Erecting Partitions on Airplanes

An interesting article up at Yated, online:

Committee Working to Protect Public from In-Flight Movies Sends Delegation to HaRav Kanievsky

A delegation representing the Rabbinical Committee for Transportation Matters was received by HaRav Chaim Kanievsky shlita at his home and received his blessings for success in the efforts to protect travelers from immodest entertainment on airplanes.

During the visit the delegation demonstrated their new folding mechitzoh designed to hide the main cabin screens from view in order to protect people from seeing inappropriate images.

After erecting the mechitzoh — which can be folded to 25 cm (10 inches) — on HaRav Kanievsky's table, the delegation members asked whether it appeared bizarre and would be liable to cause chilul Hashem, but he allayed their concerns, saying "it's a kiddush Hashem!"

They also asked him about non-Jewish travelers sitting behind them who complain the mechitzoh obstructs their view of the screen, but HaRav Kanievsky dismissed these concerns as well.

At the end of their visit HaRav Kanievsky said he was pleased with the solution the delegation presented to improve modesty on airplanes and blessed them for success. For information on flights without movies and regarding the mechitzoh call

(Note: I see Emes veEmunah already has a post about this.)

I wish they had included me in their committee. I have some brilliant ideas which could be incorporated into the design of this mechitza.

Firstly, the mechitzah is going to have to be up for quite a long period of time, as there are many movies shown on this flight. If the religious passenger is going to be staring at it for so long, we might as well put words of Torah on the mechitza so that the passenger could learn Torah at the same time.

Associated with this, since the flight is so long, the traveler will eventually run out of inspiring words of Torah. The solution would be that instead of constructing a mechitza out of whatever material they are using, construct it out of many pieces of paper. That way, one could always flip to more Torah.

A problem might be the gentile behind him. Forget about the movie -- a gentile should not be taught Torah! The solution, to my mind, is to place the mechitzah on one's lap, and then look down onto it!

Seriously, though, several things bother me about this story.

First and foremost, this seems to be a self-appointed committee. Rather than Rav Kanievsky coming up with this idea, this came from the bottom-up from a bunch of askonim convinced that movies projected on airplanes is a terrible thing. And the specifics of the idea came from them. Of course, once they had a solution, they need Rabbinic approval, so they go around to various gedolim to get "blessings" for their work.

Secondly, there was no satan here -- no devil's advocate. From the accounting, they weakly brought up points people might raise as objections. When something like this is proposed, you need someone actively and forcefully arguing the other side. Someone to say that this is not what the people running the airplane want; that the gentile (or, in fact, Jew) will not only be miffed, but will complain to the flight attendant, who will ask the chareidi to take down his mechitza. That at that point, he will either take it down, in which case there was no blocking, or else he will refuse, at which point he will be tased by a federal marshall, or else kicked off the flight.

I think, furthermore, that to seriously propose this betrays an ignorance of how this will be received, or else a callousness to it. Forget about chillul Hashem, for he says it is a kiddush Hashem. Will this promote shalom, or sinah? And perhaps this will "fly" on El Al flights. On other flights, besides the selfishness of this, I can well imagine that this would frighten other passengers with fears about terrorism. I have to wonder at the grasp of metzius in all this.

Also, while they got this "endorsement," what was left unclear is whether this is obligation, a good idea, or just something acceptable for those who wish to adopt it as a middat chassidut. My impression is that it is the last, but by not being clear, it makes it seem as if the endorsement of this is a psak that one must purchase and utilize one of these mechitzot.

Finally, what concerns me is how this fits into the general theme of insisting on one's own chumras at the expense of other people. It is like being machmir on the shiur of water for netilas yadayim when a poor maidservant is the one who has to shlepp the water from the well. And even by endorsing this in this instance, it encourages to unfortunate general trend.

The Two Events in Yerushalayim

Or, why the Dati Leumi and the heterosexual Chilonim should have marched in the Jerusalem Gay Pride Parade.

I made this point to a lesser extent, and in a different manner, last year. I think the issue of protest or participate comes down to a simple question:

Do you think that as a matter of policy, the sanctity of Jerusalem demands that certain conduct, which is otherwise entirely acceptable in secular society, should not be allowed?

People were objecting to the gay pride parade because homosexuality is assur according to halacha (and according to Christian and Muslim law) and therefore, one should not march in holy Yerushalayim saying "we are homosexuals!"

Belief in a man as deity is avodah zarah in both Judaism and Islam, yet there is an annual march from Jerusalem to Bethlehem.

This is a problem because even religious people have different definitions of religiosity, and whose standards are you going to enforce?

This came to the fore in a celebration the day before the gay pride parade, at the inauguration of the Bridge of Strings. See A Mother In Israel for details, and links. The before and after pictures are really something to see. The the specific choice of the black caps, as opposed to white or colored, was done in protest of this compulsion.

In the before pictures, the girls are dressed as dancers, in stretchy white pants and shirts. In many cases, the shirtsleeves even extended past the elbows. The girl posing on the left is not attempting to be non-tznius, but rather stretching showing flexibility in a dancer's pose. See, for example, this picture which shows other dancers in stretchy clothing in similar poses. For secular Israeli girls, they are extremely tzanua.

But the chareidim threatened to protest unless they dressed more in accordance with chareidi standards. And those standards include making 13-16 year old penuyas cover their hair.

Here is an interesting quote:

“Yes, I was involved in the change and I’m not ashamed of it,” Jerusalem Deputy Mayor Yehoshua Pollak told the paper. “Their costumes offended the general public. I believe that religious people also have the right to attend performances like these, and if this had bothered the Arabs or any other religion, I would have done the same. The change was necessary, and people enjoyed the result very much.”

I do not think this is true to its full extent -- that if religious Muslims said they would protest unless all females were dressed in burqas, he would have similarly caved and made them wear it.

Chareidim see this as similar cause for protest, just as they saw the gay pride parade. And to cite the Daas Torah blog:

I guess you didn't notice the picture that accompanied the article. Furthermore - as with the Parade - there are activities that are not acceptable. To the degree you can protest you have a halachic obligation to protest.

and also

Furthermore for those who live according to halacha - it is being quite lenient to have a public dance performance of young women dancing - even if they are modestly clothed. I am not sure why it should be permitted.

(I responded with a snarky comment about how the Mishna in Taanis states that there were no better days in Israel than when Yom Kippur and Tu BeAv when the chareidim gathered around to protest the eligible Jewish women who would go out and dance in white, in large part so that the eligible Jewish bachurim would see them.)

The matter is not whether "it" "should be permitted according to halacha, but whether in principe it should be permitted in a country which is a free democratic society, rather than a theocracy.

What might distinguish this from the gay pride parade in the minds of religious non-chareidim (and some secular) is that they agree that homosexuality is something they do not want to see promoted, while they may disagree with this particular case of dancers and imposing this specific dress on people.

However, it is a matter of principle that applies across the board. And one should realize what precedent one sets when one tells gay that they cannot march because it offends certain people's religious sensibilities.

After all, many chareidim think that "mehadrin" buses are a religious requirement, even though Rav Shlomo Zalman Aurbach was willing to sit next to a lady on a bus. And see how some are hoping to turn regular buses into de-facto mehadrin buses, and hoping that the new light-rail system will be similarly mehadrin.

It is not that I am in favor of zenus, which mixed seating buses are not. Rather, I am against imposing chumras of one group on an unwilling majority. And I think this is necessary to preserve religious freedom, as well.

Related to this: In England, Muslims are seething because of a postcard showing a puppy sitting on a policeman's cap. And it looks like those in authority are apologizing. Though there, maybe it is just an issue that certain stores choose not to put them up.

Next year, when the gay pride parade in Jerusalem rolls around, perhaps we should have this in mind.

Dueling Chumras

Note: Not halacha lemaaseh, or intended as such. About anything like this, consult your local Orthodox rabbi.

Sometimes the only thing that stops the spread of a chumra is the bounds set by another chumra. This would be because while people are willing to roll over previously acceptable lenient practice, when someone raises the possibility that they are being lenient regarding another din, or another chumra.

I think we can cast as one such example how the stringency of Pesach cleaning up of every tiny crumb much less than a kezayis duels with the requirement not to eat matza on erev Pesach.

