Abolish The Candyman!

Note: Of course, not halacha lemaaseh. See note on the bottom.

My brother sent me the following email, from a neighborhood yahoo group list. Since I am criticizing it, I will edit out all identifying information, which I will restore upon request of those involved. Here is the email my brother forwarded to me:

] I am looking to contact shul candy men.
] I have an offer for them to save them money
] on lollipops.

Dear [Redacted 1], {Update: See comments. This is the person associated with KosherGourmetMart.}

I do not understand the synagogue candy man.

So far as I know, he is never mentioned
by any Jewish holy book.

Great Rabbis prohibited bringing young
children to the synagogue, including:

{1} Sefer Tanna DeBei Eliyahu
(from Eliyahu HaNavi, according to Ketubot 106A)
{2} Maharil
{3} Rabbi Isaiah ben Avraham Halevi Horowitz
{4} Magen Avraham
{5} Mishnah Berurah (Chafetz Chaim)
{6} Rabbi Abraham J. Twerski MD said:

"Small children sometimes romp around the synagogue. "Let them feel at home
in the synagogue," goes the argument. But the synagogue is not a home, and it should not be a playground. ALL halachic authorities state that children who are too young to be able to sit quietly in shul, should NOT be brought to shul"

SOURCE: Reading for Shevat 22 (page 142) from Wisdom Each Day by Rabbi Abraham J. Twerski MD, year 2000, Mesorah Publications.

The prohibition against bringing young
children to the synagogue is clear, but
we look for heterim (permission) because
we love our children more than we love G_d,
and we look for kulot (leniencies) because
our loyalty to our children is greater than
our loyalty to the Torah.

This past Rosh HaShanah, I personally
witnessed a synagogue mechitzah being
torn down by young children during prayers.

Need I say more?

Sincerely,
[Redacted 2]

Oy.

It is easy to assemble a bunch of sources against some practice, especially since they cite each other down the line. It would, however, be nice to provide people with explicit sources, such as where to find these rulings. Where does it say this in Tanna deVei Eliyahu? Can I look this up and see whether this is an accurate characterization of what it says there? Where does it say this in Mishnah Berurah? People might want to look it up for themselves. This article in Ten Daat gives better attribution, and actually cites some of the words.

What is the level of this prohibition? And are there any mitigating sources? For example, other halachot which talk about how one should not kiss his banim ketanim in shul, assuming the presence of young children? Other halachot which talk about the positive practice of infants kissing the sefer Torah? There are such, but I am not going to source them here.

It is a widespread Jewish practice nowadays, and appears to have been through the ages -- which necessitated these condemnations. (And in many places for years it was practiced without condemnation.) But Minhag Yisrael Torah, except where it comes to leniencies. I will not attempt to justify the practice here -- though I probably could do so if I wanted to waste the effort. (E.g. shul decorum has different definitions and different precedence in different communities, to try to optimize different things, and there is a mimetic tradition of sorts.)

But assume that it is an absolute prohibition for young children who will be running around to be brought to a shul. And so of course (of course!) there should be no candymen in shul. But given that they exist as part of widespread synagogue practice, and [Redacted 1] will in no way be able to stop them from doing this, what harm is there is [Redacted 1] making a bit of parnassa and giving fellow Jews a good deal on lollipops?

Take this a step further back. Still assume that "it is an absolute prohibition for young children who will be running around to be brought to a shul." But given that there will be these young children there, as a matter of widespread practice, what is the problem of having a candyman present?

Indeed, a candyman can help foster synagogue decorum. Sit through Shema and say the words, and afterwards the candyman will give you a lollipop. Or better -- the kid is chewing on his Laffy Taffy and is not yollering! There is no reason to blast the candyman. With his presence, perhaps there is no longer such a problem with young children in shul.

Indeed, when I was young, a certain fellow in Kew Gardens Hills would have a program in Rabbi Oelbaum's shul, and which children would all gather round during kaddish, and they would say Amen and Yehei Shmei Rabba with all their strength. And he would reward them with bags of candy. A similar thing takes place in Rabbi Freidman's shul, nowadays. In Rabbi Shapiro's shul, apparently, when the kid politely comes up at a specific point in davening to say "Good Shabbos" to the Rabbi, he gives them a candy. Perhaps in some shuls they have youth groups, so they are not romping around the shul, but come in for short periods to do a bit of davening, and while there the candyman gives them a candy. Who says that the presence of a candyman must indicate the presence of misbehaving children?

Also, only Hashem knows the inner thoughts of man. To allege that

"The prohibition against bringing young children to the synagogue is clear, but we look for heterim (permission) because we love our children more than we love G_d, and we look for kulot (leniencies) because our loyalty to our children is greater than our loyalty to the Torah."

is being motzi laaz on one's fellow Jews. Again assuming the prohibition is clear, it is a sociological issue, and people do it because that is how it is done. Do they know this prohibition? Are they convinced of it? Are you a mind and heart-reader, to know that they do this "because we love our children more than we love G_d?" Perhaps they do it because they think that it is a good thing for a child to be in shul, so that the child will absorb the words of prayer and Torah. Perhaps they do not see anything wrong with it, and are giving the child's mother a break. All sorts of alternative answers are possible, rather than that "our loyalty to our children is greater than our loyalty to the Torah." That over-the-top rhetoric also will make people shrug off your words.

At any rate, here is the relevant quote from Tanna deVei Eliyahu {it is perek 14 (13) in Eliyahu Rabba.}

"There was an incident with a certain person, where he and his son were standing in the synagogue. And all the congregants were answering after the shliach tzibbur "Halleluyah." And his son answered words of silliness. They said to him, "See, your son is answering words of silliness." He said to them, "What shall I do? -- he is a child! Let him play." Again the next day he did in like manner, and all the congregants answered after the shliach tzibbur "Halleluyah,"and he [=the son] answered words of silliness. They said to him, "See, your son is answering words of silliness." He said to them, "What shall I do? -- he is a child! Let him play." All those 8 days of Succot his son answered words of silliness, and he did not say anything to him.
They said: That year, the next year, the third year did not pass, until that man died, and his wife died, and his son died, and his son's son died, and 15 souls passed out of his household, and the only ones left to him were one pair of sons -- one lame and blind, and the other one a fool and wicked man."

Now, is this source a source that shows that "Great Rabbis prohibited bringing young
children to the synagogue, including: {1} Sefer Tanna DeBei Eliyahu?"

It seems to me that the issue here was not the bringing the child to shul, but rather that the father did not talk to him to tell him not to say these divrei tiflus. With the implication specifically that the child was old enough to know better and behave, and after being spoken to would behave. And was the problem divrei tiflus in general, or was it specifically answering divrei tiflus to that which everyone else was answering "Halleluya," which perhaps had an aspect of blasphemous conduct to it? Indeed, I would suggest that it may have been mocking mangling of the words, as we find in Shir haShirim Rabba as a derash on vediglo alay ahava as:
תינוק שקורא לְמשֶׁה מַשֶׁה, לְאַהֲרן אַהֲרַן, לְעֶפְרן עֶפְרַן.
אמר הקדוש ברוך הוא: "וליגלוגו עלי אהבה"
Unless we take oneh as simply speaking, and so the child was talking through that portion. That is not necessarily the same as running in the aisles. (Though see how Mishnah Berurah takes it, applying it to fathers not allowing children to prattle in foolishness in shul.) Which is why it is nice to see the sources inside, and exactly what they say, and exactly what is a leap in the characterization. The others are more on target, but there still is what to say about them, and how to carefully apply them or not apply them to specific situations.

