Did Eliezer, or 318 men accompany Avraham? It can't be both!

Inspired by a post at Yachdus, some delving into a midrash brought down by Rashi, and how it might work alongside the peshat. The pasuk in Lech Lecha {Bereishit 14:14} states:

יד וַיִּשְׁמַע אַבְרָם, כִּי נִשְׁבָּה אָחִיו; וַיָּרֶק אֶת-חֲנִיכָיו יְלִידֵי בֵיתוֹ, שְׁמֹנָה עָשָׂר וּשְׁלֹשׁ מֵאוֹת, וַיִּרְדֹּף, עַד-דָּן.

14 And when Abram heard that his brother was taken captive, he led forth his trained men, born in his house, three hundred and eighteen, and pursued as far as Dan.

and Rashi there states that this is a reference to Eliezer:

three hundred and eighteen: Our Sages said (Gen. Rabbah 43:2, Ned. 32a): It was Eliezer alone, and it [the number 318] is the numerical value of his name.

שמונה עשר ושלש מאות: רבותינו אמרו אליעזר לבדו היה, והוא מנין גימטריא של שמו:

Siftei Chachamim is troubled by the concept of ain mikra yitzei midei pshuto, and that since the peshat on the pasuk is clearly that there were 318 separate people, and only one of the two are possible historically, how does Rashi maintain both?

And two answers: One, from Maharan, is that they started with 318, but applied the Biblical rules about those who had just married, built a house, feared, sinned, returning from the battlefield, such that only Avraham and Eliezer was left.

I am not convinced that this is what Rashi, or the midrash meant. This is a charming enough story that if it were so, it should have and would have been mentioned by an explicit midrash somewhere.

Indeed, this is a famous skit from a certain yeshiva -- Israel is fighting a war, and they start out with a large army, and keep excusing people based on the Biblical rules until they only have two tzaddikim left. And then, between the two, they only have one gun. And they dispute who should be the one to fire first -- one says the other should have precedence because he is older, while the other one points out that the other should have precedence as a kohen. And then, the tale ends with the head of the yeshiva saying that it is no joke, that this is indeed what happened, but the greatest punch line is that they indeed won!

Regardless, I don't think that this first explanation, which resolves the contradiction, reflects the original intent of either the midrashic author of Rashi. Rather, it is a neo-midrash, sparked by classic concerns of ain mikra yotzei midei peshuto.

Also, later, even according to Rashi (who we are trying to harmonize), all the naarim who accompanied Avraham get a share. Why should they get a share if they all returned home from the battlefield? What did they do to deserve a share?

The second answer, from Gur Aryeh, works out better in terms of the pesukim, and the nearim who went with Avraham who get a chelek, in a later pasuk. Gur Aryeh has them accompany Avraham and Eliezer, but just to scare them.

My problem with Gur Aryeh is that this is also not explicitly mentioned in the midrash, where it might (though not as convincingly so) be interesting enough to mention. And further, there is a distinction drawn in the gemara as to whether they were in addition to Eliezer, such that Eliezer was just worth all of them, or whether they were indeed Eliezer. And Rashi appears to be adopting the latter. If so, it is not the strongest of answers.

In terms of questions, this is perhaps first a question on Rashi's sources. After all, Rashi wasn't the one who innovated this, and if אין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו, then the same is a valid question on them. Rashi basis himself on Nedarim 32a:

וירק את חניכיו ילידי ביתו רב אמר שהוריקן בתורה ושמואל אמר שהוריקן בזהב (בראשית יד) שמנה עשר ושלש מאות א"ר אמי בר אבא אליעזר כנגד כולם איכא דאמרי אליעזר הוא דחושבניה הכי הוי

And he armed his trained servants, born in his own house. Rab said, he equipped them by [teaching them] the Torah. Samuel said, he made them bright with gold [i.e., rewarded them for accompanying him].
Three hundred and eighteen: R. Ammi b. Abba said: Eliezer outweighed them all. Others say, It was Eliezer, for this is the numerical value of his name.

Thus, according to both Rav and Shmuel, there actually were 318 servants who accompanied him. So too R' Ami bar Abba -- Eliezer was there, and outweighed them, but they were still presumably present. Only the "others" say that it was Eliezer alone. And according to this "others", it is indeed difficult how to square it with the plain meaning of the pasuk.

However, I would also point out that, as I demonstrated many times in the past, ika deAmrei doesn't mean that there is another unnamed person in play. Rather, we are dealing with a variant manuscript of the gemara, both brought down in our Talmudic text. Thus, it is possible no one said it. And if someone said it, it was R' Ami bar Abba.

