Monday, September 07, 2009

Was the Bar Yochni an Ostrich?

When Rabbi Slifkin visited Kew Gardens Hills last, I purchased a copy of his Sacred Monsters. This post is not a review -- those take too long -- but it is a very good read, and I would encourage others to check it out.

Of course, being the radical that I am, and having a somewhat different methodology, I would approach some of the sources he brings in a slightly different manner. Here is one such example. He discusses the possible identification of the Bar Yochni as the ostrich, since the pesukim in Iyov appear to be speaking of an ostrich, and a Rashi in Menachot, and a gemara in Bechorot, equates the two. There are reasons he brings to doubt it, such as a gemara that talks of it bringing its eggs up, which the ostrich does not do; but also a gemara which discusses the face of the Bar Yochni as something much larger than a tefach -- while the face of an ostrich is about a tefach -- maybe a bit larger, but not much.

From my perspective, not all Talmudic sources should be weighted equally. I'll consider three sources in this post.

The first, a gemara in Bechorot:
בכורות דף נז, ב גמרא
פעם אחת נפלה ביצת בר יוכני וטבעה ששים כרכים ושברה שלש מאות ארזים
ומי שדיא ליה והא כתיב (איוב לט) כנף רננים נעלסה
אמר רב אשי ההוא מוזרתא הואי:
This quite clearly comes from the Tannaim and Amoraim. The first statement I believe is stated by Rabbi Yishmael ben Satriel, a Tanna, while the clarification comes from Rav Ashi, an Amora. The question which prompts the statement might have been filled in by the setama de-gemara, and perhaps not -- but regardless, we have named Tannaim and Amoraim for a good portion of it.

In contrast, consider the gemara in Yoma 80a:
דף פ, א גמרא
טומאת אוכלין כביצה מנלן
א"ר אבהו א"ר אלעזר דאמר קרא (ויקרא יא) מכל האוכל אשר יאכל
אוכל הבא מחמת אוכל ואיזה זה ביצת תרנגולת
ואימא גדי מחוסר שחיטה
ואימא בן פקועה טעון קריעה
ואימא ביצת בר יוכני
תפסת מרובה לא תפסת תפסת מועט תפסת
ואימא ביעתא דציפורתא דזוטר טובאץ...ש
Here again, the Bar Yochni appears as a bird with an exceptionally large egg. But while Rabbi Abahu, a named Amora, makes the initial statement, the question and answer is anonymous and in Aramaic, and of the style of the setama. And furthermore, as I argue in the general case, you can almost always find what is stated by the setama stated elsewhere, in another context, attributed to a named Amora, which means that the setama, while creative, will rely on existing Talmudic material and will apply it to new contexts. Here, I would posit, the anonymous setama is taking the gemara in Bechorot as evidence for the existence of this large egg of the Bar Yuchni and applying it to his systematic analysis of the Amoraic-level gemara.

The third reference to the Bar Yochni can be found in Sukkah 5a-b:
סוכה דף ה, א גמרא
רב הונא אמר מהכא (ויקרא טז) על פני הכפורת קדמה ואין פנים פחות מטפח
ואימא כאפי
סוכה דף ה, ב גמרא
דבר יוכני
תפשת מרובה לא תפשת תפשת מועט תפשת
ואימא כאפי דציפרתא דזוטר טובא
...
Once again, while Rav Huna, a named Amora, makes a statement, the give and take is anonymous, in Aramaic, and in the style of the setama di-gemara. Indeed, they are the same questions as we find in the gemara in Yoma.

I would posit that the setamaist never saw a bar yochni. He is relying entirely on the account in Bechorot. The gemara in Bechorot described the Bar Yochni as a bird with an extraordinarily-sized egg. The setama in Yoma used this to ask a question and provide an answer. And the setama in Sukkah saw this precedent and asked a similar question, just based on the face of the Bar Yochni rather than its egg. While the gemara in Bechorot does not describe the size of the Bar Yochni's face, it stands to reason that with such an exceptionally large egg, capable or drowning 60 towns, it is a large bird in general and therefore has an exceptionally large face.

Therefore, the application of the setama in Sukkah should not be used to define features of the actual Bar Yochni bird, and it should then not discount the ostrich as a candidate, even though the ostrich has a face indeed the size of a tefach.

Even an ostrich is not this exceptional size, that its egg can drown 60 cities. Should we conclude that the Bar Yochni in general is an allegory, and that they did not intend any actual bird? Well, the number 60 in terms of 60 towns is what Maharatz Chayos would call a guzma, and perhaps these "magic numbers" indeed should convey to us that it is intended as allegory. But I am not at all positive that the Bar Yochni was a fictional bird. Let us reexamine the context in the gemara in Bechorot:
העיד רבי ישמעאל בן סתריאל מערקת לבינה לפני רבי במקומנו מפשיטין את המתה ומלבישין את החי
אמר רבי נתגלה טעמא של משנתינו
חזירין שבמקומנו יש להם ששים רבוא קלפים בבית המסס שלו
פעם אחת נפל ארז אחד שבמקומנו ועברו שש עשרה קרונות על חודו אחת
פעם אחת נפלה ביצת בר יוכני וטבעה ששים כרכים ושברה שלש מאות ארזים
ומי שדיא ליה והא כתיב (איוב לט) כנף רננים נעלסה
אמר רב אשי ההוא מוזרתא הואי:
Thus, this Rabbi Yishmael is talking about the strange and excessively large dimensions in Arkat Levena. And so he speaks about arazim, cedars, of exceptionally large size such that one fell and sixteen wagons were able to pass over it. This does not mean that cedars are metaphorical, and don't exist. It means that the particular cedars in Arkat Levena were this size.

It reminds me of a joke about Texas:
There once was a blind man who decided to visit Texas. When he arrived on the plane, he felt the seats and said, "Wow, these seats are big!" The person next to him answered, "Everything is big in Texas."

When he finally arrived in Texas, he decided to visit a bar. Upon arriving in the bar, he ordered a beer and got a mug placed between his hands. He exclaimed, "Wow these mugs are big!" The bartender replied, "Everything is big in Texas."

