Why is Moshe's death after the war against Midian?

Summary: Last year, I presented one reason from Rav Yonasan Eibeshitz. Here is another one, having to do with the laws of ritual purity.

Post: The pasuk in Matos, with the instruction to take revenge on the Midianites, is:

ב  נְקֹם, נִקְמַת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, מֵאֵת, הַמִּדְיָנִים; אַחַר, תֵּאָסֵף אֶל-עַמֶּיךָ.

2 'Avenge the children of Israel of the Midianites; afterward shalt thou be gathered unto thy people.'

And there are various midrashim about this juxtaposition. For instance, that Moshe immediately acted, without delay, even though this meant his demise. But other diyukim are made into just why this juxtaposition is made. Here is another one by Rav Yonasan Eibeshitz. In Midrash Yehonasan, he writes:

That is, he refers us to Sanhedrin daf 39a:

A certain Min said to R. Abbahu: Your God is a priest, since it is written, That they take for me Terumah [wave offering].³⁹  Now, when He had buried Moses,⁴⁰  wherein did He bathe [after contact with the corpse]?⁴¹  Should you reply, 'In water: is it not written, Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of His hand?⁴²  — 'He bathed in fire,' he answered, 'for it is written, Behold the Lord will come in fire.'⁴³  'Is then purification by fire effective?' 'On the contrary,' he replied, 'bathing [for purposes of purification] should essentially be in fire, for it is written, And all that abideth not the fire ye shall make to go through the water.'⁴⁴ 

This is a nice back-and-forth, with perhaps a hidden encoded meaning. And this may require an understanding of Christian theology. I don't possess such knowledge, but I can Google. Thus, for instance:

The best place to start any discussion of this ritual is Erdsman's Le Baptême de Feu. Here Origen is cited as having consistently confirmed the baptism of fire as a purification ritual:

At the Jordan river, John awaited those who came for baptism. Some he rejected, saying, "generation of vipers," and so on.3 But those who confessed their faults and sins he received. In the same way, the Lord Jesus Christ will stand in the river of fire near the "flaming sword." If anyone desires to pass over to paradise after departing this life, and needs cleansing, Christ will baptize him in this river and send him across to the place he longs for. But whoever does not have the sign of earlier baptisms, him Christ will not baptize in the fiery bath. For, it is fitting that one should be baptized first in “water and the Spirit.” Then, when he comes to the fiery river, he can show that he preserved the bathing in water and the Spirit. Then he will deserve to receive in addition the baptism in Christ Jesus, to whom is glory and power for ages of ages. Amen

Thus, in this gemara, the Min, which means early Christian, believed in the necessity of baptism, purification by water, and was told that actually the purification by fire is the preferable one. Perhaps; perhaps not. Perhaps it has to do with the limitations on the Infinite, such that the Min was arguing that it could not have been Hashem Himself who buried Moshe. See here for an example of a Christian who believes that Christ buried Moses, rather than Hashem. Similarly, the prooftext that Hashem is a kohen also could be a reference to Hashem restricting Himself, so as to dwell amongst the bnei Yisrael {vayikchu li terumah veshachanti besocham}.

(If I wanted to reject the Min's words, I would point out that Hashem is Himself compared to fire. Thus, on the pasuk in Devarim,

Devarim 10:20

And (1) you will fear the Lord, your God; (2) Him you shall worship/serve; and (3) to Him you will cleave; and (4) by His Name you shall swear.

Ketubot 111b asks,

…Is it possible to cleave to the Divine Presence? Isn’t it written, (Devarim 4:24) “Because the Lord, your God, is a Consuming Fire, He is a Zealous God”?  But rather anyone who marries off is daughter to a Tora scholar, who engages in business arrangements with Tora scholars, who benefits Tora scholars from his possessions, the text considers him as if he has cloven to the Holy One, Blessed Be He…

And we know fire is not susceptible to ritual impurity. Thus, Berachot 22a:

"It has been taught, Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra used to say: The words of the Torah are not susceptible to Tumah [commonly translated 'impurity']. It happened that a disciple standing before Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra spoke hesitatingly [evidently he was tameh (one who is in a state of Tumah)- being a ba'al keri, one who has had a seminal emission- thought that he was debarred from uttering words of Torah]. He said to him: My son, open your mouth and let your words be clear, for the words of the Torah are not susceptible to Tumah. For it is said: "Is not My word like fire, says the Lord" (Jeremiah 23:29)? As fire is not susceptible to Tumah, so are words of Torah not susceptible to Tumah."

And so Hashem, although being a kohen, would not be susceptible to tumah.)

Rav Yonasan Eibeshitz, for his purposes, takes this gemara literally. And since the pasuk about purification of vessels by fire is stated about the vessels captured in Midian, until that law was given, Hashem was not about to bury Moshe, and so Moshe was not ready to die.

Rabban Gamliel and confirmation by experimentation

Many years ago, I learned this gemara in Ketubot daf 10b.

Someone came before Rabban Gamaliel the son of Rabbi [and] said to him, 'My master, I have had intercourse [with my newly-wedded wife] and I have not found any blood.' She [the wife] said to him, 'My master, I am still a virgin.' He [then] said to them: Bring me two handmaids, one [who is] a virgin and one who had intercourse with a man. They brought to him [two such handmaids], and he placed them upon a cask of wine. [In the case of] the one who was no more a virgin its smell7 went through,8 [in the case of] the virgin the smell did not go through.9 He [then] placed this one [the young wife] also [on a cask of wine]. and its smell10 did not go through. He11 [then] said to him:12 Go, be happy with thy bargain.13 — But he should have examined her from the very beginning!14 — He had heard a tradition,15 but he had not seen it done in practice.16 and he thought. The matter might not be certain17 and it would not be proper18 to deal lightly with daughters of Israel.19

And naturally, it sounded a bit "strange." Is this really the case? There is no direct pathway between the lower regions and the mouth, such that the odor of alcohol should pass through! As such, one would suspect that this is based on the faulty science of the day.

Indeed, I think the Jewish Worker had the same analysis back in 2005:

The difficulty with the story should be obvious to everyone, we know now that this kind of test proves nothing and in fact is based on a completely false physiological premise. The fact that this story is quoted l'halacha further complicates the issue as the gemara clearly needs to be taken literally.

It seems clear to me that Chazal were relying on the medical knowledge of their day and that this test is not Torah M'Sinai.

However, neither Jewish Worker nor I have performed this test myself. So it seems a bit presumptuous to dismiss it out of hand, even if it seems crazy to us, based on our own assumptions and knowledge of the science of our day.

What brings this to mind is a somewhat risque possible urban legend that Snopes covers, about a vodka tampon. They write:

The most commonly-given reason, the avoidance of bowery breath, has the least going for it. If one were to ingest vodka vaginally (or anally -- the rumor is also expressed that way), the practice wouldn't result in booze-free breath because alcohol is partially expelled from the body via the lungs. Once liquor is in the blood, at least some of it gets breathed out, which is how breathalyzers measure blood alcohol content.

Sitting on top of a cask is not the same as somehow bringing it into one's body, but if there are fumes, perhaps they can enter the body and get someone slightly intoxicated. And it is not travelling through the body directly, but entering the bloodstream and then exiting the lungs.

And perhaps if the hymen is intact, the alcohol fumes do not have as much surface area to come in contact with, and so not so much alcohol would be absorbed into the bloodstream, such that alcohol would not be smelled on the woman's breath.

This sound like something that can be subjected to an empirical test. Rabban Gamliel the son of Rabbi was able to call for two participants for his study. But it would be interesting if we could confirm or refute his findings.

Regardless, I think that the straightforward reading of this gemara is that this was not halacha leMoshe miSinai, and this would be so whether or not this scientific "fact" is confirmed or refuted. The gemara itself said that he heard it as a tradition. In most cases of tradition which is halacha leMoshe miSinai, does one take steps to confirm the veracity? Well, in most cases one cannot, but still, how would he doubt a halacha leMoshe miSinai. Rather, he had heard a report of this, either from a scientist or from a rabbi (who may have heard it from a scientist), and so he saw fit to empirically test it. He certainly did not know it was true via ruach hakodesh!

Is Vayin`atz a transitive or intransitive verb?