The obligation to do away with any chametz -- bal yeraeh / bal yimatzei really applies only to chametz equal to or more than a kezayit. This based on various gemaras which talk about dough in a vessel, or on a wall, and whether it combines to a kezayit which then must be gotten rid of. Indeed, Tur says that based on this, it is only chal on >= a kezayit.
(Other acharonim might argue, but this seems to be correct. And indeed, this seems pashut peshat in the gemara in Pesachim 6b which states
אמר רב הבודק צריך שיבטל מאי טעמא אי נימא משום פירורין הא לא חשיבי
Crumbs which are not chashivei need not be worried about.
)
But Tur notes that the Jews are holy and their accepted practice is to eliminate any chametz, no matter what amount.

There is a separate requirement not to eat chametz, and there, it is even bemashehu, any amount. These two defined requirements are counterintuitive since we would expect the issur achila to be the one with the kezayit and the other with the other shiur, and so people even today confuse them -- which may have led, IMHO, to the stringency of removing every crumb

Because of this adopted stringency, people take a lot of time getting rid of every single crumb from every crevice, and so Pesach cleaning takes much longer than it otherwise might have taken. And once all this effort has been expended, we don't want to bring chametz back into that room, for it is already kosher for Pesach, and we do not want to expend all that effort again.

I remember a year or two back, it was close to Pesach, that is that Pesach was a few days away, and I was by people who did not want to have the meal at home because it would involve dealing with chametz. They discussed buying pizza. But they would not bring the pizza into the home, to be eaten by the table. I noted that they could eat the pizza and throw out any remainders. But they were afraid of crumbs. So a sweep of the linoleum floor would suffice. But they might miss a crumb or two, and did a real thorough job (perhaps mopping, and so on), so this was not feasible. Instead, they ate out at the pizza store. So this is a stringency even in cleaning -- not only will you sweep to get rid of the crumbs which one is not required to get out, but one must be extremely careful in this elimination lest one crumb escape. And rather than doing this again and again, or rather because this effort must be done gradually over time, to maintain this non-required level of absence of chametz, no chametz may enter the house at all.

The pasuk, meanwhile, says that 7 days leaven shall not be found in your house. Not 3 weeks.

I know people who are faced with a dilemma when erev Pesach falls out on Shabbos. You can't eat matza because of another prohibition (to be dealt with in a moment). So it must be challah. But disposal is a problem. So they get a tiny amount of challah, enough to fulfill the obligation, and eat it on the porch. {Update: In fact, to clarify, they do this any Shabbos before Pesach, even if it does not fall on erev Pesach.}

If this was unchecked, I am pretty confident that Jewish practice would have evolved to remove the consumption of chametz, at least in the house, a few weeks before Pesach. For Shabbos, all we need to do is eat matza!

But there is another halachic statement, which expanded into the realm of chumra itself. The gemara states that kol h`aochel matza erev Pesach ke`ilu bo'eil arusaso beveis chamav. (Jackie Mason Achad HaAm Bialik, BTW, has an interesting line about this: "I tried both, and it's not the same.") It is not brought down by the Mechaber but it is by the Rema who prohibits the entirety of the 14th. The Mishneh Berurah notes the minhag not to eat matza from Rosh Chodesh. And elsewhere (unsourced), the minhag has developed not to eat it from Purim. (We might contrast this with the statement shebechol haleilos anu ochelin chametz umatza which might suggest that every night on which we can eat, which is not Pesach, we can eat either chametz or matza.)

So this extension of the halachic requirement blocks any potential imposition of eating (only) matza in the weeks before Pesach. :) Which is a good thing.

11 For a Minyan??

Update: Chaptzem reports on a possible new takkanah in Lakewood requiring 11 for a minyan. I fell for it. I wasn't expecting April Fools jokes until tomorrow.

Heh.

At least I really hope so.

Older post:
Chaptzem reports that Lakewood may implement a takana requiring 11 people for a minyan. I hope this rumor is belated Purim Torah, or a joke in honor of April 1st, tomorrow, or just a nonsense rumor. There is an unfortunate recent trend of taking one or two high-profile anecdotal incidents and making major changes in halacha on their basis, in the direction of chumra. What comes to mind are the new kashrus takkanos on the basis of one or two incidents, never mind the idea of a chezkas kashrus, which is a chazaka which we are allowed to rely upon, not a guarantee of metzius. I am sure that this fellow is not the first person to claim to be Jewish when he is not. Even the gemara records the case of the gentile who pretended to be Jewish, who was trapped by Rabbi Yehuda ben Beseira into asking for the fat-tail, the choicest piece of meat. Yet after this incident, the Talmud does not institute a requirement for 11 people for a minyan.

Even if there is one such individual who does this, this does not mean it is a widespread phenomenon. We can surely still rely on a chazaka that a person is who he says he is. (I have heard of other cases where two gentile shnorrers were taught by other shnorrers to act Jewish, so as to collect money in shuls, and who participated in a minyan.)

Perhaps some additional reason not to worry: The rule is that 9 which looks like 10 is really halachically acceptable, IIRC. But we are not sure if this means scattered, or grouped together, so practically, we never act on it. Perhaps we can say that ten people, and one is not-really Jewish, but everyone thinks he is, is also a case of nine that looks like ten... But I can't even track down the gemara that says this at the moment.

Another problem: We (or rather, they in Lakewood) would no longer be able to use the pasuk "Hoshia es amecha..." to count a minyan. What nice pesukim have eleven words in them?

Pesach: The Prayer For An Edible Matza

While I opposed adopting the minhag of saying a special prayer on Tu BiShvat for a beautiful esrog, for reasons I describe there, I think a nice tefillah that we might adopt is one for an edible matza. While there is no fear nowadays that we will not have a kosher or mehudar esrog available, the situation is not so great for hand-matzot.

Part of the reason is that while we can inspect esrogim, we buy sealed boxes of matzos. So we cannot see that the matzot therein are unburnt. And there is a great likelihood that a matza will get burnt, because they have a chumra deAti liydei kulla, a stringency that leads to a leniency. As Rabbi Tendler notes, nowadays they bake matzas in much hotter ovens than they used to, for fear that it would become chametz. And since the ovens are so hot, they cannot leave it in too long, or else it will get burnt to a crisp. And therefore they bake them in 2000 degree ovens for just 25 seconds. Any longer and the matzah gets burned. To cite an article about this:

"The whole process takes 18 minutes from mixing to baking, no longer. Otherwise, there is a chance the flour will become leavened and start to rise. That's another reason why we poke holes in the rolled-out matzah before it is baked for 25 seconds in a 2,000-degree oven."

Rabbi Tendler is of the opinion that 25 seconds is not long enough to cook the dough inside the matzah, even in such a hot oven. And then they remove it from the oven. So he is of the opinion that such matzahs are likely to be chametz. In the past, they used ovens at a lower temperature for a longer period of time, such that both inside and outside would be baked. And he bakes his own matzahs at this lower temperature.

While I do not hold by this shitta of Rabbi Tendler and in fact I eat these hand-matzahs (though I do not know enough about the scientific process of baking and chimmutz to know one way or the other), it is a good example of how people in all ignorance, yet well meaning, set out to increase the chumra level of something but actually end up with a kullah, or a michshol.

At any rate, in such a hot oven, of course a bunch of matzas will get burned. We've encountered cases in the past in which an expensive box of matzas had maybe one or two that were not charred, or had burn holes, and did not taste good at all, or were broken. I am not making a halachic statement about this (all sorts of factors can come into play), but on a conceptual level, it is hard to see how this is not theft and cheating one's customers.

The solution may be to buy and use SoftMatzas, like I did last year, but more about this in a different post, bli neder.

At any rate, 30 days before the chag of Pesach, when we start learning the halochot thereof and such that it is in our minds, it might be a good idea to address Hashem and ask for kosher, tasty, and non-chometz-dikke matzas. You can say this in your own words, or you can use the following nusach, based on the nusach about esrogim, and tell people you got it from the Ri me-"Josh."

So, say the following on Purim:

May it be Your Will Hashem our God, and the God of our forefathers, that You bless all of the matzah ovens to send out their matzot at the proper time, and that they shall send out matzot that are good, nice, beautiful, and clean from all cracks, char, chametz and folds, and that they shall be complete and they should not have any deficiencies. May these matzot be available for us and for all of Israel in every place that they are, in order to fulfill the mitzvah of eating matzah on the Holiday of Pesach, that shall come to us with good life, and with peace, as You have written in Your Torah by way of Moshe, Your servant, "Seven days shall ye eat unleavened bread." (Shemot 12:15)

The Sheitel Display

Note: I know nothing. These are just my musings.

