Showing posts with label rif. Show all posts
Showing posts with label rif. Show all posts

Wednesday, August 19, 2009

Stipulations of Bet Din, and Stipulations of Yehoshua

I fell behind in translating the Rif, but am slowly catching up. And so recently translated the following, from the end of Bava Kamma:
הא דתניא דרבי ישמעאל ברבי יוחנן בן ברוקה אומר תנאי ב"ד הוא שיהא זה יורד לשדה חבירו וקוצץ סוכה של חבירו ומציל נחילו ונותן דמי סוכה מתוך נחילו
וכן תנאי ב"ד הוא שיהא זה מפרק את עציו ומציל פשתנו של חבירו ונוטל דמי עציו מתוך פשתנו של חבירו
וכן תנאי בית דין שיהא זה שופך את יינו ומציל דבשנו של חבירו ונוטל דמי יינו מתוך דבשנו של חברו
חזינן מאן דאמר הני כולהו הלכתא נינהו
ואנן לא סבירא לן הכי דקי"ל כמתני' דתנן אין לו אלא שכרו
וגרסי' נמי בס"פ מרובה בענין עשרה תנאין שהתנה יהושע
ותו ליכא
הא איכא הא דא"ר יהודה בשעת הוצאת זבלים אדם מוציא זבלו וצוברו כל ל' יום ברה"ר כדי שיהא נישוף ברגלי אדם וברגלי בהמה שע"מ כן הנחיל יהושע לישראל את הארץ
והא איכא הא דרבי ישמעאל בנו של רבי יוחנן בן ברוקה וכו'
ופרקינן דיחידאה לא קאמרינן דביחידאה לא קא מיירי דשמעת מינה הא דר' יהודה והא דר' ישמעאל בנו של ר' יוחנן בן ברוקה כולהו לאו הלכתא נינהו:
This that they learnt {in a brayta}:
Rabbi Yishmael the son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka says: It is a stipulation of Bet Din that this one may descend to his fellow's field and cut off a bough that belongs to his fellow and thus save his swarm, and pay the amount of the bough from {the value of} his swarm. And so too, it is a stipulation of Bet Din that this one may unload his wood {from his donkey} and save his fellow's flax, and take the cost of his wood from the flax of his fellow. And so too, it is a stipulation of Bet Din that this one may pour out his wine {to have a container available} and save the honey of his fellow, and take the cost of his wine from the honey of his fellow.
We have seen one who said that all of these are the halacha. But we do not maintain this to be so, for we establish like our Mishna which taught "he only has his wages." And also, we learn in the end of perek Merubah {Bava Kamma 81b}:
There were ten stipulations which Yehoshua stipulated. And are there not more? Behold, there is that that Rabbi Yehuda said: At the time of the taking out of dung, a person may take out his dung and pile it up for a period of 30 days in the public domain such that it be trodden upon by the legs of people and the legs of animals, for on this condition Yehoshua gave over the land to Israel as an inheritance. And behold, there is that of Rabbi Yishmael the son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka, etc.?!
And we answer that those which are positions of individuals we do not say {in the brayta}, for something which is of an individual we don't say. And we deduce from this that this of Rabbi Yehuda and this of Rabbi Yishmael the son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka, all of them are not the halacha.
I don't think I agree with this assessment by Rif, and agree more with his bar plugta.

Now, it is true that the three statements by Rabbi Yishmael the son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka seem related in message. And I agree that the following Mishna seems to argue against him. For the Mishna (in Bava Kamma 115) states:
IF ONE MAN WAS COMING ALONG WITH A BARREL OF WINE AND ANOTHER WITH A JUG OF HONEY, AND THE BARREL OF HONEY HAPPENED TO CRACK, AND THE OTHER ONE POURED OUT HIS WINE AND RESCUED THE HONEY INTO HIS [EMPTY] BARREL, HE WOULD BE ABLE TO CLAIM NO MORE THAN THE VALUE OF HIS SERVICES. BUT IF HE SAID [AT THE OUTSET], 'I AM GOING TO RESCUE YOUR HONEY AND I EXPECT TO BE PAID THE VALUE OF MY WINE,' THE OTHER HAS TO PAY HIM [ACCORDINGLY].
Whereas according to Rabbi Yishmael the son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka, this would be an implicit stipulation. And that this is given as the stam Mishna seems to suggest that in this case, we do not rule like Rabbi Yishmael, but that he is merely a daas yachid.

However, looking at the gemara in 81b, the motivator is that the brayta on 80b - 81a mentioned precisely 10 stipulations of Yehoshua. And so one can object with other stipulations attributed to Yehoshua. And all this give seems to me to be the work of the setama digmara, which is expanding on the question and resolution on the next amud (82a), with the statement of Rabbi Avin citing Rabbi Yochanan, and the resolution Rabbi Geviha of Bei Ketil:
But did not R. Abin upon arriving [from Palestine] state on behalf of R. Johanan that the owner of a tree which overhangs a neighbour's field as well as the owner of a tree close to the boundary has to bring the first-fruits [to Jerusalem] and read the prescribed text as it was upon this stipulation [that trees might he planted near the boundary of fields and even overhang a neighbour's field] that Joshua transferred the land to Israel for an inheritance. [How then could R. Johanan describe this as a stipulation of Joshua when it was not included in the authoritative text of the Baraitha cited enumerating all the stipulations of Joshua?] — It must therefore be that the Tanna of [the text enumerating] the ten stipulations laid down by Joshua was R. Joshua b. Levi. R. Gebiha of Be Kathil explicitly taught this in the text: 'R. Tanhum and R. Barias stated in the name of a certain sage, who was R. Joshua b. Levi, that ten stipulations were laid down by Joshua.'
But I would assert that the setama was overzealous in his expansion of this idea and proferred answer. Because while all of them are indeed contradictions (as Rabbi Yishmael's stipulations of Bet Din are, as he concludes, rooted in stipulations of Yehoshua), the question was answered wonderfully on 82b, in terms of Rabbi Yochanan's statement. The answer is not that it is a daas yachid -- indeed, it appears that Rambam and Semag pasken like Rabbi Yochanan's statement. (I don't know about Rif; since it is not halacha lemaasah, his non-citation of it does not say anything.) Rather, this was just one version of Yehoshua's stipulations. And by accepting Rabbi Yochanan's statement as halacha (if we indeed do), then we are rejecting this version of the brayta that restricts it to ten; and then the question and answer in the shakla veTarya are unnecessary. And not only unncessary -- if they are indeed setammaitic, then the inclusion of this in the hava amina does not necessarily reflect what Ravina and Rav Ashi maintained about it.

One could still reject Rabbi Yishmael son of Rabbi Yochanan's single position, or three related positions, on the basis of its contradiction with a setam Mishna. And even say that this indeed indicates it is daas yachid. (Indeed, perhaps this is where the setama digmara got it from.) But the particular proof from the gemara on daf 81 I don't really agree with, as a forceful rejection.

This was all a surface exploration. I wonder who Rif's bar plugta is, and how this shapes up in later sources. This is a reminder to myself to try to look at this later.

Tuesday, March 31, 2009

Rav Yochanan, Rav Chanan, Rav Avin, on

The following is an interesting gemara. And it has a meaning one can discuss. I am not going to discuss that meaning. My dad sometimes likens this to someone pointing at something wondrous in the distance, and the foolish person focuses on the finger and not on the thing being pointed at. That is true, but focusing on the finger is sometimes necessary, to ensure that we understand who is doing the pointing, or to determine just exactly what is being pointed at.
{Bava Kamma 93a}
אמר רבי יוחנן כל המוסר דין על חבירו הוא נענש תחלה שנא' ותאמר שרי אל אברם חמסי עליך וכתיב ויבא אברהם לספוד לשרה ולבכותה
והנ"מ דאית ליה דיינא בארעא
Rabbi Yochanan said: He who invokes the judgment {of Heaven; yes, based on context, but we may interpret otherwise} against his fellow is himself punished first, as it says {Bereishit 16:5}:
ה וַתֹּאמֶר שָׂרַי אֶל-אַבְרָם, חֲמָסִי עָלֶיךָ--אָנֹכִי נָתַתִּי שִׁפְחָתִי בְּחֵיקֶךָ, וַתֵּרֶא כִּי הָרָתָה וָאֵקַל בְּעֵינֶיהָ; יִשְׁפֹּט יְהוָה, בֵּינִי וּבֵינֶיךָ. 5 And Sarai said unto Abram: 'My wrong be upon thee: I gave my handmaid into thy bosom; and when she saw that she had conceived, I was despised in her eyes: the LORD judge between me and thee.'
and it is written {Bereishit 23:2}:
ב וַתָּמָת שָׂרָה, בְּקִרְיַת אַרְבַּע הִוא חֶבְרוֹן--בְּאֶרֶץ כְּנָעַן; וַיָּבֹא, אַבְרָהָם, לִסְפֹּד לְשָׂרָה, וְלִבְכֹּתָהּ. 2 And Sarah died in Kiriatharba--the same is Hebron--in the land of Canaan; and Abraham came to mourn for Sarah, and to weep for her.

And these words are where there are {existing} courts in the land {to judge it}.
My question is just who the author of the statement is. In the version above, it is Rabbi Yochanan. But that is just in the Rif's girsa. In our own gemara, we have:
אמר רב חנן המוסר דין על חבירו הוא נענש תחילה שנאמר (בראשית טז) ותאמר שרי אל אברם חמסי עליך וכתיב (בראשית כג) ויבא אברהם לספוד לשרה ולבכותה והני מילי דאית ליה דינא בארעא

In Rosh HaShana 16b:
דא"ר (אבין) [חנן] כל המוסר דין על חבירו הוא נענש תחלה שנאמר (בראשית טז, ה) ותאמר שרי אל אברם חמסי עליך וכתיב (בראשית כג, ב) ויבא אברהם לספוד לשרה ולבכותה

Yalkut Shimoni (but this is no proof):
אמר רבי חנן כל המוסר דין על חברו הוא נענש תחלה שנאמר ותאמר שרי אל אברם חמסי עליך וכתיב ויבוא אברהם לספוד לשרה ולבכותה.

