her house, for such is written (Tehillim 45:14), kol kevudah bat melech penimah, "All glorious is the king's daughter within the palace..."

And so I ask why we are seeing these Taliban women out on the streets. If they were really tznius, they would heed the Midrash Rabba, Rashi, Rambam, and Ralbag and stay in their homes.

Of course, this is a joke. Just because I can harness rabbinic sources for a position does not mean that this is how women should be acting today. What Ralbag and Rambam wrote was, perhaps, appropriate for their day, their place, and their social circle. But it is more than inappropriate in other situations.

Yes, tznius is in many respects a function of cultural norms. The gemara in Kesubos refers to daas Moshe and daas Yehudis in terms of head coverings, and one well-established way of understanding daas Yehudis is as a function of cultural norms.

The Rambam, who writes of wearing the radid, freely admits to this. He prefaced all this with:

Places where it is the women's custom not to go out to the market with...

That is, specifically in those places is where the wife would then be expected to wear a radid, in which case the husband is obligated to furnish her with one. There are other cultural aspects of tznius. For instance, he see that a tefach of exposed flesh has some status of ervah only in those places where it is common for women to keep that area of the body covered.

And one could debunk each of these rabbinic sources with rabbinic counter-sources. Fault Dinah's going out, and connect it to Leah's "going out"? What about the pasuk in Vayeitzei that states that:

ו  וַיֹּאמֶר לָהֶם, הֲשָׁלוֹם לוֹ; וַיֹּאמְרוּ שָׁלוֹם--וְהִנֵּה רָחֵל בִּתּוֹ, בָּאָה עִם-הַצֹּאן.

6 And he said unto them: 'Is it well with him?' And they said: 'It is well; and, behold, Rachel his daughter cometh with the sheep.'

Clearly, as a shepherdess, Rachel did not spend all days indoors either! See another Rishon, Rabbi Yosef Ibn Caspi, who does not seem to take such a negative attitude to Dinah's going out:

ותצא דינה בת לאה .  זה חסד גדול מנותן התורה כי הודיענו סבתה


which then presents is as a sort of justification of Dinah.

And see the more recent Malbim, who writes (in haTorah veHamitzvah):

"And Dinah went out: It informs that Dinah was not guilty in this, that you should not say that the breached the fence of tznius, for she was 'the daughter of Leah', who was tznuah in her tent, and 'whom she bore to Yaakov', that her birth was associated with Yaakov, that she was a modest and worthy person, for the 'going out' was not to go after the young men but rather 'to see the girls of the land' and their ways."

This admittedly does not get us precisely at our destination, but a good portion of the way. Dinah is no longer to blame for the "untznius" act of "going out".

But one need not resort to this. There is normal behavior in this world and in this society, and there is non-normal behavior. The wives of many, many great rabbis, for many generations, did indeed leave the house more than once or twice a month. As just one example, as if this needed evidence, the Chafetz Chaim's wife managed a store. Maybe for the Rambam, living in Arab lands in the middle ages, this sort of behavior was not out of the ordinary. I don't believe that the Rambam (or Ralbag), being the same great talmid chacham he was, but living today in our society and knowing of our society and our women, would be saying the same thing.

How is the failed negative prophecy exclusion encoded in Shofetim? part ii

Summary: The same issue as before. How shall we resolve the exclusion of negative prophecy from a prophet test, with the absence of such an exclusion in the plain meaning of the pasuk. This bothers Rabbi Yosef Ibn Caspi, as a pashtan, and so he puts forth a different elaborate theory from that of the Rambam. Namely, there is no distinction between a positive or negative prophecy. Rather, the distinction is whether there is an explicit condition attached or not.

Post: Ibn Caspi addresses the same issue discussed in the previous post, and creates an elaborate theory. He writes:


"And if you say in your heart -- this is a protest referring to the first segment {J: namely, the false prophet of Hashem}, for the second {namely, the prophet of idols} is explained in and of itself.


Says Yosef, the author of sefer haSod and sefer haMashal: in these sefarim {I wrote}, I have already discussed at length this subject and that of prophecy. And we are drawn in it to the opinion of the Sages of the Talmud and that of the Rambam, in that which he explains in sefer haMada {meaning in Mishneh Torah, sefer haMada, hilchot Yesodei HaTorah, perek 10} and in his introduction to his commentary on Mishnayot {you can find this at the end of a gemara Brachot}. And more have I expanded on this in sefer haMashal, in parashat Ki Tisa.


