Chullin 96: What does Rav Pappa mean that Shmuel's position is a matter of Tannaitic dispute?

In today's daf yomi (Chullin 96a, going on to b), Shmuel had a position that only that portion of the sciatic nerve which was over directly the spoon of the thigh was prohibited. And Rav Pappa says:

אמר רב פפא כתנאי אכלו ואין בו כזית חייב רבי יהודה אומר עד שיהא בו כזית

That is, while the Mishna did not have Rabbi Yehuda argue regarding whether one who ate a full gid hanasheh was liable, in a brayta Rabbi Yehuda does argue. And, somehow, one unspecified side of this argument lines up with Shmuel's position limiting the (Biblically) prohibited area of the gid.

Rashi explains it as follows:

אמר רב פפא כתנאי - כדמפרש ואזיל דרבנן אית להו דשמואל ורבי יהודה לית ליה דשמואל

This is indeed a faithful rendition of the conclusion of the gemara, that the side in the machlokes who holds like Shmuel is the Rabbanan (=Rabbi Meir, I think), and it is not in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

The gemara which follows bears the clear mark of authorship by the setama degemara. It is a derasha chain. This Tanna interprets this pasuk in this way. So how does the opponent interpret the verse? And if so, where does the first Tanna derive that law? And so on, until the game of musical chairs ends. This is a systematic approach to derashot that one often finds in the setama.

And the way it operates here is that Rabbi Yehuda requires "asher al kaf hayarech" to derive a specific law, while the Rabbanan utilize that verse for Shmuel's derasha. So, even though the specifics of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbanan about eating a berya of gid less than a kezayit have little semantically to do with Shmuel's identification of the prohibited gid, it turns out that the two positions are related because of competition for the verse each is derived from.

Besides being somewhat awkward and surprising, in the sense that Rav Pappa should really have been much clearer in how these relate, there are difficulties in the derasha chain itself. In particular (96b), we have to believe that Rabbi Yehuda holds that the presence of the word achila in the pasuk indicates that it must be a kezayit, and a berya does not suffice, even though (as Tosafot points out), in all other places, one is liable for a berya (such as an ant) even less than a kezayit, and there is no indication that Rabbi Yehuda disagrees there. Tosafot's question is better than any answer. And the Rabbanan's rejoinder, that the word achila is to indicate that one is liable even if there are multiple olive measures and he only ate one is also suspect. Would one say that one is liable only if he ate all the cheilev?

My resolution of Rav Pappa is against what is explicit in the setama degemara, but I think that it makes sense. Shmuel's position is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, not the Rabbanan. Here is how.

If the entire gid is forbidden, then it makes sense to say that eating a berya, meaning a complete forbidden entity, makes one liable, even if that whole entity is less than a kezayit. But if you tell me that only a small portion of the entity is forbidden, one cannot label it a berya. If only the cheilev of the ant were forbidden, eating a whole ant that includes that cheilev is not berya. And eating just all that forbidden portion is also not berya.

Therefore, since Shmuel holds that only a small subsection of the gid, namely that over the spoon of the thigh, is forbidden, Rabbi Yehuda would say that there is no aspect of berya here for eating that entire forbidden entity. The forbidden part of the gid is not a complete entity in and of itself. Therefore, the Rabbanan who maintain that it is indeed a berya for less than a kezayit could not hold that only a small portion of the gid is forbidden, and argue upon Shmuel.

How could Yaakov Avinu go out at night?

A few days ago, in daf yomi (Chullin 91a), we saw that one a Torah scholar should not go out alone at night, and that this is derived from the case of Yaakov, who went out alone after his small vessels at night.

(בראשית לב, כה) ויאבק איש עמו עד עלות השחר אמר רבי יצחק מכאן לת"ח שלא יצא יחידי בלילה

As Rashi explains, they wrestled until dawn, showing that mazikin cannot harm during the day, such that he would not need shemira during the day.

מדקאמר עד עלות השחר - שמע מינה לא ניתנה רשות למזיק להזיק ביום לפיכך לא הוצרך שמירה:
מכאן לתלמיד חכם כו' - שהרי יעקב נשאר יחידי והוזק:

Someone in the shiur asked how Yaakov could go out alone at night. After all, the avot kept the entire Torah. (And, I would add, the gemara just above sort-of endorsed this idea, stating that Yosef in disguyise commanded that his brothers be able to see the bet hashechita as well as that the gid hanasheh was removed.) How could Yaakov go out alone at night, when the gemara says that a Talmid Chacham should not go out at night?

My answer is this: Where is this halacha derived from, if not this very incident! What if Yaakov tried to keep this halachah, and did not go out at night? Then, the incident would not have happened and the gemara could not have derived the halachah. In which case, Yaakov would not have known not to go alone out at night.

More than that, not going out alone at night would have created a temporal paradox which could have destroyed the entire universe! Therefore, Yaakov had no choice but to go out alone at night and subject himself to danger.

Are the kosher signs of wild animals Biblical?

Note: This is the work of one evening, rather than something thought out over months. There may be sources of which I am embarrassingly unaware. I haven't looked at other gemaras to see if this works out consistently, or at midreshei halacha such as Sifra, and so on. Rather, this is a way of playing with the text, on the basis of a discovered variant text. So this likely requires more thought, and certainly should not be the basis for any changes in practice.

(Initially posted at Girsology, but at present, few people visit that site. So now cross-posted here.)

0. Table of contents
1. The variant texts and their implications
2. Evidence from piskaot
3. Evidence from the gemara's question
4. The straightforward implication of the Tosefta
5. A possible nafka mina

1. The variant texts and their implications

If one examines the Munich manuscript of the Talmud, Chullin 59a, one would discover a fascinating variant version of the Mishna:

It reads:

סימני בהמהנאמרו מן התורה וסימני העוף לאנאמרו

However, on that first line, there is a marginal gloss, adding in the word וחיה.

This brings it in line with the Mishna we have in our printed editions of Chullin 59a:

מתני' סימני בהמה וחיה נאמרו מן התורה וסימני העוף לא נאמרו אבל אמרו חכמים כל עוף הדורס טמא כל שיש לו אצבע יתירה וזפק וקורקבנו נקלף טהור ר' אלעזר בר' צדוק אומר כל עוף החולק את רגליו טמא ובחגבים כל שיש לו ארבע רגלים וארבע כנפים וקרצולים וכנפיו חופין את רובו רבי יוסי אומר ושמו חגב ובדגים כל שיש לו סנפיר וקשקשת רבי יהודה אומר שני קשקשין וסנפיר אחד ואלו הן קשקשין הקבועין בו וסנפירים הפורח בהן:

What would the implications be of the word וחיה being absent from the Mishna? This omission might well be a scribal error, which was corrected by the same or some other scribe, but we should still consider what the implications would be of its omission, as this could help us decide if it is a mere error or something significant. Further, if the word וחיה was indeed originally absent, what would drive a scribe to add it?

The difference between these two girsaot is that, with the word וחיה present, the Mishna definitively and explicitly states that the signs of kosher wild animals are Biblical, and written in the Torah text. These signs would then be identical to the signs of kosher domesticated animals. As Rashi notes, in explaining a question of the gemara:

חיה בכלל בהמה היא לסימנין - קושיא היא דהא כתיב זאת החיה כו' וכתיב סימנין בתריה:

That is, there is an explicit pasuk, in Vayikra 11:

ב  דַּבְּרוּ אֶל-בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, לֵאמֹר:  זֹאת הַחַיָּה אֲשֶׁר תֹּאכְלוּ, מִכָּל-הַבְּהֵמָה אֲשֶׁר עַל-הָאָרֶץ.	2 Speak unto the children of Israel, saying: These are the living things which ye may eat among all the beasts that are on the earth.
ג  כֹּל מַפְרֶסֶת פַּרְסָה, וְשֹׁסַעַת שֶׁסַע פְּרָסֹת, מַעֲלַת גֵּרָה, בַּבְּהֵמָה--אֹתָהּ, תֹּאכֵלוּ.	3 Whatsoever parteth the hoof, and is wholly cloven-footed, and cheweth the cud, among the beasts, that may ye eat.

The pasuk begins with זֹאת הַחַיָּה and afterwards lists the signs of split hoof and rumination. Thus, chayot, wild animals, are included in this topic of signs for kosher animals.