There was a whole tumult last week about Arami Oved Avi, and whether Oved could function as a transitive verb. We have a related question this week in Haazinu, about the verb וינאץ. See a discussion of נאץ, with examples, in Radak's sefer Shorashim, on the bottom on the first column. The Radak does not mention it, Shadal does -- נאץ is always a transitive verb, so there must be a direct object. Thus, he writes:

יט] וירא ה ' וינאץ : נאץ פועל יוצא תמיד , גם אל תנאץ למען שמך אל תנבל כסא כבודך ( ירמיה י " ד כ " א ), ענינו אל תנאץ ואל תנבל כסא כבודך , והיה ראוי לקרוא וירא ה ' וינאץ מכעס , רק בא האתנח באמצע הפסוק כדי להשוות שני חלקיו , לנועם השיר , וזה מצוי בשירי הקודש , כגון ( תהלים ק " ב ח ') שקדתי ואהיה כצפור בודד על גג , גל עיני ואביטה נפלאות מתורתך ( שם קי " ט י " ח ). ומה שהזכיר הבנות שלא כמנהג , נראה שהיא נבואה על ימי ירמיה , שבימי החרבן היו גם הנשים אדוקות הרבה לע " ז

This impacts how we are to view the parsing of the pasuk. JPS has it:

יט וַיַּרְא ה', וַיִּנְאָץ, {ר} מִכַּעַס בָּנָיו, וּבְנֹתָיו. {ס}

19 And the LORD saw, and spurned, because of the provoking of His sons and His daughters.

but that would have וינאץ as an intransitive verb, lacking a direct object. But this is only if we stop there, after וינאץ. As indeed the etnachta on וינאץ tells us to.

But Shadal says to keep reading, such that it should read "and spurned, from anger, His sons and His daughters." Thus "His sons and His daughters" would be the direct object.

I don't know that this is necessary, as it is Biblical poetry such that weird, archaic forms surface. And it has the drawback of breaking up the structure of the poetry, in this case of the second half of the verse neatly expanding upon the ideas of the first half. But it is an interesting alternative parse nonetheless.

I wonder how the pasuk is understood in this derasha in Ketubot, daf 8:

פתח ואמר (דברים לב) וירא ה' וינאץ מכעס בניו ובנותיו דור שאבות מנאצים להקב"ה כועס על בניהם ועל בנותיהם ומתים כשהם קטנים

I see two ways of parsing this, but this might be from my own deficiency.

If I understand the parse correctly, it is that a generation who are menaatzim Hashem, that generation is angry at their sons and daughters. Thus Hashem sees their actions and becomes נאץ as a result of their מנאצים of Hashem. And they do this because of their "anger", keviyachol, at their children. That is the role of the mi in mikaas.

The more standard parse, which is in Soncino and also seems to be Rashi's parse, is "[This means, in] a generation [in which the fathers spurn the Holy One, blessed be He, He is angry with their sons and their daughters and they die when they are young." I don't see how this accounts for the מ in מכעס.

In the former parse, ונאץ would appear to be an intransitive verb. In the latter parse, it would appear that, effectively, the sons and daughters become almost the direct object of וינאץ (though one can argue that it is כועס), such that it can be a transitive verb.

Which Naarah is Plene? Did Rambam forget the gemara?

In the laws of the defamed maiden:

טו וְלָקַח אֲבִי הַנַּעֲרָ, וְאִמָּהּ; וְהוֹצִיאוּ אֶת-בְּתוּלֵי הַנַּעֲרָ, אֶל-זִקְנֵי הָעִיר--הַשָּׁעְרָה.

15 then shall the father of the damsel, and her mother, take and bring forth the tokens of the damsel's virginity unto the elders of the city in the gate.

and then:

יט וְעָנְשׁוּ אֹתוֹ מֵאָה כֶסֶף, וְנָתְנוּ לַאֲבִי הַנַּעֲרָה--כִּי הוֹצִיא שֵׁם רָע, עַל בְּתוּלַת יִשְׂרָאֵל; וְלוֹ-תִהְיֶה לְאִשָּׁה, לֹא-יוּכַל לְשַׁלְּחָהּ כָּל-יָמָיו. {ס}

19 And they shall fine him a hundred shekels of silver, and give them unto the father of the damsel, because he hath brought up an evil name upon a virgin of Israel; and she shall be his wife; he may not put her away all his days. {S}

This second occurrence, in pasuk 19, is the only instance in the entire Torah that naarah is spelled plene, with a final heh. In all other places it is a krei ukhetiv, or almost so, with it pronounced naarah but written only with the the consonants of naar. In Nach, there are plenty of others, but this is the case in Torah.

And so goes the masoretic note, as Minchas Shai states, that leit malei batorah, there is no other plene one in the Torah.

We also have this is ketubot, and I would add that perhaps this is a basis of the masoretic note, beside manuscript evidence. In Ketubot 40b, we have:

אמר ר"ל המוציא שם רע על הקטנה פטור שנא' (דברים כב, יט) ונתנו לאבי הנערה נערה מלא דיבר הכתוב מתקיף לה רב אדא בר אהבה טעמא דכתב רחמנא נערה הא לאו הכי הוה אמינא אפילו קטנה והא כתיב (דברים כב, כ) ואם אמת היה הדבר הזה לא נמצאו בתולים לנערה והוציאו את הנערה אל פתח בית אביה וסקלוה וקטנה לאו בת עונשין היא אלא כאן נערה הא כל מקום שנאמר נער אפילו קטנה במשמע:

Resh Lakish ruled; A man who has brought an evil name upon a minor is exempt, for it is said in Scripture, And give them unto the father of the damsel,53 Scripture expressed the term na'arah as plenum.

R. Adda b. Ahabah demurred: Is the reason then because the All-Merciful has written na'arah, but otherwise it would have been said that even a minor [was included], surely [it may be objected] it is written in Scripture, But if this thing be true, and the tokens of virginity be not found in the damsel, then they shall bring out the damsel to the door of her father's house, and [the men of her city] shall stone her, while a minor is not, is she, subject to punishment? — [The explanation,] however, [is that since] na'arah [has been written] here [it may be inferred that here only is a minor excluded] but wherever Scripture uses the expression of na'ar even a minor is included.

Thus, there is an explicit derasha on the basis of the naarah in pasuk 19 being spelled malei, with a final heh. And it is easy to extrapolate that it is only this instance in Torah which is malei, but all others are not. That is indeed the import of the gemara.

Yet, as Minchas Shai notes, there is a weirdness when Rambam brings down these laws in his Mishneh Torah. He writes:

הלכות נערה בתולה פרק ג

א המוציא שם רע על בת ישראל, ונמצא הדבר שקר--לוקה, שנאמר "וייסרו, אותו" (דברים כב,יח); ואזהרה שלו, מ"לא תלך רכיל בעמיך" (ויקרא יט,טז). ונותן לאביה, משקל מאה סלעים כסף מזוקק; ואם הייתה יתומה, הרי הן של עצמה. [ב] והמוציא שם רע על הקטנה, או על הבוגרת--פטור מן הקנס, ומן המלקות; ואינו חייב, עד שיוציא על הנערה--שנאמר "והוציאו את בתולי הנערה" (דברים כב,טו;וראה דברים כב,יט), "נערה" מלא דיבר הכתוב.

He is citing the wrong pasuk -- one not brought for this purpose in the gemara -- and declaring it malei there!! But as we know from our masoretic notes, only pasuk 19 has naarah malei; he is making pasuk 15 malei. These are two separate but interrelated problems: (a) citing the wrong pasuk, and (b) declaring that wrong pasuk malei.

Indeed, the Kesef Mishnah notes (see inside, bottom of right column and top of left column) a separate problem, that according to the conclusion of the gemara, this need not be the source, but rather according to the gemara that it must be talking about a naarah and not a ketana, because it talks of her punishment, of stoning. So in the entire segment we must be talking about naarah. Thus, the gemara concludes with a separate derivation of this law, though it derives things about נער as ketana in general. His answer is that the Rambam chose a derech ketzara here.

But he also asks that the pasuk the Rambam cites is the wrong pasek, and is indeed chaser! He does not offer an answer, other than to say וזה שלא בדיקדוק. Thus, he appears to maintain that Rambam simply made an error.

Indeed, this is one of the big points made in Dr. Marc Shapiro's Maimonides and His Interpreters (see here), that Rambam sometimes makes mistakes, including in terms of quoting statements. And this may well be what it is here.

However, I would like to defend this Rambam, if possible. It is not so clear to me that Rambam made such a major error here. Rather, he may have simply understood the gemara in a different way.

Part of why we understand the gemara the way we do is that we assume that there is only one instance in all of Torah that naarah is written chaser. Indeed, we have a masorah for that. But is it possible that this masorah was based on the gemara, and not just on manuscript evidence? I would consider it extremely plausible that this is so. Even if not, we find thousands of examples of conflicting masorot, so we might imagine Rambam had a different masorah here. What I am getting at is that we should lay aside this tradition for a moment, that there is only one instance of naarah that is plene (malei), and then look back at the gemara.

It is only because we assume that only one naarah is plene that we interpret the gemara's question and answer as we do -- namely, that the naarah of pasuk 19, which speaks of the fine, is plene, but others not. And the question is that in the same section, this damsel is threatened with the death penalty, but we know that a ketana would not receive that punishment. Rather, it is the punishment which shows that in all cases here, we are speaking of a naarah and not ketanah. And the writing in malei in one instance here, in pasuk 19, sets the stage for all other instances, that naar(ah) spelled without the final heh also includes a ketana.