Thus, we have three alternatives: חנן אבין יוחנן. With three combinations, and presumably one of them (rather than some outside name not represented), we have several possible combinations, but only a few plausible combinations. The possible are that any of the three can be the original, and that original could spark both of the other two; or else that there is an original, it sparks the intermediate, and the intermediate sparks the final. Thus:

1) Yochanan to Avin; Yochanan to Chanan.
2) Yochanan to Avin; then Avin to Chanan.
3) Yochanan to Chanan; then Chanan to Avin.

4) Chanan to Yochanan; Chanan to Avin.
5) Chanan to Yochanan; then Yochanan to Avin.
6) Chanan to Avin; then Avin to Yochanan.

7) Avin to Yochanan; Avin to Chanan.
8) Avin to Yochanan; then Yochanan to Chanan.
9) Avin to Chanan; then Chanan to Yochanan.

Some of these are not as plausible as others. Thus, Avin/Chanan requires a reinterpretation of a bet as a nun, or in Chanan/Avin, a nun as a bet. There is also a disappearing or appearing yud, but that is fairly easy.

Rabbi Yochanan to Rav Chanan is fairly plausible -- the yud at the end of Rabbi and the yud at the beginning of Yochanan merge together and disappear, or are interpreted as the apostrophe in ר' חנן. The other direction seems more probable to me. רב חנן to become ר' חנן to become ר יחנן to be interpreted and rewritten as ר' יוחנן.

But some are less plausible. רבי יוחנן to רבי אבין -- well, perhaps the aleph from the yud vav, depending on the font, but then a disappearing chet and an interpretation of nun as bet? There are so many more edit operations that need to be done to accomplish this transformation, in either direction. Therefore, I would discard any transformations involving a link between Avin and Yochanan. Thus, I would discard, off the bat: 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8.

We are then left with three possibilities:
3) Yochanan to Chanan; then Chanan to Avin.
4) Chanan to Yochanan; Chanan to Avin.
9) Avin to Chanan; then Chanan to Yochanan.

Of these three remaining, all are somewhat plausible, but I would favor (4). This for two reasons. First, each of these options, it is true, involves two transformations. What is more likely, though, that a text goes through one transformation, and then independently, that transformed text goes through a further transformation; or alternatively, that a single text, with some "difficulty" in it, prompts to different corruptions?

This might be quite subjective, but my inclination is that the latter is most plausible, with Chanan standing as the nexus.

Furthermore, I would point out that under the principle of lectio difficilior, the rule of the more "difficult" word being original, I would guess Rav Chanan to be the most "difficult." Certainly Rav Chanan is less common than Rabbi Yochanan. And I would say the same for Rabbi Avin.

Wednesday, March 25, 2009

Daf Yomi: Implicit Values in the Halachic System

Today, we are back on track in terms of Rif Yomi. For this brief period at least, we are caught up with Daf Yomi. From today's Rif:
ירושלמי
א"ר יוחנן הקוטע יד עבדו של חבירו רבו נוטל חמשה דברים והלה מתפרנס מן הצדקה דמצווין ישראל לפרנס עבדים הקטועים ולא שלימים
והא ר' יוחנן אכיל קופר ויהיב לעבדיה שתי חמר ויהיב לעבדיה וקרי עליה הלא בבטן עושני עשהו התם מדת רחמנות הכא מדת הדין:
Yerushalmi:
Rabbi Yochanan said: If one cuts off the arm of a Hebrew servant of another, the master takes the five things {=nezek, tzaar, ripui, shevet, boshet} and this other one {=the servant} subsists off charity, for Israel is available {/ready} to support amputee slaves, but not complete ones.
But Rabbi Yochanan would eat a piece of meat and give it to his servant; drink wine and give it to his servant, and call upon him {Iyyov 31:15}
טו הֲלֹא-בַבֶּטֶן, עֹשֵׂנִי עָשָׂהוּ; וַיְכֻנֶנּוּ, בָּרֶחֶם אֶחָד. 15 Did not He that made me in the womb make him? And did not One fashion us in the womb?
There was the attribute of Mercy. Here was the attribute of Law {Din}.
Now, he did cite a pasuk, or at least apply a pasuk {big difference} to his servant. But still, it is a fascinating and perhaps important gemara. Just because the strict halacha is X, that does not mean that one must derive one's value system from that, even though one may argue that this is therefore Hashem's declaration of what it Right and Just. Here, despite ruling honestly that the halacha was X, he personally conducted himself in such a manner as not required at all by halacha, and endorsed a value of equality of all mankind. And Rabbi Yochanan was an early Amora!

This is perhaps applicable to people reading specific anti-feminist values into the halachic system, and then criticizing it on that basis, or endorsing specific worldviews on that basis. Perhaps we may maintain values and moralities which differ from, and are more liberal, than the strict law, and the strict law is as it is for certain other {perhaps unknown or unknowable} reasons.

Just my own musings. And perhaps relevant to those folks studying Akeidas Yitzchak (even though as I have explained, I think the entire question is irrelevant to this).

How would you interpret the above Yerushalmi? Must one, as a frum Jew, adopt and endorse the values in the halachic system?

Wednesday, March 18, 2009

Prepare for Pesach by reading through all of Rif on Pesachim

I've been translating the Rif for a while now, and a commonly requested feature is to have all the Rifs in a masechta in one file, such as a PDF, to allow quick reading, instead of the clumsy and reverse navigation of a blog format.

So in honor of Pesach, I decided to make my translation of Rif on Pesachim available as a PDF. It is somewhat large -- about 10 meg, and 136 pages, but it is (IMHO) quite nice. It includes the actual tzuras hadaf of the Rif as well, so you can follow along and refer to the translation where necessary. Check it out, forward it to your friends, and enjoy!

Follow this link to download it, or else use the menus and popup to preview it full-screen, or download:

Sunday, December 07, 2008

Daf Yomi Kiddushin 60b: Where The Piska, And Just What Is Obvious?

When preparing Rif for my Rif Yomi blog, I noticed something a bit different in the Rif from our gemara. The Rif reads:
Kiddushin 60b
על מנת שאראך מאתים זוז הרי זו מקודשת ויראנה הראה על השולחן אינה מקודשת:
תנא לא נתכוונה זו אלא להראותה משלו
פשיטא לא צריכא אף על גב דנקיט זוזי בעיסקא
""On condition that I show you 200 zuz," she is betrothed, and he shows her. If he shows her on the table {money which is not his} she is not betrothed":
A tanna taught: {For} this one {=the woman} only intended that he would show her of his own {money}.
This is obvious?!
No, it is necessary -- even though he received the money to invest.
While our gemara reads:
ע"מ שאראך מאתים זוז וכו':
תנא לא נתכונה אלא לראות משלו:
ואם הראה לה על השלחן אינה מקודשת:
פשיטא לא צריכא דאע"ג דנקט דמי בעיסקא:
Can you spot the difference? It is quite subtle. It is a difference in the piska, the citation from the Mishna. In our gemara, there are two separate citations from the Mishna, where תנא לא נתכונה אלא לראות משלו goes on the first citation, and פשיטא לא צריכא דאע"ג דנקט דמי בעיסקא goes on the second. In contrast, in Rif, all the words of the citation are present, but they are present in a single, lengthy, citation.

Mai Beinayhu? Perhaps nothing. But perhaps something. Specifically, what is the peshita going on?

In our gemara, the peshitta is going on the statement of the Mishna that if he shows her money on a table, she is not betrothed. This is certainly not something obvious to me, given only the preceding words in the Mishna. Indeed, only once we understand the justification given in the brayta. Also, it is slightly awkward in our gemara how the brayta goes on ע"מ שאראך מאתים זוז וכו, which is the positive rather than negative case in the Mishna. But at any rate, in the tzricha, the idea is that in whatever {expansive} case the money is on the table, she is not betrothed.

In the Rif, the peshitta seems to be going on the brayta, which is giving the reason for the law in the Mishna. And once you see the two sides of the case in the Mishna, the brayta's elaboration indeed seems somewhat obvious. If so, the point is that the brayta, rather than the Mishna, is telling us that she expects the money to be his, and here, it is not his, even though he has the money to make more money with.

Which is correct? I don't know. I prefer the second. But on the other hand, earlier in the gemara on the daf, a different diyuk is made from the Mishna, in the same form of first asking peshitta.

It is also important to point out that these piskas are not Talmudic, or even savoraic. They are Geonic at the earliest. Originally, Mishna and gemara were separate. And the Geonim added these short quotations to show what part of the Mishna the gemara was going on. This might be a girsological difference which arose from mistaken copying, but perhaps reflects an actual machlokes in how to understand the gemara.

Monday, November 03, 2008

Daf Yomi Kiddushin 24b: The halacha like the words of the machria?

I was just going through this gemara, and Rif in the course of Rif Yomi:
{Kiddushin 24b}
ת"ר וכולן עבד יוצא בהן לחירות וצריך גט שחרור דברי ר"ש
ר"מ אומר אינו צריך
ר' אלעזר אומר צריך
ר' טרפון אומר א"צ
ר"ע אומר צריך
המכריעין לפני חכמים אומרים נראין דברי ר"ט בשן ועין שהתורה זכתה לו ודברי ר"ע בשאר אברים הואיל ומדרש חכמים הוא

והלכתא כר"ע
דר"ט חבירו הוא וקי"ל הלכה כר"ע מחבירו
ואע"ג דמכריעין לפני חכמים אמרו נראין דברי ר"ט בשן ועין לא סמכינן אהא דלא אמרינן כ"מ ששנים חולקין ואחר מכריע הלכה כדברי המכריע אלא במתני' אבל בברייתא לא
The Sages learnt {in a brayta}: And all of them, a servant goes out for them to freedom. And he requires a deed of manumission. These are the words of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Meir says: He does not need it. Rabbi Eleazar says: He does need it. Rabbi Tarfon says: He does not need it. Rabbi Akiva says: He needs it.
These who are machria {/decide amongst opinions -- or quite likely, compromise} before the Sages say: The words of Rabbi Tarfon appear true by tooth and eye, for the Torah {itself} gives it to him. And the words of Rabbi Akiva by the remainder of the limbs, since it is a midrash of the Sages.