This story obviously did not occur Eliyahu's time, since it speaks of shuls, but rather in Rav Anan's time (perhaps when Eliyahu appeared to him), or later.

Assuming we don't date this to 10th century, but rather assume it is the same as mentioned in Talmud, and the story as well, then it was taught to Rav Anan, a 3rd century Amora, by Eliyahu haNavi. Whether this is then entirely to be considered direct from Eliyahu, or to be akin to how we might regard Ramchal getting taught kabbalah from a maggid, and Rav Yosef Karo being taught from a maggid who was the essence of the Mishnah, is another story. Regardless, this is not really a halachic source, though it is perhaps something to keep in mind. And we do not really see this punishment of decimation of entire families happening in our days, though the shul candyman is a widespread phenomenon.

I'll admit -- quite possibly this is my failing -- that I side more with the father in this story than the congregants. And I do not believe that the story, with this over-the-top punishment of decimation of the wife, grandson, and many other members of the family, is historical. Or if it is historical, that there was cause and effect in play here.

Finally, in response to "So far as I know, he is never mentioned by any Jewish holy book." I do not know of any Jewish holy book that mentions specifically a synagogue candy man. But first off, do Jewish holy books mention the shul President or treasurer? Certain positions evolve. Besides, if you want a partial basis, see Pesachim 109a: אמרו עליו על רבי עקיבא שהיה מחלק קליות ואגוזין לתינוקות בערב פסח כדי שלא ישנו וישאלו. This is not in shul, but it is distributing candies to children to excite them and make them more involved in a mitzvah. By extension, by giving them sweets in shul, one excites them about going to this place of mitzvah.

Note: I do not intend this halacha lemaaseh, and there is a lot involved, including what halachic works have to say, including accepted synagogue practice and accommodations for children of various ages, including personal situation, and including the particular behavior of the children. Which is why it is good to consult your local Orthodox rabbi, as well as learn through the various sources inside.

Daf Yomi Megillah 28a-b: Levity In Shul -- Followup and Counterpoint

As a follow up to the previous post, I thought I would present a counterpoint, to show why my last point, in particular, is not so convincing.

Firstly, cheshbonot and lachashov cheshbonot occurs elsewhere in Shas {in Shabbat 150a and Ketubot 5a}, where the context is clearly doing these sorts of accounting. Thus, י והא רב חסדא ורב המנונא דאמרי תרוייהו חשבונות של מצוה מותר לחשבן בשבת.

We can then say that cheshbonot are mundane and thus should not be performed on Shabbat and likewise should not be performed in shul.

What of the connection to Avodah Zara? I could still stand by my definition there, as regards to the permissibility of circuses. Where it said ובלבד שלא יחשב עמהם, we need not cast being a jester as being within the semantic inventory of חשב. Instead, we read יחשב as the niphal, as shelo yeichasheiv imahem, that you are not considered one of them, one of the performers, and thus are not in violation of moshav leiztim. This then bears no relation to our gemara in Megillah, occurrence of the phrase kallut rosh in Megillah. The halachic fallout would then need to be recalculated, but I cannot type this out at the moment, because I have a baby to put to bed.

Daf Yomi Megillah daf 28: What Kind Of Levity Cannot Be Done In A Synagogue?

On the Permissibility of Talking in Shul, of Having a Purim Play in Shul, and of Circuses

A brayta forbids levity, as well as eating, drinking, etc., in a shul. This was true of the shuls in Eretz Yisrael, but not in Bavel, where they made a precondition:

Rif citing Megillah 28a-b:

ועוד אמר ר' יהודה וכו'.
ת"ר בתי כנסיות ובתי מדרשות אין נוהגין בהן קלות ראש אין אוכלין בהן ואין שותין בהן ואין נאותין בהן ואין מטיילין בהן ואין נכנסין בהן בחמה מפני החמה ובגשמים מפני הגשמים אבל קורין בהן ושונין בהן ומספידין בהן הספד של רבים ומכבדים אותן ומרביצים אותן
א"ר יהודה אימתי בישובן אבל בחרבנן מניחין אותן ועולין בהן עשבים מפני עגמת נפש:

"And Rabbi Yehuda further said":
The Sages learnt {in a brayta}: Synagogues and study halls, we do not conduct ourselves with levity therein. We do not eat therein, nor drink therein, nor adorn ourselves therein, nor do we travel through them, nor do we enter them in sunny days to get out of the sun and on rainy days to get out of the rain. However, we read therein and learn therein, and deliver a eulogy of the public, and we sweep them and sprinkle water on them {after sweeping}.

R' Yehuda said: When? When they are extant, but when they are destroyed, we leave them alone and weeds grow in them, in order to cause anguish.

א"ר אסי בתי כנסיות שבבבל על תנאי הן עשויות ואעפ"כ אין נוהגין בהן קלות ראש
ומאי נינהו חשבונות
דאמר רב ששת בהכ"נ שמחשבין בה חשבונות לסוף מלינין בו מת מצוה:

Rabbi Assi said: The synagogues in Bavel were made with a precondition, and even so, we do not conduct ourselves with levity therein.
And what is that? Making calculations.
For Rav Sheshet said: A synagogue in which they make "calculations," in the end {in punishment} they will keep a met mitzvah overnight.

Note that the brayta does not mention sichat chullin, but it makes its way in there by the time it gets to Shulchan Aruch.

Let us turn our attention to the gemara and see what we can make of it. Firstly, the brayta.

ועוד אמר ר' יהודה וכו'.
ת"ר בתי כנסיות ובתי מדרשות אין נוהגין בהן קלות ראש אין אוכלין בהן ואין שותין בהן ואין נאותין בהן ואין מטיילין בהן ואין נכנסין בהן בחמה מפני החמה ובגשמים מפני הגשמים אבל קורין בהן ושונין בהן ומספידין בהן הספד של רבים ומכבדים אותן ומרביצים אותן
א"ר יהודה אימתי בישובן אבל בחרבנן מניחין אותן ועולין בהן עשבים מפני עגמת נפש:

"And Rabbi Yehuda further said":
The Sages learnt {in a brayta}: Synagogues and study halls, we do not conduct ourselves with levity therein. We do not eat therein, nor drink therein, nor adorn ourselves therein, nor do we travel through them, nor do we enter them in sunny days to get out of the sun and on rainy days to get out of the rain. However, we read therein and learn therein, and deliver a eulogy of the public, and we sweep them and sprinkle water on them {after sweeping}.

There are two ways to parse this brayta. In the first parsing, kalut rosh is disjoint from the other activities. Thus, we do not conduct ourselves with levity therein. Furthermore, do not eat therein, nor drink therein, nor adorn ourselves therein, nor do we travel through them, etc.. However, we do read therein and learn therein, etc.

In the second parsing, kalut rosh is not disjoint, but rather, the relationship is definitional. That is, synagogues and study halls, we do not conduct ourselves with levity therein. How so? We do not eat therein, etc., for this would be considered conducting ourselves with levity.

