Showing posts with label aruch hashulchan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label aruch hashulchan. Show all posts

Wednesday, September 25, 2013

Aruch HaShulchan on Pitom falling off, part i: a definition of terms

The Aruch HaShulchan
As a followup to the preceding post, it is fitting to provide some background into the sugya. And for this, a wonderful place to turn is naturally the Aruch HaShulchan, Rabbi Yechiel Michel Epstein:


סימן תרמח סעיף יז[עריכה]

יש באתרוג שני מיני עצים דקים:
  • האחד בסופו העוקץ, שהוא תלוי בו בהאילן כבכל הפירות, והוא הזנב של הפירי בתחתיתו. ובלשון המשנה הוא "עוקץ" (לד ב). ואצלינו ההמון קורין לזה פיטום, והוא יושב עמוק בתוך האתרוג, עד שאם ניטלנו כולו מעיקרו – תשאר גומא.
  • והשני מעבר האחר בראש האתרוג, כפרח שבמיני תפוחים. ובאתרוג יש שאין להם זה כלל, ויש שיש להם. ונקרא בלשון המשנה "פיטמא", ובלשונינו "שושנתא", מפני שהיא מייפית את האתרוג כשפת פרח שושן. והיא אינה נכנסת בעומק האתרוג, אלא בראשו.
ולפי שהלשונות מתחלפות בזה, לכן בארנו זה: שיש לדעת שהעוקץ הוא התחתון הנכנס בעומק, והשושנתא הוא העליון. ויש אתרוגים שאין להם שושנתא כלל, והיינו אתרוגי קארסיק"א – אין להם שושנתא. וכן אתרוגי ארץ ישראל – יש שיש להם, ויש שאין להם. ואתרוגי קורפו וגינובא ומאראקא – כולם יש להם שושנתא.
ועתה נבאר דיניהם לפי דיעות רבותינו בסייעתא דשמיא.

"There is in the esrog two types of small stems. One is on its end, the Uketz, by which it hangs from the tree as is the case by all fruits, and it is the tail of the fruit on its bottom. And in the language of the Mishna it is the עוקץ (Sukkah 34b). And by us we call it the Pitom [!], and it sits deep within the esrog, such that if we take it all out from its base, there would be a furrow left.

The stalk connects to the tree. The calyx on
the bottom is the outer floral envelope.
And the second is on the other end, at the head of the esrog, like a blossom in types of apples. And among the esrogim, there are some which do not have it at all, and there are some which have them. And this is called in the language of the Mishna Pitma, and in our language Shoshanta, because its beautifies the esrog like the lip of a lily. And it does not enter the bottom [עומק] of the esrog, but rather at its head.

And since the languages can readily be accidentally switched, one for the other, therefore we have explained this: For there is to know that the Uketz is the bottom which enters into its depth, while the Shoshanta it the upmost part. And there are esrogim which do not have a Shoshanta at all. And these are the esrogim of Corsica -- they do not have a Shoshanta. [Josh: Corsican citrons are sweet.]

Corsican esrogim

And so too the esrogim of Eretz Yisrael, some have them [Shoshantas], and some do not have them. And the esrogim of Corfu, Genova, and Morocco, all of them have a Shoshanta.
Morrocan esrog
And now we will explain their dinim accordin to the opinions of our Rabbis, with the help of Heaven."

Perhaps to be continued...

Sunday, August 21, 2011

Clasping one's hands together

Shirat Devorah reposts a halacha discussion from Rabbi Eli Mansour. He is a Sephardic rabbi, and so it might more reflect practices of Sefardim -- though plenty of Ashkenazim hold by this as well. Here is the post:
by Rabbi Eli J. Mansour
The Zohar Ha’kadosh, in Vayikra (p. 24), writes that when a harsh judgment is issued against a person, Heaven forbid, his fingers will unwittingly begin moving, and the fingers of his two hands will become interlocked.  As interlocking hands is a sign of harsh judgment, it is improper for a person to intentionally hold his hands in this position.  The Ben Ish Hai (Rav Yosef Haim of Baghdad, 1833-1909), in Parashat Pinhas (18), cites this Halacha in the name of the Arizal (Rav Yishak Luria of Safed, 1534-1572).  This is mentioned in other sources, as well, including the Sefer Ha’hasidim (by Rabbenu Yehuda Ha’hasid, Germany, d. 1217) and the Kaf Ha’haim (Rav Yaakob Haim Sofer, Baghdad-Israel, 1870-1939).  Thus, while it is permissible to place one hand on top of the other, one should not interlock the fingers of the two hands.



The Ben Ish Hai goes even further, writing that one should never place his hands behind his back, and should rather keep them in front of him at all times.  Indeed, there are different kinds of spiritual powers associated with the positioning of one’s hands and fingers, as Rabbenu Bahya discusses at length.


The Sefer Hazechira mentions that those who are accustomed to interlocking their fingers run the risk of experiencing extreme anxiety, Heaven forbid.

There are many warnings of this kind that we hear as children, and many people are unable to distinguish between those that stem from folklore and superstition, and those which have a clear basis in Jewish tradition.  When it comes to interlocking fingers, this is a well-documented warning that originates already from the Zohar and the teachings of the Arizal.

Summary: According to Kabbalistic tradition, one should not merge his hands together such that the fingers of the two hands interlock.  According to some sources, one should also refrain from placing his hands behind his back.

Devorah researched more into this, and so has more, in the comment section. See there.

Rav Elyashiv, clasping his hands together
Now, not everyone worries for this kabbalistically-rooted practice. See the image to the right, of Rav Elyashiv clasping his hands together, with interlocking fingers. (And see here for a discussion about it. At least one person there appears to believe that the image has been PhotoShopped, because it is impossible that Rav Elyashiv would do such a thing!)

Let us start, perhaps, with the contrary gemara. Kabbalistic sources might say this, but Talmudic sources strongly suggest otherwise. The gemara in Shabbat 10a reads as follows:

רבא בר רב הונא רמי פוזמקי ומצלי אמר הכון לקראת וגו' רבא שדי גלימיה ופכר ידיה ומצלי אמר כעבדא קמיה מריה אמר רב אשי חזינא ליה לרב כהנא כי איכא צערא בעלמא שדי גלימיה ופכר ידיה ומצלי אמר כעבדא קמי מריה כי איכא שלמא . לביש ומתכסי ומתעטף ומצלי אמר הכון לקראת אלהיך ישראל
Or, in English:
Raba son of R. Huna put on stockings and prayed, quoting, 'prepare to meet etc.' Raba removed his cloak,6  clasped his hands and prayed, saying, '[I pray] like a slave before his master.' R. Ashi said: I saw R. Kahana, when there was trouble in the world, removing his cloak, clasp his hands, and pray, saying, '[I pray] like a slave before his master.' When there was peace, he would put it on, cover and enfold himself and pray, quoting, 'Prepare to meet thy God, O Israel.'7
Rashi defines פכר ידיה as clasping of hands with fingers intertwined:
פכר ידיה - חובק ידיו באצבעותיו מרצי"ר (טריציי"ר: לשלב (מלה במלה: לקלוע)) בלע"ז כאדם המצטער מאימת רבו:

What, then, of the Zohar? Well, where Zohar contradicts the gemara, we should follow the gemara. But in fact, the Zohar does not prohibit clasping together the hands. The Zohar, on Vayikra (24a), reads as follows:

411. When Judgment is made complete and rests on man, it is concluded and the fingers are placed five against five, right within the left, as an indication that everybody agreed on that Judgment. Then his hands are straightened; TO WIT, THE FINGERS ARE INTERLACED, which shows that it was done without the man's intention and without his meaning to do so. It is therefore written, "Your right hand, Hashem, is glorious in power: Your right hand Hashem, has dashed the enemy in pieces" (Shemot 15:6), WHICH MEANS that left was included within the right and Judgment is complete. Then everything is resolved. Therefore, when the Holy One, blessed be He, wishes that everything be set, it is written, "Hashem has sworn by His right hand, and by the arm of His strength. Surely I will no more give your corn to be food for your enemies..." (Yeshayah 62:8).