And the halacha is like Rabbi Akiva. For Rabbi Tarfon is his colleague, and we establish that the halacha is like Rabbi Akiva over his colleague. And even though those who are machria before the Sages said "the words of Rabbi Tarfon appear true by tooth and eye," we do not rely upon this, for we do not say that any place that two {people} argue and one is machria, the halacha is like the words of the machria, except by a Mishna, but in a brayta, no.

דגרסי' בפ' כירה בענין הא דתניא לא ישתטף אדם כל גופו בין בחמין בין בצונן דברי ר' מאיר
ר"ש מתיר
ר' יהודה אומר בחמין אסור בצונן מותר

אמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר ר' יוחנן הלכה כרבי יהודה
אמר ליה רב יוסף לרבב"ח בפירוש שמיע לך או מכללא שמיע לך
מאי כללא דא"ר תנחום א"ר יוחנן א"ר ינאי אמר רבי כ"מ ששנים חולקין ואחר מכריע הלכתא כדברי המכריע חוץ מקולי מטלניות שאע"פ שר' אליעזר מחמיר ורבי יהושע מיקל ור"ע מכריע אין הלכה כדברי המכריע דר"ע גבי ר' אליעזר ור' יהושע תלמיד הוא ועוד הא הדר ביה ר"ע לגבי רבי יהושע
ואמר ליה ואי מכללא מאי
דלמא הני מילי במתני' אבל בברייתא לא
אמר ליה אנא בפירוש שמיע לי:
For we learn in perek Kira {Shabbat 39b, here in the Rif}, in the matter of this which they learnt {in a brayta}:
A person must not souse his entire body, whether in hot or cold water. These are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon permits. Rabbi Yehuda says: In hot it is forbidden, while in cold it is permitted.
Rabba bar bar Channa cited Rabbi Yochanan: The halacha is like Rabbi Yehuda.
Rav Yosef said to Rabba bar bar Chana: Did you hear this explicitly, or are you deriving this from a principle?
What principle {was he referring to}? For R' Tanchum cited Rabbi Yochanan who cited Rabbi Yannai who cited Rabbi: Any place where two people argue and one is machria, the halacha is like the words of the machria, except for the leniencies related to rags {three square tefachim used for specific purposes, whether they become tamei, as discussed on Shabbat 29a}, where even though Rabbi Eliezer is stringent, Rabbi Yehoshua is lenient, and Rabbi Akiva is machria, the halacha is not like the words of the machria. {switch to Aramaic} For Rabbi Akiva in regard to Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua is a student, and furthermore, Rabbi Akiva retracted in this in regard to Rabbi Yehoshua.
And he {=Rabba bar bar Channa} said to him: and if it is derived from a principle, what of it?
{The response:} "Perhaps these words were by a Mishna, but by a brayta, no.
He said to him: I heard it explicitly.
It is interesting, this application of the rule by the Rif, which is a klal horaah he extracted from perek Kira. A few notes, though:

1) In that gemara in perek Kira, a lot of information is actually provided by the setama digemara, something we can discover by looking at the transition between the Hebrew and the Aramaic, and other cues.

I would declare that the original discussion between Rav Yosef and Rabba bar bar Chana did not include a discussion of the specific "kelal" involved. Thus, the discussion went:
אמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר ר' יוחנן הלכה כרבי יהודה
אמר ליה רב יוסף לרבב"ח בפירוש שמיע לך או מכללא שמיע לך
אמר ליה אנא בפירוש שמיע לי

Even though Rif has the words
ואמר ליה ואי מכללא מאי
which would suggest that Rabba bar bar Channa uttered those words, in which case Rav Yosef would have had to have replied
דלמא הני מילי במתני' אבל בברייתא לא
in fact, the words ואמר ליה are supplied by Rif to explain the progression of that sugya, but in our text of gemara, the words ואמר ליה are absent. Thus, this explanation of
דלמא הני מילי במתני' אבל בברייתא לא
are not necessarily the words of Rav Yosef, but rather quite possibly the words of the setama, and one should keep this in mind before deciding that this is a limitation on one of the kelalei horaah.

2) Another point is that within the citation of the statement of Rabbi Tanchum, there is a distinction between the words of Rabbi and the setama's explanation. And this is made clear by a sudden shift from Hebrew to Aramaic. Thus,
מאי כללא דא"ר תנחום א"ר יוחנן א"ר ינאי אמר רבי כ"מ ששנים חולקין ואחר מכריע הלכתא כדברי המכריע חוץ מקולי מטלניות שאע"פ שר' אליעזר מחמיר ורבי יהושע מיקל ור"ע מכריע אין הלכה כדברי המכריע
דר"ע גבי ר' אליעזר ור' יהושע תלמיד הוא ועוד הא הדר ביה ר"ע לגבי רבי יהושע
The text in red is the actual statement cited by Rabbi Tanchum, while the text in blue is the explanation. We can tell because the text in red is Hebrew, and thus uses a shin to mean "that," while the text in blue, which is the explanation, is introduced with a daled to mean "that," and has the Aramaic word beih therein.

This distinction is possibly important, since this is then, once again, just a suggested reason for the divergence in this case, within the general class in which it is true, for Mishnayot.

3) Is Rif correct to extract this restriction, that halacha kidivrei hamachria only applies to Mishna and not to brayta? After all, it was quite possibly a suggestion by a setama, rather than a named Amora such as Rav Yosef.

And even if we do lend it full credence, whoever said it used the language of dilma, perhaps. In asking this, Rav Yosef is not entirely discounting it. Rather, he is uncertain, and perhaps it only applies to Mishnayot.

4) Does this restriction, to Mishnayot, make sense? I would say that it depends.

On the one hand, see who authored the original statement. If we follow the chain all the way up, it was Rabbi, that is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who compiled the Mishnayot. If so, we can readily say that he was making a declaration about the corpus he was responsible for, namely Mishna, and what metziut is true for that corpus.

But who is to say that the other compilers of Tannaitic material, Rabbi Chiyya Rabba and Rabbi Hoshaya, that the same general rule holds true.

On the other hand, we can understand Rabbi's rule as an observation of the structure of the Tannaitic literature. If one bothers to give two conflicting opinions and follow it up with a machria, one who compromises, the purpose is to endorse the machria as practical halacha. And if so, such would (or could) also be true for Tannaitic material in a brayta.

Or looking at it from a slightly different perspective, if another Tanna bothered to inspect other Tannaitic opinions, and feels capable of being machria, such that it applies one way in one situation and another in another situation, then perforce the halacha is like him. Perhaps something akin to hilcheta kebatrai. This would then also apply even to braytot.

Perhaps we can call back to mind that the reason for the exception was not made clear by Rabbi. Rather, the setama gave two different suggestions. If this is just the way that Rabbi happened to arrange the Mishnayot, then we do not need to give a reason for an exception to the rule, that in this particular case, Rabbi Akiva is not qualified as a machria, or that he retracted as a machria. But if one needs to give reasons for the exclusion as a machria, then perhaps this is a general rule that indeed should apply even by braytos, for why not?

5) If we ignore this kelal horaah restricting ruling like the machria, then it would perhaps be pashut that we rule like the machria.

But let us say we do decide to apply this exclusion to the general rule. Do we then just apply that the halacha is like Rabbi Akiva over his colleague?

Perhaps, and perhaps not. For example, let me suggest that the machria is also arguing with Rabbi Akiva. And then, while the halacha is like Rabbi Akiva over his colleague, the halacha is not like Rabbi Akiva over his colleagues. Would the machria indeed be considered his colleague, though?

6) Ignoring the machriin, one should point out the following:
ת"ר וכולן עבד יוצא בהן לחירות וצריך גט שחרור דברי ר"ש
ר"מ אומר אינו צריך
ר' אלעזר אומר צריך
ר' טרפון אומר א"צ
ר"ע אומר צריך

Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva are clearly contemporaries, and take different positions. And Rabbi Akiva says it is necessary. But Rabbi Eleazar (ben Shamua) was a student of Rabbi Akiva, and agrees with him. And Rabbi Shimon (ben Yochai) was also a student of Rabbi Akiva and agrees with him. But Rabbi Meir was a student of Rabbi Akiva and argues with him.

I am still learning kelalei horaah. But do we say that the halacha is like Rabbi Akiva over his colleague, when it is dispute also within the subsequent Tannaitic generation? It would seem so, but perhaps there is room for discussion. We have to see when this is generally applied.

Note: Obviously not intended halacha lemaaseh. I am only wandering about here.

Wednesday, September 24, 2008

Is Hatarat Nedarim A Sham? pt iii (paskening like Rav Pappa because he is later)

In the first post of this series, a question: how could hatarat nedarim on erev Rosh haShanah work, if it specifically avoided pirut haneder, and halachah requires this even bedieved? And other questions.

In the second post of this series, a proposed answer: that when the gemara and Rishonim say that bedieved it does not work without pirut haneder, they were not speaking of the case where the judges know that the neder is not being specified.

Now, in the third post in this series, I wish to address whether Rif, Rosh, etc., are correct in ruling in accordance with Rav Pappa over Rav Nachman. This is important because only according to Rav Pappa is pirut haneder required as protocol. According to Rav Nachman, it should not be done.

Pictured to the right is a scan of the Rosh. Click on the picture to see it very large. You want the first column, d"h kasavar.

Rosh gives three reasons we should hold like Rav Pappa over Rav Nachman:

1) Rav Pappa is later than Rav Nachman, so he is batrai, and hilcheta kebatrai.

2) Rav Huna holds like him.

