Rav Ovadia Seforno and the balance of opposites

Note: I am trying a gentler approach to my critiques. I am trying to first praise for what is good and then suggest areas for improvement.

I read through the Chazaq parsha package this Shabbos and came across an interesting devar Torah from Rabbi Bentzion Shafier. You can read it here in the Shmuz.

Rabbi Shafier encounters a Seforno which is difficult to reconcile with modern science. And -- kudos! -- he asks the question! Others would have just accepted it without question. He could have done better in his approach. His assumption appears to be that Seforno must be correct. (After all, Seforno is a late Rishon.) And if so, we must look to modern science to justify the Seforno's position. And then, when finding something which can be kvetched to support Seforno's idea, we accept this as Seforno's meaning. Finally, we marvel at how Seforno was 500 years ahead of his time -- a sure sign of ruach hakodesh -- and draw important life lessons of how to conduct ourselves.

Drawing inspirational life lessons from the words of great Biblical commentators is nice. And it is also nice that people walk away with great respect for Torah and its interpreters. On the other hand, it is unfortunate that people walk away with a flawed understanding of what Rav Ovadia Seforno actually meant. I think that Seforno would have preferred that we understand his actual meaning, even if we ultimately disagreed with him.

Rav Ovadia Seforno was a physician. He was born in 1475 and died in 1550. If he is bringing science to bear on a question, it makes sense that he would be using the science of his day. Let us see the pasuk and comment in question.

 ספר במדבר פרק כה

יא) פינחס בן אלעזר בן אהרן הכהן השיב את חמתי מעל בני ישראל בקנאו 

 :את קנאתי בתוכם ולא כליתי את בני ישראל בקנאתי

 :יב) לכן אמר הנני נתן לו את בריתי שלום

 ספורנו עה"ת ספר במדבר פרק כה פסוק יב

יב) את בריתי שלום. ממלאך המות, כענין עושה שלום במרומיו כי אמנם 

ההפסד לא יקרה אלא בסבת התנגדות ההפכים. וזה אמנם נתקיים בפינחס 

שהאריך ימים הרבה מאד מכל שאר אנשי דורו, עד שהיה הוא משמש במשכן 

שילה בזמן פלגש בגבעה, שהיה בלי ספק אחרי מות יהושע ושאר הזקנים 

אשר האריכו ימים אחרי יהושע וכל שכן אם היה בזמן יפתח שכתב למלך בני 

עמון בשבת בני ישראל בחשבון ובבנותיה כו' שלש מאות שנה וכבר סיפרו ז"ל 

שפינחס לא רצה ללכת אז אל יפתח להתיר נדרו. וכל שכן לדברי האומר 

 אליהו זה פנחס, והוא עדין חי וקיים

Rabbi Shafier explains:

Pinchas was zealous in defending the honor of HASHEM; therefore, he
was granted a Bris of Shalom. The Siforno explains that because of
this covenant of peace, Pinchas lived to an extraordinary age -- far
longer than was expected in his times. However, the Siforno points out,
the reason for his longevity wasn’t supernatural, but rather because he
was granted this Bris. Since he was given Shalom, he was at peace with
himself, and as a result, he didn’t suffer the normal internal conflict
that causes damage to our bodies. He therefore lived to an extremely
old age.

The Siforno explains: all degeneration happens to the body because of
conflict of the opposites. In other words, all disease, infirmity, and
weakening with age, only occurs because of internal conflicts. Since
Pinchas was granted peace, he had no internal battles; therefore, his
body didn’t age, and so he lived hundreds of years. 

The way he explains the degeneration because of conflict of opposites, it seems like this is a psychological conflict, "internal conflicts", "internal battles", which Pinchas lacked because he now was granted peace.

However, to understand Seforno, we must understand the science of his day. This was the theory of humours. Here is a good summary of the theory:

Based on the theory that natural matter comprised four basic elements, the Greek philosophers came up with the idea that the human body consisted of the four humours, which had to be kept in balance. This theory survived until after AD 1700.

Then, derived from his study of mathematics, the Greek philosopher Pythagoras came up with the idea of the balance of opposites. This gave Greek doctors their idea of the underlying cause of disease. We can read about this in the 70 books ascribed to the Greek doctor Hippocrates, who thought that disease occurred when the humours of the body fell out of balance.

So, when Seforno says כי אמנם ההפסד לא יקרה אלא בסבת התנגדות ההפכים, all degeneration happens to the body because of conflict of the opposites, he is speaking as a medieval physician, and the opposites are the opposing humours in the body. Part of this gift of shalom was that these opposites were in balance, and so Pinchas was immune to disease.

That is a true explanation of Seforno. It is emes, which is a great virtue. By knowing a bit about the science of the day, we can get to the bottom of what Seforno meant. However, if we don't study the history of science, and cannot entertain the possibility that Seforno could be basing himself on faulty science, then we end up with a flawed understanding of Seforno's intent. Such as, e.g., that he was speaking from psychological perspective, and that he intuitively, or via ruach hakodesh, knew all of modern science.

Let us see how this plays out. Rabbi Shafier continues:

The body was made to last only so long… 
The difficulty with this understanding of the Siforno is that it negates
our basic understanding of health. The reality is that humans age. The
heart, the liver, the pancreas were designed to function only for a given
length of time, and then they break down. Infirmities and weakness
come naturally with old age; arthritis, high blood pressure, and the
thickening of the arteries are a part of life. While the heart may be a
remarkable living pump, the valves start to weaken with time, the
muscle tissue begins to break down, and the health of the heart
deteriorates with age. The body was made to last only so long; then it
just wears out. 

The Chazaq sheet (but not the Shmuz) then ends with this question:

So how can the Sifrno [sic] argue with our accepted understanding by stating "All deterioration happens to the body because of conflict of the opposites.[sic]"

The answer to this question, from our perspective is straightforward. Of course the Seforno can argue with our accepted understanding. Seforno is based on Aristotelian science. Our accepted understanding is based on modern science. There are a great many differences between the two. And Rishonim have often based themselves on Galenic or Aristotelian science.

Rabbi Shafier offers the following answer, based on modern science:

Mind / body relationship 
The answer to this question is based on 20th century medical findings.
Herbert Benson, MD, PHD, was professor of medicine in Harvard
University in the 1960’s when he stumbled upon an unusual
phenomenon. He found that when a patient’s blood pressure was taken
in his office, invariably it was higher than then when taken at home.
His patients would regularly report blood pressure levels significantly
lower than what was found in his office.

After careful study, he concluded that anxiety contributes to high blood
pressure. Being examined by a doctor was causing his patients to be
nervous, and that was contributing to the rise in their blood pressure.

While it may seem obvious to us today, at the time it wasn’t clear at all
that there was a correlation between stress and high blood pressure. For
decades, it was assumed that a person’s mental condition
had no affect on his physical condition. Any reported affects of stress
and anxiety on health were taken as psychosomatic or imagined.

