Showing posts with label kiddushin. Show all posts
Showing posts with label kiddushin. Show all posts

Tuesday, March 22, 2016

Kiddushin 2a - Why say נקנית?

(Cross posted to Daf Yummy.)

We recently started Kiddushin in Daf Yomi. Here are a few thoughts about the opening gemara.

The Mishna (Kiddushin 2a):

האשה נקנית בשלוש דרכים, וקונה את עצמה בשתי דרכים.
נקנית: בכסף, בשטר ובביאה.

The gemara (2a):

האשה נקנית - מאי שנא הכא דתני "האשה נקנית" ומ"ש התם דתני "האיש מקדש"? משום דקא בעי למתני כסף

That is, why use the word נקנית here, where it is a language of kinyan, rather than mekadesh as it appears in the Mishna in the beginning of the second perek in Kiddushin 41a:

האיש מקדש בו ובשלוחו האשה מתקדשת בה ובשלוחה האיש מקדש את בתו כשהיא נערה בו ובשלוחו:

Or, to refine the gemara’s question somewhat, since we focused only on the question of swapping out shorashim, why not say האשה מתקדשת in our Mishna?

And the answer the gemara gives is that since kesef is one of the three methods, the language of kinyan is appropriate here.

I would run with the gemara’s question and give a different answer. If we learn through all the Mishnayot in the first perek first, we see a pattern and a structure emerge:

2a
האשה נקנית בשלוש דרכים…
היבמה נקנית בביאה....
עבד עברי נקנה בכסף ובשטר...
הנרצע נקנה ברציעה...
עבד כנעני נקנה בכסף ובשטר ובחזקה…
בהמה גסה נקנית במסירה והדקה בהגבהה…
נכסים שיש להם אחריות נקנין בכסף ובשטר ובחזקה שאין להם אחריות אין נקנין אלא במשיכה

The answer to the question is then obvious. The point is to go through a whole bunch of different kinyanim, formal binding acquisitions. These differ depending on what it is being “acquired”. And so, it is appropriate to use the word נקנית or נקנה throughout. If we would use האשה מתקדשת, then we wouldn’t be able to carry through this language throughout the perek. Possibly we could continue it for yevama, but no further. We also couldn’t use the words וקונה את עצמה (or the equivalent by yevama or eved) as a simple flip of the expression.

The gemara, elsewhere, analyzes other bits of language. For instance, why not use נקנית in the second perek? Why use derachim. Be’ezrat Hashem, these questions are for follow-up posts.

Wednesday, November 14, 2012

The Torah obligation to love one's wife

Sometimes, a deep understanding of how midrash works is necessary to understand what it is that Chazal are saying. Case in point is a post, and discussion, at the Daat Torah blog about the obligation to love one's wife.

Let us start with a pasuk in Shir Hashirim, 5:2:
ב  אֲנִי יְשֵׁנָה, וְלִבִּי עֵר; קוֹל דּוֹדִי דוֹפֵק, פִּתְחִי-לִי אֲחֹתִי רַעְיָתִי יוֹנָתִי תַמָּתִי--שֶׁרֹּאשִׁי נִמְלָא-טָל, קְוֻצּוֹתַי רְסִיסֵי לָיְלָה.2 I sleep, but my heart waketh; Hark! my beloved knocketh: 'Open to me, my sister, my love, my dove, my undefiled; for my head is filled with dew, my locks with the drops of the night.'


We see that in Biblical Hebrew, ra'yati can mean beloved, not just merely a friend. Chazal make a wonderful derasha in two places on the pasuk of veahavta lerei'acha kamocha, which appears in Vayikra 19:18.
יח  לֹא-תִקֹּם וְלֹא-תִטֹּר אֶת-בְּנֵי עַמֶּךָ, וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ:  אֲנִי, ה.18 Thou shalt not take vengeance, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself: I am the LORD.


On a peshat level it means your neighbor, your fellow man. But Chazal darshen the word lerei'acha to mean 'your beloved', as in Shir Hashirim. 'You should love your beloved as yourself.' If they do so, it is not a simple application of the peshat version of the pasuk, but is rather a specialized derasha, on the midrashic level. And then 'love' can plausibly also take a slightly different meaning than it does on a peshat level.

Daat Torah does not realize this and so, in reply to this comment:
DT: "Where does it say that there is a command to love one's wife?"

Have you excluded "ואהבת לריעך כמוך"?
He replies:
if you want to go that route then there is nothing unique about the emotional connection between husband and wife - she is no worse then Joe the barber or any strangers one meets during the day. The Rambam is clearly basing himself on the gemora in Yevamos - as all commentaries acknowledge. 

Rav Zilberstein does raise this question - the answer is not very satisfying - but I'll get to the translation soon.

Where is the source for the imperative - the gemora does not say or imply that there is?

Bottom line - according to your approach we need to translate the word ahava - not as love but rather "being concerned for another's welfare."
He asserts that if one gets it from  וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ, then there is no distinction from Joe the barber. But this assertion ignores the distinction between peshat in a pasuk and Chazal's derash of a pasuk.

Here is the contradiction he discusses in the main body of the post:
In the discussion about the nature of marriage - the prime question is the role or necessity for love between husband and wife. It is important to note there is an apparent contradiction between the language of the Talmud and the language of the Rambam and subsequent authorities. The Rambam clearly states that the obligation to love  one's wife as oneself is rabbinic. However if he is basing himself on Yevamos (62b) - which the commentaries state is his source - there is no assertion of a rabbinic obligation. It simply says that if one does love one's wife as oneself and a bunch of other things  - there will be peace in his tent. At most it is a wise suggestion. An additional problem is that the Rambam in his commentary to the Mishna (Kiddushin 2:1) clearly states that the obligation is from the Torah command to love your fellow as yourself. That is the language of the gemora Kiddushin 41a. So is the Rambam basing his  obligation of love on a Torah command or rabbinic? Is he basing himself on Yevamos 62b or Kiddushin 41a? Are there two obligations of love as Rav Zilberberg suggests below? Finally it seems from the following sources that love is refering to caring or not hating or not doing negative things to another person . It is not referring to the emotion that we call love.
Yevamos (62b): Our  Rabbis taught: If a man loves his wife as himself and honors her more than himself and guides his sons and daughters on the straight path and has them married close to the age of puberty - the verse (Job 5:24) is applied to him, And you shall know that your tent is in peace.
Rambam(Hilchos Ishus 3:19): Similarly a man should not marry of a child nor should he marry a woman until he has seen her and she is acceptable in his eyes. That is because if he doesn’t see her first it might turn out that she doesn’t find favor in his eyes when he does see her.
 Kiddushin (41a): Rav said that it is prohibited for a man to marry a woman until he has seen her because when he does see her he might notice something which disgusts him and the Torah (Vayikra 19:18) has commanded, “You shall love your fellow as yourself.”
Rambam (Hilchos Ishus 15:19): Our Sages have commanded that a man should honor his wife more then himself and love her as himself.
Rambam(Commentary Kiddushin 2:1): It is correct that each man marry directly rather than through an agent, since we have a general rule that a man should not marry a woman until he has seen her. That is because we are concerned that she won’t find favor in his eyes and yet he will remain married to her in spite of not loving her. Such a thing is prohibited since there is a rule, “You should love your fellow as yourself.” Therefore it is important that the man marries directly rather than through an agent.

It certainly does seem correct that the yellow Rambam passage is based primarily on the yellow gemara and the green Rambam passage is based primarily on the green gemara.

