Showing posts with label re`eh. Show all posts
Showing posts with label re`eh. Show all posts

Monday, August 10, 2015

Memes and parshas Re'eh

When looking through parshas Re'eh (starting Devarim 11:26), I thought it might be useful to consider the parsha from the perspective of memes. To cite Wikipedia for a quick definition of meme:
The word meme is a shortening (modeled on gene) of mimeme (from Ancient Greek μίμημα pronounced [míːmɛːma] mīmēma, "imitated thing", from μιμεῖσθαιmimeisthai, "to imitate", from μῖμος mimos, "mime")[4] coined by British evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins in The Selfish Gene (1976)[1][5] as a concept for discussion of evolutionary principles in explaining the spread of ideas and cultural phenomena. Examples of memes given in the book included melodies, catch-phrases, fashion, and the technology of building arches.[6]
Proponents theorize that memes are a viral phenomenon that may evolve by natural selection in a manner analogous to that of biological evolution. Memes do this through the processes of variationmutationcompetition, and inheritance, each of which influences a meme's reproductive success. Memes spread through the behavior that they generate in their hosts. Memes that propagateless prolifically may become extinct, while others may survive, spread, and (for better or for worse) mutate. Memes that replicate most effectively enjoy more success, and some may replicate effectively even when they prove to be detrimental to the welfare of their hosts.[7]
This sort of meme is distinct from but related to Internet memes, the silly pictures with short captions which spread virally on the Internet.

The basic idea is that which ideas which spread are those which can compete successfully with competing ideas, and influence behavior in ways which help them spread.

For an example I've heard as regards to Torah law, consider circumcision. How did this practice become widespread? The argument goes that circumcision decreases penile sensitivity and in such a way that circumcised men would prefer vaginal to anal sex. As a result, those who practice circumcision would have more children than those who are uncircumcised. And those children would carry on the traditions of their parents. Thus, the practice of circumcision (introduced for whatever reason) would spread and compete effectively with the non-practice of circumcision.

Ideas or practices can also mutate, and those mutations will either succeed or fail. It is survival of the fittest of ideas and practices.

We might grapple with some of the laws in parshas Re'eh, especially if we approach it with a modern attitude. For instance, are we comfortable with betray a spouse or kin who secretly entices to idolatry? What of familial loyalty and love? What of the free marketplace of ideas? Is it not extreme to execute a missionary?

There may well be good answers to this sort of moral / ethical question. Obviously we don't actually practically practice these laws nowadays. But in thinking about this, perhaps we should adjust our modern attitude. Perhaps we should say society has changed. Perhaps we should explain it in a way that some would consider apologetics.

But perhaps we should just sidestep this whole like of thinking. We should consider these laws from the perspective of memes.

The Torah contains a core monotheistic idea, as well as a series of religious, legal, and ethical practices. If the Giver of the Torah wanted to ensure that this idea / ideas last, and that the Masorah carried on, what could He do preserve the Torah -- to avoid its adulteration or replacement with other competing ideas?

Devarim 12:2-3:

ב  אַבֵּד תְּאַבְּדוּן אֶת-כָּל-הַמְּקֹמוֹת אֲשֶׁר עָבְדוּ-שָׁם הַגּוֹיִם, אֲשֶׁר אַתֶּם יֹרְשִׁים אֹתָם--אֶת-אֱלֹהֵיהֶם:  עַל-הֶהָרִים הָרָמִים וְעַל-הַגְּבָעוֹת, וְתַחַת כָּל-עֵץ רַעֲנָן.2 Ye shall surely destroy all the places, wherein the nations that ye are to dispossess served their gods, upon the high mountains, and upon the hills, and under every leafy tree.
ג  וְנִתַּצְתֶּם אֶת-מִזְבְּחֹתָם, וְשִׁבַּרְתֶּם אֶת-מַצֵּבֹתָם, וַאֲשֵׁרֵיהֶם תִּשְׂרְפוּן בָּאֵשׁ, וּפְסִילֵי אֱלֹהֵיהֶם תְּגַדֵּעוּן; וְאִבַּדְתֶּם אֶת-שְׁמָם, מִן-הַמָּקוֹם הַהוּא.3 And ye shall break down their altars, and dash in pieces their pillars, and burn their Asherim with fire; and ye shall hew down the graven images of their gods; and ye shall destroy their name out of that place.

Hashem is a "jealous God", but what does He have to be jealous of? One answer is that the best defense is a good offense. Hashem is not really jealous or hurt by people worshiping other, non-existent, gods. However, if people worship other gods, then they will not be monotheistic worshipers of Hashem. And there are other sources of law and determiners of good and evil.

Now consider two Biblical Judaisms. One version plays nice with idolatry. It allows their altars, pillars, and Asherim to remain. The other version commands the destruction of their altars, pillars, and Asherim. Which would be more effective in propagating the core and secondary ideas of Judaism?

ד  לֹא-תַעֲשׂוּן כֵּן, לַה' אֱלֹהֵיכֶם.4 Ye shall not do so unto the LORD your God.
ה  כִּי אִם-אֶל-הַמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר-יִבְחַר ה' אֱלֹהֵיכֶם, מִכָּל-שִׁבְטֵיכֶם, לָשׂוּם אֶת-שְׁמוֹ, שָׁם--לְשִׁכְנוֹ תִדְרְשׁוּ, וּבָאתָ שָּׁמָּה.5 But unto the place which the LORD your God shall choose out of all your tribes to put His name there, even unto His habitation shall ye seek, and thither thou shalt come;

By making people come to a central location for worship and festivals, one curbs the mutation of the religious idea.