After a couple of beers, the blind man asked the bartender where the bathroom was located. The bartender replied, "Second door to the right." The blind man headed for the bathroom, but accidentally tripped over and skipped the second door. Instead, he entered the third door, which lead to the swimming pool and fell into the pool by accident.

Scared to death, the blind man started shouting, "Don't flush, don't flush!"
Perhaps there is a metaphorical explanation, or perhaps things were large and this is mere exaggeration. Either way, this does not mean that there were no cedars elsewhere, which were real. Just like there are indeed airplane seats, mugs, and toilets outside of Texas.

The cedar is a big tree, so it makes sense that the typical Bar Yochani is a big bird, and a real one -- just not typically, or really, as big as described in Bechorot. The egg, outside of Arkat Levena and Texas, might be big -- for example the size of an ostrich egg -- but not typically so big as to drown 60 towns. If so, the Bar Yochni can be a real creature; perhaps an ostrich, or perhaps an entirely separate bird.

While Rabbi Slifkin notes that the Musaf HaAruch notes that it is a metaphorical, rather than actual bird, I see that Jastrow's entry on the bar Yochani (page 568) says that it is a fabulous bird; but in square brackets, he writes [Koh. Ar. Compl. s.v. בר, vol. II pg. 176 refers to Varaghna (Bactrian) ostrich.]

This Persian etymology for בר יוכני makes sense to me, gh is more or less a kh sound, and that it refers to a large bird such as the ostrich is compelling -- even aside from the other basis of declaring it an ostrich, based on Talmudic linkages to the bird in Iyov, which is likely an ostrich. See here for other fantastic features of Varaghna birds, though not at all necessarily the same one.

There is one major problem with declaring the Bar Yochani the ostrich. The gemara in Menachot 66b describes a feature which seems not to match the ostrich. And this is the bird linked to the Bar Yochani. Thus, in Menachot:
ואומר (משלי ז) נתעל"סה באהבים נשא ונתן ונעלה ונשמח ונתחטא באהבים
ואומר (איוב לט) כנף רננים נע"לסה נושא עולה ונתחטא
Rashi there equates it with the Bar Yochni, and also explains the gemara (correctly) to mean that נע"לסה is an acronym for "it carries it (=the egg), ascends, and descends (placing it down in the nest). Yet an ostrich does not do this!

I would guess that Rashi's basis for associating this with the Bar Yochni is that in the gemara in Bechorot, prior to Rav Ashi's elaboration, the gemara cites this pasuk, with the impled question of why the egg would drop and shatter in this way, which is why Rav Ashi explains that it was an unfertilized egg.

We could say that where the gemara posed this question, it was merely the setama filling in the shakla vetarya to help it flow better -- indeed, this occurs often -- such that this was never Rav Ashi's question. I wonder if one could fill in a different cause, such as making it not a hard egg containing a baby Bar Yochni, but one which would shatter over a large area, and also explaining וטבעה. But if we do, we not only cut away the "problematic" behavior for an ostrich, but the very connection to the ostrich in the first place. Aside from the having of large eggs -- and the exaggeration would be perhaps greater for Texas and Arkat Levana if the Bar Yochani were generally a small bird -- the connection to the ostrich is via the verses in Iyov, which Rabbi Slifkin demonstrates are quite descriptive of the ostrich. Cut out the question, and we cut out Iyov, and we have almost no basis for claiming the Bar Yochni is an ostrich! Well, not really -- we still have the etymology relating it to the Varghna ostrich.

But it does make sense, based on the egg size, that we are referring to an ostrich. And it seems that this was the assumption in our gemara in Bechorot as well. For otherwise, why pose this question, and relate it to the gemara in Iyov? And it works out nicely based on etymology. What then, are we to do with this "difficult" feature of the Bar Yochni / kenaf rananim?

I would merely be forced into the position that not all zoological knowledge put forth in the gemara is entirely accurate. Either we can reinterpret the gemara in Menachot (and perhaps also Bechorot) about the animal's behavior, or else we could say that it was based on faulty contemporary knowledge. This is what I say about certain aggadot regarding techelet. There is sufficient and convincing evidence, based on archaeological evidence as well as some gemaras, that murex trunculus was indeed the techelet of Chazal. But a brayta about how often the chilazon surfaced may be based on faulty contemporary Greek accounts of how often the chilazon frequented the shores. And it is overly pious to insist that therefore we have not identified the chilazon, for we would never find a creature that truly matches it. Just as we would not say that the gemara, and Tosafot, were not talking about elephants because they refer to an elephant jumping. And just as we would not say that our bovines are not the same as the bovines of Chazal because Chazal's bovines were constructed in a way that a needle could get to the liver in a normal way after being consumed. And that ancient accounts of lions were not of lions, because they claimed that lions were stillborn, and only came to life after three days.

We are faced with a derasha from a pasuk, perhaps one that accords with contemporary zoological beliefs in the time of Chazal; but that does not mean that Chazal made a careful study of the nesting habits of ostriches.

And so, to conclude, I believe that an ostrich is a solid candidate for the Bar Yochani, and that it was believed to be a real bird; though the gemara in Bechorot might have involved Chazal's true beliefs, in which case it would have been intended literally (for our beliefs, and sense of plausibility, is not the same as Chazal's); or allegorically; or else as an exaggeration.

Interesting Posts and Articles #206

  1. An Oh Nuts Rosh Hashanah giveaway, here at parshablog.

  2. Orthononics is appalled at a "spoiled brat" writing in to an advice column in the Five Towns Jewish Times, who apparently expects that everything is coming to her, and who is annoyed at her in-laws for not helping out.

  3. A movement organizing people to ignore / boycott World Net Daily.

  4. At Rationalist Judaism, the final two parts of the review of Chaim BeEmunasam. In part thirteen, the three paths of "guidance" the sefer provides to dealing with "inconvenient" sources: that it has been disqualified because we now have the kabbalistic revelations of the Arizal, that we should consider ourselves not to have understood their meaning, and that one shouldn't think about such things. And a reaction. In part fourteen, a summary to the critique, which stresses that this sefer is not a mere compilation of sources which represent the masorah -- well, it depends on how one defines "masorah".