The green passages reflect the explicit derasha, by Rav, of וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ. It is possible that Rambam would consider this to be a rabbinic command rather than a Biblical command, since it is a derasha made on a pasuk, rather than the peshat meaning of the pasuk itself. So even though the Rambam attributes it to וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ, that does not necessitate that this is Biblical, in contradistinction to his statement in Hilchos Ishus that "our Sages have commanded". The green passages, which deal with being married to a person despite not loving them, can carry the connotation of romantic love.

The yellow passages might implicitly reflect the same derasha. This is a brayta, which is Tannaitic, rather than a statement by Rav, an Amora. Yet it states 'if a man loves his wife as himself'. The choice of language clearly reflects the pasuk of  וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ. This may or many not refer to romantic love, but it is a reading off of the pasuk.

Why would Rambam summarize the yellow gemara as "our Sages commanded" rather than "the Torah commanded"? Because this is a derasha based on a pasuk, rather than the peshat meaning of the pasuk itself. Or alternatively, because of the continuation of the statement in both the gemara and Rambam, "honors her more than himself", which is a rabbinic extension.

Why would Rambam summarize the yellow gemara as "our Sages commanded" rather than "our Sages recommended"? Because the recommendation (with positive results) is based on a derasha of a pasuk, so clearly Chazal themselves regarded it as an obligation. Indeed, we could turn to Rav's statement in Kiddushin to reveal how Chazal midrashically interpreted the pasuk, and then apply that knowledge to the brayta in Yevamot. Or alternatively, just because Chazal mentioned a positive result of following their directives does not mean that they considered (or Rambam considered) their statement to be only a wise recommendation.

Friday, February 10, 2012

Who's the man? Moshe's the man!

Summary: But why not Yisro, who is called HaIsh is Shemos? And why not another prooftext local to sefer Shemot? The Chasam Sofer answers that it really was a function of Moshe's humility (mentioned in the continuation of the prooftext). Plus my own suggestion.

Post: At the start of parashas Yisro, the following pasuk and Rashi:

7. So Moses went out toward Jethro, prostrated himself and kissed him, and they greeted one another, and they entered the tent.ז. וַיֵּצֵא מֹשֶׁה לִקְרַאת חֹתְנוֹ וַיִּשְׁתַּחוּ וַיִּשַּׁק לוֹ וַיִּשְׁאֲלוּ אִישׁ לְרֵעֵהוּ לְשָׁלוֹם וַיָּבֹאוּ הָאֹהֱלָה:

prostrated himself and kissed him: I do not know who prostrated himself to whom. [But] when it says, “one another (אִישׁ לְרֵעֵהוּ),” [lit., a man to his friend,] who is called "a man"? This is Moses, as it is said: “But the man (וְהָאִישׁ) Moses” (Num. 12:3). [from Mechilta]וישתחו וישק לו: איני יודע מי השתחוה למי, כשהוא אומר איש לרעהו, מי הקרוי איש, זה משה, שנאמר (במדבר יב ג) והאיש משה:


After citing this pasuk and Rashi, the Chasam Sofer writes:

"So is it in the Mechilta. And in Nachalas Yaakov it asks that behold, we find that Yisro as well is called ish, as is stated {in parashat Shemot, in Shemot 2:21}: וַיּוֹאֶל מֹשֶׁה לָשֶׁבֶת אֶת הָאִישׁ וַיִּתֵּן אֶת צִפֹּרָה בִתּוֹ לְמֹשֶׁה, "Moses consented to stay with the man, and he gave his daughter Zipporah to Moses." 


Further, there is to analyze. Why did he not bring an earlier pasuk to that one {namely, the one in Sefer Bamidbar 12:3}, namely the one in parashat Ki Tisa {Shemot 32:23}, that is is written, וַיַּרְא הָעָם כִּי בֹשֵׁשׁ מֹשֶׁה לָרֶדֶת מִן הָהָר וַיִּקָּהֵל הָעָם עַל אַהֲרֹן וַיֹּאמְרוּ אֵלָיו קוּם עֲשֵׂה לָנוּ אֱ־לֹהִים אֲשֶׁר יֵלְכוּ לְפָנֵינוּ כִּי זֶה מֹשֶׁה הָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר הֶעֱלָנוּ מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם לֹא יָדַעְנוּ מֶה הָיָה לוֹ,  "When the people saw that Moses was late in coming down from the mountain, the people gathered against Aaron, and they said to him: "Come on! Make us gods that will go before us, because this man Moses, who brought us up from the land of Egypt we don't know what has become of him." "


And there is to say behold, it is a question in the gemara in Kiddushin 33b, 'his son who is his teacher, should his father stand before him.' And the same in reverse, 'should he stand for his father'?

{That gemara is:
The scholars propounded: What if his son is his teacher? Must he rise before his father? — Come and hear: For Samuel said to Rab Judah: Keen scholar!6  rise before your father!7  — R. Ezekiel was different, because he had [many] good deeds to his credit, for even Mar Samuel8 too stood up before him. Then what did he tell him?9  — He said thus to him: Sometimes he may come behind me;10 then do you stand up before him,11 and do not fear for my honour.
    The scholars propounded: What if his son is his teacher; must his father stand up before him? — Come and hear: For R. Joshua h. Levi said: As for me, it is not meet that I should stand up before my son, but that the honour of the Nasi's house [demands it].12 Thus the reason is that I am his teacher:13 but if he were my teacher, I would rise before him.14  — [No]. He meant thus: As for me, it is not meet that I should stand up before my son, even if he were my teacher, seeing that I am his father,but that the honour of the Nasi's house [demands it].
}

And the doubt is because of kibbud av vs. kibbud talmid chacham. And behold, in this they were equal. Moshe was obligated in honor of Yisro more, since he was his father-in-law, whom he was obligated to honor, just as David called King Shaul 'my father', as is known; that we learn from there that a person is obligated in honoring his father-in-law. And so Moshe honored Yisro. Yet opposing this is that Moshe was a talmid chacham and the teacher of all of Israel, and so Yisro was obligated in honoring him. And since they were equal in terms of precedence of honor, 'I don't know' {says Rashi / Mechilta} 'who prostrated to whom.' However, in truth, it was Moshe, who was humbler than any other person on the face of the earth; without a doubt, Moshe bowed first to Yisro. And this is what Rashi explains: I do not know who bowed to whom, for they were equal in this matter. When it says ish lerei'eihu, who is called here the ish who bowed? Say it is certainly Moshe, as is stated, 'And the man Moshe was exceedingly humble."

This is a beautiful construction. And it explains why this particular verse was selected, and why the opposing verse bolstering Yisro was not selected.

To bolster this interpretation even more, I will note that the text of the midrash itself, in the Mechilta, mentions the obligation of honoring one's father-in-law:
וישתחו וישק לו - איני יודע מי השתחווה למי או מי נשק למי, כשהוא אומר: וישאלו איש לרעהו, מי קרוי איש? 
הלא משה, שנאמר: והאיש משה, הוי אומר: לא השתחווה ולא נשק אלא משה לחמיו. 

מכאן אמרו:
 
שיהא האדם מוכן לכבוד חמיו. 
One might still ask based on this, if this is going to be a primary source for honoring one's father-in-law, with no kvod talmidei chachamim explicitly mentioned.

Despite how nice I find the construction, I must admit that I don't find it persuasive. If so, it would be a good thing to account for these two details. Why isn't Yisro a viable candidate for האיש, and why not select an earlier pasuk about Moshe being an איש?

