Ibn Caspi on the Avos keeping the entire Torah

Summary: He endorses the idea, kind-of. In one instance, as a restrained and coded rejection. In another, as a philosophical co-opting of the idea. Also, Chizkuni and my own approach to understanding the pasuk that sparks all this.

Post: A pasuk and Rashi, in the midst of parashat Toledot (26:5):

5. Because Abraham hearkened to My voice, and kept My charge, My commandments, My statutes, and My instructions."

ה. עֵקֶב אֲשֶׁר שָׁמַע אַבְרָהָם בְּקֹלִי וַיִּשְׁמֹר מִשְׁמַרְתִּי מִצְוֹתַי חֻקּוֹתַי וְתוֹרֹתָי:

and kept My charge: [Referring to] decrees to distance [himself] from transgressing the warnings in the Torah, e.g. secondary prohibitions to prevent incest from occurring, and the Rabbinic decrees to safeguard the prohibitions of the Sabbath.		וישמר משמרתי: גזרות להרחקה על אזהרות שבתורה, כגון שניות לעריות ושבות לשבת:
My commandments: [Referring to] things, which, had they not been written, would have been fit to be commanded, e.g. [prohibitions against] robbery and bloodshed.		מצותי: דברים שאילו לא נכתבו ראויין הם להצטוות כגון גזל ושפיכות דמים:
My statutes: [Referring to] things that the evil inclination and the nations of the world argue against, e.g. [the prohibitions against] eating pork and wearing garments of wool and linen for which no reason [is given], but [which are] the decree of the King and His statutes over His subjects.		חקותי: דברים שיצר הרע ואומות העולם משיבין עליהם כגון אכילת חזיר ולבישת שעטנז שאין טעם בדבר אלא גזירת המלך וחקותיו על עבדיו:
and My instructions: To include the Oral Law, the laws given to Moses from Sinai. [Yoma 28b]		ותורתי: להביא תורה שבעל פה, הלכה למשה מסיני:

This is based on Yoma 28b, which reads:

  Rab said: Our father Abraham kept the whole Torah, as it is said: Because that Abraham hearkened to My voice [kept My charge, My commandments, My statutes, and My laws].21 R. Shimi b. Hiyya said to Rab: Say, perhaps, that this refers to the seven laws?22 — Surely there was also that of circumcision!23 Then say that it refers to the seven laws and circumcision [and not to the whole Torah]? — If that were so, why does Scripture say: ‘My commandments and My laws’? Raba or R. Ashi said: Abraham, our father, kept even the law concerning the ‘erub of the dishes,’24 as it is said: ‘My Torahs’:25 one being the written Torah, the other the oral Torah.26

Rabbi Yosef Ibn Caspi writes:

ה)  וישמור  משמרתי  וגו. מה אומר אחרי רבותינו ז"ל
 בפירוש זה שאמרו  קיים אברהם כל התורה כולה  (יומא כ־ח)  פקח:
 עיניך וראה

"What shall I say after our Sages za'l in explanation of this, that they said that Avraham kept the entire Torah (Yoma 28)? Open your eyes and see."

I think that it is fairly clear that Ibn Caspi is speaking in code. Rather than saying explicitly that he disagrees with Chazal in this, he says 'what can I say?' And since he is unable to say explicitly what he wants to, he resorts to "Open your eyes and see."

Compare with what Ibn Caspi wrote on an earlier parashah, Lech Lecha, in his more flowing worth, Tiras Kesef:


ואשיב ואומר כי ידוע שמנהג הארץ  ההיא לקחת  איש אחד
 נשים  רבות, עם  שגם תורתנו התירה זה לעמנו,  ולכן היה מהפלגת
  קדושת  אברהם,  אע״פ שגדלה תשוקתו לבנים שלא נזדווג רק
 לאשתו  הנכבדת,  אשר הוא נעזר ממנה לכל עת צורך,  גם לא
 לשפחותיו הנמצאות אתו  בבית,  ומה טוב מה שאמרו פלוסופי  חכמינו
 קיים אברהם  כל התורה כלה  (יומא כ״ח), ודי במה שזכרנו  מופת
 שהחמיר על עצמו אף במקום שהתירה אותו התורה העתידה להמסר
 לכלל עם ישורון. והנה ביאר כי אברהם לא בקש זה משרה, אבל
 שמע לקולה כאשר בקשה זה מאתו, ובכלל זה שלום הבית  ג״כ
 שהוא עיקר גדול לכל מבקש שלמות .

"And I will further say that it is known that the custom of that land was for one man to take many wives, besides that our Torah permits this to our nation. And therefore it was of the great holiness of Avraham that, despite the greatness of his desire for children, he only paired with his honored wife, from whom he received aid at any time of necessity, and not from his maidservants who were found with him in the house.

And how good was that which the philosophers of our Sages said, that Avraham kept the entire Torah (Yoma 28b). And it is sufficient in that which we have mentioned, the exemplar that he was strict upon himself even in a place that which was permitted by the Torah which was to be transmitted over to the populace of the nation of Yeshurun. And behold, it explains that Avraham did not request this of Sarah, but rather that he hearkened to her voice when she requested this of him, and encompassed with this is the peace of the household {shalom habayit}, which is as well an important fundamental to anyone who desires completeness."

This is not a contradiction. Ibn Caspi does not believe, on a peshat level -- on a literal level or on a historical level -- that Avraham Avinu kept the entire Torah, including eruv tavshilin. This is obvious, and to say otherwise is to subscribe to an obvious anachronism.