    Finally, Rabbi Slifkin posts the full article / critique in a single PDF.

  5. Also, see the Daat Torah blog, where he puts up the full article, as linking to someone who does not deserve the attention and which a commenter notes seems quite the lunatic. But Daat Torah posts in the comments, about the critical blogger, and the unfortunate sefer:
    It unfortunately characterizes many of R' Slifkin's critics. They perceive a need to get him - they are not too particular about the means. The book being reviewed is a good example. it is simply an embarrassment. Gedolim support something which is not only poor scholarship - but it presents a distortion of Torah.

    If Slifkin had written a sefer like this he would have been laughed out of town.

    There are definitely issues to criticize R' Slifkin - but producing such a sefer and claiming that it is the true version of Torah - is extremely damaging to the credibility of gedolim and anti-Slifkin forces...
  6. Also, Mystical Paths (here and here) and Wolfish Musings post on the silliness of that particular blogger, who has apparently been sending out emails advertising his blog. Though they don't link to him. Which is a good idea. What this fellow writes is silly, and he does not engage in rational discourse. Not every crackpot should get a link, and attention.

  7. In the second post of his series, Eruv Online puts forth evidence that Rav Moshe Feinstein did not really sign the 1979 kol korei against the Flatbush eruv.

  8. Hirhurim reviews Rabbi Hayyim Angel's Revealed Texts, Hidden Meanings.

  9. Emes veEmunah on a meaningless call to end the violence, in the protests in Meah Shearim. And I thought so as well. But according to Life In Israel, Rabbi Shternbuch joined in (once again) in speaking out against violent protests. And also:
    The shabbos protests of this past shabbos, that passed peacefully, clearly show that when the Eidah wants to, they do have control of their people. Despite what they say at other times, that they can tell people to stop but nobody listens. For the most part they listen. Let's hope they stay in control of their people and keep it reasonable...
  10. This week's Haveil Havalim.

  11. At parshablog, start preparing the parsha (Nitzavim - Vayelech) with my list of online seforim for study of parshat Nitzavim.

Sunday, September 06, 2009

Nitzavim sources

by aliyah
rishon (Devarim 29:9)
sheni (29:12), shlishi (29:15)
revii (30:1)
chamishi (30:7), shishi (30:11)
shevii (30:15), maftir
haftara (Yeshaya 61)

by perek
30

meforshim
Rashi, in English and Hebrew
Shadal (here and here)
Daat -- with Rashi, Ramban, Seforno, Ibn Ezra, Rashbam, Rabbenu Bachya, Midrash Rabba, Tanchuma+, Gilyonot
Gilyonot Nechama Leibovitz (Hebrew)
Tiferes Yehonasan from Rav Yonasan Eibeshitz
Toldos Yizchak Acharon, repeated from Rav Yonasan Eibeshutz (nothing on Nitzavim)
Even Shleimah -- from Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Ehrenreich
R' Saadia Gaon's Tafsir, Arabic translation of Torah (here and here)
Collected commentary of Saadia Gaon on Torah
Zohar, with English translation (nothing on Nitzavim)
Baal Haturim (HaAruch)
Imrei Shafer, Rav Shlomo Kluger
Ibn Gabirol (nothing until end of Devarim)
Kol Eliyahu (Gra) -- nothing on Nitzavim
Mipninei Harambam -- nothing on sefer Devarim
Sefer Zikaron of Ritva -- nothing until Zot Habracha

The following meforshim at JNUL. I've discovered that if you click on the icon to rotate sideways, change to only black and white, select only the portion which is text, it is eminently readable on paper.
Ralbag (394)
Chizkuni (153)
Abarbanel (401)
Shach (323)
Aharon ben Yosef the Karaite (247)

rashi
Daat, Rashi In Hebrew (perek 29, 30)
Judaica Press Rashi in English and Hebrew
Mizrachi, Mizrachi (315, JNUL)
Gur Aryeh (Maharal of Prague)
Berliner's Beur on Rashi (here and here)
Commentary on Rashi by Yosef of Krasnitz
R' Yisrael Isserlin (on Rashi, 17, JNUL)
Two supercommentaries on Rashi, by Chasdai Almosnino and Yaakov Kneizel
Rav Natan ben Shishon Shapira Ashkenazi (16th century), (JNUL, pg 174)
Yeriot Shlomo (Maharshal)
Moda L'Bina (Wolf Heidenheim)
Minchat Yehuda and Mekorei Rashi (in Mechokekei Yehuda)
Also see Mikraos Gedolos above, which has Rashi with Sifsei Chachamim

ramban
Daat, Ramban in Hebrew (perek 29, 30)
R' Yitzchak Abohav's on Ramban (standalone and in a Tanach opposite Ramban)
Rabbi Meir Abusaula (student of Rashba)

ibn ezra
Daat, Ibn Ezra in Hebrew (perek 29, 30)
Mechokekei Yehudah (HebrewBooks)
Mavaser Ezra -- nothing on Nitzavim
R' Shmuel Motot (on Ibn Ezra, pg 51, JNUL)
Ibn Kaspi's supercommentary on Ibn Ezra, different from his commentary (nothing on Nitzavim)
Avi Ezer -- nothing on Nitzavim
Also see Mikraos Gedolos above, which has Ibn Ezra with Avi Ezer

targum
Targum Onkelos opposite Torah text
Shadal's Ohev Ger on Targum Onkelos
Avnei Tzion -- two commentaries on Onkelos
Or Hatargum on Onkelos
Commentary on Targum Yonatan and Targum Yerushalmi
Septuagint (Greek, English)

masorah
Commentary on the Masorah -- nothing on Nitzavim
Taamei Masoret -- nothing on Nitzavim
Shiluv Hamasorot -- nothing on Nitzavim
Rama (but based on alphabet, not parsha)

midrash
Midrash Rabba at Daat (29, 30)
Midrash Tanchuma at Daat (29, 30)
Devarim Rabba, with commentaries
Midrash Tanchuma with commentary of Etz Yosef and Anaf Yosef
Commentary on Midrash Rabba by R' Naftali Hirtz b'R' Menachem
Matat-Kah on Midrash Rabba -- Nitzavim (and that's it)
Sifrei, with commentary of the Gra
Nefesh Yehonasan by Rav Yonasan Eibeshutz (nothing on Nitzavim)

haftarah (Yeshayahu 61:10-63:9)
In a separate Mikraos Gedolos, with Targum, Rashi, Mahari Kara, Radak, Ibn Ezra, Metzudat David.
Haftarah in Gutnick Edition
Daat, which includes Yalkut Shimoni, Radak
Ahavas Yehonatan by Rav Yonasan Eibeshutz
Aharon ben Yosef the Karaite