If one wanted, though, one could argue that as a matter of peshat, זֹאת הַחַיָּה need not refer to wild animals in particular. The word חַיָּה simply means "living creature", rather than the particular halachic connotation it often takes of wild animal. For instance, in the first perek of Bereishit, 

כד  וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים, תּוֹצֵא הָאָרֶץ נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה לְמִינָהּ, בְּהֵמָה וָרֶמֶשׂ וְחַיְתוֹ-אֶרֶץ, לְמִינָהּ; וַיְהִי-כֵן.

24 And God said: 'Let the earth bring forth the living creature after its kind, cattle, and creeping thing, and beast of the earth after its kind.' And it was so.

...

ל  וּלְכָל-חַיַּת הָאָרֶץ וּלְכָל-עוֹף הַשָּׁמַיִם וּלְכֹל רוֹמֵשׂ עַל-הָאָרֶץ, אֲשֶׁר-בּוֹ נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה, אֶת-כָּל-יֶרֶק עֵשֶׂב, לְאָכְלָה; וַיְהִי-כֵן.

30 and to every beast of the earth, and to every fowl of the air, and to every thing that creepeth upon the earth, wherein there is a living soul, [I have given] every green herb for food.' And it was so.

It means "living creature" in general. If so, when the pasuk states זֹאת הַחַיָּה, it could be referring to the living creatures within the specified subgroup of מִכָּל-הַבְּהֵמָה. Instead of saying זֹאת אֲשֶׁר תֹּאכְלוּ, מִכָּל-הַבְּהֵמָה, the pasuk was a little more expansive and added the general and appropriate selector of הַחַיָּה.

Then, if we take בְּהֵמָה in its halachic sense of domesticated animal in particular, to the exclusion of wild animals. This is a sort of klal and prat, and we should only consider those within the prat.

And if so, the Mishna can be read as deliberately agnostic as to whether wild animals, chayot, are explicitly Biblical. Thus,

סימני בהמהנאמרו מן התורה וסימני העוף לאנאמרו

בהמה is written in the Torah, עוף is not written in the Torah, and the חיה is left as an exercise to the reader.

Those are the two girsaot. Let us consider if we can harness evidence towards one reading of the Mishna or the other.

2. Evidence from piskaot

There is a piska in the gemara which begins the discussion of the signs of kosher domesticated animals. A piska is typically a quote from the Mishna, separated by space, or two dots. This piska reads:

סימני בהמה

In our printed gemaras, this text does not occur. This is because it is unnecessary. Recall that in manuscript gemaras, the Mishna appeared separately, and so piskaot were required to identify what part of the Mishna the gemara was going on. However, in our printed gemara, the text of the gemara which immediately follows this piska, namely, תנו רבנן אלו הן סימני בהמה, is printed right after the Mishna. If so, there is no need for a piska, and it is omitted. This is a pity, since we lose out on Talmudic text.

Perhaps the fact that the piska states סימני בהמה and does not continue with the word וחיה should be taken as evidence that the Mishna itself did not continue with that word. However, an obvious rejoinder is that the topic at hand in the gemara is specifically the signs of the בהמה, and that חיה is going to be discussed in the very next sugya. As such, it makes sense to cut off the citation of the Mishna right at this point. Also, we should note that the piskaot were composed by the Geonim (or later), and so might only shed light as to the text of the Mishna at a later stage.

However, there is a later piska, starting off the next sugya:

This one does appear in our printed text:

סימני חיה:

ת"ר אלו הן סימני חיה חיה בכלל בהמה היא לסימנין אמר רבי זירא

If so, this would indicate that the word חיה does appear in our Mishna.

However, we should consider the following counterpoints.

a. This piska dates from the Geonim, and cannot be taken as definitive proof.

b. The Mishna, as we have it, states סימני בהמה וחיה נאמרו מן התורה. Note how the word וחיה has a connective vav, while the piska does not. Note how the preceding word in the Mishna as we have it is בהמה, while the piska has סימני. To try to make this a valid quote of the Mishna, we would need to emend the Mishnaic text to סימני בהמה וסימני חיה נאמרו מן התורה. But even that would not work, because the piska has no vav before the word סימני.

We can salvage this piska by stating that it is a selective citation of the Mishna. That is, imagine an ellipses. The word סימני was important to quote. But the word בהמה would be misleading and distracting from the main topic, namely the signs of חיה. And so בהמה ו was removed from the quote.

Alternatively, we can suggest that the authors of the piskaot were working off of the Tosefta 3:7 for their quotations. If so, the quote in the first piska would have nothing to do with whether the signs of בהמה were Biblical. Rather, these are quotes from the braytot which immediately follow, put in as signposts for the beginning of new sugyot.

3. Evidence from the gemara's question
Perhaps we can harness the gemara's question to prove the correct text of the Mishna. The gemara (59a-b) asks:

סימני חיה:

ת"ר אלו הן סימני חיה 

חיה בכלל בהמה היא לסימנין 

אמר רבי זירא להתיר חלבה 

והכי קאמר אלו הן סימני חיה שחלבה מותר כל שיש לה קרנים וטלפים

The brayta begins to list the signs of the חיה, namely horns and hooves. The setama degemara fills in the question underlying Rabbi Zera's explanation of that brayta. The signs which make a chaya kosher are the same as those which make a beheima kosher. If so, what is the significance of these signs? That is why Rabbi Zera assumes that the brayta here deals with the signs of a chaya as separate from a beheima, such that its fats are permitted.

Thus, Rabbi Zera, and the setama degemara, understand this brayta to refer to signs which make a kosher animal a chaya as opposed to a beheima.

Rashi's proof to this is from an interpretation of a pasuk, rather than the explicit Mishna, which is interesting. But that does not necessarily mean that Rashi didn't have the word חיה in the Mishna. Perhaps a conflict between a brayta and a Mishna could be read as a Tannaitic conflict, while an appeal to a pasuk is unambiguous, and the author of the brayta would have to accept this.

4. The straightforward implication of the Tosefta
Looking at the Tosefta, the straightforward explanation seems to be that the סימני חיה are signs of kosher status, rather than signs of chaya status. Consider the structure formed in the Tosefta:

ג,ז  אלו הן סימני בהמה (ויקרא יא) לכל הבהמה אשר היא מפרסת פרסה ושוסעת שסע פרסות מעלת גרה בבהמה אותה תאכלו כל מעלת גרה אין לה שינים שלמעלה איזה שור שקדמו קרניו לטלפיו זה פרו של אדם הראשון שנא' (תהילים סד) ותיטב לה' משור פר מקרין מפריס. 

These are simanei kashrut. Also note that only simanei beheima are mentioned, not simanei beheima vechaya, which we might have expected if it encompassed chaya as well. The quote is from Vayikra 11:3, such that it only mentioned beheima, and skipped over the passing and ambiguous reference to chaya in Vayikra 11:2. (Though it starts at 11:3 because that where the Biblical text lists the signs.)

The Tosefta continues:

אלו הן סימני חיה כל שיש לה קרנים וטלפים ר' דוסא אומר יש לה קרנים אי אתה צריך לשאול על הטלפים אע"פ שאין ראיה לדבר זכר לדבר ותיטב לה' משור פר מקרין מפריס

Simply by context, we would expect these to also be simanei kashrut. There is also the zecher to Rabbi Dosa's opinion, based on Tehillim 69:

לב  וְתִיטַב לַה', מִשּׁוֹר פָּר;    מַקְרִן מַפְרִיס.

32 And it shall please the LORD better than a bullock that hath horns and hoofs.

I think this means that if an animal is makrin -- has horns, then it is also mafris -- has split hooves, or telafim. (I don't see explicitly that the טלפים are split, but maybe that is definitional.)

There is also the analysis made by Tosafot on our daf (Chullin 59a):

אלו הן סימני חיה כל שיש לה קרנים וטלפים. קרנים אתי לאפוקי מבהמה דכיון דיש לה קרנים חרוקות וכרוכות כדלקמן אם כן לאו בהמה היא אבל אכתי איכא לספוקי בחיה טמאה לכך בעינן טלפים פרסות הסדוקות דהשתא ליכא לספוקי לא בחיה טמאה ולא בבהמה טהורה וחלבה מותר רבי דוסא אומר כל שיש לה קרנים קרני חיה אי אתה צריך לחזור על הטלפים דסבר דחיה טמאה אין לה קרנים

That is, the purpose of horns is to distinguish chaya from beheima, and the purpose of (split) hooves is to distinguish kosher from non-kosher chaya. And Rabbi Dosa holds that no kosher wild animal has horns. If so, kashrut is at least part of the equation.