That is, clasping the fingers of each hand together does not cause the bad judgement. Rather, when there is bad judgement, the hands will subconsciously clasp together in this manner. This is the difference between saying that one blinks one's eyes when someone throws sand in it, versus saying that blinking one's eyes causes people to throw sand in it. There is, then, no contradiction between the Zohar and the gemara.

Next, in chronological order, is the Sefer HaChassidim, by Rabbenu Yehuda Ha’hasid, Germany, d. 1217. This is that it is improper to place one's hands in this position. There are a number of such novelties in the sefer haChassidim and in the Tzavaah of Rabbi Yehuda HaChassid. They are not obligatory, but pious individuals may adopt them.

But this is not the only instance in which something in the sefer ha-Chassidim contradicts an explicit gemara and practice of the Tannaim and Amoraim. The Noda be-Yehuda notes such contradictions. For instance:
  1. The sefer Chassidim says one should not marry one's niece. The gemara, meanwhile, recommends it.
  2. The sefer Chassidim says one should not marry someone with the same name as his parent. The Noda Be-Yehuda gives examples of Amoraim who did precisely this. (For example, Rami had a father-in-law named Rami.)
  3. This, then, is the third such instance -- clasping the hands.
And he has various teirutzim, such as that it was only intended for direct descendants of Rabbi Yehuda Ha-Chassid. In general, though, not to follow these various innovations in the sefer Chassidim, which are motivated by kabbalah.

The Kaf HaChaim and the Ben Ish Chai obviously hold differently, and they are allowed to. But that does not mean that it is binding on everyone. This is a dispute as to the boundaries of halacha and kabbalah. Even if the Arizal maintains this. We don't follow, or have to follow, every kabbalistic hanhaga of the Arizal. (Well, I suppose one can debate who "we" are. Chassidim might incorporate more kabbalistic practices than Misnagdim.)

Devorah, in the comment section, also cited from this Revach post, about the Aruch HaShulchan:
The Aruch HaShulchan brings L'Halacha (OC 91:7) that in times of Za'am or raging tzorus, one should daven with his hands clasped together and his fingers interlocking. However says the Aruch HaShulchan in times of peace you should not do so because it causes Din Shamayim to be brought down on you.
I would surmise, before looking at it inside, that this distinction comes directly from the gemara in Shabbos listed above, with the two different practices, in times of tza'ara vs. in times of shalama, of Rav Kahana. In the former, he would remove his cloak and clasp his hands together. In the latter, he would enwrap himself in the tallis. Note that Rava did not make any such distinction. My guess is that someone was bothered by the contradiction of the kabbalistic practice and the explicit gemara to the contrary, and seized upon Rav Kahana's differing practice as a way of harmonizing the two sources. (Looking further, it seems that this is what the Taz says.) Note that the gemara is not, on the level of a simple reading, distinguishing between clasping and not clasping as bringing down judgement to the world. Rather, it has to do with removing one's cloak or enfolding oneself in it. In times of trouble, he would strip himself of the cloak, to make himself more like a servant, and assume the pose of a beseeching servant. In times of peace, there was no need for it, so he wrapped himself in his cloak, for better focus. And the pose was presumably not needed, rather than being a bad and counter-productive idea.

Looking now at the Aruch Hashulchan, I see that he mentions that Rava made no such distinction. Still, he does state what is stated above:

סימן צא סעיף ז


וכתבו רבותינו בעלי השולחן ערוך בסעיף ו:

דרך החכמים ותלמידיהם שלא יתפללו אלא כשהם עטופים. ובעת הזעם יש לחבק הידים בשעת התפילה כעבדא קמי מאריה. ובעת שלום יש להתקשט בבגדים נאים להתפלל.
עד כאן לשונו, וכבר כתבנו מזה. ו"חיבוק ידים" הוא שחובק אצבעות ידיו זה בשל זה, כאדם ששובר אצבעותיו כשמצטער. ויש מהחכמים שהיו עושים כן גם בעת שלום (רבא בשבת י א). ומכל מקום יש ליזהר שלא לחבוק אצבעותיו בעת שלום, כי בזה מוריד דין על עצמו. אלא יניח ידיו זו על זו כפותין (הגר"ז).
ואין טבעי בני אדם שוים בזה. ויש שקשה עליהם להתפלל באופן זה, אלא מניחים הידים על הסטענדע"ר או על הדף הדבוק בכותל. ואין כלל קבוע בזה, וכל אחד יעשה כפי מה שמוטב לו להתפלל באופן זה. ולא יתפלל בבתי ידים (האנטשו"ך).

There are other halachic sources I haven't mentioned. This is one instance in which kabbalah has made significant inroads into halacha, especially in terms of hand position during davening.

Personally, I would not consider it problematic to be clasping my hands together as a comfortable hand position or nervous habit. Even during prayer, clasping them together in this matter does not seem problematic to me, for the reasons I described above. Still, I would avoid certain types of hand clasping in prayer, due to its adoption within Christian prayer.

Note: I wrote this up last week. Today, just before publishing, I noticed Daat Torah posted about it. He has video of REav Elyashiv.

Thursday, October 08, 2009

Must one sit in a succah when one works in Manhattan?

Note: Not halacha lemaaseh. Consult your local Orthodox rabbi.

This is something that occurred to me back when I was working in Manhattan. On a typical non-Succos day, I would eat at my desk. It was not such a schlep to eat in a Succah, since Chabad made a nice Succah on 42nd Street, in front of the public library. But depending on where one worked, it could be a trip many blocks out of the way. And perhaps if one factored in the time to order lunch, go to the succah, and return to work, there would be no time to eat. And eating in restaurants which did not have a succah (say, on a date, or for work) is also problematic. And undoubtably, some people took non-motzi and mezonot to sort of avoid the issue.

But is such really necessary? It seems to me that it is nowhere near clear-cut. In fact, I would lean heavily towards saying that it is not necessary. Though according to Magen Avraham, it might well be necessary. Of course, this post is not intended halacha lemaaseh, so consult your local Orthodox rabbi who could likely explain why I am an ignoramus here. And your individual case may easily be different from the case I am envisioning. At the very least, if we mattir this, the typical Jew in New York will end up not entering into a succah for most of Succos. After all, we don't sleep in a succah. If we eliminate most chol hamoed day meals, and many restaurant meals, from the obligation, how will we feel that it is Sukkos? And how will we have teshvu?

Also, regardless of whether it is strictly obligatory, the gemara records a praiseworthy chumra that some adopted to not eat anything outside a succah. And one presumably gets sechar for eating in a succah even if not obligated. (Indeed, it is quite possible that even a non-Jewish person gets such sechar.)

But still, it seems to me that it is not necessarily obligatory.

Let us start at the beginning, in the gemara in Succah, daf 26a. The gemara there states:
ת"ר הולכי דרכים ביום פטורין מן הסוכה ביום וחייבין בלילה
הולכי דרכים בלילה פטורין מן הסוכה בלילה וחייבין ביום
הולכי דרכים ביום ובלילה פטורין מן הסוכה בין ביום ובין בלילה
הולכין לדבר מצוה פטורין בין ביום ובין בלילה
Thus, those who travel by day are exempt from Succah by day and obligated at night; those who travel at night are exempt from Succah by night and obligated by day; those who travel by day and night are exempt from Succah during both day and night; and those who travel for the sake of a precept are exempt whether by day or night.

Why should this be?

Rashi explains (there):
הולכי דרכים ביום פטורין מן הסוכה ביום - דכתיב בסוכות תשבו כעין ישיבת ביתו כשם שכל השנה אינו נמנע מלכת בדרך בסחורה כך כל ימות החג שאינו יום טוב לא הצריכו הכתוב למנוע:
Since the pasuk states Basukkos teishvu, and Chazal darshen that teshvu means ke'ein taduru, as one typically dwells, that it should be as he typically dwells in his house, then just as throughout the year he would not refrain from traveling on the road to do business, so too throughout all the days of the chag which are not Yom Tov, the Scriptures do not require him to refrain.