The midrash in Bereishit Rabba reads similarly:

אמר רבי שמעון בן לקיש:

באבנים טובות ומרגליות הוריקן, היך מה דאת אמר: (תהלים סה) ואברותיה בירקרק חרוץ.

רבי לוי אמר:

בפרשת שוטרים הוריקן, היך מה דאת אמר: (דברים כ) מי האיש הירא ורך הלבב, ילך וישוב לביתו.

חניכיו, בעלי חניכתו. שמם אברם, כשמו.

שמנה עשר ושלוש מאות

ריש לקיש בשם בר קפרא:

אליעזר לבדו היה, מנין אליעזר, י"ח וג' מאות.

Thus, first Resh Lakish indicates that he gave all these servants gifts. And then he says in the name of Bar Kappara that it was only Eliezer, and that the gematria of Eliezer is 318. This would seem to be a contradiction, but often the gemara contrasts Resh Lakish with Resh Lakish in the name of Bar Kappara, and resolves that one is his own opinion and the other is the opinion he is citing.

Given the matching text in Bereishit Rabba, I would resolve that the ikka deAmrei is correct, and that the assertion is that it was only Eliezer, not Eliezer as well as 318 servants of Avraham.

What, then, do we make of this midrash? Do we not say ain mikra yotzei midei peshuto? I have at least two answers.

The first answer is that this is a midrash and was intended allegorically, to make a homiletic point. We don't have any evidence otherwise, and given that the pasuk states clearly that 318 people went, there is no other alternative. I don't like this answer.

The second answer is that it may indeed have been intended literally. But who says that they are maintaining ain mikra yotzei midei peshuto, or that we understand the principle? Indeed, the principle only occurs three times in all of Shas.

In the primary case, that of Rav Kahana, he had already learned through all of Shas and yet was unaware of this principle. Perhaps the midrashic author was also unaware of the principle?

But more than that, I think that there is a difference between how it is used in the primary case involving Rav Kahana and the other two cases in which it is harnessed by the setama digmara. And there is a further difference between how it is used in the gemara and how it is used by medieval Jewish commentators.

The primary case is in Shabbat 63a:

א"ל אביי לרב דימי ואמרי לה לרב אויא ואמרי לה רב יוסף לרב דימי ואמרי לה לרב אויא ואמרי לה אביי לרב יוסף מ"ט דר"א דאמר תכשיטין הן לו דכתיב (תהילים מה) חגור חרבך על ירך גבור הודך והדרך א"ל רב כהנא למר בריה דרב הונא האי בדברי תורה כתיב א"ל אין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו א"ר כהנא כד הוינא בר תמני סרי שנין והוה גמירנא ליה לכוליה {תלמודא} ולא הוה ידענא דאין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו עד השתא מאי קמ"ל דליגמר איניש והדר ליסבר:

Abaye asked R. Dimi — others state, R. Awia, — others again state, R. Joseph [asked] R. Dimi — and others state, R. Awia whilst others state, Abaye [asked] R. Joseph: What is R. Eliezer's reason for maintaining that they are ornaments for him? — Because it is written, Gird thy sword upon thy thigh, O mighty one, Thy glory and thy majesty.9 R. Kahana objected to Mar son of R. Huna: But this refers to the words of the Torah?10 — A verse cannot depart from its plain meaning, he replied.11 R. Kahana said: By the time I was eighteen years old I had studied the whole Shas,12 yet I did not know that a verse cannot depart from its plain meaning.13 until to-day. What does he inform us? — That a man should study and subsequently understand.

If I were to explain this gemara, and there were no other gemaras which referred to this principle, I would say one of two things. Firstly, what is meant by peshuto is not necessarily derash vs. peshat. Rather, it is Biblical mashal and Biblical nimshal. Rav Kahana's objection was that we know the meaning of the allegory, so of course the pasuk did not refer to a real sword, such that we cannot deduce some fact about the ornate nature of swords. And the response is that the text has a meaning on a literal level. The mashal has to first make sense, and then we understand the nimshal. And so we can deduce facts about the world, lehalacha, from the literal meaning of the allegory.

But this does not really have anything to do with midrash halacha, midrash aggadah, or the like. It could be that when using midrashic methods, this would establish the Truth and Reality in terms of the meaning of the pasuk, such that applying "peshat methodology" might reveal an interpretation which has been entirely uprooted. Because this is a completely different matter than that discussed in this gemara. (The disproof of this may well be evident in the gemara in which Rava applies it to a gezeira shava.)