Kashrut could then also be all of it, though. If these two, or this one, is sufficient to identify it as a wild animal and to exclude non-kosher wild animals, then it is kosher! And so, why would one need to appeal to the signs for the beheima?

The Tosefta continues:

רשב"ג אומר כל שיש לו אצבע יתירה בעוף טהור כל העוף הדורס טמא רשב"א אומר כל הקולט באויר ואין קרקבנו נקלף ר"א בר צדוק אומר כל הנותן על גבי משיחה החולק שתים לפניו ושתים לאחריו טמא אחרים אומרים השוכן בין הטמאין ודומה לטמאין טמא השוכן בין הטהורים ודומה לטהורין טהור.  אנשי איש כפר תמרתא שביהודה היו אוכלין את הזרזירין מפני שיש להן זפק.  אנשי שוק העליון שבירושלים היו אוכלין את סינוניא לבנה מפני שקרקבנה נקלף.

These are the simanei kashrut of birds.

The Tosefta continues:

ג,ח  ובביצים כל שכודרת ועגולגלת בידוע של עוף טמא וכל שאינה כודרת ועגולגלת בידוע של עוף טהור הוא.  לוקחין ביצים מ"מ ואין חוששין שמא של נבלות ושל טרפות הן אין מוכרין ביצים של נבלות של טרפות לעובדי כוכבים אא"כ היו נקופות לקערה לפיכך אמרו אין לוקחין מן העובדי כוכבים ביצים נקופות לקערה.

These are the simanei kashrut of eggs.

Next, the Tosefta states:

ג,ט  אלו סימני חגבים כל שיש לו ד' רגלים וד' סנפירים וקרסוליו וכנפיו חופין את רובו ר' יוסי אומר ושמו חגב ולא כנצרין שיש בהן סימנין הללו סומכוס אומר אף המורד ר"א בר"י אומר אין לו עכשיו ועתיד לגדל לאחר זמן כגון החולחזה כשר 

These are the simanei kashrut of locusts.

Finally, the Tosefta states:

אלו הן סימני דגים כל שיש לו סנפיר וקשקשת יש לו קשקשת אי אתה צריך לשאול על סנפיר יש לו סנפיר ואין לו קשקשת טמא אלו הן קשקשין שמלובש בהן וסנפירין ששט בהן וכמה קשקשין יהיה בו אפילו אחת תחת לחיו ואחת תחת זנבו ואחת תחת סנפיר שלו ר' יהודה אומר שני קשקשת אין לו עכשיו אבל עתיד לגדל לאחר זמן כגון הסולתנית ונפיא כשר יש לו עכשיו אבל עתיד להשירם כשעולה מן הים כגון הקוליוס והפילמיס הספיתאים ואנתינוס.  ר"י בן דורמסקא אומר לויתן דג טהור הוא שנאמר (איוב מא) גאוה אפיקי מגינים סגור חותם צר אחד באחד יגשו וגו' תחתיו חדודי חרס וגו' גאוה אפיקי מגינים אלו קשקשין שלו תחתיו חדודי חרס אלו סנפירין של

These are the simanei kashrut of fish.

If so, it is extremely out of the ordinary for the סימני חיה alone to be for the permissibility of the cheilev. Yes, this is dealing with whether one is allowed to eat the cheilev or not, but still, it is unlike the topic of domesticated animals, of birds, of eggs, of locusts, and of fish. If the topic were only the status of the cheilev, this is something that perhaps should have been stated explicitly.

Perhaps Rabbi Zera is explaining how this is practical and useful. Even though the brayta spoke of kashrut is general, we would know its kashrut status anyway based on the signs of beheima. And so, this second set of signs are useful for this other purpose.

5. A possible nafka mina
Can one rely on these signs of horns and hooves if one cannot determine rumination? (Similar to Rav Chisda earlier in the gemara)? What if the animal does not ruminate, but does have horns and hooves?

Torah Temima on danger

Summary: Yaakov was diminished by Hashem's kindness. And how one should avoid dangerous situations. And eating meat and fish, and whether bittul works for sakana. Then, at the end, I weigh in.

Post: Rashi in the beginning of parashat Vayishlach reads:

11. I have become small from all the kindnesses and from all the truth that You have rendered Your servant, for with my staff I crossed this Jordan, and now I have become two camps.		יא. קָטֹנְתִּי מִכֹּל הַחֲסָדִים וּמִכָּל הָאֱמֶת אֲשֶׁר עָשִׂיתָ אֶת עַבְדֶּךָ כִּי בְמַקְלִי עָבַרְתִּי אֶת הַיַּרְדֵּן הַזֶּה וְעַתָּה הָיִיתִי לִשְׁנֵי מַחֲנוֹת:
I have become small: My merits have diminished because of the kindnesses and the truth that You have rendered me. Therefore, I fear lest I have became sullied with sin since [the time that] You promised me, and it will cause me to be delivered into Esau’s hand[s]. — [from Shab. 32a, Ta’anith 20b, Ber. 41]		קטנתי מכל החסדים: נתמעטו זכיותי על ידי החסדים והאמת שעשית עמי, לכך אני ירא, שמא משהבטחתני נתלכלכתי בחטא ויגרום לי להמסר ביד עשו:

That gemara in Shabbos, 32b reads:

R. Jannai examined [the bridge] and then crossed over. R. Jannai [acted] upon his views, for he said, A man should never stand in a place of danger and say that a miracle will be wrought for him, lest it is not. And if a miracle is wrought for him, it is deducted from his merits.⁷  R. Hanin said, Which verse [teaches this]? I am become diminished⁸  by reason of all the deeds of kindness and all the truth.⁹  R. Zera would not go out among the palm-trees on a day of the strong south wind.¹⁰

Torah Temimah points us to the gemara and then writes:

"To explain קָטֹנְתִּי as 'my merits have been reduced'. And apparently this requires consideration, for behold, this language Yaakov said in a manner of humility, and there is not in this an allusion to the matter of reducing merits. And so is apparent in Midrash Rabba: קָטֹנְתִּי, I am not worthy. And see in Ramban and Maharsha who comment in this matter. And to me it seems, based on that which is stated in Bava Kamma 50a:

 R. Hanina said: If a man says that the Holy One, blessed be He, is lax in the execution of justice, his life shall be outlawed, for it is stated, He is the Rock, His work is perfect; for all His ways are judment.³⁹

And if so, since Yaakov said that he is not worthy of all the goodness, if so, it must be that they were they not done for free, but rather that they reduced his merits.

And know that upon this foundation, that it is prohibited to stand in a dangerous place and rely on a miracle, Chazal forbade many various things which have in there the concern for danger, and many of them are enumerated in Yoreh Deah siman 116. And that which the Taz investigates there if a dangerous substance is nullified in 60X, just as a prohibited substance, it seems to bring proof from Chullin 97a, that there was an incident in which they roasted a goat in its fat, and Rabbi Yochanan said to cut away the meat [and eat it; but here he is reading to discard] until they reached its place [of the fat]. And they [meaning Ravin bar Rav Ada] establish it there in the gemara that this is a case of kilchit in a stewpot [and that Rabbi Yochanan instructed that a non-Jew cook should taste it to see if there was the taste there],

and Rashi explains that a kilchit is a non-kosher species of small fish, in a stewpot of meat. And behold, meat and fish, it is known that this is a dangerous substance, and it is explained that klipah [cutting away] work. And in all places we establish that 60X is better than klipah. [And indeed, in our gemara in Chullin, they explicitly state that the non-Jewish cook should taste it, meaning to ascertain whether taam is there.] Howbeit, in the Yerushalmi it is made clear that a doubt of a danger one needs to be more stringent than a doubt of prohibition.