However, now I am leaning to another position in one of the roots; and this is that the Rambam sets out that in a prediction of woe a prophet cannot be tested, but only of weal. And he brings a proof from the statement of Yirmeyah to Chananiah. And he explains  אֲשֶׁר יְדַבֵּר הַנָּבִיא בְּשֵׁם ה, 'that which the prophet says in the name of Hashem' {pasuk 22}, as speaking of weal. And I have already showed you that I lean away from things such as this, namely, to add or to subtract words from the text. For if so, we have no Torah or Scriptures, and in general we have no early sefer, for every day we can add to it as we wish! And here, it is written via Moshe,  אֲשֶׁר יְדַבֵּר הַנָּבִיא בְּשֵׁם ה, this is without specification and given as a general encompassing statement. So how can we add to it 'only for weal'? Or why do we not make a division {as well} above, when it said 'or that which was said in the names of other gods'? Therefore, it meaning to me is just as it is written, no more and no less. And its intent if so is in general, whether for weal or woe, for the prophet may be tested with any foretelling of future events, whether for weal or woe. For if it is fulfilled in this way, he is a true prophet, and if not, he is a false prophet. And it is already known in logic {הגיון -- common sense?} how the fulfillment and finding correct of a statement is. For Yirmeyah, who said to Chananiah that because he prophesied falsely, 'this year you shall die' {Jeremiah 28:16}, the Scriptures testifies about him that 'Chananiah died in that year' {Jeremiah 18:17}. For if he did not



die in that year, Yirmeyahu the prophet would have been a false prophet. For a true prophet cannot err in a future foretelling at all. If so, it is upon us to explain the dispute Yirmiyah had with Chanania, where Chanania foretold weal to the nation of Israel, and Yirmeyah the woe, until Yirmeyah said to him {Jeremiah 28:7-9} 'Nevertheless hear thou now this word that I speak in thine ears, and in the ears of all the people: The prophets that have been before me and before thee of old prophesied against many countries, and against great kingdoms, of war, and of evil, and of pestilence. The prophet that prophesieth of peace, when the word of the prophet shall come to pass, then shall the prophet be known, that the LORD hath truly sent him.'


And behold, before this statement, Yirmeyah wrote regarding the prophecy which reached him in the house of the potter, {Jeremiah 18:7-10}'At one instant I may speak concerning a nation, and concerning a kingdom, to pluck up and to break down and to destroy it; but if that nation turn from their evil, because of which I have spoken against it, I repent of the evil that I thought to do unto it. And at one instant I may speak concerning a nation, and concerning a kingdom, to build and to plant it; but if it do evil in My sight, that it hearken not to My voice, then I repent of the good, wherewith I said I would benefit it.'


{Josh: Others would explain that this is intent, rather than publicly pronounced prophecy.}


And it is explained that this is true as well for an individual, as Yechezkel explains {Ezekiel 18}. But it mentions a nation and kingdom, for the intent is upon klal Yisrael, as is explained there. If so, it is made clear that Hashem Yisbarach repents and retracts regarding foretelling of woe and foretelling of weal, since He had put His thoughts in this way for the mentioned causes, according to what His wisdom, Yisbarach, decreed. And therefore, Yaakov feared {=shema yigrom hachet when encountering Esav}, even though Hashem had already promised him weal. And forfend for me to believe that there is to Hashem a changing in will; for if He decreed woe His word will come to pass, and so too for weal. However, the change comes from the recipients. By which I mean from our end, we who hear His decree in words spoken via a prophet. I mean that the statement is not understood as it is, and when it does not approach as we understood it, we think that Hashem has repented; if so, we deny Hashem. And forfend! Rather, all His words are true. But it is known that the decrees, some of them

possess different aspects {eventualities?}, and the mention of the aspects are omitted in action. For we say, by way of example {al derech mashal} 'Reuven will write tomorrow', whose intent is that it is possible that he will write. And every potentiality, it is possible that it will be and it is possible that it will not be. And if a prophet says this in the name of Hashem -- my intent is that he says this without caveat 'this Reuven will write tomorrow', behold, that hamon am who hear this will look on the morrow whether he writes or not. And if it is that he does not write at all, the hamon will say that Hashem repented. And if so, the word of Hashem which is spoken today is complete falsehood, for it is a decreed matter. And therefore, behold He said via Shmuel that Shaul will rule over Israel. Shaul, as well as the entire nation, thought, that the intent of this decree was clear and continuous. And when Hashem became detested with him, Shaul and Israel said that Hashem repented. And because of their thoughts, the Scriptures said {I Samuel 15:11} 'I have repented that I appointed Saul king'. But by way of truth, according to the intent of Hashem, Shmuel spoke {I Samuel 15:29} 'And also the Glory of Israel will not lie nor repent; for He is not a man, that He should repent.'