Even so, Ibn Caspi seizes upon this Talmudic statement by פלוסופי חכמינו. Indeed, by attributing it to them, he grants the message the status of coded, hidden philosophy. What message can we find* in here?  Don't be so averse to anachronism. Avraham's actions should not be understood as purely a function of his social context. He was not a typical Mesopotamian resident, such that we should explain his every action based on the Code of Hammurabi or the Laws of Eshnunna. He sanctified himself even in the permitted, and his moral compass could and should provide a model for his descendants. Thus, Rav Shimi bar Chiya said that perhaps this וַיִּשְׁמֹר מִשְׁמַרְתִּי מִצְוֹתַי חֻקּוֹתַי וְתוֹרֹתָי only refers to the sheva mitzvos benei Noach, which were incumbent upon everyone back then, and this suggestion of Rav Shimi bar Chiya was rejected.

Also rejected was the suggestion that the only extra item Avraham kept was milah, which we see explicitly that he was commanded. Rather, in general, Avraham kept himself to a strict moral code which exceeded that expected within his surroundings. This would be the equivalent of keeping the entire Torah. And he kept things even above the written Torah; even the Oral Torah; and specifically, eruv tavshilin which is rabbinic. Not that he literally kept eruv tavshilin. That would be silly, I think Ibn Caspi would agree. Rather, this is an example of keeping stringencies even above what the Torah would impose.

Does Ibn Caspi really think that this is what Chazal meant by this? Perhaps, though his comment in parshas Toldos suggests otherwise. This could be a philosophical coopting of a derasha of Chazal. I am reminded of what Shadal said about philosophical derash:

And if we turn to the other great commentators -- Ibn Ezra, Radak, and Don Yitzchak Abarbanel, we find that in many places they lean from the path of peshat to another side -- is it not the philosophical derash.

And the man {=the guest} replied to me and said: You have spoken correctly. A great and grievous damage has the mixed up philosophy damaged us -- which spread in the world via the Arabs, who took Aristotle as head and chief, and in his name they swear, and they wish to make his words agree with their beliefs which they received from their fathers, and they innovated a confused wisdom which confuses the hearts - which when the kingdom of Ishmael spread in the lands, this {ideology} also spread, and confused the thoughts and ruined the beliefs.

And the chachmei yisrael also, in order to make the words of this philosophy agree with our Complete Torah, forced and pressed the words of the Torah, Neviim, and the Sages of the Mishnah and the Talmud in order that they say what they did not say and never entered their hearts in {all} their days. And in order to do this they {the chachmei yisrael} brought out the {tools of} derash, remez and mashal {allegory}. And they abandoned the peshat and did not serve it.

How shall we understand this pasuk in Toldos? I'll present Chizkuni on the pasuk, to show one alternate way of processing the pasuk; and then give my own, cruder explanation.

Chizkuni writes:

"עֵקֶב אֲשֶׁר שָׁמַע אַבְרָהָם בְּקֹלִי -- this is the Akeida, and so does He say there, 'because you have hearkened to My voice.'


וַיִּשְׁמֹר מִשְׁמַרְתִּי -- this is circumcision, that he accepted immediately, as is written 'this is my covenant that you shall תשמרו.'


מִצְוֹתַי -- this is circumcision at eight days, as is written, 'And Avraham circumcised Yitzchak his son at eight days, as Elokim צוה him. 


חֻקּוֹתַי -- that he commanded as well his descendants after him that they be circumcised, as is written, 'And my covenant shall be in your flesh for an everlasting covenant'. {Josh: and chok implies continual.} And it says 'And you shall establish it for Yaakov as a חוק.'


וְתוֹרֹתָי -- that I said to him 'Lech Lecha to the land that I show you.' And a proof to the matter is {Tehillim 32:8}:

ח  אַשְׂכִּילְךָ, וְאוֹרְךָ--בְּדֶרֶךְ-זוּ תֵלֵךְ;    אִיעֲצָה עָלֶיךָ עֵינִי.

8 'I will instruct thee and teach thee in the way which thou shalt go; I will give counsel, Mine eye being upon thee.'

and so too {Tehillim 25:12}:

יב  מִי-זֶה הָאִישׁ, יְרֵא ה--    יוֹרֶנּוּ, בְּדֶרֶךְ יִבְחָר.

12 What man is he that feareth the LORD? Him will He instruct in the way that he should choose.

And all תורה is a language of instruction. 


And according to the peshat, מִצְוֹתַי and חֻקּוֹתַי  are the seven mitzvot which the children of Noach were commanded."

I'll end by saying that on a peshat level, it might not be the correct thing to highlight and analyze each part of this repetitive pasuk עֵקֶב אֲשֶׁר שָׁמַע אַבְרָהָם בְּקֹלִי וַיִּשְׁמֹר מִשְׁמַרְתִּי מִצְוֹתַי חֻקּוֹתַי וְתוֹרֹתָי. Rather, the idea is that Avraham is wholehearted in following Hashem in every sort of command Hashem has or may issue. The duplication with near synonyms, then, does not delineate specific actions, but rather any action under and between each of the terms listed.

-----------------
Footnote:
* Here I am very free and liberal in interpreting Ibn Caspi, so as a reader, perhaps be more cautious.

Did Avraham serve the milk with the meat, or did he serve them separately?

Summary: The gemara, Chizkuni, Daas Zekeinim, and Rav Chaim Kanievsky make some interesting diyukim. Plus, how I would understand the gemara in Bava Metzia. Did the Avos keep the Torah?

Post: Towards the start of Vayera, we read:

8. And he took cream and milk and the calf that he had prepared, and he placed [them] before them, and he was standing over them under the tree, and they ate.

ח. וַיִּקַּח חֶמְאָה וְחָלָב וּבֶן הַבָּקָר אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה וַיִּתֵּן לִפְנֵיהֶם וְהוּא עֹמֵד עֲלֵיהֶם תַּחַת הָעֵץ וַיֹּאכֵלוּ:

Chizkuni, in considering the pasuk, sees a hint to the idea that one should eat cheese before meat but not  meat before cheese:

ויקח חמאה
 וחלב • רבנן אמרי אפי׳ פת הביא לפניהם ומה אם
דברים שלא אמר להם הביא לפניהם דברים שאמר
 להם על אחת כמם וכמה ואע״פ שאין ראיה לדבר
 לאכול גבינה קודם בשר ולא בשר קודם גבינה זכר
 לדבר ויקח חמאה וחלב והדר ובן הבקר :

"And though there is no proof to the matter, to eat cheese before meat and not meat before cheese, there is a hint / zecher to the matter: 'And he took ghee and milk', and then, after it, 'and the bullock'.

