Wednesday, June 22, 2005

Behaalotcha #3: אין נא אלא לשון בקשה -Na` Only Connotes "Please"

A phrase used in the Sifrei on Bemidbar, on parshat Behaalotecha, is אין נא אלא לשון בקשה. This phrase is generally taken to mean that the word נא always means "please" in Tanach, and this on a pshat level.

I would question that interpretation. Firstly, one would never find the statement אין דבר אלא לשון אמירה - Dabeir only connotes talking. Why not? Because it is obvious that דבר refers to talking, for this is the simple translation of dabeir, so there would be no use in such a statement. The fact that the statement exists suggests that there is an alternative that we would think נא means.

Now let us consider parallels. We have אין ביעור חמץ אלא שריפה, an opinion that the only acceptable mode of destroying Chametz for Pesach is via burning it, as opposed to, say, scattering it. This admits that one might have thought other modes of destruction would have been sufficient, but selects only one as legitimate.

A better parallel, though, can be found in Midrash Rabba on parshat Naso. There, in a discussion about Shimshon and his captivity at the hands of the Philistines as the end of his life, the midrash notes the word טוחן. Shoftim 16:21:

כא וַיֹּאחֲזוּהוּ פְלִשְׁתִּים, וַיְנַקְּרוּ אֶת-עֵינָיו; וַיּוֹרִידוּ אוֹתוֹ עַזָּתָה, וַיַּאַסְרוּהוּ בַּנְחֻשְׁתַּיִם, וַיְהִי טוֹחֵן, בְּבֵית האסירים (הָאֲסוּרִים. 21 And the Philistines laid hold on him, and put out his eyes; and they brought him down to Gaza, and bound him with fetters of brass; and he did grind in the prison-house.
The Midrash states that אין טחינה אלא לשון עבירה, that טוחן only refers to sexual sin. In a middah kineged middah punishment for Delilah and others, Shimshon's punishment was that while in captivity, the Philistine men brought their wives to be impregnated by him so that they would have hardy offspring. The Midrash brings proof of this from a verse in which טוחן clearly *does* refer to that.

Saying that טוחן only refers to such a sin is clearly poetic overstatement, and means that here, it is taken out of its usual meaning and means such a sin. In general, and perhaps even here on a pshat level, it means grinding, but for the purpose of midrash, we can cite another verse and assign here a specialized meaning.

You would have to say this, for otherwise, how will you explain the word טוחן in parshat Behaalotecha in Bemidbar 11:8:

ז וְהַמָּן, כִּזְרַע-גַּד הוּא; וְעֵינוֹ, כְּעֵין הַבְּדֹלַח. 7 Now the manna was like coriander seed, and the appearance thereof as the appearance of bdellium.
ח שָׁטוּ הָעָם וְלָקְטוּ וְטָחֲנוּ בָרֵחַיִם, אוֹ דָכוּ בַּמְּדֹכָה, וּבִשְּׁלוּ בַּפָּרוּר, וְעָשׂוּ אֹתוֹ עֻגוֹת; וְהָיָה טַעְמוֹ, כְּטַעַם לְשַׁד הַשָּׁמֶן. 8 The people went about, and gathered it, and ground it in mills, or beat it in mortars, and seethed it in pots, and made cakes of it; and the taste of it was as the taste of a cake baked with oil.
Similarly, in the phrase אין נא אלא לשון בקשה, the intent is that there is a general meaning of the word נא (and that meaning is "now"), and we know as well that there is a specialized meaning of "please," and that in this particular instance, perhaps only for the purpose of midrash, we will take the meaning "please."

(Similarly, we have phrases like אין מים אלא תורה, which do not mean that the literal translation of mayim is Torah, but that they can cte a prooftext that mayim can refer to Torah, and so on occassion, on a midrashic level, we can take the word mayim to refer to Torah. This is not an exact parallel to the statement regarding na` - the example of tochen is much closer, in terms of being of the form ain X ela leshon Y - but it is similar in intent.)

This, I claim, is how the Sifrei intends it. Rashi also uses this phrase, and it is unclear how he means it. After all, he often uses na` as please, so perhaps he thinks that "please" is the general meaning of the word. However, this perhaps may attributed to the fact that Rashi as a rule uses midrashim to explain psukim (such that he is more a darshan than a pashtan), and the midrashim he cited use na` in this way. On the other hand, as was pointed out in the comments by Rabbi Nachman Levine, in Bereishit 12:11:

י וַיְהִי רָעָב, בָּאָרֶץ; וַיֵּרֶד אַבְרָם מִצְרַיְמָה לָגוּר שָׁם, כִּי-כָבֵד הָרָעָב בָּאָרֶץ. 10 And there was a famine in the land; and Abram went down into Egypt to sojourn there; for the famine was sore in the land.
יא וַיְהִי, כַּאֲשֶׁר הִקְרִיב לָבוֹא מִצְרָיְמָה; וַיֹּאמֶר, אֶל-שָׂרַי אִשְׁתּוֹ, הִנֵּה-נָא יָדַעְתִּי, כִּי אִשָּׁה יְפַת-מַרְאֶה אָתְּ. 11 And it came to pass, when he was come near to enter into Egypt, that he said unto Sarai his wife: 'Behold now, I know that thou art a fair woman to look upon.

Rashi states on this:
Behold now I know: The Midrash Aggadah (Tan. Lech Lecha 5) [states that] until now, he did not recognize her [beauty] because of the modesty of both of them, but now he recognized her [beauty] through an incident. Another explanation: It is customary that through the hardship of travel, a person becomes unattractive, but she remained with her beauty. The simple meaning of the verse is: Behold, now the time has arrived when we must be concerned about your beauty. I have known already for a long time that you are of fair appearance, but now we are coming among black and ugly people, the brothers of the Cushites, and they are not accustomed to a beautiful woman. Similar to this (below 19:2): “Behold now, my lords, please turn.” - [from Gen. Rabbah 40:4]
so Rashi can take נא to mean "now." Of course, in this he has a midrash upon which he relies.
Rashi's reference to Bereishit 19:2:

א וַיָּבֹאוּ שְׁנֵי הַמַּלְאָכִים סְדֹמָה, בָּעֶרֶב, וְלוֹט, יֹשֵׁב בְּשַׁעַר-סְדֹם; וַיַּרְא-לוֹט וַיָּקָם לִקְרָאתָם, וַיִּשְׁתַּחוּ אַפַּיִם אָרְצָה. 1 And the two angels came to Sodom at even; and Lot sat in the gate of Sodom; and Lot saw them, and rose up to meet them; and he fell down on his face to the earth;
ב וַיֹּאמֶר הִנֶּה נָּא-אֲדֹנַי, סוּרוּ נָא אֶל-בֵּית עַבְדְּכֶם וְלִינוּ וְרַחֲצוּ רַגְלֵיכֶם, וְהִשְׁכַּמְתֶּם, וַהֲלַכְתֶּם לְדַרְכְּכֶם; וַיֹּאמְרוּ לֹּא, כִּי בָרְחוֹב נָלִין. 2 and he said: 'Behold now, my lords, turn aside, I pray you, into your servant's house, and tarry all night, and wash your feet, and ye shall rise up early, and go on your way.' And they said: 'Nay; but we will abide in the broad place all night.'
upon which Rashi says:
Behold now, my lords: “ Behold you are now lords to me since you have passed beside me.” Another explanation: “Behold now you must pay heed to these wicked men, that they should not recognize you,” and this is sound advice.
which is interesting because, as in the post below on Parsing Moshe's Prayer, the word נא means two different things in the same pasuk - though there the first meant "please" and the second "now."

Let us please turn now to some of the midrashim on parshat Behaalotcha involving the word נא. Towards the very end of Behaalotecha, in Bemidbar 12:6:

ו וַיֹּאמֶר, שִׁמְעוּ-נָא דְבָרָי; אִם-יִהְיֶה, נְבִיאֲכֶם--יְהוָה בַּמַּרְאָה אֵלָיו אֶתְוַדָּע, בַּחֲלוֹם אֲדַבֶּר-בּוֹ. 6 And He said: 'Hear now My words: if there be a prophet among you, I the LORD do make Myself known unto him in a vision, I do speak with him in a dream.
The Sifrei begins by stating that אין נא אלא לשון בקשה, here, na` only means "please." And the matter is a kal vachomer. If the One Who Spoke and the world came in to being speaks with entreaties, than certainly flesh and blood {=man. Thus, it is teaching derech eretz, proper conduct. Here, Hashem is entreating them to listen to His words.}

That was the Tanna Kamma. But Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai offers another explanation. He says that they wished to interrupt Hashem, to insert their words in the middle of the words of the Omnipresent. The Omnipresent said to them: Wait for me until I finish. And this is a kal vachomer than a man should not interrupt the words of his fellow.

{The idea that the latter should be a kal vachomer seems strange to me -- certainly man should not interrupt God, but how would one say that all the more so one should not interrupt his fellow? Perhaps this idea of kal vachomer was erroneously copied from the Tanna Kamma's statement?}

I would point out that Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai is not merely saying that Hashem has to ask them to please listen to his words because they wish to also speak. The one thing about midrash is that there is almost always something in the text upon which to hang your hat, and if na` means "please," is is hard to see how exactly Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai deduced that they wanted to interrupt and Hashem wanted them to wait until He finished speaking.

The answer is that Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai is actually arguing with the Tanna Kamma, and saying that na` means "now." Thus, Hashem says to them: Now, you listen to me. I will hear what you want to say later.