(1) In terms of Yisro as candidate vs. Moshe as candidate, I think there is a difference between האיש משה and someone who happens to be called האיש in one particular verse. There are many people / beings who are referred to as איש. Indeed, Moshe's father עמרם is the איש who went from the house of Levi. But האיש משה midrashically equates in one's mind that איש means משה. So even if in one particular verse, יתרו is referred to as האיש -- indeed, even in relationship to his son-in-law Moshe -- it is not the same as setting up this mental equation that Ish = Moshe.

(2) In terms of the other candidate pasuk in sefer Shemot to establish Moshe as the ish, I don't think we should underestimate the force of the famous pasuk. The verse in praise of Moshe's humility is a famous one, on the tip of everyone's tongue. So it is the obvious verse to cite to establish Moshe as the ish. Yes, perhaps the more local pasuk would have served equally well, but it would not necessarily have been the one to come to mind, either in the mind of the midrashic author, or in the minds of his audience.

Along similar lines, the lengthy pasuk about Moshe being late represents the words of the people. But the pasuk about HaIsh Moshe is a narrative statement, or else from the mouth of Hashem himself. This might be a stronger basis for establishing Moshe as HaIsh.

Monday, October 19, 2009

Not referring to one's father by name

An interesting post over at Daf Notes, analyzing a gemara (Bava Batra 56b) in which Rabbi Yossi ben Chalafta refers to his father as Abba Chalafta:
מתני' דלא כרבי עקיבא דתניא א"ר יוסי כשהלך אבא חלפתא אצל רבי יוחנן בן נורי ללמוד תורה ואמרי לה ר' יוחנן בן נורי אצל אבא חלפתא ללמוד תורה אמר לו הרי שאכלה שנה ראשונה בפני שנים שניה בפני שנים שלישית בפני שנים מהו אמר לו הרי זו חזקה

As Rashi says, this means Avi = my father, Chalafta.
אבא חלפתא - אבי חלפתא דר' יוסי סתם היינו רבי יוסי בן חלפתא:
But
If so, how was Rabbi Yosi permitted to mention the name of his father? It is explicitly ruled in Shulchan Aruch (Y”D 240:2) that one is forbidden from mentioning his father’s name, during his lifetime and after his death as well!?

He quotes an answer from his son, Reb Shlomo: It emerges from Rashi in Sanhedrin (100a) that if a title of honor precedes the mentioning of one’s father’s name, it is permitted. Since “Abba” is a title of honor, Rabbi Yosi was permitted to say “Abba Chalafta.”

The following is the explanation of the proof: Rabbi Yochanan said: Geichazi was punished for calling Elisha, his Rebbe, by his name. Rashi writes: He did not say, “My teacher, my master, So-and-So.” Evidently, one is permitted to mention his Rebbe’s name if he says, “My teacher, my master” first. Accordingly, Reb Shlomo derived from here that the same would be true regarding one’s father. A son would be permitted to mention his father’s name if he mentions a title of honor before the name. Reb Akiva Eiger agreed to this logic.
And it continues, so check it out there.

I suppose that it being explicitly ruled as such in Shulchan Aruch is mentioned to show that it is a clear-cut halacha. But if that were the only objection, then it strikes me that it would not be an objection at all. On what basis does the Shulchan Aruch state this? If Rav Yosef Karo made it up, well then, one cannot innovate post-Talmudic halacha. Indeed, this is the point the Noda Be-Yehuda made in the face Yehuda HaChassid's assertion that one may not marry someone whose parent shares your name: that we see Chazal did not do this, for Rami, e.g., married the daughter of a Rami. And we would pay no heed to the innovated halacha against Chazal.

But Rav Yosef Karo gets it from Tur, who gets it from Rambam, who gets it from a brayta and the ensuing discussion on Kiddushin 31b, as well as the aforementioned gemara in perek Chelek about Gechazi. That gemara in Kiddushin is:
תנו רבנן חכם משנה שם אביו ושם רבו תורגמן אינו משנה לא שם אביו ולא שם רבו אבוה דמאן אילימא אבוה דמתורגמן אטו תורגמן לאו בר חיובא הוא אלא אמר רבא שם אביו של חכם ושם רבו של חכם כי הא דמר בר רב אשי כי הוה דריש בפירקא איהו אמר אבא מרי ואמוריה אמר הכי אמר רב אשי
To cite the Point By Point Summary, with my own elaborations in {curly braces}.
(b) (Beraisa): A Chacham citing his father or Rebbi should not say their actual names; the one broadcasting the lesson says the actual names.
(c) Question: Whose names does he {Josh: the meturgeman = the broadcaster} say?
1. Suggestion: If this means, the names of his own father or Rebbi - but the broadcaster must also honor his father and Rebbi {Josh: so by saying "the father of X," the meturgeman ends up saying his Rebbe's name, X}!
(d) Answer (Rava): The names of the Chacham's father and Rebbi.
1. When Mar bar Rav Ashi would teach, he would say 'My father, my teacher'; the broadcaster would say 'Rav Ashi'.

The conclusion of the gemara would seem to pose a fairly strong kasha on the answer put forth by Rbbi Shlomo, the son of Rabbi Akiva Eiger. Of course, I haven't seen it inside, so perhaps he addresses this, but while his answer is predicated on a the wording of a particular Rashi in perek Chelek, the basic source in Kiddushin strongly implies that even with an honorific it is not permitted to name one's father! When Mar bar Rav Ashi would teach, he would say Abba Mari. He would not say Rav Ashi, even though Rav is as much an honorific as Abba. Rather, he would say Abba Mari, and the meturgeman would say Rav Ashi!

One could say that was personal conduct, and just the particular maaseh shehaya. But this seems unlikely, if "Rav Ashi" in the first place would have been entirely fine. I would try some other answers.

We could simply posit that Rabbi Yossi was a tanna, and he argued with that brayta, even if we end up paskening against him.

We can posit that Rabbi Yossi did not say Abba Chalafta, but rather Abba Mari. But that the one who quoted him is the equivalent of the meturgeman, and so substituted Abba Chalafta in its place.

We can posit that Abba Chalafta was not the father of Rabbi Yossi ben Chalafta. Rashi's assertion was that in Abba Chalafta, Abba meant "my father", and since stam Rabbi Yossi is Rabbi Yossi ben Chalafta, he was referring to his father Chalafta.
אבא חלפתא - אבי חלפתא דר' יוסי סתם היינו רבי יוסי בן חלפתא:
Before adopting this, we should do a search throughout Bavli, Yerushalmi, and Tosefta to ascertain if the one calling him Abba Chalafta is always a son.

It occurs 7 times in Bavli, some of which are repeats. We have Sota 34a:
אמר רבי יהודה אבא חלפתא ורבי אליעזר בן מתיא וחנניא בן חכינאי עמדו על אותן אבנים ושיערום כל אחת ואחת שקולה כארבעים סאה
Rabbi Yehuda was not a son of Chalafta, and yet he calls him Abba Chalafta.