ח  לֹא תַעֲשׂוּן--כְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר אֲנַחְנוּ עֹשִׂים פֹּה, הַיּוֹם:  אִישׁ, כָּל-הַיָּשָׁר בְּעֵינָיו.8 Ye shall not do after all that we do here this day, every man whatsoever is right in his own eyes;

What is right should be defined by Hashem, not by each individual.

So too, even with permitting of besar taavah as a result of spreading out across the land making making eating meat inconvenient, for ritual sacrificial purposes, one still comes to a central location:

כו  רַק קָדָשֶׁיךָ אֲשֶׁר-יִהְיוּ לְךָ, וּנְדָרֶיךָ, תִּשָּׂא וּבָאתָ, אֶל-הַמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר-יִבְחַר יְהוָה.26 Only thy holy things which thou hast, and thy vows, thou shalt take, and go unto the place which the LORD shall choose;

When conquering other lands, even though you are being militarily successful, there is a danger of assimilating their religious practices into the worship of Hashem. There is a command to avoid adopting even those aspects which strike you as positive religious innovation and adoption:

כט  כִּי-יַכְרִית ה' אֱלֹהֶיךָ אֶת-הַגּוֹיִם, אֲשֶׁר אַתָּה בָא-שָׁמָּה לָרֶשֶׁת אוֹתָם--מִפָּנֶיךָ; וְיָרַשְׁתָּ אֹתָם, וְיָשַׁבְתָּ בְּאַרְצָם.29 When the LORD thy God shall cut off the nations from before thee, whither thou goest in to dispossess them, and thou dispossessest them, and dwellest in their land;
ל  הִשָּׁמֶר לְךָ, פֶּן-תִּנָּקֵשׁ אַחֲרֵיהֶם, אַחֲרֵי, הִשָּׁמְדָם מִפָּנֶיךָ; וּפֶן-תִּדְרֹשׁ לֵאלֹהֵיהֶם לֵאמֹר, אֵיכָה יַעַבְדוּ הַגּוֹיִם הָאֵלֶּה אֶת-אֱלֹהֵיהֶם, וְאֶעֱשֶׂה-כֵּן, גַּם-אָנִי.30 take heed to thyself that thou be not ensnared to follow them, after that they are destroyed from before thee; and that thou inquire not after their gods, saying: 'How used these nations to serve their gods? even so will I do likewise.'
לא  לֹא-תַעֲשֶׂה כֵן, לַה' אֱלֹהֶיךָ:  כִּי כָל-תּוֹעֲבַת ה אֲשֶׁר שָׂנֵא, עָשׂוּ לֵאלֹהֵיהֶם--כִּי גַם אֶת-בְּנֵיהֶם וְאֶת-בְּנֹתֵיהֶם, יִשְׂרְפוּ בָאֵשׁ לֵאלֹהֵיהֶם.31 Thou shalt not do so unto the LORD thy God; for every abomination to the LORD, which He hateth, have they done unto their gods; for even their sons and their daughters do they burn in the fire to their gods.

Next, bal tosif and bal tigra. Devarim 13:

א  אֵת כָּל-הַדָּבָר, אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי מְצַוֶּה אֶתְכֶם--אֹתוֹ תִשְׁמְרוּ, לַעֲשׂוֹת:  לֹא-תֹסֵף עָלָיו, וְלֹא תִגְרַע מִמֶּנּוּ.  {פ}1 All this word which I command you, that shall ye observe to do; thou shalt not add thereto, nor diminish from it. {P}

According to the petucha and setuma breaks, this pasuk associates with the previous perek. If so, one could argue (on a peshat level) that this has to do only with the sacrificial rites. It is understood by halachic midrash to refer to all sorts of Torah law. According to the perek boundaries, this pasuk starts a new section, such that it is joined with the laws of false prophet. Thus, a prophet (post-Moshe) is not empowered to innovate new laws.

This is not just anti-innovation. This instruction of don't-add-don't-subtract ties all the laws together, such that they all live or die together. In this way, the law of circumcision, if it is an idea which aids in its own propagation, also aids in the propagation of the law to love one's neighbor.

[Devarim 13:2-6] False prophesy of an idolatrous prophet -- the death penalty is preservational.

[Devarim 13:7-12] A close family who invites to idolatry is exposed and stoned to death by you, followed by all the people -- consider that this is otherwise a great way for foreign ideas to infiltrate. Just convince one member of a family unit of the idolatry, and let the family tolerate it in silence. Eventually, those ideas spread within the family unit.

Make the family and the community at large participate in the sentence, so as to take a physical stand against the outside influence, and to put the fear of God into the people.

יב  וְכָל-יִשְׂרָאֵל--יִשְׁמְעוּ, וְיִרָאוּן; וְלֹא-יוֹסִפוּ לַעֲשׂוֹת, כַּדָּבָר הָרָע הַזֶּה--בְּקִרְבֶּךָ.  {ס}12 And all Israel shall hear, and fear, and shall do no more any such wickedness as this is in the midst of thee. {S}

[Devarim 13:13-19] The utter destruction of the idolatrous city. Here, the foreign idea and worship has spread even further. More drastic action is called for, entire obliteration. It is unclear if this was ever carried out, or if the very idea was preventative enough.

[Devarim 14:1-2] No cutting or baldness because you are a holy people;
[Devarim 14:3-21] A special diet, because you are a holy people. Certain abominable things you may give to the toshav among you, or sell to a gentile, but you may not yourselves eat of it, because you are a holy people. All this serves to set the Israelites aside as special, both in eating habits and in their own minds. This is a good way to prevent assimilation of ideas and practices.

[Devarim 14:22-26] Regular bringing of maasar to a central location of worship, as above. Of course, not every law is towards this aim. There is another thread running through this is support for the Levite, widow, orphan, and so on, until pasuk 29.