So demonstrating the power of the "Army of Davids," DovBear put out a request that someone take a photo of the offending store display, and then posted the picture up. (See DovBear's post here.) I said I would put the picture on the blog as a show of solidarity with those who think that at the very least one should know something about the contents of the picture before making pronouncements of condemnation of it. Having seen it, I do not believe that it is pritzus, but in consideration to any reader who is worried about seeing it, I placed it towards the end of this post, so you can stop reading here. (I would encourage seeing the pictures, nonetheless.)

Seeing the picture is useful, for it helps put into perspective the issue, and to perhaps understand the dynamic in play here. It also prevents misunderstanding of what is the metizius. Over Shabbos, some people I discussed it with were sure that the women were dressed in revealing clothing, based on the description of it as pritzus.

Firstly, see the actual letter, at YeshivaWorld. Here is a link to the image. This store owner had a display of wigs, both on Styrofoam heads and in a series of color photographs. These are common in certain parts. In fact, in Kew Gardens Hills we have a store that I would say has equivalent photographs. However, this store is opposite Chaim Berlin. Actually, one thing you can see in the picture below is the reflection of the business opposite it, which is a funeral home, which a source tells me is at the end of the block.

At any rate, some avreichim went to this store owner and requested that he remove this display, for they felt that it was pritzus, since it consists of pictures of attractive women and as an advertisement is designed to draw the eyes of those who see it towards it. I do not know the content of the conversation -- the letter does not make it clear -- but it is possible that they were polite and the store-owner's reaction was one of "rudeness," in responding with such responses as "this is not Bnai Brak," or it is equally possible that they were not so respectful in their request, with the end result of prompting this reaction from the store owner.

According to the letter, the owner of the store is an Israeli who made yerida -- and it continues to say, he is fittingly called this because "he wishes to take down the taste of Torah which is among us."

I believe that such strong terms are unwarranted. That he is an Israeli who made yerida gives a bit of insight into the situation, but instead of being able to step back and understand the other person's perspective and motivations, it becomes a basis of attack.

Frankly, in Israel it is often much worse than it gets here in America, in terms of the culture clash between the secular and the religious. The secular Israelis, with some good cause, see the religious as trying to stuff religion down their throats, and to impose their religious standards upon them. And this is true even with certain groups of chareidim when interacting with religious Jews who are non-Chareidi -- they also try to impose their standards of observance on others. Some prominent recent examples are the clashes on the segregated buses, and what is going on in Ramat Bet Shemesh.

An Israeli leaves Israel for whatever reason. {Update: As Bray of Fundie points out (see comments), the store owner is a chareidi from Bnei Brak. This might provide different insight for his reaction.} Perhaps he is entirely secular, perhaps he is religious but not chareidi. And then in America, where one is supposed to have religious freedoms, suddenly a group of obvious chareidim come and try to intimidate him to take down his advertisement, which he would not naturally view as pritzus, even by certain non-chareidi yet still religious standards. His reaction would be "this is not Bnei Brak"; don't impose Bnei Brak definitions of modesty upon me here and in this neighborhood; do not intimidate me and make me change my business practice because you have certain religious standards.

His being a yored is not a negative thing to call him, and should not be a pretext for saying that his goal is to reduce that taste of Torah amongst us. This was an opportunity to understand the motivations of someone you disagree with, and to either persuade or understand one another. (The issue of the pritzus aside.) Even if you do need to call for a boycott, this misses the point, misunderstands the person, misunderstands the culture clash, and serves to distance him and those in his community from Judaism, rather than draw them closer.

Of course I may be misunderstanding him as well, not knowing enough about the situation, but at least this is an attempt to understand the other side. And with more intimate knowledge of the situation, one can find get to the bottom of this. Condemnations, and casting the person as an evildoer just doing this to be an evildoer just increases the sinas chinam on both sides.

I don't know if the boycott will be effective. They have the right to boycott, and perhaps other people will sign on to the boycott, or perhaps not. If it impacts his business, he might well cave in. But what do you think the store-owner's attitude will be? And just as bad, this is reinforcement for attitudes on the chareidi side, so what do you think their attitude will be towards people who hold differently? The types of comments at YeshivaWorld betray exactly what kind of attitudes people are being trained in. And perhaps before claiming that "who knows, perhaps all these tzaros are being caused by pritzus," think firstly that "who knows" means that even the person proclaiming it does not know, and secondly, perhaps such pronouncements plus perhaps the closed-mindedness and condemnation of different approaches could be the cause of those tzaros (just as equally, though I do not profess to know why things happen).

This is one reason I am so thankful to live in Kew Gardens Hills. There are so many niches, so many shuls with different approaches, and so many communities living side by side, within the spectrum of Orthodox Judaism. It is not necessarily the same in many other communities, where there is a pressure to conform, in terms of dress, in terms of practice, and in terms of thought.

And that is why I think that even if indeed there are pritzus problems with the advertisements according to their opinion, it is less important to remove this advertisement -- have men avert their gaze, or avoid walking near there if it is a problem -- and it is more important to develop in specifically these individuals, in specifically these communities, the idea that other people can have other opinions, and we should not force them to conform to specifically our ideals. (Of course, on some level I am doing the same, asking that they accept my ideal of tolerance.)

Another problematic aspect is the decision to solve tnius problems by making someone else modify to accommodate you. In some cases, this is justified. But in other cases, it is not so. There is an idea that an adam chashuv does not look at the face of women. Iyyov, if I recall correctly, did not look at penuyot even, lest they marry his sons and they be arayot in the future to him. But firstly, this does not mean that this extreme middat chassidut should be imposed as the standard. And even if it is, the solution was not that the women cover up but rather that the men do not look at them.

I forget which gadol it was, but a gadol was known to usually use a lot of water for washing hands. But once he did not. His students asked him why, and he pointed out that the poor maidservant was the one who had to lug all the water, and he was not going to insist on his chumra at someone else's expense. Yet here, the solution is to make the other person conform. Just as it is to make the women ride in the back; or to make the person with the television get rid of his television so that people do not peer into his house and watch; and so on. Worse than a color picture display, we have 3-D displays of the same, with real flesh, and movement. Will we make them wear veils? Not at present, but the trend seems troubling.

The women are indeed inclining their necks. This is not for the sake of pritzus. I doubt that the women were thinking of enticing men when posing, and I doubt that the store owner thought to entice the men in the yeshiva with his ad. The intent was to make the women look glamorous and pretty, so that women would see them and think that they would also look glamorous and pretty when wearing these sheitels. And inclining the neck has the effect of making the neck look longer and more graceful.

We see in Shir haShirim a praise comparing a woman's neck to a tower:

ד כְּמִגְדַּל דָּוִיד צַוָּארֵךְ, בָּנוּי לְתַלְפִּיּוֹת; אֶלֶף הַמָּגֵן תָּלוּי עָלָיו, כֹּל שִׁלְטֵי הַגִּבֹּרִים.

4 Thy neck is like the tower of David builded with turrets, whereon there hang a thousand shields, all the armour of the mighty men.

I can understand how some people in some communities might have a problem with this inclined neck. (They might consider it a come-hither neck. Heh.) Personally I do not. The problem might simply be advertisements featuring women's faces. I know that in some communities, in some newspapers and magazines, they consider this pritzus. This is unfortunate, IMHO. Especially if they do not allow for the possibility that others might hold differently.

I also think that this incredible focus on tznius as the most important thing ever is counterproductive. It has the effect of sexualizing everything. I was astounded to see in a recent discussion about mixed seating weddings that chareidim's response is that they do not need to spend the wedding ogling the friends of their wives, or the assumption that this leads to wife swapping. This assumption is so far off base, for that is absolutely not what happens at mixed weddings. But to think that this would happen if they engaged in mixed weddings tells more about their own attitudes than those who they judge.

At any rate, I know nothing, and these are just my musings on the subject. If you want to see what the basis of all this controversy/boycott is, see DovBear's post, or see the picture below:

SPOILER SPACE





































END SPOILER SPACE

Washing Out the Cup Before Kiddush, Continued, Continued

I posted a while back about a custom some have to put some water into the cup to be used for kiddush and then pour that water into the wine bottle.

I gave three suggestions: 1) Remove pegam of the wine; 2) dilution as described in the gemara of their thick wine; and 3) the kabbalistic requirement to wash out even a clean cup prior to kiddush, followed by a need to put the water somewhere. I prefer #3, out of all of these.

My father told me that Rabbi Friedman does the same thing, and SoccerDad told me he saw it at Rabbi Rosenberg's table. They both give the same reason: The red wine represents din, judgment, and we add water to be mamtik (sweeten) then din with chesed (water). I still consider #3 to be somewhat plausible, with a practice of specifically putting the water into the wine bottle afterwards, once the water was in the glass, to be coming from this reason of being mamtik the din, or else with this reason developing afterwards and then reinforcing the custom.