Moving on, the Sifrei discusses another na` a bit later on. Moshe prays to Hashem, in Bemidbar 12:13:
יג וַיִּצְעַק מֹשֶׁה, אֶל-ה לֵאמֹר: אֵל, נָא רְפָא נָא לָהּ 13 And Moses cried unto the LORD, saying: 'Heal her now, O God, I beseech Thee.'
The Sifrei first addresses וַיִּצְעַק מֹשֶׁה אֶל-ה and explains it as referring to the matter of אֵל, נָא רְפָא נָא לָהּ. That is, אֵל, נָא רְפָא נָא לָהּ is the content of Moshe's cry. The Sifrei continues, and states that the Scripture is coming to teach derech eretz, proper conduct, that any time that a man wishes to make seek out his requests, he needs to say two, three speeches of entreaties, and afterwards seek out his requests, as it is written אֵל נָא רְפָא נָא לָהּ.

Now, I do not agree with Rabbi Levine that the אֵל is one of the words of entreaty mentioned by the midrash. Rather, this is the same anonymous voice of the midrash, the Tanna Kamma, that earlier argued with Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai. We know he holds that נא should be interpreted as an entreaty. And we recognize the style of learning proper conduct, derech eretz, from this incident. And we know that the midrash picks up on irregularities as the hat upon which to hang, and without it the midrash will not simply make up details.

It is clear to me that אֵל as an entreaty and the first נָא as an entreaty are not sufficiently off-kilter to inspire a midrash. Why take אֵל as an entreaty? Sure, one could take it as an entreaty, but this would be a (somewhat forced) way of explaining the words of the midrash, as opposed to showing what inspired it.

The strange detail is clearly the repetition of נא. It is this that sparks a midrashic interpretation, and it is this irregularity that makes the author of the midrash state that the pasuk is coming to teach us something special. Further, the repetition of נא creates the detail that one should venture forth two or three speeches of entreaty and then ask his request. The fact that the second נא comes after the verb רפא is awkward but immaterial - the main point is that the word נא, the classic word of entreaty, is repeated, and the midrash talks about repetition of entreaty, and so both נא's are surely being taken by the midrash to mean please. And the midrash surely does not take it to mean now.

The midrash mentions two or three entreaties. What is the third? One could dismiss the language of the midrash as imprecise. That is, the midrash is saying one should repeatedly introduce a request with entreaties.

Alternative, we have to identify a third entreaty in the verse. One could take אֵל, the call out to God, as an entreaty, as Rabbi Levine did, but it seems forced to me. No. That does not strike me as the approach the midrash would take.

Rather, consider what the midrash was just discussing. It had said that וַיִּצְעַק מֹשֶׁה אֶל-ה should be defined by the following content: אֵל, נָא רְפָא נָא לָהּ.

I would posit that the midrash now takes a different tack and claims that וַיִּצְעַק is its own entreaty, and so that is the first entreaty, and the two נא's are the second and third entreaties. All this is provisional - if we need to identify a third entreaty. However, I do not believe we need to do this.

The Sifrei continues, and states that the word לֵאמֹר is unnecessary - it could have stated: he cried out to Hashem "LORD, please, heal please, her." Since לֵאמֹר is unnecessary, it is coming to teach us something. And so, וַיִּצְעַק מֹשֶׁה אֶל-ה takes on a new meaning.

It is no longer: And Moshe cried out to Hashem, saying...
But rather: And Moshe cried to to Hashem to say.

This is actually a more literal rendition of the infinitive לֵאמֹר. And it is no longer Moshe who is to do the speaking, but Hashem. Moshe cried out to Hashem that Hashem should speak. And so, this first part of the verse is divorced from, and refers to an entirely different entreaty, that the second part of the verse - אֵל, נָא רְפָא נָא לָהּ.

Since Moshe is asking for a response, he is asking for an immediate response. Why does he need this? Perhaps because if Hashem heals her immediately, there is no need to go through the process of metzorah (shutting in, etc.) but otherwise, they would need to start the process on that day.

Hashem gives a response that she will be healed in seven days.

Now, we see that the immediacy of response is based on the word לֵאמֹר, and not on the word נא. And nowhere in the midrash does it mention a demand for immediate healing - just immediate knowledge if she is to be healed. Rashi is just citing Sifrei, so I would not attribute to him any extra interpretations into the word נא that what we find is driving the Sifrei.

One might say that Rashi, by citing the Sifrei, is casting Hashem's statement as a response to Moshe's prayer, and thus, not NOW, but in SEVEN DAYS. Which would then make נא mean "now," even according to Sifrei/Rashi. I would object to this categorization because nowhere does the midrash refer to נא as "now," and in fact we see it seems to take both נא as "please." The immediateness is only in terms of Hashem's response, to know what will be.

One could still read Hashem's response as "NOT NOW, but LATER" into the psukim, and perhaps one should, but I do not think that the Sifrei or Rashi do this.

Some More Information On 'The Land of Cabul'

Over at Hirhurim, R' Gil has aninteresting response (detailing how the commentators understand the verses) to Dr. Mordechai Cogan's citation of King Shlomo's gift to Chiram as a precedent and halachic justification for disengagement.

The relevant psukim, in Melachim Aleph 9:10:


י וַיְהִי, מִקְצֵה עֶשְׂרִים שָׁנָה, אֲשֶׁר-בָּנָה שְׁלֹמֹה, אֶת-שְׁנֵי הַבָּתִּים--אֶת-בֵּית יְהוָה, וְאֶת-בֵּית הַמֶּלֶךְ. 10 And it came to pass at the end of twenty years, wherein Solomon had built the two houses, the house of the LORD and the king's house--
יא חִירָם מֶלֶךְ-צֹר נִשָּׂא אֶת-שְׁלֹמֹה בַּעֲצֵי אֲרָזִים וּבַעֲצֵי בְרוֹשִׁים, וּבַזָּהָב--לְכָל-חֶפְצוֹ; אָז יִתֵּן הַמֶּלֶךְ שְׁלֹמֹה לְחִירָם, עֶשְׂרִים עִיר, בְּאֶרֶץ, הַגָּלִיל. 11 now Hiram the king of Tyre had furnished Solomon with cedar-trees and cypress-trees, and with gold, according to all his desire--that then king Solomon gave Hiram twenty cities in the land of Galilee.
יב וַיֵּצֵא חִירָם, מִצֹּר, לִרְאוֹת אֶת-הֶעָרִים, אֲשֶׁר נָתַן-לוֹ שְׁלֹמֹה; וְלֹא יָשְׁרוּ, בְּעֵינָיו. 12 And Hiram came out from Tyre to see the cities which Solomon had given him: and they pleased him not.
יג וַיֹּאמֶר--מָה הֶעָרִים הָאֵלֶּה, אֲשֶׁר-נָתַתָּה לִּי אָחִי; וַיִּקְרָא לָהֶם אֶרֶץ כָּבוּל, עַד הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה.
13 And he said: 'What cities are these which thou hast given me, my brother?' And they were called the land of Cabul, unto this day. {P}

I would just add to this they gemara's discussion of these psukim, which we will encounter very soon in daf yomi. From Shabbat 54a:

EWES MAY GO OUT TIED [KEBULOTH].
What is KEBULOTH?
With their tails tied downwards, to restrain the males from copulating with them. How is it implied that kabul denotes non-productively?
Because it is written (Melachim Aleph 9:13)

יג וַיֹּאמֶר--מָה הֶעָרִים הָאֵלֶּה, אֲשֶׁר-נָתַתָּה לִּי אָחִי; וַיִּקְרָא לָהֶם אֶרֶץ כָּבוּל, עַד הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה. 13 And he said: 'What cities are these which thou hast given me, my brother?' And they were called the land of Cabul, unto this day.

What is 'the land of Cabul'?

Said Rav Huna: It contained inhabitants who were smothered [mekubbolin] with silver and gold.
Said Rava to him, If so, is that why it is written {in the previous verse}, 'and they pleased him not?'
Because they were smothered with silver and gold they pleased him not?!
Even so, he replied; being wealthy and soft-living, they would do no work.
Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said, It was a sandy region.
{Jastrow: the land of Humton, a district of northern Palestine}
And why was it called Cabul?
Because the leg sinks into it up to the ankle, and people designate it an ankle-bound land which produces no fruit.
All of this fits in nicely, I think, with Abarbenel's understanding (mentioned by Gil) that it is the annual bounty of these cities, as opposed to sovereignty, that Shlomo gave Chiram.

Monday, June 20, 2005

Posts so far for parshat Shlach

Year 1:
Year 2:
to be continued...