Tuesday, August 19, 2014

The Gazelle and the Deer

In Nature and Man in the Bible, page 271, Dr. Yehuda Feliks explains how the common identification people make of the Biblical tzvi and ayal is reversed.



Chazal had their identities correct (as we can see from details in the gemara, Chullin 59a), but it was confused in the time of the Rishonim. To cite a post (/letter) from Rabbi Slifkin:
This is no different from how the Rishonim in Ashkenaz mistakenly thought that the tzvi is the deer, and were therefore confounded by the Gemara which states that the horns of a tzvi are not branched. The reason was that that they were unfamiliar with the gazelle, which does not live in Europe, and so transposed the name tzvi to the deer. Only Rav Saadiah Gaon, who was familiar with the animal life of the Middle East, correctly identified the tzvi as the gazelle and the ayal as the deer.
And in another post (/letter):
Europe has very different animals from those of Eretz Yisrael, and the names of animals in Tanach were transposed to local equivalents. For example, the gazelle of Israel perfectly matches all Scriptural, Talmudic and Midrashic descriptions of the tzvi. While Jews in north Africa, which also has gazelles, had a (correct) tradition that the tzvi is the gazelle (and that the deer is the ayal), there were no gazelles in Europe. As a result, the name tzvi in Europe was transposed to the deer (hirsch). This led Rashi, in his commentary to Chullin 59b, to note that the creature traditionally called tzvi in Europe (i.e. the deer) is not the tzvi described by Chazal. Thus, Rashi himself observes that European traditions regarding the identities of animals mentioned in the Torah are not accurate."
I would like to look in this post specifically at what Saadia Gaon says, but we should not forget this point, that "the gazelle of Israel perfectly matches all Scriptural, Talmudic and Midrashic descriptions of the tzvi." And that reversing the identification introduces a mismatch with these descriptions.

From Saadia Gaon's Tafsir on parashat Reeh:



Thus, the Biblical Hebrew word ha-tzevi is translated into the Arabic al-tzabi. And Biblical Hebrew word ha-`ayal is translated into the Arabic wal-`iyal.

In other words, Saadia Gaon is translating these Hebrew words into their Arabic cognates.

In other words, it is not merely Saadia Gaon operating in a place which has both animals transmitting the masorah by identifying these species by their (completely unrelated) Arabic names. There is an even stronger linguistic connection present in this identification, in that people living in the Middle East used the very same names, or their cognates, for these species. And we would expect less linguistic shift in the same area of the Torah and of Chazal. And Saadia endorses that linguistic connection.

On the other hand, this raises the possibility that Saadia Gaon is not really translating at all. Sure, he is writing in Judeo-Arabic, and explicitly identifying Hebrew species by their Judeo-Arabic equivalents, where these were indeed Judeo-Arabic words. (And if the species were indeed reversed, a conscientious translator would make sure to reverse them, as al-`iyal and al-tzabi.) But at the same time, since these are cognates, perhaps he was simply rendering the definite article ha as al and writing the existing Arabic word which was the cognate. Not necessarily as a masorah, but just assuming that word X == equivalent word Y. Just as in Onkelos, tabya is a cognate, because Aramaic letter tet corresponds to Hebrew letter tzadi; and ayla is obviously the Aramaic cognate of ayal.

Update:

A bit later in parashat Re'eh, in Devarim 14:5, we again have the tzvi and the ayal, in a list of five kosher wild animals. For the sake of completeness, we should see how Saadia Gaon renders this as well:


Once again, we have the Hebrew ayal rendered into Judeo-Arabic as wal-`iyal and the Hebrew utzevi rendered into the Judeo-Arabic wal-tzabbi.

We also see how many cognates there are in these lists of animals. For instance, Hebrew veyachmur in wal-yachmur in Judeo-Arabic. For the Hebrew ve`ako, we have wal-we'il, which does not match, but notice that the Aramaic in Onkelos is veya'la (note that yud and vav switch off). The other animals listed in this pasuk are not cognates. But see the previous pasuk and the cognates there, for behemah and tochelu, and for bakar, tzon, and ez.

So for some of these creatures, such as the giraffe for zemer, Saadia Gaon clearly is performing an identification and translation. And cognates will be present just because the two languages are closely related. Still, the ambiguity discussed above is present: that these are cognates lends strength to the identification, since these are approximately the same names in approximately the same area. On the other hand, these are easy to assume and fall back upon.

Update:

Also, in the Tafsir on Shir HaShirim 2:9, Saadia Gaon translates tzvi and ayal the same way:

Thursday, August 01, 2013

Re'eh: The Bible Critic and the Rabbi

Over at A Fire Burns In Breslov, a post I'd like to comment on. It is short, so I will first reproduce a good portion of the story which forms the post:
A certain rabbi once ran into a “freethinker” who considered himself quite a scholar. With hardly a word of introduction, the non-believer declared that he was learning Bible criticism and had spoken to many religious people who were unable to reply to the compelling questions he posed. 
The rabbi asked the academic what Rishonim he had learned. The academic was obviously taken aback and his halting reply showed that he had never studied rishonim at all. He defended himself with the statement, “Clearly, the Torah must be a work that is complete in and of itself, requiring no added exposition by the rabbis...” he began.
“Anyone who thinks so has not learned it carefully,” replied the rabbi. “For example, the verse tells us, [Josh: in Re'eh] ‘and you shall slaughter of your cattle...as I have commanded you,’ yet nowhere in the rest of the Torah do we find instructions as to how we are meant to slaughter animals. Obviously, the accompanying instruction was transmitted orally—the oral Torah of the rabbis that you find superfluous.”
The academic was flustered for only a moment before blurted out his ignorant response, “There is no such verse.”
“Try parshas R’ei,” the rabbi replied. “And it’s not just there. Many mitzvos cannot possibly be fulfilled with only the written instructions.....
An inspirational story, meant to inspire. There seem three points to this story.
  1. The questions raised by Biblical critics are addressed by the Rishonim.
  2. Biblical critics are ignoramuses, which is why they even think these are real questions.
  3. And so you should not be threatened by questions raised by them. Even if you don't know, a better educated person would know the answers.
  4. Here, indeed, is a great proof 
On the other hand, it might be an authentic exchange. There are some good points made in this story, but others are not so strong. To consider this story line by line:
A certain rabbi once ran into a “freethinker” who considered himself quite a scholar.
This story is then, likely, a polemic, meant to prove a point. Once, a rabbi, a freethinker, and a chimpanzee walk into a bar...
With hardly a word of introduction, the non-believer declared that he was learning Bible criticism and had spoken to many religious people who were unable to reply to the compelling questions he posed.
This is indeed a weak point. Many religious people don't really know how to learn in depth, and are not trained to address specific types of questions. It seems that the rabbi in this story was better prepared to engage Biblical criticism -- even though as it develops, the discussion turns into one of Karaism.
The rabbi asked the academic what Rishonim he had learned. The academic was obviously taken aback and his halting reply showed that he had never studied rishonim at all. He defended himself with the statement, “Clearly, the Torah must be a work that is complete in and of itself, requiring no added exposition by the rabbis...” he began.
This might well be a good response to many an individual. And yet, other Biblical scholars / critics probably have studied at least some rishonim. Just as it was silly for this "Biblical scholar" to think that the inability of random Jews to answer his questions demonstrated anything, it it silly to think that the deficiencies of this particular fellow demonstrates anything about the validity, or lack thereof, of Biblical criticism.

The idea behind this seems to me to be that Biblical critics raise "difficulties" in the text. But these difficulties are not new discoveries, and have been adequately addressed by Rishonim who acted as Biblical commentators.

Now, the assumption in this story appears to be that the Rishonim, as commentators, only act in accordance with Oral Law and tradition. This is not necessarily the case. Some operated on a peshat level, and tried to resolve difficulties not on Oral Traditions (if that is what midrashim are), but based on other textual cues.
“Clearly, the Torah must be a work that is complete in and of itself, requiring no added exposition by the rabbis...” he began.
This is a silly argument by the Biblical scholar. Every text needs exposition. There are scholars of Shakespeare. And there are (religious and nonreligious) scholars of Bible, who explain the meaning of verses. An explanation by Rashi, or Ibn Ezra, of the Biblical text is a deep, close reading of the text itself. Furthermore, if he subscribes to Biblical criticism, why should he think that the Torah, as a single entity, is a complete work? Couldn't something have been left on the cutting-room floor, in a non-canonized work?
“Anyone who thinks so has not learned it carefully,” replied the rabbi. “For example, the verse tells us, ‘and you shall slaughter of your cattle...as I have commanded you,’ yet nowhere in the rest of the Torah do we find instructions as to how we are meant to slaughter animals. Obviously, the accompanying instruction was transmitted orally—the oral Torah of the rabbis that you find superfluous.”
This is Pharisee / Karaite Polemics 101. It is a fairly standard argument in favor of the existence of an Oral Torah. The Bible critic's response,
The academic was flustered for only a moment before blurted out his ignorant response, “There is no such verse.”
is indeed a flustered and ignorant response.

However. Just as this particular Bible critic did not know Rishonim, this particular Rabbi did not know the work of Aharon ben Yosef, the Karaite scholar. This proof is indeed Pharisee / Karaite Polemics 101. And so we should expect the Karaites to have some response to this particular proof. And indeed, the Karaites do respond. Aharon ben Yosef wrote a running commentary on all of Tanach, so you are not going to surprise him with some verse he is unaware of. And he is well aware of the traditional rabbinic interpretation of many pesukim, as well as the commentaries of Rishonim, Ibn Ezra especially.

Since this story turned into an anti-Karaite polemic, I wonder how the story would have developed were the Biblical critic to respond with the Karaite response to this prooftext. That is, the prooftext was about shechitas chullin, in parashat Re'eh. In Devarim 12:

כא  כִּי-יִרְחַק מִמְּךָ הַמָּקוֹם, אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ לָשׂוּם שְׁמוֹ שָׁם, וְזָבַחְתָּ מִבְּקָרְךָ וּמִצֹּאנְךָ אֲשֶׁר נָתַן ה לְךָ, כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִךָ--וְאָכַלְתָּ, בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ, בְּכֹל, אַוַּת נַפְשֶׁךָ.21 If the place which the LORD thy God shall choose to put His name there be too far from thee, then thou shalt kill of thy herd and of thy flock, which the LORD hath given thee, as I have commanded thee, and thou shalt eat within thy gates, after all the desire of thy soul.

Yet while earlier, we find commands regarding bringing olot and zevachim, we do not find a place regarding chullin that could function as an expansion of וְזָבַחְתָּ ... כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִךָ.

Therefore, this must have been explained to Moshe orally. That is the proof.

So what do the Karaites respond? Let us look to Aharon ben Yosef, the Karaite scholar:


"כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִךָ, as I have commanded you: you shall [specifically] slaughter and then eat [Josh: as in Devarim 12:15, six pesukim earlier, תִּזְבַּח וְאָכַלְתָּ]. For that which is slaughtered is permitted and not that which is strangled, nor that which had a messed up slaughter. And shechita in the Hebrew language is the severing of the signs of the throat [trachea and esophagus]. And that which is stated [in Bemidbar 14] וַיִּשְׁחָטֵם בַּמִּדְבָּר [Josh: that the Egyptians would say, ch"v, that Hashem has slain the Israelites in the wilderness, in an instance which is not severing of the trachea and esophagus], this is an idiom that He has slain them like sheep.