Update: A bit later, Rabbi Rosenberg emailed me something else he came across on this subject, from the Raavya:

ראבי"ה ח"ב - מסכת ראש השנה סימן תקמז

ומה שאנו מטילין מים בכוס של הבדלה ושותים ומה שנשתייר אנו רוחצין פנינו, כדי לחבב את המצות, ואמרו חכמים שיורי מצוה מעכבין את הפרענות

And this that we pour water in the cup of havdalah and drink (presumably the water itself), and from what is left over we wash our face, is in order to make the precepts dear, and the Sages said that the remnants of the precepts hold back the punishment.

This seems to be specifically the cup of havdalah, and it is not before drinking the havdalah wine but rather when cleaning it out afterwards. Thus, there is mostly water in the cup and a bit of wine stickiness. Yet we hold these remnants dear and drink the water, and use it to wash our face.

This custom may indeed be related to this other custom of pouring water to clean out the cup for kiddush, then pouring that into the wine bottle such that, here too, we can drink this water. If so, when at someone else's house, they might appreciate it if you poured the water into your hands and used it to wash your face, or into a separate cup to drink later, rather than pouring it into the bottle.

Reading Pitum HaKetoret From A Klaf

Reading Aruch HaShulchan the other day, I saw a cute practice. He writes (IIRC he was citing someone) that because by saying korbanot it is like offering it, one should be careful to say pitum haketoret, the list of the ingredients that make of the incense offering, without omitting any ingredient. Indeed, one should say it from a text. This is because we say at the end of it ve-im chisar achat mikol sammaneha chayav mita, "and if he left out one of the ingredients he is liable to death."

Thus, it is a bad thing to leave out any ingredient, even by accident (though the Aruch haShulchan obviously would not say we would administer the death penalty to someone who misspoke, even when capital punishment was in existence). Aside from this, it is a list of arcane ingredients, and if one wants to say over the list correctly, it is appropriate to do it from a text. All in all, cute, good encouragement of Jewish practice, and taking certain halachic principles to their logical conclusion.

My father pointed out a practice which he believes stems from this. At the relevant part of davening, when it comes to this point, he has seen people put down their siddur and take a rolled up parchment out of their pocket. This parchment has the relevant text, written in ketav ashurit, but as would be written in a sefer Torah. They read pitum haketoret from this.

Indeed, in my shul, someone donated a parchment, framed and behind glass, which has the text of pittum hakketoret on it, so that people can go over to it and read it from the parchment.

If this is indeed the source of this new custom (and it surely seems so), then it is silly. The requirement to read from a ketav is not meant as a requirement to read from a kelaf. The entire purpose is so as not to make a mistake of omission, and this is accomplished just as well from a siddur. It would provide insight into how new custom develops.

Washing Out a Cup Prior to Kiddush

I recently was told of an interesting minhag. That is that prior to making kiddush, one pours water into the cup and then that water into the bottle of wine or grape juice. Then, one pours the grape juice into the cup.

I was thinking of various bases for the minhag. Two I rejected and one seems probable.

First, the two rejected:

1) There is an idea of pagum on wine which was sipped from, but you can add wine to the cup to make it non-pagum, and then pour it back into the bottle. But then it was clarified that this was done before any wine was in the cup.
2) There is a Talmudic basis for diluting wine, either with 2 or 3 parts water to 1 part wine, but that was because they had thick, strong wine. And here, the water was poured first into the cup and then from there into the wine/grape juice bottle.

It seems likely that the basis is:
3) Halachically, the requirement of washing the cup is only to make sure that it is clean. Therefore, an unused, clean cup suffices without washing.(M.B.173:1) Kabbalistically, there is a
stress to always wash out the cup before use.(Kaf Hachaim 173:4)

(All this, BTW, is based on Berachot 51a (see here)):

Rabbi Yochanan said: We only have four: rinsing, washing, undiluted and full.
Rinsing - is done on the outside.
Washing - is done on the inside.

Therefore, the custom developed to pour water into the completely clean cup, before kiddush. What to do with this water? Perhaps because there was nowhere to pour it when indoors at the time of kiddush, someone decided to pour it into the wine bottle. After all, perhaps the glass would otherwise be full of water. Or at least be too much dilution, whereas in an entire bottle, it would not dilute the wine so much. Or perhaps for some other reason. Regardless, it seems an extension of a practice which is based on some kabbalistic source, and is not really in its base form halachically required.

For whatever the reason, it might pay to think through doing this when a guest in someone else's house. They might be OK with it, but on the other hand, they might get miffed at your diluting their whole bottle of wine or grape juice, for something that is after all just a personal minhag. And if the purpose is really to clean the glass, and the glass is not entirely clean, perhaps they might not want whatever dirt or germs in the bottle. And an additional problem -- while the alcohol in wine may prevent spoilage, apparently pouring back grape juice, or any liquid, into a bottle of grape juice causes it to spoil more quickly.

At any rate, an interesting minhag.

Wigs Are Permitted - part I

Note: Unlike other posts on this blog, this is intended halacha lemaaseh.

I have written an 18 page article showing that on a Biblical level, and also on a dat yehudit level, wigs are permitted, but I am debating whether post it just yet, or first to look for a more formal venue in which to publish it. I am not publishing it in this post.

Regardless of the fact that I have semicha and have spent more than 100 hours learning through sugyot relevant to this topic, some people will not listen to the possibility, preferring their own appeals to authority. Therefore, in this post I will appeal to an authority myself, though he takes a different approach to permitting wigs. I am referring to Rav Moshe Feinstein, zt"l. Perhaps one can kvetch out of what I am about to derive from Igros Moshe, but I do not believe that this is a valid kvetch.

One of the Rabbanim who forbid wigs, who says that nobody can possibly find that authorities who permitted wigs were talking about modern wigs, is Rav Shmuel Aurbach. His father, Rav Shlomo Zalman Aurbach, zt"l, said of Rav Moshe Feinstein ""Who am I to eulogize him? I studied his sefarim; I was his talmid (student).""

Firstly, what these Rabbanim said, or what was said in their respective names. I don't know whether to trust it, because it all depends on who authored the exact words of the statement and what types of facts were presented to them by handlers. Regardless, here is the announcement (hat tip: towncrier, where I believe I saw this a while back):

Excerpted from YNet:

Citing decisions in Jewish law that forbid the wearing of wigs that look like hair, by among others, Rabbi Shmuel Auerbach, Rabbi Shalom Elyashiv, and Rabbi Nissim Karelitz, three of the most important ultra-Orthodox authorities on Jewish law.

“Modern wigs are forbidden according to the Torah since they are just as much a breach of the law as hair, if not more,” according to the announcement. “Unfortunately, such breaches are rampant among the ultra-Orthodox, and everyone has an obligation to put out the burning flame and to make haste to remove an obstacle, to eradicate this terrible problem of wigs… Every woman well knows in her heart the bitter truth, and how wigs look today, and she is going to be judged for this, and no excuses will avail in the next world.

"Therefore, every woman should make haste to join the thousands of righteous women who have already removed all kinds of wigs and pieces of wig that harm the souls of pure and holy young men and yeshiva students of the Jewish people.”

According to the announcement, while there were a number of authorities in Jewish law who permitted the wearing of wigs for married women, they were referring to the older type of wig. The newer wigs, which look just like real hair, are clearly “forbidden according to the Torah.”

Therefore, “in order to encourage students of Torah to study and to teach the real truth… it has been decided to offer a prize of USD 18,000 to any observant Jew who can show that modern wigs are permitted, and can disprove the aforementioned. And since there are rabbis who still do not know about all this, and who still think that there is permission that can be relied upon, and in order to encourage the students to discuss this with their rabbis, it has been declared that anyone who succeeds in gleaning information from a rabbi who can disprove the aforementioned - as well as the rabbis themselves - will receive a double prize of USD 36,000.

Furthermore, the Institute’s instructions for those who have gone back to wearing an acceptable head covering are to cover the head with a “modest kerchief, and not, Heaven forbid, all kinds of newfangled modern kerchiefs and head coverings that are liable to attract attention because of the evil inclination and to cause the public to sin with accessories that attract the eye.”

This announcement oversteps the usual bounds of halachic pronouncement. Sure, every posek thinks he is correct. And when a Gadol makes a statement like this, many people world-over tend to listen. However, a gadol is not a Sanhedrin, and there is room for different takes by local poskim, and people can listen to their local posek. This seems to not be the case here. The statement effectively says that, in all likelihood, any American pesak that wigs are permitted was referring to old wigs, not modern wigs. Therefore, any modern posek who says that modern wigs are forbidden is saying so in error but furthermore ignorance, such that one should not listen to him but rather encourage him to learn. Thus, they undermine any competing pesak.