His discovery led him to firmly establish the correlation between stress
and high blood pressure, and he became a pioneer in a new field of
medicine: the relationship between mind and body. Since those times,
it has now become accepted in the medical community that stress causes
a marked deterioration to a person’s health. Stress can bring about heart
disease, gastrointestinal disorders, pain, insomnia, asthma, allergies…
It is now accepted medical opinion that along with diet and exercise, the
lowering of stress levels is a major contributor to a person’s overall
health. 

This answer unfortunately takes us further in the wrong direction. It continues in the incorrect assumption that Seforno's conflict of opposites" is mental and psychological. And it finds some relatively recent discovery. I don't know that Herbert Benson was the first to come up with the idea that emotional state can have an effect on physical health, and that the idea did not exist at all prior to the 1960's. However, let us grant that, for the sake of argument. It is still the case that according to modern science, absence of mental stress will not ensure a lifespan of hundreds of years, which is what Seforno is speaking about. See Seforno's words! Does all degeneration happen as a result of mental stress? Scientists in the 20th century will tell you that there is still the effect of aging, of physical stresses to the body from daily living, the effect of diet, and attacks by microbes. A really mellow person will still not live forever, or for hundreds of years!

Rabbi Shafier continues:

This is something that the Siforno taught us over 500 years ago. What
he was saying was the Pinchas naturally lived for hundreds of years
because the normal cause of deteriorating health didn’t apply to him. He
wasn’t in conflict; he was at peace with himself, and as such, his body
was healthier and able to live to a remarkably advanced age

Here we are supposed to be awed at Seforno's knowledge of present science. 500 years ago, he already knew this. And scientists are just catching up!

It is more likely that, rather than the kvetch that doesn't actually resolve the problem, Seforno was basing himself on what was known 500 years ago.

The rest of the Shmuz is how to apply this deep lesson to our own lives. Thus:

The ultimate cause of distress – the voice inside 
This concept has major ramifications in our lives. When HASHEM
created man, He implanted into each of us an inner sense of right and
wrong, a Voice Inside that allows us to know the correct course of
behavior for each situation. More than simply a moral compass, this
Voice Inside acts as our guide to self-perfection.

When a person listens to that voice, he lives a fulfilling, meaningful life
-- as his Creator intended -- and he is at peace with himself. If he
chooses to ignore that voice, not only doesn't he grow to the heights for
which he was destined, he lives in

And so on.

OK, so I disagree with the Shmuz as far as methodology and conclusions go. But should we be so harsh? Here I explain why it is not such a big deal.

What is the purpose of a Shmuz? Is it Talmud Torah? Is it deep study of Biblical commentators in order to understand their intent and perhaps the meaning of the Biblical text?

Or, is the purpose to inspire? If so, getting to the true meaning of Seforno's words may not be as important.  Consider that this might be what happens in a lot of midrash: rather than considering the pasuk as text, the midrashist treats it as pretext, a means of getting a specific homiletic message across while tying it to the Torah text.  And so the highlighted textual difficulty need not be truly as difficult as presented.  It is a specific genre of midrash.  So too here, a Shmuz is a specific genre of dvar Torah, and so perhaps we need not be so insistent that Seforno be understood correctly.

Still, this was a missed opportunity to teach how to understand Chazal,  Rishonim,  and Acharonim -- on their own terms,  based on the science of their day.  And a missed opportunity to promote Torah Umaddah -- since Seforno thought to explain pesukim based on science,  something which is only entirely evident when the science is wrong.  (Otherwise people attribute it to ruach hakodesh, as seems to be the case here in this Shmuz;  or else drawn from the text itself,  with science learned from pesukim,  as perhaps is being suggested here. ) And of course, it is better to draw inspiration from interpretations of pesukim and meforshim when the interpretation is actually true...

Eat this red lentil stew; it will put color in your cheeks!

In a comment on a recent post, a commenter pointed me to an interesting explanation of Seforno, and sought some clarification:

How to understand Sforno comment on Genesis 25.30 And Esau said to Jacob, "Pour into [me] some of this red, red [pottage], for I am faint"; he was therefore named Edom. It says, that he was named "red", because eat red food. Does food affect human color?

The pasuk in parashat Toledot reads:

ל  וַיֹּאמֶר עֵשָׂו אֶל-יַעֲקֹב, הַלְעִיטֵנִי נָא מִן-הָאָדֹם הָאָדֹם הַזֶּה--כִּי עָיֵף, אָנֹכִי; עַל-כֵּן קָרָא-שְׁמוֹ, אֱדוֹם.

30 And Esau said to Jacob: 'Let me swallow, I pray thee, some of this red, red pottage; for I am faint.' Therefore was his name called Edom.

And Seforno says on this:

פסוק לעַל כֵּן קָרָא שְׁמו אֱדום. כְּשֶׁרָאוּ שֶׁכָּל כָּךְ הִתְמַכֵּר לִמְלַאכְתּו הַנִּפְסֶדֶת אֲשֶׁר לא כְּתורַת הָאָדָם, עַד שֶׁלּא הִכִּיר בַּנָּזִיד כִּי אִם צִבְעו, קָרְאוּ אותו "אֱדום"! לְשׁון צִוּוּי, כְּלומַר: הִתְאַדֵּם! וֶהֱיֵה צָבוּעַ אָדם בְּהַלְעָטַת הָאָדם.

I think I understand this comment, but it gets a little unclear towards the end. Here is how I would translate it:

"Therefore was his named called Edom: When they saw that he was so sold over to his indecent work such that he was not in the manner of man, such that he was only able recognize the color of the stew [rather than that it was stew], that called him 'Edom!', in the language of command [an imperative]. That is to say, turn red! And your color will be red in the [matter of the] pouring of the red."

I do not think that Rav Ovadia Seforno was saying that his color would medically change as a result of the eating of the stew. He studied medicine and, while it is possible that medieval medicine might maintain that red foods turn a person red, I don't think that the words of Seforno's commentary merit that explanation. This is what people are telling him to turn, as a result of the red food.

I think he was saying that, while mocking him, people were instructing him to turn red. Perhaps to blush in embarrassment.

What do you think?

(Of course, there still stands the other parallel source for Edom identification, that he was already born ruddy:

כה  וַיֵּצֵא הָרִאשׁוֹן אַדְמוֹנִי, כֻּלּוֹ כְּאַדֶּרֶת שֵׂעָר; וַיִּקְרְאוּ שְׁמוֹ, עֵשָׂו.

)

A censored Sporno on Vayishlach?

Summary: It would seem so. They did not like the talk of worldwide Jewish domination.

Post: An anonymous commenter pointed out a fascinating Seforno on parashat Vayishlach. The pasuk (Bereshit 35:13) states:

יב  וְאֶת-הָאָרֶץ, אֲשֶׁר נָתַתִּי לְאַבְרָהָם וּלְיִצְחָק--לְךָ אֶתְּנֶנָּה; וּלְזַרְעֲךָ אַחֲרֶיךָ, אֶתֵּן אֶת-הָאָרֶץ.

12 and the land which I gave unto Abraham and Isaac, to thee I will give it, and to thy seed after thee will I give the land.'