Tosafot say the same thing, though also connect mitztaer pater min hasuccah with the same derivation:
הולכי דרכים ביום. כל זה נפקא מתשבו כעין תדורו שכשם שאדם בביתו אינו נמנע מלצאת לדרך. וכן מצטער דפטרו לעיל מן הסוכה היינו מתשבו כעין תדורו דאין אדם דר במקום שמצטער:

This carries over to practical paskened halacha.

Moving now to Tur, Orach Chaim, siman 640, the Tur says (image reconstructed by pulling different parts from the page):

Looking to the right, we see that Tur basically cites the brayta from masechet Sukkah, lehalachah.

Bet Yosef, in his commentary on Tur, states that it is a brayta in Succah 26a, and then cites Tosafot on that page that it is because of teshvu ke'ein taduru -- just as a person in his house does not refrain from going out on the road.



But this is not all that he says. He has another followup comment, which is unfortunately too small too see as an embedded image on my blog. Right-click and open the image in a new window or tab to see it larger.

Alternatively, all that he does is cite the Orchos Chaim, hilchot Succah, seif 33, from Rabbi Aharon HaKohen miLunil, which I will provide next, so simply look at the next image. But to translate: It is written in Orchos Chaim that "those who travel by day are exempt from Succah by day and are exempt by night. And if they are on the road, or in a place where there is no settlement, they are exempt even by night, for he is not able to make a dwelling there. And those who travel at night are exempt by night, etc., to explain, that if he can go on the road but he knows that he will need to eat before he finds a succah, he does not need to refrain because of this." And he writes further that "And so {since} those who travel by day are obligated at night, there is to say that those who travel to towns to claim their debts of chol haMoed of the chag, they must return to their homes at night to eat in a Succah, if they do not have a Succah in that town. And even though there is room for a litigant to argue, one who is stringent, blessings shall come upon him."

Orchos Chaim, inside:
"33: Agents going to perform a precept are exempt from Succah, whether by day or night.

Those who travel by day are exempt from Succah by day and are obligated at night. And if they are on the road, or in a place where there is no settlement, they are exempt even at night, for he is not able to make there a dwelling.

Those who travel by night are exempt from Succah at night and are obligated by day. To explain, that if he is able to travel on the road and knows that he will need to eat before he will find a Succah, he is not required to refrain {from traveling} because of this, because he is exempt from this. And the reason is that teshvu means ke'ein taduru, as you typically dwell. And just as, when he is in his house, he does not refrain from traveling for his business dealings, whether by day or night, so too here.

And since those traveling by day they are exempt {by day}, {but} at night they are obligated, there is to say that those who travel to the towns to seek out their debts {owed to them by gentiles, which one is permitted to collect on chol haMoed, as a davar haavud} on chol haMoed of the chag, they are required to return to their homes at night in order to eat in the Succah, if there is no Succah in that town. And even though there is room for a litigant to argue, one who is stringent, blessing should come upon him.

Those who watch the town by day are exempt from Succah by day and are obligated at night. Those who watch the town by mohjy are exempt from Succah at night and are obligated by day. Those who watch gardens and orchards are exempt whether by day or night, for if the watchman makes a Succah, the theif knows that there is an established place for him {the watchman}, and he will steal from another place. And Rabbi P. {?} za"l wrote that this is a support for those who make wine amongst the gentiles, that they do not make a Succah whether by day or night, for they must make a watch over the wine, because of Nisuch {from the gentiles}, end quote."
This is what Beis Yosef says, and cites in his commentary to Tur. Turning now to Shulchan Aruch, we can see what he says:

Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim siman 640. We see that Rav Yosef Karo only cites the words of the Tur, but not the words of the Orchot Chaim.

I would note that Orchot Chaim said two things. The first was a commentary of what peturin means, that he need not refrain from traveling even if he won't encounter a Succah, and that the Mechaber chooses briefer language does not mean that he argues. The second, about those traveling to towns of gentiles to collect their debts, I would say was a chumra. For it is "obvious" that this was part of their travels and that they are unable to make a Succah there, such that it is like a yishuv. The reason Bet Yosef cited it, and indeed the language of the Orchos Chaim, that it is because they are obligated by night, is because of the chumra of it, that they need to return to their home towns at night. That the Mechaber doesn't bring this down lehalacha in Shulchan Aruch seems to me more meaningful, that he is something of a "litigant" and thinks that this is a chumra rather than actual halacha.

At any rate, that would be for Sefardim. We Ashkenazim rely on the Rema, who does bring it down.

First the Rema cites the Ran, who gives the explanation we saw some of before, as explanation: that this that they are "obligated by night" is specifically where they are able to find a succah, but if they are not able to find a Succah, they are able to go on their way, even if they will not be able to settle their during either day or night. Just like the other days of the year, that one does not abandon the road because of his home. And even though he only travels by day, he is exempt even by night.

And then he cites the aforementioned Orchos Chaim, via the Beis Yoseif: And those who travel to towns to claim their debts and do not have a Succah in those towns, they should be stringent upon themselves to return to their homes every night to eat in a Succah. And even though there is room to be lenient, still, one who is stringent, blessings shall come upon him.


Turning now to Magen Avraham, on the side of Shulchan Aruch.
And they are obligated at night: When they sleep over at night in a settled area (Tosafot and Ran). It imples that he needs to make there a Succah, and as is written in Orchot Chaim, and this is his language: "And since those traveling by day are obligated at night, there is to say that those who travel to towns {to collect debts} should be stringent upon them selves to return to their homes if there is no succah in that town. And even though there is room for a litigant to argue, one who is stringent, blessings shall come upon him." End quote from the Bet Yosef. To explain this, by law they are obligated to make there a Succah, and if they do not make one, they are obligated to return to their homes, even though there is to say that if they do not have a succah at the time of eating, they are exempt, just as if rain fell, that they do not need to wait. Even so, one who is stringent, blessings should come upon him, for this is called negligence, since he should have made a succah there. And all of this is about those who travel from one town to another in order to collect their debts, but if one remains in one town three or four days, he is obligated to build a succah there, and as is written at the end of this siman.

And the Levush writes that one is not obligated to make a succah among the heathens, and this that it states "they are obligated at night" is where there is a succah there in the place that they sleep. And this is not precise. For behold, Tosafot write that then one reaches the settled area he is obligated; and the place of heathens is also called a settled area. And furthermore, since this that it states "they are exempt by day," this is that they need not wait until they reach a succah. And if so, day and night are equal, and it should have stated plaintly that if he wishes to eat and there is no succah, he need not wait; and what is it to me that he is traveling on the road or staying in his house. Rather, perforce, this is what it means to say: Those who travel by day are exempt by day -- even if they reach an inn, they are not required to establish themselves there and make a succah there, since their intent is to travel immediately, and they are obligated at night to make there a succah. And so seems implied from the language of Rashi and the Ran precisely. And therefore one should be stringent.


And so writes the Bet Yosef in the name of the Orchos Chaim that they are only exempt when they sleep on the road, or in a place where there is no settlement, see there. However, if he comes to a town close to the time of eating, he does not need to wait for the construction of a succah, just as by the falling of rain. And if he is in the field even all the days of the chag, he does not need to trouble himself and construct there a succah, as is stated in the gemara, at the beginning of daf 26, that there is no settlement there.

Skipping his comments on shomrei hair, and going to the next comment now.










In Magen Avraham, the next comment: Those who sit in a shop, even though they are used to, in most times, to eat during the day there, even so, during Sukkot, there are obligated to eat in a succah, similar to how those who watch by day are required to make a succah there, so too they are obligated to make a succah there, even if they dwell outside the city while their shops are in the city, they are obligated to construct there a succah in the city, for there is his house.

In the Yerushalmi, Rav Huna was traveling on the road and was thirsty, and he did not wish to drink until he reached a succah.

This ends my citation of Magen Avraham. From here, I can see plenty of reason to require one to eat in a succah when working in Manhattan. But I don't find this Magen Avraham entirely convincing.

Firstly, he seems to make a diyuk from "if there is no succah in this town." But that is obvious, that if there is a succah readily available, if one is being machmir, one should only be machmir to go sleep in that succah in the town, rather than going all the way home.