And we have seen fit to comment here about how the world has seized upon this, to be careful because of a concern of danger, because of the instruction [tzavaah] of Rabbi Yehuda Chassid in the matter of matchmaking, that the name of the groom and the father-in-law, or the name of the bride and her mother-in-law, should not be identical. And many wish to be lenient in this, and they brought out a sevara to say that Rabbi Yehuda Chassid only commanded this to his family; and the like, with other sevarot. See in Shu"t Nodeh Biyhuda Tinyana, chelek Even HaEzer siman 79, and Chasam Sofer chelek Even haEzer at the end of siman 197, and in Chochmas Adam klal 123 din 13, he wrote that this is specifically where the names are threefold, such as that his name is Reuven, his father-in-law's name was Reuven, and he takes a son-in-law whose name is Reuven; and so by a bride and her mother-in-law, and he did not explain a reason in the matter. And further are there more acharonim who wrote other sevarot different from this.

However, to me it seems that this matter is not prohibited because of danger, but rather from the primary law. And this is based on that which we establish that it is forbidden to call his father by his name, and so is it prohibited to call others by their name, where their names are identical, unless you change their name. [And according to the position of the Rambam, in perek 6 from Mamrim, it is prohibited even not before him to call others, whose name is like his, when the name is distinct and irregular, see there.] And according to this, is it not so that it is not possible for a son-in-law and father-in-law, or a daughter-in-law and her mother-in-law, whose names are identical, to dwell together? For is it not so that the daughter will not be able to call her husband by his name before her father, whose name is like his? [And according to the Rambam, for a distinct name, even note before him?] And so too a husband to his wife, whose name is like his mother's name. And there is not to rely on changing the name, for not everyone is knowledgeable of the din, and also at times it is not possible with this. And so, is it not possible to stumble in the cancellation of the command of kibud av va'em, with is Biblical, vedo'k. (See here.)

It is also possible to give the reason for refraining from this based on that which is written in Midrash Rabba, parashat Noach, parasha 38: "Rabbi Yossi said: The rishonim [early ones], because they recognized their lineage, they would name based on events that occurred, but we, who do not recognize our lineage, we name based on our ancestor's name." And the explanation of this is that since we are traveling to and from in Exile, it is fitting for us to recall the chain of our ancestor's lineage, based on the fathers calling their sons based on their fathers [of the fathers] who have passed on, and this is as we are accustomed to in our days. And also in the Talmud we find this custom in every place, such as in Gittin 33b: R' Parta the son of R' Elazar ben Parta, the grandson of R' Parta the Great. And the name of Abayei was Nachmani, based on the name of his grandfather, And see Moed Kata 25b and Yoma 38b.

And behold, if the names of the groom and his father-in-law are the same, the groom and his wife are not able to call their son by the name of the father-in-law and the father of his wife, since the name of the groom is the same as his; and so too for daughters, by a bride and her mother-in-law. And behold, this matter would cause refraining the calling of them for the purpose of recalling the chain of our lineage, vedo'k in this."

End quote.

Here are my thoughts:

1) In terms of fish with meat, we start with the gemara in Pesachim 76b (and here):

תני רב כהנא בריה דרב חיננא סבא פת שאפאה עם צלי בתנור אסור לאכלה בכותחא ההיא ביניתא דאיטווא בהדי בישרא אסרה רבא מפרזיקיא למיכליה בכותחא מר בר רב אשי אמר אפי' במילחא נמי אסורה משום דקשיא לריחא ולדבר אחר:

(q) (Rav Kahana brei d'Rav Chinena - Beraisa): If bread was baked in an oven with roasting meat, it may not be eaten with Kutach. 
(r) A case occurred, fish was roasted with meat - Rava of Parzakiya forbade eating it with Kutach; 
(s) Mar bar Rav Ashi forbade eating it even with salt (i.e. alone), for it (a mixture of fish and meat) is prone to cause odor and Tzara'as.

Now, we have to think about this gemara that the Torah Temimah raised, in Chullin 97b:

והאמר רבה בר בר חנה עובדא הוה קמיה דר' יוחנן בכנישתא דמעון בגדי שצלאו בחלבו ואתו ושיילוה לרבי יוחנן ואמר קולף ואוכל עד שמגיע לחלבו ההוא כחוש הוה רב הונא בר יהודה אמר כוליא בחלבה הוה ושריא רבין בר רב אדא אמר כילכית באילפס הוה ואתו שיילוה לרבי יוחנן ואמר להו ליטעמיה קפילא ארמאה

But surely Rabbah b. Bar Hana has related a case which came before R. Johanan at the synagogue of Ma'on of a kid that was roasted with its fat, and on enquiring of R. Johanan he ruled that one may cut away [the meat] and eat it until one reaches the fat! — That was a lean kid.  R. Huna b. Judah suggested that it was the case of a kidney roasted with its fat, and he [R. Johanan] declared it to be permitted. Rabin son of R. Ada said: It was the case of a kilkith that was found in a pot of stew, and on enquiring of R. Johanan he ruled that a gentile cook should taste it.

Now, Torah Temimah may be correct in interpreting the gemara as each modifying the first statement, such that even where Ravin bar Rav Adda said it was the non-kosher kilkith in stew, Rabbi Yochanan still said (in addition to a gentile cook tasting it) that one should cut away the meat. But I think this is actually an argument as to the situation. And if so, he should not be discussing klipah, but rather whether there is taam, and whether that is parallel to batel beshishim.

Further, if it is not roasting a kid, but cooking in (meat) stew, then perhaps one could assert a distinction between roasting and cooking.

Further, yes, Rashi says it was a meat stew, but before one draws great halachic conclusions from this, outside the primary intent of the sugya, we should consider if there is anything in the gemara itself to suggest that it is specifically meat stew.

Further, and perhaps most importantly, note that in Pesachim, it is only Mar bar Rav Ashi, a very late (7th century) Amora of Bavel. who forbade the meat roasted with fish in any event. Rava of Parzakiya permitted it, so long as it was not eaten with a dairy dip! And while it may indeed be so that we pasken like Mar bar Rav Ashi, it is not a safe assumption that every other Amora agreed with this medical diagnosis. Rabin son of R' Ada, and Rabbi Yochanan, could very well not have held that there was any medical concern with meat cooked/roasted with fish.

2) That said, I think that not contributing taam and being nullified in 60 times as much would be something that the Amoraim would endorse, even for matters of sakana. I don't believe that they maintained 60X as a magical construct, or a mere halachic construction. Here is not the place to elaborate, but it all comes down to the continuum model of matter, as opposed to an atomic model. Rather than matter being made up by distinct pieces, some ancient Greeks believed that matter was made up of a continuum, with different attributes. And they explicitly discuss the case of wine diluted in water. Drop a tiny but of wine in a lot of water and it is nullified. It is NOT that there are bits of wine floating in the water, and we don't care about it. Rather, in the mixture, the various attributes of the wine contribute themselves to the water, so that the water gets a bit more of the wine attributes, and the entire mixture is thus moved a bit further along the continuum. But as such, the entire mixture is really now water. The wine has been physically nullified. However -- and the Greeks discuss this -- keep dripping wine into the water and you have chozer vene'or, it reawakens. Well, not really reawakens, but enough of the attributes of wine have affected the entire liquid substance that it now is quasi-wine.

If so, taste might well be a measure of how far along the continuum something is. And if there is no taste, then it has been physically nullified, and doesn't exist. So perhaps yes, it would work for matters of sakana. 

(One might still distinguish between something which is already sakana and is then nullified / klipa, vs. something that if it infuses sufficiently will create with its mixture something which is a sakana.)

3) In terms of marrying someone with the same name, it is not a matter of seeking a kula. For Nodeh BeYehuda at least, it is a matter of defending Yehuda HaChassid. Because surely if he meant it seriously as halacha, we wouldn't listen. But must we also think negatively about him? Rather, let us be dan lekaf zechut.

That is, halacha is halacha, and that is determined by the gemara. We see from the gemara that Amoraim had the same name as their fathers-in-law. Just because a kabbalist or mystic comes along and invents new rules, against the gemara, does not mean that we need to listen to him. (Thus, Yehuda HaChassid also invents an issur to marry a niece, where the gemara recommends it.)

If so, it is misguided to find reasons to support this invented halacha. We should rather discourage people from heeding Yehuda HaChassid's instructions.

4) In terms of katonti, I don't agree that one must reconcile the midrash and the peshat. The midrash takes the mi of  קָטֹנְתִּי מִכֹּל הַחֲסָדִים as "as a result of". The peshat takes it as "less than". And the rest of the interpretation follows from that. Yes, the peshat interpretation is an expression of humility. But I don't think we need to work that humility into the midrash.