Friday, September 04, 2009

posts so far for parshat Ki Tavo

 2010

  1. Ki Tavo sources -- improved further.
    .
  2. Ki Tavo: Is the blessing on hafrashat maaser Biblical? What about on shechitaAccording to the sefer Hilchot Eretz Yisrael, saying the beracha on shechita ismeakev. But this makes little sense if all berachot on mitzvot are a Rabbinic innovation. Apasuk in Ki Tavo, darshened by Sifrei and by a Mishna in Maaser Sheni, and brought by Rashi, might counter this. But I don't think so.
    .
  3. The spelling of ויוציאנו -- Is this a typo in Minchat Kohen, or does he reverse himself?
    .
  4. Bringing the bikkurim to the kohen who exists in those days -- Ramban criticizes Rashi (respect) based on a Sifrei (kashrut), but Rashi is really just restating a different version of the Sifrei. And Ramban's peshat explanation, that it refers to the mishmar of that week, is not as convincing as that of Ibn Ezra, that it holds as long as kohanim are presiding. Though I would suggest something even smoother, that it is part of the future-tense tone.
    .

2009
  1. Ki Tavo sources -- revamped; links by perek and aliyah to the parsha in a Mikraos Gedolos, but also a while bunch of meforshim on the parashah and haftorah.

  2. If you sin too much, will you come back as an unripe fruit? An "interesting" interpretation of bevoecha and betzeitecha, via Revach, about gilgul as unripe fruit. And then a disproof from a gemara in Bava Metzia.

  3. Why is the krei / ketiv of yishkavena / yishgalena not a problem of reading not from the ketav? And an interesting story of someone who insisted it indeed was a problem.

  4. Hayom Hazeh -- these are the words of Moshe. Who else would be speaking? In which the standard interpretation of Ibn Ezra is that it is Moshe, rather than the farmer. But I suggest he means Moshe rather than a later peson issuing the Biblical command to the farmer.
    .
  5. Does Arami Oved Avi refer to a wandering / poor Aramean, or to Lavan who sought to destroyThis post deals with an interpretation of Arami Oved Avi by Ibn Ezra and Radak which goes against the classic midrashic interpretation, and the reaction of two supercommentaries of Rashi to this "daring" interpretation. What comes into play is whether Ibn Ezra and Radak can claim to have absolute knowledge of Hebrew to be able to declare the midrashic interpretation to not work out according to the rules of dikduk; and whether one can argue on midrash, as they are doing, if after the midrashic interpretation goes all the way back to Sinai! It could also be that as supercommentators of Rashi, they are simply defending Rashi's interpretation as one of peshat.
    .
  6. Arami Oved Avi -- the Karaites have their cake and eat it too! Related to the above. The purpose of this post is to bring forth an interesting explanation I saw in the commentary of Aharon ben Yosef the Karaite. It seems like he wants to have his cake and eat it too. That is, he agrees that אובד is a poel omed, an intransitive verb, and thus means that he was a pauper, as per Ibn Ezra. But at the same time, the Arami is Lavan!
    .
  7. The Rav on Arami Oved Avi in the Haggadah -- Dr. David Segal told me over a peshat he heard from the Rav zt"l, in which Arami Oved Avi as expounded in the haggadah is in line with Ibn Ezra and Radak's insistence that Oved is an intransitive verb. Rabbi Wohlgelenter also heard this from the Rav. The chiddush here is that we would think that the haggadah is understanding it as Lavan, but really, it refers to Yaakov, even in the derasha.
    .


2008
Ki Savo sources -- links by perek and aliya to the relevant page in an online Mikraos Gedolos.

Shadal on Tithes -- and how there is really only one tithe.

A Beautiful Midrash About Kinas Soferim, and about wanting Torah as a cherished inheritance, rather than a weird midrash brought down by Rashi.

2007
Adoption in public of required behavior in private -- as a theme in the klalot

Why plaster them with plaster? Well, it would be silly to plaster them with peanut butter. ;) But seriously, to make them long-lasting, for the future.

It's not so odd -- and how choosing God made us into the Am Segulah.

Vaytzav -- An important grammatical form, and how it saps the energy out of a multiple authorship proof.

Bikkurim -- an interesting theme and underlying message.

2006
From parshat Matot, Pinchas the Flying Priest. In the course of this, I mention Arami Oved Avi, and how this is interpreted to be the saga of Bilaam from the time he was Lavan, until when he (Lavan rather than Yaakov) went down to Egypt, and so on and so forth, as Bilaam.

2003

Talk of a Death Cult: Is this being doresh Torah shelo kehalacha? I analyze לֹא-אָכַלְתִּי בְאֹנִי מִמֶּנּוּ and show how each phrase may refer to practices of a death cult, which he is proclaiming that he did not participate in.

In Bowdlerization of Torah I mention the possibility that certain krei and ketiv pairs were formed because the original term changed in connotation and became a crude word.

to be continued...

Thursday, September 03, 2009

Hayom Hazeh -- "These are the words of Moshe"; who else would be speaking?