3) The Yerushalmi seems to conclude like Rav Pappa that there is such an obligation.

And so, we shall have to address each of these three in turn. Here, we will address the first point, and declare:

1) Rav Pappa is not actually batrai.

We have two ways of accomplishing this.

a) Rav Pappa is batrai when compared with plain Rav Nachman, who is Rav Nachman bar Yaakov. (See here.) But what if the Rav Nachman in this dispute is Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak? (See here.) Rav Nachman bar Yaakov was a disciple of Shmuel and so is of an earlier generation than Rav Pappa, who was a student of both Abaye and Rava. But if it is Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak, then he is of the same generation of Rav Pappa, for he was also a student of both Abaye and Rava. Then, neither is batrai. And it makes more sense for there to be a dispute between the two.

I do not make this suggestion idly. In fact, the Rif has a girsa of this gemara in which he explicitly has Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak rather than just plain Rav Nachman. Thus, in Nedarim, on 21b in the pages of Rif:
גרסינן בפרק השולח
צריך לפרט הנדר או לא
רב פפא אמר צריך
רב נחמן בר יצחק אמר אין צריך
דאי אמרת צריך זמנין דגייז וחכם מה דשמע מיפר
ורב פפא אמר צריך דלמא אמילתא דאיסורא משתבע
והלכתא כרב פפא:
We learn in perek haSholeach {=the 4th perek of Gittin, daf 35b}:
Does one need to spell out the vow {when asking absolution} or not?
Rav Pappa said: He needs to.
Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said: He does not need to.
For if you say that he needs, there are times that he will cut off his words, and the sage will only annul that which he hears.
And Rav Pappa said: He needs to, for perhaps he swore about something which was forbidden.
And the halacha is like Rav Pappa.
Rif still says the halacha is like Rav Pappa, but his reason does not need to be that Rav Pappa is batrai. Indeed, he specifies no reason, though the reason may well be that Rav Huna holds like Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak, rather than that Rav Pappa is later. Meanwhile, Rosh has the girsa of just plain Rav Nachman, and so he cites this as a reason.

This is really enough for me. Lectio difficilior dictates that "bar Yitzchak" is more likely to be dropped than added to a text, and so the most likely original is Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak.

Of course, a bit earlier in the gemara, we have Rav Nachman arguing with Rav Huna. This would presumably be the earlier Rav Nachman, namely Rav Nachman bar Yaakov. This could also explain the reason for the dropping of "bar Yitzchak" a bit later in the gemara, when a Rav Nachman argues with Rav Pappa.

b) But I could propose another solution, if I wished. Namely, that Rav Nachman is indeed Rav Nachman bar Yaakov, who is a student of Shmuel, but his disputant is not Rav Pappa, but rather Rav Pappi, who some say was of an earlier generation. Indeed, we have Rav Pappi visit Mar Shmuel's house, and so some then distinguish Shmuel from Mar Shmuel, but I believe others say that Rav Pappi was of an earlier generation. Since he visited Shmuel's house, he would be of the same generation as Shmuel's student, Rav Nachman bar Yaakov.

While I did not look, and thus certainly have no manuscript evidence to support me in this bold assertion, I do have the fact that this is not the only time "Rav Nachman" and "Rav Pappa" disagree. We also have a dispute between Rav Nachman and Rav Pappa elsewhere. (See here for a partial list.) We really need to sit down and see whether we can figure out a rule for this.

Thus, for example, from my transaltion in the Rif:
Rav Nachman said: People do not make a son the agent in the place of his father. And Rav Pappa {our gemara: Rav Pappi} said: People do make a son the agent in the place of his father.
And the halacha is that people to make a son an agent in place of his father.
And in this dispute, we have a girsological variant between Rav Pappa and Rav Pappi. Lectio difficilior would argue in favor of the less well-known Rav Pappi, but then again, if one scribe writes פפ' מ instead of פפא, the shmitchik could be reinterpreted by the next scribe as a yud.

But other gemaras (e.g. this) make me favor the identification of Rav Pappa rather than Rav Pappi. Thus, I would reject option (b) but would promote option (a).

All in all, we have this compelling variant in the words of the Rif that Rav Nachman is Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak, and so he is a contemporary of Rav Pappa. Rosh's first argument in favor of ruling like Rav Pappa is thus readily dismissed.

Note: This is all not intended halacha lemaaseh.

Sunday, September 07, 2008

Daf Yomi Gittin 58a-b: Does ארצי ליה זוזי mean that the buyer gives money, or that the recipient counts out the money given to him?

From my Rif blog:
{Gittin 58a}
Gemara:
לקח מסיקריקון כו'. אמר רב לא שנו אלא דאמר ליה לך חזק וקנה אבל בשטר קנה
ושמואל אמר אף בשטר לא קנה עד שיכתוב לו אחריות
"IF A MAN BUYS FROM THE SICARICON...":
Rav said: They only learned this where he {the original owner} said to him {the buyer} "Go and take possession {via chazaka, by working the land} and acquire it." But with a written deed, he acquires.
And Shmuel said: Even with a deed he does not acquire until he writes for himself responsibility {for reimbursing him if the title proves invalid}.

{Gittin 58b}
ואותבינן עליה דרב מהא דתניא
רבי שמעון בן אלעזר אומר לקח מן האשה בכתובתה וחזר ולקח מן האיש מקחו קיים מן האיש וחזר ולקח מן האשה מקחו בטל עד שיכתוב אחריות
ופריק מאי אחריות נמי שטר
והלכתא כשמואל דקי"ל דכל היכא דפליגי רב ושמואל ולא איתמר הלכתא כחד מינייהו הלכתא כשמואל בדיני ועוד דתניא מסייעא ליה
ופירוקא דרב שינויא הוא ולא סמכינן אשינויא
And they object to Rav from this that they learnt {in a brayta}:
Rabbi Shimon ben Eleazar says: If one buys [a married woman's property] from the wife and then buys it again from the husband, his purchase is effective. But if he first buys from the husband and then from the wife the purchase is invalid, unless he {our gemara: she} writes responsibility.
And it resolves: What is "responsibility?" It is also a written deed.
And the halacha is like Shmuel, for we establish that wherever Rav and Shmuel argue, and the halacha is not stated like one of them, the halacha is like Shmuel in laws {dinei, such as monetary matters}. And furthermore, that there is a brayta which supports him, and resolution of Rav {that Rav could offer} is a mere shinuya {a weak retort and a way of reading his position into the brayta with difficulty}, and we do not rely on a shinuya.

ואי קשיא לך ההיא דגרסינן בחזקת הבתים אמר רב הונא תליוה וזבין זביניה זביני
ואותיב רב המנונא עליה דרב הונא מהא מתני' לקח מסיקריקון וחזר ולקח מבעל הבית מקחו בטל
ואמאי התם נמי נימא אגב אונסיה גמר ומקני
ופריק הא איתמר עלה אמר רב לא שאנו אלא דא"ל לך חזק וקנה אבל בשטר קנה
ואקשינן ולשמואל דאמר אף בשטר לא קנה מאי איכא למימר
ופריק מודה שמואל היכא דיהיב זוזי
ואסיקנא והלכתא בכולהו זביניה זביני ואפי' בשדה זו בין ארצי ליה זוזי בין לא ארצי ליה זוזי אלא בשטר בלבד קנה וכי אמר ליה בתר הכין תא שקול זוזך לא מצי למהדר ביה
למימרא דהלכתא כרב דאמר לא צריכינן לכתיבת אחריות
ההיא לא קשיא מידי דהא אמרינן מודה שמואל היכא דיהיב זוזי
ואע"ג דאיפסיקא הלכתא בין ארצי ליה זוזי בין לא ארצי ליה זוזי התם גבי תליוה וזבין דעתיה למיתן ליה זוזי ודעתיה דמוכר למישקל מיניה זוזי
אבל הכא גבי אשה וסיקריקון ליכא מאן דיהיב להו זוזי הילכך לא מהניא כתיבת שטר עלייהו עד דכתיבי אחריות:

And if it is difficult to you this that we learned in Chezkat HaBatim {the third perek of Bava Batra}:
{Bava Batra 47b}
Rav Huna said: If someone is threatened {with physical violence} and he sells, his sale is valid.
{Bava Batra 48a}
And Rav Hamnuna objects to Rav Huna from this Mishna {local to Gittin}:
'If a man buys a field from a sicarius and then buys it again from the original owner, the purchase is void.'
But why? There {in the Mishna} as well, let us say that because of compulsion he decided to sell it ?
And it resolves: Behold, Rav said upon it {=the Mishna, as we see local to Gittin}: They only learned this in the case where he said "take hold {chazaka} and acquire," but with a {written} deed, he does acquire.
And we ask: But according to Shmuel who said that even with a {written} deed, he does not acquire, what is there to say?
And they resolve: Shmuel admits in the case where he gives money.
And we conclude {Bava Batra 48b}: And the halacha in all of these is that his sale is a valid sale, even for {threats to sell} "this field" {rather than just "a field"}, and whether he counted out for him the money or did not count out for him the money -- but rather just did the acquisition with a {written} deed, and when he says to him after this "come, take your money," he is not able to retract.
That is to say that the halacha is like Rav who said that we do not require the writing of responsibility.

{This is difficult because Rif would like to rule in accordance with Shmuel, for the reasons given above. And so:}

This is no question at all, for we say that Shmuel admits in the case where he gave money. And even though we rule the halacha is whether he gives him money or does not give him mother, there, where he was pressured and sold, his intent was to give him money and the intent of the seller was to take money from him. But here, by the woman and the sicarius, there is none who gives them money. Therefore, the writing of the deed does not help them until they write responsibility.
End quote from the Rif.