And it is more correct [to say] that כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִךָ means that he had commanded them in the wilderness that they eat chullin [non-korban meat] according to the laws of the sacrificed, now that He came and permitted them to eat them as chullin, He said 'as I commanded you' when they were korbanot, you shall eat them as chullin in every place, just so long as they are slaughtered as they were initially when they were korbanot."

End quote of Aharon ben Yosef.

To summarize, Aharon ben Yosef does not take כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִךָ to mean the specific details of shechita, which would then need to be explicitly commanded, and would then need to appear in the written text, unless there were an Oral Law. Rather כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִךָ simply means that, as I mentioned immediately above in pasuk 12:15, they need to be shechted. And don't then tell me that the definition of shechted needs to be an explicit Divine definition, and command. The Hebrew language has words, and words have meaning. And the meaning of shechita as a word was known to the Israelites. Further, the link to pasuk 15 can be that it is as I have commanded you in pasuk 15 about korbanot andthat they need shechita, just with this minor other distinction now that your borders have expanded, in pasuk 20.

If so, the Bible critic has his ready answer.

It is nice to have our own arguments, and even to find them convincing. But as we develop, it pays to also understand the difference between peshat and derash, and maybe to realize (if it is indeed so) that there are other ways of understanding the pasuk. This famous explanation of kaasher tzivisicha is found in Rashi, who is citing Chazal:

you may slaughter… as I have commanded you: We learn [from here] that there is a commandment regarding slaughtering, how one must slaughter. [Since this commandment is not written in the Torah we deduce that] these are the laws of ritual slaughtering given orally to Moses on [Mount] Sinai. — [Sifrei ; Chul. 28a] וזבחת וגו' כאשר צויתך: למדנו שיש צווי בזביחה היאך ישחוט, והן הלכות שחיטה שנאמרו למשה בסיני:

Tuesday, July 30, 2013

YUTorah on parashat Re'eh

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Sunday, July 28, 2013

posts so far for parshat Re`eh



2012

1. Hillel Hazaken's establishment of prozbul -- was not the nullification of a mitzvah deOraysachas veshalom. Just the opposite! It was akiyum of a mitzvah!

2. Reeh sources, 2012 edition.

3. YUTorah on parshas Reeh.

4. Bal Tosif in context -- It relates to changes in sacrificial worship. How can adding positive things turn out negative? Shadal gives an example.

2011

  1. Re'eh sources -- I improve this from year to year. I gather a nice group of meforshim on the parsha and haftarah, and link to a mikraos gedolos, by perek and aliyah. This is a very useful starting point for learning through the parsha with meforshim. In subsequent years, I added more meforshim. This year, I added even more, in several different categories. For instance, there are many more meforshei Rashi and even a few manuscripts of Rashi.
    .
  2. How has the eved ivri served you 'twice as much as a hired servant'Considering the approaches of a group of meforshim on this phrase, and pasuk. Rashi, Ibn Ezra, Ibn Caspi, Seforno, Rashbam, and Shadal. While I add a bit of my own analysis to Rashbam's analysis, the topic is not yet settled in my mind, so I don't end up taking sides. Plus, in the comment section, Rav Chaim Kanievsky's take on the issue.
    .
  3. YU Torah for parashat Reeh.
    .
  4. The movement of the Shalach -- Targum Yonasan on Re'eh is unduly influenced by the Targum and pasuk in parashat Shemini. Or is it working from a Samaritan text? Based in part on a comment in Taama de-Kra, from Rav Chaim Kanievsky.
    .
  5. The hyrax as ruminant -- in which I explain, in a systematic manner, how to read the pasuk in this week's parasha with shafan as hyrax, even if hyrax is not a true ruminant, but ancient people just thought it was. And in the comment section, a lot of discussion, given video evidence that it is actually maaleh gerah, brings up the already chewed food, to rechew, in that it practices merycism.

2010
  1. The Gra on the trup of asser ta'aser -- Part of a series focusing on the Vilna Gaon's interpretation of trup, this one focuses on the pasuk in Re'eh, 'asser te'asser, and works the trup into the famous derasha on those words.
    -
  2. The trup on acharei derech mevo hashemesh -- An analysis of the trup on acharei derech mevo hashemesh, according to Rashi, Rashbam, and Shadal. Does Rashi have a complete theory of trup?
    -
  3. The other side of the Jordan -- A pasuk which must have been written in the midbar. What about the reference to Gilgal, then?
    -
  4. Hashem testing you with false signs, or is this just dibra Torah kilshon bnei AdamThe Torah indicates that the signs of a false prophet of idolatry are really simply Hashem testing you, which seemingly indicates that the signs are real, and that Hashem would mislead in this way. While theologically possible, is this indeed so? Ibn Caspi gives another way, in which this is a (near-) false statement in the Torah, for the hamon am who would not otherwise understand.
    -
  5. Korbanos as compromise -- Ibn Caspi. If so, do we really desire them in messianic times?
    -
  6. Deah vs. Reah in Re'eh -- I respond to a snarky guest-post at DovBear.
    -
  7. How did the Samaritans falsify their Torah?  Let me count the ways. It turns out, in two or three ways, not just one. And there might be an over-correction or two in the Yerushalmi and Bavli.

In 2009, in Re'eh sources, I gather a nice group of meforshim on the parsha and haftarah, and link to a mikraos gedolos, by perek and aliyah. This is a very useful starting point for learning through the parsha with meforshim.

In One understandable, and one perplexing, instance of censorship in Baal Haturim, I explore how certain controversial text was edited out or modified in different versions. It is perplexing what one would find offensive in an injunction not to raise pigs.