The "difficulty" with this reading is that there are other instances, even within this segment -- indeed, even in the instance of stoning, that it is spelled naar(ah), without that final heh. And if we learn out from stoning that it excludes a minor, that it is spelled deficiently in that very instance should disprove the assertion the naar(ah) includes minors.

Maybe we can reread the gemara that way and make this Rav Ada bar Ahava's objection. But then it is difficult to see how the answer is an answer. The gemara just doesn't seem (to me) to parse well if we read it in this way I just suggested. How can it extrapolate to other cases? And it seems to be begging the question, and using the problem as if it is the proof. Try reading this into the gemara and see what I mean.

There is another important point. When the gemara cites the pasuk about stoning, which is not pasuk 19, but rather is pasuk 21, they cite it malei. Now this could just be because it is quoting it in the way it is read rather than written. But in a gemara where the very point is the malei vs. chaser, this seems sheer sloppiness!

I would assert that it is not sheer sloppiness. The gemara was citing the pasuk as indeed written. And while throughout all of Torah, it is written deficient, in pasuk 15, 19, and 21 is is written plene. So it is not that the entire section is linked, such that despite it being written deficiently, one asks from the stoning punishment onto another pasuk.

The gemara then reads as follows:

(1) Resh Lakish: That it is not a ketana comes from the plene spelling, which is highly irregular and only occurs in the three pesukim in this section.

(2) Rav Ada bar Ahava: The implication of your statement is that were it not for this plene spelling, I would not know that a ketana is excluded. But if so, the plene spelling in pasuk 21, only, is entirely superfluous. Because that plene spelling would indicate that only a naarah but not a ketanah would be punished. But we would know this anyway, because a ketana is lav bat oneshin! And the Torah does not add letters unnecessarily, so why have this extra heh in naarah in pasuk 21, to create an entirely unnecessary derasha?

(3) The gemara answers: No, this is not superfluous! Rather, it is the entire basis of the association of the derasha of the malei heh with her not being a ketana. Here, in pasuk 21, we have a clear instance in which it cannot be a ketana, and it is written in this strange manner, with a full heh. We extrapolate from there. And that is how we know, in general, that if it is written malei it is not a ketana. And the other places, not in this section with three pesukim, but all the other times in Torah, a ketana is included.

This works out well with the gemara.

If so, and if this is how Rambam understood the gemara, then Kesef Mishnah's first question is resolved. It is not based on the fact that the girl gets stoned, if guilty. Rather, that empowers the naar / naarah distinction, and then we can use the derasha of the malei to learn this out. (Indeed, you might be able to say that without my radical reinterpretation of the gemara.)

Why did the Rambam choose a different pasuk from the gemara, which is chaser rather than malei as he asserts? It is possible he has a slightly different girsa of the gemara, which cites pasuk 15. Though obviously 19 is better since it actually discusses the fine.

I don't think Rambam had a different girsa. Rather, he chose pasuk 15 for one, or both, of these reasons.

(1) This is the first pasuk in the section which is malei, and his point is that all of them are malei in this section. Something we get from the first instance and on.

(2) He is making a cute derasha here, and manages to work the word hotzi in the derasha. Again, he had said:

ואינו חייב, עד שיוציא על הנערה--שנאמר "והוציאו את בתולי הנערה" (דברים כב,טו;וראה דברים כב,יט), "נערה" מלא דיבר הכתוב.

Even though this vehotziu means to bring out evidence, rather than to bring up a false name on her, as we see in pasuk 19 -- כִּי הוֹצִיא שֵׁם רָע עַל בְּתוּלַת יִשְׂרָאֵל -- pasuk 19 does not have this lucky sequence of words which parallels the point, as the naarah occurs earlier in the pasuk. Therefore, Rambam seizes this one.

Unless he has another girsa in which this is indeed the prooftext in the gemara. Or unless the Rambam forgot.

The conclusion of all this is that since Rambam does not cite the gemara in full, we don't really know what was before him, and can only try to reconstruct his line of reasoning based on the sources before us. And I believe that the reconstruction I put forth is a reasonable one. However, if so, then perhaps our Sifrei Torah are not in line with the Sefer Torah that the Rambam had; or perhaps what Chazal had. Even so, I would not change our present sifrei Torah.

Which of the two interpretations of the gemara do I find more convincing? I am not going to take a stand on that. I am just suggesting that this could have been how Rambam read the gemara.

One final point: See how the Rif treats this:

ועוד דגרסי' בפ' נערה שנתפתתה אמר ריש לקיש המוציא שם רע על הקטנה פטור שנאמר ונתן לאבי הנערה נערה מלא דבר הכתוב וכו' עד אלא כאן נערה הא כל מקום שנאמר נער אפילו קטנה במשמע

aIt could just be him summarizing in order to get to the broader point he is developing here, but he does seem to leave it, in this derech ketzara, with the implication that it stems from this derasha, and that the conclusion of the gemara reinforces this. And in Rambam's bet midrash, they studied Rif -- indeed, more often than they studied the gemara itself.

Extrospective vs. Introspective Derashot

Recently, I have seen too many divrei Torah with the message of "here is why we are great and those other people are entirely without merit." Those other people are on occasion religious Zionists, secular Israelis, people who don't belong to a particular end-of-times kabbalistic cult, and so on. This annoys and offends me -- first because I think it is not true, and second because even if it were true, is this really what one should be expending energy on? How is this productive? It just boosts feelings of superiority rather than introspection and true love for one's fellow man. There are indeed times and places when there is a need for such derashos, but I do not think the present situation warrants it.

I think that Rabbi Yochanan felt the same way, in an exchange in Kesubos 111b with Rabbi Eliezer. And I think that the proper way to learn this gemara is to realize what is happening on this meta-level, an almost homiletic level, rather than the actual interpretation of texts.

Ketubot 111b reads:

R. Eleazar said; The illiterate will not be resurrected, for it is said in Scripture, The dead will not live etc. So it was also taught: The dead will not live. As this might [be assumed to refer] to all, it was specifically stated, The lax will not rise, [thus indicating] that the text speaks only of such a man as was lax in the study of the words of the Torah.

{The pasuk was Yeshaya 26:14:

יד מֵתִים, בַּל-יִחְיוּ--רְפָאִים, בַּל-יָקֻמוּ; לָכֵן פָּקַדְתָּ וַתַּשְׁמִידֵם, וַתְּאַבֵּד כָּל-זֵכֶר לָמוֹ.

14 The dead live not, the shades rise not; to that end hast Thou punished and destroyed them, and made all their memory to perish.

and refaim, "shades," is understood here as lax.
First the statement was that the dead shall not live, but this is not all the dead, only the refaim -- the lax.
}

Said R. Johanan to him: it is no satisfaction to their Master that you should speak to them in this manner. That text was written of a man who was so lax as to worship idols.

'I', the other replied, 'make an exposition [to the same effect] from another text. For it is written in Scripture, For thy dew is as the dew of light, and the earth shall bring to life the dead. him who makes use of the 'light' of the Torah will the 'light' of the Torah revive, but him who makes no use of the light of the Torah the light of the Torah will not revive'.

{This is a verse a few pesukim later in the same perek:

יט יִחְיוּ מֵתֶיךָ, נְבֵלָתִי יְקוּמוּן; הָקִיצוּ וְרַנְּנוּ שֹׁכְנֵי עָפָר, כִּי טַל אוֹרֹת טַלֶּךָ, וָאָרֶץ, רְפָאִים תַּפִּיל. {פ}

19 Thy dead shall live, my dead bodies shall arise--awake and sing, ye that dwell in the dust--for Thy dew is as the dew of light, and the earth shall bring to life the shades.

}

Observing, however, that he was distressed, he said to him, 'Master, I have found for them a remedy in the Pentateuch: But ye that did cleave unto the Lord your God are alive every one of you this day;

{ Devarim 4:4:

ד וְאַתֶּם, הַדְּבֵקִים, בַּה, אֱלֹהֵיכֶם--חַיִּים כֻּלְּכֶם, הַיּוֹם.

4 But ye that did cleave unto the LORD your God are alive every one of you this day.

}

now is it possible to 'cleave' to the divine presence concerning which it is written in Scripture, For the Lord thy God is a devouring fire? But [the meaning is this:] Any man who marries his daughter to a scholar, or carries on a trade on behalf of scholars, or benefits scholars from his estate is regarded by Scripture as if he had cleaved to the divine presence. Similarly you read in Scripture, To love the Lord thy God, [to hearken to His voice,] and to cleave unto Him. Is it possible for a human being to 'cleave' unto the divine presence? But [what was meant is this:] Any man who marries his daughter to a scholar, or carries on a trade for scholars, or benefits scholars from his estate is regarded by Scripture as if he had cleaved to the divine presence.