In the beginning of Ki Tavo, there is a transition from the vidui maaser {note: fixed from mikra bikkurim} back to Moshe's instruction. Thus, in Devarim 26:
טו הַשְׁקִיפָה מִמְּעוֹן קָדְשְׁךָ מִן-הַשָּׁמַיִם, וּבָרֵךְ אֶת-עַמְּךָ אֶת-יִשְׂרָאֵל, וְאֵת הָאֲדָמָה, אֲשֶׁר נָתַתָּה לָנוּ--כַּאֲשֶׁר נִשְׁבַּעְתָּ לַאֲבֹתֵינוּ, אֶרֶץ זָבַת חָלָב וּדְבָשׁ. {ס}15 Look forth from Thy holy habitation, from heaven, and bless Thy people Israel, and the land which Thou hast given us, as Thou didst swear unto our fathers, a land flowing with milk and honey.' {S}
טז הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה, ה' אֱלֹהֶיךָ מְצַוְּךָ לַעֲשׂוֹת אֶת-הַחֻקִּים הָאֵלֶּה--וְאֶת-הַמִּשְׁפָּטִים; וְשָׁמַרְתָּ וְעָשִׂיתָ אוֹתָם, בְּכָל-לְבָבְךָ וּבְכָל-נַפְשֶׁךָ.16 This day the LORD thy God commandeth thee to do these statutes and ordinances; thou shalt therefore observe and do them with all thy heart, and with all thy soul.

On this, Ibn Ezra comments:
כו, טז]
היום הזה -
אלה דברי משה.

ושמרת -
בלבך.

ועשית אותם -
בארץ.
Now Avi Ezer, Ibn Ezra's supercommentator, gives a rather straightforward and convincing explanation, that Ibn Ezra is simply explaining the transition; that these are the words of Moshe to the Bnei Yisrael, and are not part of the viduy maaser. Thus,
דלא תטעו לומר שגם פסוק היום הזה אומר המביא ביכורים
And so says Mechokekei Yehuda in Yahel Or. Though I admit to seeing the potential for misreading it in this way, and I see from context why one should not err this way, I am having a bit of trouble really trusting that this was Ibn Ezra's motivation. Context makes clear that it is not part of the statement of the person bringing bikkurim; and does anyone seriously suggest otherwise?! Unless we can find something in Rashi's citation in Tanchuma that Ibn Ezra is responding to -- that Rashi says that every day the command should be new to you, while Ibn Ezra is explaining that it is Moshe, back then, speaking and saying היום הזה. Still, such does not really seem to be required.

Add to this Mekor Chaim's statement, though not entirely helpful here. Upon אלה דברי משה by Ibn Ezra, Mekor Chaim says זה כתוב בפסוק ויפגע במקום ובמקומות רבות.

That is, in parshat Vayeitzei, on vayifga bamakom, the patach under the bet represented the definite article, and thus it was a known place. But at this point in the narrative, the place was not yet known. Thus, Ibn Ezra writes there:
[כח, יא]
וטעם פתחות בי"ת במקום -
דברי משה.
והטעם: במקום הידוע היום.
וכן אמר הושע: ושם ידבר עמנו, כי הוא התנבא על ירבעם בן יואש, והוא היה בבית אל.
ואמר לשון רבים בעדו ובעד עמוס ובספר עמוס מבואר.
ועל דרך הפשט לא יתכן להיות
Thus, it reflects a later hand, namely Moshe telling the story, and for Moshe it already is a known place today. This is great throughout Bereishit, but how is this helpful in the case at hand. Surely Moshe Rabbenu is writing chumash Devarim, and giving them their instructions! What does this add, if Ibn Ezra is really saying this? And if there is some deep meaning, Mekor Chaim should elucidate it for us, instead of leaving us in the dark.

If I may, I would suggest an alternate possibility. Ibn Ezra has other famous and controversial comments, about such statements as עד היום הזה. Thus his statement about the first pasuk of Devarim, and the last twelve pesukim of Devarim (as discussed here). That is, that they were written later by Yehoshua.

Here, the pesukim are talking about bringing the bikkurim to the makom Hashem chooses, once they enter the land. Saying that one should perform the mitzvot during Hayom hazeh implies that the command itself was given during a time that one can fulfill it. Did Yehoshua, or someone later, write this instruction?

This, I posit, may be what Ibn Ezra is trying to counter. Again, he wrote:
כו, טז]
היום הזה -
אלה דברי משה.

ושמרת -
בלבך.

ועשית אותם -
בארץ.
By saying that these are the words of Moshe, Ibn Ezra is saying that these are not the words of Yehoshua or someone later. And it is on that day that Moshe is speaking which is Hayom Hazeh. But how does one fulfill these instructions? And this is the rest of Ibn Ezra's commentary on the verse; and this I think shows that my interpretation is correct, over that of Avi Ezer. ושמרת, to keep it, is to keep it in your heart. So that is how you keep it today. ועשית אותם, such that when you enter the land in the future, you will actually perform it.

Wednesday, September 02, 2009

Interesting Posts and Articles #205

  1. I didn't yet note this week's Haveil Havalim, at West Bank Mama.

  2. Divrei Chaim gives some attention to Not Brisker Yeshivish, and posts again about how one must follow consensus and not pick and choose sources and based on what most appeals to you, in terms of hashkafa. I don't think it necessarily even applies so far as halacha, and at any rate, this is not a matter of choosing people based on what you want, but choosing truth. There is no pesak in reality. I elaborate, and argue, in the comment section at Divrei Chaim as well as in this parshablog post, which considers whether we must accept the ridiculous, either in halacha or hashkafa.

  3. At Rationalist Judaism, Rabbi Slifkin continues his review and critique of Chaim BeEmunasam. In part eleven, he discusses how the book is selective in its citation of authorities, while purporting to give the only authentic approach. And in part twelve, how the sefer puts the pnimiyus approach of Maharal and others as the only authentic approach, while in fact many Rishonim and Acharonim argued, either having Chazal making an error, or else Chazal being right but meaning their words literally and physically, in our realm.

  4. Another argument against evolution based on irreducible complexity shot down:

    Intricate cellular components are often cited as evidence of intelligent design. They couldn’t have evolved, I.D. proponents say, because they can’t be broken down into smaller, simpler functional parts. They are irreducibly complex, so they must have been intentionally designed, as is, by an intelligent entity.