Proof for this second parsing is the lack of connective vav between levity and eating, and a connective vav introducing every subsequent activity. It is as if there is a colon present, such that the parse would be:

אין נוהגין בהן קלות ראש: אין אוכלין בהן ואין שותין בהן ואין נאותין בהן ואין מטיילין בהן ואין נכנסין בהן בחמה מפני החמה ובגשמים מפני הגשמים אבל קורין בהן ושונין בהן ומספידין בהן הספד של רבים ומכבדים אותן ומרביצים אותן

Still, even if this second parse of the brayta is correct, it would seem (at least at first glance) that the eventual halacha as formulated in the gemara views kalut rosh as disjoint, a separate activity from the rest.

Now let us turn to the gemara, and see how Amoraim interpret this brayta, and what novelties they add to the picture.

א"ר אסי בתי כנסיות שבבבל על תנאי הן עשויות ואעפ"כ אין נוהגין בהן קלות ראש
ומאי נינהו חשבונות
דאמר רב ששת בהכ"נ שמחשבין בה חשבונות לסוף מלינין בו מת מצוה:

Rabbi Assi said: The synagogues in Bavel were made with a precondition, and even so, we do not conduct ourselves with levity therein.
And what is that? Making calculations.
For Rav Sheshet said: A synagogue in which they make "calculations," in the end {in punishment} they will keep a met mitzvah overnight.

Rabbi Assi thus states that we have an exception to the stringencies stated in the brayta, because of preconditions made on the synagogues in Bavel. Even so, we do not conduct ourselves with levity therein.

How does Rabbi Assi view kalut rosh and its relationship with the remainder of the activities in the brayta? Are they disjoint, or are the activities definitional?

From Rav Assi's statement in and of itself, we have no help. It could be either. That is, the activities in the brayta might well be definitional of kalut rosh. If so, Rabbi Assi would be saying that in truth, because of preconditions made on synagogues in Bavel, all manner of activity is permitted in these synagogues, namely, those activities listed in the brayta are permitted. However, even so, we do not avail ourselves of this precondition and still do not do any of those activities. Thus, we may not eat or drink in a synagogue, etc.. Rabbi Assi's statement would then be a stringent one.

On the other hand, Rabbi Assi might consider kalut rosh and the other activities to be disjoint. Indeed, that is the common reading of his statement, supporting in large part by the setama digmara's definition which immediately follows (and which we shall discuss in short order). If so, there are preconditions made on synagogues that allow all manner of activity mentioned in the brayta to be performed in those synagogues. However, perhaps those preconditions did not cover, or could not cover, such extreme disrespect to the sanctity of the synagogue as kalut rosh, whatever that may be. Alternatively, perhaps those preconditions do indeed cover kalut rosh, but even so, as an extra stringency, we refuse to conduct ourselves with kalut rosh therein.

Regardless, the way Rabbi Assi uses the term kalut rosh is not necessarily identical with or indicative of how he parses kalut rosh in the brayta.

The setama digmara clearly considers Rabbi Assi's definition of kalut rosh to be disjoint from the other activities in the brayta. Thus, the setama defines kalut rosh as "calculations," cheshbonot, whatever they may be.

What influences the setama to give such a definition? There are two factors I would point out (among possibly others). First, there is the juxtaposition of Rabbi Assi's statement with that of Rav Sheshet, disallowing cheshbonot. Secondly, what was cited above was the Rif's girsa of the gemara, and has Rav Sheshet making this second statement. However, our girsa of the gemara has Rabbi Assi making both statements. If this girsa is the original and what the setama had before him, it makes sense to view Rabbi Assi's second statement as definitional of the first.

Let us now turn to Rav Sheshet (/Rav Assi's second) statement:

ומאי נינהו חשבונות
דאמר רב ששת בהכ"נ שמחשבין בה חשבונות לסוף מלינין בו מת מצוה

And what is that? Making calculations.
For Rav Sheshet said: A synagogue in which they make "calculations," in the end {in punishment} they will keep a met mitzvah overnight.

What are cheshbonot, and how is one mechashev cheshbonot? The standard translation is "business calculations." This definition, however, gives me extreme pause. After all, the setama uses this as a definition of levity, kalut rosh. Somehow, when I imagine a bunch of accountants going over the books, levity is not the first thing that comes to mind. On the other hand, we need not take kalut rosh as the English term of levity, but rather as not treating the synagogue with the utmost respect and awe it deserves, in which case doing mundane business calculations can well be a definition of kalut rosh. If so, one can readily extend this prohibition to other mundane treatments and uses of a synagogue -- perhaps including sichat chullin. Still, this is not the first interpretation I would seize upon, if there was another interpretation available.

I have another problem with Rav Sheshet's statement. What in the world is the relationship between accountants doing business calculations in a synagogue and keeping a met mitzvah overnight? Sure, the met mitzvah might be viewed as punishment of death for what was done, but isn't this punishment somewhat random? I would expect some sort of poetic justice, some sort of middah kineged middah in Rav Sheshet's statement!

Indeed, I have another explanation of cheshbonot that renders Rav Sheshet's statement much more poetic, and which helps explain what the setama saw to make the statement definitional of kalut rosh.

In July 2005, I wrote a post about the permissibility of circuses, considering the gemara which appears to outlaw in, in tandem with a contemporary Christian writing which did the same (and used some of the same "derashot" and many of the same terms), in order to determine what exactly was being forbidden and in what contexts. It is a good post -- check it out.

One part of that gemara {Avodah Zarah 18b} reads:

ורמינהי [הולכין] לאיצטדינין מותר מפני שצווח ומציל ולכרקום מותר מפני ישוב מדינה ובלבד שלא יתחשב עמהם ואם נתחשב עמהם אסור
קשיא איצטדינין אאיצטדינין קשיא כרקום אכרקום
בשלמא כרקום אכרקום ל"ק כאן במתחשב עמהן כאן בשאין מתחשב עמהן
אלא איצטדינין אאיצטדינין קשיא
תנאי היא [דתניא] אין הולכין לאיצטדינין מפני מושב לצים ור' נתן מתיר מפני שני דברים אחד מפני שצווח ומציל ואחד מפני שמעיד עדות אשה להשיאה

It is permitted to go to stadiums, because by shouting one may save [the victim]. One is also permitted to go to a camp for the purpose of maintaining order in the country, providing he does not conspire [with the Romans], but for the purpose of conspiring it is forbidden.

There is thus a contradiction between [the laws relating to] stadiums as well as between [those relating to] camps! There may indeed be no contradiction between those relating to camps, because the one may refer to where he conspires with them, and the other to where he does not; but the laws relating to stadiums are surely contradictory! — They represent the differing opinions of [two] Tannaim. For it has been taught: One should not go to stadiums because [they are] 'the seat of the scornful', but R. Nathan permits it for two reasons: first, because by shouting one may save [the victim], secondly, because one might be able to give evidence [of death] for the wife [of a victim] and so enable her to remarry.

The business of going to a karkom for the purpose of conspiring with the Romans is a bit strange. Perhaps it is like going to the horse races in order to deal with the mob. Still, the strangeness depends on how one defines karkom. Ran defines karkom as a place to go for amusements, while Rashi defines it as a siege works. Still, it is somewhat difficult.