In Why shouldn't we eat the chassidah, I consider the gemara which explains its traits, and draw a rationalist / non-rationalist distinction regarding timtum halev in whether to agree with the Kotzker Rebbe's premise that the bird would only be non-kosher if its had an undesirable trait.

In A good friend will help you move; a true friend will help you move the body, I manage a tie-in to the parsha, in that a meisis to Avodah Zarah who is a friend who is like your soul should nevertheless be reported rather than concealed. The main body of the post consists of tracing the history of story which appeared in Rabbi Bibi's article in the Jewish Star, about how none of the youngster's friends would assist him when he came to them claiming that he had killed someone, but his father's half-a-friend did.

In The target of Re'eh, I grapple with why Re'eh is singular but the remainder of the verse is plural. Ibn Ezra says it is distributive; Ibn Caspi suggests it refers to the entire nation, and Avi Ezer says that it is a ziruz and hazmana and thus does not take gender or number.

In Why specifically the son of your mother?, I continue on a point started last year (2008) about "your brother, the son of your mother." Ibn Ezra's remarks seem to contain some cryptic, philosophical derash. Avi Ezer dismisses this idea and provides a straightforward explanation, but I would side with Mechokekei Yehuda and Ibn Caspi who say otherwise. However, I don't think I agree with the substance of their interpretation of Ibn Ezra's philosophical derash.

In Chizkuni and You are not *Able* to Eat, I consider Chizkuni's explanation of Rashi's midrashic remarks about the identity of the Yevusi, in different places as descendants of the Chiti with whom Avraham dealt when purchasing the Cave of the Patriarchs, or as descendants of Avimelech. I disagree with him in one or two points.

In Rav Papa Stumbles, I consider a curious gemara in which Rav Pappa's stumbling upon a ladder is blamed on possible lack of charity. I consider the Gra's tie-in to the names of the trup symbols on a pasuk, but then give an explanation I believe is more likely, based on the symbolism of ladders.

In Why pour out the blood like water, I consider the explanation of Rav Yonasan Eibeshitz, and then my own suggestion on the level of peshat, that it is spilling it rather than sprinkling it on the mizbeach.

In Who Was The Baal HaTurim's Woman, I consider just who she was. I have reasons to doubt Rabbi Akiva Eiger's explanation that it is a reference to Mary and her son, and instead believe that he is referring to the Intellect.

In 2008, in Shadal on Tithes, I note an interesting explanation Shadal has about tithes -- that there is only one, which is to be eaten in Jerusalem. And that at the end of the third year, if the produce has not been eaten in Yerushalayim, it should be distributed to the Levi or to the pauper. Shadal claims that the practice of giving all the produce of that year to the pauper rather than taking it to Yerushalayim is a rabbinic enactment so that people should not lie to the paupers and tell them that it was all already consumed in Yerushalayim. And the Biblical vidui maaser is also to ensure that the maaser is distributed correctly, for people would not lie to God.

In Would Hashem Empower A False Prophet, I discuss an interesting theological question which relates to a sequence of psukim in Reeh. If a false prophet makes an os or mofes, and it comes to pass, yet he says to worship idols, we do not believe him. This, states the next verse, is Hashem testing us. Does this mean that Hashem is granting this false prophet actual power to predict the future or to perform wonders? Different commentators offer their different takes on the question, and how to read peshat in those pesukim.

In Your Brother, The Son of Your Mother, I consider this case of apparent duplication from the perspective of the gemara, Rashi, Ibn Ezra, Aharon ben Yosef the Karaite, Targum, and trup. Is this an instance of poetic duplication or is it dealing with two separate individuals?

In 2004, in The Blessing and the Curse, I cite the opening words to Re`eh: רְאֵה, אָנֹכִי נֹתֵן לִפְנֵיכֶם--הַיּוֹם: בְּרָכָה, וּקְלָלָה.
אֶת-הַבְּרָכָה--אֲשֶׁר תִּשְׁמְעוּ, אֶל-מִצְו‍ֹת ה אֱלֹקֵיכֶם
and suggest that the keeping of the Torah, and living a life of Torah and mitzvot, is the blessing. Homiletical, I know, but clearly marked as such, and I think the message behind it is true.

In 2003, I focused on false prophets, as well as a bal tosif/bal tigra issue.

In Parshat Re`eh: Don't Add Nor Subtract: Mitzvot or Avodah? - I focused on the specific language of the prohibition of adding/subtracting something in this week's parsha (to the exclusion of elsewhere).
I point out that based on the context, although the pasuk in Devarim 13:1 mentions that which Hashem commands, the intent seems to be not that one should not add or subtract commandments, but rather methods of worshipping Hashem. That is, do not see idolatrous practices and do similar things for Hashem, nor remove modes of worship which Hashem has commanded. This context is the preceding chapter. The perek division, imposed later by Christians, contradicts the Jewish subdivisions of the text in the form of whitespace breaks (petuchot and setumot) makes it seem to have another meaning, either mitzvot in general, or related to whether a prophet can add or subtract mitzvot (the juxtoposition of which doubtless forms a basis of drashot that a prophet cannot do this.)

One point I did not make at the time is that there is another bal tosifu/tigre'u, in Devarim 4: 2 which is more explicitly about commandments in general, based on the context.