Loving Your Neighbor As Yourself

In Yerushalmi Nedarim 9:4, we have a beautiful discussion. At issue is when a person takes a vow (neder) not to give any benefit to a certain other person, and now goes to a chacham to find an opening to his vow - a consideration or eventuality he did not have in mind when he made the vow, and if he had thought of this, he would not have vowed. The Mishna:

דף ל, א פרק ט הלכה ד משנה
ועוד אמר ר"מ
פותחין לו מן הכתוב שבתורה ואומר לו
אילו היית יודע שאתה עובר על
(ויקרא יט) לא תקום ועל לא תטור
ועל לא תשנא את אחיך בלבבך
ואהבת לרעך כמוך
וחי אחיך עמך
שמא יעני ואין את יכול לפרנסו
ואמר אילו הייתי יודע שהוא כן לא הייתי נודר
הרי זה מותר
Rabbi Meir further said:
We may open for him {his vow} from that which is written in the Torah, and say to him:
If you had known that by doing so you thus violate
(Vayikra 19:18)

יח לֹא-תִקֹּם וְלֹא-תִטֹּר אֶת-בְּנֵי עַמֶּךָ, וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ: אֲנִי, ה. 18 Thou shalt not take vengeance, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself: I am the LORD.
and {violate the previous pasuk}:
יז לֹא-תִשְׂנָא אֶת-אָחִיךָ, בִּלְבָבֶךָ; הוֹכֵחַ תּוֹכִיחַ אֶת-עֲמִיתֶךָ, וְלֹא-תִשָּׂא עָלָיו חֵטְא. 17 Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart; thou shalt surely rebuke thy neighbour, and not bear sin because of him.
and {violate}

יח לֹא-תִקֹּם וְלֹא-תִטֹּר אֶת-בְּנֵי עַמֶּךָ, וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ: אֲנִי, ה. 18 Thou shalt not take vengeance, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself: I am the LORD.
לה וְכִי-יָמוּךְ אָחִיךָ, וּמָטָה יָדוֹ עִמָּךְ--וְהֶחֱזַקְתָּ בּוֹ, גֵּר וְתוֹשָׁב וָחַי עִמָּךְ. 35 And if thy brother be waxen poor, and his means fail with thee; then thou shalt uphold him: as a stranger and a settler shall he live with thee.
לו אַל-תִּקַּח מֵאִתּוֹ נֶשֶׁךְ וְתַרְבִּית, וְיָרֵאתָ מֵאֱלֹהֶיךָ; וְחֵי אָחִיךָ, עִמָּךְ. 36 Take thou no interest of him or increase; but fear thy God; that thy brother may live with thee.

for perhaps he will become poor and you will be unable to support him {because of your vow}.
And if he says: Had I known that it were so I would not have vowed,
He is then permitted.
Thus, ideals like veahava lera'acha komocha, "love your neighbor as yourself" are not just nice platitudes, but have force to the extent that one can violate them, and halachic force to the extent of being a consideration which is able to cancel someone's vow.

The gemara in the Yerushalmi, upon this Mishna:

כתיב לא תקום ולא תטור את בני עמך
היך עבידא?
הוה מקטע קופד ומחת סכינא לידוי
תחזור ותמחי לידיה?
(ויקרא יט) ואהבת לרעך כמוך.
רבי עקיבה אומר זהו כלל גדול בתורה.
בן עזאי אומר (בראשית ה) זה ספר תולדות אדם
זה כלל גדול מזה
It is written
(Vayikra 19:18):
יח לֹא-תִקֹּם וְלֹא-תִטֹּר אֶת-בְּנֵי עַמֶּךָ, וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ: אֲנִי, ה. 18 Thou shalt not take vengeance, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself: I am the LORD.
How so?
If he was cutting a kupad and {accidentally} stabbed his hand
Would he turn and stab the hand {that did the stabbing}?!?

{Similarly, if he loves his neighbor as himself, it makes no sense to take vengeange upon his fellow, just as he would not take revenge upon his own hand.}

(Vayikra 19:18):

יח לֹא-תִקֹּם וְלֹא-תִטֹּר אֶת-בְּנֵי עַמֶּךָ, וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ: אֲנִי, ה. 18 Thou shalt not take vengeance, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself: I am the LORD.
Rabbi Akiva says: This is a major principle in the Torah.
Ben Azzai says: (Bereishit 5:1)

א זֶה סֵפֶר, תּוֹלְדֹת אָדָם: בְּיוֹם, בְּרֹא אֱלֹקִים אָדָם, בִּדְמוּת אֱלֹקִים, עָשָׂה אֹתוֹ. 1 This is the book of the generations of Adam. In the day that God created man, in the likeness of God made He him;
This principle is even greater than that one
{of Rabbi Akiva. Perhaps because it emphasises the commonality of all humanity, or perhaps because it emphasizes how all of humanity was created in the "image" of God}.
Meanwhile, there is another, similar statement by Hillel. When a convert asked him to summarize the Torah and teach it to him while standing on one foot, Hillel replied (see Shabbat 31a):
דעלך סני לחברך לא תעביד - זו היא כל התורה כולה, ואידך - פירושה הוא, זיל גמור
That which you hate, do not do to your fellow - this is all of Torah. And the rest - it is explanation, go and learn it.
Which can be understood in a similar way to the statement of Rabbi Akiva/the pasuk in Vayikra. Indeed, people often understand these statements as the flip side of the other, and generally having the message of treating others as you want to be treated.

This statement of Hillel also occurs in Tobit, an apochryphal book, of Jewish origin, but not included in Tanach. In Tobit 4:15:
"Do that to no man which thou hatest: drink not wine to make thee drunken: neither let drunkenness go with thee in thy journey."
It is not immediately clear who got from whom. It depends when you date the writing of Tobit - it may precede or follow Hillel. This chapter of Tobit is in the class of wisdom literature, but such wisdom can be accumulated from the wise sayings of the time period. Further, we see that Chazal often cite psukim to get their point across - as did Rabbi Akiva and ben Azzai above. Occassionally we see them cite seforim chitzonim, literature from outside the canon, such as Ben Sirach. And so, Hillel might have taken it from there, stressing its importance as a general principle, which encompasses the basic message of the whole Torah.

This idea of "treating thy neighbor as you would like to be treated" is often taken to be a Christian concept. If fact, Jesus got this, and other similar statements, from well-known and accepted statements of the "Pharisees."

Consider Matthew
22:34-39:

22:34 But when the Pharisees had heard that he had put the Sadducees to silence, they were gathered together. 22:35 Then one of them, which was a lawyer, asked him a question, tempting him, and saying, 22:36 Master, which is the great commandment in the law? 22:37 Jesus said unto him, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. 22:38 This is the first and great commandment. 22:39 And the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. 22:40 On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets.

This is mentioned also in Mark 12, where he first says it and a "scribe" knows of this saying, and in Luke 10, in which the "lawyer" is the one who first says this, with Jesus being the one who agrees.

In the gospel of Thomas, we have the same statement as that of Hillel/Tobit: "
Do not lie; and that which you hate, do not do". And in Matthew 7:12, we see "Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets." We have here the same statement, written in the positive and the negative, with "for this is the law and the prophets" echoing the "this is is the entirety of the Torah" of Hillel or "this is a major principle of the Torah" of Rabbi Akiva.

They all come down to the basic idea of veahavta lereacha kamocha - Love Your Neighbor As Yourself - treating others with kindness and respect. One can state it in the negative, and one can state it in the positive, but it really amounts to the same message. How one then takes and applies the message, of course, is another matter.

Update: Confucius also formulated Hillel's statement in the negative:
Zigong asked: "Is there any single word that could guide one’s entire life?
The Master [Confucius] said: Should it not be reciprocity? What you do not wish for yourself, do not do to others." --- Analects XV:24
Update: Some do see a difference between the positive and negative formulation, but see Rabbi Akiva's statement as the positive formulation. For example, Chiddushei HaRim:

When a gentile, who wanted to convert, came to Hillel and presumptuously demanded, "Teach me the Torah in the time it takes to stand on one foot," Hillel answered, "What is hateful to you, do not do to another. That is the whole Torah. The rest is commentary. Now go and learn." (Talmud Shabos 31a).

The central principle of the Torah is "Love your neighbor." This is worded in positive (i.e. active) language. Why did Hillel use negative language (ie. do not do)?

Hillel saw that this person was not able to take on as heavy an obligation as to actively do good for others. It was enough to tell him not to hurt anybody. To tell him to do good or to love another unconditionally as himself would have been over this man's understanding. So all that could be asked of such a person is to not do any harm (Chidushay Harim).

Friday, June 17, 2005

Behaalotcha #2: Who Is The Naar?

When Eldad and Medad start prophesying in the camp, we find (Bemidbar 11:27):

כז וַיָּרָץ הַנַּעַר, וַיַּגֵּד לְמֹשֶׁה וַיֹּאמַר: אֶלְדָּד וּמֵידָד, מִתְנַבְּאִים בַּמַּחֲנֶה. 27 And there ran a young man, and told Moses, and said: 'Eldad and Medad are prophesying in the camp.'
כח וַיַּעַן יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בִּן-נוּן, מְשָׁרֵת מֹשֶׁה מִבְּחֻרָיו--וַיֹּאמַר: אֲדֹנִי מֹשֶׁה, כְּלָאֵם 28 And Joshua the son of Nun, the minister of Moses from his youth up, answered and said: 'My lord Moses, shut them in.'
כט וַיֹּאמֶר לוֹ מֹשֶׁה, הַמְקַנֵּא אַתָּה לִי; וּמִי יִתֵּן כָּל-עַם יְהוָה, נְבִיאִים--כִּי-יִתֵּן יְהוָה אֶת-רוּחוֹ, עֲלֵיהֶם. 29 And Moses said unto him: 'Art thou jealous for my sake? would that all the LORD'S people were prophets, that the LORD would put His spirit upon them!'
A literal translation of הַנַּעַר would be "the young man," not "a young man."

Who is this young man?

An open-canon approach allows that persons mentioned in a verse might not be mentioned elsewhere, and thus the identity of the person would only be found outside the canon of Biblical text. Adopting this approach, the young man is some young, random Israelite.

Chazal generally tend to assume a closed-canon approach - and so we would expect to be able to identify the young man with some other Biblical personality.

Add to this that the definite article, the heh hayedi'a, is used, perhaps suggesting that this is some known young man.

Rashi states that some say that this was Gershom, Moshe's firstborn. This would make sense in context - what identifiable young man would run to report to Moshe?