Then, a bit later, Chizkuni says:

ויאכלו• מצא באגדה שאכלו וזהו
 ששנו רבותינו  שאמר להם הקב"ה  למלאכים תינוק
 הגמול בבית ישראל משמרה יותר מכם שאכלתם בשר
 בחלב

"And they ate: We find in the aggada that they [indeed] ate. And this is what the Rabbi's taught, that Hashem said to the angels, a weaned child in an Israelite house keeps more than you, for you are meat with milk."

That does not mean that he endorses it as a matter of peshat. And there is this tension between the midrashic assumption of Avraham keeping all the mitzvos, on the one hand, and the angels having violated basar bechalav, on the other. Chizkuni did not mention Avraham keeping away from basar bechalav, but he did interpret the pasuk as a zecher to the proper way of eating cheese and meat, with the cheese first.


In a comment on a previous parshablog post, Bluke wrote:

Take a look at the Daas Zekainim at the beginning of Vayera. He has a fascinating explanation of what Chazal meant when they said Avraham kept even Eruv Tavshilin. He says it means that Avraham served the malachim first milk then meat, explaining the words literally that he know how to arrange the order of the food so that they would not violate an issur.

That is, eruv (mixing) of tavshilin (dishes). You can read the Daas Zekeinim here:

"ויקח חמאה וחלב: this teaches that he fed them meat which was basar vechalav; and when Hashem wished to give the Torah to Israel, the angels said, 'give Your glory to the Heavens.' He said to them, 'it is written in the Torah: thou shalt not seethe a kid in its mother's milk, and you, when you descended below, ate basar bechalav, as it written ויקח חמאה וחלב.' Immediately they admitted to Hashem, and this is what is written in parashat Ki Tisa, כי על פי הדברים האלה כרתי, and is written above from it לא תבשל גדי בחלב אמו.


And this midrash contradicts another midrash, that Avraham Avinu kept even eruvei tavshilin, which should be explained as dishes which are combined, that he did not eat basar bechalav, nor even basar and afterwards chalav, but rather chalav and afterwards basar, for it is written  ויקח חמאה וחלב and then ובן הבקר אשר עשה. And so as well explains Rashi, 

and the calf that he had prepared: that he had prepared. Each one that he prepared, he took and brought before them. — [from B.M. 86b]

ובן הבקר אשר עשה: אשר תקן, קמא קמא שתקן, אמטי ואייתי קמייהו:

"

Baruch shekivanti regarding the conflicting tendencies of these two midrashim.

In Taama deKra, Rav Chaim Kanievsky writes:

ויקח חמאה וחלב ובן הבקר, במדרש
 תהלים פ״ח אמרו שהקב״ה אמר למלה״ש איך
 אתם רוצים את התורה הרי אכלתם בשר בחלב
 אצל אברהם וכבר הקשו דהא חלב ואח״כ בשר
 מותר עי׳ חזקוני וי״ל ע״פ הגמ׳  ב״מ פ״ו ב׳
 דפריך אהא דאמר שם ששחט ג׳ בהמות והכתיב
 ובן הבקר אשר עשה דמשמע חד  ומשני דקמא
 קמא דמטיא אייתי לקמייהו א״כ מדכתיב ויקח
 חמאה וחלב ובן הבקר אשר עשה ויתן לפניהם
 מוכח דהביא שלשתן יחד ואם נימא שלא אכלו
 יחד רק בתחלה החלב ואח״כ הבשר א׳׳כ למה
 מיהר להביא לפניהם הבקר מיד הרי בלא״ה לא
 אכלוהו מיד וע״כ שאכלוהו יחד.

"In the Midrash of Tehillim, p. 8, they say that Hashem said to the ministering angels: how can you want the Torah? Behold you ate basar bechalav by Avraham. 


And they have already asked that behold chalav and afterwards basar is permitted. See the Chizkuni. And there is to answer based on the gemara in Bava Metzia 86b, that they ask upon that he [=Avraham] slaughtered three animals. But, it is written  ובן הבקר אשר עשה, which implies one. And they answer that each one as it was ready they brought before them. If so, since it is written ויקח  חמאה וחלב ובן הבקר אשר עשה ויתן לפניהם, it is evidence that he brought the three of them together. {Josh: I think by the three of them, he does not the three cows, but rather the butter, milk, and meat.} And if you say that they did not eat all three together, but rather, at first the milk and afterwards the meat, if so, why did he rush to bring them the bullock [=meat] immediately? Behold that without this {rushing} they would not have eaten immediately. And perforce, they ate them together."

I am not sure I understand Rav Kanievsky's diyuk into the gemara -- is he contradicting the Chizkuni? --  but I will note that putting meat and dairy on the table together would be a violation by Avraham Avinu.

The gemara in question is here:

And Abraham ran unto the herd and fetched a calf, tender and good. Rab said: 'A calf', means one; 'tender' — two; and 'good' — three. But perhaps it [all means] one, as people say, a tender and good [calf]? — If so, Scripture should have written, [a calf] tender, good; why 'and' good? This proves that it is for exegesis.¹²  Then perhaps it means two?¹³  — Since 'good' is for exegesis, 'tender' [too] is for the same purpose. Rabbah b. 'Ulla — others say, R. Hoshaia — and others again Say, R. Nathan son of R. Hoshaia objected: And he gave unto a young man; and he hasted to dress it?¹⁴  — He gave each to one young man. [But is it not written] And he took butter and milk, and the calf which he had dressed, and set it before them?¹⁵  — [This means,] each, as soon as it was ready, was brought before them. But why three? Would not one have sufficed? — R. Hanan b. Raba said: In order to offer them three tongues with mustard.¹⁶

When the gemara discusses the giving to the young man, the singular is used. The purpose of citing the hastening to dress it is not that haste was necessary, but that he hastened to dress it, not them. And then it gives a teretz that it is distributive to each in turn.