And we have a brayta in Bava Metzia 94a, also not necessarily stated by a son, about Abba Chalafta Ish Kefar Chanania, who I would guess is someone else.
דתניא אבא חלפתא איש כפר חנניא אמר משום ר"מ תנאי קודם למעשה הרי זה תנאי מעשה קודם לתנאי אינו תנאי
We also have two+ instances in which Rabbi Yossi refers to Abba Chalafta, in Sanhedrin 80a,
אמר ר' יוסי אפילו אבא חלפתא ביניהן
אמר רבי יוסי מודה אבא חלפתא בזה
However, the final instances shows us conclusively that Rashi is correct, and Abba Chalafta is Rabbi Yossi's father. In Meila 17b,
ואחריו מי ילך ר"א בר ר' יוסי
אמר להם רבי יוסי ואילו היה אבא חלפתא קיים יכולין אתם לומר לו תן בנך להריגה
אמר להם ר' שמעון אילו היה יוחאי אבא קיים יכולין אתם לומר לו תן בנך להריגה
To use the Point by Point Summary for easy translation:
1. R. Yosi: If my father was alive, you could not tell him to endanger his son! [Likewise, how can you tell me to endanger my son and let him go?]
2. R. Shimon: If my father was alive, you could not tell him to endanger his son! [Nevertheless, I agree to go; likewise, R. Elazar should go!]
Except of course in the gemara, it does not say only "my father" each time. Rather, Rabbi Yossi says "Abba Chalafta" and Rabbi Shimon says "Yochai Abba", or "Yochai, my father". This is a stronger gemara for Rabbi Akiva Eiger to ask the question from.

The answer might be that Abba serves as an honorific, and indeed, others appear to have called him Abba Chalafta, which makes it surely an honorific. But Yochai Abba is not the same as Abba Yochai! And we see that Mar bar Rav Ashi did not even say Rav Ashi! Perhaps we can say that this was inserted by the gemara / composer of the brayta in the role of meturgeman to make it clearer.

Recently, I had a nice post about whether the "Rabbi Yitzchak" cited in the first Rashi on Chumash was Rashi's father, who was (according to this theory) an am haaretz. And I showed why it was not so. But I wonder if this recommendation / injunction of calling one's father by name carries over from speech to text. (I haven't studied this topic sufficiently, but just glanced briefly at the Tur.) For otherwise, one could ask according to this theory, how could Rashi have cited his father as Rabbi Yitzchak rather that Abba Mari?

The Rambam similarly requires one to change the name of others when speaking to them, if they happen to have the same name as one's father. Though the Tur is astounded by this, and restricts it to where it is a unique name, but not something common like Avraham. (If this extended to text, Rashi referring to Rabbi Yitzchak even if it is a Tanna or Amora would be relevant, and a good counter-example of either the requirement in text, the need to change the names of others, or an example of how an honorific makes it acceptable.)

I recall several years ago, in the elevator of the YU Library, that there was a fellow telling over an incident which had just occurred. He was greatly embarrassed, because he say his friend Carmi standing a bit away and called out "hey Carmi!" And Rabbi Carmy, who happened to be in proximity, looked up and thought that he was referring to him.

Wednesday, December 31, 2008

Your Brother, The Son of Your Mother

This may be obvious, but I wanted to speak it out nonetheless. I was learning through a recent daf {Kiddushin 80b} in the daf Yomi cycle and came across this:
From where do we know these words? Rabbi Yochanan said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: A hint to {the prohibition on} seclusion from the Torah, from where? For it is stated {Devarim 13:7}:
ז כִּי יְסִיתְךָ אָחִיךָ בֶן-אִמֶּךָ אוֹ-בִנְךָ אוֹ-בִתְּךָ אוֹ אֵשֶׁת חֵיקֶךָ, אוֹ רֵעֲךָ אֲשֶׁר כְּנַפְשְׁךָ--בַּסֵּתֶר לֵאמֹר: נֵלְכָה, וְנַעַבְדָה אֱלֹהִים אֲחֵרִים, אֲשֶׁר לֹא יָדַעְתָּ, אַתָּה וַאֲבֹתֶיךָ. 7 If thy brother, the son of thy mother, or thy son, or thy daughter, or the wife of thy bosom, or thy friend, that is as thine own soul, entice thee secretly, saying: 'Let us go and serve other gods,' which thou hast not known, thou, nor thy fathers;
{Where "your brother the son of your mother" is understood as a single phrase.}
Now does the son of a mother entice, while the son of a father not entice? Rather to say to you that a son may seclude himself with his mother, but is forbidden to seclude himself with all of the forbidden relations in the Torah.
The gemara continues with trying to figure out the pashteih dikra, and cites Abaye that it means "your mother's son," and all the more so your father's son. So the simple text only refers to a single son.

And my immediate thought was how this is based on how the phrase כִּי יְסִיתְךָ אָחִיךָ בֶן-אִמֶּךָ is taken as a single phrase, such that it is your brother who is the son of your mother; but that we can easily take it as achicha, which would be a "typical" brother, who is a paternal {and possibly simultaneously maternal} brother, and separately, the son of your mother, that is a maternal brother.

Then I looked in Rashi on the pasuk, in Reeh, and found that this is exactly how Rashi interprets it:
your brother from the father[’s side].
the son of your mother from the mother[’s side].

I am not entirely sure how Ibn Ezra understands it. He writes:
יג, ז]
כי יסיתך אחיך -
הטעם אפילו אחיך.

וטעם בן אמך
שהייתם בבטן אחת והאם כגוף והאב כצורה והצורה לא יבינוה, כי אם מתי מעט.

Is he treating brother as one, and son of mother as a separate entity, as an intensifying case of the emotion and connection one would feel to him? It certainly seems that way to me. Or alternatively, is he offering explanation of why the pasuk elaborates, and it is speaking of a single brother, who is both a maternal and paternal brother. I can certainly see it this way as well.

Aharon ben Yosef the Karaite takes it as a single entity, of one who is exclusively the son of the mother and not the son of the father. (At least as I understand him.) He references Tehillim 50:
כ תֵּשֵׁב, בְּאָחִיךָ תְדַבֵּר; בְּבֶן-אִמְּךָ, תִּתֶּן-דֹּפִי. 20 Thou sittest and speakest against thy brother; thou slanderest thine own mother's son.
This raises an interesting question about Biblical parallelism. Is it mere echoing in other language, or is it an intensification? This is something of a discussion even among modern Biblical scholars. But here, is the achicha the same as ben imecha?

Rashi in Tehillim makes no overt distinction between the two (such that it could be either), but explains why "your own mother's son" should be a reason why it is worse:
your mother’s son with whom you have no [legal] quarrel, since he does not inherit with you.
and indeed, that is a reason Aharon ben Yosef offers for their special closeness.

I would read Onkelos as having them a single individual, as there is not elaboration in:
אֲרֵי יִמְלְכִנָּךְ אֲחוּךְ בַּר אִמָּךְ אוֹ בְּרָךְ אוֹ בְּרַתָּךְ אוֹ אִתַּת קְיָמָךְ, אוֹ חַבְרָךְ דִּכְנַפְשָׁךְ--בְּסִתְרָא לְמֵימַר: נְהָךְ, וְנִפְלַח לְטָעֲוָת עַמְמַיָּא, דְּלָא יְדַעְתָּא, אַתְּ וַאֲבָהָתָךְ.

Tg Yerushalmi has the same non-elaboration. Targum Yonatan makes it overt as "your brother the son of your mother, and all the more so the son of your father" making it clear that the Biblical text only was explicitly talking about one person, the maternal brother. This is then echoing Abaye in our gemara in Kiddushin.