Secondly, it seems to me that he is ignoring the major diyuk in the Orchos Chaim. The whole requirement in this chumra was predicated on the idea that "one is travels by day is exempt by day and is obligated by night." So the Orchos Chaim is talking about what to do by night. Since he traveled to the town during the day, the entirety of the day was exempt, and so he need not eat in a succah if the town does not have one, and need not construct one. Only at night does the brayta say he is obligated, and this is used by Orchos Chaim as a foothold for his chumra. Now at night he is obligated, so he must either sleep in a succah if such is available in town, or else go home to his hometown where he has his succah. And Orchos Chaim even admits that such is a chumra, and tavo alav bracha, but that there is room for a litigant to argue. The very valid argument is that this is part of his travels. His travels took him to a place where there is no succah available to him, and so he does not have a choice. (Plus, the idea of constructing other succahs in other locations might be questionable, as being soter his original succah at home.)

The reasoning behind all this is indeed teshvu ke'ein taduru. There is no negligence involved in not constructing a succah there! He should treat his succah in his home town as his residence. For a meal, he would not return all the way home. (And by extension, if work took him to a distant town, he would not go all the way home to sleep, but would rest there. Which is why the litigant has a very good counterargument against this chumra.)

If this was indeed what Orchos Chaim meant, then he should have also said that one should return home during the day to eat if there is no succah; or else build a succah there. Rather, I think he means something much like the Levush.

And in terms of saying "if there is no yishuv", this is just speaking about the instance where he was traveling by day, and needs to sleep at night, that since at night he is obligated, I would think he would be obligated to find or build a succah. Therefore Orchos Chaim says that if there is no yishuv, he is exempt even at night. But he certainly is agreeing here to the day / night distinction.

Thus, in my humble opinion, I don't believe that Magen Avraham is reading Orchos Chaim correctly, and Orchos Chaim rather maintains that there is a general exemption over the course of the day for someone who has traveled for business purposes during the day.

I am not the only one astounded by Magen Avraham. Aruch Hashulchan differs with him as well
Let us look to Aruch Hashulchan's write-up as well. In Aruch Hashulchan, Orach Chaim, siman 640, seif 17. He cites the brayta from Succah 26a about those who travel by day, those who travel by night, etc.

Then, he cites Rashi and Tosafot's explanation that this comes from teishvu keein taduru, that one would not refrain from going from his house on the road, or for some other matter, and so he will not refrain from leaving the Succah.

And then he expands his commentary: When one travels by day, he is exempt from Succah even when he encounters a Succah, and need not delay there in order to eat, but rather may continue on his way, and should simply eat on the road {without a Succah} when he reaches the time he would normally eat. But at night, when he does not travel, but rather sleeps, he is obligated in Succah, and so he should sleep there, and is not permitted to travel from there and sleep in a place where there is no Succah.

And those who travel at night are obligated during the day to eat in a Succah when they encounter it. But if they do not encounter a Succah, they are exempt. And we do not say to him to make a Succah. And just as we would not expect him to build a house on the road, so too he would not build a Succah on the road.

And there is one who obligates him to make a Succah (namely the Magen Avraham, seif katan 15), and these are astonishing things! For certainly if he needs to be in some place for a long time, behold it is to him there like his house, and he is obligated to make a Succah. But when he merely sleeps over there or is delayed there a day or two, how do we obligate him to make for himself there a Succah. [And this that a watchman of grain is obligated is because he dwells there many days, as was explained.]


In seif 18, Aruch Hashulchan continues: And so is made clear from the words of Rabbeinu the Rema, in seif 8, and these are his words: "and this is specifically where they are able to find a Succah, but if they do not find a Succah, they are able to travel on their way even though they do not dwell therein during either day or night. {Just as} During the rest of the days of the year, where one does not leave off from his travels because of his house. And even though he only travels during the day, he is exempt even during the night, for he cannot make for himself there a dwelling. And those who travel to towns to collect their debts and do not have for themselves a succah in those towns, they should be machmir upon themselves to return to their homes every night in order to eat in a succah; and even though there is to be lenient, even so, one who is stringent, blessings should come upon him."

That is to say that those who always travel to the towns which are about the city, it is the case that at times even during the rest of the year they return to their houses every night. And therefore, one should do this during succot as well. And this is within the realm of teshvu keein taduru. And yet, by law, one cannot obligate them , because in the majority of cases they do not return to their homes, for we going after the majority of days [see Bava Btra 29b, regarding peddlars etc., see there]. And therefore, he wrote the language of chumra for it is fitting to be stringent, since at times they return every night. However, at any rate, we learn from his words that there is no obligation to make a succah, but rather, if he finds a succah, he is obligated to dwell there in it.

Now, in terms of a worker in Manhattan eating outside a Sukkah, there are other possible inputs. For example, how does this factor into those who sit in a shop in a town, and whether they need to build a succah. And I think there is a relevant Maharil as well.

But it seems to me that, ignoring the Magen Avraham for a moment, someone in Manhattan who is not allowed (by law) to build a succah and does not have a succah available to him should be able to eat a sandwich outside of a succah. He should be exempt from Succah just like the fellow who went to another town without a succah in order to collect his debts.

Indeed, the idea of bassukot teshvu is teshvu ke'ein taduru, and what person who works in Manhattan travels back to the suburbs to his home in order to eat breakfast or lunch?! He certainly goes home to sleep, but this eating is not part of his teshvu.

This if he regularly eats at his desk. If he goes to a restaurant and eats there, and there is no succah in that restaurant, what of it? He wouldn't order take-out and then take his lunch to his house outside of Manhattan! So why should he need to sit in a succah. He traveled to Manhattan to work, and is thus patur min hasuccah during the day.

Of course, if there is a succah immediately available, he should eat in it. But what if the Succah is annoying, such that he would typically not eat there from the aggravation? Mitztaer patur min hasukkah, for the same reason of teshvu keein taduru. By aggravation, I mean smell and crowds. Chabad does a wonderful job of setting up sukkahs all over the place, but years ago I bought food from a restaurant, walked the 5 blocks over to the sukkah (such that my lunch break was almost over), and saw that people hadn't properly disposed of their garbage because there were many people and not enough garbage bins. I didn't like how crowded it was, I didn't like the smell, and I didn't like the mess. Were I at home, I would have taken my food and eaten it outside. But out of guilt, I ate my food in the only succah available to me.

Of course, this is nowhere near simple, and different situations would have different analyses and different results.

I am not sure we should even give Magen Avraham a second thought. Especially since if we do, it means we are being choshesh for him and so we in effect pasken like him, the more stringent position. But if we do, it is much more complicated.

If one is a poshea for not building a succah during the day to use, and we were only talking about being patur for the period immediately after arrival, then what is involved in finding or constructing such a succah? Then we have more of a need for the modern innovation of a pop-up succah. Now, one cannot simply construct a Succah anywhere in Manhattan. It is against the law, and to stay within the law one needs to apply for a permit, which may or may not be granted. But the time that it would take to construct a Succah could also be spent traveling 10 or 20 blocks to a Chabad succah or to a restaurant with a succah where you can buy a meal. If, as per Magen Avraham, one is actually obligated in the non-immediate case, then such an effort, even if a hassle, might be mandated. Or maybe not. This would once again be travel; whereas in his area there may not be a succah. How much of an effort, and how much travel, should be required? And if we say that while traveling, he need not wait until he reaches a succah, perhaps this can be comparable. So according to Magen Avraham, it seems possible that there would still be this requirement.

But if we don't maintain like the Magen Avraham, but like me as I laid out, or like Aruch Hashulchan for Aruch HaShulchan's reasons, then it seems to me that in many (but not all) cases, a commuting worker to Manhattan should be patur from Succah, and can eat at his desk or local restaurant.

Also, see Mishnah Berurah here.

Once again, to stress: Talk to your local Orthodox rabbi, because besides the fact that I might be wrong, everything is dependent upon the details of the particular situation.

Tuesday, January 06, 2009

Vaychi: Rashbam vs. Zohar on Deviating From The Parsha

Apparently, Rashbam was not among the yechidei segulah who learned kabbalah and Zohar. Either that or the Zohar was authored sometime after the Rashbam.