    But new research comparing mitochondria, which provide energy to animal cells, with their bacterial relatives, shows that the necessary pieces for one particular cellular machine — exactly the sort of structure that’s supposed to prove intelligent design — were lying around long ago. It was simply a matter of time before they came together into a more complex entity.

    It reminds me of the argument about "vestigial organs" on the other side; many things may just be labelled vestigial organs because science had not yet discovered the purpose of it, such as the spleen.

  5. Orthonomics and WolfishMusings note an "interesting" YNet article, also discussed at the Yeshiva World coffee room. A girls school is offering a scholarship in exchange for a promise that when the girl becomes a kallah, she not wear makeup on her wedding day. Something which may well be against a gemara. Now, some people are natural beauties and actually do not need makeup, some are not so much so and can use the extra help, and it is good and meritorious.
    Rabbi Ishmael wept and said, "The daughters of Israel are really beautiful, but it is poverty that makes them look ugly."
    And he would help them become pretty. And there are many other such sources. I understand somewhat when girls are in school. They are not dating, and the superficiality of it and the idea of making oneself look pretty, possibly for boys, may be deemed inappropriate -- at that stage in their lives. Unfortunately, some mechanchim are under the impression that this should be the conduct even after they leave school, in entirely different circumstances.

    On the other hand, there is a clear basis from Chumash for a bride not wearing makeup on her wedding day. After all, we see a marriage in the beginning of last week's parsha:

    יא וְרָאִיתָ, בַּשִּׁבְיָה, אֵשֶׁת, יְפַת-תֹּאַר; וְחָשַׁקְתָּ בָהּ, וְלָקַחְתָּ לְךָ לְאִשָּׁה.11 and seest among the captives a woman of goodly form, and thou hast a desire unto her, and wouldest take her to thee to wife;
    יב וַהֲבֵאתָהּ, אֶל-תּוֹךְ בֵּיתֶךָ; וְגִלְּחָה, אֶת-רֹאשָׁהּ, וְעָשְׂתָה, אֶת-צִפָּרְנֶיהָ.12 then thou shalt bring her home to thy house; and she shall shave her head, and pare her nails;
    יג וְהֵסִירָה אֶת-שִׂמְלַת שִׁבְיָהּ מֵעָלֶיהָ, וְיָשְׁבָה בְּבֵיתֶךָ, וּבָכְתָה אֶת-אָבִיהָ וְאֶת-אִמָּהּ, יֶרַח יָמִים; וְאַחַר כֵּן תָּבוֹא אֵלֶיהָ, וּבְעַלְתָּהּ, וְהָיְתָה לְךָ, לְאִשָּׁה.13 and she shall put the raiment of her captivity from off her, and shall remain in thy house, and bewail her father and her mother a full month; and after that thou mayest go in unto her, and be her husband, and she shall be thy wife.

    Thus, while she might be pretty before, it is a mitvah to make her look ugly before her wedding day. They probably just extrapolated from the Eshes Yefas Toar to the general case...

  6. Emes veEmunah on martyrdom, Meah Shearim style.

  7. Geulah Perspectives and Rav Shmuel Kaminetsky are hoping for moshiach's arrival this coming Sunday, based on a prediction by R' Elchanan Wasserman. May it be so; but messianic prediction by famous rabbinic figures are a dime a dozen. I wouldn't put too much stock in any particular one.

  8. Prepare the parsha by using my Ki Savo sources.

  9. At the Yeshiva World, Rabbi Weiss comes out against violence at the protests. But still for protests. I don't think that such is truly possible, in the current climate. My rebbe in Israel told me that a midwife is called a chachma because she is roeh et hanolad. Meanwhile, "misguided youths" attack an Arab taxi driver in Geulah.

  10. Oh! Nuts is having a Rosh Hashanah giveaway. You can enter by dropping a comment at this parshablog post, as well as in two other ways. See there.

Neturei Karta? They are nothing but Charuvei Karta!

Bava Batra 8a:
Rab Judah said: All must contribute to the building of doors in the town gates, even orphans; not, however, the Rabbis, [since] they do not require protection.
...
R. Assi further said in the name of R. Johanan: All are required to contribute to the repair of the town walls, including orphans, but not the Rabbis, because the Rabbis do not require protection. R. Papa said: For the repair of the walls, for the horse-guard and for the keeper of the armoury even orphans have to contribute, but the Rabbis [do not, since they] do not require protection.
Or the key phrase in Aramaic: אבל מרבנן לא רבנן לא צריכי נטירותא

There is a famous story, which can be found in Yerushalmi Chagiga 6a-b, about the Rabbis, or rather teachers, being the protectors of the city.

I recall hearing from Dr. Steiner* that it was funny, from a grammatical standpoint, that the Neturei Karta call themselves the Neturei Karta. If one wanted to say protectors of the city in Aramaic, it should be Netorei Karta, with a cholam**. With Neturei Karta appearing to be the passive, and those those who were protected, rather than the protectors. Of course, he clarified, that is not how it would work in Aramaic. The "protected" would be Netirei Karta, with a chirik. Which after all is their Chassidic pronunciation of Neturei, so that it works out after all.

(Presumably, the same applies to Charovei Karta...)

Footnotes:
______________
* though I heard it years ago, and so any errors in what I report are almost certainly due to my deficiency in recollection.

** and thus also against the vocalization provided to the right.

Must we accept the ridiculous, in both halacha and hashkafa?

Over at Divrei Chaim, Chaim B. is arguing once again that belief is the same as halacha, and that one is therefore obligated to accept consensus, rather than what makes sense, and picking and choosing amongst shitot which make sense. One wouldn't simply choose between Shach and Taz based on which is the most persuasive. And similarly for hashkafa, and that this is basic.