In the Sifri on Bemidbar, they report that some say that this was Yehoshua ben Nun, pointing out the pasuk in Shemot 33:11:

יא וְדִבֶּר יְהוָה אֶל-מֹשֶׁה פָּנִים אֶל-פָּנִים, כַּאֲשֶׁר יְדַבֵּר אִישׁ אֶל-רֵעֵהוּ; וְשָׁב, אֶל-הַמַּחֲנֶה, וּמְשָׁרְתוֹ יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בִּן-נוּן נַעַר, לֹא יָמִישׁ מִתּוֹךְ הָאֹהֶל 11 And the LORD spoke unto Moses face to face, as a man speaketh unto his friend. And he would return into the camp; but his minister Joshua, the son of Nun, a young man, departed not out of the Tent.
Thus, Yehoshua ben Nun is elsewhere identified as a naar, a young man. I would further say: He is also the known mesharet of Moshe, as we see both in this pasuk in Shemot and in one of the verses cited above in Bemidbar. We may add to this the fact that Yehoshua ben Nun is mentioned in the immediate context in Bemidbar, so if we are adopting a closed-canon approach, we do not need to look far for the young man's identity.

In the Sifri, Rabbi Shimon objects, based on the next pasuk:

כח וַיַּעַן יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בִּן-נוּן, מְשָׁרֵת מֹשֶׁה מִבְּחֻרָיו--וַיֹּאמַר: אֲדֹנִי מֹשֶׁה, כְּלָאֵם. 28 And Joshua the son of Nun, the minister of Moses from his youth up, answered and said: 'My lord Moses, shut them in.'
From the fact that Yehoshua is having this response, Rabbi Shimon says, we may deduce that the young man in the preceding verse is not Yehoshua.

I would answer to this that it is not uncommon to have a character first referred to without a name, and later refer to him by name. To throw out some examples, we have Moshe, we have Rivka, and best of all, we have Elimelech, Naami, Machlon and Kilyon.

Further, וַיַּעַן does not need to mean answer. Do a study of the root, and discover that it often means to speak up. So Yehoshua could speak up with his suggestion to Moshe of what to do, and need not be responding to the naar, who in this case would be himself.

Thursday, June 16, 2005

Behaalotcha #1: Parsing Moshe's Prayer

Moshe has an extremely short prayer in this week's parsha, yet people still often get it wrong. What is the meaning of El Na Refa Na Lah?

I would say the simplest translation and parsing that comes to mind is: "God Please, Heal Please, Her." In part I would venture this comes from the song Yedid Nefesh, as usually sung: Ana, El Na, Refa Na, La.

The pasuk, in Bemidbar 12:13:

יג וַיִּצְעַק מֹשֶׁה, אֶל-ה לֵאמֹר: אֵל, נָא רְפָא נָא לָהּ 13 And Moses cried unto the LORD, saying: 'Heal her now, O God, I beseech Thee.'
Looking at the trup (cantillation), there is an etnachta on the word לֵאמֹר, dividing the introduction in the verse from Moshe's actual speech. In the remaining half of the verse (Moshe' speech), there is a zakef katon on the word אֵל, a tevir on first נָא, a mercha and tipcha on רְפָא and נָא respectively, and the silluq (=sof pasuk) on the word לָהּ.

Based on the continuous dichotomy rules as laid out by Wickes, we first have:
אֵל נָא רְפָא נָא לָהּ

Then, we divide this in two:
אֵל || נָא רְפָא נָא לָהּ

so the word אֵל is off by itself.
(Feel free to ignore the justifications I offer in blue.)
(We know this because both the zakef katon and the tipcha are disjunctive accents which work to subdivide a clause ending in silluq, and for both to appear, the zakef katon must first subdivide - otherwise, we would have a different trup on the word אֵל, since the clause does not end anymore in a silluq.)

Of the remaining speech:
נָא רְפָא נָא לָהּ

we subdivide as follows:

נָא רְפָא נָא || לָהּ
so the word לָהּ is off by itself, and נָא רְפָא נָא is off by itself.
(We know this because the only trup present which is a disjunctive accent which subdivides a clause ending in silluq is the tipcha, which is present on the second word נָא.)

Of the remaining speech:
נָא רְפָא נָא

we subdivide as follows:

נָא || רְפָא נָא
so the first נָא is off by itself.
(We know this because the tevir is a trup which is a disjunctive which subdivides a clause ending in tipcha, and that is on the first נָא.)

Of the remaining speech:
רְפָא נָא

there is no need for further subdivision since we only need subdivide clauses of three words or more. (Indeed, the trup on the word רְפָא is a mercha, which is a mesharet, or a conjunctive accent, serving a tipcha. So no further subdivision happens.)

In summary, then, with smaller numbers representing earlier, and thus more major, dichotomies, we have:

אֵל |1| נָא |3| רְפָא נָא |2| לָהּ

Or, using colons, dashes, and commas:

אֵל: נָא, רְפָא נָא -- לָהּ

So now we know the parsing. What about the meaning?

Rashi, who always channels midrashim, generally assumes that נָא means please. Here he says that this comes to teach us proper conduct - that one who wishes something from his friend should first introduce it with one or two entreaties and only then ask for the favor. He thus takes both instances of נָא to mean please.

Modern scholars say that נָא as please is rather late, and Biblical נָא means "now." Indeed, Onkelos consistently translates נָא as כען, which means "now," only occasionally translating it as please. Here, he translates the first נָא as "please" (בבעו) and the second as "now."

Thus:
God, please heal now, her.

Note there seems to be a kerei and ketiv at play here. That is, why did Moshe choose specifically אל as the name of God?

Consider the context:

יא וַיֹּאמֶר אַהֲרֹן, אֶל-מֹשֶׁה: בִּי אֲדֹנִי--אַל-נָא תָשֵׁת עָלֵינוּ חַטָּאת, אֲשֶׁר נוֹאַלְנוּ וַאֲשֶׁר חָטָאנוּ. 11 And Aaron said unto Moses: 'Oh my lord, lay not, I pray thee, sin upon us, for that we have done foolishly, and for that we have sinned.
יב אַל-נָא תְהִי, כַּמֵּת, אֲשֶׁר בְּצֵאתוֹ מֵרֶחֶם אִמּוֹ, וַיֵּאָכֵל חֲצִי בְשָׂרוֹ. 12 Let her not, I pray, be as one dead, of whom the flesh is half consumed when he cometh out of his mother's womb.'
יג וַיִּצְעַק מֹשֶׁה, אֶל-ה לֵאמֹר: אֵל, נָא רְפָא נָא לָהּ.
13 And Moses cried unto the LORD, saying: 'Heal her now, O God, I beseech Thee.'
That is, it is poetic repetition of Aharon's אַל-נָא, even as in those cases, the two words are placed together.

Friday, June 10, 2005

Parshat Naso/Shavuot

A famous Midrash is that before Har Sinai, all the various blemishes that the Israelites had were healed. Bamidbar Rabba on this week's parsha contains this midrash (see parasha 7:1), so I will turn to look at the textual basis of the idea.

(Click on the picture to see it in full)



The midrash states (citing R Tanchuma) that
When the Israelites left Egypt, the vast majority of them had blemishes. Why? Because they worked with the clay and bricks and ascended to the top of the building, and the builder when he ascended on top of the walls, either a stone would fall and cut off his hand, or the board or the clay would enter his eyes and he would become blind, so they had blemishes.
When they came to the wilderness of Sinai, Hashem said: is this to the honor of the Torah that I should give it to a generation of people with blemishes? And if I wait until other are established {the next generation} I am delaying the giving of the Torah. He said to the angels that they should descend to the Israelites and heal them.
And know that this is so, for Rabbi Yehuda cited Rabbi Simone: How do we know that they did not have amongst them those who were lame? For it is stated (Shemot 19:17)

יז וַיּוֹצֵא מֹשֶׁה אֶת-הָעָם לִקְרַאת הָאֱלֹהִים, מִן-הַמַּחֲנֶה; וַיִּתְיַצְּבוּ, בְּתַחְתִּית הָהָ. 17 And Moses brought forth the people out of the camp to meet God; and they stood at the nether part of the mount.
and nitzav only means upon his legs.

And how do we know there was none missing an arm? For it is stated (Shemot 24:7):

ז וַיִּקַּח סֵפֶר הַבְּרִית, וַיִּקְרָא בְּאָזְנֵי הָעָם; וַיֹּאמְרוּ, כֹּל אֲשֶׁר-דִּבֶּר ה נַעֲשֶׂה וְנִשְׁמָע. 7 And he took the book of the covenant, and read in the hearing of the people; and they said: 'All that the LORD hath spoken will we do, and obey.'

{and the "we will do" part implies such ability to do}

And how do we know there were no blind people? For it is stated (Shemot 20:14):

יד וְכָל-הָעָם רֹאִים אֶת-הַקּוֹלֹת וְאֶת-הַלַּפִּידִם, וְאֵת קוֹל הַשֹּׁפָר, וְאֶת-הָהָר, עָשֵׁן; וַיַּרְא הָעָם וַיָּנֻעוּ, וַיַּעַמְדוּ מֵרָחֹק. 14 And all the people perceived the thunderings, and the lightnings, and the voice of the horn, and the mountain smoking; and when the people saw it, they trembled, and stood afar off.
{where ro`im literally means "saw"}

And how do we know that there were no mute people? For it is stated (Shemot 19:8):

ח וַיַּעֲנוּ כָל-הָעָם יַחְדָּו וַיֹּאמְרוּ, כֹּל אֲשֶׁר-דִּבֶּר ה נַעֲשֶׂה; וַיָּשֶׁב מֹשֶׁה אֶת-דִּבְרֵי הָעָם, אֶל-ה. 8 And all the people answered together, and said: 'All that the LORD hath spoken we will do.' And Moses reported the words of the people unto the LORD.
Thus we find that all were healed.