The end of Vayigash and the beginning of Vaychi read:
כז וַיֵּשֶׁב יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם, בְּאֶרֶץ גֹּשֶׁן; וַיֵּאָחֲזוּ בָהּ, וַיִּפְרוּ וַיִּרְבּוּ מְאֹד. 27 And Israel dwelt in the land of Egypt, in the land of Goshen; and they got them possessions therein, and were fruitful, and multiplied exceedingly.
כח וַיְחִי יַעֲקֹב בְּאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם, שְׁבַע עֶשְׂרֵה שָׁנָה; וַיְהִי יְמֵי-יַעֲקֹב, שְׁנֵי חַיָּיו--שֶׁבַע שָׁנִים, וְאַרְבָּעִים וּמְאַת שָׁנָה. 28 And Jacob lived in the land of Egypt seventeen years; so the days of Jacob, the years of his life, were a hundred forty and seven years.
and in his initial comments on the sidra, Rashbam writes:
ועיקר התחלת פרשה זו מן - וישב ישראל בארץ מצרים וגו' כי עליו מחובר ויחי יעקב אלא שלא רצו הקהילות לסיים פרשת ויגש בותהי הארץ לפרעה וסיימוה בוישב ישראל.

I am not sure if he considers יִשְׂרָאֵל in pasuk 27 to mean Israel the man or Israel the nation. His comment makes more sense if it is Israel the man, but this is an unlikely explanation of the pasuk; anyway, it makes perfect sense even if it means Israel the nation. It is not entirely clear if this comment is a record of historical happenings Rashbam is privy to, or (more likely IMHO) represents his educated guess.

Some {?} DH people put 27-28 as one source as an interjection into another source forming the rest of the perek; this might reflect something about Biblical style and what goes with what. That is, they are saying that there is indeed a sudden shift right before the pasuk Vayeshev Yisrael, thus echoing Rashbam's point, that the last pasuk in Vayigash seems disjoint with the preceding and akin to the following pasuk.

I also saw one commentator suggest that this was part of the reason that this is setuma -- so as to make this link.

I could argue with this stylistic assessment, against Rashbam. Perhaps it is a continuation of the idea in pasuk 11 and 12, after the interjection. And then Vaychi begins with Yaakov's age, as an introduction to the point of the sidra, which is his various blessings and his burial.

But note two points in Rashbam:
1) The original sidra division was a pasuk earlier -- by whom? he does not say.
2) But the kehillot, the communities, decided to move it one pasuk later.

If he is right, is this permissible? Or is this considered a violation of keeping to the divisions that Moshe Rabbenu established?

This brings us to Aruch Hashulchan, who paskens that such would not be permissible, based on his reading of a Zohar.

First, in Orach Chaim, siman 135, Aruch Hashulchan writes what is pictured to the right.

That is, he cites Rambam, perek 12 from Hilchot Tefillah that:

א מֹשֶׁה רַבֵּנוּ תִּקַּן לָהֶן לְיִשְׂרָאֵל, שֶׁיִּהְיוּ קוֹרִין בַּתּוֹרָה בָּרַבִּים בַּשַּׁבָּת וּבַשֵּׁנִי וּבַחֲמִישִׁי בַּשַּׁחְרִית, כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִשְׁהוּ שְׁלוֹשָׁה יָמִים, בְּלֹא שְׁמִיעַת תּוֹרָה. וְעֶזְרָא הַסּוֹפֵר תִּקַּן שֶׁיִּהְיוּ קוֹרִין כֵּן בַּמִּנְחָה בְּכָל שַׁבָּת, מִשּׁוֹם יוֹשְׁבֵי קְרָנוֹת; וְגַם, הוּא תִּקַּן שֶׁיִּהְיוּ הַקּוֹרִין בַּשֵּׁנִי וּבַחֲמִישִׁי שְׁלוֹשָׁה בְּנֵי אָדָם, וְלֹא יִקְרְאוּ פָּחוּת מֵעֲשָׂרָה פְּסוּקִים.

Now, I would say that this means that Moshe instituted the practice of laining these times. But instead, he interprets this into the Rambam that Moshe instituted what to read, every sidra in its proper time.

And he says the same in seif 2, that also within this decree of Moshe was to read each in its proper time.

How does he get the idea that this was part of the enactment of Moshe Rabbenu? He expands on this matter in a later siman. As we will see, the Aruch haShulchan is basing himself on a Zohar.

In Orach Chaim, siman 282, seif 2 and seif 3, Aruch Hashulchan writes {my translation}:

סימן רפב סעיף ב

וכבר נתבאר בריש סימן קל"ה, דמשה רבינו תיקן לישראל לקרות כל סדרה וסדרה בשבת שלה, וחלילה להחליף סדרה זו באחרת

And it was already explained in siman 135 that Moshe Rabbenu enacted for Israel to read each sidra in its own Shabbat, and forfend to switch one sidra with another.

ויש בתורה נ"ד סדרות, ובזוהר בכל מקום אומר נ"ג, ונראה לי דכוונתו הוא על [השבתים] (השבתות) שבהם קורים הסדרות, לאפוקי 'וזאת הברכה' שאין לה שבת אלא היא מיוחדת ליום טוב האחרון של חג הסוכות, בארץ ישראל - בשמיני עצרת, ובחוץ לארץ - בשמחת תורה. אבל כל הג"ן סדרות הם מיוחדים רק לשבתות השנה. ולפי שבשנה פשוטה ליכא נ"ג [שבתים] (שבתות), ולבד ימי יום טוב שחלו בשבת, דאז אין קורין הסדרה, ובשנה מעוברת יש יותר מנ"ג [שבתים] (שבתות) - ולכן יש סדרות המחוברים יחד, שקורין אותן שנים בשבת אחד.

And there is in the Torah 54 sidrot, and in the Zohar in every place it says 53. And it appears to me that his intent is on the Shabbats upon which they read the sidrot, to the exclusion of VeZot HaBeracha which does not have a Shabbat but which is designated for the last day of Yom Tov of Succot -- in Israel, on Shemini Atzeret, and outside the land, on Simchat Torah. But all the 53 sidrot are designated only to the Shabbats of the year. And because in a simple year there are not 53 Shabbats, and besides that there are days of Yom Tov which fall on Shabbat, at which point they do not read the sidra, and on a leap year there are more than 53 Shabbats -- and therefore, there are sidrot joined together, where they read two of them on one Shabbat.

וכבר נתבאר שם דאם על פי סיבה לא קראו הסדרה בשבת זו - שקורין אותה בשבת הבאה עם הסדרה השייך לה, ואפילו היו אז שתי סדרות - קורין גם הסדרה של שבת שעברה ע"ש

And it was already explained there that if, based on some circumstance, they did not read the sidra on this Shabbat, that they read it the subsequent Shabbat together with the sidra which is relevant to it. And even if then there were two sidrot {already joined together}, they also read the sidra of the previous Shabbat. See there.

סימן רפב סעיף ג

כתב הזוהר (ויקהל דף ר"ו:): "אסור ליה למאן דקרי באורייתא למיפסק פרשתא, או אפילו מילא חדא, אלא באתר דפסק משה פרשתא לעמא קדישא יפסיק וכו'" עכ"ל

The Zohar wrote (Vayakhel page 206b) that "it is forbidden for someone reading the Torah to be mifsak {break off} a 'parsha,' or even a single word, except in the place where Moshe pasak the parsha for the holy nation he should yafsik, etc." End quote.

ואין הכוונה על כל אחד מהקרואים שלא יפסיק אלא בפרשה, והיינו פתוחה או סתומה, דאם כן מאין נקח שבעה קרואים, שהרי יש סדרות שאין בהם כלל פתוחה או סתומה, כמו 'ויצא', 'מקץ', ויש שאין בהם רק פרשה אחת, כמו 'בלק', 'האזינו', והרבה סדרים יש שאין בהם ז' פרשיות. אלא הכוונה על תשלום הקרואים, שיסיימו ממש בסוף הסדרה, ולא קודם ולא מאוחר אפילו תיבה אחת, וכל שכן הרבה, כמו שמסיים אחר כך וזה לשונו:

And the intent is not on each of the readers that he should not break except by a parsha, and this would be by a petucha or setuma gap, for if so, from where will we take 7 readers, for behold there are sidrot which do not have in them at all a petucha or a setumah, such as Vayeitzei and Miketz, and there are those which only have a single parsha, such as Balak, Haazinu. And there are many sedarim which do not have in them 7 parshas.