And that Hashem is not a vatran, that is, not lax in the execution of justice, conveys to me that one should not say that Hashem will not punish misdeeds. That is not the same as saying that Hashem will not give a matnas chinam. See the midrashim on va'etchanan, about how Moshe was seeking a free gift, rather than relying on his own merits; and that was a mark of his humility.

Calculations regarding stolen blessings and mitzvos

Summary: an elaborate construction from the Chasam Sofer.

Post: In parashat Mishpatim, the following pasuk and Rashi:

37. If a man steals a bull or a lamb and slaughters it or sells it, he shall pay five cattle for the bull or four sheep for the lamb.		לז. כִּי יִגְנֹב אִישׁ שׁוֹר אוֹ שֶׂה וּטְבָחוֹ אוֹ מְכָרוֹ חֲמִשָּׁה בָקָר יְשַׁלֵּם תַּחַת הַשּׁוֹר וְאַרְבַּע צֹאן תַּחַת הַשֶּׂה:
five cattle, etc.: Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai said: The Omnipresent was considerate of people’s honor. [For] a bull, which walks with its [own] feet, and the thief was not disgraced by carrying it on his shoulder, he pays fivefold. [For] a lamb, which he [the thief] carries on his shoulder, he pays [only] fourfold because he was disgraced by it. Rabbi Meir said: Come and see how great the power of work is. [For the theft of] a bull, which caused [the owner] to stop working, he [the thief] pays five. [For the theft of] a lamb, which did not cause [the owner] to stop working, [the thief pays] four. -[From Mechilta, B.K. 79b, Tosefta B.K. 7:3]		חמשה בקר וגו': אמר רבן יוחנן בן זכאי חס המקום על כבודן של בריות, שור שהולך ברגליו ולא נתבזה בו הגנב לנושאו על כתפו, משלם חמישה, שה שנושאו על כתפו, משלם ארבעה הואיל ונתבזה בו. אמר רבי מאיר בא וראה כמה גדולה כחה של מלאכה, שור שבטלו ממלאכתו משלם חמשה שה שלא בטלו ממלאכתו ארבעה:

The Chasam Sofer refers us to this pasuk and Rashi. Then, he writes:

"It is stated in Chullin {daf 87a} 

Another [Baraitha] taught: ‘He shall pour out . . . and cover it’: that is, he who poured it out shall cover it up. It once happened that a person slaughtered but another anticipated him and covered up the blood, and R. Gamaliel condemned the latter to pay ten gold coins.7

The question was raised: Was this the reward for [being deprived of the performance of] the
commandment or for [being deprived of] the Benediction? But where would there be any practical difference [between these two views]? In the case of the Grace after meals.8 If you say that it was the reward for [being deprived of the performance of] the commandment, then here there is also but one [commandment]; but if you say that it was the reward for [being deprived of] the Benediction, then here the reward should be forty gold coins. 

What is the answer then? — Come and hear from the following incident. A certain min9 once said to Rabbi, ‘He who formed the mountains did not create the wind, and he who created the wind did not form the mountains, for it is written: For, lo, He that formeth the mountains and createth the wind’.10 He replied. ‘You fool, turn to the end of the verse: The Lord, [the God] of hosts, is His name’. Said the other: ‘Give me three days’ time and I will bring back an answer to you’. Rabbi spent those three days in fasting; thereafter, as he was about to partake of food he was told. ‘There is a min waiting at the door’. Rabbi exclaimed, ‘Yea they put
poison into my food.’11 Said he [the min]. ‘My Master, I bring you good tidings; your opponent could find no answer and so threw himself down from the roof and died’. He said: ‘Would you dine with me?’ He replied. ‘Yes’. After they had eaten and drunk, he [Rabbi] said to him, ‘Will you drink the cup of wine over which the Benedictions of the Grace [after meals] have been said, or would you rather have forty gold coins?’ He replied: ‘I would rather drink the cup of wine’. Thereupon there came forth a Heavenly Voice and said: The cup of wine over [which] the Benedictions [of Grace have been said] is worth forty gold coins. R. Isaac said: The family [of that min] is still to be found amongst the notables of Rome and is named ‘The family of Bar Luianus.'

{Thus, for each of the four blessing of Birkat HaMazon, 10 gold coins.}


And Tosafot there write:

או ארבעים זהובים אתה נוטל. שתיה לא שייכא לשכר ברכה אלא היה רוצה לסלקו מברכת המזון לפי שהיה צדוקי וא"ת או נ' זהובים ה"ל למימר דהא איכא ברכת בפה"ג שלאחר בהמ"ז וי"ל דסבר כמ"ד בערבי פסחים (דף קג: ושם ד"ה לאו) דאין צריך לברך אכסא דברכתא אלא אכסא קמא ותו לא:

that there should have been 50 gold coins, for there was the Borei Pri HaGafen which was after Bikas HaMazon. And there answer is a bit farfetched. 


And IMHO, the reason he should pay 10 zehuvim for a mitzvah snatched from his friend, is that behold, it is brought in Rashi {here in parashat Mishpatim, cited above}:

Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai said: The Omnipresent was considerate of people’s honor. [For] a bull, which walks with its [own] feet, and the thief was not disgraced by carrying it on his shoulder, he pays fivefold. [For] a lamb, which he [the thief] carries on his shoulder, he pays [only] fourfold because he was disgraced by it.

Behold it is evident that Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai maintains that the primary obligation to pay for a theft is five times, except that for a sheep, since he was disgraced, he only pays four.


And behold, Eliezer, the servant of Avraham, gave to Rivkah two bracelets on her hands, of weight 10 gold. And Rashi explains {in Chayei Sarah}:

22. Now it came about, when the camels had finished drinking, [that] the man took a golden nose ring, weighing half [a shekel], and two bracelets for her hands, weighing ten gold [shekels].

כב. וַיְהִי כַּאֲשֶׁר כִּלּוּ הַגְּמַלִּים לִשְׁתּוֹת וַיִּקַּח הָאִישׁ נֶזֶם זָהָב בֶּקַע מִשְׁקָלוֹ וּשְׁנֵי צְמִידִים עַל יָדֶיהָ עֲשָׂרָה זָהָב מִשְׁקָלָם:

weighing ten gold [shekels]: An allusion to the Ten Commandments [inscribed] on them. — [Gen. Rabbah 60:6]

עשרה זהב משקלם: רמז לעשרת הדברות שבהן:

If so, parallel to each dibbur was 1 zahav. And it is evident that each dibbur {which is a single mitzvah} is worth a single zahav. However, according to the calculation, after Mattan Torah, the coinage of kodesh was double that of chullin, as is stated in Rashi in parashat Pekudei, pasuk 23, that that of kodesh was double.


And if so, the mitzvah is equal to two gold coins. And according to Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai, the thief is liable to pay five times for the ox. If so, the calculation is precise, that 2 {gold coins} X 5 = 10 gold coins.


Meanwhile, this is not so according to Rabbi Meir {who is Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai's disputant above}, who says:

Rabbi Meir said: Come and see how great the power of work is. [For the theft of] a bull, which caused [the owner] to stop working, he [the thief] pays five. [For the theft of] a lamb, which did not cause [the owner] to stop working, [the thief pays] four.

It is evident that the primary obligation of paying is only 4X, but that by the ox, since he caused him to stop working, he needs to pay 5X. If so, the reward for a mitzvah is only 8 gold coins, as is understood.


And there is to say that Rabbi {in the gemara in Chullin above} held like Rabbi Meir (for in his teaching {?}, a plain Mishnah is in accordance with Rabbi Meir}, and according to him, the reward for a blessing was only 8 gold coins, and five blessings inclusive of Borei Pri HaGafen of the cup of blessing would only amount to 40. And the question of Tosafot is thus resolved."

This is a very neat and entertaining construction, though I am not convinced that this is actually the intent of Rabbi, or the intent of the gemara. If it is just meant as a neat construction, then it is fine. But to say that it is peshat in the gemara, and that there is a hidden multiplier of 8 rather than 10, strikes me as a bit ridiculous. This it an extremely salient point that surely would not have been left implicit in the discussion in the gemara.