And if you do not learn from here, you can learn from another place, for it is stated (Shemot 15:26):

כו וַיֹּאמֶר אִם-שָׁמוֹעַ תִּשְׁמַע לְקוֹל יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ, וְהַיָּשָׁר בְּעֵינָיו תַּעֲשֶׂה, וְהַאֲזַנְתָּ לְמִצְו‍ֹתָיו, וְשָׁמַרְתָּ כָּל-חֻקָּיו-- כָּל-הַמַּחֲלָה אֲשֶׁר-שַׂמְתִּי בְמִצְרַיִם, לֹא-אָשִׂים עָלֶיךָ, כִּי אֲנִי ה, רֹפְאֶךָ.
26 and He said: 'If thou wilt diligently hearken to the voice of the LORD thy God, and wilt do that which is right in His eyes, and wilt give ear to His commandments, and keep all His statutes, I will put none of the diseases upon thee, which I have put upon the Egyptians; for I am the LORD that healeth thee.'

Thus we have that they were healed.

{and I would note that it does not say "on the Egyptians" but "in Egypt." That is, all the blemishes and diseases that I put upon you in Egypt I will no longer put on you in the future, but will remove it from you. Why? For I am the LORD that healeth thee.}
I believe there are other derivations (from Shir Hashirim) but I will not address them now, for lack of time.

Update:
To make to final derivation clearer, the midrash is comparing perfect (past tense) שַׂמְתִּי with imperfect (future tense) אָשִׂים. Just as in the future, Hashem will not place upon them, apparently in the past Hashem did. Hashem will stop this imposition of physical deformity. Thus, He is Hashem who heals them.

In terms of the genesis of this midrash, looking only at the prooftexts offered here, I believe the following order was followed:

First, the prooftext of Shemot 15:26:
כָּל-הַמַּחֲלָה אֲשֶׁר-שַׂמְתִּי בְמִצְרַיִם, לֹא-אָשִׂים עָלֶיךָ, כִּי אֲנִי ה, רֹפְאֶךָ
"...I will put none of the diseases upon thee, which I have put upon the Egyptians [lit. in Egypt]; for I am the LORD that healeth thee"

was the first basis of the Midrash. What is the idea of Hashem being a healer, if He is saying that he will not place the maladies upon them in the first place?
Further, why specify "in Egypt" rather than "on the Egyptians." (Recall, this is a hyper-literal reading of the verse.)
It must be that in the past, Hashem did impose certain maladies on them in Egypt.

Once you have this, there are two things to be filled in. (Now in general in midrash, no detail is invented without a basis and prooftext.)

The first is the specific maladies and proofs that no Israelite possessed them. That was the first part of the midrash, which showed, for example, that all the nation answered, and so all of them must have been capable of answering.

The second is an accounting for how the Israelites obtained these maladies. The words אֲשֶׁר-שַׂמְתִּי בְמִצְרַיִם implies they obtained them in Egypt, so it makes sense it was a result of the servitude. And once we know which maladies they were healed from, creation of the backstory flows naturally.
It is possible that other psukim enter into this picture, but I do not have the time to consider them.

Posts so far for parshat Naso

Year 1
Year 2
to be continued...

Absence of Evidence is not Evidence of Absence

R' Gil over at Hirhurim has a post about the number of Jews who left Egypt, and how the lack of archaeological evidence of the Israelite's presence in the wilderness, at least in those numbers, among other things, poses a serious question, and it not as easily answerable as the Frumteen's moderator presented it (that there was plently of evidence, etc.).

While Gil does say that this is the current archaeological perspective, and this can change if they discover new evidence, I feel that this point can be stressed more.

In February 2005, I linked to a Jerusalem Post article, and discussed it, in this post. Basically, for years minimalists had been saying that the depiction of Biblical Edom in the days of David and Shlomo could not be right, for there was no evidence that Edom existed back then. A citation:
Jordanian dig confirms Biblical Edom
Just-published evidence from a US-directed archeological dig in Jordan further authenticates the Bible's descriptions of the existence of the ancient nation of Edom during the eras of King David and his son, King Solomon.

...

The new study, headed by archeology Prof. Thomas Levy of University of California, San Diego, contradicts much contemporary scholarship claiming – on the basis of no physical evidence – that no Edomite state existed before the 8th Century BCE. Until the new discovery, many scholars said the Bible's numerous references to ancient Israel's interactions with Edom could not be valid.

While previous investigations in Edom had been carried out in the Jordanian highland zone and put the rise of the Edomite kingdom during the 8th to 6th centuries BCE, the new archeological data from modern-day Jordan presents strong evidence for the involvement of Edom with neighboring ancient Israel as described in the Bible and indicates the existence of the biblical nation of Edom at least as early as the 10th Century BCE – when David and Solomon were alive.

The Edomite lowlands, home to a large copper ore zone, had been ignored by archeologists because of the logistical difficulties of working in the extremely dry and hot region. But with an anthropological perspective and using high precision radiocarbon dating, the team showed evidence of two major phases of copper production – during the 12th to 11th centuries BCE and the 10th to 9th centuries BCE.
That is, they had assumed that the Biblical narrative was incorrect because they did not find archaeological evidence to support it. But, it is possible to miss archaeological evidence. And if the evidence ever turns up, is overturns previous conceptions.

Another example. The word shofet occurs in Devarim, and scholars tried to say that Dvarim was composed very late, for there was no evidence of this root contemporary to the purported time of the exodus from Egypt. Then, they discovered a treasure trove - the royal archive at Mari, which contained many documents - and discovered that shft was indeed a root that was in use well previous to that. There are other examples of this.

As a result, the claim that absence of evidence is a knock-down argument against the exodus from Egypt (or at least in those numbers) as described in the Torah - is unconvincing, to me at least.

This all assumes there is evidence to be found of such numbers of people. After all, not all bones, or vessels, last. The Israelites were in the desert for 40 years. That may seem like a long period of time, but I doubt it is from the perspective of archaeology. Furthermore, they did not spend that time in one place. There were 42 encampments, corresponding to answer to Life, the Universe, and everything, enumerated in Bemidbar 33. They may well have carried many things with them, and that which they left behind could have been collected by desert scavengers. This is without resorting to claiming miracles, of which the Torah itself describes (manna, the Clouds of Glory), and which the midrash itself expands upon. For example, one opinion in a dispute recorded in the midrash claims that the Israelites were surrounded on all 6 sides by Clouds of Glory.

Update: Further, giant squid were thought to be mythological sea creatures, the creation of the minds of seafarers, until in recent times they were spotted, and in fact, washed ashore.

The "Rav Moshe" Segula

I imagine that the Rambam would be dismayed by this legend: (from the Wall Street Journal)
Maimonides, the great rabbi, philosopher and healer, died 800 years ago in Egypt, but for many of those years he kept on working. Over the centuries his presence was said to be felt in the little synagogue deep in the heart of Cairo's old Jewish Quarter where, legend had it, he taught his disciples in a basement room. For the Jews of the Levant, Maimonides the doctor was as important as Maimonides the theologian and codifier of Jewish law. So it was to his small shul, known as Rav Moshe, that Jews from across Egypt journeyed in hopes that the man who believed in both God and science could cure them.

As it happens, I once went to this Jewish Lourdes as a little girl. When I was six, there was a small sleeping area in Rav Moshe, with worn-out mattresses. Anyone who came to be healed was handed a threadbare blanket and a pillow, and perhaps some holy rubbing oil, and urged to go to sleep and wait for the Rambam, as Maimonides was called. As a child, I was terrified of the place: It was so dark and spooky. But legend had it that once you were asleep, Maimonides would visit you in a dream and heal you. I was suffering at the time from a puzzling swelling in my left leg that mystified all the specialists my parents consulted.

I have no idea if Maimonides made one of his "house calls" for me. But I do know that my symptoms abated. My crisp, rational American upbringing in the decades since hasn't entirely cured me of my faith in the unseen hand of Maimonides and his presence in the little temple in the ghetto.
The article continues.
I think that Maimonides the doctor would object as strongly as Maimonides the theologian and Maimonides the codifier of Jewish law.

Monday, June 06, 2005

Wired has an article

entitled "New Tech Protects Ancient Torahs" about two methods to create a "Safer" Torah:

First, the Universal Torah Registry:
the system works like this: A synagogue mails in a form with their contact information and the number of Torahs they want to place in the system, and the registry sends back a computer-coded template for each scroll. The 3.5- by 8-inch template resembles an IBM punch card, with eight holes arranged so their position relative to one another describes a unique identification number in a proprietary code.

A rabbi uses the template to perforate the coded pattern into the margins of the scroll with a tiny needle. To keep an enterprising thief from swapping the perforated segment with a section from another stolen scroll in some kind of twisted Torah chop shop, the registry recommends applying the code to 10 different segments of the scroll. Pollack says the code contains self-authentication features that keep a thief from invalidating it by just adding an extra hole in an arbitrary location.

Now if a crook tries to sell the Torah, the pattern can be mapped back to the ID number, which is linked to the rightful owner in a database. "It makes it harder to fence," says Pollock. "If your car has a VIN number, it's harder to sell illegally."

and an alternative system:
Machon Ot's system, the International Torah Registry, takes advantage of the handcrafted nature of the Torahs. Though the content is always the same, the position of the lettering varies from scroll to scroll, making each Torah as individual as a halachic snowflake. By measuring the distances between letters at certain standardized points, and entering them into a computer program, Machon Ot generates a 20-digit number that uniquely identifies each Torah.