But then the gemara says

 each, as soon as it was ready, was brought before them.

And this is the same thing Rashi on our pasuk in Chumash says.

What is each? Each calf or each dish? The Daas Zekeinim brought this Rashi as evidence that each dish -- the butter, the milk, then the calf -- was brought out in turn, thus proving that he kept from eruv tavshilin.

But that does not seem to be the case. Rather, it is like Rashi says on the gemara:
קמא קמא דמטאי - ראשון שמגיע לאכול שנגמר בישולו:

Each one that finished its cooking he brought forth. So it is speaking about the three calves. And each one, as it finished its cooking, was brought forth.

To explain the gemara a bit better -- the way I would understand it, more or less -- they had previously dismissed "and he hasted to dress it", לַעֲשׂוֹת אֹתוֹ, as being the preparation each young man had performed on the calf assigned to him. But if so, when it came to the actual meal, it is stated וּבֶן הַבָּקָר אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה, such that only one was brought. And it is the same asiyah as before, and yet only one is mentioned. Therefore, they answer that it is not the same asiyah as before. The asiyah from before was perhaps the slaughter. This was the cooking, done by Avraham Avinu. And only one was made at this point.

This seems, then, to be Rav Chaim Kanievsky's diyuk. Why not wait to bring all three? The answer is that these were indeed all served at once. And if so, they ate basar bechalav. If so, is this not a contradiction in midrashim? Sure, but that is allowed. Or else, this is a remez for proper action for us.

Though it is a nice diyuk, I don't think I agree. I would interpret the last statement of the gemara in a slightly different way. Why is asher asah in the singular?  וּבֶן הַבָּקָר אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה means "and [each single] calf, as it was made". So it is not referring to only the first calf, but to all three calves in turn. And asher asah means as it was made. So no diyuk needs to be made that it was all served together, the milk and butter and cow tongue. In terms of the point in hurrying to bring it out as prepared, perhaps to serve it at its freshest, hot off the grill. Or that these were courses, and so others were finishing their courses, but he still gave the main course as soon as it was ready for each.

How does Rashi interpret it, as each calf or only the first? I think that Rashi on the gemara is not like me -- ראשון, he says.

It depends on how one interprets קמא קמא, I suppose. Consider the following examples. From Bava Batra 27b:
רבי אליעזר מתיר בכדי שתהא עגלה מהלכת וטעונה אבנים רבי יוחנן אמר אפילו תימא רבנן התם זימנין דמפחית ולאו אדעתיה אבל הכא קמא קמא קא קייץ ליה


 For we learnt: 'A cavity must not be made under a public thoroughfare, nor pits, ditches, or caves. R. Eliezer says it is permissible if the covering is sufficient to bear a moving cart laden with stones.'¹⁷  R. Johanan said: You may even say that the Rabbis [of that Mishnah] also concur [with the ruling here]. For there they prohibit because the cover may give way unexpectedly, but here every branch can be cut down as it grows.¹⁸

Here it means each branch as it comes into play.

And Bava Batra 97a:
לא צריכא שתמדו במי גשמים וכיון דקא שקיל ורמי להו למנא אחשבינהו לא צריכא שנתמד מאליו וכיון דקא נגיד קמא קמא אחשבינהו 
It is required [in the case] where the Tamad was made without the aid of human effort.²¹  But since he draws out [the infusions] one after the other,²²  [does he not, thereby,] reveal his intention [of using them]? 

and Bava Batra 87a:
ואי ס"ד כור בשלשים סאה בסלע אני מוכר לך ראשון ראשון קנה ה"נ קמא קמא מיפסק פסק ואסור להנות הימנו

Now, if you are of the opinion that [if the seller said]. 'I sell you a kor for thirty, [each] se'ah for a sela', '[the buyer] acquires possession of every se'ah as it is measured out, here also, [since mention was made of a 'denarius a day'] every day that has passed⁴  [should have been regarded as] cut off⁵  [from the other days of the period that follow] and it should, [therefore], be forbidden to derive any benefit from it.⁶  

and Gittin 12a:
והשתא נמי תיסגי לך בלא העדפה הקדש גופיה ניחא לי' כי היכי דלשבח עבדיה עושה ופורע קמא קמא קדיש ליה בפחות פחות משוה פרוטה הכי נמי
The Sanctuary itself prefers this, so that its slave should be in good condition. You say that he works and pays from his earnings. How can he do this, seeing that every penny as he earns it becomes sanctified?¹  — [He keeps on paying his earnings] before they amount to a perutah.²  

There are counterexamples. Thus, in Bava Metzia 26a and Pesachim 71, we have:
ירושלים עשויין להתכבד בכל יום אלמא אמרי' קמאי קמאי אזלי ליה והני אחריני נינהו הכא נמי נימא קמא קמא אזיל
 Because the streets of Jerusalem⁸  were swept daily. This proves that we assume: the earlier [losses] have gone, and these [coins] are different ones.  So here too, the earlier [deposits] have gone, and these belong to the last [tenant]?⁹ 

Here we are talking about only one set of coins, rather than continuous action. But one could still read this as that deposit, or dropped coins, has gone. And so this too can be read as continuous action, rather than just the first.

My inclination is to read this into the gemara regardless of whether Rashi agrees.

Ibn Janach on וְעָשְׂתָה אֶת צִפָּרְנֶיהָ

Summary: as well as Chizkuni, Shadal, Ibn Caspi, and my own thoughts. It could be cutting, growing, or it could be that we don't have enough background knowledge (from cultural setting, rather than from psukim) to make an informed decision.