On a related note, here is the Rambam about this:

טז  [יד] וכן מי ששחט חיה או עוף, ובא אחר וכיסה הדם שלא מדעת השוחט--חייב ליתן כמו שיראו הדיינים.  ויש מי שהורה שהוא נותן קנס קצוב, והוא עשרה זהובים; וכן הורו הגאונים שכל המונע הבעלים מלעשות מצות עשה שהן ראויין לעשותה, וקדם אחר ועשאה--משלם לבעלים עשרה זהובים.

At least as cited, the Geonim associate this with the mitzvah, rather than specifically with each bracha. Is it an either / or situation? What about mitzvos for which one would not have otherwise pronounced a blessing?

I myself wonder if Tosafot's question is rather strong, and indeed better than the answer anyone offers. And whether there is a distinction between drinking the kos shel bracha and leading the bentching, such that only the former was offered. And therefore whether this story only illustrated valuing mitzvos highly, with forty being a representative high number, rather than being a calculation of ten coins per blessing. In which case, the penalty would indeed be for the stolen mitzvah, rather than for the stolen blessing.

See more on this topic here.

Tying my tefillin shel rosh

The gemara in Chullin 9a has it as follows:

ואמר רב יהודה אמר רב תלמיד חכם צריך שילמוד ג' דברים כתב שחיטה ומילה ורב חנניא בר שלמיא משמיה דרב אמר אף קשר של תפילין וברכת חתנים וציצית ואידך הני שכיחן

"And Rav Yehuda cited Rav: A Torah scholar needs to learn three things. Writing, ritual slaughter, and circumcision. And Rav Chanina bar Shelemyah in the name of Rav said: Also the knot of tefillin, the blessing of bridegrooms, and tzitzit.  

And the other [=Rav Yehuda]? These are common."

By כתב, Rashi explains it to mean the ability to sign one's name if he sits to be a judge or to give testimony. By שחיטה, Rashi explains that this does not mean just knowledge of the technical laws but actual physical ability to perform a shechita. And in terms of the knot of the tefillin, Rashi explain how there is a skill in getting it to look like a dalet so that all together the Divine name of Shakai is spelled out.

And what is meant by common? Rashi explains that since these are common, of course one would not how to do this automatically.

Another possibility is that all of these things are required to enable Jewish life, even out in the boondocks. And so someone needs to provide kosher meat, circumcise people, and so on. (Ketiva might then be a sort of safrut.) They would also need tzitzis, or someone who can fix tzitzis if it breaks. And so too the tying of the retzuos of tefillin. By saying that הני שכיחן, we are saying that even if the talmid chacham himself does not know one of these skills, someone else will be able to step in, and so it is not critical.

I admit that I don't possess all of these skills. I can sign my name. (Though I never took safrus.) I cannot perform milah. Though I studies hilchos shechita for semicha, I never actually slaughtered an animal. I can tie tzitzis, and know birchas chasanim. But I didn't really know how to tie the kesher shel tefillin.

This became relevant this morning. By accident, I left my tefillin bag in a place accessible to my 2 year old son, who took the tefillin out of the bag. My older son, Junior, saw this and rescued the tefillin. But then he noticed that the baby had really messed up the tefillin, by putting knots in the retzuos of the shel rosh. And so Junior "fixed" the tefillin for me by untying the knots. This morning, I discovered this, and Junior explained what had happened.

So, after borrowing someone else's tefillin for davening, I set about retying the knot. I have a double-daled knot -- that is, a box knot, and so I followed the instructions in this helpful video:




So, that is one off my list!

Daf Yomi, Chullin 52a: Do Hawks, Martens, and Cats have Venom?

Here is an interesting clash of modern scientific knowledge and a statement put forth by Chazal.

In Chullin 52b:

מר רב עמרם אמר רב חסדא דרוסת חתול ונמייה בגדיים וטלאים דרוסת חולדה בעופות מיתיבי דרוסת חתול נץ ונמייה עד שתינקב לחלל

Or, in English:

An objection was raised: The clawing by a cat or a hawk or a marten [does not render trefah] unless the claw actually penetrated into [the abdominal] cavity.17

Why the abdominal cavity? Rashi explains:

עד שתינקב לחלל - כקוץ בעלמא ועד שניקבו הדקין ומדשוי להו כקוץ בנקובה מכלל דארס שלה אין מזיק אפילו לעופות וכל שכן לגדיים וטלאים:

It has to do with the venom, and its strength. Read through the whole gemara to get a better sense of it. But for a (seeming) explicit statement that there is venom involved, see this:

הא ההיא תרנגולת דהואי בי רב כהנא דרהט חתול בתרה ועל לאידרונא ואיתחיד דשא באפיה  ומחייה לדשא בסיחופיה ואשתכח עלה חמשה קורטי דמא

הצלת עצמה נמי כהצלת אחרים דמי ורבנן זיהרא אית ליה ולא קלי זיהריה 

But it once happened that a hen belonging to R. Kahana was being pursued by a cat and it ran into a room. The door shut in the face of the cat so that [in its fury] it struck the door with its paw. There were then found on it five spots of blood!21— When the attacked animal tries to save itself it is the same as when others are present to save it. But [does not this incident contradict the view of] the Rabbis?22— They maintain that it has venom, but the venom does not burn.23

The "blood" is red venom, as Rashi explains -- ארס של חמש אצבעות:

(I might be able to "save" Chazal from maintaining this by distinguishing between the Amoraim and the setama de-gemara, but I will leave this alone for this post.)

Could the "venom" be bacterial infection, and 'cat scratch disease'? I don't see how this would account for finding five spots of 'blood' (=venom) on the door, in the case of Rav Kahana. And furthermore, on the next amud, 53a, we have:

Abaye said: We have it on tradition that clawing is only with the fore-leg, thus excluding the hind leg; that clawing is only with the claws, thus excluding the teeth; that the clawing must be intentional, thus excluding an unintentional act;5and that the clawing must be by a living animal,thus excluding the clawing by a dead animal.6But since you have already said it must not be unintentional, is it then at all necessary to say that it must not be by a dead animal? — It is indeed necessary for the case where the animal struck with its claw and it was immediately amputated. Now you might have thought that it discharges the poison at once when it strikes with the claw, we therefore learn that it discharges the poison only when it withdraws the claw.

Does this strike you as Chazal discussing bacterial infection? It is speaking of discharging poison on withdrawal of the claw. Should the bacteria not infect the wound as it enters, but only as it exits? No. This is, rather, a conflict between a gemara and the metzius as we presently know it.

The Kuzari, in maamar 4, section 31, brings this as proof to Chazal's deep knowledge of science:

It is interesting how a 'proof' can so swiftly turn into a 'disproof'.

We have another "out" besides saying that Chazal erred in science. In other contexts, some folks try to claim that conflicts with Chazal's descriptions demonstrate that another animal must be under discussion. Or, they say this about a statement by a Rishon. This occurs in apologetics, such as in identifying the shafan, where it cannot be a hyrex, since a Rishon who never encountered a shafan described a feature which instead belongs to the, common in that place, rabbit. Or people reject the best candidate for the chilazon, because an aggadic statement of Chazal or a position of a Rishon does not fit with what we presently know about murex trunculus. So, in like manner, Chazal must have been speaking about other animals. It could not be a cat or a hawk, because we know that they don't have venom. It must, instead, be an otherwise unknown species.

Perhaps there are other resolutions out there. This is not something I have spent a good time researching.

Note: Right before publishing this to the web, I saw that Rabbi Slifkin posted this morning on this very topic, on Rationalist Judaism.

Mor dror as musk

Mor dror?

Summary: A discussion of deer musk, according to medieval scientific conceptions, in medieval parshanim.

Post: The Torah, in parashat Ki Tisa, delineates the ingredients of the ketores. One of these ingredients is mor deror, commonly translated as "pure myrrh". But different meforshim translate it in different ways. Ibn Ezra, in particular, cites a tradition from Rav Saadia Gaon that this is muska, which is musk. Relying on contemporary zoological descriptions, he makes some incorrect assumptions about its genesis and initial form, and grapples with this. Ramban solves some of these problems, yet proves that musk could not be mor deror, based on descriptions provided by Chazal. I will analyze this.