And so did Eliyahu prophesy in the name of Hashem to Achav, {I Kings 21:21}'Behold, I will bring evil upon thee, and will utterly sweep thee away, and will cut off from Ahab every man-child, and him that is shut up and him that is left at large in Israel....' And this language would support either in his days or to his house after him, for all of that is woe to him. But Achav and those by him who heard imagined that the intent of this language was that




it would be in his days, such that he humbled himself, and Hashem said {I Kings 21:29}'Seest thou how Ahab humbleth himself before Me? because he humbleth himself before Me, I will not bring the evil in his days; but in his son's days will I bring the evil upon his house.'


For if not for this, Hashem would have lied. And so too the opposite of this, that if Achav would in the future humble himself, Hashem would not say 'in his days', for {Proverbs 28:13}'but whoso confesseth and forsaketh them shall obtain mercy'. And it is known that all is foreseen and yet freewill is granted. And the general idea of the matter is that Hashem decrees His decrees and informs the prophet of them in words, sometimes absolute and sometimes tied to a condition. And this is whether for weal or woe. And the words of Hashem are always true, and He does not lie, forfend. And if we, who hear it, judge it as absolute, that they are certain when they are merely possibilities, or there is some condition even if it not mentioned, what is His iniquity, Yisbarach? For Moshe, by way of example, when he said to Pharaoh {Exodus 8:23} 'a three day journey, etc.'. And Pharaoh, in his foolishness in thinking,









understood this statement as that they would return after the sacrifice, then what sin did Moshe His agent sin? If so, the statement {in Yirmiyahu 18, in the house of the potter}as well, 'At one instant I speak', whether for woe or weal, for upon both of them is written 'I repent', this is within the thought of people. And the matter is such, that Hashem, as He sits upon his throne, looks and sees the nation as evil at that time, and He sees the future what will be if they return from their evil, and what the level of their repentance will be as well. And if He, Yisbarach, sees that in the future they will not repent, he will decree upon them the woe in absolute. And if He, Yisbarach, sees that in the future they will repent, he will decree upon them the woe on condition, by which I mean that if they repent, the woe will not come upon them. And so it the matter for good, upon the nation which is presently good. And there is no doubt that Hashem reveals his secret to his servants the prophets. And all is in accordance with the completeness of the prophets. Sometimes Hashem will reveal to the prophet if that nation will repent of his wickedness or goodness, and sometimes He will not reveal to him the foretelling, whether for woe or weal, and sometimes in absolute terms, with the prophet confused for himself, to know if this decree is an absolute certainty or not, and he will wait and watch what will be be in the end, just as happened to Yonah, in that which Hashe revealed to him, {Jonah 3:4}'Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be overthrown', , עוֹד אַרְבָּעִים יוֹם, וְנִינְוֵה נֶהְפָּכֶת. For Hashem only told him these four words, but with the prophet being perplexed in this. He know that Hashem does not lie nor repent, until at the ed of the forty days it was made clear to Yonah the intent of Hashem in His previous statement. And this was via one of two ways. Either the city would be overturned and the people would leave from it, just as Lot and his daughters left from the overturning, in which case the decree was absolute; or that the city would not be overturned and the city and its residents would be spared, in which case the decree was only a possibility, based on a condition which was in the intent on Hashem, by which I mean if they did not repent. And this is how the decree was always correct and not in error, forfend.


And the general principle of the matter, we have already explained in the statement of Yirmeyah in the prophecy in the house of the potter, for all of us, whether a nation or individual, we are in the hands of Hashem like clay in the hands of the potter. For if Hashem decrees upon us woe, and we repent of the misbehavior which is our hands, the woe will not come to us; and so too for weal. And there is no difference whether we day that Hashem decreed this by His own aspect, Yisbarach, or whether



we say that the prophet prophesied this in His name, for the prophet only has the content of the words which Hashem said to him in vision or in dream, no more and no less in its words. Just as 'if you listen' and 'if you do not listen', which Moshe said from the mouth of Hashem, it is required that the foretelling stand when the condition stands. And if the decree is absolute in its words, we the listeners are left in perplexity until we see what happens in the end. For it is not possible to interpret the intent of the decree based on the words, and the lack is from our side, rather than from the side of the decree or from the side of the One who said it, namely Hashem Yisbarach. For He knows His intent, and the Eternity of Israel neither lies nor repents. And this is the true approach which we have in this.