I do some deep analysis of the gemara, and compare what is going on in the derashot there with a derasha from Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi, and arrive at the following conclusion, entirely independent of this gemara in Megillah:

I will now offer an answer according to the Ran, who translated karkom as a circular structure built like seigeworks for the purpose of amusement. As I asked before, "Why would one think one conspires there?"

I believe the answer is that the work נתחשב should not be translated as "conspire." Rather, it means perform feats of skill. As I noted before, Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi referred to תחבולה. Soncino rendered this as an evil planning - that is, the act of consipiring. Artscroll meanwhile, translated this as "trick or strategem - feats of skill." That is, the performances mentioned in the brayta about the sorcerers and enchanters, or of bukion and mukion, lulion and mulion, blurin or salgurin {various jesters} performing in the karkom.

Thus, נתחשב does not mean to conspire, but rather to perform feats of skill and jest for entertainment. If so, this is a possible meaning for the root חשב.

Let us now return to Megillah daf 28, and to Rav Sheshet's derasha. He writes: בהכ"נ שמחשבין בה חשבונות לסוף מלינין בו מת מצוה.

This now makes perfect sense, and it quite poetic, actually. He states that a synagogue in which they perform this feats of extreme comedy, in the end it will be a house for extreme tragedy. If jesters perform therein, it will eventually hold a corpse overnight. Recall that a synagogue was a place where people saw fit to congregate, so they might have held a sort of jester / entertaining sorcerer exhibition there. Of course, all sorts of meanings from the semantic inventory are available to us for the root חשב, but given the poetic nature of the statement, and the context of kalut rosh, I would select this as the most likely meaning.

If so, it is easy to see how the setama saw Rav Sheshet's (/second Rabbi Assi's) statement as definitional of kalut rosh (especially if both statements were made by Rabbi Assi and were juxtaposed). Rabbi Assi said that in a synagogue, despite preconditions, we do not conduct ourselves with levity. Then, we have a statement discussing jesters (rather than accountants) in the synagogue, with the opposite extreme of tragedy as punishment for doing so. Indeed, the setama's reading of this as definitional is quite convincing.

Halachic fallout
What then, would be the practical fallout, were we to pasken in accordance with my analysis here? We would simultaneously have a big chumra and a big kulla.

First, the kulla. How do we parse the brayta? I would parse it as definitional, rather than disjoint. However, how we parse the brayta is irrelevant, since our synagogues are made with preconditions. How do we parse Rabbi Assi and Rav Sheshet (/Rav Assi's second statement)? I would say that they treat kalut rosh as disjoint from the other activities, with the definition of kalut rosh minimized to only this extreme type of conduct of levity, that of jesters performing. Therefore, if accountants wished to congregate in a synagogue and perform their calculations, it would be permitted. Similarly, other types of personal activities, as well as sichat chullin, would be permitted in a synagogue. Only the extreme levity as defined by Rav Sheshet is prohibited.

Next, the chumra. Here is where I disallow what is done year after year in some shuls. In one shul I know of in KGH, they have a magic show, for the children, in the shul, by an entertainer, on the night of Purim. In one yeshiva I know of, they hold a Purim play in the shul/bet midrash. This would be the very definition of kalut rosh as given in the gemara. Therefore, we should avoid doing so.

Now, for the Disclaimer. Though I had this post in mind a few weeks before Purim, I deliberately held back until after, so as not to get in anyone's way. (I did a similar thing with Tu Beshvat seders, whose post I still have to get to.) And remember, this discussion was not intended halacha lemaaseh. You might wish to consult your local Orthodox rabbi, perhaps printing out this post and the one about circuses.

Why I Support Talking In Shul

(Within Limits, Of Course)

Beit Tefillah vs. Beit HaKnesset

Perhaps a good place to start is with an idea from a close friend of mine, who suggested that talking in shul is a good thing (TM), even where in violation of halacha. I don't agree with him entirely, of course, but it is an interesting point to consider.

Nowadays, a shul serves a dual function. It acts as a bet tefillah, a house of prayer, and as a bet haknesset, a house of gathering. It is a place to make a connection with one's Creator and a place to make a connection with one's co-religionists. Jewish society has changed; people used to interact on a daily basis with fellow Jews, but now, shul has become a place to make social connections and to feel part of the community. This is not a bad thing, but a good thing. It keeps people part of the Jewish community.

Of course, there are tradeoffs, and one (most) would not want to violate halacha in the process, but perhaps the socializing within shul is not entirely bad in and of itself. On the other hand, if it does in fact mean a bizayon to the bet haknesset, or a reduction in decorum, or speech when forbidden or halachically problematic in the course of davening, then it is a problem. But in analyzing this, we should not ignore that there is something beneficial to socializing with co-religionists, if it creates a kesher to the Jewish community that otherwise would not exist.

Of course, we should not think of a shul as a social hall, rather than a place of prayer. As we see in Shabbat 32a:

תניא ר' ישמעאל בן אלעזר אומר בעון שני דברים עמי הארצות מתים על שקורין לארון הקודש ארנא ועל שקורין לבית הכנסת בית עם

(though one may interpret this in different ways.)

On the other hand, don't tell me that shul was not historically a place to congregate and make social connections. As we read about the splendor of the Synagogue in Alexandria in Succah 51b,

תניא רבי יהודה אומר מי שלא ראה דיופלוסטון של אלכסנדריא של מצרים לא ראה בכבודן של ישראל אמרו כמין בסילקי גדולה היתה סטיו לפנים מסטיו פעמים שהיו בה <ששים> כפלים כיוצאי מצרים [פעמים שהיו שם ששים רבוא כיוצאי מצרים ואמרי לה כפלים כיוצאי מצרים] והיו בה ע"א קתדראות של זהב כנגד ע"א של סנהדרי גדולה כל אחת ואחת אינה פחותה מעשרים ואחד רבוא ככרי זהב ובימה של עץ באמצעיתה וחזן הכנסת עומד עליה והסודרין בידו וכיון שהגיע לענות אמן הלה מניף בסודר וכל העם עונין אמן ולא היו יושבין מעורבין אלא זהבין בפני עצמן וכספין בפני עצמן ונפחין בפני עצמן וטרסיים בפני עצמן וגרדיים בפני עצמן וכשעני נכנס שם היה מכיר בעלי אומנתו ונפנה לשם ומשם פרנסתו ופרנסת אנשי ביתו

That is, people would not sit all mixed together, but rather they recognized people in their own profession, and from there, they helped each other make a living. And this was looked on as a good thing. Of course, this does not necessarily mean that they talked shop in shul. But they surely greeted one another and became friendly.