Friday, June 03, 2005

Daf Yomi Shabbat 21b-22a: The Shitta of Rav About Making Use of Chanukka Lights

I addressed in a previous post the idea of the Chanukka lamps being holy and their use absolutely forbidden, and demonstrated that even according to the usual reading of the gemara this would seem not to be so. I now want to reevaluate the relevant gemaras in order to explore Rav's opinion on what one may or may not do with Chanukka lamps.

1)
We begin on Shabbat 21a-21b:

אמר רב הונא פתילות ושמנים שאמרו חכמים אין מדליקין בהן בשבת אין מדליקין בהן בחנוכה בין בשבת בין בחול
אמר רבא מאי טעמא דרב הונא קסבר כבתה זקוק לה ומותר להשתמש לאורה
ורב חסדא אמר מדליקין בהן בחול אבל לא בשבת
קסבר כבתה אין זקוק לה ומותר להשתמש לאורה
Rav Huna said: the materials for wicks and oils that the Sages said that we do not light with them for Shabbat, we do not light with them on Chanukka, neither on Shabbat nor during the week.
Rava said: what is the reason of Rav Huna?
He holds that if it is extinguished he need must deal with it {to relight it} and furthermore that it is permissible to make use of its light.
And Rav Chisda said: We may light with them {on Chanukka} during the week but not on Shabbat.
He holds that if they were extinguished he need not deal with it, and furthermore that it is permitted to make use of its light.
By way of explanation, Rava claims that Rav Huna holds that if it is extinguished he must deal with it, and thus if it goes out his initial lighting was not sufficient. Therefore, we should not light with it, neither on Shabbat nor during the week, because what if it goes out? He would have to relight, and what if he did not?

This first reason is sufficient. The bit about being able to use the light on Shabbat is irrelevant, because it may not be used even during the week, so how can Rava make this deduction? (The idea of being able to make use of the Chanukka lamp is that if he uses it with these inferior materials, he may come to tilt the lamp and violate the Shabbat.) Rishonim take this as an additional reason why these materials may not be used.

I would claim this is a back-formation of sorts. Once Rava explained Rav Chisda, who requires the fact that it is permissible to use on Shabbat, he mentioned it as well in explaining Rav Huna , who does not need it. Since there is no cause to say they disagree, we might as well have Rav Huna and Rav Chisda agreeing in this matter.

In terms of the explanation of Rav Chisda, who says that it may be used for Chanukka lamps on weekdays but not on Shabbat, someone (perhaps Rava, perhaps the stama degemara) explains that he holds that if it is extinguished, he need not relight it. Thus, on a weekday, there is nothing to be concerned with. It may not be used on Shabbat because benefit may be had from its light, and he may come to tilt the lamp.

Now, we know not who says this explanation. However, it is most likely Rava, since we see elsewhere in terms of disputes between Rav Huna and Rav Chisda that Rava steps in and an explanation of both sides is given. For example, here in Brachot 25a (link goes to the Rif Brachot 16a}, Rava explains both sides of a dispute between Rav Huna and Rav Chisda as to whther one may read the Shema when their is fecal matter on his flesh. {Alternatively we can have the explanation of Rav Chisda provided by the stama degemara as a back formation after seeing the explanation Rabbi Yirmiya gives to Rav/Rav Matna, to be discussed shortly, and it is tacked on to Rava's explanation of Rav Huna to make everything nicely parallel.}

The gemara continues:
א"ר זירא אמר רב מתנה ואמרי לה א"ר זירא אמר רב:
פתילות ושמנים שאמרו חכמים אין מדליקין בהן בשבת מדליקין בהן בחנוכה בין בחול בין בשבת
א"ר ירמיה מאי טעמא דרב?
קסבר כבתה אין זקוק לה ואסור להשתמש לאורה
אמרוה רבנן קמיה דאביי משמיה דר' ירמיה ולא קיבלה
כי אתא רבין אמרוה רבנן קמיה דאביי משמיה דר' יוחנן וקיבלה
אמר אי זכאי גמירתיה לשמעתיה מעיקרא
והא גמרה?!
נפקא מינה לגירסא דינקותא
Rabbi Zera cited Rav Matna, and some say Rabbi Zera cited Rav:
The wicks and oild that the Sages said we do not light with on Shabbat, we may light with on Chanukka {for Chanukka lamps}, whether on a weekday or on Shabbat.
Rabbi Yirmiya said: What is the reason of Rav?
He holds that if it is extinguished he need not deal with it, and furthermore it is forbidden to make use of its light.
The Rabbis said this {explanation} before Abaye in the name of Rabbi Yirmiya and he did not accept.
When Rabin came, the Rabbis said this before Abaye in the name of Rabbi Yochanan and he accepted it.
He said: If I have merited, I would have learned this report initially {from Rabbi Yirmiya}.
But he did learn it?!
There is a difference, in terms of the learning of one's youth.
Now, to explain Rav/Rav Matna's opinion, according to Rabbi Yirmiya: we need not be concerned if they become extinguished as a result of the inferior materials used, because even if it goes out, he need not deal with it, and he has already fulfilled his obligation. Further, since he may make use of the Chanukka lamp, we need not worry that he will come to tilt it.

The Rif cites this explanation of Rav lehalacha (see here). And it makes sense to do so. After all, this is a statement of Rav, and we rule like Rav in regarding issurim. Further, Abaye eventually accepts Rabbi Yirmiya and Rabbi Yochanan's explanation of this statement of Rav, so it stands to reason that we should rule like him.

There are some problem with this: later we see that Abaye states that Rabba ruled with Shmuel, and against Rav, that one may light from one lamp to another, which perhaps should be forbidden if all use of the lamp is forbidden. Further, why is Rav talking later about whether one may specifically count money opposite the lamp, and if one may light from one lamp to another, if he holds that all use is forbidden?

In fact, it may not be Rav who makes this statement. As mentioned earlier in the gemara, Rabbi Zera either cited Rav Matna or Rav. We must determine who was cited - this is a critical point.
א"ר זירא אמר רב מתנה ואמרי לה א"ר זירא אמר רב
Rabbi Zera cited Rav Matna, and some say Rabbi Zera cited Rav:
Who did Rabbi Zera cite? I would explain as follows. The sofer had two different girsaot before him. One gemara had Rabbi Zera citing Rav Matna, and another had him citing Rav. If the sofer only copied one version, he could be losing important information (who was cited) for future generations. As a result, he copied "Rabbi Zera cited Rav Matna." Then, since another girsa was before him that said "Rabbi Zera cited Rav," he wrote, "and some say" followed by the alternate girsa.

Now, in the continuation of the gemara, we see only Rav is mentioned. א"ר ירמיה מאי טעמא דרב? Rav Yirmiya said: What is the reason of Rav? Rabbi Yirmiya is not explaining the reason of Rav Matna. Thus, we might think to say that it is surely Rav who is being citing. I would argue against this. What is happening is that the sofer had two versions, and one had Rav throughout, and the other had Rav Matna throughout. The sofer saw fit to mention Rav Matna as an alternative to Rav the first time, but afterwards needs not continue to mention Rav Matna as an alternative to Rav, since it is obvious that he should be substituted throughout (here, in one other instance).

Now, we know Rav was in Eretz Yisrael at some point, so it makes sense for both Rabbi Yirmiya and Rabbi Yochanan to give an explanation. So, perhaps this is sufficient evidence that it is Rav, and not Rav Matna, who was cited. Alas, Rav Matna is often enough cited in Talmud Yerushalmi, and so he remains a valid possibility.

Textually, the version that says Rav Matna is better. When you have two variant texts A and B, a good way to decide which is original is to ask the question: How easy is it to get from A to B? And how easy is it to get from B to A?

Assume the text was originally Rav Matna. How easy is it to get from there to Rav? Fairly easy. The sofer need only accidentally omit one word, Matna, and you have Rav Zera citing Rav.

Now assume the text was originally Rav. How easy is it to get from there to Rav Matna? Not so easy. The sofer would need to copy a word ex nihilo, which does not exist in his source text.

Since it is easier to go from Rav Matna to Rav than in the opposite direction, from a purely textual perspective Rav Matna is probably the original.

From a logical perspective Rav Matna is also the better choice. After all, we would otherwise seem to have an inconsistency in the opinion of Rav, in that Rav (thoug some would say this is only Rav Assi) only seems to forbid the use of the lamp in specific cases, such as counting coins, such that Rav Yosef says that it is only because of degrading the mitzvah, so how can Rav say that in all cases its use is forbidden? This contradiction is resolved if it is not Rav who forbids in all cases, but rather Rav Matna.

{Caveat: I speak of deciding halacha here only in theory. This is all lehalacha and not limaaseh.}
In terms of deciding halacha:
Even had it been Rav who made the statement, Rav did not say explicitly that use may not be made of the Chanukka lamp, but rather others (Rabbi Yirmiya and Rabbi Yochanan) had derived it from his words. Abaye eventually agreed to the explanation, but initially rejected this explanation.

Now, we no longer have the strength of it being Rav who made the statement. It is Rav Matna. We do not say that the halacha is like Rav Matna regarding issurim. We only say that regarding Rav.

We now have a three way dispute between Rav Huna, Rav Chisda, and Rav Matna. Assuming for a moment that we reject Rav Matna, it is a dispute between Rav Huna and Rav Chisda. In such a case, we would decide like Rav Huna, because he is the teacher (see here in the Rif Shabbat 16a where the Rif decides like Rav Huna over Rav Chisda on this basis).