Can the trup help us choose? Not really, since it is after all just going to select one of two possible perushim, and so is a commentary in its own right. But the trup is:

כִּ֣י יְסִֽיתְךָ֡ אָחִ֣יךָ בֶן־אִ֠מֶּךָ אֽוֹ־בִנְךָ֨ אֽוֹ־בִתְּךָ֜ א֣וֹ ׀ אֵ֣שֶׁת חֵיקֶ֗ךָ א֧וֹ רֵֽעֲךָ֛ אֲשֶׁ֥ר כְּנַפְשְׁךָ֖ בַּסֵּ֣תֶר לֵאמֹ֑ר נֵֽלְכָ֗ה וְנַֽעַבְדָה֙ אֱלֹהִ֣ים אֲחֵרִ֔ים אֲשֶׁר֙ לֹ֣א יָדַ֔עְתָּ אַתָּ֖ה וַֽאֲבֹתֶֽיךָ

In terms of parsing this, there is a pazer on כִּ֣י יְסִֽיתְךָ֡ and a telisha gedolah on בֶן־אִ֠מֶּךָ. Both are on equal footing breaking off the clause, so the earlier one in the pasuk functions first. So first the pazer breaks off, and then the telisha gedolah. There is a munach on achicha, such that it all is one phrase. But does that really show anything? Not that I know of, since these are the lowest of disjunctive accents, meaning that there are no other disjunctive accents to subdivide it, such that the munach had to come there. And in o vincha o vitecha there is no disjunctive accent in between anyway.

However, perhaps we can make a big deal over the lack of the word או in between achicha and ven imecha. The word או stands between every other scenario in the verse, so its absence here may indeed be significant.

What happens in the general case of lists in Tanach, particularly long lists? Some prime examples:
וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה אֵלָיו, מִי שָׂם פֶּה לָאָדָם, אוֹ מִי-יָשׂוּם אִלֵּם, אוֹ חֵרֵשׁ אוֹ פִקֵּחַ אוֹ עִוֵּר--הֲלֹא אָנֹכִי, יְהוָה
כִּי-תֵצֵא אֵשׁ וּמָצְאָה קֹצִים, וְנֶאֱכַל גָּדִישׁ, אוֹ הַקָּמָה, אוֹ הַשָּׂדֶה--שַׁלֵּם יְשַׁלֵּם, הַמַּבְעִר אֶת-הַבְּעֵרָה.
כִּי-יִתֵּן אִישׁ אֶל-רֵעֵהוּ חֲמוֹר אוֹ-שׁוֹר אוֹ-שֶׂה, וְכָל-בְּהֵמָה--לִשְׁמֹר; וּמֵת אוֹ-נִשְׁבַּר אוֹ-נִשְׁבָּה, אֵין רֹאֶה.
אוֹ נֶפֶשׁ, אֲשֶׁר תִּגַּע בְּכָל-דָּבָר טָמֵא, אוֹ בְנִבְלַת חַיָּה טְמֵאָה אוֹ בְּנִבְלַת בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה, אוֹ בְּנִבְלַת שֶׁרֶץ טָמֵא; וְנֶעְלַם מִמֶּנּוּ, וְהוּא טָמֵא וְאָשֵׁם.
נֶפֶשׁ כִּי תֶחֱטָא, וּמָעֲלָה מַעַל בַּיהוָה; וְכִחֵשׁ בַּעֲמִיתוֹ בְּפִקָּדוֹן, אוֹ-בִתְשׂוּמֶת יָד אוֹ בְגָזֵל, אוֹ, עָשַׁק אֶת-עֲמִיתוֹ.
וְהָיָה, כִּי-יֶחֱטָא וְאָשֵׁם--וְהֵשִׁיב אֶת-הַגְּזֵלָה אֲשֶׁר גָּזָל אוֹ אֶת-הָעֹשֶׁק אֲשֶׁר עָשָׁק, אוֹ אֶת-הַפִּקָּדוֹן אֲשֶׁר הָפְקַד אִתּוֹ; אוֹ אֶת-הָאֲבֵדָה, אֲשֶׁר מָצָא.
וְכֹל אֲשֶׁר-יִפֹּל-עָלָיו מֵהֶם בְּמֹתָם יִטְמָא, מִכָּל-כְּלִי-עֵץ אוֹ בֶגֶד אוֹ-עוֹר אוֹ שָׂק, כָּל-כְּלִי, אֲשֶׁר-יֵעָשֶׂה מְלָאכָה בָּהֶם; בַּמַּיִם יוּבָא וְטָמֵא עַד-הָעֶרֶב, וְטָהֵר.
אָדָם, כִּי-יִהְיֶה בְעוֹר-בְּשָׂרוֹ שְׂאֵת אוֹ-סַפַּחַת אוֹ בַהֶרֶת, וְהָיָה בְעוֹר-בְּשָׂרוֹ, לְנֶגַע צָרָעַת--וְהוּבָא אֶל-אַהֲרֹן הַכֹּהֵן, אוֹ אֶל-אַחַד מִבָּנָיו הַכֹּהֲנִים.
וְאִם-תֵּרָאֶה עוֹד בַּבֶּגֶד אוֹ-בַשְּׁתִי אוֹ-בָעֵרֶב, אוֹ בְכָל-כְּלִי-עוֹר--פֹּרַחַת, הִוא: בָּאֵשׁ תִּשְׂרְפֶנּוּ, אֵת אֲשֶׁר-בּוֹ הַנָּגַע.

A particularly relevant example, IMHO, in Vayikra 18:9:
עֶרְוַת אֲחוֹתְךָ בַת-אָבִיךָ, אוֹ בַת-אִמֶּךָ, מוֹלֶדֶת בַּיִת, אוֹ מוֹלֶדֶת חוּץ--לֹא תְגַלֶּה, עֶרְוָתָן.
such that achotecha is explained as being either one or the other, and there is a notable absence of או in between.
And then in Vayikra 20:
וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר-יִקַּח אֶת-אֲחֹתוֹ בַּת-אָבִיו אוֹ בַת-אִמּוֹ וְרָאָה אֶת-עֶרְוָתָהּ וְהִיא-תִרְאֶה אֶת-עֶרְוָתוֹ, חֶסֶד הוּא--וְנִכְרְתוּ, לְעֵינֵי בְּנֵי עַמָּם; עֶרְוַת אֲחֹתוֹ גִּלָּה, עֲו‍ֹנוֹ יִשָּׂא.
And we also have:
אָרוּר, שֹׁכֵב עִם-אֲחֹתוֹ--בַּת-אָבִיו, אוֹ בַת-אִמּוֹ; וְאָמַר כָּל-הָעָם, אָמֵן.

In terms of vav connecting, we can omit it in a list until the last element:
רְאוּבֵן שִׁמְעוֹן, לֵוִי וִיהוּדָה.

So I think just the absence of או is sufficient in this case to establish it like the gemara, and not like Rashi (and whatever midrashic source he relied upon, if he did).

Sunday, December 07, 2008

Daf Yomi Kiddushin 60b: Where The Piska, And Just What Is Obvious?