Note how there is specification at the beginning of the pasuk just which land is being given to Yaakov -- the one which Hashem gave to Avraham and Yitzchak. However, there is no such specification regarding the אָרֶץ at the end of the pasuk, given to the descendants of Yaakov.

Therefore, we can take אֶת-הָאָרֶץ at the pasuk's end to refer to the entirety of the Earth, rather than a specific land. And this is what Seforno says:

פסוק יבוּלְזַרְעֲךָ אַחֲרֶיךָ אֶתֵּן אֶת הָאָרֶץ. לְקֵץ הַיָּמִין אֶתֵּן לְזַרְעֲךָ כָּל כַּדּוּר הָאָרֶץ לא אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל בִּלְבַד, כְּאָמְרו "וּפָרַצְתָּ יָמָה וָקֵדְמָה וְצָפנָה וָנֶגְבָּהּ" (לעיל כח, יד), וּכְאָמְרו "וְקַרְקַר כָּל בְּנֵי שֵׁת" (במדבר כד, יז). ש

"At the end of days, I will give your descendants the entire globe of the earth, and not the land of Israel alone, as it states (earlier, 28:14), "and thou shalt spread abroad to the west, and to the east, and to the north, and to the south." And as it states (Bemidbar 24:17, {in parashat Balak, about the end of days}), "[I see him, but not now; I behold him, but not nigh; there shall step forth a star out of Jacob, and a scepter shall rise out of Israel, and shall smite through the corners of Moab,] and break down all the sons of Seth."

One might imagine that such world-wide domination, which would encompass also domination of Edom, might spark concern from the censors. And then consider what appears in our Mikraos Gedolos for this Sporno:

a

How has the eved ivri served you 'twice as much as a hired servant'?

Summary: Considering the approaches of a group of meforshim on this phrase, and pasuk. Rashi, Ibn Ezra, Ibn Caspi, Seforno, Rashbam, and Shadal. While I add a bit of my own analysis to Rashbam's analysis, the topic is not yet settled in my mind, so I don't end up taking sides.

Post: In parashat Re'eh, in Devarim 15:18, when speaking about sending away the eved ivri at the end of six years, with gifts, the pasuk states:

18. You shall not be troubled when you send him free from you, for twice as much as a hired servant, he has served you six years, and the Lord, your God, will bless you in all that you shall do.		יח. לֹא יִקְשֶׁה בְעֵינֶךָ בְּשַׁלֵּחֲךָ אֹתוֹ חָפְשִׁי מֵעִמָּךְ כִּי מִשְׁנֶה שְׂכַר שָׂכִיר עֲבָדְךָ שֵׁשׁ שָׁנִים וּבֵרַכְךָ יְ־הֹוָ־ה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר תַּעֲשֶׂה:
		כי משנה שכר שכיר: מכאן אמרו עבד עברי עובד בין ביום ובין בלילה. וזהו כפלים שבעבודת שכירי יום. ומהו עבודתו בלילה, רבו מוסר לו שפחה כנענית והולדות לאדון:

Rashi explains that "From there they {=Chazal} said that an eved ivri serves both during the day and the night. And this is the twice more than the service of the daily worker. And what is his night 'work'? That his master can appoint him a shifcha kenaanis and bear children {servants} for the master."

Other meforshim explain this doubled service differently. Ibn Ezra understands this as a matter of Jewish law, that one may not hire a worker for a period of more than three years:

[טו, יח]
לא יקשה בעיניך -מצאנו כתוב: שלש שנים כימי שכיר וזו ראיה כי אין רשות לאדם שישכיר עצמו יותר משלש שנים, ג"כ לשוכר אותו הנותן שכרו. וזה טעם משנה. כמו כפל. 

His proof it the pasuk in Yeshaya 16:14:

יד  וְעַתָּה, דִּבֶּר ה לֵאמֹר, בְּשָׁלֹשׁ שָׁנִים כִּשְׁנֵי שָׂכִיר, וְנִקְלָה כְּבוֹד מוֹאָב בְּכֹל הֶהָמוֹן הָרָב; וּשְׁאָר מְעַט מִזְעָר, לוֹא כַבִּיר.  {פ}

14 But now the LORD hath spoken, saying: 'Within three years, as the years of a hireling, and the glory of Moab shall wax contemptible for all his great multitude; and the remnant shall be very small and without strength.' {P}

Thus, three years are the years of a hireling, and six years are the years of an eved ivri. And (I would add) perhaps they even darshened this pasuk in Re'eh and arrived at that halacha referred to as an understood matter. An interesting approach, but this does seem to be adding halachot which Chazal made no reference to. Not the end of the world, as we see other derashot change over time from the neviim to Chazal. Still, it is noteworthy that Ibn Ezra would maintain this.

I would guess that this was troubling Ibn Caspi. He more or less echoes Ibn Ezra, but changes one detail:

He cites the same pasuk in Yeshaya, but while Ibn Ezra had it that a person was not allowed to hire himself for more than three years, and similarly, one may not hire someone for more than three years, Ibn Caspi just puts it as a minhag pashut beineihem, a standard common practice among them. This makes sense, and then the pasuk in Devarim does not introduce a new law about hired workers, but simply refers to common practice.

Rashbam rejects the idea of the 2X being twice the number of years. He writes:

פסוק יח 
לא יקשה בעיניך - שתשלחנו חפשי מעמך במה שאתה נותן לו משנה וכפילות - שכר שכיר - בעבודת שש שנים שעבד אותך שאתה מעניק לו מצאנך ומגרנך ומיקבך מלבד שכירות של קנין שש שנים שקנית אותו שהרי למען כן יברכך ה', בכל אשר תעשה.
והרי פירוש פסוק זה דוגמת: ולא ירע לבבך בתתך לו - וכן: תרע עינה באיש חיקה ובבנה ובבתה מתת לא' מהם, כי רוע העין וקשיות הלב מדבר על נתינת ממון לאחרים. ואשר הורגלו לפרש לא יקשה בעיניך על מה שאתה משלחו חפשי לסוף שש, שהרי הרבה עבדך שש שנים, כלומר יותר משאר שכירים, שטות הוא בידם.
וכי למה יקשה בעיניו בשילוח חפשי והלא לא קנאו מתחלה אלא לפי עבודת שש שנים שהכל יודעים שבשביעית יצא?
ועוד לא היה לו לומר משנה שכר שכיר אלא משנה שכיר? 
ויש מפרשים:
משנה שכיר שש שנים הם, לפי שסתם שכיר שלש שנים, כדכתיב: בשלש שנים כשני שכיר ונקלה כבוד מואב. וגם זה הבל.
כי במקום אחר כתיב: בעוד שנה כשני שכיר. ופירוש כשני שכיר. שלש שנים מצומצמות כשני שכיר שהיא שנה מצומצמת. 

My translation:

"You shall not be troubled when you send him free from you, in that you have given him twice, and double, that of the wages of a hired worker, for the service of six years that he served you, in that you give him presents from your flock, from your grain and from your wine, besides the wages of the hiring of six years, in which you acquired him. For behold, this is so that Hashem will bless you, 'in all that you do.'
And behold, the explanation of this verse shall serve as an example. {Same perek, pasuk 10:}

10. You shall surely give him, and your heart shall not be grieved when you give to him; for because of this thing the Lord, your God, will bless you in all your work and in all your endeavors.