The "illiterate" refers to amaratzim, and in fact soon Shadal will be discussing Rabbi Eliezer's first derasha in the context of the philosophical notion that only intellectual study will allow the soul to be everlasting, instead of being cut off.

The problem with Rabbi Eliezer's derasha is not that something about the pasuk which acts as a prooftext works correctly, or better, about idolaters than an interpretation about not learning Torah -- even though the previous pasuk is:

יג ה אֱלֹהֵינוּ, בְּעָלוּנוּ אֲדֹנִים זוּלָתֶךָ; לְבַד-בְּךָ, נַזְכִּיר שְׁמֶךָ.

13 O LORD our God, other lords beside Thee have had dominion over us; but by Thee only do we make mention of Thy name.

But this is not Rabbi Yochanan's issue, I think. Rather, he states his issue -- " it is no satisfaction to their Master that you should speak to them in this manner."

Homiletic derashos such are this are in the hands of man, and this is an unproductive and possibly hurtful path to take. I doubt that an am haaretz hear this derasha and so, "Oh noes! I had better start studying!" Rather, it makes those who learn Torah feel more accomplished, but more than that, that they solely will be getting reward. As opposed to the unlearned man in the market, who is their fellow Jew. I don't know how Hashem will reward effort, though I hope all good people, even if unlearned, will get their just reward. But in terms of my own attitude, it is not positive to think of other people, who in general will not be changing, with disdain, and to consider their lives of little or no value. Even if the derasha, and the actual facts, are true, it is not to the satisfaction of their Master that I speak of them in this manner. Rather, I should value them as fellow human beings, and regard them with love and respect. Even if my priorities and judgments differ.

If one does not make such a derasha, the pasuk still stands waiting for a derasha. And Rabbi Yochanan provides one. And it is one against idolatry. This places those not to be resurrected at a greater extreme, for those do not worship Hashem at all, but worship other gods. But in terms of fellow Jews, even those who do not commit themselves to the study of Torah, they still will merit resurrection. But I do not think the point was the alternate derasha.

Rabbi Eliezer's response is to seize on a pasuk a bit later in the same perek in Yeshaya, and darshen it in the same manner as he first attempted.

Rabbi Yochanan is not happy. This is not because of a problem with linguistic merits of the derasha. Rather, Rabbi Yochanan is vexed by the conclusion of the derasha. And if presses, surely one could come up with an alternative homiletic derasha here. But Rabbi Eliezer has certainly not won the argument against Rabbi Yochanan. Rather, Rabbi Yochanan blocked his first derasha by showing an alternative interpretation, and Rabbi Eliezer (perhaps tone-deaf) circumvents this block by showing that he will just take another verse (and perhaps another verse, and another verse, and so on) and apply it to this class of people.

It is indeed the conclusion that vexes Rabbi Yochanan. How could Rabbi Eliezer write out so many of his fellow Jews, who simply did not merit to learn Torah? Rabbi Eliezer senses this, and is willing to meet Rabbi Yochanan half-way. Those Jews who agree to the general program and priorities, and even though they do not themselves learn, respect learning and do what they can to support it -- they can also be resurrected. Thus the pasuk in Devarim reads

ד וְאַתֶּם, הַדְּבֵקִים, בַּה, אֱלֹהֵיכֶם--חַיִּים כֻּלְּכֶם, הַיּוֹם.

4 But ye that did cleave unto the LORD your God are alive every one of you this day.

which is interpreted as those who attach to Talmidei Chachamim. Those will be alive on that day, hayom.

This is a more inclusive picture, though not an entirely inclusive one. Still, it answers to the problem of superiority and sinas chinam, for these also have their place and are valued by Hashem values them. And it gives a role to those who are not cut out to study, because of whatever life-circumstances. And it is productive in that it brings these people from the outside in to the mission, in a way they can participate.

A while ago, when discussing a similar derasha made by Rabbi Yochanan (in comparison to statements made by Rabbi Ovadia Yosef), someone suggested that this was all self-serving of Rabbi Yochanan, as a way of garnering support for himself and other Torah scholars. But we can see from this exchange that it was not this. Rather, it is out of love for a fellow Jew and a desire to find a place for others of different backgrounds in the service of Hashem.

This actually brings us to that other derasha, which occurs in Berachot 34b:

וא"ר חייא בר אבא א"ר יוחנן כל הנביאים כולן לא נתנבאו אלא למשיא בתו לתלמיד חכם ולעושה פרקמטיא לתלמיד חכם ולמהנה תלמיד חכם מנכסיו אבל תלמידי חכמים עצמן עין לא ראתה אלהים זולתך

This is remarkably similar to Rabbi Eliezer's derasha, but Rabbi Eliezer was Rabbi Yochanan's student, and he made the derasha in conversation with Rabbi Yochanan. What is happening here?

I do not think this is the general trend some claim that statements from Eretz Yisrael are attributed to Rabbi Yochanan. No. I think that it is possible that Rabbi Eliezer knew of Rabbi Yochanan's derasha, and patterned his own after it. Or potentially vice versa.

Rabbi Yochanan's derasha in Berachos is in fact different in slight ways, which are really major ways.

1. Here, Rabbi Yochanan is not merely allowing them to be resurrected in techiyas hameisim, but rather is saying that all the rewards mentioned in Tanach are going to them.
2. Of course, Rabbi Yochanan is not talking about those who do not contribute in this manner, but I would not read that as agreeing with Rabbi Eliezer about such people. Such people as e.g. do chessed, but are not committed to learning Torah.
3. It is entirely positive all around. Not only does it encourage everybody to take part in this great Torah-learning endeavor, but it also encourages the Talmidei Chachamim by saying they will get even more, something which is unimaginable. You do not need to knock down others to promote your own group as doing something more important.

Maharatz Chayos actually treats this derasha as homiletic, and as a guzma, in order to encourage certain attitudes one should take. But I think it would be unfortunate if someone takes Rabbi Yochanan's derasha, meant to encourage each group, in order to foster attitudes of low-worth to e.g. those who do not commit themselves to learning while working, or (in from another person's perspective) those who do not commit themselves to kollel-only, but instead work for a living. Not everyone is cut out for such a life, or such a direction to their efforts. Personalities are different, and abilities are different. Some people may be well-suited for hours of intensive Talmud study, and others might have talents in creative endeavors such as painting, or in working with people in a bein adam lachaveiro realm.

The Segulah of Divorce Then Marriage

DafNotes has an interesting post of a practical halachic question involving a segulah for a childless couple:

A couple who did not merit having children came to Rav Yitzchak Zilberstein with the following inquiry: Should they get divorced and then remarried, for they had heard that this is a segulah for having children? The woman, however, was refusing because getting divorced was degrading to her. What should they do?

He cited proof from our Gemora {Kesuvos 81b} that a divorce, even just for a few moments is degrading and therefore, the wife has grounds to refuse the divorce.

...

The Steipler Gaon, when asked the same question, said that a childless couple may try to divorce and remarry (and the husband need not be concerned that after the divorce, the wife will refuse to remarry); however, he personally never heard that this is a valid segulah and he has no opinion regarding its veracity.

I excerpted the post, so check out the rest of it over there.

Personally, I think that they should not do it for many reasons, foremost that (a) segulah-ism in general is bad, and (b) this is a mean thing to do to one's wife, to divorce, and any feeling that it is degrading to her is based on her personal feelings, which have validity, rather than any question of whether the degradation has valid halachic status.

Furthermore, in putting this segulah into practice in this instance, one hits against a technical violation of the Cherem deRabbenu Gershom, which forbids divorcing one's wife against her will. For even if the conclusion is that it is not halachically degrading, for her it is so, and so her feeling is that she does not wish to get divorced.

The Steipler's response about whether one must worry that the wife will refuse to remarry seems off to the question of whether it is degrading. I wonder if it was a separate couple who asked him this, or the same couple.