Secondly, this occurs in the context of a halachic sugya. It is quite possible that ain mikra is itself a midda shehaTorah nidreshet bahen, a midrashic method. That even though we apply other midrashic methodology, when it comes to establishing halacha, the peshat meaning can still contribute. This does not necessarily mean that we must therefore restrict midrash aggada, and what can be said there, to assure that it does not contradict the reality as defined by the peshat.

The next instance of this phrase is in Yevamot 11b, as used by the setama de-gemara:

בעא מיניה רב יהודה מרב ששת המחזיר גרושתו משניסת ומת צרתה מהו אליבא דרבי יוסי בן כיפר לא תיבעי לך כיון דאמר ר' יוסי בן כיפר טומאה במחזיר גרושתו הוא דכתיבא צרתה כמותה ואי משום דכתיב בה (דברים כד) תועבה היא היא תועבה ואין בניה תועבין הא צרתה תועבה כי תיבעי לך אליבא דרבנן אע"ג דאמור רבנן טומאה בסוטה הוא דכתיב אין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו או דלמא כיון דאיעקר איעקר איכא דאמרי אליבא דרבנן לא תיבעי לך כיון דאיתעקר איעקר כי תיבעי לך אליבא דרבי יוסי בן כיפר מאי אע"ג דאמר ר' יוסי בן כיפר טומאה במחזיר גרושתו הוא דכתיבא מיעט רחמנא היא תועבה ואין צרתה תועבה או דלמא היא תועבה ואין בניה תועבין הא צרתה תועבה

Rab Judah inquired of R. Shesheth: What is the law in regard to the rival of a woman whom her former husband remarried after her second marriage and died?18 According to the view of R. Jose b. Kipper the question does not arise. For R. Jose b. Kipper having stated that 'uncleanness' is mentioned in the case of him who remarried his divorced wife, it follows that her rival is subject to the very same restrictions. And if [objection be raised] from the Scriptural text, She is an abomination,19 [it may be replied that the implication is] that she is an abomination and not her children,20 her rival, however, being an abomination. The question, however, arises on the view of the Rabbis: Does the Scriptural text,21 despite the fact that the Rabbis had applied the expression 'uncleanness' to the sotah, also bear its ordinary meaning,22 or since it23 was once torn away [from its ordinary meaning] it must in all respects so remain?24 Others say: According to the Rabbis no question arises, for since the text has once been torn away [from its ordinary meaning] it must in all respects so remain. The question, however, arises according to the view of R. Jose b. Kipper: What is the law? [Is it assumed that] although R. Jose b. Kipper stated that the expression of 'uncleanness' refers to the remarriage of a divorced wife, the All Merciful has written 'She is an abomination' to indicate that 'she' is an abomination but not her rival,25 or is the implication, perhaps, that 'she' is an abomination, but her children are not; a rival, however, being an abomination?

Thus, different ways are given to understand the question of Rav Yehuda. And one option involves ain mikra yotzei, but at the same time they acknowledge the opposite possibility, that once it was torn away from its ordinary meaning, it was uprooted. And in the second version, according to the Sages, it is taken as a given that it has been uprooted.

I would point out three things. (1) It is the setama that suggests this. (2) It is not clear that even if this is the operating principle, we rule that it applies in this instance. So where it applies or not is unknown. (3) This is a question of midrash halacha, not midrash aggadah. It could be that we would not apply this to midrash aggadah, but rather just allow the midrash to entirely redefine the meaning of the text.

The third instance is also in Yevamot, daf 24a:

ת"ר (דברים כה) והיה הבכור מיכן שמצוה בגדול לייבם (דברים כה) אשר תלד פרט לאילונית שאין יולדת יקום על שם אחיו לנחלה אתה אומר לנחלה או אינו אלא לשם יוסף קורין אותו יוסף יוחנן קורין אותו יוחנן נאמר כאן יקום על שם אחיו ונאמר להלן (בראשית מח) על שם אחיהם יקראו בנחלתם מה שם האמור להלן נחלה אף שם האמור כאן לנחלה ולא ימחה שמו פרט לסריס ששמו מחוי אמר רבא אע"ג דבכל התורה כולה אין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו הכא אתאי גזרה שוה אפיקתיה מפשטיה לגמרי

Our Rabbis learned: And it shall be, that the firstborn15 implies16 that the commandment of the levirate marriage devolves upon the [surviving elder brother];17 that she beareth15 excludes a woman who is incapable of procreation, since she cannot bear children: shall succeed in the name of his brother,15 in respect of inheritance.18 You say, 'in respect of inheritance';19 perhaps it does not [mean that]. but, 'in respect of the name':20 [If the deceased, for Instance, was called] Joseph [the child] shall be called Joseph; If Johanan he shall be called Johanan! — Here it is stated, shall succeed in the name of his brother15 and elsewhere it is stated, They shall be called after the name of their brethren in their inheritance,21 as the 'name' that was mentioned there [has reference to] inheritance, so the 'name' which was mentioned here [has also reference] to inheritance. That his name be not blotted out15 excludes a eunuch22 whose name is blotted out.