The portion marked in red above is not in our gemara and seems to be Rif's gloss. Also, in our gemara we have ארצי זוזי instead of ארצי ליה זוזי. Rif, and Tosafot who happens to have ארצי ליה זוזי, understand this as giving over the money as payment. Therefore, the alternative, which Rif offers as a gloss, is that he did not give money but only had a shtar. In contrast, see Rabbenu Gershom, who understands this phrase as the recipient counting out the money after he is given it, to make sure that all is there. If so, this is different from דיהיב זוזי. And if so, this hilchesa is certainly in agreement with Shmuel, such that there is no question. Indeed, the assumption is that money was given, for otherwise, there would not be two alternatives of counting out the money or not counting it. But Rif interprets this as simply giving money, and it is valid even if no money is given, but only a shetar.

Friday, August 08, 2008

Daf Yomi Gittin 28b: How Do We Know "Asher Pihem Dibber Shav" Refers to Nochrim?

Citing from my Rif Yomi blog, about Gittin 28b:
Gemara:
תניא שמע מבית דין שהיו אומרים איש פלוני מת איש פלוני נהרג ישיאו את אשתו
מקומנטריסין של עובדי כוכבים איש פלוני מת איש פלוני נהרג לא ישיאו את אשתו
ואע"ג דקי"ל דכל מסיח לפי תומו הימוני מהימן ה"מ במילתא דלא שייך בה אבל במילתא דשייך בה לא מהימנא דכתיב אשר פיהם דיבר שוא וגו':ש
They learnt {in a brayta}: If he heard {a report} from Bet Din that they were saying "a man, Ploni, died"; "a man, Ploni, was killed"; they allow his wife to marry.
If from heathen jailers that "a man, Ploni, died"; "a man, Ploni, was killed", they do not allow his wife to marry.

And even though we establish that any time one is speaking in all innocent, they are believed, these words are by something with which they did not participate. But with something which which they participated, they are not believed, for it is written {Tehillim 144:8}
ח אֲשֶׁר פִּיהֶם, דִּבֶּר-שָׁוְא; וִימִינָם, יְמִין שָׁקֶר. 8 Whose mouth speaketh falsehood, and their right hand is a right hand of lying.

This derasha appears in the Rif, but not in our version of the gemara. How do we know it refers to nachrim? The derasha does not make it explicit, but this is why it is so important to look up every pasuk used for a derasha. The context of the previous pasuk, I believe, provides the context:
ז שְׁלַח יָדֶיךָ, מִמָּרוֹם: פְּצֵנִי וְהַצִּילֵנִי, מִמַּיִם רַבִּים; מִיַּד, בְּנֵי נֵכָר. 7 Stretch forth Thy hands from on high; rescue me, and deliver me out of many waters, out of the hand of strangers;
ח אֲשֶׁר פִּיהֶם, דִּבֶּר-שָׁוְא; וִימִינָם, יְמִין שָׁקֶר. 8 Whose mouth speaketh falsehood, and their right hand is a right hand of lying.

While it does not appear in our version of the gemara, the pasuk does appear in two other gemaras. The first is one of the solutions the stama digmara applies to a contradiction between Chazal's science and the testimony of Justinia, a non-Jewish woman, about the age a woman can safely give birth.
Niddah 45a:

ת"ר מעשה ביוסטני בתו של אסוירוס בן אנטנינוס שבאת לפני רבי אמרה לו רבי אשה בכמה ניסת אמר לה בת ג' שנים ויום אחד ובכמה מתעברת אמר לה בת י"ב שנה ויום אחד אמרה לו אני נשאתי בשש וילדתי בשבע אוי לשלש שנים שאבדתי בבית אבא ומי מעברה והתני רב ביבי קמיה דרב נחמן ג' נשים משמשות במוך קטנה מעוברת ומניקה קטנה שמא תתעבר ותמות מעוברת שמא תעשה עוברה סנדל מניקה שמא תגמול את בנה וימות ואיזוהי קטנה מבת י"א שנה ויום אחד ועד י"ב שנה ויום אחד פחות מכאן או יתר על כן משמשת והולכת דברי ר"מ וחכ"א אחת זו ואחת זו משמשת כדרכה והולכת ומן השמים ירחמו שנאמר (תהילים קטז) שומר פתאים ה' איבעית אימא (יחזקאל כג) אשר בשר חמורים בשרם ואיבעית אימא (תהילים קמד) אשר פיהם דבר שוא וימינם ימין שקר
The two (not three, it should be stressed) solutions given are that non-Jewish women are more sturdy, or that Justinia was lying, as it states in that pasuk in Tehillim.

The other gemara which makes reference to the pasuk makes it a derasha about וימינם ימין שקר rather than about אשר פיהם דבר שוא. Thus, in Bava Batra 45a:
האי בר ישראל דזבין ליה חמרא לישראל חבריה וקא אתי {נכרי} ואניס ליה מיניה דינא הוא דמפצי ליה מיניה ולא אמרן אלא שאינו מכיר בה שהיא בת חמורו אבל מכיר בה שהיא בת חמורו לא ולא אמרן אלא דלא אניס ליה לדידיה ולאוכפא אבל אניס ליה לדידיה ולאוכפא לא אמימר אמר אפי' ליכא כל הני לא מאי טעמא מידע ידע דסתם {נכרי} אנס הוא שנא' (תהילים קמד) אשר פיהם דבר שוא וימינם ימין שקר:
"Anis" in this case means "grabber," and the idea is that their right hand grabs not in truth. So this does not really have anything to do with our derasha, though of course the context of the previous pasuk also is important for this derasha.

We see this derasha made explicitly in reference to heathen jailers in Yerushalmi Pesachim 51b, an excellent parallel to our gemara:

דף סא, ב פרק ח הלכה ו משנה האונן והמפקח בגל וכן מי שהבטיחוהו להוציאו מבית האסורין החולה והזקן שהן יכולין לוכל כזית שוחטין עליהן ועל כולן אין שוחטין עליהן בפני עצמן שלא יביאוהו את הפסח לידי פסול לפיכך אם אירע בהן פסול פטורין מלעשות פסח שני חוץ מן המפקח בגל שהיה טמא מתחילתו:
דף סא, ב פרק ח הלכה ו גמרא
ר' יוסי בי ר' בון אבא בר בר חנה בשם ר' יוחנן מתניתא בשחבשוהו ישראל אבל אם חבשוהו עכו"ם (תהילים קמד) אשר פיהם דבר שוא וימינם ימין שקר. בנתון חוץ לירושלם אבל בנתון בתוך ירושלם אפילו לא הבטיחו כמי שהבטיחו

Thus, if Jewish jailers promise to release him, we can shecht with him in mind. But not if they are heathen jailers.

Monday, July 28, 2008

Daf Yomi Gittin 9a: To Whom Did Rabbi Yossi Apply The Words In Mishlei?

A bit late, because I let it sit as a draft a bit too long.

Gittin 9a.
והאמר רב יוסף בר מניומי אמר רב נחמן אע"פ שקילס רבי יוסי את רבי שמעון הלכה כר' מאיר דתניא כשנאמרו דברים לפני ר' יוסי קרא עליו המקרא הזה (משלי כד) שפתים ישק משיב דברים
To whom did he apply this pasuk?
Soncino:
[But can Raba then rule thus, Seeing that] R. Joseph b. Manyumi said in the name of R. Nahman: Although R. Jose commended R. Simeon, the halachah follows R. Meir. For it has been taught: When the discussion was reported to R. Jose, he applied to him [R. Meir] the Scriptural words, He shall be kissed upon the lips that giveth a right answer.
But where, then, is the commendation of Rabbi Shimon? Is this commendation simply left out?

Rashi says on "Although R. Jose commended R. Simeon" the words כדמפרש ואזיל, making it clear that the praise it to come in the gemara, and thus the praise in the brayta is praise of Rabbi Shimon, not Rabbi Meir.

Tosefta Peah:
א,טז הכותב נכסיו לעבדו יצא בן חורין שייר קרקע כל שהוא לא יצא בן חורין ר"ש אומר האומר כל נכסי נתונין לפלוני עבדי חוץ מאחד [מרבוא שבהן לא אמר כלום חוץ מעיר פלונית חוץ משדה פלונית אף על פי שאין שם אלא אותה שדה ואותה העיר זכה עבד זה בנכסים וקנה עצמו בן חורין וכשנאמרו דברים לפני ר' יוסי אמר (משלי כד) שפתים ישק משיב דברים נכוחים.

and Rif makes this even clearer, by moving about the brayta, in to the middle of the quote:
והאמר רב יוסף בר מניומי אמר רב נחמן אע"פ שקילס ר' יוסי את ר"ש
דתניא כשנאמרו דברים לפני רבי יוסי קרא עליו המקרא הזה שפתים ישק משיב דברים נכוחים
הלכה כר"מ
{Thus, this statement of Rava was in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, it seems.}
But Rav Yosef bar Minyumi cited Rav Nachman: Even though Rabbi Yossi praised Rabbi Shimon, for they learnt {in a brayta}:
When these words were said before Rabbi Yossi, he applied to him {=Rabbi Shimon} this verse {Mishlei 24:26}:
כו שְׂפָתַיִם יִשָּׁק; מֵשִׁיב, דְּבָרִים נְכֹחִים. 26 He kisseth the lips that giveth a right answer.
The halacha is like Rabbi Meir {=the Tanna Kamma}.

Also, it occurred to me that perhaps what is happening here is that the pasuk in Mishlei is applied to Rabbi Shimon in light of his position. That is, perhsps מֵשִׁיב דְּבָרִים נְכֹחִים is a way of describing palginan diburah. Nochach means the one opposite, or opposing. And see in the gemara how this would work out.

Sunday, July 27, 2008

Hilchos Rav Alfes

I've been spending a lot of time recently on HebrewBooks.org. What is nice is that besides allowing downloads of full PDFs, they also allow browsing of individual pages online. And in a way that supports direct links to that page. Therefore, if there is some source I want to link to, I can link to it, and people could read the context -- the text before and after, as well as any commentaries on the side, and so on.

And I came across this pdf, הלכות רב אלפס, on Gittin. I think has different pagination that the Rif in our gemaras, but it strikes me as useful. You get to compare our text with their text, to see that it is the same or different; there are sometimes gaps indicating change of topic; and you have convenient access to the Ran while sitting in front of the computer. And this is useful to me, as I post to my Rif Yomi blog.