י. נָתוֹן תִּתֵּן לוֹ וְלֹא יֵרַע לְבָבְךָ בְּתִתְּךָ לוֹ כִּי בִּגְלַל הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה יְבָרֶכְךָ יְ־הֹוָ־ה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בְּכָל מַעֲשֶׂךָ וּבְכֹל מִשְׁלַח יָדֶךָ:

and so too {Devarim 28:56}:

55. of giving any one of them of the flesh of his children that he is eating, because not a thing will remain for him in the siege and in the desperation which your enemies will bring upon you, in all your cities.		נה. מִתֵּת לְאַחַד מֵהֶם מִבְּשַׂר בָּנָיו אֲשֶׁר יֹאכֵל מִבְּלִי הִשְׁאִיר לוֹ כֹּל בְּמָצוֹר וּבְמָצוֹק אֲשֶׁר יָצִיק לְךָ אֹיִבְךָ בְּכָל שְׁעָרֶיךָ:
56. The most tender and delicate woman among you, who would not venture to set her foot upon the ground, because of delicateness and tenderness, will begrudge the husband of her embrace and her own son and daughter,		נו. הָרַכָּה בְךָ וְהָעֲנֻגָּה אֲשֶׁר לֹא נִסְּתָה כַף רַגְלָהּ הַצֵּג עַל הָאָרֶץ מֵהִתְעַנֵּג וּמֵרֹךְ תֵּרַע עֵינָהּ בְּאִישׁ חֵיקָהּ וּבִבְנָהּ וּבְבִתָּהּ:

For begrudging and hardness of heart is speaking regarding giving money to others. And that which they {=other meforshim} are accustomed to explain לֹא יִקְשֶׁה בְעֵינֶךָ as referring to that you are sending him free at the end of six, for much has he served for you for six years, that is to say, more than other hired laborers, this is shtus in their hands. For why should it be difficult in his eyes to send him free? After all, did he not from the start purchase him for servitude of six years, for everyone knows that on the seventh year, he leaves?! And further, should it not have stated מִשְׁנֶה שָׂכִיר, twice that of a hired laborer, rather than מִשְׁנֶה שְׂכַר שָׂכִיר, twice the wages of a hired servant? 

And there are those who explain that twice that of a hired laborer is six years, since a typical hired laborer is for three years, as is written [in that pasuk in Yeshaya]. And this is also vanity. For in another place, it is written {Yeshiva 21:16}:

טז  כִּי-כֹה אָמַר אֲדֹנָי, אֵלָי:  בְּעוֹד שָׁנָה כִּשְׁנֵי שָׂכִיר, וְכָלָה כָּל-כְּבוֹד קֵדָר.

16 For thus hath the Lord said unto me: 'Within a year, according to the years of a hireling, and all the glory of Kedar shall fail;

And the meaning in "like the years of a hireling" is three precise years, like the years of a hireling, which is a precise year."

My reaction to each of these three counterpoints to the other meforshim:

1. Why should it be difficult to send him away, given that this is the operating assumption? Well, it is only the operating assumption once the Torah law has been set. In the backdrop of Ancient Near Eastern law, or even against the Torah laws of eved kanaani, it is standard that a slave is owned perpetually. Indeed, if we look even in the context in this parasha, the immediately preceding pasuk is that of the eved nirtza, who served perpetually, or at least until Yovel. So in enacting this reform, for Hebrew slaves, Moshe is giving them justification, such that they should understand that the Torah's reform is not burdensome, but rather the reform is rooted in fairness and justice.
2. Why should it state מִשְׁנֶה שְׂכַר שָׂכִיר, rather than just מִשְׁנֶה שָׂכִיר? One would need to work it out grammatically, but I would assume that these meforshim who understand it as referring to the term of service maintain that this is twice the hiring period of the sachir. Can it work out grammatically? I would assume so, even if one needs to appeal to either an arcane word form or a revocalization. But Rashbam is not opposing those meforshim who speak of terms of service. Rather, he is opposing those who understand it שְׂכַר שָׂכִיר as the labor provided by the sachir. I will grant that this is rather difficult. But we can interpret this as "twice what you get in the hiring of the laborer." Or, less smoothly, sechar as a derived form from the noun sachir, meaning that which the sachir produces.
3. Rashbam's third point is rather strong, in my opinion. It is nice to take a verse out of context, from another sefer, and use it to bolster a local interpretation. But what does כִּשְׁנֵי שָׂכִיר in context mean in Yeshaya. The other verse in Yeshaya indicates how the author intends it. If so, Ibn Ezra's proof fails.

Interestingly, Ibn Ezra himself does not provide this commentary of three years as a mandatory maximum as he comments locally on sefer Yeshaya. Rather, on the "three year" verse in 16:14, he writes

That is, that "the intent of "as the days of the hireling" is that every day, we will be mevaser his soul when the time will end. So is the prophet rejoicing when the time of their destruction is reached."

However, on reflection, this need not be contradictory. The question is why one would use the parallel to the years of a hireling, and the answer is the psychological feature of looking towards the end. But such a parallel could still be appropriate, and thus ripe to be made, by virtue of it being the hiring maximum.

What about on the second verse, of the single year? Ibn Ezra writes:

Once again, it seems that there is some psychological component -- that this year is deemed long, like the year of a hireling.

But, the three-year maximum period is not appropriate here, and Ibn Ezra never made reference to it in his commentary on either verse. It truly seems as if Ibn Ezra is not advancing this explanation here. And it is difficult to say how he would answer the Rashbam's objection.

And I would think Ibn Ezra (1089-1164) was familiar with the commentary of the Rashbam (1085-1158). It was Rashbam who wrote the commentary on Bereishit contrary to Chazal that peshat in the pasuk was that night followed day, and Ibn Ezra speaks of having a dream in which Shabbos complained to him about his having a heretical commentary in his possession which stated precisely that. Maybe he cast the Rashbam's commentary out of his house prior to reading it in its entirety?

Could we save this explanation? Perhaps. For instance, Yeshaya 20:1 represents a time-change: בִּשְׁנַת בֹּא תַרְתָּן, אַשְׁדּוֹדָה, בִּשְׁלֹחַ אֹתוֹ, סַרְגוֹן מֶלֶךְ אַשּׁוּר; וַיִּלָּחֶם בְּאַשְׁדּוֹד, וַיִּלְכְּדָהּ. Perhaps, then, two years have passed, and the first sets up the three year period, while the second represents a one-year countdown to the same time? It is difficult, and requires further investigation.

Here is what R' Ovadia Sporno has to say:

פסוק יחלא-יִקְשֶׁה בְעֵינֶךָ. לְהַעֲנִיק עִם שִׁלּוּחו חָפְשִׁי, כִּי רָאוּי הוּא לָזֶה וְאַתָּה לא תֶחְסַר.