One can make distinctions between the two -- there are sources, previously discussed, for making such a distinction --and indeed, how does he know that it is not my masorah to make distinctions between the two? But even if there were not such a distinction, who says that one should not do this for halacha as well? Of course, this is for someone who is a qualified posek, but such a person who is worthy and capable of considering the question is supposed to consider it, according to some very prominent opinions. He may think all he wants that in matters of hashkafah, I am not a bar hachi to put forth my own position -- for example, that it is not true that all extinct animals are in hiding, or that it is not true that Jews have a different number of teeth than gentiles, but I respectfully disagree. Indeed, in several instances involving modern "consensus", the chareidi consensus is not just restricted to chareidim, but it is based on a willfull ignorance of modern science.

A little while back, on Hirhurim, I engaged in a debate about ridiculous halachic opinions, and whether one (of course, one who was sufficiently qualified) was able to pass judgement over whether a halchic idea was ridiculous. An example was the Kaf HaChaim saying that one could not say the blessing on the trees on Shabbos, because kabbalistically, he is separating off klipos, which is Borer. The Chasam Sofer said it was an improper conflating of two areas, halacha and kabbalah. And indeed, they are mere homonyms, but separating off klipos is not doing this in the physical realm and is entirely separate from what Chazal intended with the Biblical prohibition of Borer. Similarly, it seems mighty strange to claim that reflecting on different theories and arguments, and choosing among them, should be considered Borer. That is not what they meant, and it seems more than a bit ridiculous.

Someone frum in the comment section there offered a challenge that all of halacha is ridiculous, so how can we choose to label any halachic position ridiculous. Personally, I don't think that all of halacha is ridiculous, and we argued that out, but I came up with a few examples of nonsense which I thought that anyone would agree was utter nonsense. Thus, a reductio ad absurdum to challenge my disputant's "Credo quia absurdum".

My examples:
(1) if someone greeted a woman (thus being *shoel* in her shalom) and she was subsequently raped (*ones*) by another person, he have to pay the 50 shekel to her father, because a Shoel is chayav in Ones. But if he had his Baal idols with him when he greeted her, he would be exempt, because it is a case of Baalav Imo.

(2) If one reads a brayta on Shabbos, he has to read it in full, until the end of the seifa, or else it would be a case of Pesik Reisha.

(3) One is forbidden from sending his amputated leg-bone to the Soviet Union, because "Ain adam meisim atzmo Russia."

(4) If two people are hiding inside a bull-costume made of an actual bull, one may not pull aside the costume to reveal their faces while they are not in the course of walking, because it is "megaleh panim batora shelo kehalacha."
and LamedZayin helped out with other examples:
One who is in doubt as to whether his requirement to make a blessing on bread was satisfied by listening to another person's blessing must rely on the other person's recollection and not his own, since "hamotzi ma'chaveiro alav haraya."

It is forbidden to apply foundation cream to another person's face in public since "hamalbin p'nei chaveiro b'rabim ein lo cheilek ba'olam ha'baa".

These were examples of using homonyms, such that it was a clear misapplication of one category to another.

When pressed whether he would agree that these hypotheticals were ridiculous, and if so, how he would distinguish between these and other statements others were labelling ridiculous, if one could not pass judgement, my disputant replied:
The answer to your hypothetical would be it depends on who is saying it.
Of course, he seemed to restrict this to where Chazal said it. At any rate, I don't think that one should accept the obviously silly and untrue even in the realm of halacha.

In terms of halacha though, at least there is the halachic process in place, such that the position, whether true or false, is the "correct" conclusion of the system. But in many matters of hashkafah or hilchos de'os, we are dealing with reality. There is a distinction between reality and halacha. For example, in halacha one can say elu veElu. But in terms of history, the gemara itself asks by the instance of the Pilegesh BeGiveah that only one can be true, and the other must be false. That they were able to resolve it in that particular case was to the credit of the Rabbinic figure involved, but the strong implication is that it does not apply to narrative aggadah in general -- or else it would not be to his particular credit here.

We cannot "pasken" reality. When the Rambam saw the Mishnah that spoke of two children born, the first via C-section and a later child in the normal way, which conflicted with the reality (up until his time) that a woman would die as a result of a C-section, he did not say that we must believe that women do not always or regularly die as a result of C-sections. Instead, he reinterpreted the Mishnah in a way to make it accord with his perceived reality. Centuries later, Rav Moshe Feinstein did not say, based on the Rambam, that women never survive C-sections. He acknowledged reality that women in his day were surviving it, and concluded that this was a case of nishtaneh hateva. But he did not deny reality. And if nishtaneh hateva were not an established excuse, I don't believe he would have shut his eyes to reality.

Rav Yaakov Kaminetzsky watched the moon landing on TV, he did so to determine whether the Rambam was correct that the moon was of a different, non-substantial material. When Neil Armstrong touched foot on the moon, Rav Yaakov Kaminetzsky concluded that Chazal, including the Rambam, must have been wrong. (He likely didn't know that this was drawn from Aristotle, not Chazal in particular, and had been disproven centuries earlier based on optics.) He did not say that we must not believe our own eyes and our own seichel. In contrast, the Satmar Rebbe believed the moon landing must have been faked.

While this story about Rav Kaminetzsky was printed in the first copy of the sefer, it was apparently blanked out in the next printing, and in the third, even the gap was missing. I am not certain whether the "problem" was the TV watching or the claim that Chazal were wrong.

When Rav Shamshon Refael Hirsch explained that some statements of Chazal were based on contemporary science, he did not instead simply decide to believe that Chazal were right. The rabbinic consensus of Chazal did not cause him to deny reality and to choose to believe that Chazal were correct in these scientific matters. To then turn around and say that I cannot follow him in this hashkafic assertion because I am not a Yekke would seem to be against the Rationalist position, and thus is begging the question. One may not be a rationalist because one may not be a rationalist in epistemology, but must instead follow consensus and masorah.

The point is that when it comes to reality, and truth vs. falsehood, to claim that one must follow and believe "consensus" as opposed to what is true is somewhat upsetting. One can claim this, but then the religion itself is false.