The pasuk, at the start of Ki Sisa, reads:

23. "And you, take for yourself spices of the finest sort: of pure myrrh five hundred [shekel weights]; of fragrant cinnamon half of it two hundred and fifty [shekel weights]; of fragrant cane two hundred and fifty [shekel weights],

כג. וְאַתָּה קַח לְךָ בְּשָׂמִים רֹאשׁ מָר דְּרוֹר חֲמֵשׁ מֵאוֹת וְקִנְּמָן בֶּשֶׂם מַחֲצִיתוֹ חֲמִשִּׁים וּמָאתָיִם וּקְנֵה בֹשֶׂם חֲמִשִּׁים וּמָאתָיִם:

Rashi does not define it. But Rav Saadia Gaon translates, in his Tafsir, as follows:

Al-misk al-khalis. Now, khalis means pure (parallel to Onkelos' dachya) and al-misk means musk. Thus, "pure musk".

Ibn Ezra cites this:

ומלת מר –
קשה.

והגאון תרגמו:

מוש"ק. 

והנה איננו מעצים, אף על פי שיש לו ריח טוב, אולי בעבור זה הפרידו הכתוב מהבשמים כי כתוב: אריתי מורי עם בשמי.
והנה הוא מלוקט. ואומרים המביאים אותו, כי הוא נעשה בגרון הצבי. והנה כתוב: וידי נטפו מר, אולי כן הוא בהיותו לח. 

"And the word mor is difficult; and the Gaon translates it as musk. And behold, this is not from wood {J: unlike the others}, even though it has a good scent. Perhaps because of this the Scriptures separated it from the spices. For it is stated {Shir Hashirim 5:1}:

א  בָּאתִי לְגַנִּי, אֲחֹתִי כַלָּה--אָרִיתִי מוֹרִי עִם-בְּשָׂמִי, אָכַלְתִּי יַעְרִי עִם-דִּבְשִׁי שָׁתִיתִי יֵינִי עִם-חֲלָבִי; אִכְלוּ רֵעִים, שְׁתוּ וְשִׁכְרוּ דּוֹדִים.  {ס}

1 I am come into my garden, my sister, my bride; I have gathered my myrrh with my spice; I have eaten my honeycomb with my honey; I have drunk my wine with my milk. Eat, O friends; drink, yea, drink abundantly, O beloved. {S}

and behold, it is gathered. And those who bring it say that it is made in the throat of the deer. And behold, it is  written {Shir HaShirim 5:5}:

ה  קַמְתִּי אֲנִי, לִפְתֹּחַ לְדוֹדִי; וְיָדַי נָטְפוּ-מוֹר, וְאֶצְבְּעֹתַי מוֹר עֹבֵר, עַל, כַּפּוֹת הַמַּנְעוּל.

5 I rose up to open to my beloved; and my hands dropped with myrrh, and my fingers with flowing myrrh, upon the handles of the bar.

And perhaps this is so when it is wet."

Ibn Ezra is grappling with evidence about Biblical mor from the pesukim, and making it work with the physical musk that he sees before him, together with the scientific reality as described by those who bring the musk.

Thus, he makes the assumption that mor is the same substance throughout Tanach, and that the two pesukim in Shir HaShirim indicate that it is gathered {"I have gathered..."} and that it is flowing {"my hands dripped..."}. Those who bring musk presumably don't say anything about gathering. But they do say that they get it from the throat of the tzvi, some sort of deer in this case.

Unfortunately, it seems that those who brought the musk did not know, or chose not to tell, the actual source of musk. (I recall reading this in a book about medieval science). It indeed comes from the musk deer, but not from the throat. There is a special musk gland in adult male musk deer, in a sac between the genitals and the umbilicus.

(Chavel, in his translation of Ramban, page 525, fixes this up. When he translates Ramban's citation of Ibn Ezra, he renders כי הוא נעשה בגרון הצבי as "that it is a substance gathered in a glandular sac under the skin of the neck of the deer". This glandular sac is not located on the neck, and nobody mentioned that it was a glandular sac. And indeed, Ibn Ezra didn't say that it was gathered in the sac, for that would possibly undermine his question that it is not something gathered -- although he means gathered by human hands.)

These are indeed secretions, and as such could be לח. Or the perfumer could make it into a לח substance, as part of the dilution process, as we shall see.

To cite Wikipedia:

 To obtain the musk, the deer is killed and its gland, also called "musk pod", is removed. Upon drying, the reddish-brown paste inside the musk pod turns into a black granular material called "musk grain", which is then tinctured with alcohol. The aroma of the tincture gives a pleasant odor only after it is considerably diluted. No other natural substance has such a complex aroma associated with so many contradictory descriptions; however, it is usually described abstractly as animalic, earthy and woody^[3] or something akin to the odor of baby's skin.^[4]

Thus, when it came to people, it is this black granular material called musk grain. Such a musk pod and musk grain is pictured to the right.

As I noted above, this is then diluted, and this dilution could make it drip. I wonder, though, whether it is really something one could gather. Unless the מור of Shir Hashirim is a different substance?

With a little bit of research, it indeed comes out that this musk is something one could gather, and which people do gather. Not the musk gland itself, but the secreted substance. To cite A history of the earth and animated nature, by Oliver Goldsmith, we discover that in most cases, people actually collected the secretions, for then it is a renewable resource, rather than killing the animal and extracting the musk gland. Thus:

If so, both verses in Shir Hashirim may be satisfied.

Ramban considers this explanation of Ibn Ezra, raises a few objections to it, answers those objections, but finally rejects the identification of mor with musk based on evidence that Chazal did not consider mor to be musk.

Ramban writes:

(כג): מר דרור חמש מאות - 

הסכימו המפרשים. והרב רבי משה (הרמב"ם בהל' כלי המקדש פ"א ה"ב): מכללם, כי המור הוא הנקרא מוסק.

ור"א השיב: 

כי איננו בשם אע"פ שריחו טוב. 

ואולי בעבור זה הפרידו הכתוב מן הבשמים. והוא הקשה כי כתיב (שה"ש ה א): אריתי מורי, שהוא דבר מלוקט, ואומרים המביאים אותו כי הוא נעשה בגרון הצבי. ועוד מן הכתוב (שם ה ה): וידי נטפו מר.
ואולי כן הוא בהיותו לח, ויתכן שיאמר "אריתי מורי" בעבור כי הוא דם נצרר בבטן החיה הדומה לצבי הידועה בארץ הודו, ובלכתה בין השיחים בימי החום הגדול מגרדת בנפח ההוא, והדם יוצא צרור ולוקטים אותו מן האחו. ואמר וידי נטפו מר, כי הכתוב ידמה ריחו כאילו ידיו תיטופנה מריח ההוא נטפי מים:

ואחרים (הראב"ד בהל' כלי המקדש פ"א ה"ג): אמרו איך יכנס בקטרת ובשמן הקדש דם חיה טמאה. גם זו אינה קושיא, כי הלחות ההוא הנאסף בה מרוב הדם ויזוב ממנה בחייה אין בו לא טומאה ולא מאוס.

ופירשו (הראב"ע בפירוש הקצר והרד"ק בספר השרשים ש' דרר): 

דרור מלשון וקראתם דרור (ויקרא כה י), שיהיה חפשי מן הזיוף והתערובת. 

ואולי נאמר שהצריך הכתוב להיותו חפשי, לומר שיוקח מן הצבי ההוא בהיותו חפשי מתהלך בין ערוגות הבשמים ומתענג כרצונו, כי כאשר ילכד ויעמוד ברשות אדם לא יעשה מור כי אם מעט ואיננו מבושם. וזה דבר ברור:

"The mefarshim are in consensus, and Rabbi Moshe (=Rambam in Hilchot Klei Hamikdash, perek 1 halacha 2) among them, that mor is that thing called musk. And Rabbi Avraham {Ibn Ezra} rejoined that it is not a spice even though its odor is good, and perhaps because of this the Scriptures separated it from the spices. And he asked that it is stated {in Shir Hashirim 5:1} 'I have gathered my mor", such that it is a gathered substance, while those who bring it state that it is made in the throat of the deer! And further, from the verse {Shir HaShirim 5:5} "and my hand dripped with mor", and perhaps it is so when it is wet.