Post: There is a famous machlokes as to whether וְעָשְׂתָה אֶת צִפָּרְנֶיהָ means that the eshet yefat toar should grow her nails or cut her nails. Rashi endorses the interpretation which is accordance with halacha. Thus:

12. You shall bring her into your home, and she shall shave her head and let her nails grow.		יב. וַהֲבֵאתָהּ אֶל תּוֹךְ בֵּיתֶךָ וְגִלְּחָה אֶת רֹאשָׁהּ וְעָשְׂתָה אֶת צִפָּרְנֶיהָ:
		ועשתה את צפרניה: תגדלם כדי שתתנוול:

"She should grow them long, so that she should become disgusting."

But Rabbi Yonah Ibn Janach has an interesting comment:

"She should cut; in parallel to וְגִלְּחָה אֶת רֹאשָׁהּ. And in the Talmud (Yevamot 38), it is a dispute between Rabbi Eliezer who says she should cut and Rabbi Akiva who said that she should grow it. And the halacha is like Rabbi Akiva."

Yet, the halacha being like Rabbi Akiva does not stand in the way of Ibn Janach saying the reverse, based on internal textual evidence. Yes, Rashi does this as well, citing a midrash which is more in line with peshat even though the halacha is different. But as far as I know, he never explicitly rejects the halachic interpretation, saying it is halacha while endorsing the reverse. Yet here Ibn Janach explicitly mentions that the halacha is not like the opinion he selects. He might subscribe to some idea of halacha superseding peshat, but I don't know enough about Ibn Janach to say for sure.

Chizkuni arrives at the same conclusion, citing other evidence for asiyah referring to cutting. Namely, by Mepiboshet -- “he had not done his mustache and had not done his feet {=toenails}”. Presumably, this would refer to cutting the toenails, as something to do or neglect to do, just like his mustache. He notes that this is one side of the machlokes, but does not note that the halacha is like the other side.

Indeed, this selection of Rabbi Eliezer over Rabbi Akiva is well manifest; the explicit mention of contrary halacha was just something I found interesting.

Shadal has a rather wonderful statement of "I don't know." This is a mark of precision, to know what you do not know. Plus, it is a statement that perhaps others do not know either. Shadal writes:

 ולשון ועשתה את צפרניה אין ספק שענינו תיקון. ואנחנו לא נדע מנהג הימים ההם, ואולי תיקון הצפרנים לאבלות הוא הוא גידולן, שאם היה מנהג האבלים לגדל צפרניהם, גידולן זהו תיקונן.

"And the language of וְעָשְׂתָה אֶת צִפָּרְנֶיהָ, there is no doubt that its meaning is 'fixing'. But we don't know the custom of those days. And perhaps the 'fixing' of fingernails for mourning was their growing. For if the custom of mourners was to grow their fingernails, their growing was their fixing."

This overcomes any prooftext from Mepiboshet, since 'do' means different things in different contexts.

On the other hand, I don't think that cutting the hair necessarily has to do with the custom of mourners. They may grow their hair long. Rather, consider Yosef leaving the pit, where his hair was cut (not necessarily shaved) before seeing Pharaoh. If so, maybe this is a matter of preparation before her marriage, so that she does not enter as a captive of war, but a normal woman who has had chance to recover from the trauma and has full rights as a wife (as the pesukim indeed continue). The question might then be whether trimming the nails or letting them grow is a sign of beauty. I would guess that trimming would be -- a manicure -- since why should we assume that they would be trim at the time she was captured.

Ibn Caspi takes it as a sort of purification ritual. She removes all connection to her old life. Her hair, she shaves off. So too, she trims her fingernails. And he says, by way of stress, that 'if she could remove one of her limbs it would be a mitzvah -- and the intent in this is that there is an impression in her soul that she is like another woman, and that she should forget her entire father's household and her relatives.' This naturally leads into her mourning her father and mother for a month.

A follow-up to 'After you, or after them'

Summary: A follow-up to a 2009 post on Ekev about how Chizkuni makes a derasha assuming a heh rather than a kaf. Now, considering evidence from the Septuagint and from Vetus Testamentum.

Post: First read the previous post. Should the words be בְּרָדְפָם אַחֲרֵיכֶם or בְּרָדְפָם אַחֲרֵיהם? The Septuagint supports our Masoretic text:

4 καὶ ὅσα ἐποίησε τὴν δύναμιν τῶν Αἰγυπτίων, τὰ ἅρματα αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἵππον αὐτῶν, καὶ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν, ὡς ἐπέκλυσε τὸ ὕδωρ τῆς θαλάσσης τῆς ἐρυθρᾶς ἐπὶ προσώπου αὐτῶν καταδιωκόντων αὐτῶν ἐκ τῶν ὀπίσω ὑμῶν καὶ ἀπώλεσεν αὐτοὺς Κύριος ἕως τῆς σήμερον ἡμέρας, 

4 and what he did to the host of the Egyptians, and to their chariots, and their cavalry, and their host; how he made the water of the Red Sea to overwhelm the face of them as they pursued after you, and the Lord destroyed them until this day;

So too, the Samaritan text, as we can see in Vetus Testamentum. However, it turns out that there are Masoretic variant texts which corresponds to the midrash mentioned by Chizkuni and Radak. From the Hebrew variants listed in Vetus Testamentum:

This would, perhaps, support the idea that this is a derasha made on a variant text, rather than other proposed answers.

The extra vav that wasn't

Summary: As it appears in Rashi, Ibn Ezra, and Chizkuni. See also this earlier post, by the same title.

Post: There is a masoretically troubling word in parashat Terumah. In Shemot 25:22, we read:

22. I will arrange My meetings with you there, and I will speak with you from atop the ark cover from between the two cherubim that are upon the Ark of the Testimony, all that I will command you unto the children of Israel.