Here is the first page of the Rif on Gittin. I am not sure who made the emendations -- the printer, or perhaps some shnook, so this is something to keep in mind. But anyway, there are some interesting features just on this first page.

The emendation on the bottom of the page is no doubt correct. While Rava sometimes switches for Rabba, our girsa in the gemara, and our girsa in the Rif in our gemara (see here), has Rabba. And indeed, this is a machlokes, and on the next page in the Rif (even in this printing) Rava argues with this first speaker. So it must be Rabba.

The emendation in the middle of the page is more interestin. There is a gap, followed by והמוליך והמביא ממדינה למדינה במדינת הים. Though there seems not to be a vav there in והמביא, such that it is simply המביא. This gap might indicate a new statement. But note the mark after והמוליך to mark it off. But then, someone inserted a two-letter word in between והמביא and ממדינה. It is hard to make out. The first letter seems to be a gimmel while the second letter seems to be an aleph. But this makes no sense. I would guess the second letter is really a tes. Then, the inserted word is get.

But why should that word get be inserted? The answer, I think, lies in the (accidental) gap, or in the lack of vav in והמביא.

The way one is supposed to read the Mishna (and so does e.g. Rashi read) is with והמוליך as attached to the previous sentence. Thus, not only one who brings from an overseas country (to Eretz Yisrael), but also one who takes it (from Eretz Yisrael to an overseas country). Meanwhile, והמביא (or perhaps without the vav) is the beginning of a separate statement. This may or may not be part of the statement of the Chachamim.

And, as the beginning of a separate statement, one might expect to have get there to explain what is being brought. Indeed, looking to the Yerushalmi Gittin 4b, I would point out the following statement from Rabbi Leizer, which does not have the vav in hameivi, and does indeed have the word get:

מתיב רבי לעזר לרבנן כמא דאית לכון המביא גט ממדינה למדינה במדינת הים צריך שיאמר בפני נכתב ובפני נחתם. אף אנא אית לי המביא ממדינה למדינה בא"י צריך שיאמר בפני נכתב ובפני נחתם.

This is not in the Mishna as printed in our Yerushalmi, but it might well have been in the Mishna back then.

If so, this would imply that this is not some accidental emendation by some shnook, but rather making the text comply with a version of the Mishna as reflected in the Yerushalmi. Indeed, the Rif's girsa of the Mishna is (often?) the girsa of the Geonim, and often reflects the Mishna as found in the Yerushalmi.

Sunday, May 18, 2008

The Gap Between One Navi and the Next

I was learning through Yoreh Deah siman 273 the other day in Aruch haShulchan and I came across an interesting discussion and pesak halacha.

ערוך השולחן יורה דעה סימן רפג
ומניח בין חומש לחומש ד' שיטין וכבר בארנו פרטי דינים בזה בסי' רע"ג ע"ש ובין כל נביא ונביא ג' שיטין וכן בין נביא לנביא של תרי עשר כן כתבו הרמב"ם והטור והש"ע וכן מפורש במסכת סופרים פ"ב [ה"ד] ע"ש אבל גירסת רש"י בב"ב שם דרק בתרי עשר ג' שיטין אבל בכל הנביאים צריך ד' שיטין ריוח כמו בס"ת וכן משמע להדיא בירושלמי פ"ק דמגילה [ה"ט] שאומר בין ספר לספר ד' שיטין ובתרי עשר ג' שיטין ע"ש ומבואר להדיא דבין ספר לספר הוה אפילו בנביאים ובוודאי יש לעשות כדעת הרמב"ם והטוש"ע וכל זה לא לעיכובא כמ"ש שם בסי' רע"ג ע"ש:

The gemara, in Bava Basra 13b, discusses situations in which various chumashim are bound together into a sefer Torah, or where Torah, Neviim, and Ketuvim are bound in the same scroll, and so on and so forth. An interesting sugya in its own right, of whether, and why, one could do this.

But then, the gemara discusses how much of a gap needs to exist between one Chumash and the next in the same scroll, how much of a gap needs to exist between one Navi and the next in the same scroll, and finally how much of a gap needs to exist between one Navi and the next within Trei Asar, the Twelve Prophets, which are all extremely short and have been grouped into a single sefer of Navi.

The Aruch haShulchan makes note of the fact that there are multiple girsaot of the gemara: Rashi's girsa is:
  • Four lines between two chumashim.
  • Four lines between two Neviim.
  • Three lines between two Neviim within Trei Asar.
Meanwhile, the Rambam, Tur, and Shulchan Aruch (see siman 273 and 283) say differently, reflecting a different girsa:
  • Four lines between two chumashim.
  • Three lines between two Neviim.
  • Three lines between two Neviim within Trei Asar.
This girsa of Rambam, Tur and Shulchan Aruch is echoed in the second perek of Maseches Soferim, thus bolstering it. But, continues Aruch haShulchan, the text in Yerushalmi Megillah matches the conclusions one would draw if one had Rashi's girsa.

That is, Yerushalmi Megillah 12a reads:
וצריך שיהא משייר בין ספר לספר כמלא ארבע שיטין ובנביא של י"ב שלש וצריך שיהא גומר באמצע הדף ומתחיל באמצעיתו ובנביא גומר בסופו ומתחיל בראשו ובנביא של י"ב אסור

Therefore, concludes Aruch haShulchan, one should certainly rule like Rambam, Tur and Shulchan Aruch.

This surprised me, for I would have read all this and said the opposite, that one should certainly rule like Rashi.

This presumably is a difference in methodology. I can definitely see where Aruch haShulchan is coming from. To argue along his lines: After all, the standard halachic tracts -- Rambam, Tur, and Shulchan Aruch all rule this way. And this is a machlokes Bavli and Yerushalmi, so we should rule like Bavli. And we even have maseches Soferim bolstering the Bavli! Of course we should rule this way. The fact that Rashi has a girsa parallel to Yerushalmi should not matter, because major halachic words favor a different version of the Bavli, and there is masechet Sofrim to support this girsa.

My methodology is different, and so it can conceivably lead to a different conclusion. I would (initially) summarize the situation, and argue, as follows:

First of all, Aruch haShulchan does not cite another important Rishon who has the same girsa as Rashi. Namely, as Masoret haShas notes, Rif also has the same girsa as Rashi and the Yerushalmi:

רי"ף מסכת בבא בתרא דף ח עמוד ב
ומניח כדי לגול עמוד בתחלתו וכדי היקף בסופה ונותן בין כל חומש וחומש ארבע שיטין וכן בין כל נביא ונביא ובנביא של י"ב שלש שיטין ומתחיל מלמעלה ומסיים מלמטה שאם רצה לחתוך חותך

I tend to be partial to Rif's girsa in general, but a must put aside any favoritism.
However, now, within Rishonim we have another opinion favoring Rashi's girsa. So we have:

One one side: Girsat Rashi, Girsat Rif, Yerushalmi. Also the girsa in our gemara (which has bein navi leNavi rather than veNavi, which is effectively the same), but what they happened to print does not really impact the halachic conclusion. It is a girsa like any other.
On the other: Girsat Rambam, Tur, Shulchan Aruch, and Masechet Soferim.

These sources are not all equal. Specifically, the Shulchan Aruch from Rav Yosef Karo is relatively late. Perhaps we might say Tur's position reflects his father, so that we have Rambam and Rosh on one side and Rif (and Rashi) on the other, such that following Rav Yosef Karo's methodology we would rule in favor of the two of the triad over the Rif.

However, note that the Rosh has a general principle that when the Bavli is silent on some matter, and there is a machlokes between Maseches Soferim and Yerushalmi, we rule like the Yerushalmi. Why? Because Maseches Soferim is post-Talmudic, from the Savoraim. Thus, even though the Rosh is silent on this matter, and does not cite the gemara lehalacha at all, we might speak on his behalf the following extension: say that Maseches Soferim should not factor into this dispute of Bavli/Yerushalmi, since alone against the Yerushalmi, the Yerushalmi would win.

It is therefore a machlokes between one girsa of Bavli vs. a different girsa of Bavli with a Yerushalmi. That is, we should reckon and weight all the sources on the basis of their respective strengths. We still don't know what Rosh would say in such a situation, but I am just pointing out that this is not as straightforward as it may seem at first glance.

Another point to consider is that Rosh very often responds to, and builds off, the Rif. If Rif cites a specific gemara lehalacha, and Rosh thinks the girsa is or should be different, then he should not be silent. Perhaps we should say that his shtika is kehodaah.

Continuing my analysis: if Maseches Soferim says this, it is Savoraic and it presumably saying this on the basis of one girsa on the gemara that it has. So it is not an independent source, but rather a source which depends on the Bavli. It does give weight to that particular girsa, in that it shows this was a fairly early girsa, but still, it comes down to one girsa of Bavli.

But the other girsa of Bavli also has weight. The Rif has this girsa, and the Rif's girsa in general is an important factor to weigh.

And furthermore, Rashi does not just summarize or cite the gemara such that we may derive what his girsa is. Rather, he says hachi garsinan. That is, Rashi is absolutely aware that there are multiple girsaos available. He has seen them and is now deciding in favor of one girsa. We do not know that this is so for Rambam, who just states the halacha and does not list his sources which feed into the final decision. And we don't know this for Rambam and Tur. They just cite this, but do not attribute this text to be the text of the brayta. Perhaps it is thus not one girsa vs. another, but rather one girsa which happened to be before them vs. a girsa which was explicitly chosen as best by a Rishon.

Furthermore, we should factor in the odds of coming up with various girsaot.
That is, first assume that Rambam's girsa of Bavli is correct. Then, what happened is that there was an original machlokes between Bavli and Yerushalmi, and then somehow, through the random process of scribal error, the Bavli developed a variant girsa which just happened to be in line with the Yerushalmi, even though the Yerushalmi has different text.