When preparing Rif for my Rif Yomi blog, I noticed something a bit different in the Rif from our gemara. The Rif reads:
Kiddushin 60b
על מנת שאראך מאתים זוז הרי זו מקודשת ויראנה הראה על השולחן אינה מקודשת:
תנא לא נתכוונה זו אלא להראותה משלו
פשיטא לא צריכא אף על גב דנקיט זוזי בעיסקא
""On condition that I show you 200 zuz," she is betrothed, and he shows her. If he shows her on the table {money which is not his} she is not betrothed":
A tanna taught: {For} this one {=the woman} only intended that he would show her of his own {money}.
This is obvious?!
No, it is necessary -- even though he received the money to invest.
While our gemara reads:
ע"מ שאראך מאתים זוז וכו':
תנא לא נתכונה אלא לראות משלו:
ואם הראה לה על השלחן אינה מקודשת:
פשיטא לא צריכא דאע"ג דנקט דמי בעיסקא:
Can you spot the difference? It is quite subtle. It is a difference in the piska, the citation from the Mishna. In our gemara, there are two separate citations from the Mishna, where תנא לא נתכונה אלא לראות משלו goes on the first citation, and פשיטא לא צריכא דאע"ג דנקט דמי בעיסקא goes on the second. In contrast, in Rif, all the words of the citation are present, but they are present in a single, lengthy, citation.

Mai Beinayhu? Perhaps nothing. But perhaps something. Specifically, what is the peshita going on?

In our gemara, the peshitta is going on the statement of the Mishna that if he shows her money on a table, she is not betrothed. This is certainly not something obvious to me, given only the preceding words in the Mishna. Indeed, only once we understand the justification given in the brayta. Also, it is slightly awkward in our gemara how the brayta goes on ע"מ שאראך מאתים זוז וכו, which is the positive rather than negative case in the Mishna. But at any rate, in the tzricha, the idea is that in whatever {expansive} case the money is on the table, she is not betrothed.

In the Rif, the peshitta seems to be going on the brayta, which is giving the reason for the law in the Mishna. And once you see the two sides of the case in the Mishna, the brayta's elaboration indeed seems somewhat obvious. If so, the point is that the brayta, rather than the Mishna, is telling us that she expects the money to be his, and here, it is not his, even though he has the money to make more money with.

Which is correct? I don't know. I prefer the second. But on the other hand, earlier in the gemara on the daf, a different diyuk is made from the Mishna, in the same form of first asking peshitta.

It is also important to point out that these piskas are not Talmudic, or even savoraic. They are Geonic at the earliest. Originally, Mishna and gemara were separate. And the Geonim added these short quotations to show what part of the Mishna the gemara was going on. This might be a girsological difference which arose from mistaken copying, but perhaps reflects an actual machlokes in how to understand the gemara.

Monday, November 17, 2008

Daf Yomi Kiddushin 31a/32a: Dama ben Netina as Rabbi Eliezer's Paradigm For Kibbud Av VaEm

Sometimes, with all the intricate discussions of various Amoraim in the gemara, it is difficult to see the forest for the trees. This, I think, is the case here, where a discussion of Rabbi Eliezer's position on Kibbud Av VaEm spans from Kiddushin 31a to 32a, with a large gap in between. But something jumped out at me when I learned it in the Rif.
{Kiddushin 31a}

אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל שאלו את רבי אליעזר עד היכן כבוד אב ואם
אמר להם צאו וראו מה עשה עובד כוכבים אחד לאביו באשקלון ודמא בן נתינה שמו
פעם אחת בקשו ממנו אבנים לאפוד בששים רבוא שכר
ורב כהנא מתני בשמונים רבוא שכר
והיה המפתח תחת מראשותיו של אביו ולא צערו לשנה נתן לו המקום שכרו נולדה לו פרה אדומה בעדרו נכנסו חכמי ישראל אצלו אמר להם יודע אני בכם שאם אני מבקש מכם כל ממון שבעולם הרי אתם נותנין לי אלא איני מבקש מכם אלא אותו ממון שהפסדתי בשביל אבא
א"ר חנינא ומה מי שאינו מצווה ועושה כך מצווה ועושה על אחת כמה וכמה
כי אתא רב דימי אמר פעם אחת היה לבוש סריקון של זהב ויושב בין גדולי רומי ובאת אמו וקרעה ממנו וטפחה לו על ראשו וירקה בפניו ולא הכלימה:

Rav Yehuda cited Shmuel: They asked Rabbi Eliezer: To what extent honoring father and mother? He said to them: Go and see what a certain idolater does for his father in Ashkelon, and Dama ben Netina is his name. One time, they requested from him stones {gems} for the Ephod for an amount of 600,000 in payment -- and Rav Kahana taught it as 800,000 in payment -- and the key was under the head of {sleeping} his father, and he did not vex him {to get the key}. The {next} year, the Omnipresent give him his wages. There was born to him a red heifer {parah aduma} in his herd. The sages of Israel came to him. He said to them: I know about you that if I request from you all the money in the world, you would give it to me, but I will only request from you that money that I lost because of father.
Rabbi Chanina said: And if one who is not commanded and does this so, then one who is commended and performs it, even more so {will he be rewarded}.
When Rav Dimi came {from Eretz Yisrael}, he said: One time he was wearing a silken garment woven with gold, and was sitting among the nobles of Rome, and his mother came and tore it from him, hit him on the head, and spat before him, and he did not embarrass her.

{Kiddushin 32a}
ועוד שאלו את רבי אליעזר עד היכן כבוד אב ואם
אמר להם כדי שיטול ארנקי שלו ויטילנו לים בפניו ואין מכלימו:
And they further asked of Rabbi Eliezer: To what extent is honoring father and mother? He said to them: Such that he {=one of them} takes his wallet and throws it into the sea before him, and he does not embarrass him.

{Kiddushin 31b}
רבי טרפון הוה ליה אימא סבתא דכל אימת דבעיא מסקא לפוריא גחין וסלקא עליה אתא וקא משתבח בי מדרשא אמרו לו עדיין לא הגעת לחצי כבוד כלום זרקה ארנקי שלך לים בפניך ולא הכלימתה:
Rabbi Tarfon had an elderly mother, that whenever she wished to leave the bed, he would bend down and she would come down upon him. She came and praised him in the study hall. They said to him: You have still not reached half of 'honor.' Did she throw your wallet into the sea and you did not embarrass her?
In the first instance, as to the extent of the honor one must accord one's father (and mother), Rabbi Eliezer cited the case of Dama ben Netina. Therefore, I think it fairly straightforward that when Rav Dimi cites another story of Dama ben Netina conducting himself towards his mother, that too forms a partial basis for Rabbi Eliezer's second statement. After all, she damaged an expensive gold and silk garment he was wearing, and his response was ולא הכלימה. And this then becomes Rabbi Eliezer's statement, as well as the standard for judging Rabbi Tarfon's conduct.

Daf Yomi Kiddushin 32b: Fear vs. See

A quick idea.
Kiddushin 32b:

יכול יעצים עיניו ממנו כדי שלא יראהו תלמוד לומר תקום ויראת דבר המסור ללב נאמר בו ויראת
Perhaps he may shut his eyes from him so that he does not see him {and thus does not need to rise up}? Therefore it informs us takum - veyareita {stand up... and you shall fear}. Something which is given over to the heart is stated about it veyareita.
Forgetting about the whole derasha about דבר המסור ללב. Rather, just as immediately above they used the juxtaposition of תקום והדרת, here it is using the juxtaposition of תקום ויראת. And it does not mean yirah, fear, but rather is an instruction to see. Thus, כדי שלא יראהו is ruled out.
A quick idea --

Daf Yomi Kiddushin 31a: Walking Four Cubits BeKomah Zekufah, and With Uncovered Head, pt i

Recently, in Daf Yomi, we encountered an interesting gemara. To cite my translation of the Rif, who cites the gemara lehalacha:
{Kiddushin 31a}
אמר ר' יהושע בן לוי אסור לאדם שיהלך ארבע אמות בקומה זקופה
שנאמר מלא כל הארץ כבודו
Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: It is forbidden for a person two walk 4 cubits while standing erect, for it is stated {Yeshayahu 6:3}:
ג וְקָרָא זֶה אֶל-זֶה וְאָמַר, קָדוֹשׁ קָדוֹשׁ קָדוֹשׁ ה צְבָאוֹת; מְלֹא כָל-הָאָרֶץ, כְּבוֹדוֹ. 3 And one called unto another, and said: Holy, holy, holy, is the LORD of hosts; the whole earth is full of His glory.