כב. וְנוֹעַדְתִּי לְךָ שָׁם וְדִבַּרְתִּי אִתְּךָ מֵעַל הַכַּפֹּרֶת מִבֵּין שְׁנֵי הַכְּרֻבִים אֲשֶׁר עַל אֲרֹן הָעֵדֻת אֵת כָּל אֲשֶׁר אֲצַוֶּה אוֹתְךָ אֶל בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל:

Rashi comments on this:

"and all that I command you unto the children of Israel" -- behold this vav is extra and extraneous, and there are many like it in Scriptures. And so shall you interpret: And that which I speak with you there, it is all that I command you to the children of Israel.		ואת כל אשר אצוה אותך אל בני ישראל: הרי וי"ו זו יתירה וטפלה, וכמוהו הרבה במקרא, וכה תפתר ואת אשר אדבר עמך שם, את כל אשר אצוה אותך אל בני ישראל הוא:

So too, Ibn Ezra notes the presence of this extra vav:
וטעם וי"ו ואת כל אשר אצוה. ככה הוא. 

Chizkuni also seems to have, and explain, this extra vav. While this printing omits the vav in the citation (three lines from the bottom):

This one does not:

"And all that I command" -- The explanation is: and I will speak with you from atop the kapores, and I will also speak to you there all that I command you.

There is also the Septuagint text which seems like it might be based a vav there:
21 καὶ γνωσθήσομαί σοι ἐκεῖθεν καὶ λαλήσω σοι ἄνωθεν τοῦ ἱλαστηρίου ἀνὰ μέσον τῶν δύο Χερουβὶμ τῶν ὄντων ἐπὶ τῆς κιβωτοῦ τοῦ μαρτυρίου καὶ κατὰ πάντα, ὅσα ἐὰν ἐντείλωμαί σοι πρὸς τοὺς υἱοὺς ᾿Ισραήλ.
22 And I will make myself known to thee from thence, and I will speak to thee above the propitiatory between the two cherubs, which are upon the ark of testimony, even in all things which I shall charge thee concerning the children of Israel. 

While I don't know of any masoretic note or codex which supports this ve'et, Vetus Testamentum lists a number of texts which have the vav in place:

Minchas Shai writes:

"et kol asher -- I am astonished at three gedolei haDor, who are great scholars, Ibn Ezra, Rashi and Chizkuni, who explain ve'et kol asher with a vav, as if such was written in their sefarim. And we have already investigated this matter, and we found it in the mesora rabbata that it places this pasuk among those three which have a command 'et kol asher'. And two of those are: et kol asher anochi metzaveh etchem of parshat Re'eh, and et kol asher atzavenu of Shoftim, and in those as well, it was written without a vav. And there is no room for argument. And so writes the Rav Eliyahu Mizrachi upon Rashi -- 'I have searched in many sifrei Torah and I have not found this."

But, while Mizrachi did not find it in any Sifrei Torah, we saw that the author of Vetus Testamentum did find a number of sefarim which had this reading. Also, Masoretic notes were composed on the basis of looking at texts, so this just demonstrates a masoretic tradition based on the same texts we have (and based on the Leningrad codex, etc.). Also, I would point out that this is an instance in which the principle of lectio difficilior  works against our Masoretic text. It is stranger, on the surface, to have the vav, yet it can work out grammatically, as Rashi and Chizkuni explain.

After writing this, I found Rabbi Dr. Shnayer Leiman's article on this: "Was Rashi's Torah Scroll Flawed?". I see that I hit on many of the same points, but he also delves deeper, and e.g. considers Chavel's suggestion that it is about אֶל בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, the el is written without a vav, instead of ve'el. He also considers many variant manuscripts and printings that exist. His conclusion, though, is that Rashi's sefer Torah indeed had that extra vav.

As easy as falling off a ladder, part ii of ii

Summary: Further analyses of the midrash of Divine justice presented by Rashi. If the meidiz was chayiv hereg, why should someone falling on him help, when it is more akin to sekilah?

Post:  As I mentioned in my previous post on this subject, a pasuk in Mishpatim states:

13. But one who did not stalk [him], but God brought [it] about into his hand, I will make a place for you to which he shall flee.

יג. וַאֲשֶׁר לֹא צָדָה וְהָאֱ־לֹהִים אִנָּה לְיָדוֹ וְשַׂמְתִּי לְךָ מָקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יָנוּס שָׁמָּה:

and Rashi writes:

		והא-להים אנה לידו: זימן לידו, לשון לא תאונה אליך רעה (תהלים צא י), לא יאונה לצדיק כל און (משלי יב כא), מתאנה הוא לי (מלכים ב' ה ז), מזדמן למצוא לי עילה:
"but God brought it to his hand" -- and why did this come before him? This is what David said (I Shmuel 24:13) "As saith the proverb of the ancients: Out of the wicked cometh forth wickedness." And the proverb of the ancients is the Torah, which is the proverb of Hashem, who preceded the world. And where did the Torah state "Out of the wicked cometh forth wickedness"? "But God brought it to his hand." In what does the verse speak? Of two people, one who killed by accident and one who killed on purpose, and there were no witnesses to the matter who could testify. This one is then not killed and this one is not exiled. And Hashem appoints them to the same inn. This one who had killed deliberately sits under the ladder, while this one who killed accidentally climbs the ladder, and falls on the one who had killed deliberately and kills him. And witnesses testify on him and render him obligated in exile. Thus, it emerges that the one who killed by accident is exiles and the one who killed deliberately is killed.		והא-להים אנה לידו: ולמה תצא זאת מלפניו, הוא שאמר דוד (שמואל א' כד יג) כאשר יאמר משל הקדמוני מרשעים יצא רשע, ומשל הקדמוני היא התורה, שהיא משל הקב"ה שהוא קדמונו של עולם. והיכן אמרה תורה מרשעים יצא רשע, והא-להים אנה לידו. במה הכתוב מדבר, בשני בני אדם, אחד הרג שוגג ואחד הרג מזיד, ולא היו עדים בדבר שיעידו, זה לא נהרג וזה לא גלה, והקב"ה מזמנן לפונדק אחד, זה שהרג במזיד יושב תחת הסולם, וזה שהרג שוגג עולה בסולם ונופל על זה שהרג במזיד והורגו, ועדים מעידים עליו ומחייבים אותו לגלות, נמצא זה שהרג בשוגג גולה, וזה שהרג במזיד נהרג:

I covered the first of two objections in that post, that Rashi says oleh where halacha and our gemara would seem to insist on yored. See there. But here is a second objection to the details of this Rashi.