On the one hand, Tosfot Yom Tov relates that the Chmielnicki massacres were partially punishment of people talking during davening when they shouldn't. {Update: Note that the above may well not be true. See Menachem Butler's comment to this Hirhurim thread.}
On the other hand, the gemara tells us that Christianity started partially because someone did not talk during Shema:

Sota 47a:

יהושע בן פרחיה מאי היא כדהוה קא קטיל ינאי מלכא לרבנן שמעון בן שטח אטמינהו אחתיה ר' יהושע בן פרחיה אזל ערק לאלכסנדריא של מצרים כי הוה שלמא שלח ליה שמעון בן שטח מני ירושלים עיר הקודש לך אלכסנדריא של מצרים אחותי בעלי שרוי בתוכך ואני יושבת שוממה אמר ש"מ הוה ליה שלמא כי אתא אקלע לההוא אושפיזא קם קמייהו ביקרא שפיר עבדי ליה יקרא טובא יתיב וקא משתבח כמה נאה אכסניא זו א"ל <אחד> רבי עיניה טרוטות א"ל רשע בכך אתה עוסק אפיק ארבע מאה שפורי ושמתיה כל יומא אתא לקמיה ולא קבליה יומא חד הוה קרי קרית שמע אתא לקמיה הוה בדעתיה לקבוליה אחוי ליה בידיה סבר מדחא דחי ליה אזל זקף לבינתא פלחא אמר ליה חזור בך א"ל כך מקובלני ממך כל החוטא ומחטיא את הרבים אין מספיקין בידו לעשות תשובה דאמר מר {יש"ו} כישף והסית והדיח והחטיא את ישראל

Our Rabbis have taught: Always let the left hand thrust away and the right hand draw near. Not like Elisha who thrust Gehazi away with both his hands and not like R. Joshua b. Perahiah who thrust one of his disciples away with both his hands.

...

What was the incident with R. Joshua b. Perahiah? — When King Jannaeus put the Rabbis to death, Simeon b. Shetah was hid by his sister, whilst R. Joshua b. Perahiah fled to Alexandria in Egypt. When there was peace, Simeon b. Shetah sent [this message to him]: 'From me, Jerusalem, the Holy city, to thee Alexandria in Egypt. O my sister, my husband dwelleth in thy midst and I abide desolate'. [R. Joshua] arose and came back and found himself in a certain inn where they paid him great respect. He said: 'How beautiful is this 'aksania'! {achsania means both "inn" and "the female innkeeper." One of his disciples {other manuscripts: Jesus} said to him, 'My master, her eyes are narrow!' He replied to him, 'Wicked person! Is it with such thoughts that thou occupiest thyself!' He sent forth four hundred horns and excommunicated him. [The disciple] came before him on many occasions, saying 'Receive me'; but he refused to notice him. One day while [R. Joshua] was reciting the Shema', he came before him. His intention was to receive him and he made a sign to him with his hand, but the disciple thought he was repelling him. So he went and set up a brick and worshipped it. [R. Joshua] said to him, 'Repent'; but he answered him, 'Thus have I received from thee that whoever sinned and caused others to sin is deprived of the power of doing penitence'. A Master has said: The disciple practised magic and led Israel astray.

On the one hand, ideally one should not interrupt during and the paragraphs of Shema. On the other hand, we are supposed to interrupt to greet or respond to greetings during this very time, in specific circumstances. (Whether this applies nowadays is up for discussion.)

Different Approaches to Tefillah
To cite some famous words of a song by Alan Thicke, Gloria Loring and Al Burton:

Now, the world don't move to the beat of just one drum,
What might be right for you, may not be right for some.
A man is born, he's a man of means.
Then along come two, they got nothing but their jeans.

But they got, Diff'rent Strokes.
It takes, Diff'rent Strokes.
It takes, Diff'rent Strokes to move the world.

This is an approach I feel would be good to adopt. Unfortunately, for many, the approach is: anyone to the left of me religiously is a sheigitz and anyone to the right of me is a crazy frummy.

Rav Schachter posed the following in a shiur a while back. (My crude summary, so if you dislike the message, blame only the messenger.) Why did each and every shevet have its own Sanhedrin? He suggested that it is because variety is the spice of life, and even as they might have slightly different halacha, all are valid, and Hashem wants this situation. And in present day, we have a similar situation for Ashkenazim, Sefardim, Chassidim, etc..

We might apply this approach to shuls and their form of tefillah. A few years back, when staying for Shabbat in Washington Heights, I attended the Breuer's shul on Friday night. They had a choir, led by a choirmaster, for Lecha Dodi, and it seemed that only those in the choir were to sing. I'm sure for those in this community, they felt that this added to shul decorum, and was a beautiful way of greeting the queen, Shabbat. Yet I felt a bit miffed at the exclusion of the rest of the tzibbur. And I felt also as if it were a church service.

However, they would probably similarly dislike, or feel uncomfortable the less-orderly singing in a chassidishe shteible, and would look askance at the lack of decorum in a Carlebach minyan in which people sang and danced well past any actual words of the kabbalat Shabbat.

Luckily, there are both types of shul available, and people can go to the shul that is right for them.

I have been blessed to have grown up in Kew Gardens Hills, where there is a shul on every block. There are Young Israels, Agudahs, shteibels, yeshivas, Sefardic shuls, etc.. If one shul is not a good match for you, you can always cross the street and try the next shul. These shuls have different ambiances and davening experiences. They have differing architecture in terms of the ezrat nashim, different structure, in terms of saying tefillot lishlom hamedina, adon olam, anim zemirot, etc. at the end of davening, whether the Rabbi speaks and for how long, different levels of decorum, different policies on dealing with talking during davening, different hashkafot, different zemanei tefillah and length of various parts of davening, different expected responses at various parts of davening (e.g. do we say, or sing in unison, as the sefer Torah is brought out/back to the aron), etc..

And this is a good thing, to my mind.

Yet some people believe that their shul has the right approach and if a shul does it differently, they are doing wrong. In certain cases -- such as where there is violation of halacha -- this indeed has merit. But sometimes there is room for variance. And approaches to shul decorum may somewhat subjective.

I am reminded of the old joke about a priest who visits a shul (presumably a shteible), and he remarks at what he sees as the lack of decorum there - people shukkling, pacing as they daven, lack of coordination of prayer, etc., (I'm not sure whether talking in shul was part of this joke) and remarked to the rabbi about the difference between this and the decorum in his church, wondering what accounted for the difference. The Rabbi thought for a moment and told the priest, "that's because your religion has a mother."

Of course, different people will have different reactions to this joke. But there are in fact different attitudes to shul decorum that vary sociologically.

Some Sources
This is not going to be a comprehensive coverage of the topic, and please don't act based on anything in this post (i.e. the discussion is not le-maaseh). However, there are some interesting sources which factor into talking during prayer and during various points in kriyat haTorah.

One should distinguish between various reasons not to talk. For example, there is an aspect of kavod to the bet haknesset that may (or may not) preclude talking idle talk (as opposed to divrei Torah). This reason should apply regardless of where one is in tefillah, or even after tefillah. This might not apply if the shul is built with a precondition allowing other uses. (Thus, the same siman in Shulchan Aruch states that one may not eat or drink in a shul, yet many shuls have the kiddush in the sanctuary regardless. See this article which mentions this leniency as well.) This should not apply if, for some reason, one is davening at home.

Then, there are reasons of hefsek - one should not interrupt because it causes problems based on the surrounding blessings. (However, even in such a case, in certain instances greeting and responding to greetings were allowed, at least initially.)

Then, there is the reason of not disturbing others around you. Then, there is the reason of not focusing on what the shliach tzibbur is saying, such that one will not be able to respond appropriately.