Why should we reject Rav Matna?
Well, we see Rav says later that is is forbidden to count money opposite the Chanukka lamp, and Shmuel says it is permitted. But both of them were only speaking about counting money, but (in the simplest reading) not every single type of use. So if both Rav and Shmuel agree, it is hard to believe that we should rule against them and hold like Rav Matna. And even if it Rav Assi and Shmuel there, the fact remains that it was a matter for discussion in that case of counting coins. I will show soon that it was Rav and not Rav Assi, but no matter. The fact that is was still be discussed, and debated by the likes of Rav Yosef, who says it is only because of disgrace of the mitzvah. This would all contradict Rav Matna, who would forbid in every case. So, we seem to have Shmuel, Rav Yosef, and Rav or Rav Assi against Rav Matna.

Further, we have Rav's dispute with Shmuel about lighting from one lamp to another, and the dispute between Rav Ada bar Ahava and a certain member of the rabbinate for the reason - is it because it takes away from the mitzvah or because it is disgraceful. Why should Rav make a separate statement about lighting from one lamp to another if all use is forbidden. He must hold some use is allowed. And within the dispute, no one says by way of explanation that it is because all use is forbidden. And so Rav, Shmuel, Rav Ada bar Ahava, and the member of the rabbinate would all seem to disagree with Rav Matna.

What about the fact that Abaye was convinced of the reason for Rav Matna's statement? Firstly, he was not originally convinced of the truth of this explanation. And even when he accepted the reason, he only accepted this as a reason for Rav Matna's statement. This does not mean that he accepted Rav Matna's statement.

Indeed, how could he accept Rav Matna's statement. After all, he said (as we will see later) that Master (Rabba bar Nachmani) practiced like Rav over Shmuel in all cases except three, and one of the three in which he practiced like Shmuel in that one may light from one Chanukka lamp to another. We see that some use may be made of the lamp, and so his teacher Rabba clearly does not rule like Rav Matna.

Furthermore, let us assume for a moment that Abaye in fact agrees with Rav Matna. We have Rava who explains both Rav Huna and Rav Chisda, and ignoring Rav Matna. This would suggest that Rava holds like Rav Huna or Rav Chisda, and so we have a dispute between Abaye and Rava. Since this is not ya"l kega"m, we would rule like Rava agaist Abaye.

So we should reject Rav Matna, and then within the dispute of Rav Huna vs. Rav Chisda, we should rule like Rav Huna, as we said above, because he is the teacher.

Recall what Rav Huna says:

אמר רב הונא פתילות ושמנים שאמרו חכמים אין מדליקין בהן בשבת אין מדליקין בהן בחנוכה בין בשבת בין בחול
אמר רבא מאי טעמא דרב הונא קסבר כבתה זקוק לה ומותר להשתמש לאורה
Rav Huna said: the materials for wicks and oils that the Sages said that we do not light with them for Shabbat, we do not light with them on Chanukka, neither on Shabbat nor during the week.
Rava said: what is the reason of Rav Huna?
He holds that if it is extinguished he need must deal with it {to relight it} and furthermore that it is permissible to make use of its light.
As a result, we should say that we may not light with these wicks and oils on Chanukka, whether during the week or during Shabbat; further, that if it is extinguished, he needs to relight; further, it is permissible to make use of its light {with some exceptions to be discussed later).

Now, the stama degemara tries to make sense of the opinion that if is extinguished, he need not deal further with it.
וכבתה אין זקוק לה
ורמינהו מצותה משתשקע החמה עד שתכלה רגל מן השוק
מאי לאו דאי כבתה הדר מדליק לה
לא דאי לא אדליק מדליק
וא"נ לשיעורה
And if it is extinguished, he need not deal with it.
And one can ask: "Its mitzvah is from sunset until the foot ceases from the market."
Does this not mean that if is is extinguished he should relight it?
No. Rather that if he did not light it yet, he should light.
Alternatively, for the measure {of how much oil there should be for it to stay lit}.
Which implies that if it is extinguished he need not relight it.
We might say that this is just trying to figure according to this opinion of Rav Matna, but we do not pasken like it. Alternatively, we need to know this because we hold like Rav Chisda. Alternatively, as we know, this is the stama degamara, and we should not derive halacha from his questions and answers. (Perhaps then, we need it to be lit for this whole span of time, while people are still in the market, and can thus see it, so that he fulfills publicizing the miracle to the best of his ability.)

Alternatively, (and this is the best answer,) we see that Rav Huna, Rav Chisda, and Rav Matna dispute the issue of whether he would need to relight, and so the two (Rav Chisda and Rav Matna) who say he does not need to relight need to make sense of the statement about the timespan of the mitzvah. While they do not discuss it directly, it needs to make sense. As a result, the question is asked how they would explain it, and this explanation works just as well if we rule like Rav Huna. In other words, it is an opportunity to clarify what the meaning of the statement about the timespan is, on the basis of the fact that it must make sense according to all.


2)
The gemara in Shabbat 22a states:
אמר רב יהודה אמר רב אסי <אמר>:
אסור להרצות מעות כנגד נר חנוכה
כי אמריתה קמיה דשמואל אמר לי וכי נר קדושה יש בה?!
מתקיף לה רב יוסף וכי דם קדושה יש בו?!
דתניא (ויקרא יז)
ושפך וכסה
במה ששפך יכסה שלא יכסנו ברגל שלא יהו מצות בזויות עליו
ה"נ שלא יהו מצות בזויות עליו
Rav Yehuda cited Rav Ashi (who cited Rav):
It is forbidden to count money opposite a Chanukka lamp.
When I said this before Shmuel, he said to me: And does the lamp possess sanctity?!
Rav Yosef challenged this: And does blood possess sanctity?!
For we learn {in a brayta}: (Vayikra 17:13):

יג וְאִישׁ אִישׁ מִבְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, וּמִן-הַגֵּר הַגָּר בְּתוֹכָם, אֲשֶׁר יָצוּד צֵיד חַיָּה אוֹ-עוֹף, אֲשֶׁר יֵאָכֵל--וְשָׁפַךְ, אֶת-דָּמוֹ, וְכִסָּהוּ, בֶּעָפָר. 13 And whatsoever man there be of the children of Israel, or of the strangers that sojourn among them, that taketh in hunting any beast or fowl that may be eaten, he shall pour out the blood thereof, and cover it with dust.
With what he poured {that is, with his hand} he should cover - that he should not cover with his foot - so that the mitzvot should not be disgraceful to him.
Here too {in terms of counting money}, so that the mitzvot should not be disgraceful to him.
Once again, before determining meaning, we must establish a correct text. Who said the initial statement? Was it Rav? Was it Rav Assi?

In the Artscroll translation, they write: Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav Assi (who said in the name of Rav). They explain in a footnote that they follow here the Masoret HaShas who notes that the words in parentheses do not appear in the Rosh's text, nor in Rashi, who attributes it to Rav Assi. Similarly, in Soncino. There, they omit (who said in the name of Rav) entirely, and explain in a footnote: "Cur. ed. adds: in Rab's name: Rosh omits it, and it appears to be absent from Rashi's text too."

Thus, they decide, following Rosh and Rashi, and following the decision of Masoret HaShas, that the words in parentheses do not belong, and are incorrect. Thus it is Rav Assi who says the statement, and it is a question whether Rav Assi would agree with "Rav" cited above. (As I already showed, "Rav" above is really Rav Matna.)

However, I feel they do this statement a bit of an injustice here. From reading them, one would get the impression that there are two possible versions of the attribution:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav Assi:
Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav Assi who said in the name of Rav:

In fact, there is a third version of the attribution:
Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav:

Indeed, in the Rif Shabbat 9b going on Shabbat 22a, we have: אמר רב יהודה אמר רב.

I would posit that the version with Rav Yehuda citing Rav Assi citing Rav is in fact derivative of the other two versions. Indeed, we see a somewhat similar situation in the case of Rav/Rav Matna above. Our gemara has א"ר זירא אמר רב מתנה ואמרי לה א"ר זירא אמר רב, that is, Rav Zera is either citing Rav Matna or Rav, and explicitly outlaying that these are alternatives, and the Rif constructs from this א"ר זירא (אמר רב מתנה) אמר רב, with either the Rif or someone else enclosing the alternative in parentheses to show it is not the favored version. I don't know what Masoret HaShas had before him, but even if he had it in full without parentheses, this might have resulted from an amalgamation of the two versions.

At any rate, we can confirm two versions of the statement from the Rishonim - Rashi and Rosh, vs. that of the Rif:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav Assi:
Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav:
אמר רב יהודה אמר רב אסי
אמר רב יהודה אמר רב
and it is between these two versions that we should decide. To help in the decision, I will include the next line of text.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav Assi:
It is forbidden to count money opposite a Chanukka lamp.
אמר רב יהודה אמר רב אסי
אסור להרצות מעות כנגד נר חנוכה
vs.
Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav Assi:
It is forbidden to count money opposite a Chanukka lamp.
אמר רב יהודה אמר רב אסי
אסור להרצות מעות כנגד נר חנוכה
Another piece of necessary information. In manuscripts of Mishna, Talmud, Rishonim, etc., a common feature is what the sofer does at the end of a line. Sometimes he places extra letters like a ב at the end of a line to get it to justify neatly. Other times, he begins a word, and does not have space to finish it, and so places a little mark over the end of the word to note and writes the word in full on the next line.

Imagine now that the last word on the line is אסור, but there is not enough space to finish it. He would write:
אמר רב יהודה אמר רב אס' א
אסור להרצות מעות כנגד נר חנוכה
Another sofer, copying the manuscript, could easily confuse the little mark for a yud, and so Rav becomes Rav Assi. Alternatively, a sofer could think this is an abbreviation for Assi, and expand it by adding a yud.