וּבֵרַכְךָ ה' אֱלהֶיךָ. וּמִשֶּׁלּו תִּתֵּן. 

The difficulty is in giving him presents, together with sending him free. Why? Because this is fitting for him, and you are not losing anything by it. And Hashem will bless you, such that you are giving him from His. This is similar to Rashbam, in that both say that the comfort is one giving him the presents.

Shadal collects, and reacts to, many of the prior meforshim on this. He writes:

 יח ] כי משנה שכר שכיר עבדך שש שנים: אמרו קצת מן הקדמונים ואחריהם ראב"ע ורלב"ג, כי אין רשות להשכיר עצמו יותר משלוש שנים, ויפה השיבהו רשב"ם ודון יצחק כי זה הבל, כי שלש שנים כשני שכיר ( ישעיה ט"ז י"ד), אין ענינו רק שנים מצומצמות. וכן כתוב ( שם כ"א ט"ז) בעוד שנה כשני שכיר; 

גם פירוש רשב"ם ור' עובדיה ספורנו לא ייתכן, כי הכתוב אומר: בשלחך אותו, לא: בהעניקך אותו, ועוד אין להענקת שיעור, ואיך יאמר שנתן לו שכר כפול מפני שהעניקו? 

גם דברי רד"ק ור"י עראמה הקרובים לדברי רש"י שהשכיר נשכר ליום או ללילה, והעבד הוא בכל רגע תחת ממשלתך, לא ייתכנו כי היה לו לומר משנה "עבודת" שכיר, לא "שכר" שכיר. 

והנכון לדעתי: לא יקשה בעינך בשלחך אותו חפשי, כי אמנם אם באת לשכור שכיר היית מוכרח לשלם לו כפליים, כי כן דרך השכירים, כי צריכים הם להביא טרף לביתם, והמוכר עצמו לעבד מסתמא אין עליו משא אשה ובנים; והנה אע"פ שתשלחנו כבר הרווחת הרבה. ופירוש המילות כך הוא: משנה וכפליים ( ממה שנתת לעבד זה) היה השכר שהיית צריך לתת לשכיר שיעבדך שש שנים. 

והיום י"ג טבת תרכ"א נ"ל ודאי כי מילת עבדך שש שנים חוזרת לעבד (כמו שהבינו כל העולם) ולא לשכיר ( כמו שפירשתי אני), גם ראיתי כי מילת משנה אף כשהיא בסגול היא תמיד דבקה בענין לשם שאחריו (משנה כסף, בראשית מ"ג ט"ו, ומשנה שברון, ירמיה י"ז י"ח), והנה משנה שכר שכיר משמע כפליים של שכר שכיר, ולא ששכר שכיר הוא כפליים כנגד שכר העבד. לפיכך נ"ל לפרש כי כפליים ממה שנותנים לשכיר היה ראוי ליתן לאיש הזה, כי עבדך שש שנים, ומילות אלו (עבדך שש שנים) הן דרך קריאה, כמו במה ישכב (שמות כ"ב כ"ו), אשר ינאף את אשת רעהו ( ויקרא כ"ב י'), מיד איש אחיו ( בראשית ט' ח'). כ 

והמכוון בקריאה הזאת הוא: האיש הזה עבד אותך כעבד ולא כשכיר, באופן שלא היתה לו שעה שלא היה משועבד לך, ולא למלאכה אחת, אלא לכל דבר שהיית מבקש היה משועבד לך וחייב לעשות רצונך, וכל זה לא היה ליום או ליומים, לשנה או לשנתיים, אבל עבדך שש שנים! ואתה לא נתת לו אלא פחות ממה שנותנים לשכיר שנה בשנה, תחת כי לפי שורת הדין היה ראוי לך ליתן לו משנה וכפליים ממה שנותנים לשכיר, כי השכיר איננו משועבד רק למלאכות מיוחדות, והעבד לא נשאר לו שום חירות בעולם, והאיש הזה נשתעבד לך כעבד במשך שש שנים שהוא ג"כ זמן בלתי קצר, א"כ לא יקשה בעינך בשלחך אותו וגם בהעניקך לו; ומלבד שזה מחוייב לפי שורת הדין, עוד תדע כי בשכר זה יברכך ה ' אלקיך בכל אשר תעשה.

My translation:

כִּי מִשְׁנֶה שְׂכַר שָׂכִיר עֲבָדְךָ שֵׁשׁ שָׁנִים -- A few of the kadmonim, and following them, Ibn Ezra and Ralbag, that it was not permitted for him to hire himself out for more than three years. And Rashbam and Don Yitzchak Abarbanel answered them well that this is vanity, for "three years like the years of a hireling" {from Yeshaya 16:14} only means precise years. And so is written {Yeshaya 21:16} "in one year, like the years of a hireling".

The commentary of Rashbam and R' Ovadia Sporno is also not possible, for the verse  stated, "when you send him out", not "when you grant him presents". And furthermore, there is no measure to the presents, so how could one say that he gives him twice the wages, because he is giving him presents? 

Also the words of Radak and R' Yitzchak Arama which are close to the words of Rashi, that the laborer is hired out to either a day or to a night, while the servant is under your command at every moment, is not possible. For it then should have stated that it is twice the "avodah" of the sachir, not the sechar {wages?} of the sachir.

And what is correct to my mind is: It should not be difficult in your eyes, when you set him free. For consider that if you came to hire a laborer, you would be required to pay him twice as much, for such is the way for hired laborers, for they require to bring provisions to their homes. Meanwhile, one who sells himself for a slave presumably does not have upon him the burden of a wife and kids. And behold, even though you are sending him away, you have already profited much. And the explanation of the words is as follows: Twice and double (from that which you have given this slave) was the wages that you would have had to give to a hired laborer to work for you for six years.

[Shadal then updates]: And today, the 13th of Teves, 5621 {=1861}, it appears to me certain that the phrase עֲבָדְךָ שֵׁשׁ שָׁנִים modifies the earlier slave (just as the entire world understands) and not to the hired laborer (as I had explained). I have also seen that the word מִשְׁנֶה, even when it is with a segol, always is attached in meaning to the noun which follows (see וּמִשְׁנֶה-כֶּסֶף לָקְחוּ בְיָדָם in Bereshit 43:15, and וּמִשְׁנֶה שִׁבָּרוֹן שָׁבְרֵם in Yirmeyahu 17:18). And behold, מִשְׁנֶה שְׂכַר שָׂכִיר implies twice that of the wages of the hired laborer, not that the wages of the hired laborer would be twice the wages of the slave. Therefore, it appears to me to explain that 'double that which you give to the laborer is fitting to give to this man, for he has served you for six years', and these words ( עֲבָדְךָ שֵׁשׁ שָׁנִים ) are by way of calling out {=because of this reason}, such as in {Shemot 22:26}

26. for it is his only covering; it is his garment for his skin. With what shall he lie? And it shall be [that] if he cries out to Me, I will hear because I am gracious.