What of the origin of this segulah? I have my strong suspicions that it is rooted in Ketubot, in the halacha, no longer enforced, that if a man is married to a woman for ten years and they do not have children, they must get divorced. As we write there (translation from my Rif blog):

{Ketubot 77a}

א"ר יהודה א"ר אשי אין מעשין אלא לפסולות
כי אמריתה קמיה דשמואל אמר כגון אלמנה לכהן גדול גרושה וחלוצה לכהן הדיוט ממזרת ונתינה לישראל בת ישראל לממזר ולנתין אבל נשא אשה ושהה עמה עשר שנים ולא ילדה אין כופין אותו
(ורב תחליפא בר אבימי אמר שמואל אפילו נשא אשה ושהה עמה עשר שנים ולא ילדה כופין אותו להוציא)
וכולהו בין הני דרבנן דתנן במתני' שכופין אותן להוציא ובין הני דאורייתא כגון אלמנה לכה"ג גרושה וחלוצה לכהן הדיוט כולהו היו כייפינן להו בשוטים דבדברים לא יוסר עבד
וכל הני דמדרבנן אי אמרה הוינא בהדיה שבקינן לה בר ממוכה שחין ומי שנשא אשה ושהה עמה עשר שנים ולא ילדה
מוכה שחין אי אמרה דיירנא בהדיה בסהדי שבקינן לה
ומי שנשא אשה ושהה עמה עשר שנים ולא ילדה אע"ג דאמרה דיירנא בהדיה בסהדיה לא שבקינן לה אלא יוציא ויתן כתובה ומותרת לינשא לאחר אע"פ שאין לו בנים
כדגרסי' בפ' הבא על יבמתו
ת"ר נשאת לראשון ולא היו לו בנים לשני ולא היו לו בנים לשלישי לא תנשא אלא למי שיש לו בנים ואם נשאת למי שאין לו בנים תצא בלא כתובה:

Rav Yehuda cited Rav Ashi {this makes no chronological sense; emend to our gemara's Rav Assi, or to Rosh's Rav}: We do not force {divorce} except to invalid {/tainted} women.
When this was stated before Shmuel, he said: Such as a widow to a kohen gadol, a divorcee or chalutza to a regular kohen, a bastardess and female descendant of Gibeonites to an Israel, the daughter of an Israelite to a bastard or to a descendant of Gibeonites. However, if he married a woman and remained with her for 10 years and she did not bear children, we do not force him.

(*And Rav Tachlifa bar Avimi cited Shmuel: Even if he married a woman and remained with her for 10 years and she did not bear children, we force him to divorce. *)

And all of them, whether the Rabbinic ones which we taught in the Mishna that we force them to divorce, and whether the Biblical ones, such as a widow to a kohen gadol, a divorcee or chalutza to a normal kohen, all of them they force them with whips, for {Mishlei 29:19}:

יט בִּדְבָרִים, לֹא-יִוָּסֶר עָבֶד: כִּי-יָבִין, וְאֵין מַעֲנֶה.

19 A servant will not be corrected by words; for though he understand, there will be no response.

{Ketubot 77b}
And all the Rabbinic ones, if she said "I wish to be with him," we leave her, with the exception of one afflicted with boils, and one who married a woman and remained with her 10 years, and she did not bear children.
One {= a man} afflicted with boils, if she says "I will dwell with him with witnesses," we leave her. And one who married a woman and remained with her ten years, and she did not bear children, even though she says "I will dwell with him with witnesses," we do not leave her, but rather he divorces and grants the ketuba. And she is permitted to marry another, even though he does not have children, and we learn in perek haba al yevimto: The Sages learnt {in a brayta}: If she was married to the first one and he did not have children, to the second and he did not have children, then to the third one she should not marry, except to one who already has children. And if she marries one who does not have children, she goes out {of the marriage} without a ketuba.

Now, nowadays we do not force such a divorce. But back then, they forced a divorce. But she could marry another person, even one who did not have children, because perhaps the lack of potency came from his side rather than hers. After three such tries, she may only marry someone who already had children.

My guess would be that though this divorce was not being enforced nor put into practice, some folks thought they would be clever and divorce and then remarry. This would be for one of two reasons. Either (a) they thought that this would restart the clock of ten years, or (b) they thought that they would thus fulfill the Talmudic obligation to divorce, though undoing the ill effects immediately thereafter.

I lean towards reason (b). However, note that the Talmudic formulation is ומותרת לינשא לאחר אע"פ שאין לו בנים, with a stress I would place on the word לאחר. The idea, and hope, is that perhaps with someone else she would be able to have children. But to the same man, it has already been established sufficiently that this union will likely not produce children. As such, I think the plain meaning of the gemara is that she is permitted to marry another, but of course she cannot remarry him.

Perhaps many couples in some area and time pulled this unnecessary formalism/trick, and a few of them finally conceived. And then, this practice was established as a segulah for having children, especially since ignorant people would not know the reason for the formalism.

At any rate, I would suggest that, at least for couples married a minimum of ten years without a child, not only is this segulah nonsense, but it may present halachic problems. It is not neutral but negative. For it is one thing to disregard the Talmudic instruction to divorce, and to remain in the marriage. This has an element of shev veAl taaseh, and has parallels in other cases where if the woman is married in a halachically troublesome scenario, we permit her to remain in the marriage. However, once they are divorced, it is no longer a shev veAl taaseh. The remarriage to someone to whom is is forbidden is a violation via a kum veAseh.

For the sake of a segulah, people are putting themselves into possibly questionable halachic territory. But alas, this is true of quite a number of segulot.

Daf Yomi Ketubot 102b: When Did The Heirs Slaughter the Son?

From Ketubot 102, translation from my Rif blog:

לא יאמר הראשון כשתבא אצלי אזונה
אמר רב חסדא זאת אומרת בת אצל האם לא שנא גדולה ולא שנא קטנה
תניא מי שמת והניח בן קטן יורשי האב אומרים יהא גדל אצלנו והיא אומרת [יהא] גדל אצלי אין מניחין [אותו] אצל מי שראוי ליורשו מעשה היה ושחטוהו ער"ה

"The first husband is not entitled to plead, 'when she comes to me I will give her maintenance'":
Rav Chisda said: This says that the daughter must be living with her mother, with no difference whether she is an adult of a minor.
They learnt {in a brayta}: One who died and left a minor son, the heirs of the father say 'let him grow up with us,' and she says 'let him grow up with me,' we do not place him with anyone entitled to be an heir. There was an incident and they slaughtered him on erev Rosh haShana! {Note that after posting this on parsha blog, I changed my translation to match that of masoret haShas.}

It is strange that they would specifically slaughter him on Rosh haShana. To what end, specifically on that date?!

Soncino has an interesting, and true comment, about how this passage has been used to bolster the blood libel:

In order to secure his property. Now since there is nothing to prove that an older daughter (who is well capable of looking after herself) must also be maintained at her mother's house and cannot be compelled to live with the brothers and receive maintenance from them, an objection arises against R. Hisda. [Detractors of the Talmud, it may be mentioned, professed to find in this passage an allusion to the 'ritual' murder of 'Christian' children! The absurdity of this suggestion was pointed out by Eric Bischoff in his Talmudkatechismus, p. 38, where he describes it as 'sinnlos' (senseless). It is evident that this incident was recorded to emphasize the danger of entrusting a child to the care of one who stands to benefit by its death. For we see here that even the sanctity of the Festival did not deter the brothers from perpetrating a crime for the purpose of gain. This danger has also been recognized in the English Law of Insurance which lays down that a man cannot insure his child's life to derive a benefit on its death].

Note that despite the fact that our gemara has ער"ה (which I might plausibly expand to Erev Rosh Hashana), Soncino translates "Such a case once occurred and [the heirs] killed him on the eve of passover!" With such a girsa, one can see how it could be easy fodder for people trying to falsely accuse Jews of ritual murder. And invoking Pesach makes a bit more sense that Rosh haShana, at least, for slaughter in context here, since there is the typical slaughter of the pascal lamb.

Why this exchange between the Pesach and Rosh haShanah? Perhaps because Pesach made more sense for shechita? Or perhaps, in the other direction, there were blood libels arising from the reference to Passover, and so a scribe changed it to erev Rosh haShana, to prevent bloodshed from people attacking Jews, while maintaining the fact that it was a Jewish festival.

Masoret haShas has a an illuminating comment. First, Rabbi Yehoshua Boaz (16th century) writes that the printers made an error here, and it was really erev haRishon, meaning that the very first night the son came to live with them, the heirs killed him. This makes a lot more sense in context. But there were roshei teivot, and the printers made an error, to something which makes no sense in context.

(I would say that perhaps those letters were עה"ר, and the printers transposed them to ער"ה, which makes no sense in the context. But see what I write later.)

Also in masores hashas, in square brackets, Rabbi Yeshayahu Pick notes that there are other printed editions which have Passover.

Thus, the development might have been erev haRishon to erev Rosh haShanah to erev haPesach. (Or directly from erev haRishon to erev haPesach.)

It would be nice to see Kitvei Yad on this. Two I found: Ktav Yad Vatikan, Ebr 113, has erev Pesach. See the very last line, in the picture to the right.








Similarly, in Ktav Yad Vatikan, Ebr 130, we have the same. See the picture to the left, the first words on the third line.

Thus, it is understandable that Soncino selects erev haPesach as his girsa, as it is based on other printings and has basis in manuscript evidence.

Note the fact that this is just one small selection of manuscripts that I was able to look at online.