This, brought to you courtesy of the Chizkuni.

"Here, Rashi explains that this one who had killed accidentally, etc, -- one needs to say that this one who fell upon his friend was holding a knife and killed him. For if you do not say this, that the death by sword is not fulfilled in him {the meizid}, which he is liable to. And this is specifically when he was descending, for if it was while ascending, he {the shogeg} would not be liable {galus}, which we derive from וַיַּפֵּל עָלָיו. And one would not say that he is {now} liable to two galus-es, for behold, he killed someone who was already {reckoned} dead."

Here is the Taz discussing this idea:

 "and this one who killed deliberately is killed" -- there is a difficulty from that which is stated in Sanhedrin 37b:

תניא א"ר שמעון בן שטח אראה בנחמה אם לא ראיתי אחד שרץ אחר חבירו לחורבה ורצתי אחריו וראיתי סייף בידו ודמו מטפטף והרוג מפרפר ואמרתי לו רשע מי הרגו לזה או אני או אתה אבל מה אעשה שאין דמך מסור בידי שהרי אמרה תורה (דברים יז, ו) על פי שנים עדים יומת המת היודע מחשבות יפרע מאותו האיש שהרג את חבירו אמרו לא זזו משם עד שבא נחש והכישו ומת והאי בר נחש הוא והאמר רב יוסף וכן תני דבי חזקיה מיום שחרב בית המקדש אף על פי שבטלה סנהדרי ארבע מיתות לא בטלו לא בטלו והא בטלו אלא דין ארבע מיתות לא בטלו מי שנתחייב סקילה או נופל מן הגג או חיה דורסתו מי שנתחייב שריפה או נופל בדליקה או נחש מכישו מי שנתחייב הריגה או נמסר למלכות או ליסטין באין עליו מי שנתחייב חנק או טובע בנהר או מת בסרונכי אמרי ההוא חטא אחריתי הוה ביה דאמר מר מי שנתחייב שתי מיתות ב"ד נידון בחמורה:

Or, in English:

It has been taught: R. Simeon b. Shatah said: May I never see comfort⁶  if I did not see a man pursuing his fellow into a ruin, and when I ran after him and saw him, sword in hand with blood dripping from it, and the murdered man writhing, I exclaimed to him: Wicked man, who slew this man? It is either you or I!⁷  But what can I do, since thy blood [i.e., life] does not rest in my hands, for it is written in the Torah, At the mouth of two witnesses etc., shall he that is to die be put to death?⁸  May he who knows one's thoughts exact vengeance from him who slew his fellow! It is related that before they moved from the place a serpent came and bit him [the murderer] so that he died.

But should this man [have died] through a serpent? Did not R. Joseph say, and so too it was taught in the school of Hezekiah: From the day the Temple was destroyed, although the Sanhedrin was abolished, the four modes of execution were not abolished? They were not abolished, [you say,] but surely they were! — But the law of the four modes of execution was not abolished:⁹  He who is worthy of stoning either falls from the roof,¹⁰  or is trampled to death by a wild beast; he who merits burning either falls into the fire or is bitten by a serpent;¹¹  he who is worthy of decapitation is either delivered to the [gentile] Government¹²  or brigands attack him; he who is worthy of strangulation is either drowned in a river or dies of suffocation?¹³  — I will tell you: that man was guilty of another crime,¹⁴  for a Master said: One who incurs two death penalties imposed by Beth din is executed by the severer.¹⁵

If so, this one who killed deliberately, his judgement should be via the sword, so why was he judged with this one falling upon him, which is equivalent of stoning? For this is like casting stones upon him, which is stoning, even without pushing him from a height of two heights, as I mentioned in parashat Yitro on the verse {Shemot 19:13}:

יג  לֹא-תִגַּע בּוֹ יָד, כִּי-סָקוֹל יִסָּקֵל אוֹ-יָרֹה יִיָּרֶה--אִם-בְּהֵמָה אִם-אִישׁ, לֹא יִחְיֶה; בִּמְשֹׁךְ, הַיֹּבֵל, הֵמָּה, יַעֲלוּ בָהָר.

13 no hand shall touch him, but he shall surely be stoned, or shot through; whether it be beast or man, it shall not live; when the ram's horn soundeth long, they shall come up to the mount.'

And Chizkuni wrote that in truth it is dealing here in the case that the one who fell on him was holding a knife in his hand and pierced him. Thus, this was like his correct judgement, with a sword. And this has no basis and hint!


And it appears to me to analyze further, why did the "proverb of the ancients" deal with two murderers where their judgement was carried out by way of falling from the ladder? Rather, it is apparent that this, as well, is like the gemara that I mentioned. That just like in that case, that it was not known that this murderer had to him another sin, but we say that so it was, since we see that his death was more stringent that was appropriate to him, which is burning, so too here absolutely in this "proverb of the ancients", that from the actions of these wicked -- that this one fell on this one and the punishment of the one below is greater than what was appropriate to him -- namely, stoning -- perforce 'evil comes out' -- to explain, it becomes clear that there was another wickedness, which is the other sin which is even more stringent. (And now, all is settle, with the aid of heaven.)