Second, assume that Rashi and Rif's girsa is correct. Then what happened was that there was an original agreement between the Bavli and Yerushalmi, and then somehow, through the random process of scribal error, the Bavli developed a variant girsa which diverged from this semantic agreement with the Yerushalmi.

Obviously, I think that the latter is more probable than the former. In general, we would expect entropy to cause systems to go into a state of randomness rather than of order. (Aside from this, in general I believe that many of the purported disputes between Bavli and Yerushalmi are not in fact disputes. Rather, they are agreements but either through development of girsological differences, or through a reinterpretation by the setama digmara, a dispute develops.)

Because it is less likely for agreement to come about via scribal error than for disagreement to arise via the same process, I would say that the existence of this parallel Yerushalmi demonstrates which of the two Bavlis is correct and original. And so we should surely rule in favor of Rashi and Rif's girsa of Bavli.

However, there is an extra twist here, and that is Ritva's girsa of Rashi's girsa, and Ritva's interpretation of what Rashi is saying. That is, in Chiddushei haRitva on Bava Basra 13b, Ritva cites Rashi as saying וכן נביא של י"ב שלשה שיטין. (Or perhaps he does not. See below.) He explains that what the gemara is saying here according to Rashi is that there is no difference between a regular sefer of Navi and one of the Neviim in Trei Asar. One would think that since the Neviim in Trei Asar are so small, there would not need to be any gap. Ka Mashma Lan that there is no difference between a Navi one the one hand and a Navi in Trei Asar on this other hand -- both get a gap of 3 lines.

Thus, Ritva's girsa of Rashi, and his explanation of the intent of Rashi, accords with Rambam, Tur, and Shulchan Aruch, rather than Rif and Yerushalmi!

It is somewhat troubling that a variant girsa arises in a text whose very purpose is to establish the correct girsa. One would think that a sofer would take extra special care in this case! Yet it appears that there is this variant girsa in Rashi. Our Rashi has the וכן before the words בין כל נביא ונביא. Ritva's citation of Rashi begins after that phrase, so we are not sure exactly what full text he has of Rashi, or believes Rashi has. This also suggests that Ritva has, or knows of some other text, which is not like the text he attributes to Rashi.

It is also possible that Ritva is misquoting Rashi here. This would be strange since his intent is to explain Rashi's meaning, and so he would be careful here. Unless, he somehow thinks his citation of Rashi is good enough, that is, equal to the girsa as actually found in Rashi.

On the other hand, that was the text as printed in a specific printing of Ritva I have. In the Bar Ilan of the Ritva, we have: Girsat Rashi veChen [Bein] Navi leNavi UveNavi shel Shneim Asar Shelosha Shitin. And then the explanation. Note though how "bein" is in square brackets.

This made me start to think. Is it possible to read the girsa of Rashi and Rif in a way that accords with Rambam, Tur, et al? Certainly so.

Recall that the girsa according to our printed Rashi, and according to the Rif, would be approximately as we have in our printed Bavli:
בין חומש לחומש של תורה ארבעה שיטין וכן בין נביא לנביא ובנביא של שנים עשר שלש שיטין.

We can parse this in one of two ways:
בין חומש לחומש של תורה ארבעה שיטין וכן בין נביא לנביא
and then
ובנביא של שנים עשר שלש שיטין

This first parsing would mean that chumash is the same as navi in having 4 lines separating.

We could also parse this as:
בין חומש לחומש של תורה ארבעה שיטין
and then
וכן בין נביא לנביא ובנביא של שנים עשר שלש שיטין

The second parsing would mean that between chumashim there are four; and so too between Neviim, even between those of Trei Asar, there would be three.

Sefer HaEshkol has the following:
ספר האשכול (אלבק) הלכות ספר תורה דף נו עמוד ב
ובין חומש לחומש של תורה ארבעה שטין, וכן בין נביא לנביא [ובנביא של שנים עשר שלשה שטין] ש

Without the text in brackets, one would certainly read this as the first parsing. Once the text in brackets is put in, we suddenly are back to the possibly-ambiguous text of the gemara, such that both parsings are possible.

Then, the Meiri:
קרית ספר (למאירי) מאמר ג חלק א
ולדעתנו אפילו סיים בסוף הדף אינו מתחיל בספר האחר בתחילת הדף האחר אלא בהרחקת ד' שטין, וכן בין נביא לנביא ובנביאים של תרי עשר ג' שטין בין זה לזה.
This is basically the same as our gemara, but the commas, and perhaps the saving of בין זה לזה until the end, make the parsing semantically the same as Rambam, Tur, and company.

Elsewhere, Meiri writes
קרית ספר (למאירי) מאמר ג חלק א
ויש גורסין בין חומש לחומש ד' שטין ובין נביא לנביא של תרי עשר ג' ובין כל נביא ונביא מסיים מלמטה ומתחיל מלמעלה ופירושו בבין נביא לנביא לא דיו בהבדל ד' שטין אלא שלא יתחיל בדף שסיים בו. ועקר הדברים או כפי' הא' לשטתנו או כפי' אמצעי לשי' גדולי הרבנים.
This shows that there was an alternate girsa that established that for Neviim, there would have to be a start on a separate page, and a division of four (or even three) lines would not suffice. This, I think, tells us that what Rashi was doing with hachi garsinan was not to necessarily take away from a variant girsa which the Rambam had, but rather from this alternate girsa which the Meiri mentions. Which is why his hachi garsinan continues into the next text of umatchil.

See also haGahot Maimoniyot:
הגהות מיימוניות הלכות תפילין ומזוזה וספר תורה פרק ז
ומסיים למטה וכו' אנביאים דוקא קאי אבל בין חומש לחומש א"א לעשות כן ואפילו יניח ד' שיטין כדאמר בירושלמי פ"ק דמגילה וצריך שיהא גומר באמצע ומתחיל באמצעיתו ובנביאים גומר בסופו ומתחיל בראשו.

Kesef Mishna (=the Mechaber) talks about the girsa of Rambam and Tur:
כסף משנה הלכות תפילין ומזוזה וספר תורה פרק ז
ומ"ש ומניח וכו' ברייתא שם בין חומש לחומש של תורה ד' שיטין וכן בין כל נביא ונביא ובנביא של י"ב ג' שיטין כך היא גירסת ספרינו אבל גירסת רבינו ובין כל נביא ונביא ג' שיטין וכן בנביא של י"ב וכך היא גירסת הטור

Thus, he would understand the girsa as we have in our sefarim the same way as Aruch haShulchan, and in a way semantically equal to the Yerushalmi, but that Rambam who moves ג' שיטין to be before beNavi shel Trei Asar, it would mean 3 for both a regular Navi and a Navi in Trei Asar.

And so too a bit later:
בית יוסף יורה דעה סימן רפג
ולעולם מניח ד' שיטין ודוקא בין נביא לנביא אבל בין חומש לחומש לא יסיים מלמטה ויתחיל מלמעלה אפילו בהנחת ד' שיטין כדאמרינן בירושלמי פ"ק דמגילה (הל"ט) צריך שיהא גומר באמצע הדף ומתחיל באמצעיתו ובנביא מסיים בסופו ומתחיל בראשו ונראה לי הטעם דאין לו לסיים בסוף הדף אפילו יניח ד' שיטין משום שמא יבוא לחתוך אבל בין נביא לנביא שאם בא לחתוך חותך מסיים מלמטה עכ"ל

Let us turn to consider Masechet Sofrim. We have:
מסכתות קטנות מסכת סופרים הוספה ב פרק א
הלכה יח
בין חומש לחומש של תורה ארבעה שיטין, ובין נביא לנביא נותן ריוח לכל אחד ואחד, ומתחיל מלמעלה.

Here, in this hosafa, it omits mention of particularly 3 lines as opposed to 4. I wonder why.

In terms of the actual statement in Masechet Soferim, we see:
מסכתות קטנות מסכת סופרים פרק ב
הלכה ו
מניחין בין ספר לספר, בתורה ריוח ארבע שיטין, ובנביא של שנים עשר שלש שיטין.

Thus, we do not actually see mention of what to do for a regular Navi. I think that this claim made by Masoret haShas and of Aruch haShulchan is incorrect. Masechet Sofrim is not mechaven to the girsa of the Tur and Rambam. For there is no mention of what to do for a regular Navi.

It seems that the assumption is that one would put the sefarim in Torah together, so there is need for a specification of the separation. And similarly in Trei Asar, one must put them together. So, there is need for a specification of the separation. But there is no mention of between one Navi and Navi in general. And this would accord not with Rambam and Tur, but rather with the girsa which the Meiri brought down -- that for a regular Navi, one must begin at the next page, but no mere separation of a few lines would suffice.

I now think this it is quite possible that these were the only two girsaot, namely that of Rashi-Rif and our gemara, on the one hand, and that Meiri notes exists on the other. That Rambam and then Tur said otherwise, in what appears to be a third girsa, may not in fact be a third girsa. Rather, it may be a rephrasing of the gemara to make it clearer. Recall that our gemara is ambiguous, with two possible parsings. By slight rearrangement, it makes it clearer what is meant. It is certainly possible that such a girsa indeed exists, but I would suggest it may be subservient to and derived from our girsa, which encompasses both meanings.

If so, it is not a matter of whose girsa is correct, but rather we might cast it as which interpretation of the Bavli makes the most sense. And then, the Yerushalmi which uses sefer lesefer as opposed to ובנביא of Trei Asar could shed light on which interpretation is correct.

Now, what about the dispute between the girsaot as mentioned by Meiri?
We have on one side: Rashi, Rif, Rambam, Tur, Shulchan Aruch, and possibly the Yerushalmi.
And on the other side: Hagahot Maimoniyot, the Meiri's mention of it, and possibly the Yerushalmi.

I think we can add the Maseches Soferim to the second list, given that it does not mention "Ben Navi leNavi" except as within Trei Asar. But Masechet Soferim should have the same weight I argued in favor of earlier, that is, nil.