כו. כִּי הִוא [כסותה] כְסוּתוֹ לְבַדָּהּ הִוא שִׂמְלָתוֹ לְעֹרוֹ בַּמֶּה יִשְׁכָּב וְהָיָה כִּי יִצְעַק אֵלַי וְשָׁמַעְתִּי כִּי חַנּוּן אָנִי:

and in {Vayikra 20:10}

10. And a man who commits adultery with [another] man's wife, committing adultery with the wife of his fellow the adulterer and the adulteress shall surely be put to death.

י. וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִנְאַף אֶת אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִנְאַף אֶת אֵשֶׁת רֵעֵהוּ מוֹת יוּמַת הַנֹּאֵף וְהַנֹּאָפֶת:

{Note the doubling; Shadal refers to the second phrase.} And {Bereshit 9:8}

5. But your blood, of your souls, I will demand [an account]; from the hand of every beast I will demand it, and from the hand of man, from the hand of each man, his brother, I will demand the soul of man.

ה. וְאַךְ אֶת דִּמְכֶם לְנַפְשֹׁתֵיכֶם אֶדְרֹשׁ מִיַּד כָּל חַיָּה אֶדְרְשֶׁנּוּ וּמִיַּד הָאָדָם מִיַּד אִישׁ אָחִיו אֶדְרֹשׁ אֶת נֶפֶשׁ הָאָדָם:

{These seem to work as a kind of interjection.} And the intent in this calling out is: This man served you as a servant and not as a hired worker, in a manner that he did not have an hour that he was not subservient to you. And not for a single labor, but for any matter that you wished, he was subservient to you and obligated to do your will. And all of this was not only for a day or two, for a year or two, but he served you for six years! And you only gave him less than one would give to a laborer who served you year by year. Because, according to the shurat hadin, it would be fitting for you to give him twice, and double, that which you would give to a hired laborer, for the hired laborer is only subservient in regards to specific work, while the servant has not a speck of freedom in the world. And this man was subservient to you as a servant for a span of six years, which is also a time which is not short. If so, it should not be difficult in your eyes as you send him away, and also as you grant him presents. And besides the fact that this is what is required according to the shurat hadin, you should further know that in reward for this, Hashem your God shall bless you in all that you do.

I have to think more about this before I come to my own conclusion in this sugya.

According to Sporno, why does Yehudah reference 'monetary profit'?

Summary: After all, the point is judgement, not revenge! The answer is that Yehudah doesn't really, literally. But this just goes to show how derash, introduced by Rashi, gets totally ingrained as peshat in our minds.

Post: On a previous post on parashat Vayeshev, in the comment thread:

Maverick said... 

As a serious question: the Sforno says that the brothers judged Yosef to be a Rodef, so they dealt with him. The problem is that Yehudah statement (paraphrase) "lets sell him so we can get some profit from this" doesn't jive with this pshat. If he was a rodef Yehudah should have said "we don't need to kill him, we can sell him."

This is a great illustration of how Rashi sets the peshat, and how hard it is to break free of this understanding. The pasuk, with Rashi:

26. And Judah said to his brothers, "What is the gain if we slay our brother and cover up his blood?		כו. וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוּדָה אֶל אֶחָיו מַה בֶּצַע כִּי נַהֲרֹג אֶת אָחִינוּ וְכִסִּינוּ אֶת דָּמוֹ:
What is the gain: What money [will we profit]? As the Targum renders.		מה בצע: מה ממון, כתרגומו:

This is an extremely tempting explanation to give. It stems from a close reading of the pasuk coupled with an awareness of how betza is sometimes used elsewhere. After all, Yehuda follows up with the suggestion that they sell Yosef to the Yishme'eilim, and they do so, for 20 silver. And we see, for example, in Mishlei 15:27:

כז  עֹכֵר בֵּיתוֹ, בּוֹצֵעַ בָּצַע;    וְשׂוֹנֵא מַתָּנֹת יִחְיֶה.

27 He that is greedy of gain troubleth his own house; but he that hateth gifts shall live.

This is likely what prompted Targum Onkelos to render it as such:

לז,כו וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוּדָה, אֶל-אֶחָיו:  מַה-בֶּצַע, כִּי נַהֲרֹג אֶת-אָחִינוּ, וְכִסִּינוּ, אֶת-דָּמוֹ.

וַאֲמַר יְהוּדָה, לַאֲחוֹהִי:  מָא מָמוֹן נִתְהֲנֵי לַנָא, אֲרֵי נִקְטוֹל יָת אֲחוּנָא, וּנְכַסֵּי, עַל דְּמֵיהּ.

Thus, he translates ma betza as מָא מָמוֹן נִתְהֲנֵי לַנָא, and Rashi follows him. So too renders Targum Yonatan.

But even though this translation is so delicious, peshat is rather unlikely to be in accordance with this. Rather, he is likely simply asking what is the benefit, the profit (in the sense of benefit rather than monetary reward), the point? Compare Tehillim 30:10:

י  מַה-בֶּצַע בְּדָמִי,    בְּרִדְתִּי אֶל-שָׁחַת: הֲיוֹדְךָ עָפָר;    הֲיַגִּיד אֲמִתֶּךָ.

10 'What profit is there in my blood, when I go down to the pit? {N} Shall the dust praise Thee? shall it declare Thy truth?

Such is the position of the pashtan, Ibn Ezra:
[לז, כו]
מה בצע -מה תועלת. 
וקרוב מטעם חפץ. 
וכן: מה בצע בדמי.

and so renders Seforno:

פסוק כומַה בֶּצַע. מַה תּועֶלֶת. כִּי אָמְנָם הַנְּקָמָה תְּכַוֵּן לְאֶחָד מִשְּׁתַּיִם: אִם לְשַׁלֵּם לְעושֵׂי הָרָע, וְהִנֵּה בָּזֶה כִּי נַהֲרג אֶת אָחִינוּ נְשַׁלֵּם רָעָה גַּם לְעַצְמֵנוּ, כִּי יִכְאַב לִבֵּנוּ עַל מִיתָתו וְעַל אַכְזָרִיּוּתֵנוּ נֶגְדּו. וְאִם לְהַפְחִיד אֶת הַנִּשְׁאָרִים שֶׁיִּשְׁמְעוּ וְיִירְאוּ מִלְּהַזִּיק אותָנוּ, הִנֵּה גַּם זֶה הַמִּין מֵהַתּועֶלֶת לא נַשִּׂיג כִּי נַעֲלִים אֶת מִיתָתו. 

"What is the purpose -- for surely revenge is directed towards one of two: if to pay back the one who does evil, behold in this, if we kill our brother, we shall pay evil as well to ourselves, for our hearts will ache over his death and over our cruelty towards him. And if to frighten the ones who remain, that they will hear and fear from harming us, behold that we will not achieve this purpose, for we will conceal his death."

With "purpose" rather than "monetary profit", it is far easier to read Seforno's peshat into this. Regardless of whether we think that the brothers judging him with a din rodef is good peshat.