In my particular case, much (though not all) of my "rationalist" perspective is one I did grow up with, and one I absorbed from certain of my teachers. But it bothers me that he casts this as a matter of picking and choosing amongst Rishonim and Acharonim, and that such is illegitimate. I believe what I believe because I think it is True, not because I can find some Rishon or Acharon to support it. That various Rishonim or Acharonim do support it is just icing on the cake.

I make other related points in the comment thread there. Check it out.

Tuesday, September 01, 2009

Why is the krei/ketiv of yishgalena/yishkavena not a problem of reading not from the ktav?

A famous krei and ketiv pair in parshat Ki Savo is in Devarim 28:30:
ל אִשָּׁה תְאָרֵשׂ, וְאִישׁ אַחֵר ישגלנה (יִשְׁכָּבֶנָּה)--בַּיִת תִּבְנֶה, וְלֹא-תֵשֵׁב בּוֹ; כֶּרֶם תִּטַּע, וְלֹא תְחַלְּלֶנּוּ.30 Thou shalt betroth a wife, and another man shall lie with her; thou shalt build a house, and thou shalt not dwell therein; thou shalt plant a vineyard, and shalt not use the fruit thereof.

As I discussed in the past, a convincing reason for this krei and ketiv is that over the centuries, language changed, and what was once an acceptable word became unacceptably crude. Just as many English curse words nowadays.

This krei and ketiv is mentioned in Megillah 25b, where it is clear that the problem is that it is inappropriate:

ת"ר כל המקראות הכתובין בתורה לגנאי קורין אותן לשבח כגון (דברים כח) ישגלנה ישכבנה (דברים כח) בעפולים בטחורים (מלכים ב ו) חריונים דביונים (מלכים ב יח) לאכול את חוריהם ולשתות את מימי שיניהם לאכול את צואתם ולשתות את מימי רגליהם

And the Rambam discusses this in hilchot sefer Torah, that it should not chas veshalom be written in accordance with the krei, for that would be an invalid sefer Torah:
רמבם ספר אהבה הלכות תפילין ומזוזה וספר תורה פרק ז הלכה יא
וכל הדברים האלו למצוה מן המובחר ואם שינה לא פסל. אבל אם כתב המלא חסר או החסר מלא. או שכתב מלה שהיא קרי וכתב כקריאתה כגון שכתב ישכבנה במקום ישגלנה ובטחורים במקום ובעפולים וכיוצא בהן. או שכתב פרשה פתוחה סתומה או סתומה פתוחה. או שכתב השירה כשאר הכתב. או שכתב פרשה אחת כשירה הרי זה פסול ואין בו קדושת ספר תורה כלל אלא כחומש מן החומשין שמלמדין בה התינוקות:
Thus, the ketiv certainly has importance in terms of being the required Biblical text.

Minchas Shai discusses this krei and ketiv, which is mentioned in the gemara and masechet Soferim. And then he cites the Rashba, who wrote in response to the question that since it is forbidden to read in the Torah even a single letter not from the text, how can the baal koreh read yishkavena when the text is yishgalena. And so too, every word which has a krei and ketiv, since all of them are written in the Torah according to the masoret (consonantal text) and not according to the reading (/vocalization) -- basically, every krei and ketiv. The answer is that this is a halacha leMoshe miSinai, as is written in perek Ain Bein HaMudar, Nedarim 37b:

אמר רבי יצחק מקרא סופרים ועיטור סופרים וקריין ולא כתיבן וכתיבן ולא קריין הלכה למשה מסיני

The ones which one reads, even though there is no word there at all, are as follows:

קריין ולא כתיבן (שמואל ב ח) פרת דבלכתו (שמואל ב טז) איש דכאשר ישאל איש בדבר האלהים (ירמיהו לא) באים דנבנתה (ירמיהו נ) לה דפליטה (רות ב) את דהגד הוגד (רות ג) אלי דהגורן (רות ג) אלי דהשעורים הלין קריין ולא כתבן

while the ones which are present, though one does not read, are:
וכתבן ולא קריין (מלכים ב ה) נא דיסלח (דברים ו) זאת דהמצוה (ירמיהו נא) ידרוך דהדורך (יחזקאל מח) חמש דפאת נגב אם (רות ג) דכי גואל הלין כתבן ולא קריין

Presumably this means an old tradition, rather than all the way to Sinai, since most of the examples are not Pentateuchal. It does not mention this particular sort of krei and ketiv in which one reads an entirely different word for the written word, but perhaps one can derive this by simple combination of the two sorts.

He continues that there was an incident with one who read as it was written {I suppose yishgalena} before the Gedolei Hador, and they admonished him that he should read according to the masoret {here, this means according to the traditional way it should be read} and he did not desire to do so; and they placed him under the ban and removed him from the teva.

It takes a specific type of personality for this, I suppose. I recall my brother-in-law, when laining in the YU Bet Midrash, refusing to modify his pronunciation of patach ganuv mapik heh, where he insisted on laining it ha (with an extended patach) rather than ah; despite being corrected multiple times. For he felt he was correct, following a tradition from his father and grandfather.

In the case in question, about krei and ketiv, perhaps this was some fellow with Karaitic leanings. Though I see that Aharon ben Yosef the Karaite is perfectly happy with this krei and ketiv. Perhaps the "problem" was indeed this injunction against not reading anything not from the text.

In Igros Moshe, Orach Chaim 1:32, Rav Moshe Feinstein makes it clear that he does considerthis reading from the text. That is,
ומסתבר רהוא הדין בקרי וכתיב כגון על תיבת
ישגלנה נמי יצטרך להוציא אהרת משום שבהלכה
נאמר שתיבת ישגלנה בכאן יקרא ישכבנה ולא שיקרא
תיבת ישכבנה בע"פ.
That is, if wax drips and obscures the word, it is logical that you need to bring out another one, for the halacha is that looking at the word ישגלנה, you should read ישכבנה, but not by reading it baal peh.

A related question is just how crude the word is. Rambam, in Moreh Nevuchim 3:8, tries to declare lashon kodesh holy in that it has no crude words, and so he explains the meaning of ישגלנה in a non-crude manner.

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