However, these particular manuscript are one piece of evidence. We can also make use of how Rishonim cite the gemara. In Tosafot Rid, he says ע"ה, without the ר. Both with and without the resh, it is understandable as erev haRishon. It is quite a stretch, in my humble opinion, that a scribe would take erev haPesach and make it into ע"ה or ע"רה, which makes the erev part clear (the first letter or first two letters), but only present the ה, the definite article, from the second word. How in the world did the scribe expect the reader to make sense of which holiday it was. It it was erev Rosh Hashana, then the ער"ה makes sense, since the ע (rather than ע"ר) stands for erev and the ר"ה stands for Rosh haShana. But, the presence of ע"ה without the resh in Tosafot Rid tells me that it could not be erev rosh hashana, at least in the manuscript before him, because the scribe would be omitting the rosh of rosh hashana.

Furthermore, I have seen nothing with erev rosh hashana spelled out in full, so this is quite likel a red herring I have introduced myself.

If we look in Rosh (1250-1328), he explicitly has erev haRishon. Thus, we see much earlier than masoret hashas that there was this reading of the gemara. Thus, together, I believe that Rosh and Tosafot Rid are sufficient to establish that this was the original reading, as put forth by Rabbi Yehoshua Boaz.

As an aside, it thus has nothing to do with Passover, and thus provides no bolster to the blood libel, even without the insightful comment in Soncino.

Ketubot 99b: Did He Specify "To One" But No Further? Or Did He Not Specify At All?

In Rif on Ketubot 99b, I would offer the following translation, which diverts a bit off of the standard translation, all because of one missing word.

The Rif:

{Ketubot 99b}

וסוגייא דמעביר על דבריו הוי פשיטא אמר לחד קפידא ואי זבין לתרי לא הוי זביניה זביני
אמר סתמא מאי
רב הונא אמר לאחד ולא לשנים
רב חסדא ורבה בר רב הונא אמרי לאחד ואפילו לשנים לאחד ואפילו למאה

{note girsological differences with our gemara, such that the topic is where he said "one but not two," vs. saying simply "one" with no further specification}
And the sugya of violating his words is:
It is obvious that if he {=the owner} said {to his agent to sell} to one, it is a point of insistence, such that if he sold to two, his sale is not a sale. If he said it plainly {without specifying the number of purchasers}, what?
Rav Huna said: To one but not to two. {Alternatively, as our gemara: 'To one,' implying not to two.}
Rav Chisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna said: To one and even to two. To one and even to 100.

אקלע רב נחמן לסורא
עול לגביה רב חסדא ורבה בר רב הונא
אמרי ליה כה"ג מאי
אמר להו לאחד ואפילו לשנים ואפילו למאה
ואע"ג דטעה שליח
היכא דטעה שליח לא קאמינא
והא מר הוא דאמר אין אונאה לקרקעות
ה"מ היכא דטעה בעה"ב אבל שליח א"ל לתקוני שדרתיך ולא לעוותי
וכן הלכתא

Rav Nachman visited Sura. Rav Chisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna entered to him. They said to him: In such an instance, what?
He said to them: To one, and even to two, and even to one hundred.
"And even where the agent erred?"
"Where they agent erred, I am not speaking of."
"But Master is the one who said that there is no overreaching {ona'ah} by land."
"Those words are where the homeowner erred, but if the agent erred, he may say to him, 'I sent you so fix me and not to mess me up.'"
And so is the halacha.

Our gemara, meanwhile, has:

פשיטא אמר לאחד ולא לשנים האמר ליה לאחד ולא לשנים
א"ל לאחד סתמא מאי
רב הונא אמר לאחד ולא לשנים רב חסדא ורבה בר רב הונא דאמרי תרוייהו לאחד ואפילו לשנים לאחד ואפילו למאה איקלע רב נחמן לסורא עול לגביה רב חסדא ורבה בר רב הונא אמרו ליה כי האי גוונא מאי אמר להו לאחד ואפי' לשנים לאחד ואפילו למאה אמרו ליה אע"ג דטעה שליח אמר להו דטעה שליח לא קאמינא אמרו ליה והאמר מר אין אונאה לקרקעות הני מילי היכא דטעה בעל הבית אבל טעה שליח אמר ליה לתקוני שדרתיך ולא לעוותי

Thus, in our gemara, we have: "If he said to him, 'to one and not to two,' he has told him to one and not to two." "If he said to him, "to one" without further stipulation, what?

Thus, in our gemara, the question is about where he actually said the word "to one," but did not further specify.

Meanwhile, the Rif has two features which differ. He has:

פשיטא אמר לחד קפידא ואי זבין לתרי לא הוי זביניה זביני
אמר סתמא מאי

Here, in the "obvious" case, there is no word "and not to two." We might interpret לחד קפידא as "one, insistently," which would map to an explicit statement of "to one but not to two."

However, we could also interpret it, and parse it, as having the quotation marks at the beginning and end of the single word לחד. This, IMHO, is the better parsing, and would mean: If he said to to "{sell} to one," this is a point of insistence, such that if he sold to two, his sale was not a sale.

Furthermore, in the next statement in the Rif's gemara, the word לאחד is missing, as well as the word ליה. Therefore, the statement reads, "if he told him without stipulation." We can then read this as "he told him to sell" without stipulating to how many people to sell to. Thus, our gemara's question (where he said "to one") is Rif's gemara's peshitta.

This all colors how we read the subsequent gemara, and how we parse לאחד ואפילו לשנים לאחד ואפילו למאה. Is the word לאחד a quote, and ואפילו לשנים לאחד ואפילו למאה the implication. Or is it all an implication, and they are discussing the extent of the implication?

I also think it quite likely that this is the reason for the setama digmara's establishing of what the peshitta and what the question is. There was a dispute, perhaps even between manuscripts, on the matter, and so it is important to arrive at what the question is before approaching the Amoraic statements.

My feeling is that the gemara originally has סתמא מאי, and our gemara is elaboration on the point. But that the interpretation of our gemara (rather than Rif's) may well match the intention of the Amoraim more closely.

Daf Yomi Ketubot 98a: Who [Authorized] You To Make the Assessment?

From my Rif translation, on Ketubot 98a:

שלח ליה רבה בריה דרבא לרב יוסף מוכרת שלא בב"ד צריכה שבועה או אינה צריכה שבועה
ותיבעי לך הכרזה
אמר ליה הכרזה לא מיבעי לי
דאמר רבי זירא אמר רב נחמן אלמנה ששמה לעצמה לא עשתה כלום
היכי דמי אי דאכרוז אמאי לא עשתה כלום
אלא לאו דלא אכרוז לעצמה הוא דלא עשתה כלום הא לאחר מה שעשתה עשתה
לעולם דאכרוז ואמרינן לה מאן שם לך

Rabba son of Rava sent to Rav Yosef: If she sold not in front of bet din, does she require an oath or does she not require an oath?
{The reply}: And you should have asked about a public announcement {, if it is required}.
He said to him: I have no question about a public announcement. For Rabbi Zera cited Rav Nachman: A widow who assessed for herself accomplishes nothing.
How so? If there was a public announcement, why has she not accomplished anything? Rather, is it not that she did not make an announcement, and thus it is for herself that she did not accomplish anything, but for another, what she did was done?
{No.} In truth, she announced, and we say to her "Who told you to assess?"

כי ההוא גברא דאפקידו גביה כיסתא דיתמי אזל שמה לנפשיה בארבע מאה זוזי
לסוף אייקר וקם בשית מאה
אתו לקמיה דרב אסי
אמר ליה מאן שם לך
והלכתא צריכה שבועה ואינה צריכה הכרזה

Just like the certain man, to whom corals of orphans were deposited, and he went and assessed them for himself as worth 400 zuz. In the end, they increased in value and stood at 600 zuz. They came before Rav Assi. He said to him: Who told you to assess?

Soncino translates מאן שם לך as 'Who [authorized] you to make the assessment?'

This is a tricky phrase to translate, and that which makes it tricky is not spelled out explicitly, so I may as well attempt to spell it out. The case appears to be one in which the person made his/her own assessment. If we translate מאן שם לך as "who assessed for you," what sort of question is this? We know who assessed -- it was the person we are talking to! Of course, this is a rhetorical question, so this is acceptable.

But there is another tricky bit -- at least I think so. Let us compare Rashi with Tosafot.

Rashi writes, mimi kabalta mechira zo, from whom did you receive this price. Not from bet din nor from the orphans!

Thus, the word sham becomes mechira, or sale price, in Rashi's translation.


Tosafot, meanwhile, has kelomar, me hechezikcha beElu hanechasim -- "who put you in charge of these assets?"

In this translation of the statement, there is the same rhetorical effect. But which specific word does sham map to? It seems to map to nothing! The answer may well be that Tosafot says kelomar, and so it is not a word by word translation.

Soncino seems to try to satisfy both Rashi and Tosafot, by translating it as 'Who [authorized] you to make the assessment?' But it is difficult to see how the one translates to the other.