In Re`eh #2: Can a false prophet perform miracles? - I focus on a dispute in the Sifre. Devarim 13:2-3 states that a false prophet can do miracles, and Hashem lets this happen/causes the miracles to happen to test us if we will be true to Him.
Two opinions: either Hashem is actually doing this as a test, or else this is a true prophet who performed miracles for true prophecies in the past, and is now relying on his chazaka, established precedent as a true prophet, {and , I would fill in, Hashem let this happen even though He knew the prophet would later do this.}

In 
Re`eh #3: How can you tell if a prophet is false? - I detail the criteria for declaring a prophet false, on the basis of the Rambam in his peticha to his perush HaMishnayot. In short, he has to give a public, positive prophecy which does not come to pass. This is because Hashem can backtrack on negative prophecy if the people repent (think Yonah in Ninveh). Further, Hashem can recant a promise to an individual not made public, if the merits of the person are reduced (think of Yaakov's fear when about to confront Esav, according to the midrash on katonti miKol hachadasim). Another major precedent/source-text: Yirmiyahu's showdown with the false prophet Chananya ben Azur in Yirmiyahu perek 28. This should form the basis for determining a true and false prophet, and in fact, in Shofetim, next week's parsha, in the devar torah entitled Dvar torah for Shoftim #4: Was the Lubavitcher Rebbe a Navi Sheker?, I dealt with the fact that if we accept (which we don't), as many Lubavitchers claim, that the Rebbe said certain things as prophecy, then he would be a false prophet, rather than that those things must be true even though it is readily apparent that they are not.

Friday, August 17, 2012

posts so far for parshat Re`eh



2012

1. Hillel Hazaken's establishment of prozbul -- was not the nullification of a mitzvah deOraysachas veshalom. Just the opposite! It was akiyum of a mitzvah!

2. Reeh sources, 2012 edition.

3. YUTorah on parshas Reeh.

4. Bal Tosif in context -- It relates to changes in sacrificial worship. How can adding positive things turn out negative? Shadal gives an example.

2011

  1. Re'eh sources -- I improve this from year to year. I gather a nice group of meforshim on the parsha and haftarah, and link to a mikraos gedolos, by perek and aliyah. This is a very useful starting point for learning through the parsha with meforshim. In subsequent years, I added more meforshim. This year, I added even more, in several different categories. For instance, there are many more meforshei Rashi and even a few manuscripts of Rashi.
    .
  2. How has the eved ivri served you 'twice as much as a hired servant'Considering the approaches of a group of meforshim on this phrase, and pasuk. Rashi, Ibn Ezra, Ibn Caspi, Seforno, Rashbam, and Shadal. While I add a bit of my own analysis to Rashbam's analysis, the topic is not yet settled in my mind, so I don't end up taking sides. Plus, in the comment section, Rav Chaim Kanievsky's take on the issue.
    .
  3. YU Torah for parashat Reeh.
    .
  4. The movement of the Shalach -- Targum Yonasan on Re'eh is unduly influenced by the Targum and pasuk in parashat Shemini. Or is it working from a Samaritan text? Based in part on a comment in Taama de-Kra, from Rav Chaim Kanievsky.
    .
  5. The hyrax as ruminant -- in which I explain, in a systematic manner, how to read the pasuk in this week's parasha with shafan as hyrax, even if hyrax is not a true ruminant, but ancient people just thought it was. And in the comment section, a lot of discussion, given video evidence that it is actually maaleh gerah, brings up the already chewed food, to rechew, in that it practices merycism.

2010
  1. The Gra on the trup of asser ta'aser -- Part of a series focusing on the Vilna Gaon's interpretation of trup, this one focuses on the pasuk in Re'eh, 'asser te'asser, and works the trup into the famous derasha on those words.
    -
  2. The trup on acharei derech mevo hashemesh -- An analysis of the trup on acharei derech mevo hashemesh, according to Rashi, Rashbam, and Shadal. Does Rashi have a complete theory of trup?
    -
  3. The other side of the Jordan -- A pasuk which must have been written in the midbar. What about the reference to Gilgal, then?
    -
  4. Hashem testing you with false signs, or is this just dibra Torah kilshon bnei AdamThe Torah indicates that the signs of a false prophet of idolatry are really simply Hashem testing you, which seemingly indicates that the signs are real, and that Hashem would mislead in this way. While theologically possible, is this indeed so? Ibn Caspi gives another way, in which this is a (near-) false statement in the Torah, for the hamon am who would not otherwise understand.
    -
  5. Korbanos as compromise -- Ibn Caspi. If so, do we really desire them in messianic times?
    -
  6. Deah vs. Reah in Re'eh -- I respond to a snarky guest-post at DovBear.
    -
  7. How did the Samaritans falsify their Torah?  Let me count the ways. It turns out, in two or three ways, not just one. And there might be an over-correction or two in the Yerushalmi and Bavli.

In 2009, in Re'eh sources, I gather a nice group of meforshim on the parsha and haftarah, and link to a mikraos gedolos, by perek and aliyah. This is a very useful starting point for learning through the parsha with meforshim.

In One understandable, and one perplexing, instance of censorship in Baal Haturim, I explore how certain controversial text was edited out or modified in different versions. It is perplexing what one would find offensive in an injunction not to raise pigs.

In Why shouldn't we eat the chassidah, I consider the gemara which explains its traits, and draw a rationalist / non-rationalist distinction regarding timtum halev in whether to agree with the Kotzker Rebbe's premise that the bird would only be non-kosher if its had an undesirable trait.

In A good friend will help you move; a true friend will help you move the body, I manage a tie-in to the parsha, in that a meisis to Avodah Zarah who is a friend who is like your soul should nevertheless be reported rather than concealed. The main body of the post consists of tracing the history of story which appeared in Rabbi Bibi's article in the Jewish Star, about how none of the youngster's friends would assist him when he came to them claiming that he had killed someone, but his father's half-a-friend did.

In The target of Re'eh, I grapple with why Re'eh is singular but the remainder of the verse is plural. Ibn Ezra says it is distributive; Ibn Caspi suggests it refers to the entire nation, and Avi Ezer says that it is a ziruz and hazmana and thus does not take gender or number.