Frankly, both the Chizkuni and the Taz are rather far-fetched. Chizkuni, because of the objection that the Taz raised, that there is no hint at all that the fellow was holding a knife, and so the clear and simple implication of the gemara is that the fellow was slain because of the impact of the man falling upon him. The Taz is far-fetched because of the way he is kvetching the gemara. Just as the point of the shogeg falling when there are witnesses was so that the shogeg is punished for the previous sin which was mentioned, so too the point of the meizid being fallen upon and thus slain was as punishment for the sin which the gemara explicitly mentions. Yes, there is a hidden sin, but this hidden sin is one which is revealed to the reader of the parable, so that he should understand it. To posit a second unmentioned sin, which the typical reader would not intuit, except by application of the principle, unmentioned in this gemara, of Rav Yosef and the academy of Chizkiyah, is extremely דוחק, in my estimation.

I will bring up two further points. While it is true that the gemara in Sanhedrin does teich up Shimon ben Shetach's statement in this manner, the parallel Yerushalmi leaves his statement unadorned and unmodified. They leave it, and understand it, kifshuto.

The Yerushami Sanhedrin 23b:

דף כג, ב פרק ד הלכה ט גמרא  כיצד מאומד.  לא תאמרו ראינוהו רודף אחריו וסייף בידו.  נכנס לחורבה אחריו נכנסנו אחריו ומצאנוהו הרוג ראינוהו יוצא והסייף מטפטפת דם.  אמר ר' שמעון בן שטח אראה בנחמה אם לא ראיתי רודף אחר אחד נכנס לחורבה נכנסתי אחריו ומצאתיו הרוג וזה יוצא וסייף מנטף דם אמרתי לו אראה בנחמה שזה הרגו אבל מה אעשה שאין דמך מסור בידי אלא היודע מחשבות יפרע מאותו האיש.  לא הספיק לצאת משם עד שהכישו נחש ומת.  

I would also add the famous Mishna in Avos, about Hillel Hazaken:

אף הוא ראה גלגולת אחת שצפה על פני המים אמר לה על דאטפת אטפוך ומטיפיך יטופון 

Additionally, he (Hillel) saw a skull floating on the surface of the water. He said to it: Because you drowned [another] you were drowned. And the those who drowned you will, in the end, be drowned themselves.

Now, I am not going to take this allegorically, but rather according to its straightforward sense, literally. Someone who drowned another is not liable to drowning. Rather, he would be liable to death by sword. This is the case of meizid, as above. Yet, middah keneged middah kicks in, which is why this happened to him. And so too to those who drowned this fellow. One could give the same forced teretz as the Taz, that there was some undisclosed other sin for which he merited drowning (which corresponds to chenek, strangulation). But this would be at odds with Hillel Hazaken's explicit statement that על דאטפת אטפוך, because you drowned someone, you were drowned.

We now have three Tannaitic statements which don't accord with this statement of Rav Yosef and the academy of Chizkiyah. That we have questions is OK. We are allowed to wonder at how these can be in accord. But that does not mean that one should harmonize them, or that such harmonizations take us closer or more distant to the true intent of the statements.

I would posit one of the following two answers.

(1) There are differing opinions within Chazal, and one shouldn't harmonize them. That is Hillel HaZaken, Shimon ben Shetach, and the author of the present midrash about the allegory maintain that there is Divine justice, but not that it accords with the punishment which would have been meted out by Bet Din. Hillel Hazaken's focus was on punishment via middah keneged middah. In the incident with Shimon ben Shetach, the point was that a murderer doesn't go unpunished, and Hashem has many agents, including this snake. In the incident in the allegory, the point is that the deliberate murderer gets death and the accidental one gets exile, but not specifically that death must accord with what the beis din would mete out.

Rav Yosef's statement is along the same line, that even though there is no beis din around today that can mete out the punishment, don't think that there is no justice nowadays. Hashem steps into this breach. The specific methods illustrate how there still is Someone carrying out the judgment the Sanhedrin would have given, and thus gives examples of deaths roughly according to the four executions of beis din. There is similar motivation, but that does not mean that they would agree. In saying this, I am arguing with the setama di-gemara, which often tries to harmonize statements of Chazal, even where it shouldn't.

(2) If one were to harmonize, one could harmonize in the following manner, again against the setama di-gemara of the Bavli: Rav Yosef was speaking about Hashem stepping into the breach to impose the four methods of execution, where the breach was caused by the abolishment of the Sanhedrin. He was not speaking of general punishment for murderers, etc., where the Sanhedrin would not have convicted the fellow anyway. For example, someone violates Shabbos in private. There is no hasraah, there are no witnesses. Would the Sanhedrin convict and execute him? Obviously not. But Rav Yosef's statement never covered such a case, just the case where were the Sanhedrin around, with power to execute, they would have done so.

The case of Shimon ben Shetach, where there was only circumstantial evidence, this was when the Sanhedrin was still around. They would not have been able to carry out the sentence because of the lack of two witnesses, as Shimon ben Shetach explicitly says. Yet he prayed, and cursed this fellow. Perhaps as a direct result, Hashem sent his agent, a snake, and slew the murderer. But this was for the sin Shimon ben Shetach observed, not for a different, unobserved and unspoken (in the Tosefta, and in the Yerushalmi) sin. This was not taking over for the Sanhedrin, because even the Sanhedrin, which was present, could not have convicted.

So too the case of Hillel Hazakein. This is middah keneged middah, but there is no evidence that any of these drownings were observed by witnesses. So too in the allegory under discussion. There were no witnesses. Yes, the accidental murderer got what was coming to him, but that might be due a cosmic guilt and debt. That does not mean that all has to happen as the Sanhedrin would carry it out, since the Sanhedrin is present but would be unable to convict anyway.

I would prefer the first answer to the second.

To my mind, this has a lot in common with part i of "Falling off a ladder". In both instances, the attempt was to make the midrash accord to certain preconceived notions, and to the details of halacha. And then, a terutz was offered which in fact takes us further from the original intent. It is better to appreciate the midrash on its own, and absorb the underlying message, rather than get caught up in irrelevant details.