Vayelech: And I Am Not Able

The second pasuk in Vayelech:

ב וַיֹּאמֶר אֲלֵהֶם, בֶּן-מֵאָה וְעֶשְׂרִים שָׁנָה אָנֹכִי הַיּוֹם--לֹא-אוּכַל עוֹד, לָצֵאת וְלָבוֹא; וַה' אָמַר אֵלַי, לֹא תַעֲבֹר אֶת-הַיַּרְדֵּן הַזֶּה.

2 And he said unto them: 'I am a hundred and twenty years old this day; I can no more go out and come in; and the LORD hath said unto me: Thou shalt not go over this Jordan.

The most simple implication of this is that because of his age, Moshe can not more go out and come in. There is an apparent contradiction between this declaration of Moshe and the declaration at the end of parshat Vezot Haberacha that at 120 years old, Moshe retained his vigor:

ז וּמֹשֶׁה, בֶּן-מֵאָה וְעֶשְׂרִים שָׁנָה--בְּמֹתוֹ; לֹא-כָהֲתָה עֵינוֹ, וְלֹא-נָס לֵחֹה.

7 And Moses was a hundred and twenty years old when he died: his eye was not dim, nor his natural force abated.

How to resolve this contradiction? Off the cuff, one could say that one of the two is slight exaggeration, either Moshe in describing his aches and pains, or the verse, in eulogizing Moshe. (Obviously the latter is more difficult because it attributes a "lie" to the Creator.) But there are other possibilities to resolving this, and this contradiction is the basis of an interesting conversation amongst the commentators.

Thus, Rashi opens things up by noting that in Vayelech, in the pasuk:

ב וַיֹּאמֶר אֲלֵהֶם, בֶּן-מֵאָה וְעֶשְׂרִים שָׁנָה אָנֹכִי הַיּוֹם--לֹא-אוּכַל עוֹד, לָצֵאת וְלָבוֹא; וַה' אָמַר אֵלַי, לֹא תַעֲבֹר אֶת-הַיַּרְדֵּן הַזֶּה.

2 And he said unto them: 'I am a hundred and twenty years old this day; I can no more go out and come in; and the LORD hath said unto me: Thou shalt not go over this Jordan.

we can bind the middle phrase, לֹא-אוּכַל עוֹד, לָצֵאת וְלָבוֹא, in one of two ways. If we connect it to "I am a hundred and twenty years old this day" then it is a contradiction, because it connotes lack of vigor. However, if we bind it to "and the LORD hath said unto me: Thou shalt not go over this Jordan," then that last phrase is an explanation of lo uchal, rather than an additional point. Then, Moshe cannot go out or come in, to take the Jews into Canaan, only because of Hashem's command. But of course he retained his vigor. Another explanation Rashi offers, on a more midrashic level, and based on Sotah 13b, is that the channels of transmission of Torah were closed to him, and that it what לָצֵאת וְלָבוֹא means. Indeed, we would have to look more closely at it, but this apparent contradiction may in part be a source for that midrash.

Ibn Ezra appears to maintain that it refers to strength, but a particular kind of strength:

לצאת ולבוא -
במלחמה.
והטעם: כי אילו לא הייתי מת עתה, אין בי יכולת להלחם ואין לכם צורך למי שיעזור אתכם, כי השם ישמיד הגוים גם יהושע, והעד מה שראיתם בעיניכם במלחמת סיחון ועוג

Thus, now is his time to pass away, for if he did not, he does not have the ability to battle. But meanwhile, Hashem can help them via Yehoshua, as they have already seen.

Perhaps his intent by making this about battle is that this is a different kind of vigor than the one described in Zos Habracha. And it certainly is plausible.

Seforno makes this about vigor (it would seem), but still manages to disconnect it from the 120 years old. He writes:

בֶּן מֵאָה וְעֶשְׂרִים שָׁנָה אָנכִי הַיּום. וְאֵין לְהִתְעַצֵּב עַל מִיתָתִי, שֶׁלּא הָיִיתִי רָאוּי לִחְיות עוד בַּטֶּבַע.

לא אוּכַל עוד לָצֵאת וְלָבא. וְגַם אִם הָיִיתִי חַי, לא הָיִיתִי יָכול לָצֵאת וְלָבא לִפְנֵיכֶם בְּזִקְנוּתִי.

וַה' אָמַר אֵלַי לא תַעֲבר. וְגַם אִם הָיִיתִי יָכול לָצֵאת וְלָבא, הִנֵּה "ה' אָמַר אֵלַי לא תַעֲבר", וְאִם כֵּן טוב לָכֶם שֶׁאָמוּת כְּדֵי שֶׁתּוּכְלוּ לַעֲבר

Thus, there are three points. He is 120, and thus his years have run out; even if he would live further, he would not be able לָצֵאת וְלָבא before them in his old age; and finally, even if he would have the ability, Hashem has decreed otherwise.

The addition of לפניכם might well connote "in battle." But also, perhaps we can read this as that up to this point, he did have the vigor. But going forwards, if he would continue to live, he would not.

(Aharon ben Yosef the Karaite (here, page 249, but you need a plugin to view these pages) has something similar to Seforno and Ibn Ezra. He says "if I would continue to live, I would not have the strength to go out in battle.)

Ramban writes:

ב): ויאמר אלהם בן מאה ועשרים שנה אנכי היום -
וזה לנחם אותם על ענינו, כלומר אני זקן ואין לכם עוד תועלת ממני, ועוד כי השם ציוני שלא אעבור שם. ואל תפחדו ואל תיראו, כי ה' יעבור עמכם לא יסלק שכינתו מכם בעבורי, ויהושע הוא העובר לפניכם במקומי. ואע"פ שמשה רבנו היה בתקפו ובבריאותו, כאשר העיד הכתוב (להלן לד ז): לא כהתה עינו ולא נס לחה, אמר להם כן לנחמם.

ורש"י כתב:

לא אוכל עוד לצאת ולבוא לפי שה' אמר אלי לא תעבור את הירדן.

ואינו נכון.

ועל דעת ר"א:

לצאת ולבוא למלחמה כי חלשו כוחותיו בזקנותו.

וגם זה איננו נכון.

ורבותינו אמרו (סוטה יג ב):

מלמד שנסתתמו ממנו מעיינות חכמה.

והיה זה במעשה נס, שלא ידאג לתת גדולה ליהושע בפניו:

Thus, besides giving his own interpretation, he lists the other interpretations of Rashi, Ibn Ezra, and declared them incorrect. He has a bit more respect for the midrash from Sotah 13b which Rashi cited -- he cites it separately, and says this was bemaaseh nes, but he does not declare it incorrect, as he did to Rashi and Ibn Ezra. The midrash, perhaps, sits on a different plane. It does not contradict his words, and can be said to be a midrash simulaneously true with whatever peshat one decides upon. Also, perhaps it would be disrespectful (heretical?) to declare to midrash incorrect.

At any rate, we see from this that Ibn Ezra indeed intended the vigor of battle to be a harmonization, and we see that Ramban dismisses it.