They say that modern wigs, since they look like hair and are attractive, are equal to the Biblical prohibition on going out with entirely uncovered hair.

Based on my own research, I believe that a peach nochrit - a wig - is permitted. All this is a side-point, which I will get to if I post a followup with my own thoughts on the matter.

However, looking at the following teshuva in Igros Moshe, Even haEzer II, siman 12, I believe it is clear that Rav Moshe Feinstein did not hold that there was a Biblical prohibition is going out in a modern wig which people think is real hair.

My commentary continues below. Click on any of these pictures to see a zoomed-in view:





Rav Moshe is considering the issue of maris ayin on wigs. The Biblical prohibition is an issur asei, for the Torah made a positive declaration (likely ufara et rosh haIsha) from which we derive a that she must go out with tzniut, covering her hair. But, if a woman goes out wearing a wig, to some people it may look as if she is not covering her hair. This is perhaps a problem of maris ayin.

I must stress this. Rav Moshe considers the potential problem to be one of maris ayin, that people will think that she is violating the issur asei. He does not say that the problem is Biblical, that since people will think it is her actual hair, she is actually violating the issur asei itself, which is what these three Rabbanim are apparently saying.

Rav Moshe concludes that it is not a problem for various reasons. Firstly, people can actually tell. Secondly, even if men cannot tell, women cannot tell. (Indeed, even with the fanciest modern wigs, my wife says she can tell.) And even if even women cannot tell, we don't have to worry for that small eventually. And furthermore, people will assume it is just a really good wig, and not that she is violating. And even in America, where some women do not cover their hair entirely, we need not think she is one of these women. And we will not innovate this prohibition because of maris ayin which is not mentioned by the Gemara or Geonim.

Furthermore, he writes, who says we worry about maris ayin in cases of an issur asei? And furthermore, a prohibition based on maris ayin is taught in the gemara on a case by case basis, but one does not extrapolate across the board.

From all of this, it seems clear that even where it really looks like her actual hair, that even women would not think it was a wig, the only potential problem is maris ayin, and he rules that even that is not a problem. He certainly does not hold that the Biblical prohibition of roshah parua is at stake. And in the '60's, they did have wigs that looked like real hair. It depends on how much money one paid.

One who wants to object to this might point out that he categorizes the biblical law to be to be tzanua and to go out with covered hair, and these Rabbanim would say that modern wigs are not tzanua. This is a problem of taking a subjective judgment, which is subjective both in terms of the beauty of the particular wig, but also subjective on the sociological background of the rabbi passing judgment, and encoding it as comprehensive, systematic law. Regardless, everything about this teshuva states that modern wigs are permitted, and are certainly not just as much a violation of Biblical law as going out with hair entirely uncovered.

These Gedolim are certainly entitled to their opinion. But I am entitled to mine as well. And we have Rav Moshe's teshuva to rely upon, and he is certainly no lightweight.

The General Preference of Right Over Left

In a previous post (which is worthwhile reading in order to get a proper background for this present post), I discussed the issue of putting the right shoe on before the left, and tying shoelaces, and how the Rishonim (Rambam, Rif, Rosh, Smag) did not record this halacha. I ended with a justification of the general practice nowadays of ignoring the requirement laid down in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch to put on the right shoe first.

However, I only discussed it in the context of putting on shoes. Meanwhile, there is a more general principle of granting precedence to right over left. To cite that gemara {Shabbat 61a} again:

ואף רבי יוחנן סבר לה להא דרב הונא
דאמר ליה ר' יוחנן לרב שמן בר אבא הב לי מסנאי יהב ליה דימין
אמר ליה עשיתו מכה
ודילמא כחייא בר רב ס"ל והכי קאמר עשית של שמאל מכה
ואזדא רבי יוחנן לטעמיה דאמר ר' יוחנן כתפילין כך מנעלין מה תפילין בשמאל אף מנעלין בשמאל
מיתיבי כשהוא נועל נועל של ימין ואחר כך נועל של שמאל
אמר רב יוסף השתא דתניא הכי ואמר רבי יוחנן הכי דעבד הכי עבד ודעבד הכי עבד
אמר ליה אביי דילמא רבי יוחנן הא מתני' לא הוה שמיע ליה ואי הוה שמיע ליה הוה הדר ביה ואי נמי שמיע ליה וקסבר אין הלכה כאותה משנה
אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק ירא שמים יוצא ידי שתיהן ומנו מר בריה דרבנא היכי עביד סיים דימיניה ולא קטר וסיים דשמאליה וקטר והדר קטר דימיניה
אמר רב אשי חזינא לרב כהנא דלא קפיד
תנו רבנן כשהוא נועל נועל של ימין ואחר כך נועל של שמאל כשהוא חולץ חולץ של שמאל ואח"כ חולץ של ימין כשהוא רוחץ רוחץ של ימין ואח"כ רוחץ של שמאל כשהוא סך סך של ימין ואח"כ של שמאל והרוצה לסוך כל גופו סך ראשו תחילה מפני שהוא מלך על כל איבריו:

Now, R. Johanan too holds as R. Huna. For R. Johanan said to R. Shamen b. Abba: Give me my sandals. When he gave him the right one, he [R. Johanan] observed, You treat it as though it had a wound. [No]. Perhaps he agrees with Hiyya b. Rab, and he meant thus: You treat the left [foot] as through it had a wound? Now, R. Johanan [here] follows his general view. For R. Johanan said: Like tefillin, so are shoes: just as tefillin [are donned] on the left [hand], so are shoes [put on] the left [foot first]. An objection is raised: When one puts on his shoes, he must put on the right first and then the left? — Said R. Joseph: Now that it was taught thus, while R. Johanan said the reverse, he who acts in either way acts [well]. Said Abaye to him: But perhaps R. Johanan did not hear this Baraitha, but if he had heard it, he would have retracted? Or perhaps he heard it and held that the halachah is not as that Mishnah {/brayta}?

R. Nahman b. Isaac said: A God-fearing person satisfies both views. And who is that? Mar, the son of Rabina. What did he do? He put on the right foot [sandal] but did not tie it. Then he put on the left, tied it, and then tied the right [sandal].

R. Ashi said: I saw that R. Kahana was not particular.

Our Rabbis taught: When one puts on his shoes, he must put on the right first and then the left; when he removes [them], he must remove the left [first] and then the right. When one washes, he must [first] wash the right [hand, foot] and then the left. When one anoints [himself] with oil, he must anoint the right and then the left. But one who desires to anoint his whole body must anoint his head first, because it is the king of all the limbs.

Now, as mentioned, Rif, Rambam, etc., do not cite this lehalacha, but rather omit the law entirely, holding like Rav Ashi citing Rav Kahana. Either because Rav Ashi is the batrai, or because (as I suggested), stating that this is the practice of a specific Amora who is labelled because of this as a "Yerei Shamayim" in effect minimizes his stance of following all positions as one of midat chasidut which was not adopted by the Amoraim at large.

However, what about the more general requirement of granting precedence of right to left? After all, the brayta did not only speak about putting on shoes, but also washing and anointing? The brayta states:

תנו רבנן כשהוא נועל נועל של ימין ואחר כך נועל של שמאל כשהוא חולץ חולץ של שמאל ואח"כ חולץ של ימין כשהוא רוחץ רוחץ של ימין ואח"כ רוחץ של שמאל כשהוא סך סך של ימין ואח"כ של שמאל והרוצה לסוך כל גופו סך ראשו תחילה מפני שהוא מלך על כל איבריו

Our Rabbis taught: When one puts on his shoes, he must put on the right first and then the left; when he removes [them], he must remove the left [first] and then the right. When one washes, he must [first] wash the right [hand, foot] and then the left. When one anoints [himself] with oil, he must anoint the right and then the left. But one who desires to anoint his whole body must anoint his head first, because it is the king of all the limbs.

Perhaps surprisingly, Rif, Rambam, Rosh, Smag do not cite this brayta lehalacha either. It is once again Tur and Shulchan Aruch who resurrect it.

Why is this surprising? Well, we would assume the reason not to be makpid was as Rav Yosef said -- that a brayta says to prefer right, while Rabbi Yochanan said to prefer left, such that whichever way one does, he is following a practice with force behind it.