רב הונא בריה דרב יהושע לא מסגי ארבע אמות בגלוי הראש
אמר שכינה למעלה מראשי
Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua did not walk four cubits with head uncovered. He said "the Divine Presence is over my head."
The Rif cites it lehalacha, as does Rosh. Indeed, this makes it into Shulchan Aruch. This all makes me somewhat ... unsatisfied.

I have my issues with even the first statement, by Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi. Specifically,
1) elsewhere Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi sometimes makes homiletic comments. For example, a recent one from masechet Kiddushin:
Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: Whoever teaches his son Torah, it is as if he received it from Mount Sinai.
And he then cites a prooftext, from Devarim.

2) The prooftext in this case is from sefer Yeshaya, or Nach. We don't derive Biblical law from Nach, in general. Perhaps this is as a gillui milta bealma, about the nature of the manifestation of the Divine Presence? Or perhaps we should cast this as a rabbinic enactment he made, such that it is derabbanan, upon recognizing this fact about reality, proven from this citation from a sefer in Nach. I would much more lean toward it being mussar, showing how one should recognize the Ominpresent aspect of the Divine Presence, such that one should not walk bekomah zekufah. And as such, I would treat it as a type of middat chassidut, rather than binding law, despite the rather strong use of the word assur.

On the other hand, we see elsewhere Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi derive halacha from Nach, such as rules for cohabitation based on a pasuk in sefer Iyyov. And he does say assur. So perhaps this is of kind.

3) The content of the statement strikes me as more along the lines of mussar, as it channels ideas of humility and recognition of the Divine Presence.

So I have my bone to pick with this first statement, from Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi. But the second statement, about Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua strikes me as even more clearly an example of middat chassidut. Namely,

1) Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua is a 5th generation Babylonian Amora. At least Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi is a fairly early Amora, such that he could be stating a quasi- (or entirely) Tannaitic halacha which others then followed. But here, it seems like this requirement, if it is such, only surfaced fairly late, a student of Rava and contemporary of Rav Pappa. Certainly we find such late halachot, but this was not stated by him, but practiced by him. The implication is that earlier generations did not practice this, but that it was something which was his innovation, and for the reason he gave.

2) Indeed, even within his own generation, all it says is that he did it, not that others in his generation were so makpid.

3) And the juxtaposition with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi's statement leads to the distinct impression that this is a fulfilling of the ethos of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi's statement. So if Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi was stating law rather than middat chassidut, others would have kept it by following Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi's instruction. It seems that, perhaps as a middat chassidut (or an extension of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi's middat chassidut), Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua extended it to a further recognition of Hashem's all extending Presence.

4) There are, of course, other sources about head-covering for men which might (and indeed do seem to) cast a different light to it. For example, Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak also seemed to have a head-covering, for similar reason. And earlier references as well. He might have been applying this existing practice to the extent he applied it, based on this idea that Hashem being everywhere.

But working just based on this gemara (and perhaps working with these other sources as well), I would certainly walk away with this impression that it is a middat Chassidut.

As such, I would consider the latter requirement to be one purely of middat chassidut, and if so, would be careful in any halachic work to label it as such.

Even as a middat chassidut, one need not adopt every middat chassidut that someone, even someone respected, innovates, to be a frum, God-fearing individual. Other Amoraim, it would seem, were frum, yet did not adopt his innovation.

Of course, in practice, I always wear a kippah wherever I go. Of course, I never learned this sugya in great detail before now, such that I did not know the nature of the obligation. But even now, I would feel and act the same, for reasons historical and sociological, which determined the role of the yarmulka in present-day Orthodox Judaism. And because of binding minhag, and because it is nice to do middat chassidut, for the reasons given as the motivation. And because this is what I have done and feel comfortable with.

As mentioned, Rif and Rosh both record the gemara, with no further comment. The implication is that a halachically practicing Jew should keep this practice, whatever its nature.

As we explore some of the later sources, we will see that they vary in their treatment of it, and to whether it is a halachic requirement or a middat chassidut.

Rambam also lists this in his halachic code, but in such a way that it seems a middat chassidut. He writes (Hilchot Deot, perek 5):
י [ו] צְנִיעוּת גְּדוֹלָה נוֹהֲגִים תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים בְּעַצְמָן: לֹא יִתְבַּזּוּ, וְלֹא יְגַלּוּ רֹאשָׁן וְלֹא גּוּפָן.
This indeed seems to be a middat chassidut, a tzniut gedolah. And a bit later,
יד [ח] לֹא יְהַלַּךְ תַּלְמִיד חֲכָמִים בְּקוֹמָה זְקוּפָה וְגָרוֹן נָטוּי, כְּעִנְיַן שֶׁנֶּאֱמָר "וַתֵּלַכְנָה נְטוּיוֹת גָּרוֹן, וּמְשַׂקְּרוֹת עֵינָיִם
As we will see in a bit, Kol Bo cites Rambam as this being a middat chassidut, and it indeed seems borne out in Rambam's own words. (Though a talmid chacham perhaps, just based on this, is being strongly encouraged, perhaps required, to keep this middat chassidut.)

Let us continue with Tur, son of the Rosh. He writes in Tur, Orach Chaim, siman 3, what is pictured to the right. He cites both Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi's statement, and the practice of Rav Huna brei deRav Yehoshua, lehalacha. He omits the 4 cubits in Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi's statement, but I am not certain that this omission was intentional. Or perhaps not even unintentional. We will see in a moment that Beis Yosef cites the gemara with identical language, and so it is quite possible that they simply had a different girsa. But then, Rosh, his father, does have 4 cubits in that statement.

Beis Yosef is pretty straightforward about endorsing this. He writes (same page) the text to the right. In both the case of walking entirely erect and walking bareheaded, he simply notes the relevant gemara, which is the first perek of Kiddushin.

And then in Shulchan Aruch (right), he repeats this, without elaboration as to its nature.

Rama in this siman in Shulchan Aruch does not contradict this (see above). On the other hand, he notes that it is a more complicated picture, in his Darkei Moshe on the Tur. He writes what is pictured to the right. Click on the image to see it larger. The text is so small, you really have to do this here. He writes:
* בטור, ויכסה ראשו – וכתב הכלבו בשם הר"מ, דאינו אסור לילך תחת אוויר השמים בגילוי ראש; כי מה שאמר: רב הונא כו' – זה היה מידת חסידות. והרי"ף כתב שאסור לילך בגילוי ראש לב"ה. ובפסקי מהרא"י סימן ר"ג כתב: על מה ששאלתם, שהשלטונים גזרו על היהודים המחוייבים שבועה להישבע בגילוי ראש, לא מצאנו בזו איסור בהדיא.
אמנם בבית יוסף לקמן סימן ח' משמע דאסור לילך תחת אוויר השמים בגילוי ראש. אך פשט דברי רבינו הטור שם משמע כדברי הר"מ, כמו שאכתוב לקמן. וכן משמע לקמן סימן צ"א דשרי בלא זמן תפילה.
* כתב באור זרוע: איתא במדרש פרשת מצורע בסופו. "'בעצלתיים ימך המקרה': על ידי שאדם מתעצל לכסות ראשו כראוי, 'ימך המקרה', הרי הוא נעשה דומי". פירוש, נזיקין.
Rama cites the Kolbo, citing the Rambam in turn, that it is a middat chassidut. The Rif writes that it is forbidden to go with bare head to the synagogue. In Piskei Maharai he writes a kulah in a case where the rulers ruled on the Jews to swear with bare heads, that we find no explicit issur in this. But Beis Yosef in Siman 8 writes that it is forbidden to go under the air of the sky with uncovered head. But the pshat in Tur there implies like the words of Rambam, as he will write there. And so too later in siman 01, that it is permitted not during the time of prayer. He finally cites the Or Zarua who cites a midrash, about damage coming because of uncovered head. So it is strange that he does not clarify in Shulchan Aruch as well the parameters of this. Perhaps since it is a middat chassidut, he is willing to leave well enough alone.