I believe that this is actually a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot as to whether the ש in שם is a sin or a shin. Rashi holds it is a shin. Bolstering him is the fact that the word sham in used in the immediate context, and is the topic of conversation here -- the assessment of the assets. Tosafot reads it as a sin, such that the phrase is man sam lach, "who appointed you?" Thus, the bracketed [authorized] in Soncino's translation is indeed the word sam in the phrase. But then, there is no explicit word sham in the phrase. Tosafot would place the word [assessment] in brackets and the word authorized out of brackets.

We have precedent for this phrase in Shemot 2, where an Israelite says to Moshe:

יד וַיֹּאמֶר מִי שָׂמְךָ לְאִישׁ שַׂר וְשֹׁפֵט, עָלֵינוּ--הַלְהָרְגֵנִי אַתָּה אֹמֵר, כַּאֲשֶׁר הָרַגְתָּ אֶת-הַמִּצְרִי; וַיִּירָא מֹשֶׁה וַיֹּאמַר, אָכֵן נוֹדַע הַדָּבָר.

14 And he said: 'Who made thee a ruler and a judge over us? thinkest thou to kill me, as thou didst kill the Egyptian?' And Moses feared, and said: 'Surely the thing is known.'

מִי שָׂמְךָ parallels man sam lach, and the question is who granted you this authority.

Which is correct? Truth be told, I am not sure, but I feel special affinity to this reconstructed nikkud in Tosafot's reading, because it works, because it does not require reordering of the words in the phrase, because it has Biblical parallel, and honestly, because I came up with it. But what Rashi really has working for him is context. But not every שם in context of sham needs to be assessment.

Ketubot 86b: If He Does *Not* Set Her Up As A Shopkeeper

The Mishna in Ketubot 86b, reads, according to the printed version of the Rif:

Mishna:

המושיב את אשתו חנונית או שמינה אפוטרופא הרי זה משביעה כל זמן שירצה
לא הושיבה חנונית ולא מינה אפוטרופא ה"ז אינו יכול להשביעה
רבי אליעזר אומר אפילו על פלכה ועל עיסתה

If one sets up his wife as a shopkeeper or appoints her as an adminstratrix, he may compel her to swear to him whenever he wants.
If he does not set her up as a shopkeeper or as an administratrix, he is not able to compel her to swear to him.
Rabbi Eliezer says: Even on her spindle and her dough.

However, Bach says to cross out the second sentence, לא הושיבה חנונית ולא מינה אפוטרופא ה"ז אינו יכול להשביעה. Indeed, it is not in our Mishna in the gemara, and is not in the same Mishna in Yerushalmi.

This is relevant because our gemara has a discussion of the meaning of Rabbi Eliezer's statement. Is he talking lechatchila or bedieved. That is, is he saying that ab initio, without any status of shopkeeper of administratrix, he can make her swear about her spindle and her dough, such that he is arguing with the Tanna Kamma? Or (this goes with the ab initio bit), is he saying that by virtue of the fact that she works with spindle and dough for him, she is a sort of administratrix, such that he can compel her to swear? Or is he saying {as a bedieved} that once he makes her swear about her duties as shopkeeping, he can roll over am additional oath about her spindle and her dough?

In other words, does אפילו in Rabbi Eliezer's statement go on the things he can make he swear about {the "cheftza"} or on the status of the woman he can make swear {the "gavra"}?

This is somewhat more ambiguous without the words that Bach tells us to remove from the text of Rif's Mishna. For the Tanna Kamma says he can compel her to swear whenever, and he is perhaps extending the subject matter upon which she swears, with the words אפילו. Thus, it can be read as an extension of the Tanna Kamma.

But with these words inserted, it is being stressed that there are situations where he cannot compel her to swear. Juxtapose Rabbi Eliezer's statement of אפילו with this, and it reads more as an argument with the Tanna Kamma, that he even allows swearing where she is not an administratrix. Perhaps for some unknown reason, or perhaps because work on spindle and dough is enough to consider her an administratrix.

Indeed, with the words inserted, it matches the words in the brayta {and if we argue the words were not initially present in the Mishna, perhaps we can say they were accidentally copied from this brayta}. That brayta reads {86b}:

ת"ש הרי שלא פטר את אשתו מן הנדר ומן השבועה והושיבה חנוונית או שמינה אפוטרופיא הרי זה משביעה כל זמן שירצה
לא הושיבה חנוונית ולא מינה אפוטרופיא אינו יכול להשביעה
רבי אליעזר אומר אע"פ שלא הושיבה חנוונית ולא מינה אפוטרופיא הרי זה משביעה כל זמן שירצה שאין לך אשה שלא נעשית אפוטרופיא שעה אחת בחיי בעלה על פילכה ועל עיסתה
אמרו לו אין אדם דר עם נחש בכפיפה
שמע מינה לכתחלה שמע מינה

Note that the statement לא הושיבה חנוונית ולא מינה אפוטרופיא אינו יכול להשביעה is present. And that Rabbi Eliezer is expanded, such that אפילו is expanded into אע"פ שלא הושיבה חנוונית ולא מינה אפוטרופיא הרי זה משביעה כל זמן שירצה, and על פלכה ועל עיסתה is expanded so that it is clear that it is because of her dough and spindle that he can make her swear, for she is now considered an administratrix: שאין לך אשה שלא נעשית אפוטרופיא שעה אחת בחיי בעלה על פילכה ועל עיסתה.

This represents a Tannaitic expansion of the shorter version, and thus an interpretation of the shorter version.

Now, perhaps we should therefore say the girsa in the Mishna should be as without the sentence there. After all, the Mishna needs to be ambiguous in order for the setama digmara to feel compelled to resolve this. However, we might answer that that part, in and of itself, is not sufficient to remove all ambiguity. It is only the phrases inserted in to Rabbi Eliezer's position (rather than the Tanna Kamma's position) that makes this brayta entirely unambiguous.

Ketubot 86a: Collecting the Value of the Paper?

The gemara {Ketubot 86a} reads:

גופא אמר שמואל המוכר שטר חוב לחברו וחזרו ומחלו מחול ואפילו יורש מוחל

אמר רב הונא בריה דרב יהושע ואי פקח הוא מקרקש ליה בזוזי וכתיב ליה שטרא בשמיה
אמר אמימר מאן דדאין דינא דגרמי מגבי ביה מיניה דמוחל [דמי] שטרא מעליא ומאן דלא דאין דינא דגרמי מגבי ביה דמי ניירא בעלמא
[הוה עובדא] ואכפייה רפרם לרב אשי ואגבי ביה ככשורא לצלמי
והלכתא כוותיה

To return to the main text: Shmuel said: If one sold a bond of debt to his fellow, and then turned around and forgave it, it is forgiven, and even the heir can forgive.
Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua said: And if he {the buyer} is clever, he rattles for him {the debtor} some money such that he {the debtor} will write the bond in his name {before the creditor forgives the debt}.
Amemar said: He {=Rabbi Meir} who judges liability for indirect action would here allow one to collect from the one who forgave, the amount of a valid bond, and one who does not judge liability for direct action would allow collection of only the value of the paper.
[There was an incident] and Rafram compelled Rav Ashi to order collection of it as a beam fit for decorative mouldings.
{Rif}: And the halacha is like him.

I don't understand why according to Amemar, one would allow the collection of the value of the paper. After all, the buyer is in possession of the paper, so what it to collect from the seller?

We might answer that this is intended idiomatically, that he could not collect anything from either the borrower or the creditor, as the paper is a mere scrap, as opposed to a valid shtar. I think this is correct, but as written, it appears to be misused, since he is not in fact collecting anything at all.

Daf Yomi Ketubot 85a: Tear or Impair?

From my translation of the Rif:

ההיא איתתא דמחייבה שבועה בי דינא דרבא
אמרה בת רב חסדא ידענא בה דחשידא אשבועתא
אפכה רבא אשכנגדה

זמנין הוה יתיב רב פפא ורב אדא בר מתנא קמיה אייתו ההוא שטרא לקמיה
אמר ליה רב פפא ידענא ביה דשטרא פריעא הוא
אמר ליה איכא איניש אחרינא בהדי מר
אמר ליה רב אדא בר מתנא ולא יהא ר"פ כבת רב חסדא
אמר ליה בת רב חסדא קים לי בגוה ומר לא קים לי בגויה
אמר רב פפא השתא דאמור רבנן קים לי בגויה מלתא היא כגון אבא בר מר דקים לי בגויה קרענא שטרא אפומיה
קרענא סלקא דעתך אלא מרענא שטרא אפומיה
ולא מפרע מידי מיניה אלא בשבועה אי נמי בשודא דדייני יהבינא לההוא דלא איתרע שטריה

There was a woman who was obligated in an oath in the courthouse of Rava. The daughter of Rav Chisda {=Rava's wife} said, "I know about her that she is suspect in her oaths." Rava flipped over the oath to the one opposite her {in judgment}.