Rather, the intent was on the complete readers, that they finish precisely at the end of the sidra, and not before it or after it a single word, and all the more so a lot, as he concludes after that, and this is his language:

"ולא יפסיק מילין דפרשתא דשבתא דא בפרשתא דשבתא אחרא... כיון דאשלימו הני למיפסק פרשיין דכל שתא ואתעטרו קמי קב"ה ואמרי אנא משבת פלוני מציבורא פלוני... ואסור לן לערבא אלין באלין... אפילו כמלא נימא ואפילו בחד תיבא וכו'" עכ"ל
"And he should not yafsik words of the parsha of this Shabbat in the parsha of another Shabbat... Once they finish being mifsak the parsha of the entire year, and they are crowned before Hashem, and say "I am from this Shabbat, from this community"... And it is forbidden for us to mix these with these... even a hairsbreadth, and even with one word, etc." End quote.

והקפידא הוא רק בשבת שחרית ולא במנחה ולא בב' וה', שאין הקריאות מן החשבון הכללי. וראיה, שהרי בשבת שחרית חוזרין וקורין אותן הפרשיות עצמן, וזה כמו קריאת ראש חודש ומועדים

And this insistence is only at Shabbat Shacharit, but not at Mincha or on Monday and Thursday, for these readings are not from this count. And a proof to this is that at Shabbat Shacharit, we return and read those very parshiyot themselves, and this is like the readings for Rosh Chodesh and Moadim.

(עיין מג"א, וזה שאמרו בברכות י"ב:: 'כל פרשה דלא פסקה משה - לא פסקינן', היינו לעשותה בקביעות כן, כמו פסוקי בלק שבקשו לקבוע בקריאת שמע ע"ש. אבל במנחה בשבת ובשני וחמישי, דאחר כך בשבת משלימין - לית לן בה, ורק באמצע פסוק אסור, כדאמרינן בתענית כ"ב:. ומה שאמרו במגילה כ"ט. דבמערבא פסקי לתלת שנין, האמת כן, דהם לא חשו לזה, ולכן באמת לא נתפשט מנהגם, וכל ישראל משלימין בשנה אחת. וזה שבמקדש היו מחלקים פרשת האזינו - התם לא היה בשביל לימוד התורה לכל ישראל, אלא הלוים בשיר היו מנגנים, כדאיתא בראש השנה ל"א. ע"ש ודו"ק)

See Magen Avraham, and this is what they said in Berachot 12b: Every parsha which Moshe did not break off, we do not break. This is to do it so as established, such as the pesukim of Balak which they wished to establish in Keriat Shema, see there. But on Mincha of Shabbat, and on Monday and Thursday, which we complete afterwards on Shabbat, we have no concern, and only {are concerned about breaking} in the middle of a pasuk, as we say in Taanit 22b.

And this which they said in Megillah 29a, that in Eretz Yisrael they break it into three years, the truth is indeed so, that they were not concerned for this, and therefore, indeed, their custom did not spread, and {now} all of Israel complete in a single year. And this that in the Mikdash we divide the parsha of Haazinu -- there, it was not because of teaching Torah to all of Israel, but rather the Leviim were singing it in song, as is so in Rosh Hashanah 31a. See there.

The Zohar in question is here. It is clear that it means what we call a sidra, because it talks of all of the parshiyot of the year (see רל). And also because in רלא we see reference to the 53 of them, which is how Zohar refers to the parshiyot in the year.

If so, and if Rashbam is simultaneously correct, then we will be violating this injunction when we lain this coming Shabbos. We broke off Vayigash in the wrong place, and we start Vayechi in the wrong place! How could the communities have decided to do this? Either Rashbam is right, and the communities did not pay heed to the Zohar (and indeed the gemara, which has the statement the Zohar is "explaining"). Or Rashbam is wrong in his statement of what the kehillot did.

Now here is an interesting point. The Zohar refers to these as parshiyot. However, the way Chazal referred to it, a parsha was the thing broken off by petuchot or setumot, or else was the standard weekly reading of the Bnai Maarava, namely this 1/3 reading which Aruch Hashulchan denounces on the basis of this Zohar. In contrast, the sidra is the weekly reading as in Bavel.

See Dr. Steinfeld's article which touches on this matter (in understanding a specific gemara about leining), and my class notes from his class.

As such, why would Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai use the incorrect term for what he is referring to? He should call them sidrot, not parshiyot. And as above, he clearly means sidrot. On the other hand, if it is Rabbi Moshe de Leon, it makes sense that he would use the term which developed in later Rabbinic Hebrew, parsha. Just as he made a derasha on Esnoga, which is Ladino, and just as he makes a derasha on the orthography of the zarka, which did not exist yet.

If you want to claim that he intended parsha as Chazal did, then we would be in violation; besides which, we have the yearly cycle and the reference to the 53 of them.

Also, I would not be so quick to criticize the conduct of the Bnei Maarava. As it seems to me from the above article, the Tannaim of Eretz Yisrael (perhaps even Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai) lained it such. And surely they, and the Amora'ei Eretz Yisrael, as well, are people who knew what is what. And why are we assuming that these Babylonian weekly sidra divisions were from Moshe, but not the Eretz-Yisraelite weekly parsha divisions?

Finally, it seems rather apparent to me that the Zohar is extending, or reinterpreting (misinterpreting?) the halacha brought down in that gemara in Berachot. That gemara reads פרשה דפסקה משה רבינו פסקינן דלא פסקה משה רבינו לא פסקינ.
R. Abbahu b. Zutrathi said in the name of R. Judah b. Zebida: They wanted to include the section of Balak in the Shema', but they did not do so because it would have meant too great a burden for the congregation. Why [did they want to insert it]? — Because it contains the words, God who brought them forth out of Egypt. Then let us say the section of usury or of weights in which the going forth from Egypt is mentioned? — Rather, said R. Jose b. Abin, [the reason is] because it contains the verse, He couched, he lay down as a lion, and as a lioness; who shall rouse him up? Let us then say this one verse and no more? — We have a tradition that every section which our master, Moses, has divided off we may divide off, but that which our master, Moses, has not divided off, we may not divide off.
The idea in that gemara was in terms of ritual reading of Shema, where one cannot simply read a pasuk without those in context in the parsha. And yet, every chapter in Shema does not form its own sidra! Rather, these are parshiyot in the sense of sections formed by petuchot and setumot gaps. The Zohar is using identical language, but for an entirely different purpose. To believe this is so, we would need to say that the identical language was used for two different purposes, for two different meanings of "parsha," and where the word parsha is actually an error -- it should read sidra.

My own conclusion here is that we do not need to pay heed to the Zohar on this; and that we should take care not to read the Zohar into Rambam or earlier sources such as the gemara. Even so, there are traditions of which parsha to read when, and it is a good thing to keep to it, and to keep with what all of klal Yisrael are doing.

And in terms of Rashbam, I am not convinced that he is correct that the parsha lines were redrawn here in parshat Vayechi.

Sunday, December 21, 2008

Why we should ban playing dreidels

Or perhaps not. Here is the Aruch ha-Shulchan on the matter. He writes, in Orach Chaim Siman 670, Seif 9:

סימן תרע סעיף ט

ריבוי הסעודות שמרבין בהם – הם סעודות הרשות. שלא קבעום למשתה ושמחה כפורים, משום דגזירת המן היתה על הגופים: "להשמיד להרוג ולאבד" – לכך צריכין לשמח הגוף. אבל גזירות אנטיוכס היתה ביטול תורה ומצות. ואף שזה גרוע מגזירת הגוף, מכל מקום סוף סוף הם גזירות הנפש, לכך צריכין לשמח הנפש בהלל, ותודה, וזמירות, ושירות ותשבחות, ואין להגוף עניין בזה (ומתורץ קושית הט"ז סעיף קטן ג).מ

ומכל מקום יש אומרים שיש קצת מצוה להרבות בסעודות. חדא: דשמחת הנפש תלוי קצת גם כן בשמחת הגוף, כמושג בחוש. ועוד: לזכר חנוכת המשכן, שקבעום למשתה ושמחה. וגם יש לומר שירות ותשבחות בהסעודות, ואז וודאי הוי סעודת מצוה.