However, Rabbi Yochanan only said this in an incident regarding putting on shoes, and as formulated in the gemara, "shoes are like tefillin." And this might well be so as not to look like someone who has a wound in his right foot. He does not say that everything is like tefillin. Thus, he should agree with the brayta to prefer right in general. If so, we cannot say דעבד הכי עבד ודעבד הכי עבד.

There are two possible solutions which present themselves to me. The first one is that in fact Rabbi Yochanan was makpid to prefer the left in all situations. This follows the position of Tosafot where he cites the Ri, on the daf (Shabbat 61a):

דעבד הכי עבד - פירוש דברייתא לא פליגא ארבי יוחנן ולא ר' יוחנן אברייתא וה"פ כתפילין אע"ג דימין חשובה לענין בהן יד ובהן רגל וכן לענין חליצה יכול לנעול של שמאל תחילה ברייתא נמי קמ"ל דאע"ג דשמאל חשובה לתפילין יכול לנעול של ימין תחילה וא"ת א"כ אמאי הקפיד רבי יוחנן על רב שמן שנתן לו של ימין כיון דיכול לנעול איזה שירצה תחילה ונראה לר"י דה"פ דעבד הכי עבד מי שרוצה לחבב של שמאל משום מצות תפילין הרשות בידו ומי שרוצה לחבב של ימין יותר משום חשיבות של ימין הרשות בידו ורבי יוחנן היה דרכו לחבב כל שעה של שמאל יותר ורב שמן בר אבא (לא) היה יודע מנהגו.

Thus, in every instance, we have two competing positions, so however one acts, in any area, he is acting appropriately.

However, I am not altogether convinced that this reading works well with the Yerushalmi (see previous post). And Rif, Rosh, Rambam, Smag also omit the end of the brayta about granting precedence to the head over the rest of his limbs, where it does not seem that we can say that however one conducts himself, he is following a Tannaitic view.

The other possibility is that they have a much broader reading of Rav Ashi and Rav Kahana -- that when Rav Ashi said that Rav Kahana was not makpid, this meant that he was not makpid in general, by any precedence mentioned in Derech Eretz Rabba. Whether that hooks in to a reading of Rav Yosef's statement (which might require Tosafot's chiddush above) or not is a tangential issue. Though perhaps we could view Rav Yosef's statement as an attempt to justify existing attitude that one need not be makpid on such issues.

In terms of current practice, as far as I have observed, despite the instruction of Tur and Shulchan Aruch, the general populace is not makpid to grant precedence to right over left in general, or head over the rest of the body in general. Perhaps the occasional yeshiva guy, for a while after the halacha is pointed out to him in Shulchan Aruch/Mishneh Berurah (though likely without the Talmudic background), will for a while be insistent upon this. But I do not think that in the shower, people in general shower their heads first and their right side first. Maybe I am wrong about this.

There is one area where people are makpid, and that is in ritual hand washing. That is, if someone gets his hands dirty and washes them, he is not likely to be makpid to wash the right hand first, despite this pesak in Shulchan Aruch. But, washing neigel vasser in the morning, or washing before eating bread, one is more likely to see insistence upon a particular order. I believe that this is because it is a ritual, and so people think about it as ritual and learn the steps by rote. Also, it is short ritual, which makes it easier. If prompted, maybe they would give the reason of giving precedent to the right, but in most cases people do this unthinkingly. In contrast, washing dirt off your hands, or showering, or brushing your teeth (right side of the mouth first), or putting on your shoes, is not really a ritual but rather a day-to-day activity. Perhaps a side effect of insistence on precedence is to ritualize and somehow in this way sanctify everyday actions, such that mundane activities are done within the framework of, and with concern for principles of Judaism.

Being Makpid To Put On One Shoe Before the Other?

After all, it says to do so in Shulchan Aruch.

The relevant gemara is in Shabbat 61a. The preceding context is that one may go out on Shabbat with a single sandal if he has a wound on his foot, and Rav Huna says that this means with the sandal on the foot which has the wound. Now the gemara relates:

ואף רבי יוחנן סבר לה להא דרב הונא
דאמר ליה ר' יוחנן לרב שמן בר אבא הב לי מסנאי יהב ליה דימין
אמר ליה עשיתו מכה
ודילמא כחייא בר רב ס"ל והכי קאמר עשית של שמאל מכה
ואזדא רבי יוחנן לטעמיה דאמר ר' יוחנן כתפילין כך מנעלין מה תפילין בשמאל אף מנעלין בשמאל
מיתיבי כשהוא נועל נועל של ימין ואחר כך נועל של שמאל
אמר רב יוסף השתא דתניא הכי ואמר רבי יוחנן הכי דעבד הכי עבד ודעבד הכי עבד
אמר ליה אביי דילמא רבי יוחנן הא מתני' לא הוה שמיע ליה ואי הוה שמיע ליה הוה הדר ביה ואי נמי שמיע ליה וקסבר אין הלכה כאותה משנה
אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק ירא שמים יוצא ידי שתיהן ומנו מר בריה דרבנא היכי עביד סיים דימיניה ולא קטר וסיים דשמאליה וקטר והדר קטר דימיניה
אמר רב אשי חזינא לרב כהנא דלא קפיד
תנו רבנן כשהוא נועל נועל של ימין ואחר כך נועל של שמאל כשהוא חולץ חולץ של שמאל ואח"כ חולץ של ימין כשהוא רוחץ רוחץ של ימין ואח"כ רוחץ של שמאל כשהוא סך סך של ימין ואח"כ של שמאל והרוצה לסוך כל גופו סך ראשו תחילה מפני שהוא מלך על כל איבריו:

Now, R. Johanan too holds as R. Huna. For R. Johanan said to R. Shamen b. Abba: Give me my sandals. When he gave him the right one, he [R. Johanan] observed, You treat it as though it had a wound. [No]. Perhaps he agrees with Hiyya b. Rab, and he meant thus: You treat the left [foot] as through it had a wound? Now, R. Johanan [here] follows his general view. For R. Johanan said: Like tefillin, so are shoes: just as tefillin [are donned] on the left [hand], so are shoes [put on] the left [foot first]. An objection is raised: When one puts on his shoes, he must put on the right first and then the left? — Said R. Joseph: Now that it was taught thus, while R. Johanan said the reverse, he who acts in either way acts [well]. Said Abaye to him: But perhaps R. Johanan did not hear this Baraitha, but if he had heard it, he would have retracted? Or perhaps he heard it and held that the halachah is not as that Mishnah {/brayta}?
R. Nahman b. Isaac said: A God-fearing person satisfies both views. And who is that? Mar, the son of Rabina. What did he do? He put on the right foot [sandal] but did not tie it. Then he put on the left, tied it, and then tied the right [sandal].
R. Ashi said: I saw that R. Kahana was not particular.
Our Rabbis taught: When one puts on his shoes, he must put on the right first and then the left; when he removes [them], he must remove the left [first] and then the right. When one washes, he must [first] wash the right [hand, foot] and then the left. When one anoints [himself] with oil, he must anoint the right and then the left. But one who desires to anoint his whole body must anoint his head first, because it is the king of all the limbs

This actually has parallel in the matching Yerushalmi Shabbat 35b:

ר' יוחנן אמר על אותה שיש בה מכה הוא נותן.
שמעון בר בא הוה משמש קומי ר' יוחנן והוה מושיט ליה סנדליה כהדא דתני.
לדרך הארץ כשהוא נועל נועל של ימין ואח"כ נועל של שמאל. וכשהוא חולץ חולץ של שמאל ואח"כ חולץ של ימין.
אמר ליה ר"י בבלייא לא תעבד כן שהראשונים לא היו עושין כן. אלא כשהוא נועל נועל של שמואל ואח"כ נועל של ימין. שלא תהא נראית של ימין פגומה.
הדא אמרת על אותה שיש בה מכה הוא נותן.
א"ל אין בבלייא דקמתיה עליה.

"Rabbi Yochanan says that upon the one which has the wound he places {the sandal}."
Shimon bar Bo was attending before Rabbi Yochanan, and he extended to him his sandal in accordance with that which was taught {in a brayta}:

For the way of the land {=proper procedure is} when he puts on his shoe he puts on the right one and afterwards he puts on the left one. And when he removes it he removes the left one and afterwards he removes the right one.

Rabbi Yochanan said to him: Babylonian! You should not do so. For the first ones {"Rishonim"} did not do so. Rather, when he dons the sandal he should don the left one and afterwards don the right one. So that the left one does not appear to be flawed.
{Shimon bar Bo said:} "This means that {in our Mishna} upon the foot which has the wound he places {the sandal}?"
He {=Rabbi Yochanan} said to him: Yes, Babylonian, you have arisen to it {the truth of the matter}.