However, after we set up this approach, and we establish as well that the decree that the prophet states from Hashem, one can take from its words only one of two ways, namely if it is absolute or if it is conditional in its words. And it is upon us the listeners to see the fulfillment of the condition to action in the future or not, and in this way the prophet is tested, by which I mean that the fortelling is fulfilled, either for weal or for woe in the establishment of the condition which left his mouth, no less and no more. For without this, his decree is not fulfilled but is false, and if so he is a false prophet. And this is what was said, הוּא הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר לֹא דִבְּרוֹ ה בְּזָדוֹן דִּבְּרוֹ הַנָּבִיא, for this is the rule, whether for woe or for weal.


But what shall we do with a decree which is 'absolute' in its wording, for such did Hashem transmit to the prophet, and the prophet transmitted as it was to the nation; where we know that a prophecy which is 'absolute' in its wording, it is possible that it is a possibility, or attached to a condition in its nature and subject matter. If so, how shall we judge in this way from the decrees if they will be retracted {?} for us, and this is whether it is for woe or weal? And how does the Torah help us in this verse, by which I mean where it states אֲשֶׁר יְדַבֵּר הַנָּבִיא בְּשֵׁם ה, such that we would execute him in Bet Din if he sins? And in what way will it be made true to us that he erred in his foretelling, since the intent of the decree was concealed from us?


The answer to this, in my opinion, is that in the decree which is 'absolute' in its wording, whether for woe or weal, the prophet cannot be tested. Yet, still the verse is sustained as true in general, by which I mean that where it says behold, אֲשֶׁר יְדַבֵּר הַנָּבִיא בְּשֵׁם ה וְלֹא יִהְיֶה הַדָּבָר וְלֹא יָבוֹא הוּא הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר לֹא דִבְּרוֹ ה. For if it is conditional in its wording, we will investigate if the condition is fulfilled and it it is found correct, if he is a true prophet. And if it is found false, he is a false prophet. And if it is 'absolute' in its wording, we are unable to declare it true or false, since its nature is concealed from us. And in this, one would not find וְלֹא יִהְיֶה הַדָּבָר וְלֹא יָבוֹא, that the matter was not and it did not come to pass.


But the verse informs us that in any case that one can find וְלֹא יִהְיֶה הַדָּבָר וְלֹא יָבוֹא, this is the matter which Hashem did not speak, and we execute the prophet. And if we do not find this, for whatever reason it would be, we do not execute him. And if this situation is withheld from us because we do not know the nature of the decree, since we are not God, there is no sin upon us, and we do not fall under the clause {in verse 19} אָנֹכִי אֶדְרֹשׁ מֵעִמּוֹ, 'I will exact it of him' {regarding one who does not hearken to the words said in Hashem's name}.


And see the division of the Giver of the Torah, that he was not stringent to spell out how the matter which Hashem did not speak is known,



but only how the matter which Hashem did NOT speak is known. And this is because He stated {in verse 19}, 'And it will be, that whoever does not hearken to My words that he speaks in My name, I will exact [it] of him.'


This judgement is to God, and if He, Yisbarach, made us somewhat deficient that it is possible that decrees go forth which our intellects cannot ascertain their nature, what iniquity do we have in this? And this is the skilled labor that we do. But He was precise in stating 'How will be known the matter which Hashem did NOT speak', such that we should execute him in Bet Din, as He commanded us, 'and that prophet shall die', and He gave us a set  boundary, that if the matter does not come to pass, this is the matter which Hashem did not speak, and we should excute him, for he is a false prophet. And if the matter rests in such a way that we cannot establish whether the matter was or was not, such as where the decree was 'absolute' in its wording, we shall abandon the judgement of this prophet to Hashem, for He is the one who knows his nature, and we shall not execute him.


And now, the choice is ours in this, whether to listen to him or not, and whatever we do, Hashem judges us according to our hearts, and all His ways are justice. Therefore, Yirmeyah, who introduced at the start of his words to prophesy the destruction of Yerushalayim with an 'absolute' decree, as is stated (Jeremiah 1:15), 'For, lo, I will call all the families of the kingdoms of the north...', behold there is not in this any sin to Israel, for in this he did not command them anything. And if so, this is not subject to the statement of Hashem of וְהָיָה הָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר לֹא יִשְׁמַע אֶל דְּבָרַי . But it was a sin to Israel when they did not hearken to Yirmeyah in that which he explained to them after this, that this decree, though it was absolute in its wording, was in its nature attached to a condition, by which I mean that if they subject themselves to the king of Bavel, unless it be told to them from the mouth of Hashem 'serve the king of Bavel and live' {Jeremiah 27:17}, and they did not hearken to him in this, and Hashem exacted from them, and they were destroyed.