Let us consider some of the sources. First, in terms of talking during aliyot, and between aliyot. In Sotah 39a:

אמר רבא בר רב הונא כיון שנפתח ספר תורה אסור לספר אפילו בדבר הלכה שנאמר (נחמיה ח) ובפתחו עמדו כל העם ואין עמידה אלא שתיקה שנא' (איוב לב) והוחלתי כי לא ידברו כי עמדו לא ענו עוד ר' זירא אמר רב חסדא מהכא (נחמיה ח) ואזני כל העם אל ספר התורה

Raba son of R. Huna said: When the Torah-scroll is unrolled it is forbidden to converse even on matters concerning the law; as it is said: And when he opened it all the people stood up, and standing up signifies nothing else than silence, as it is said: And I wait because they speak not, because they stand still and answer no more. R. Zera said in the name of R. Hisda: [It may be derived] from this passage, And the ears of all the people were attentive unto the book of the law.

There is a dispute as to the meaning of כיון שנפתח ספר תורה. Does this mean "opened up" or does it mean "begun?" If it means "opened up," then only during the aliyot when the Torah is open must the people be quiet. On the other hand, if it means "begun," then the implication is from the beginning of kriyat haTorah until the end, including the span between aliyot.

This accounts for the major dispute between authorities about whether one may talk between aliyot. There are other opinions within this, however.

For example, the opinion that the gemara actually does forbid talking between aliyas, but this was only in the time of the gemara. That is, in the time of the gemara, the first person called up made the opening bracha but no concluding bracha, and the last person made the concluding bracha but not the opening bracha. And people in between made no brachot. The other people in shul should not talk throughout, even between aliyot, lest they be called up and have a hefsek, such that they are not covered by the opening bracha. But nowadays, where each person called up makes both brachot, this is not an issue.

One might also wonder what is meant by אפילו בדבר הלכה. Is this the same as devar Torah, or does it refer to a specific, shortly-answered halachic question such that there is no fear of extending into the actual leining.

(Also, the fact that the gemara must say that in this instance, talking is forbidden implies that in other instances (e.g. before the sefer Torah is "opened" or "begun" talking (to whatever level) is allowed.)

Also, according to those who hold this means only during actual leining (and not between aliyot) I wonder what the implication of אפילו בדבר הלכה is. One could read this gemara as: Of course, during the entire service, one cannot say anything except devar halacha (or greeting). But here, even devar halacha is forbidden. Or else one could read this as: During actual leining, there are additional restrictions on speech. And don't think that just because this is public reading of Torah, other Torah-related subject matter is allowed (similar to the way Rav Sheshet turned his head and learned gemara to himself during leining, according to some ways of reading the gemara in Brachot daf 8). Rather, even Torah-related discussion is restricted. Meanwhile, between the aliyot and otherwise, perhaps even non-Torah related discussion is allowed (e.g. inviting someone over for Shabbat lunch.) This would be strange, given that one should not, according to the Shulchan Aruch, talk sicha beteila in a shul, but I am not sure where the source in the gemara is for this (I haven't tracked it down yet). I know where the other things he mentions for a shul find their source in the gemara (rperhaps someone can help me out) - not having kalut rosh, not eating, not drinking, etc. - Megillah 24a-b:

ת"ר בתי כנסיות אין נוהגין בהן קלות ראש אין אוכלין בהן ואין שותין בהן

ואין ניאותין בהם ואין מטיילין בהם ואין נכנסין בהן בחמה מפני החמה ובגשמים מפני הגשמים ואין מספידין בהן הספד של יחיד אבל קורין בהן ושונין בהן ומספידין בהן הספד של רבים

and it continues with making shuls with a precondition:

א"ר אסי בתי כנסיות שבבבל על תנאי הן עשויין ואעפ"כ אין נוהגין בהן קלות ראש ומאי ניהו חשבונות אמר רב אסי בהכ"נ שמחשבין בו חשבונות

These Rishonim who permit sicha beteila on the basis of precondition (as per that article linked above) apparently do not consider sicha beteila to be equal to kalus rosh, and so it would seem from the gemara. I would guess that sicha beteila is added in on the basis of the general theme which is to treat the bet haknesses as sacrosanct.

Another interesting source I don't know what to do with is Shabbat 31:

ת"ר אין עומדין להתפלל לא מתוך עצבות ולא מתוך עצלות ולא מתוך שחוק ולא מתוך שיחה ולא מתוך קלות ראש ולא מתוך

דברים בטלים אלא מתוך שמחה של מצוה

which is based on the fact that the Shechina is not shoreh except with simcha shel mitzvah, as we say earlier on 30b (on Pesachim 117a):

ללמדך שאין שכינה שורה לא מתוך עצבות ולא מתוך עצלות ולא מתוך שחוק ולא מתוך קלות ראש ולא מתוך שיחה ולא מתוך דברים בטלים אלא מתוך דבר שמחה של מצוה

This would imply some kind of sicha or devarim beteilim would be possible. Of course, it also says kalus rosh. Perhaps this is tefillah not in shul such that this is necessary?

At any rate, this is a good argument for decorum and for focusing on tefillah. Though one might envision one talking for some reason if and where permitted, and then before resuming tefillah, assuming simcha shel mitzvah.

The Shulchan Aruch (146) rules that speaking even between aliyot is forbidden, though some permit in a group of instances based on explanations of Rav Sheshet's actions in Berachot daf 8 compared with the gemara in Sota 39a (see the gemara and Tosafot there). But see Mishnah Brura there, who notes: bein gavra legavra - lest one be drawn into it and come to talk during the aliya itself. (perhaps this is an an additional takana over the gemara, or perhaps an explanation of the gemara. I would guess the latter.) However, the Bach appears to allow talking in divrei Torah. The Be`er Heitiv cited the Bach that it is permitted to talk betwen aliyot and explains that this is only now that they extend in mi sheberachs. The Mishna Berura also concludes that to teach something important for that time, one should not be machmir, for it is not so likely that one will come to extend to the actual leining.

In the aforementioned article, there are even more lenient readings of the Bach, and other lenient opinions.

28 Machatzis ha-Shekel, Aruch ha-Shulchan, and Shulchan ha-Tahor maintain that the Bach permits even idle talk between aliyos. See also Pri Chadash who permits conversing bein gavra l'gavra. Obviously, they refer to the type of talk which is permitted in shul and on Shabbos.

Speaking During Psukei deZimra
For this, a good source is the Rif (on brachot 23 in pages of Rif). Right click the picture and open the link in a new window if you want to see it inside:

And we learn in perek Kol Kitvei Kodesh {Shabbat daf 118b}: Rabbi Yossi said: may my portion be with those who finsh {saying all of} Hallel every day.
Is this so?
But Mar said that one who says Hallel every day is {as if} blaspheming and reproaching {the Divine Name}!
{Rather, } what are we referring to {by Hallel}: Verses of Song {=Psukei DeZimra, called Hallel because of the word Halleluya which appears often.}
{end quote from the gemara}

And what are they {Psukei DeZimra}?
{From Tehillim 145-150, that is}
From Tehilla LeDavid {=Ashrei} unti Kol HaNeshama Tehallel Kah.

And the Sages instituted to say a blessing beforehand and a blessing afterwards. And what are they? Baruch SheAmar and Yishtabach. Therefore one must not speak from the time he begins Baruch SheAmar until he finishes Shemoneh Esrei.

{Note: From Rabbenu Yona's words, citing Rav Amram Gaon, it is clear that all this - the specifics of Psukei DeZimra, and the blessings, are Geonic. See inside.}

{Note: Rashi has a different explanation of psukei deZimra.}
Rabbenu Yona, on the side, cited Rav Amram Gaon about what to do if one came late, and notes that the main Psukei deZimra is Ashrei (surrounded by Baruch SheAmar and Yishtabach).