Thus, we have more or less the same story as in the Bavli but with a bit of extra material in the narrative.

One extra point is that Rabbi Yochanan does not merely say that the left shoe goes on first like by tefillin. Rather, he says "You should not do so. For the first ones {"Rishonim"} did not do so." Who are these Rishonim? Well, Rabbi Yochanan was a first generation Amora, and has quasi-Tannaitic status {in that I can point to other instances in which he feels comfortable arguing on Mishnayot and braytot -- tanna hu ufalig, even though it doesn't say this outright like by Rav}. The "Rishonim" would be the Tannaim. Thus, he not only establishes what the practice should be, but he offers testimony as to the practice of the Tannaim.

Thus, we indeed have conflicting Tannaitic sources. We have this brayta upon which Rav Shimon bar Abba was presumbaly working off of {though it may just be an interjection in the Yerushalmi when it says כהדא דתני לדרך הארץ כשהוא נועל נועל של ימין ואח"כ נועל של שמאל}. And we have Rabbi Yochanan's testimony as to Tannaitic practice, which he works into a more general legal theory.

Turning back to the Bavli, we see this same incident with "Rav Shamen bar Abba" -- perhaps reflecting a certain pronunciation of the name Shimon bar Abba. It is the same fellow. They know of this because he is a Babylonian who went to Israel to study with Rabbi Yochanan. And thus they correctly extrapolate what Rabbi Yochanan appears to say explicitly in the Yerushalmi -- that he holds like Rav Huna about which foot to put the sandal on when he has a wound.

Facing these two Tannaitic traditions, Rav Yosef comments that "Now that it was taught thus, while R. Johanan said the reverse, he who acts in either way acts [well]." This is because you are either acting like the brayta's tradition or like Rabbi Yochanan's tradition.

Abaye raised a good objection: "But perhaps R. Johanan did not hear this Baraitha, but if he had heard it, he would have retracted? Or perhaps he heard it and held that the halachah is not as that Mishnah {/brayta}." In terms of the first half the objection, I don't think it is valid. Rav Shimon bar Bo could have repeated this brayta, which presumably he was acting in accordance with. And even if he had repeated this brayta, this is not a mere sevara upon which Rabbi Yochanan is acting, and instructing. Rather, it is a tradition that Rabbi Yochanan appears to have witnessed in action.

The second half of Abaye's objection bears more weight. "Or perhaps he heard it and held that the halachah is not as that Mishnah {/brayta}." Indeed, the sense of the Yerushalmi seems to be that he is overruling Rav Shimon bar Bo's inclination {and perhaps brayta} and stating that the halacha is otherwise. And if we only had the Yerushalmi rather than our Bavli, my sense is that we would have ruled to put the left shoe on first. On the other hand, we do not know that he was actually told over this brayta and that he then overruled it. He certainly has another tradition upon which he is acting.

And that is what we Babylonians can come away with. The brayta certainly reflects one Tannaitic tradition. And while Rabbi Yochanan's position fits in with a greater legal theory, it also is a conflicting Tannaitic tradition. Therefore, whatever one does, he is acting in accordance with some Tannaitic tradition. Rav Yosef is right.

Of course, this could mean that one should always act consistently in one way -- choose a Tannaitic tradition and stick with it. On the other hand, Rav Ashi, who is later, reports that Rav Kahana was not makpid to do it a specific way. This appears to be in line with Rav Yosef, though taking it perhaps further -- one need not pay heed to the order at all. One day it could be left first, the next right first. And the same for taking it off.

There is one other opinion in our gemara -- Mar the son of Ravina. To cite the gemara: "Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said: A God-fearing person satisfies both views. And who is that? Mar, the son of Rabina. What did he do? He put on the right foot [sandal] but did not tie it. Then he put on the left, tied it, and then tied the right [sandal]."

How is this working? I would suggest {strongly, though -- this is correct} that what is happening here is a way of fulfilling both Rabbi Yochanan's instruction that the left goes on first and the brayta's instruction that the right goes on first. One can consider the shoe to be "on" at two distinct stages -- either once it is on, or once it is tied. Thus, put on the right sandal first but do not tie it. That way, the right shoe is on first. Then put on the left sandal. This completes this first stage, and so the brayta has been fulfilled. Next, tie the left sandal. Not because there is some preference for tying to be done on the left foot, but rather since this is now tied, the left shoe has been "put on" first. Then, tie the right sandal so that the right shoe has been "put on" second.

I have heard some incorrect explanations that because Rabbi Yochanan in Yerushalmi linked this to putting on tefillin, it is specifically the tying that is done first. But looking at the Yerushalmi, and even at his words in Bavli, Rabbi Yochanan is talking about putting on the sandal in the first place, not specifically the tying.

Also, the homiletic connection of tying the sandal to tying tefillin, and the same connection there to Avraham who refused the reward from the king of Sodom "even of a shoelace," I believe from Rabbi Akiva Eiger. I don't think this is the authentic derivation of this practice, but rather the one described above.

Do we rule like Mar son of Ravina? It would seem not, for the following two reasons: First, Rav Ashi is batrai, later and hilcheta ke-batrai. But I don't think that is the real reason.

Rather, the real reason is that Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak, even when reporting it, marginalized the position. He says it is the act of a certain yerei Shamayim, and then identifies who is intended by this title - Mar son of Ravina. Just like saying that something is appropriate only for someone whose tarato umanato -- Torah is his profession -- so too here we are saying that a particular person who is especially sensitive and has extreme fear of Heaven, and who is this? -- 0ne particular Amora rather than all the others -- wants to try to fulfill the obligation according to all the different positions. By casting it such, it seems to be a midat chassidut -- a positive thing to do, but by no means obligatory such that it should be encoded as halacha.

And indeed, Rav Ashi said in closing the sugya that Rav Kahana was not particular of the order, following Rav Yosef.

Nowadays, there is a similar urge to fulfill all possible shittot in our practice of Judaism, but this is not obligatory or expected, and indeed, with time the number of positions has multiplied, such that it is that much harder to do.

Thus, the sense is that this is a special middat chassidut that he adopted for himself, but which is not binding on everyone.

Looking at the poskim, we see that they do not encode this as halacha but rather omit this. This list of those who hold like Rav Kahana (here relying upon the Aruch haShulchan's writeup) include the Rif, Rambam, Rosh, Mordechai, and Smag, who all omit this law entirely.

However, the Tur and Shulchan Aruch list this.

In a gloss in Aruch haShulchan, we read that the reason no one held like Mar son of Ravina is that Rav Ashi is later and so the halacha is like him. Artzot HaChaim apparently says that Mar son of Ravina is later, but, as the gloss notes, this is a mistake and Mar son of Ravina is actually Mar the son of Ravana, who we know is earlier. As we see in Yevamot 22:

"Mar the son of Rabana has not signed them".

Regardless, Tur and Shulchan Aruch worried for this opinion, for Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said that a God-fearing person fulfills both positions, etc., and it is upon us to fulfill the words of the Tur and Shulchan Aruch. So ends my summary of Aruch haShulchan.

However, nowadays, some people take pains to fulfill the words of the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, but many, many do not. And they are on solid ground, having all the aforementioned Rishonim to rely upon. And further, as I argued, it is not just because of the technicality that Rav Ashi was later, such that it pays to take the recommendation of the Talmud for "the God-fearing individual." Rather, I believe that by labelling it as such, Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak intended to marginalize it and label it as something that was a middat chassidut, and not something to be codified as required for every individual. As such, the current practice (or rather non-practice) is not bad, and quite possibly something good.

T

May A Woman Swing Her Arms While Walking In The Street?

Of course she may! Yet, according to SemGirl, a certain Rav said that they should not:

Now suddenly in an address about tznius to the Yeshiva he was saying that women and girls need to be careful not to swing their arms while walking in the street.

I've never heard of this, even amongst frum women. But it is not just a problem in subjectively deciding what is modest and what is not, and formalizing it for everyone. There is another issue with this -- it is not for nothing that human beings instinctually swing their arms when they walk. This serves as a counterweight for maintaining balance. (For example, when designing robots, researchers trying to mimic human locomotion have the robots swing arms to maintain balance.) Without swinging arms, people would walk more stiffly and more precariously. There are real human side-effects of making such a proclamation. I wonder if this Rav tried walking for a few days without swinging his arms before imposing this new restriction on the female Jewish population.