Said Raba: Although throughout the Torah no text23 loses its ordinary meaning, here the gezerah shawah24 has come and entirely deprived the text of its ordinary meaning.25

I would note that we see elsewhere (e.g. by the spelling of Binyamin) that bechol haTorah kullah need not be comprehensive. And I would also note that this is again an instance of midrash halacha. And in this case, we don't apply it. (I would further say that this is because this gezeira shava is no mere gezeira shava, but rather provides us with evidence as to the meaning of the term shem.)

Medieval Jewish commentators take this phrase and run with it. It becomes a rallying cry for the legitimacy of learning peshat, as opposed to merely derash. And for giving a peshat which is at odds with the derash in some way.

But I am pretty certain that this is not how it is meant in the gemara. If so, who says that Resh Lakish citing Bar Kappara, or R' Ammi bar Abba, need to fit the peshat with the derash?

Turning from the gemara now and considering Rashi, Rashi does subscribe to ain mikra yotzei midei peshuto. So how can he say what he says?!

I have a few answers, none of which are those of Gur Aryeh or Siftei Chachamim, et al.

First and foremost is that when one says ain mikra yotzei midei peshuto, the focus is typically on defense of the legitimacy of the peshat. This is far different than the way Siftei Chachamim and others are using it. They are asking to modify the derasha in order to accommodate what they feel is peshat. This is then a restriction on derasha (or an excuse for neo-midrash), rather than a legitimization of peshat.

Second is that who says that this derasha is not being put forth as peshat?! Just because to us it seems like it is not peshat does not mean that Rashi did not regard it as truth and midrasho-peshat!

Indeed, look at the previous Rashi:

his trained men: Heb. חִנִיכָיו It is written חִנִיכוֹ [in the singular], his trained man, (other editions: It is read). This is Eliezer, whom he had trained to [perform the] commandments, and it [חִנִיכָיו] is an expression of the initiation (lit. the beginning of the entrance) of a person or a utensil to the craft with which he [or it] is destined to remain, and similarly (Prov. 22: 6):“Train (חִנ‏ֹ) a child ;” (Num. 7:10):“the dedication of (חֲנֻכַּת) the altar ;” (Ps. 30:1):“the dedication of of (חֲנֻכַּת) the Temple,” and in Old French it is called enseigner [to instruct, train].

חניכיו: חנכו כתיב זה אליעזר שחנכו למצות והוא לשון התחלת כניסת האדם או כלי לאומנות שהוא עתיד לעמוד בה, וכן (משלי כב ו) חנוך לנער, (במדבר ז יא) חנכת המזבח, (תהלים ל א) חנכת הבית ובלע"ז קורין לו איניציי"ר [לחנוך]:

Thus, if we interpret the pasuk according to the way it is written, or else read (in fact, neither is true, according to our Masorah; see my post about this), then the entire pasuk refers to Eliezer. There is no other person present there.

What about the 318 people mentioned? Well, it does not say people. We can parse and translate this as:

14. And Abram heard that his kinsman had been taken captive, and he armed his trained man, born in his house, "three hundred and eighteen", and he pursued [them] until Dan.

יד. וַיִּשְׁמַע אַבְרָם כִּי נִשְׁבָּה אָחִיו וַיָּרֶק אֶת חֲנִיכָיו יְלִידֵי בֵיתוֹ שְׁמֹנָה עָשָׂר וּשְׁלֹשׁ מֵאוֹת וַיִּרְדֹּף עַד דָּן:

Thus, 318 is being used in place of the name Eliezer.

There are of course apparent contradictions with other pesukim. For example:

15. And he divided himself against them at night, he and his servants, and smote them, and pursued them until Hobah, which is to the left of Damascus.