Another time, Rav Papa and Rav Ada bar Matna sat before him {=Rava}. A certain bond was brought before him.
Rav Pappa said to him: I know about this that this is a paid-off bond.
He {=Rava} said to him: Is there another man together with master {such that we will have two witnesses}?
Rav Ada bar Matna said to him: And is not Rav Pappa like the daughter of Rav Chisda?
He said to him: The daughter of Rav Chisda, I know I can rely on. But Master, I do not know if I can rely on.
Rav Pappa said: Now that the Sages say "I can rely upon him" is has validity, someone such as Abba bar Mar, upon whom I can rely, I would tear up a bond on his say-so.
Tear-up, does it arise in your mind?
Rather, "impair a bond on his say-so."
{Rif explains:} and not allow payment of anything from it without an oath. Alternatively, with the discretion of the judges we give it to he whose bond is not impaired.

This is clear emendation on the part of the setama digmara. The word קרענא is emended to מרענא, changing the ק to a מ, and the meaning from "tear" to "impair." Yet tearing is a physical act one can do to a document, and furthermore lectio difficilior applies, where they explicitly change the text to something else because of a problematic implication. Perhaps "tear" was meant figuratively. But maybe it was meant literally. Just as the daughter of Rav Chisda was trusted to prevent swearing, Abba bar Mar is trusted to say that the bond has been paid off. If he is actually trusted on this fact about this particular bond, why should we allow the holder of the bond (the lender) to swear? This would be treating him as a single witness, but the contrast is to Rav Pappa, where Rava required another person to say the same. And if another person said the same, the bond would have been torn up. Thus, the first suggestion of the Rif certainly appears problematic. Which is why a second explanation is offered. That it is based on shuda dedayni. But if so, and the judge, as here, can decide to not let him collect with this shtar, then why not rip it up?

Meanwhile, Tosafot (pictured to the right, from Ketubot 85a), based an Rabbenu Chananel, says the same, first explanation of Rif, that it means to collect without an oath. And he notes that this is the usage of the term throughout all of Shas. (Yet here it is the setama rather than in an Amora's original use.) If so, there is a problem -- if all that is being imposed is an oath, even for Abba bar Mar, then why would Rav Pappa not be trusted as a single witness, which would indeed impose a requirement of an oath? The answer Tosafot gives is forced -- that Rav Pappa (and in an analogous situation, Abba bar Mar) was a relative of either the lender or borrower.

The problem with this forced explanation is twofold. Firstly, it is nowhere in the gemara, and this seems like the sort of detail that should be mentioned, either by the setup in the original gemara or in the setama. Secondly and more importantly, Rava does not ask if there is another single witness to stand alone and impose as oath. His words are איכא איניש אחרינא בהדי מר, with the implication that he will work together with Rav Pappa as a second witness. If Rav Pappa were invalid because of being a relative, he could not stand with the other witness. And indeed, as I mentioned above, the intent with that second witness would be to entirely invalidate, and therefore tear up, the shtar.

As such, I would question the setama digmara's emendation here, and say that we should preserve the reading of קרענא.

Daf Yomi Ketubot 83: Does The Husband Write To Her "Ad Infinitum?"

Translation from my Rif translation:

{Ketubot 83a}
BEGIN PEREK NINE
Mishna:

הכותב לאשתו דין ודברים אין לי בנכסיך הרי זה אוכל פירות בחייה ואם מתה יורשה
אם כן למה כתב לה דין ודברים אין לי בנכסיך שאם מכרה ונתנה קיים
כתב לה דין ודברים אין לי בנכסיך ובפירותיהן הרי זה אינו אוכל פירות בחייה ואם מתה יורשה
רבי יהודה אומר לעולם הוא אוכל פירות ופירי פירותיהן עד שיכתוב לה דין ודברים אין לי בנכסיך ובפירותיהן ובפירי פירותיהן עד עולם
כתב לה דין ודברים אין לי בנכסיך ובפירותיהן ובפירי פירותיהן [עד עולם] בחייך ובמותיך אינו אוכל פירות בחייה ואם מתה אינו יורשה
רשב"ג אומר אם מתה יירשנה מפני שהתנה על מה שכתוב בתורה וכל המתנה על מה שכתוב בתורה תנאו בטל

If one wrote to his wife, "I have no right or claim to your assets," behold he eats the fruits in her lifetime, and if she dies, he inherits her.
If so, why did he write to her ""I have no right of claim to your assets?" That is she sold or gave, it is valid.
If he wrote to her, "I have no right or claim to your assets or their fruits," behold he does not eat the fruits, and if she dies, he inherits her.
Rabbi Yehuda says: He always eats the fruits, and the fruits of the their fruits, until he writes to her ""I have no right or claim to your assets or their fruits or the fruits of their fruits ad infinitum."
If he wrote to her, "I have no right or claim to your assets or their fruits or the fruits of their fruits [ad infinitum] in your life and in your death," he does not eat fruits in her lifetime and if she dies, he does not inherit her.
R' Shimon ben Gamliel says: If she dies he inherits her, for he has attempted to impose a stipulation upon what was written in the Torah, and whoever imposes a stipulation on what is written in the Torah, his stipulation is nullified.

Of interest are the words [עד עולם] inserted in brackets here. One would need to check manuscripts of Rif to see what was and what was not present. Compare with the Mishna in our gemara, and with the Mishna in Yerushalmi. You will discover that the girsa is exactly as we have in Rif, and without the words in brackets. So does [עד עולם] in fact belong?

Relevant to this is Tosafot on the daf (83a), who makes a girsological point. In the dibbur hamatchil, he has כתב לה דין ודברים אין לי בנכסיך ובפירותיהן בחייך ובמותיך. This clearly does not have the words ובפירי פירותיהן. Yet as he notes, most sefarim do in fact have ובפירי פירותיהן there. Thus, the Tanna of the Mishna is stating stam in accordance with the wording of Rabbi Yehuda. But then, he notes, the words עד עולם are not present, and there is a discussion in the gemara (on 83b) whether עד עולם is really essential. And the fact that it is missing in this next part of the Mishna can be taken as proof that this is not essential. Yet the gemara does not bring this as proof. Why not? Tosafot answers that perhaps the Tanna just included enough words to establish a plain Mishna like Rabbi Yehuda, but did not want to overextend the verbiage, and so left it out, but of course he would write this as well.

Of course, one could also say that Tosafot's question is valid, and therefore we should establish like this minority girsa.

At this point, with the evidence we presently have before us, and not looking at manuscripts or conducting further analysis of the gemara, I think this issue is not really resolvable. Yet, I have a few observations which might be valid.

1. This discussion of whether עד עולם is essential is conducted by the setama digmara, which is post-Talmudic. Thus, we could answer like Tosafot, or else we could answer that the version of the Mishna which stood before the stamaim {Savora or Gaon} was this minority girsa. But that does not mean that the original, correct girsa of the Mishna is like that.

2. Perhaps this variation between Rabbi Yehuda's statement and the statement based on him was the impetus for the gemara's discussion of whether עד עולם or ובפירי פירותיהן was the essential component. Obviously, there is the issue that they seem to carry the same implication, but the variation could also be the spark.

3. We can understand how a girsa which has עד עולם could come about. That is, it seems like the Tanna is establishing a stam Mishna like Rabbi Yehuda. But then the language is off. So we should reinsert the language. And furthermore, Tosafot's question from the fact that the gemara does not resolve from the absence of עד עולם could also cause עד עולם to be inserted in the Mishna. Thus, under lectio difficilior, I would doubt that עד עולם really belongs.

4. I am not entirely convinced that the Tanna is really establishing plainly like Rabbi Yehuda. This is, after all, a further "gate" in the Mishna, dealing with the additional issue of uprooting his inheriting of her. For this, the phrase might be required, but not for the simpler issue of eating fruits and fruit of fruits.

5. Note that Tosefta Ketubot 9:3 does not actually have Rabbi Yehuda giving over the proper text to write to dismiss fruits and fruits of fruits.

ט,ג ר' יהודה אומר לעולם הוא אוכל פירי פירות וילקח בהן קרקע והוא אוכל פירות רשב"ג ור' ישמעאל בן ר' יוחנן בן ברוקה אומרים אם מתה יירשנה שהתנה על מה שכתוב בתורה וכל המתנה על מה שכתוב בתורה תנאו בטל.

Indeed, it looks a bit like expansion of this juxtaposition of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel to establish the two disputes as in the Mishna.

But still, tzarich iyyun.

Update: Note that Rosh says basically the same as Tosafot. He notes the prevalent girsa and that one should be gores like it, that this proves the halacha is like Rabbi Yehuda, notes the issue of the missing עד עולם, and gives two suggestions -- the Tanna is writing in shorthand, or perhaps "in life and after death" carries the same implication as עד עולם -- something I find difficult, because that is a further bava in the Mishna, which adds this additional aspect in terms of inheritance.

Also, others prove that the halacha is like Rabbi Yehuda from the fact that the gemara brings down a brayta which gives a definition of peiri perot, in this context.