This is not unlike the previous tznius issue I posted about -- slits in women's skirts. There, there is a strong possibility that those banning slits in women's skirts did not realize that the slits were not just there to attract attention to the bare leg, but were actually functional -- they allow women in straight skirts to move their leg forward. If so, they may have treated slits as mere "pritzus" within fashion, such that it is forbidden in any form (e.g. even below the knee, even with thick stockings underneath). But in reality, it is necessary for a woman to walk forward comfortably. The same here -- swinging the arm forward is functional, and serve not just to attract a man's attention.

So now you have women, hobbling along in these narrow skirts up to the ankle, and they cannot swing their arms to maintain balance. Next we will hear that they cannot swing their legs -- they can move by pivoting their hips.

Why I Oppose the Refuah Card

So I saw the following on Mystical Paths (picture at the right) -- a card with a Yehi Ratzon to say before and after taking any medication or undergoing any medical procedure. And it establishes it as an halachic requirement, both on the card by citing those sources (Shulchan Aruch and Mishnah Brurah) and on the website by describing it as such.

I oppose this, for reasons I'll eventually get to. Let us begin by tracing the development of this practice.

We see in Berachot 60a, cited lehalacha by the Rif, the following:

{Brachot 60a}
On entering a bath-house one should say: 'May it be Thy will O Lord, my God, to let me enter peacefully, and leave peacefully, and deliver me from this and from the like of this in the time to come.

And when he leaves, what does he bless?
Rav Acha said: Blessed be he who delivered me from the fire.

On going in to be cupped {let blood} one should say: May it be Thy will, O Lord, my God, that this operation {/endeavor} may be a cure for me, for You are a free healer.

And when he leaves, what does he bless?
Rava said: Blessed is the free healer. {rofeh chinam}

The context was only that of going to be cupped -- that is, to have his blood let. And that is how the Rif cites it, without extending it.

I would note a slight difference in girsa. This follows the girsa of our gemara, and Rif and Rosh. But the Rambam, Smag and Tur have "Baruch Rofeih Cholim," rather than "chinam." (So says the Divrei Chamudos on the Rosh.)

There are two other girsological differences - Rava vs. Rav Acha, and ki kai -- when he gets up -- rather that ki nafik -- when he leaves.

But throughout, this is said specifically when having blood let. And though the card cites the Shulchan Aruch, the Shulchan Aruch only says the same -- when having blood let. However, a commentary on the Shulchan Aruch, namely the Magen Avraham, says that the same should also apply to any matter of refuah.

This is a new extension of the old din, and if this were so, I would have expected someone earlier to say this. One can argue in favor of it, but it is just one commentator's opinion on the matter. The other major commentator on the Shulchan Aruch there, the Taz, does not put forth this extension. And, the רד"א takes exception to the extension. He says that this is said only in cases where there is sakana, danger to life. And we know from other gemaras that blood-letting has aspects of sakana to it. But that this is not meant to extend to e.g. changing a band-aid or taking a Tylenol.

Indeed, given the context of the statement -- going into a heated bathhouse, which we see from commentators that there is an aspect of sakana, and the thing to say before and after entering a city -- that it should be for peace -- the idea seems to be here that this was a tefillah instituted specifically for bloodletting, that this procedure should be for good and for healing, and not, chas veshalom, for death or illness. (Thus, I would disagree with the Magen Avraham and agree with רד"א.)

Meanwhile, the Taz says (and other girsaot have it) that the blessing upon leaving has Shem and Malchus -- that is, it should be "Baruch Ata Hashem Elokeinu Melech HaOlam Rofei Chinam (or Cholim)."

Now we have an issue of Bracha Levatala, a blessing said in vain, if we extend it to cases where it should not extend. No problem -- only say it with Shem and Malchus where there is actually bloodletting, but otherwise say it without, so as not to entire into the dispute between רד"א and Magen Avraham.

And so rules the Mishnah Berurah. And so rules the Aruch haShulchan.

For what is the harm? Like this, you are saying extra praise and prayer to Hashem, and reminding yourself that whatever physical medical procedures you undergo, it all is ultimately in the hands of Hashem. Beautiful.

My first opposition to it, though, is on the grounds of feature creep. This is part of a long process, by which every aspect of Judaism is extended and extended and extended. See my posts on eating meat during the Nine Days for another example. And here, it is fairly clear that רד"א is correct and Magen Avraham not so much. But, rather than assessing the validity of the two positions, and choosing between them -- rather, since there is no harm in ruling "lechumra" and saying it, we might as well satisfy that position. But taking that approach over and over will lead to clutter of halacha, as anything anyone says which can be satisfied will be added to the ball of tar. And it will not just be cluttered, it will also get more and more chamur, stringent.

However, we are lucky! This practice has fallen into disuse. Quite probably this is because nowadays almost no one has their blood let. (Though recently, some doctors have applied it -- with leeches -- to positive effect.) But for whatever reason, kelal yisrael has not kept this extension of the original statement in the gemara, this extension of what the Rishonim say. Still, it survives as a relic in our halachic texts. But, mimetic tradition -- what people actually practice, is not in according with doing this. Rather, it is in according with רד"א, and what appears to be pashut peshat according to everyone up to that point. So, while their website says:

Prior to taking medication, or undergoing any medical procedure, Halacha requires one to pray to Hashem for the success of the procedure or medication, thereby recognizing that Hashem alone is the true healer. Over time, this halacha has been neglected and has fallen into disuse.

, it may well be that halacha does not require one to pray like this -- though it certainly is a good thing to do. I don't like how selective citations on cards and handouts in shul claim things are halachic obligations, such that those who don't are doing wrong. "Neglected" also has the same connotation. I would say, rather, that likely for hundreds of years, this has been the practice to only say it for bloodletting, then at a specific span of time, based on some opinions (there was dispute) it was extended to other medical procedures as well, and eventually the custom changed, such that people are no longer practicing the extension.

Many things in Shulchan Aruch, Mishnah Berurah, and Aruch haShulchan are not actually practiced today. We often conduct ourselves differently. One example off the top of my head -- the Aruch haShulchan paskens that really one should not talk at all during a meal, even between courses. In terms of talking between aliyot, many do not follow the Mishnah Berurah. That is not because they are doing wrong, but rather because these are compendiums of Jewish law, with a pesak halacha, but it is not really binding on everyone. Pesak halacha takes place outside the realm of these seforim as well.

If you want to change existed established Jewish practice, go to a Gadol haDor, put it forth to him, and ask him to publicize that people should do this. (It is also cited in Nishmas Avraham.) Maybe he will agree, maybe not.

Instead, anyone can start putting out cards, leIlluy Nishmat X, advocating a specific practice which is written in source X and Y (even where source A and B disagree), and encouraging people to accept this practice which they are not accustomed to, as a positive chumra or as a required halacha. I don't favor this approach.

{Update: The following Rabbis are involved in the project:
Rabbi Pesach Krohn, noted lecturer, storyteller, and mohel -- indeed, the mohel for both me and my son.
Rabbi Abraham S. Abraham, M.D., author of Nishmat Avraham, cited above.
In turn, Rabbi Krohn consulted with Rav Dovid Cohen for approval on the card. And Rabbi Neuwirth said, in response to being presented with the card, that one should say it even on putting a bandage on a child's skinned knee.
See the comment section for more on this, from the source.

I still have strong reservations about the card and its appropriateness in shaping modern Jewish practice, for all the reasons discussed in this post.
}

Finally, I have to wonder why. Why try to reestablish specifically this practice? Yes, I don't only question motivations of people involved in Women's Tefillah Groups. I also question motivations in newly adopted Tu BeShvat Seders, and I question motivations here.

Is it really because it is halacha and it is really troublesome that people are neglecting it? Or is it part of a larger trend of printing up zuggach on cards, to say incantations in all areas in life? (E.g. the popularization of the Rabbi Meir Baal HaNes cards for lost items.) I suspect the latter, and it doesn't help its case that I see it on Mystical Paths. If so, we might have issues of lochesh on hamakkah, whispering incantations over a wound, which is frowned upon. (The gemara restricts it in various ways, but the spirit of the superstitious practice is still present, if that is how it will be cast by various people.) That is the second reason I am opposed to it.

One final "problem" with the cards -- they left out the dagesh chazak in the yud of sheyehei. But there should be a dagesh there, and thus also a sheva na under the yud. {Update: Yes, I know that often enough, yud sheva or mem sheva causes loss of the dagesh, though not always. I have doubts it happens here for various phonological reasons I won't get into in this post.}

Of course, in any matter of halacha, consult your local Orthodox rabbi.