טו. וַיֵּחָלֵק עֲלֵיהֶם לַיְלָה הוּא וַעֲבָדָיו וַיַּכֵּם וַיִּרְדְּפֵם עַד חוֹבָה אֲשֶׁר מִשְּׂמֹאל לְדַמָּשֶׂק:

Who are "his servants" in plural? Maybe we can answer that this is like baalav, and is a false plural. Or that since Eliezer has been defined earlier as the 318, we are going to carry this through.

Finally, by the chaluka, we have:

24. Exclusive of what the lads ate, and the share of the men who went with me; Aner, Eshkol, and Mamre they shall take their share."		כד. בִּלְעָדַי רַק אֲשֶׁר אָכְלוּ הַנְּעָרִים וְחֵלֶק הָאֲנָשִׁים אֲשֶׁר הָלְכוּ אִתִּי עָנֵר אֶשְׁכֹּל וּמַמְרֵא הֵם יִקְחוּ חֶלְקָם:
the lads: My servants who went with me, and additionally, Aner, Eshkol, and Mamre, etc. Although my servants entered the battle, as it is stated (above verse 14): “he and his servants, and smote them,” while Aner and his companions stayed with the luggage to guard [it], nevertheless, “they shall take their share.” And from him, David learned, as he said (I Sam. 30:24): “for as the share of him who goes down into battle, so is the share of him who stays with the luggage; they shall share alike.” Therefore, it says (ibid. verse 25):“And it was so from that day (and had been so) from before, that he made it a statute and an ordinance.” It does not say וָהָלְאָה [and onwards], because that statute had already been enacted in the days of Abram. [from Gen. Rabbah 43:9]		הנערים: עבדי אשר הלכו אתי, ועוד ענר אשכול וממרא וגו'. ואף על פי שעבדי נכנסו למלחמה, שנאמר לעיל (פסוק טו) הוא ועבדיו ויכם, וענר וחבריו ישבו על הכלים לשמור, אפילו הכי הם יקחו חלקם. וממנו למד דוד שאמר (ש"א ל כד) כחלק היורד למלחמה וכחלק היושב על הכלים יחדיו יחלוקו. ולכך נאמר (שם פסוק כה) ויהי מהיום ההוא ומעלה וישימה לחוק ולמשפט, ולא נאמר והלאה לפי שכבר ניתן החוק בימי אברהם:

Perhaps we can revocalize Avaday as Avdi, my servant. Or we could say again that Eliezer is in the plural because the text decided to refer to him as 318. Or we could try to kvetch this as referring to the members of the Baalei Berit Avraham, even though I agree with Rashi that what he gives is the best peshat.

(Besides the peshat, we also might want to resolve Rashi with himself. The difficulty is in this pasuk, about the division to the נערים, as well as to a variant version of Rashi, mentioned in this post, that reads:

חניכיו, בעלי חניכתו. שמם אברם, כשמו

instead of the non-existence chaser which is darshened in our version of Rashi.)

At the end of the day, I do think that the most likely is that Rashi is not thinking in terms of ain mikra, and so gives both peshat and derash which ultimately cannot have been simultaneously true historically. And furthermore, I think it quite possible that where he gives this midrash, he is envisioning it as peshat, even though we ourselves would not regard it as such. My "proof" for this is a michlal lav ata shomea hen from Ibn Ezra, who writes:

יד, יד]

וירק -

שנתן להם כלי מלחמה כטעם: והרק חנית.

ויש אומרים:

להוציא החרב מתערה, כטעם על הארץ יריקו.

מריקים שקיהם. גם יש לחנית כן.

חניכיו -

שחנכם פעמים רבות במלחמה ואם לא נזכר.

וחשבון אותיות אליעזר דרך דרש, כי אין הכתוב מדבר בגימטריא, כי יכול יוכל הרוצה להוציא כל שם לטוב ולרע, רק השם כמשמעו.

He writes "and the count of the letters Eliezer is by way of derash, for the Scriptures does not speak in gematria, for anyone who wishes is able to cast any name for good or for bad. Rather the name is as its simple implication."

From what he writes above, it is clear that Ibn Ezra thinks that literally (and I would guess historically) what is meant in the pasuk are a group of 318 people. He says shenatan lahem. And he says that this is not the way Scriptures speaks. Then, he either considers it untrue or, likely in this case, allegorical.

But why would he need to say this? My guess is that it seems to him that Rashi is regarding it as literal, and as peshat, just as I outlined above.

This, then, provides us with two answers to Siftei Chachamim's question. First, that the midrash is not meant literally. Second, that perhaps Rashi does regard it as literal and as a derech of peshat, in which case the question of ain mikra yotzei midei peshuto never arises.