It is interesting that Rif states between Baruch sheAmar and Shemoneh Esrei. What about after Yishtabach? One might say that this time is brief, and so he was not introducing any innovation, but rather noting that the brachot surrounding the spans of psukei deZimra and Shema, together with the fact that one may not interrupt Shemoneh Esrei, plus a statement by Chazal that teikef lig`ula tefillah means that in general during that span there would be no interruptions. But if pressed, he might acknowledge the time between Yishtabach and the first blessing of Shema.

Alternatively, look on the side at Shiltei Giborim, who cites a Yerushalmi that one may not interrupt between Yishtabach and Yotzer Or (see note 4), that such is a sin for which one is returned from fighting a war. And so does Hagahot Maimoni cite this Yerushalmi. And the Shulchan Aruch brings it down lehalacha, though giving some exceptions.

(I find this surprising since I thought the brachot of psukei deZimra were also post-Talmudic enactments, and further because I learned through all of Yerushalmi and do not recall seeing this gemara. If someone has seen it, please help me out here.)

The implication is that if not for the blessings before and after, one would have been able to talk somewhat. And this would then be applicable to other parts of tefillah not mentioned by the Rif. (Again, for specifics, see this article by Rabbi Doniel Neustadt.)

Even in pesukei deZimra, the Rif did not intend a total prohibition on speech. As Shiltei Giborim notes the obvious (also in note 4), citing Tur: "However, it is not better that Shema and its blessings. Therefore, between the mizmorim one may ask {=introduce greeting} because of honor {such as to an elderly, learned, or rich person} and respond to a greeting by anyone. And within mizmorim, one may ask {=introduce greeting} because of fear {such as of his father or teacher} and answer because of honor.

And the same applies to Shema, of course. See Shulchan Aruch.

Of course, based on Mishna Berura, even this would be ruled out, as we shall see.

Not Talking At All
It is possible to construct a case where one can argue that one should adopt a taanit dibbur until chatzot on Shabbat morning. After all, one is forbidden from going to a friend's door to greet him before greeting Hashem via davening. And Mishnah Brura considers crossing the shul to greet an example of this. Furthermore, he states that it is not present custom to greet during davening at all, and thus one should not respond or ask greeting. Furthermore, sicha beteila is forbidden in a shul. Further, various times one is forbidden to interrupt because of the enclosing blessings. And he maintains one should not talk in general during kriyat haTorah. One can quite possibly go until 12:30 without saying a word to his fellow.

Yet let us see the Mishna Brura inside (in English):

In terms of the practice of not going out of one's path to greet, but only if one chances upon him:

(1) Between the paragraphs - This is only where they meet each other in the natural course of events, but it is forbidden to get up early to visit one's friend, or to cross the Shul from his own fixed place to his friend's in order to greet him. This is true even for one's father, Rebbe [Torah teacher], and even before he commences "Boruch She'Omar" [the Blessing before the Verses of Praise] or any time before saying the main Amidah prayer [see Berochos 14a, where they say that one may not greet anyone before praying, as one first has to "greet" HaShem, as it were, before anyone else --SP].

However, this would not exclude people you meet on the street on the way to shul, or (yet - see next point) people in your path to your seat or at your table, or people who come up to you.

(2) One may greet - even in one's own language. One may only greet and return a greeting to strangers [literally "new faces"], where if one did not return the greeting it might cause hatred.

There might be several ways of interpreting this, but it seems to be that one should only greet panim chadashot, since otherwise it would cause hatred. I am not sure how to resolve this with the statement in Shulchan Aruch that talks of greeting ones father or teacher. Perhaps he means that specifically for strangers who do not expect greeting, one should only greet where otherwise it might cause hatred? (I don't see how that would work with the words, though - vedavka befanim chadashot shoel umeshiv, sheim lo yashiv yavo lidei sin`a.) Maybe by vedavka befanim chadashot he means when they first enter and are panim chadashot, and is not referring to strangers at all? That is the way I would read it. Suggestions welcome.

He continues:

The Sefer HaChinuch also writes that one may not interrupt [the Shema] for a person whom we see is not disturbed by his friend's behavior [and will not be bothered if not greeted]. Therefore, because it is our custom nowadays not to greet others in Shul during Davening, Heaven forbid that we should greet or return a greeting (even with words of Torah) whether between the paragraphs [of the Shema] or even in the Verses of Praise.

Let us consider whether this is the case. It is in fact custom (in my shul at least) to greet during davening. People, even those who do not talk between aliyot, come in and say good Shabbos (with a handshake) to everyone at the table. It is considered being a mentch. This is not to say that in the Chafetz Chaim's shuls they weren't mentchen. But what is considered appropriate in one time is not necessarily so in another place. As the Mishna Brura himself writes, the custom nowadays was different than it was in the past.

And in our present shuls, we reverted to the custom of old and we do in fact greet. Should we then apply the Mishna Berura's rule even in a situation in which it does not apply?

(One can argue that people will not take offense because he knows that the person cannot reply during this point in davening. It is a good argument. But how is this any different than in the time of the gemara, when they most assuredly did respond and greet?)

Thus
Thus, if there is a shul in which people do actually shmooze in Torah (or other) between aliyot, I do not see this as the end of the world. It happens in one of the shuls I frequently daven in. And I do not find that this detracts from the decorum of the shul. And I do not find it distracting in the least. Further, this is an established custom in the shul that has firm basis in halacha.

Similarly, if someone comes in in between birchot haShachar and baruch sheAmar, and the chazzan is taking his time going through korbanot, and his friend greets him and they talk for a minute of two in learning (or other) in a way that does not disturb others (i.e. sitting at a table, takling quietly, such that it does not disturn others who are also saying tefillot quietly), I do not see this as the end of the world.

Everything depends on degree and context. I am not condoning talking loudly about sports throughout the silent amidah and chazarat ha-shatz. Or doing this in a shul in which the accepted custom by everyone else is not to talk during this time. Or where the structure of the shul and the service are such that you will be disturbing others. Nor am I saying that the practice in shuls which do have more stringent custom about talking are halachically illegitimate -- they are; or that their mode of prayer is not beautiful and uplifting -- it can be.

What I am saying is that this current, halachically legitimate practice need not be changed to to the most stringent in order to satisfy all shittot. And that adopting a more stringent position is not necessarily ideal, if it makes shul into an uncomfortable experience for the participants. People who will appreciate this form of davening will gravitate towards these shuls and away from others; and vice versa.

Some people will object to this because of ethnocentric belief that their way is the only correct way. And that any custom which is more relaxed than the one they grew up with is a violation of the sanctity and decorum of the synagogue. Some people would shush the Bach and kick Rav Sheshet out of shul. Or at the least, tell them that they need to work on their middot in order to gain a proper appreciation of tefillah.

Daf Yomi Brachot 8a - May One Learn Gemara During Kriyat HaTorah?

At the bottom of daf 8a, there is a great story with Rav Sheshet:

רב ששת מהדר אפיה וגריס
אמר אנן בדידן ואינהו בדידהו

Rav Sheshet turned away his face {faced the other direction} and learned.

He said: We with ours, and they with theirs.