Bli neder, perhaps a follow-up on those two simanim, in a different post.

Bach has an extensive writeup (right, but you must click on it), in which he discusses the language of Tur, whether he considers each to be a din or a middat chassidut, and whether there is a difference in middat chassidut or stringency regarding 4 cubits or less than 4 cubits, and in the house vs. outside, in each case. I am not so convinced by his conclusions about the nature of the middat chassidut, but read it all inside.

Perisha (right) notes that head-covering for men is a middat chassidut, that it is dispute between Beis Yosef and Rama, and Rama says what he says in siman 91.

Three final sources. There are many more that I am not citing, such that this is not comprehensive. First, Be'er Heitiv, which gives some perspective of how some understand what is the middat chassidut, though I do not necessarily agree.




The next is the Likutei Megadim, who brings down other interesting Tannaitic sources. See them inside.






Finally, we have the teshuva of the Maharshal, siman 72. The question posed to him was למי שראשו כבד יש לו היתר לישב ולאכול בגלוי ראש. He writes what follows. Wow! The contents are so great, and astounding, I feel compelled to transcribe it (perhaps in translation), but will leave this for a subsequent post. For now, see the images! For example, he proves from a Midrash Rabba that it is better with uncovered head, but Hashem does not impose upon us this requirement when saying Shema. Even if he does not come to this conclusion entirely in the end, for reasons he explains.

Note: Do not pasken from blogs. This was not intended halacha lemaaseh, and it is not comprehensive. Consult your local Orthodox rabbi for any practical application.

Related: A Simple Jew happens to cite Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz on wearing a yarmulke.

























Sunday, November 16, 2008

Daf Yomi Kiddushin 29b - veLimadtem / ulmadtem -- Tifdeh / Tipadeh

I encountered the following recently in the Rif, daf 29b:
ללמדו תורה מנלן
דכתיב ולמדתם אותם את בניכם
והיכא דלא אגמריה אבוה מיחייב איהו למגמר נפשיה
דכתיב ולמדתם [ושמרתם]
ואיהי מנלן דלא מיחייבא לאגמורי
דכתיב ולמדתם ולמדתם כל שמצווה ללמוד מצווה ללמד וכל שאינו מצווה ללמוד אינו מצווה ללמד
ואיהי מנלן דלא מיפקדה
דכתיב ולמדתם ולמדתם כל שאחרים מצווין ללמדו מצווה ללמוד וכל שאין אחרים מצווים ללמדו אין מצווה ללמוד
ומנין שאין אחרים מצווין ללמדה
אמר קרא ולמדתם אותם את בניכם בניכם ולא בנותיכם:
To teach him Torah, from where for us?
For it is written {Devarim 11:19}:
יט וְלִמַּדְתֶּם אֹתָם אֶת-בְּנֵיכֶם, לְדַבֵּר בָּם, בְּשִׁבְתְּךָ בְּבֵיתֶךָ וּבְלֶכְתְּךָ בַדֶּרֶךְ, וּבְשָׁכְבְּךָ וּבְקוּמֶךָ. 19 And ye shall teach them your children, talking of them, when thou sittest in thy house, and when thou walkest by the way, and when thou liest down, and when thou risest up.
And where his father does not teach him, he is obligated to teach himself. For it is written {Devarim 5:1}:
א וַיִּקְרָא מֹשֶׁה, אֶל-כָּל-יִשְׂרָאֵל, וַיֹּאמֶר אֲלֵהֶם שְׁמַע יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶת-הַחֻקִּים וְאֶת-הַמִּשְׁפָּטִים, אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי דֹּבֵר בְּאָזְנֵיכֶם הַיּוֹם; וּלְמַדְתֶּם אֹתָם, וּשְׁמַרְתֶּם לַעֲשֹׂתָם. 1 And Moses called unto all Israel, and said unto them: Hear, O Israel, the statutes and the ordinances which I speak in your ears this day, that ye may learn them, and observe to do them.
And she, from where do we know that she is not required to teach? For it is written velimadtem {Devarim 11} ulmadtem. Anyone who is commanded to learn is commanded to teach, and anyone who is not commanded to learn is not commanded to teach.
And she, from where do we know that she is not so commanded? For it is written velimadtem ulmadtem. Anyone whom others are commanded to teach is commanded to learn, and anyone whom others are not commanded to teach is not commanded to learn.
And how do we know that others are not required to teach her?
Scriptures states:
יט וְלִמַּדְתֶּם אֹתָם אֶת-בְּנֵיכֶם, לְדַבֵּר בָּם, בְּשִׁבְתְּךָ בְּבֵיתֶךָ וּבְלֶכְתְּךָ בַדֶּרֶךְ, וּבְשָׁכְבְּךָ וּבְקוּמֶךָ. 19 And ye shall teach them your children, talking of them, when thou sittest in thy house, and when thou walkest by the way, and when thou liest down, and when thou risest up.
{most literally, sons}
Your sons and not your daughters.
The girsa in the Rif is slightly more explicit than the girsa in our gemaras. Specifically, when deducing the obligation for an individual to teach himself Torah if his father does not, Rif cites the pasuk as ולמדתם ושמרתם, while we lack the word ושמרתם. This is an important difference. We might have thought that the pasuk being cited was just ולמדתם, which would be the pasuk instructing to teach, in Devarim 11. And we would arrive at the obligation to learn via revocalization. Just as by pidyon, we had תפדה קרי ביה תיפדה. By adding ושמרתם, we know that the pasuk being cited is from Devarim 5.

Of course, working with our girsa of the gemara, it remains ambiguous. But Rashi says it is a kra achrina and points us to Devarim 5, and Artscroll follows his lead. It makes sense to say this, for two reasons: First off, it does not say קרי ביה, and secondly, why derive something from an al tikra when you have an explicit pasuk.

But then, when continuing, with דכתיב ולמדתם ולמדתם and so on, are we revocalizing, or are we channeling both Devarim 11 and Devarim 5. Artscroll goes with the revocalization theory. And like this, it matches nicely with what is done with תפדה. But again, why go this way, when in fact we have a pasuk which says this revocalization?

There is a systematic derivation of this, and pidyon, in Aramaic, using dichtiv rather than sheneemar, such that the style makes me think it is stammaitic. If so, I would venture that limmud Torah was first, since we have these psukim, and it works out nicely, while pidyon is patterned in similar way, making use of an al tikra to make them align nicely in this way.

But I can see questions. Why the need for an explicit pasuk, when we can learn from an al tikra, and so on.

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