In Why specifically the son of your mother?, I continue on a point started last year (2008) about "your brother, the son of your mother." Ibn Ezra's remarks seem to contain some cryptic, philosophical derash. Avi Ezer dismisses this idea and provides a straightforward explanation, but I would side with Mechokekei Yehuda and Ibn Caspi who say otherwise. However, I don't think I agree with the substance of their interpretation of Ibn Ezra's philosophical derash.

In Chizkuni and You are not *Able* to Eat, I consider Chizkuni's explanation of Rashi's midrashic remarks about the identity of the Yevusi, in different places as descendants of the Chiti with whom Avraham dealt when purchasing the Cave of the Patriarchs, or as descendants of Avimelech. I disagree with him in one or two points.

In Rav Papa Stumbles, I consider a curious gemara in which Rav Pappa's stumbling upon a ladder is blamed on possible lack of charity. I consider the Gra's tie-in to the names of the trup symbols on a pasuk, but then give an explanation I believe is more likely, based on the symbolism of ladders.

In Why pour out the blood like water, I consider the explanation of Rav Yonasan Eibeshitz, and then my own suggestion on the level of peshat, that it is spilling it rather than sprinkling it on the mizbeach.

In Who Was The Baal HaTurim's Woman, I consider just who she was. I have reasons to doubt Rabbi Akiva Eiger's explanation that it is a reference to Mary and her son, and instead believe that he is referring to the Intellect.

In 2008, in Shadal on Tithes, I note an interesting explanation Shadal has about tithes -- that there is only one, which is to be eaten in Jerusalem. And that at the end of the third year, if the produce has not been eaten in Yerushalayim, it should be distributed to the Levi or to the pauper. Shadal claims that the practice of giving all the produce of that year to the pauper rather than taking it to Yerushalayim is a rabbinic enactment so that people should not lie to the paupers and tell them that it was all already consumed in Yerushalayim. And the Biblical vidui maaser is also to ensure that the maaser is distributed correctly, for people would not lie to God.

In Would Hashem Empower A False Prophet, I discuss an interesting theological question which relates to a sequence of psukim in Reeh. If a false prophet makes an os or mofes, and it comes to pass, yet he says to worship idols, we do not believe him. This, states the next verse, is Hashem testing us. Does this mean that Hashem is granting this false prophet actual power to predict the future or to perform wonders? Different commentators offer their different takes on the question, and how to read peshat in those pesukim.

In Your Brother, The Son of Your Mother, I consider this case of apparent duplication from the perspective of the gemara, Rashi, Ibn Ezra, Aharon ben Yosef the Karaite, Targum, and trup. Is this an instance of poetic duplication or is it dealing with two separate individuals?

In 2004, in The Blessing and the Curse, I cite the opening words to Re`eh: רְאֵה, אָנֹכִי נֹתֵן לִפְנֵיכֶם--הַיּוֹם: בְּרָכָה, וּקְלָלָה.
אֶת-הַבְּרָכָה--אֲשֶׁר תִּשְׁמְעוּ, אֶל-מִצְו‍ֹת ה אֱלֹקֵיכֶם
and suggest that the keeping of the Torah, and living a life of Torah and mitzvot, is the blessing. Homiletical, I know, but clearly marked as such, and I think the message behind it is true.

In 2003, I focused on false prophets, as well as a bal tosif/bal tigra issue.

In Parshat Re`eh: Don't Add Nor Subtract: Mitzvot or Avodah? - I focused on the specific language of the prohibition of adding/subtracting something in this week's parsha (to the exclusion of elsewhere).
I point out that based on the context, although the pasuk in Devarim 13:1 mentions that which Hashem commands, the intent seems to be not that one should not add or subtract commandments, but rather methods of worshipping Hashem. That is, do not see idolatrous practices and do similar things for Hashem, nor remove modes of worship which Hashem has commanded. This context is the preceding chapter. The perek division, imposed later by Christians, contradicts the Jewish subdivisions of the text in the form of whitespace breaks (petuchot and setumot) makes it seem to have another meaning, either mitzvot in general, or related to whether a prophet can add or subtract mitzvot (the juxtoposition of which doubtless forms a basis of drashot that a prophet cannot do this.)

One point I did not make at the time is that there is another bal tosifu/tigre'u, in Devarim 4: 2 which is more explicitly about commandments in general, based on the context.

In Re`eh #2: Can a false prophet perform miracles? - I focus on a dispute in the Sifre. Devarim 13:2-3 states that a false prophet can do miracles, and Hashem lets this happen/causes the miracles to happen to test us if we will be true to Him.
Two opinions: either Hashem is actually doing this as a test, or else this is a true prophet who performed miracles for true prophecies in the past, and is now relying on his chazaka, established precedent as a true prophet, {and , I would fill in, Hashem let this happen even though He knew the prophet would later do this.}

In 
Re`eh #3: How can you tell if a prophet is false? - I detail the criteria for declaring a prophet false, on the basis of the Rambam in his peticha to his perush HaMishnayot. In short, he has to give a public, positive prophecy which does not come to pass. This is because Hashem can backtrack on negative prophecy if the people repent (think Yonah in Ninveh). Further, Hashem can recant a promise to an individual not made public, if the merits of the person are reduced (think of Yaakov's fear when about to confront Esav, according to the midrash on katonti miKol hachadasim). Another major precedent/source-text: Yirmiyahu's showdown with the false prophet Chananya ben Azur in Yirmiyahu perek 28. This should form the basis for determining a true and false prophet, and in fact, in Shofetim, next week's parsha, in the devar torah entitled Dvar torah for Shoftim #4: Was the Lubavitcher Rebbe a Navi Sheker?, I dealt with the fact that if we accept (which we don't), as many Lubavitchers claim, that the Rebbe said certain things as prophecy, then he would be a false prophet, rather than that those things must be true even though it is readily apparent that they are not.

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