As I discussed earlier, when you have two variant texts A and B, a good way to decide which is original is to ask the question: How easy is it to get from A to B? And how easy is it to get from B to A?

Let us say A is Rav Yehuda citing Rav. To get to B, Rav Asi, all that needs happen is that אסור is recorded in one manuscript at the end and beginning of a line, and the next sofer mistakes the mark for a yud. This is different from the Rav/Rav Matna case above. There, there was no ready explanation for the insertion of the word Matna, whereas here there is a ready explanation for the insertion of the word Assi.

To get from B to A, that is from Rav Assi to Rav, we can simply say that the sofer overlooked a word. It is made even more likely by the presence of a word (אסור) which is quite similar immediately following. He started to write Assi and ended up writing Assur.

Which path is easier? This is a more subjective call. However, I would say that while the manuscript would have to be just so to get the word אסור on a line boundary, if the text is copied often enough it will get there, and then the confusion of אס' א with אסי is extremely easy. Meanwhile, while skipping a word is common, it is a more difficult operation than confusing one tiny mark for another tiny mark. Thus, I would claim that the original text of the gemara wasאמר רב יהודה אמר רב, and that this is the better version, from a purely textual perspective.

{As a Rif blogger, I feel gratified that the Rif's girsa wins out.}

This is also the better text from a logical perspective. Rav Yehuda is known as the student of both Rav and Shmuel. Many, many times, we have Rav Yehuda cite Shmuel, or Rav Yehuda cite Rav. Indeed, many times our gemara simply says "Rav Yehuda said," while the Rif has "Rav Yehuda cited Rav." As a result, we would expect Rav Yehuda to cite Rav, more than have him cite Rav Assi. And, we would expect him to learn something from one of his main teachers, Rav, and repeat it to the other of his main teachers, Shmuel, to see his opinion on it.

Further, Rav and Shmuel are among the classical sets of disputants. Abaye and Rava. Hillel and Shammai. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yochanan and Resh Lakish. Rav and Shmuel. We should expect Rav and Shmuel to be arguing.

Further, we know that Rav and Shmuel argue on a similar point, shortly thereafter in the gemara, about whether one can light from one Chanukka lamp to another. Rav says it is forbidden and Shmuel says it is permitted. This follows the general line of this dispute.

Now, the Rif has both the statement of Rav/Rav Matna, as well as this current statement of Rav Rav/Rav Assi, assigned to Rav. How does one explain why Rav discusses this more trivial case when earlier he forbad in all instances? The Ran attempts an answer. Other Rishonim discuss whether Rav Assi will agree with Rav above.

In fact, I will say once again, the first statement was not Rav but Rav Matna, so there is no reason to harmonize the two. Similarly, we need not see if Rav Assi agrees with Rav, for it is not Rav Assi but Rav who is speaking. He would most likely not agree with "Rav" {=Rav Matna} above.

3)
Now, there is another statement of Rav, on Shabbat 22a:
איתמר
רב אמר אין מדליקין מנר לנר ושמואל אמר מדליקין
רב אמר אין מתירין ציצית מבגד לבגד ושמואל אמר מתירין מבגד לבגד
רב אמר אין הלכה כרבי שמעון בגרירה ושמואל אמר הלכה כרבי שמעון בגרירה
אמר אביי כל מילי דמר עביד כרב לבר מהני תלת דעביד כשמואל
מדליקין מנר לנר
ומתירין מבגד לבגד
והלכה כרבי שמעון בגרירה
It was said {by Amoraim}:
Rav said: we do not light from one {Chanukka} lamp to another {Chanukka} lamp, and Shmuel said: we do light.
Rav said: we do not untie tzitzit from one garment to another, and Shmuel said: we do untie tzitzit from one garment to another.
Rav said: the halacha is not like Rabbi Shimon in terms of dragging {a bench, thus making a furrow, which he permits since he did not intend to create the furrow}, and Shmuel said the halacha is like Rabbi Shimon in terms of dragging.
Abaye said: In all matters that Master {Rabba bar Nachmani} did he did like Rav, with the exception of these three, which he did like Shmuel:
We may light from {Chanukka} lamp to lamp
And we may untie from one garment to another garment
And the halacha is like Rabbi Shimon by dragging.
So once again we have a dispute between Rav and Shmuel in terms of what one may do with the Chanukka lamp.

How are we to understand Rav's opinion?

The gemara continues:
יתיב ההוא מרבנן קמיה דרב אדא בר אהבה
ויתיב וקאמר טעמא דרב משום ביזוי מצוה
אמר להו לא תציתו ליה טעמיה דרב משום דקא מכחיש מצוה
מאי בינייהו? איכא בינייהו דקא מדליק משרגא לשרגא
מ"ד משום ביזוי מצוה משרגא לשרגא מדליק
מ"ד משום אכחושי מצוה משרגא לשרגא נמי אסור
A certain member of the rabbinate sat before Rav Ada bar Ahava
And he sat and he said the reason of Rav is because of disrespect for the commandment.
He said to them {the assembled Sages}: Do not listen to him! The reason of Rav is because he diminishes the commandment.
What is the difference between them? This is the difference - when he kindles {directly} from one light to the other light.
According to the one who says because of disrespect for the mitzvah, from one light {directly} to the other light, he may kindle.
The one who says because of diminishing the mitzvah, from one light {directly} to another light is also forbidden.
Diminishing the mitzvah is interpreted by Rishonim as drawing oil away from the mitzvah, or dimming it. Disrespect for the mitzvah seems to be because he is making a use of it.

Based on the distinction made of lighting directly (which, BTW, seems to be from the stama degemara), it seems that the original case under discussion was using a wood chip to take from one light in order to light the next. This could be seen as disrespectful, but lighting directly from one to the next involves no disrespect. That a wood chip was under discussion was not made clear in the framing of the dispute between Rav and Shmuel.

I would say that since the phrase "diminishing the mitzvah" and not "diminishing the oil," or "light," is used, it really means that by using it for some other purpose, even to light another Chanukka lamp, takes away from the mitzvah aspect. On the other side, disrespect for the mitzvah implies that acts which are disrespectful to the mitzvah are forbidden, but other acts are allowed. Lighting a wood chip is disrespectful, while lighting directly is not.

{As a digression: Perhaps using the Chanukka lamp directly as a shamash to light something else could also be construed as disrespecting the mitzvah, and not just use of a wood chip. That is, do not adopt this distinction from the stama, since it is not in the text of the Rav/Shmuel dispute. If one wanted to find a nafka mina, one could look to other, respectful uses, such as reading a sefer using its light.}

This argument as the reason of Rav can also be applied to the Rav/Shmuel dispute above {understood by everyone but me as a Rav Assi/Shmuel dispute}. Rav said that one may not count coins opposite the Chanukka lamp. Shmuel objected: Is the Chanukka lamp sanctified?! That is, he understood Rav was saying that no use may be made of the Chanukka lamp, because it takes away from the mitzvah to make use of it. {As opposed to "draws away oil" or "dims."} That is, Shmuel understood Rav as Rav Adda bar Ahava understands Rav, and he objects to it.

Rav Yosef agrees that this is a legitimate objection, and argues that this is not in fact the reason for Rav's opinion. Rather, using it to count coins, a mundane task, shows disrespect for the mitzvah. Rav Yosef understands Rav as a certain member of the rabbinate explained Rav's opinion before Rav Adda bar Ahava.

Thus, we have a consistency of shittot in understanding Rav. There is Shmuel + Rav Adda bar Ahava vs. Rav Yosef (+ Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi) + a member of the rabbinate.

How should we pasken?
{Again, this is just theoretical, and no one should act on the basis of my words.}
Rav vs. Shmuel in a case of prohibitions, we rule like Shmuel.
Thus, in terms of counting coins, we rule like Rav.
In terms of lighting from one lamp to another, we have Abaye's testimony that in this, Rabba bar Nachmani practiced like Shmuel over Rav, and the Rif cites this lehalacha. Whether this is via a wood chip or even directly is left unexplained.

However, if we say that the reasoning of Rav is the same in both cases, we have an inconsistency.
Some suggestions:
I would say that once these explanations of Rav arose, they assumed a life of their own, independent of whether Rav himself agreed with it. As a result, disrespect for the mitzvah may be the reason for Rav, as Rav Yosef suggested. Counting money opposite the Chanukka candles is certainly disrespect. Lighting another lamp {even via a wood chip} is more arguable, and perhaps this is why Rabba in practice acted like Abaye to allow it.

Alternatively, Shmuel objected in the case of counting coins. Rav Yosef mounted a good defense to him. Perhaps Shmuel would agree in that case, because of disrespect. However, in the case of lighting from one lamp to the next, we again have the argument. Perhaps Rav indeed holds as Rav Adda bar Abba, that it is because of taking away from the mitzvah. However, we do not rule in this case like Rav but like Shmuel. Thus, by coins, Shmuel agrees to Rav Yosef, but Shmuel said nothing about disrespect to mitzvot by lighting from lamp to lamp, and Rav has a different reason to which we do not agree.

Alternatively, taking away from the mitzvah actually does mean dimming the light or taking away oil, which is not at issue by cointing coins. By counting coins, Rav's reason is disrespect, as Rav Yosef argues to Shmuel. They (the rabbinate) tried to apply this same reason to Rav's rule about lighting from one lamp to the next, but were shot down by Rav Adda bar Ahava, who gives a different reason. This other reason is not as convincing, and so Rabba rules in favor of Shmuel.

LinkWithin

Blog Widget by LinkWithin