אבל השוחקים בקלפים – עונשן רב, ובעונותינו הרבים נתפשטה נגע צרעת הזה בבית ישראל. אוי לנו שעלתה בימינו כך, וכמה מיני עבירות תלויות בזה! והוא רחום יכפר עון. ומי שביכולתו לבטלה – שכרו מרובה מאד.

The increasing of festive meals which people increase, they are optional meals. For they {=Chazal} did not establish it {=Chanukkah} for parties and rejoicing, like Purim. For the decree of Haman was upon the bodies - "to obliterate, to kill, and to destroy" -- therefore, we are required to make the body rejoice. But the decrees of Antiochus was the nullification of Torah and Mitzvot. And even though this is worse than a decree against the body, still, at the end of the day, they were decrees against the soul. Therefore we are required to make the soul rejoice with Hallel, praise, Zemirot, Shirot veTishbachot, and the body has no connection to this. (And this answers the question of the Taz in seif katan 3.)

And still, there is to say that there is some amount of mitzvah to increase in festive meals. Firstly, that the rejoicing of the soul is somewhat connected as well in the rejoicing of the body, as is intuitively felt. And further, as a remembrance to the dedication of the Mishkan, which they established for festive meals and rejoicing. And also, there is to say Shirot and Tishbachot within those meals, and then certainly it will be a seudat mitzvah.

But those who play with cards -- their punishment is great, and in our great sins this disease of leprosy {of card-playing} in the House of Israel. Woe to us that such arises in our days! And how many types of sins are suspended from it! And He is merciful and forgives iniquity. And he who has in his ability to nullify this -- his reward is incredibly great.
The idea is that Chanukkah is not about fun. So favorable or unfavorable comparisons to Christmas, as occur on the Daily Show or South Park, are irrelevant. The point is the Hallel, and the praising of God. And physical rejoicing is only really relevant as a means to that end. So who cares how many presents you get, or if a Christmas tree is "cooler" than a menorah. The very comparison misses the point.

So too, playing with dreidel. It is an OK game, to entertain, especially kids. But if we turn dreidel into a card-game, played for high-stakes, then it is missing the point. If we make it into a game of poker, but played with dreidels, then it is certainly missing the point. And the Aruch HaShulchan would decry it.

And here is an article in the Jewish Week, about how an intermarried couple "fixed" the game of dreidel so that it is fun for adults, by adding elements of Texas Hold 'Em:
I’ve taken our ancestral Hebrew-adorned tops for many a spin.

But a full-fledged dreidel match, one in which competitors vie for the pot of gelt?
Let’s just say that the one time I tried it with a group of adults — back when my husband and I were 20-something, child-free and regular poker players — we were all bored well before the candles had burnt down low.

The simple parameters of take all, take half, take nothing or ante up may entertain small children like my daughters, who recently whiled away an afternoon doing the same 12-piece jigsaw puzzle over and over. But clearly dreidel is not much of an adult game.

So I was excited when I found out about No Limit Texas Dreidel, which entrepreneur Jennie Rivlin Roberts and her non-Jewish husband Webb Roberts dreamed up three years ago as they were driving from Florida to their home in Atlanta.

Their annual Chanukah party was coming up and Rivlin Roberts, now 37, recalls saying, “There really must be a way to make dreidel more fun.”

Since the two were poker enthusiasts, they livened up the traditional Gimel - Hey- Nun- Shin with elements of “No Limit Texas Hold ’Em.”

In the resulting product, players use multiple dreidels to create their best “hand” — a combination of communal and individual spins — and are then encouraged to bet.
And so on. See the whole article.

Note: This post is not intended halacha lemaaseh. Consult your local Orthodox rabbi.

Sunday, June 22, 2008

Halacha Alert! How to fold your tallis on Shabbos and Yom Tov

So screamed the kol korei distributed in my shul, this past Shavuos.
Halacha Alert !
How to fold your tallis on Shabbos and Yom Tov.

It says in Sh'miras Shabbos K'hilchosah (15:44:46):
"One must not fold a garment or cloth back into already existing creases... Consequently, one should not fold a tallis or a tablecloth into its previous creases... Any article may be folded if one takes care not to fold it into its original creases (e.g. one can fold it into the reverse of its folds) but one {meaning may} should re-fold it into its normal creases after Shabbos or Yom Tov."
The strong implication of this leaflet is that there is only one proper way to fold the tallis, and that anyone who acts differently is acting in ignorance and contrary to halacha. Also implied is that there is no contrary position. Thus, it is a HALACHA ALERT! You are doing it wrong.

The leaflet is unsigned by the person who printed it up/distributed it, and they presumably thought that there is no need to do so. After all, the author of Shmiras Shabbos Kehilchaso is a big talmid chacham and posek.

But of course, not everyone follows this particular posek in all their Shabbos practices. And further, this is a quote from the English sefer. Many know that the English version is the strict one, while the Hebrew one, with the same text, has footnotes, where the real kulos are. In this particular instance, the footnotes don't say the kula explicitly, but does give a reference to Aruch haShulchan among other sources, and the Aruch HaShulchan is where the kulah can be found.

The following is the text, and rough summarization (not intended as translation, though I sometimes wander into translation) of the Aruch haShulchan, Orach Chaim, siman 302:

Seif 10: There is a major conceptual dispute between Rambam and Raavad as to the nature of the prohibition of "folding."

Rambam groups it with making pleats on cuffs, just as one it metaken them during a weekday. And then mentions folding.

Thus, says Aruch haShulchan, Rambam considers this a problem of metaken kli. And so Rambam does not hold the gemara is talking about regular folding, but rather a type of folding which is craftsmanship, just as he talks about making pleats on clothing. {Perhaps Aruch haShulchan thinks the Rambam considers making pleats and folding the same, though one can argue it as that they are different actions but both work of a craftsman.} But regular folding (like folding your tallis), there is no concern at all in any form.

Meanwhile, Raavad holds that the prohibition is not because of tikkun kli but rather because he is matriach, taking pains, on Shabbos, for something needed during the week.
As he will develop it, it is only according to Raavad that folding a tallis is problematic.

Seif 11: Here Aruch haShulchan makes this distiction. According to Rambam, since there is no reason of tircha, it is permitted to fold any garment with a regular folding, since there is no tikkun kli, even if for the week.

However, according to Raavad, such would be forbidden for the reason of tircha from Shabbot for chol.

Further, he suggests that Raavad holds this is a problem even where there is no issue of metaken, but just the tircha. He connects this to Tosafot. For they write "from here we learn that it is forbidden to fold tallitot of the synagogue, because they are needed for the next day." And what seems apparent is that there is no issue of metaken kli at all. Rather, the prohibition is because of tircha.

Furthermore, he adds that even according to Raavad/Tosafot, one is not going to simply cast it aside without any folding, for this is not miderech benei Adam. {I, Josh, would note that this appears to be the derech of chassidim. :) } Rather, even according to this, in inexact folding would still be OK. He attributes this as the intent of the Mordechai in the next seif.

{I would add that this kippul she`aino meduyak might well not be the same as Shmiras Shabbos KeHilchoso's taking care not not to fold it in the original creases. But here is not the place to expand on this idea..}

Seif 12: Aruch haShulchan now turns to the Mordechai. He says that the Raaviah wrote that the white taleisim which one does not need on that day of Shabbos, after leaving shul, it is forbiddden to fold them, then even where all the other conditions from the gemara {of Rav Yannai} are satisfied, because those were the conditions for something that was needed that day. However, if it not in its original folding {seder kipulo} it is permitted, even with two people doing the folding.