And once this has been established, there is left to us to explain the statement of Yirmeyah to Chananiah who stumbled {?} on two verses, and these are the verse of (Jeremiah 28:8): הַנְּבִיאִים, אֲשֶׁר הָיוּ לְפָנַי וּלְפָנֶיךָ--מִן-הָעוֹלָם: וַיִּנָּבְאוּ אֶל-אֲרָצוֹת רַבּוֹת, וְעַל-מַמְלָכוֹת גְּדֹלוֹת, לְמִלְחָמָה, וּלְרָעָה וּלְדָבֶר; and the verse of (28:9): הַנָּבִיא, אֲשֶׁר יִנָּבֵא לְשָׁלוֹם--בְּבֹא, דְּבַר הַנָּבִיא, יִוָּדַע הַנָּבִיא, אֲשֶׁר-שְׁלָחוֹ ה בֶּאֱמֶת.


For it is not for nothing that there is a division {of sof pasuk} between these two, and so is it not for nothing that the etnachta was placed on the word לְשָׁלוֹם. Therefore, I say that the intent in this is that Yirmeyah, who prophesied woe, said to Chananiah, who prophesied weal, 'behold, there are more with me than there are with you.' For the prophets who were before me and before you from the beginning, namely Yeshaya, Michah, and the like from the renowned ones, prophesied woe, that Nevuchadnezzar the king of Bavel would obliterate them. And you Chananiah, you, the prophet who prophesied peace, opposite all of us, and you say 'I have broken the yoke of the king of Bavel' (Jeremiah 28:2), therefore you are a yachid on one bank. Perhaps you weigh as much as all of us? However, in this manner shall you and I be judged -- for when the words of the prophet come to pass, it is known that that prophet has been truly sent by Hashem. It is as if he said, 'we shall see whose words shall be established, whether our words or your words, which contradict one another. For we say that the yoke of the king of Bavel shall be on Israel and others, while you say that it shall not be. And there is no




middle ground in this. If so, this nation which hears my words and your words, shall know in the future which of the two of us is a true prophet. But see that this is an obligatory decree, by which I mean that when the words of the prophet arrive, it is known that this prophet was truly sent by Hashem -- this {positive establishment of the prophet as true} is not written in the Torah but the opposite of what is written in the Torah -- by which I mean that when the matter does not come to pass, the prophet whom Hashem genuinely sent is known. And these two decrees encompass whether weal or woe, and both of them are accurate. But the Torah was only not explicit in one of them, by which I mean that which is the opposite, from being the cause of our executing this soul and leaving off that which is required, for there is no execution by Bet Din there, and it is possible that its nature was concealed from us, as we explained above.


And if Yirmeyah had mentioned that which flowed out of it, this would also be correct, but he left this out, for the primary purpose of that which is derived is to execute the prophet, and Yirmeyah did not intend this, for he knew that Israel would not do this good; and further, this testing would only be after a long time, such as seven years, while Chananiah would die within this year. And so it sufficed for him in the place that he had, in the mentioning of that which was required, and that was correct without a doubt to the scholars of logic, and all this is explained.


But what is left for us to say is that all that comes out of our words, that that which the Rambam asserts in the introduction to the Mishnah, based on Yaakov's fear despite Hashem's promise of weal, such that there he divides between Hashem's foretelling to the prophet for private purposes and between Hashem's foretelling to the nation via a prophet, such that he promulgates it and expounds it to the public. Behold, all of this is not necessary for us, according to our assumptions. But that which he says, I am close to a bit -- this is that the prophet who expounds to the public a future foretelling, whether for woe or weal, it is more fitting that it is attached to a condition, just as Moshe made, 'if you hearken... and if you do not hearken'. And if it happens that he says it with 'absolute' words, he does not damage by a foretelling of woe, for this is the purpose, for the prophet is expounding to the nation to cause them fear and to confound them such they will search out their actions, just as the men of Ninveh did. But it would damage with a foretelling of weal, for then those would trust in their strength. And if so, what would the purpose be for the prophet to expound it to the public, for with a a future foretelling with 'absolute' wording, if the nature of the decree is only possible, or attached to a condition, and he knows this. But it is more fitting if this prophet mentions to them the condition in all foretelling of weal to them, such that they improve their ways or search out their actions and stand in fear and dread. And we have already explained all necessary for this. And behold, we lean away from the position of the Moreh {=Rambam}m za'l, and may it be His Will that we do not lean away from the truth."

This post is long enough as it stands. Perhaps I will provide some analysis in a subsequent post.