And it is possible that it states "I gave gathered my mor" because it is blood gathered in the belly of the wild animal similar to the deer known in the land of India, and when it goes between the bushes in the days of the great heat,  it scratches against this mass {Chavel renders this as 'the sac' but he has no basis for this}, and the blood comes out as this thickened mass and they gather it from the meadow. And it states "and my hands dripped with mor", for the verse compares its scent as if one's hands dripped because of that scent, with globules of water {Iyov 31:27}.


And others {=the Raavad, in Hilchot Klei HaMikdash, perek 1 halacha 3} say: how could the blood of a non-kosher wild species enter into the incense and the holy oil? This is also no question, for this wetness which is gathered in it from the abundance of blood, such that it flows from it in its lifetime has neither ritual impurity nor disgusting aspect.


And they explain {the Ibn Ezra in his short commentary and the Radak in Sefer HaShorashim, shoresh DRR} that deror is from the language {Vayikra 25:10} "and you shall proclaim deror", which is that it is free from forgery and admixture. And perhaps it may be said that the Scripture requires that it be "free" to say that it should be taken from the deer when it is free, traveling between the beds of spices and enjoying itself in accordance with its will, for when it is captured and stands in the domain of a person, it only makes a little mor and it does not  have {such an} odor. And this is something clear."

It seems to me that this is all speculation, based on pesukim and reports. I am basing myself on reports as well, but think that we have access to better information nowadays. And above, we have answered these questions.

It is not a mass of congealed blood in the throat of the musk deer, but a glandular liquid secretion. That the Rishonim had it as a solid is likely due to it being the gland itself removed from the musk deer and treated in various ways. And people indeed gathered the secretion, and hands could drip with it. One need not reinterpret the pasuk in this poetic, non-literal manner. Ramban is apparently correct about the scraping against things, though what would leave would not be this solid thickened mass of blood.

We can also speculate the mor over and mor deror means free-flowing, as opposed to the gland itself extracted from the dead animal. We then don't need to reinterpret deror as unadulterated or forged.

In terms of the Raavad's objection, it is now not blood! And it is also not necessarily from a non-kosher wild animal. We shall turn to consider the kashrus of the musk deer in a moment.

The Baal HaTurim, in his lengthy commentary, summarizes the Ramban as supporting this identification of mor as musk. See the image to the right. This is actually somewhat misleading, since if we continue reading the Ramban, we see that he then attacks this identification as being at odds with Chazal, who understand musk as a different entity. I likely won't cover this portion of the Ramban in this post, because it is already too long.

Now, what of the Raavad's point, that the musk is a chayah temei'ah? The Ramban, in rejecting it, simply says that this blood flowing from it in its lifetime has no ritual impurity nor disgusting aspect. Is the musk deer, though, kosher?

To cite Wikipedia:

Musk deer may be a surviving representative of the Palaeomerycidae, a family of ruminants that is probably ancestral to deer. They first appeared in the early Oligocene epoch and disappeared in the Pliocene. Most species lacked antlers, though some were found in later species. The musk deer are however still placed in a separate family.

Thus, they are ruminants, meaning they chew their cud. From what limited research I could do, it seems that they also have split hooves:

Though if someone has access to better pictures or other evidence, I'd appreciate it.

If so, they should be kosher. On the other hand, they have tusks, which appear to be fangs. (See image to the right.) Fangs would seem to be an impediment to a species being kosher. This, based on the Gemara in Chullin 59a:

תנו רבנן אלו הן סימני בהמה (ויקרא יא, ג) כל בהמה מפרסת פרסה וגו' כל בהמה שמעלת גרה בידוע שאין לה שינים למעלה וטהורה וכללא הוא והרי גמל דמעלה גרה הוא ואין לו שינים למעלה וטמא גמל ניבי אית ליה והרי בן גמל דניבי נמי לית ליה ותו הרי שפן וארנבת דמעלת גרה הן ויש להן שינים למעלה וטמאין ועוד שינים מי כתיבי באורייתא אלא הכי קאמר כל בהמה שאין לה שינים למעלה בידוע שהיא מעלת גרה ומפרסת פרסה וטהורה וליבדוק בפרסותיה כגון שהיו פרסותיה חתוכות וכדרב חסדא דאמר רב חסדא היה מהלך במדבר ומצא בהמה שפרסותיה חתוכות בודק בפיה אם אין לה שינים למעלה בידוע שהיא טהורה אם לאו בידוע שהיא טמאה ובלבד שיכיר גמל גמל ניבי אית ליה אלא ובלבד שיכיר בן גמל לאו אמרת איכא בן גמל איכא נמי מינא אחרינא דדמי לבן גמל לא ס"ד דתני דבי ר' ישמעאל (ויקרא יא, ד) ואת הגמל כי מעלה גרה הוא שליט בעולמו יודע שאין לך דבר מעלה גרה וטמא אלא גמל לפיכך פרט בו הכתוב הוא

Or, in English:

(e) (Gemara - Beraisa): These are the Simanim of Tahor animals: "The hooves are split..." - any animal that chews the cud surely has no upper teeth, and is Tahor.
(f) Objection: This is not always true - a camel chews the cud and has no upper teeth, but it is Tamei!
(g) Answer #1: A camel has two upper teeth (or tooth-like protrusions.) (Tosfos - this answer is incomplete, it does not answer for rabbits (the Gemara later asks about rabbits). Rashba - we currently understand the Beraisa to say 'Any animal that chews the cud *and* has no upper teeth is Tahor', this answer is complete.)

1. Objection #1: But a young camel (chews the cud and) does not have any upper teeth (and is Tamei)!
2. Objection #2: But rabbits and Shafanim chew the cud, have upper teeth and are Teme'im! (Some identify Shafan with a hare, rock-badger, or a kind of woodchuck.)
3. Objection #3: The Torah does not say that Taharah depends on upper teeth!

(h) Answer #2 (to all questions): The Beraisa means, if an animal has no upper teeth, it surely chews the cud and has split hooves and is Tahor.
(i) Question: Why must we look for teeth to know about the hooves - one can see whether or not the hooves are split!
(j) Answer: This rule is needed when the hooves are cut off; it suffices to check the mouth.

1. (Rav Chisda): If one finds an animal in the wilderness whose hooves are cut off, he checks the mouth; if there are upper teeth, it is Tamei; if not, it is Tahor;

i. He may rely on this only if he knows that the animal is not a camel.
ii. Question: Camels have two upper teeth, the rule works for camels!
iii. Correction: Rather, he must know that it is not a young camel.
iv. Question: Just like young camels are exceptions to the rule, perhaps there are more exceptions!
v. Answer (Beraisa - Tana d'Vei R. Yishmael): "The camel, for it chews the cud" - the Torah lists the only Tamei animals that chew the cud, all others that chew the cud are Tehorim.
vi. (Chazal knew that any animal without upper teeth chews the cud. Seemingly, we should be concerned for exceptions to this rule, for the Torah did not teach it! Perhaps it is impossible to chew food sufficiently without upper teeth, unless it has been partially digested in a stomach.)

Perhaps these tusks would be considered upper teeth, just like the fangs of the camel. Yet this was a general rule of Rav Chisda, and perhaps he was unaware of the particulars of the musk deer.

I'll close with the following quote, about a machlokes about the kashrus status of musk, in a debate between the Rosh and Rabbenu Yonah:

The question of when an ingredient is nishtaneh (changed) and becomes a new ingredient was the basis of a dispute between the Rosh and Rabbenu Yonah regarding musk, an aromatic substance that originates from the blood, or other secretion, of the male Musk Deer, the Rosh contends that an ingredient that changes its identity remains assur, and the Rabbenu Yonah is lenient. The Pri Megadim in Orach Chaim 216 concludes that if the aissur is a d’rabbanan, then it is appropriate to be lenient; if the aissur is prohibited min ha’Torah, then it is appropriate to be machmir. The degree to which something must be changed to qualify for nishtaneh was not precisely defined in earlier generations, but somePoskim have noted that both a chemical change and a change in the taste is required (see Teshuvos Shevat HaLevi, 5, 56).

We should really trace all these sources, inside. It would seem that this is based on a similar assumption to that of Ramban above, that musk is really blood (which would be non-kosher) which was changed in the animal. Yet, it turns out that this is not what musk is, and so it should not be non-kosher, even according to the Rosh (assuming that musk deer are kosher). Perhaps I'll explore these sources in the future.