The Bet Yosef brings this position down and agrees with it.

This, says Aruch haShulchan, is even within Tosafot's position about tircha from one day for the next. Such is apparent.

Then he sets out to explain how each Rishon and Acharon holds along this dispute of whether the problem is tikkun keilim or tircha lemachar. Tur holds the problem is metaken, and explains how by new and white clother, the tikkun is not so much. So also seems implied in Rashi.

Finally, he has a defense of the modern practice in which everyone folds their tallis normally on Shabbos. He suggests that with our folding of talleisim, there is no tikkun, such that there is no issue according to Rambam et al. Meanwhile, the idea of tircha lemachar they do not hold by, but rather hold like Rashi, Rambam, Tur and Shulchan Aruch about the nature of the prohibition being tikkun rather than tircha lemachar.

Furthermore, he cites the Kolbo saying the same thing, more or less, also defending existing practice of folding talleisim: "And nowadays that they are accustomed to folding all clothing, it is possible that our folding is not comparable to their folding, that they were extremely insistent to smooth out its folds, and we do not do so." [And the Tur and Shulchan Aruch actually separate the law of making folds in cuffs from this law, and do not bring the law of making up beds.]

All this, I would note, is something of a chiddush. It is not clear to me that Tur or Bet Yosef actually make the distinction between these two reasons so clearly, and perhaps conflate the two. And see what Mishnah Brurah does with this, harmonizing reasons. Still, Aruch haShulchan is someone upon whom one can rely.

One more seif before my own suggestion and general discussion.
.
Seif 13: is about the other law brought down in that same Mishnah, making up the bed on Shabbos, either for Shabbos or after Shabbos. So, insights into one may shed light on the other.

He suggests that the Mishna which prohibits setting up the beds on Shabbos for after Shabbos was talking about where the beds were in a separate room for the beds, where one did not go into that room all the day. But we have the bedroom as it as one of the rooms of the house, and people go in their during the day. It would look messy and not nice. Therefore, setting up the bed is to make the house look nice, and thus is specifically for the honor of Shabbos, and not for machar. He cites Magen Avraham to this effect.

And this is the widespread, common custom everywhere.

As an additional reason for permitting, he brings in his discussion from the previous seifim, about the distinction between metaken and tircha lemachar. He suggests that they hold the reason is metaken, and the way we set up the beds, it is not called metaken, in accordance with the Kol Bo said.

He also draws a distinction between setting up the beds for beauty {which is what we do when we set beds} and setting of the beds to sleep upon.

I {=Josh} would add a few points to what was discussed above. Certainly, when we make up the beds, one cannot easily sleep in them, for the top sheet or blanket is too tight, and in some cases the pillow is covered, etc., etc. It is all done for presentation, so that the bed looks good when it is not being used. It is thus for beauty, and for kavod haBayit and thus lekavod Shabbos. This was my inclination, to make such a distinction, before reading Aruch haShulchan on this, so Baruch Shekivanti!

But I had a similar reaction to the issue of tallis. Why does one fold a tallis? I can testify about myself that I am not always as neat as I should be. My clothing gets rumpled and I leave my bed unmade. My wife is not always so happy about this. And there may be various halachic problems with what I do in this regard, for a talmid chacham {if that is what I am} is supposed to always look extremely presentable. But it means that I am in general not so makpid that my clothing is always neat and pressed.

Yet, I always fold up my tallis after I am done with it. Why is that?? Am I really trying to keep the tallis smooth and unwrinkled for the next day?

I don't think so. Rather, there are two reasons:

1) Ritual. I have a specific ritual for putting on tefillin and putting away my tefillin. A specific order, a specific number of wraps around my arm for tefillin. Indeed, my father taught me the family minhag or wrapping tefillin, which is distinct from the way anyone else I have encountered ever does it. But other people also have distinct ways of wrapping tefillin. Those are more common ways, but they do vary somewhat. On the shel yad, do all the wrappings go on one side, or on both sides.

The same is true for the tallis. My father has a specific minhag of how to fold the tallis, which is distinct from most other people's. I never bothered to learn the intricacies of it exactly, but one of these days I will, bli neder.

The fact that such distinct customs can arise means that putting away the tallis has acheived a status of ritual. If so, people folding their tallit are not going through tircha to put away their tallis for the next day. Indeed, it would be easier to just let it lie there unfolded, because then it would be more accessible the next day! Rather, the seder of putting on a tallis in shul involves the ritual of taking it off and putting it away as well. So the intent is not metaken keli, and one can argue there is no tikkun kli at all. And even if you hold the problem in general is tircha lemachar, like Raavad and Tosafot, this is not tircha for machar, but rather is just part of the donning and doffing of the tallis.

2) Zilzul mitzvah. A related but distinct point. Even if we do not say it is part of the ritual, and that is why I and others fold the tallis, we can say it is a matter of treating tashmishei mitzvah with respect. To cite the Aruch HaShulchan from above, though he was making a slightly different point: "However, to cast aside a garment without any folding at all is not from the derech benei Adam."

That is why we fold our tallis. Why do we carefully wind up the tefillin from one day to the next. It takes time to unroll it. But not only is it not mentchlech in general to cast clothing about haphazardly, it would be a zilzul hamitzvah to simply leave the tefillin with the straps lying about, not in the batim, etc.

So too, the tallis gadol. We do not just want to leave it lying around. So we put it in the tallis zekel. And it is surely improper to just stuff it in, so we fold it. Even if we fold it neatly, exactly on the creases, I would argue that this is the way one puts it away bederech kavod. And it is thus not tircha lemachar.

We do not need to go this far, even though I think what I said is true. We have the Aruch haShulchan, and his reasoning to rely upon. And he is citing Kol Bo, and relying on Rambam et al. (Beis Yosef also cited this Kolbo, though he did not bring it lehalacha in Shulchan Aruch.)

Furthermore, the gemara itself never spoke about folding a tallis. We see it only in a diyyuk that Tosafot made from the Mishna and gemara. And in three generations, at least, masses of Jews did not pay heed to the restriction as it applied to folding a tallis: In the generation of Kolbo, in the generation of Aruch haShulchan, and in our own generation.

One could appeal to the principle established in Pesachim 66a, as cited by Hilel haBavli:

אמר להן הלכה זו שמעתי ושכחתי אלא הנח להן לישראל אם אין נביאים הן בני נביאים הן למחר מי שפסחו טלה תוחבו בצמרו מי שפסחו גדי תוחבו בין קרניו ראה מעשה ונזכר הלכה ואמר כך מקובלני מפי שמעיה ואבטליון

and assume that if many Jews are doing it, it is quite possible they have valid halachic reason for doing so. Especially for something like this which has aspects of mimetic tradition to it. This is not the assumption made in the leaflet. On the other hand, hilchos Shabbos is complication, and surely a lot of things are violated in ignorance, so it is a question of how far one would apply this principle I cited. And further, see in Korban Nesanel on the Rosh (note tzaddi) on Shabbos 113a that after citing the relevant Tosafot, he says וראוי להזהיר העולם על זה. Which firstly shows that in his days, the common practice of many Jews was to fold their tallis regularly on Shabbos. And secondly shows that he wanted to correct this erroneous practice. And the author of this leaflet was doing exactly that. Though perhaps the Korban Nesanel was not aware of other approaches which would permit the common custom.

Still, I hope that in general, this illustrates the problem of this kol korei/leaflet approach. One should really learn through the relevent sugyas. If you want to convince someone to take on a different practice, one should tell them all the relevant details, not just give out an anonymous kol koreh, effectively trying to pasken for them. And tell them to consult their local orthodox rabbi, who can instruct them if it is proper to change one's practice.

Please note: This is not intended halacha lemaaseh. I deliberately did not include in the above my father's practice, which is to always fold it backwards, against the creases, even during the week, so as not to err on Shabbos (which might have its own problems), or what my own practice is. I am not trying to forbid and not trying to permit here, but rather to discuss the issue and its complexities, in order to argue against the kol korei approach to such issues.

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