The context is the reading from the Torah. Other Amoraim in preceding this story say one may not leave during that time, except perhaps between people called to the Torah, and others following this story stress the importance of learning Shnayim Mikra VeEched Targum.

Thus, during kriyat HaTorah, Rav Sheshet would not pay attention to the laining but would learn gemara. {I am being approximate here - gemara meaning mishnayot, braytot, and their analysis by Amoraim.}

May one follow his example? Many see a contradiction in Bavli Sotah, where we see one may not speak during kriyat haTorah, even in matters of Torah. As a result, some reinterpret this story:

Rabbenu Chananel says that Rav Sheshet was different in that תורתו אומנתו, Torah was his profession. This is a high level of scholarship, such that most others are not on this level, and so it would not be permitted for them.

This seems to me like a cop-out, much like the oft-used excuse by the stama: adam chashuv shani - "a distinguished man is different."

Also, if he only meant himself, Rav Sheshet should have said ana bedidi, "I with mine," not anan bedidan, "we with ours." It seems that this is addressed to other talmidei chachamim, and not just yechidim shebeyechidim.

For similar cause I would dismiss the idea that Rav Sheshet was allowed to do this because he was blind. At first glance, it is compelling. Rav Sheshet was blind and is therefore exempt from studying the Written Law, while he was obligated in the Oral Law, in which he engaged himself. Firstly I would like to have seen more context in the gemara showing that is was because he was blind, but more than that, I would have expected ana bedidi. It really seems to me he is directing this at his students as well.

I also would reject the idea that he was doing this between aliyot (another harmonization with gemara Sota). Even though just before we had a statement about leaving between aliyot, if this were so, what exactly are "they" engaged in while he is engaged in his own? It seems that they are engaged in Mikra, while he and others in his company should be engaged in gemara.

I would also reject the idea that he did this since he already had heard laining with a previous minyan, and was now learning through all of tefilla, and felt free to ignore kriyat haTorah as well. This is not pashut peshat of the gemara. True, it is a possible interpretation of his statement, but is forced, and the context is imposed upon the text.

Rather, the simplest reading of this gemara is that it is Rav Sheshet's opinion that kriyat haTorah is a time in the middle of prayer set aside to have the community learn Torah. Each person should learn on his level. For most people, all they can do is listen to the Torah being read and translated, and like this, they are learning Torah on their level. However, for talmidei chachamim, who know how to learn gemara, they can spend this time more productively by engaging in learning in Torah on their own level. Thus, אנן בדידן ואינהו בדידהו, we engage in learning our Torah appropriate for us, that is gemara, while they learn Torah appropriate for them.

I think this is pashut peshat in this story, and as a result, Rav Sheshet would hold that a specific level of educated individual should learn gemara during kriyat haTorah rather than listening to the Torah being read.

What then to make of the gemara in Sota 39a? The gemara there reads:

אמר רבא בר רב הונא
כיון שנפתח ספר תורה אסור לספר
אפילו בדבר הלכה
שנאמר (נחמיה ח) ובפתחו עמדו כל העם
ואין עמידה אלא שתיקה
שנא' (איוב לב) והוחלתי כי לא ידברו כי עמדו לא ענו עוד
ר' זירא אמר רב חסדא
מהכא (נחמיה ח) ואזני כל העם אל ספר התורה

Rava bar Rav Huna said:
Once the sefer torah is opened it is forbidden to talk
Even in a matter of halacha
As it states in Nechemiah 8:5:

ה וַיִּפְתַּח עֶזְרָא הַסֵּפֶר לְעֵינֵי כָל-הָעָם, כִּי-מֵעַל כָּל-הָעָם הָיָה; וּכְפִתְחוֹ, עָמְדוּ כָל-הָעָם.

5 And Ezra opened the book in the sight of all the people--for he was above all the people--and when he opened it, all the people stood up.

and standing means being silent, as we see in Iyyov 32:16:

טז וְהוֹחַלְתִּי, כִּי-לֹא יְדַבֵּרוּ: כִּי עָמְדוּ, לֹא-עָנוּ עוֹד.

16 And shall I wait, because they speak not, because they stand still, and answer no more?

{so we see that 'amdu = standing still, such that they do not speak.}

Rabbi Zera cited Rav Chisda: from here: (two psukim earlier, Nechemia 8:3):

ג וַיִּקְרָא-בוֹ לִפְנֵי הָרְחוֹב אֲשֶׁר לִפְנֵי שַׁעַר-הַמַּיִם, מִן-הָאוֹר עַד-מַחֲצִית הַיּוֹם--נֶגֶד הָאֲנָשִׁים וְהַנָּשִׁים, וְהַמְּבִינִים; וְאָזְנֵי כָל-הָעָם, אֶל-סֵפֶר הַתּוֹרָה.

3 And he read therein before the broad place that was before the water gate from early morning until midday, in the presence of the men and the women, and of those that could understand; and the ears of all the people were attentive unto the book of the Law.

and see Tosafot there.

I think that this need not contradict Rav Sheshet. What is being forbidden in Sotah is specifically speaking to one's fellow - they deduce an obligation to remain silent. Rav Sheshet was not speaking to his fellow man. He turned around and was learning by himself! Certainly even dvar halacha is forbidden to speak, but not to learn silently.

In fact, there is a pasuk that tells us this, as interpreted in Pirkei Avot:
In Eicha 3:28:
כח יֵשֵׁב בָּדָד וְיִדֹּם, כִּי נָטַל עָלָיו.
"Sit alone {learning} and be silent, for you will receive {reward} for it."

The alternative is to say that Rav Sheshet argued on this derasha, and maintained that speaking in learning is permitted, because אנן בדידן ואינהו בדידהו.

There is also a dispute on when exactly the gemara in Sotah is saying one may not speak. The gemara says "From the time the sefer torah is opened." Some read sheniftach in שנפתח ספר תורה as meaning when the Torah is physically opened in preparation for reading from it. This would mean that between aliyot is permitted. Others read it to mean "begun" and thus from the time reading the Torah begins until it is finished, one may not speak, even in between aliyot.

Of the two explanations, I think sheniftach more likely means physically opening the sefer Torah.

People also have a custom to stand during kriyat haTorah, and would look to the gemara in Sota as a source text. But the derasha is clear as meaning being silent as opposed to standing. The gemara does not explicitly say that one must also stand. As Pharisees, do we still pay attention to the peshat meaning of a text even after it has been darshened? (Perhaps. This is the same question as: if you physically place a stumbling block in front of a blind man, do you violate the Biblical command? And, do you get a kiyum when looking at tzitzit because of Ureitem Oto?) Also, perhaps once we deduce proper practice during kriyat haTorah from Ezra in one respect via a derasha, we may apply other pashut peshat elements as well. Or perhaps not. Also, all this is according to the first derivation from 'amdu. According to the second, from R Zera and R Chisda, the pasuk of 'amdu is left alone.

I am not giving a psak here, but I think Rav Sheshet would hold that a talmid chacham may learn gemara silently by himself. Further, I think the idea in Sotah is that people may sit throughout kriyat haTorah, and even talk between aliyot even non-Torah matters {though there is perhaps an issue of talking idle talk in a shul, but in terms of the derasha at hand there is no prohibition}. During aliyot, talmidei chachamim may learn by themselves gemara, but no one may talk to his fellow even a matter of halacha.