But what does the Yerushalmi really say? After all, the Yerushalmi weighed in on both sides of this dispute. How is this possible? To quote that Yerushalmi again:
וצריך שיהא משייר בין ספר לספר כמלא ארבע שיטין ובנביא של י"ב שלש וצריך שיהא גומר באמצע הדף ומתחיל באמצעיתו ובנביא גומר בסופו ומתחיל בראשו ובנביא של י"ב אסור

I agree with Aruch haShulchan that saying sefer rather than chumash implies also a regular sefer of navi, especially when the contrast is to navi shel Trei Asar. One could claim this only means chumash, but I am not convinced of the truth of this argument.

It then continues that one needs to end in the middle of the daf and begin in the middle, presumably by chumash, which will be bound together in a single sefer; that by (regular) Navi, he ends in the end of the page and begins at the beginning; and that by a Navi of Trei Asar, this is forbidden, but presumably one must end and begin in the middle of the page, just as by a chumash.

I would not read this like hagahot Maimoniyot, that this a requirement by a regular Navi, to end at the bottom of the page and begin at the beginning of the page. Rather, I would say this is something which is permitted, for one is allowed to separate one regular Navi from another. But if one does not, there would need to be a separation. And this should be the separation of four lines, as specified above as bein sefer leSefer.

Turning back to the girsa cited by the Meiri:
ויש גורסין בין חומש לחומש ד' שטין ובין נביא לנביא של תרי עשר ג' ובין כל נביא ונביא מסיים מלמטה ומתחיל מלמעלה ופירושו בבין נביא לנביא לא דיו בהבדל ד' שטין אלא שלא יתחיל בדף שסיים בו
This girsa could work out well even according to the parallel Yerushalmi according to my interpretation. That is, the Yerushalmi and this girsa of Bavli would say:
  1. Between one chumash and the next, four lines. This is required since one may not end in the middle. (Perhaps one can even parse this that this is not required. Examine both texts and see what I mean.)
  2. Between one navi in Trei Asar to the next, three lines. This is required since one may not end in the middle.
  3. Between one regular Navi and the next, four lines. This is not required since one could just end at the end of a page.
This would be an explanation different than that offered by Meiri, that בבין נביא לנביא לא דיו בהבדל ד' .שטין אלא שלא יתחיל בדף שסיים בו

And we can read the text as given by our gemara, and the Rif, the same way -- that next statement of ending at the end, if such occurs, is permitted. Or even that one can do this ab initio. But this is specifically for a regular Navi, not for a Navi within Trei Asar.

Thus, I would conclude that regardless of the choice between Rif's girsa and the girsa mentioned in Meiri, one can come to the same conclusion, and that it would work out well with the Yerushalmi. Even with Rif's girsa, we can still parse it according to Rambam and Tur's halachic ruling. However, I think that they are wrong in this parse, or else their girsa is wrong. I do not think that Masechet Soferim actually supports their parse or girsa, but rather that one cited by Meiri.

Therefore, I would conclude that 3 lines are not really sufficient as a division between one sefer and the next. Either four lines are required, or else starting on a new page. This because our girsa and understanding of the Bavli is much better if parallel to the Yerushalmi. I would favor first Meiri and Hagahot Maimoniot's girsa, then Rashi-Rif, and finally Rambam-Tur.

One thing that might help resolve all of this is to look at manuscripts or old scrolls which contained multiple Neviim, from different geographical locations from different times. We could then perhaps understand what Rashi meant, and what various girsaot meant.

All this quickly expanded past my original intent. This all needs reworking. Perhaps at some later date.

Also, my regular caveat: this is not intended as halacha leMaaseh.

Wednesday, March 12, 2008

Nedarim 82a: Does Proximity Affect Girsology? And Did Rav Yehuda cite Rav or Shmuel?

From my translation of Rif on Nedarim 82a-b:
{Nedarim 82a}
אמר שמואל משמיה דלוי כל הנדרים בעל מפר לאשתו חוץ מן הנאתי על פלוני שאינו מפר
אבל הנאת פלוני עלי מפר
{Nedarim 82b}
א"ר יהודה אמר שמואל נדרה משתי ככרות מאחת מתענה ומאחת אינה מתענה מתוך שמפר למתענה מפר לאינה מתענ' ורב אסי א"ר יוחנן מפר למתענה ואינו מפר לשאינה מתענה
Shmuel said in the name of Levi: All vows, a husband annuls for his wife, except for "my benefit upon Ploni," which he cannot annul. But "the benefit of Ploni {should be forbidden} upon me," he can annul.

Rav Yehuda cited Shmuel {our gemara: Rav}: If she vowed off two loaves, one of which involves self-denial and one which does not involve self-denial {e.g. if one was of fine flour and one was of course flour}, since he can annul in respect of that which causes self-denial, he can also annul in respect of the one which does not cause self-denial.
And Rav Assi cited Rabbi Yochanan: He may annul the one causing self-denial, but may not annul the one which does not cause self-denial.
Rav Yehuda often cites Rav and often cites Shmuel, and this is a pretty frequent girsological variant -- whether he cites Rav or Shmuel. Sometimes this makes a practical halachic difference -- in terms of whether we rule like him over a different Amora, or whether we draw consistent opinions within Rav or Shmuel.

This is an interesting instance, though. Besides substituting Shmuel for Rav, Rif also trims a section of gemara which is not lehalacha, immediately before. This brings the earlier statement, which was Levi citing Shmuel, into a much nearer proximity. In turn, this might influence a sofer's error in substituting Shmuel for Rav, assuming Rav Yehuda citing Rav was the original text. In our gemara, there is a moderate amount of material separating the two statements, such that such a slip of the quill would be less likely.

I wonder if we can establish this as a consistent occurrence, using more than just anecdotal evidence. If so, it can serve as a useful tool in identifying girsological variants, both within a single text which has a proximate matching name, and where we have different texts with greater distance between statements. Perhaps someone has already done such a study, manually. If I had the time, I might design the following experiment. (Because I take an interest in computational girsology.) Take a corpus of text from Bavli, and a corpus of parallel text drawn from Rif. Align the two texts. Find each name substitution (=girsological variant) and within each text, measure the distance to the nearest occurrence of that name, and see if there is a tendency to echo the more proximate name. (Of course, not only names influence other names. I have seen things akin to the word שמא influencing the introduction of שמואל.)

a

Sunday, March 02, 2008

Nedarim 72b: Is Rami bar Chama's Question Resolved, Or Not?

From my Rif translation:
{Nedarim 72b}
Mishna:
דרך תלמידי חכמים עד שלא היתה בתו יוצאת מביתו אומר לה כל נדרים שנדרת בתוך ביתי הרי הן מופרין
וכן הבעל עד שלא תכנס לרשותו אומר לה כל נדרים שנדרת עד שלא תכנסי לרשותי הרי הן מופרין אם משתכנס לרשותו אינו יכול להפר
IT IS THE PRACTICE OF TORAH SCHOLARS THAT BEFORE HIS DAUGHTER DEPARTS FROM HIS HOUSE {in marriage = nisiun}, HE SAYS TO HER, "ALL THE VOWS WHICH YOU VOWED IN MY HOUSE ARE ANNULLED."
LIKEWISE THE HUSBAND, BEFORE SHE ENTERS INTO HIS CONTROL WOULD SAY TO HER, "ALL VOWS WHICH YOU VOWED BEFORE YOU ENTERED INTO MY DOMAIN ARE ANNULLED," BECAUSE ONCE SHE ENTERS INTO HIS CONTROL HE CANNOT ANNUL THEM.
Gemara:
בעי רמי בר חמא בעל מהו שיפר בלא שמיעה ושמע אישה דוקא או לאו דוקא
ובעיין לא אפשיטא
Rami bar Chama inquired: Her husband, may he annul without hearing? Is "and her husband heard it" exact {and thus required} or not?
And our question is not resolved.
{Therefore we would act stringently.}
If we actually examine the gemara, we see that Rava responds to Rami bar Chama's query based on the Mishna. To cite a fuller translation from Soncino:
Rami b. Hama propounded: Can a husband annul [a vow] without hearing [it]: is, and her husband heard it, expressly stated, or not — Said Raba: Come and hear: IT IS THE PRACTICE OF SCHOLARS, BEFORE THE DAUGHTER OF ONE OF THEM DEPARTS FROM HIM, TO DECLARE TO HER, 'ALL THE VOWS WHICH THOU DIDST VOW IN MY HOUSE ARE ANNULLED'. But he did not hear them! — Only when he hears them does he annul them. If so, why make a declaration before he hears? — He [the Tanna] informs us this: that it is the practice of scholars to go over such matters. Come and hear, from the second clause: LIKEWISE THE HUSBAND, BEFORE SHE ENTERS INTO HIS CONTROL, WOULD SAY TO HER [etc.]! — Here too it means that he said, 'When I hear them.'
So Rava gives a very compelling answer from the Mishna. This give and take which follows is typical of the style of the anonymous setama digmara which tries to find ways to argue the other side. But if it is indeed post-Talmudic, and Ravina and Rav Ashi are sof horaah, we should not say that this is an unresolved question, with all the halachic implications. Furthermore, I find the push-off extremely weak. Specifically, how can the gemara say:
Come and hear, from the second clause: LIKEWISE THE HUSBAND, BEFORE SHE ENTERS INTO HIS CONTROL, WOULD SAY TO HER [etc.]! — Here too it means that he said, 'When I hear them.'
when the end of that second clause is "BECAUSE ONCE SHE ENTERS INTO HIS CONTROL HE CANNOT ANNUL THEM?" It would seem that the annulment would only apply at the hour he heard, even though he already has fulfilled the making of the pronouncement. But if it is only chal once she enters his domain, it is extremely difficult, IMHO, to say that he says this to her because he no longer has the power to annul once she enters his domain. There are, of course, possible answers (e.g. some argument about it applying limafreia once he hears later), but one can always offer false teirutzim to justify even that which is not true.

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