Instead, Ramban declares that it is indeed a contradiction, but this was Moshe comforting the people, and so he was not entirely truthful in the nechama. And as I suggested before, Ramban is not about to say the Narrator was lying in the eulogy. Ramban makes good sense on a peshat level -- understand the words within the context of their role, and in terms of the general theme of the verses.

Shadal does not really offer a resolution to the apparent contradiction. Though he does take sides in the Ibn Ezra / Ramban debate. Thus:

לא אוכל וגו ': לא אמר : להוציאכם ולהביאכם , או : לצאת לפניכם ולבא לפניכם , אלא : לצאת ולבוא סתם , והוא כמו וצאתך ובואך ידעתי ( מ"ב י"ט כ"ז וישעיה ל"ז כ"ח ), ענינו להתנועע ולפעול בזריזות .

Thus, the pasuk does not state לפניכם, as in the words used by Seforno. And it does not state "to take you out and to bring you in" (as a transitive, where Moshe is taking them), but rather plainly, to go in and out. He gives examples of this usage in Melachim Bet and Yeshaya.

In Melachim Bet:

כז וְשִׁבְתְּךָ וְצֵאתְךָ וּבֹאֲךָ, יָדָעְתִּי; וְאֵת, הִתְרַגֶּזְךָ אֵלָי.

27 But I know thy sitting down, and thy going out, and thy coming in, and thy raging against Me.

And in Yeshaya:

כח וְשִׁבְתְּךָ וְצֵאתְךָ וּבוֹאֲךָ, יָדָעְתִּי; וְאֵת, הִתְרַגֶּזְךָ אֵלָי.

28 But I know thy sitting down, and thy going out, and thy coming in, and thy raging against Me.

See these pesukim in context. Shadal therefore says that this does not mean going in and coming out in battle, but rather to move about and act with vigor.

This would reinstate the contradiction. But then we could apply some other method of resolution, such as that this is going forward, or Ramban that this is for the purpose of nechama.

Naso: Seforno on Nazir and Taanis

As a quick follow-up to the Ostrovtze Rebbe's explanation of only someone "sitting" in Taanis being a chotei:

Here is what Sforno has to say on the pasuk. The pesukim state {Bemidbar 6}

ב דַּבֵּר אֶל-בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, וְאָמַרְתָּ אֲלֵהֶם: אִישׁ אוֹ-אִשָּׁה, כִּי יַפְלִא לִנְדֹּר נֶדֶר נָזִיר--לְהַזִּיר, לַה'שם.	2 Speak unto the children of Israel, and say unto them: When either man or woman shall clearly utter a vow, the vow of a Nazirite, to consecrate himself unto the LORD,
ג מִיַּיִן וְשֵׁכָר יַזִּיר, חֹמֶץ יַיִן וְחֹמֶץ שֵׁכָר לֹא יִשְׁתֶּה; וְכָל-מִשְׁרַת עֲנָבִים לֹא יִשְׁתֶּה, וַעֲנָבִים לַחִים וִיבֵשִׁים לֹא יֹאכֵל.	3 he shall abstain from wine and strong drink: he shall drink no vinegar of wine, or vinegar of strong drink, neither shall he drink any liquor of grapes, nor eat fresh grapes or dried.

And upon this, Sforno comments:

Thus, a Nazir-ship is a good thing. He wants to separate from the regular taanugim, to separate himself in order that he be entirely dedicated to Hashem, to engage in His Torah, to go in His ways, and to cleave to Him. So what should he do? He should not fast, since this will weaken him from doing the work of heaven. Nor should he engage in makos perushim. See Sotah 22b for more details.

To cite Point By Point Summary:

(l) (Mishnah): Blows of Perushim...
(m) (Beraisa): There are seven types of (improper) Perushim: Shichmi, Nakfi, Kizai, mi'Duchya, one who says 'what is my obligation? I will do it!', from love, and from fear.

1. Shichmi do not act for Hashem's sake;
2. Nakfi shuffle their feet like humble people, and stub their toes;
3. (Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak): Kizai bleed from bumping into walls, like one who closes his eyes to avoid looking at women;
4. (Rabah bar Shilo): Mi'Duchya walk bent.

and so on... but see inside, on Sotah 22b:

ומכות פרושין וכו': ת"ר שבעה פרושין הן פרוש שיכמי פרוש נקפי פרוש קיזאי פרוש מדוכיא פרוש מה חובתי ואעשנה פרוש מאהבה פרוש מיראה פרוש שיכמי זה העושה מעשה שכם פרוש נקפי זה המנקיף את רגליו פרוש קיזאי א"ר נחמן בר יצחק זה המקיז דם לכתלים פרוש מדוכיא אמר רבה בר שילא דמשפע כי מדוכיא פרוש מה חובתי ואעשנה הא מעליותא היא אלא דאמר מה חובתי תו ואעשנה פרוש מאהבה פרוש מיראה אמרו ליה אביי ורבא לתנא לא תיתני פרוש מאהבה פרוש מיראה דאמר רב יהודה אמר רב לעולם יעסוק אדם בתורה ובמצות אפי' שלא לשמה שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק דמטמרא מטמרא ודמגליא מגליא בי דינא רבה ליתפרע מהני דחפו גונדי אמר לה ינאי מלכא לדביתיה אל תתיראי מן הפרושין ולא ממי שאינן פרושין אלא מן הצבועין שדומין לפרושין שמעשיהן כמעשה זמרי ומבקשין שכר כפנחס:

Rather, continues Seforno, he separates himself from wine. In this way, he reduces his desires and subdues his yetzer.

This idea that the Nazir is doing something good, and that other paths are not good, can fit with the gemara somewhat. Of course, Sforno considers fasting to be a type which is not good, because it weakens one from being able to accomplish avodas Hashem.

However, to reiterate, this might be in accord with other opinions, such as Rabbi Eleazar in the gemara, or Resh Lakish. But Shmuel is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer haKappar who cited Rabbi, on Taanis 11a:

1. (R. Elazar ha'Kafar citing Rebbi): The Pasuk refers to the Nazir as having sinned, because he deprived himself from wine.
2. If he is called a sinner just for abstaining from wine, how much more so someone who abstains from all food.

Thus, he not only holds that fasting is sinful, but becoming a nazir and abstaining from wine is also sinful. (and that is why later on, we have the words we may cite out of context, וְכִפֶּר עָלָיו, מֵאֲשֶׁר חָטָא.)

If I may be so bold, I would suggest that Shmuel's perspective is that the Torah prohibits certain actions, and one should not add on to them. Just as elsewhere anyone who takes a vow is as if he built a private altar, and whoever fulfills the vow is as if he sacrificed upon it an offering. And with the issur bamos, this is a bad thing -- the Torah dictates a place for a central altar, where everyone goes, and a place where offerings are wanted, and elsewhere it is improper to bring it. So too, the Torah dictates behavior. Aside from that, Hashem wants us to enjoy His world, and this ascetic attitude is not a positive one.

Other Amoraim, and other Tannaim, can of course argue. But I think this approach is what is guiding Shmuel in his statement.

Which is also why I don't see the Ostrovtze Rebbe's response about "nikra chotei" as being correct.