- On the Torah and Science front, at ladaat.net, some fellow counted the number of seeds in a pomegranate and found it to be about 800, not 613! This is understandably disturbing since Malbim and Chatam Sofer say that there are 613 seeds in a pomegranate, and people reacted in different ways. One suggested that it is kefirah to question this, because כל המהרהר אחרי רבנן... is like he is meharher acharei haShechina. And someone suggested it was simply the average, comparing it to Zohar who says that the shoshana has 13 petals, when he counted and often found more or less.
To justify the "average", they cited from and linked to the hoax study from aquaphoenix. Someone linked to my debunking of the cute yet silly hoax, though it seems to me that they were likely bringing it as evidence for the average justification.
Rabbi Dr. Avi Zivitofsky already discussed this misconception. - Thanbook wonders where the 'Snag kabbalah is. He details how it was taken out of the curriculum, and wonders whether it is time to introduce it in a controlled way. Of course, from my perspective, it is good we don't know or follow kabbalah, and the sequestering of it is just an easy way to place it in geniza, which is good because it is not, theologically speaking, the authentic Judaism of Chazal.
- Life In Israel wonders whether the lulav shortages are deliberately manufactured in order to allow for easier importation, and wonders whether importing from Gaza and the like is positive, in the overall picture.
I remember on one kibbutz they showed us date palms, and how only lulavim from the center are not spread out and are good for lulav, which leads to the shortage. - Hirhurim about whitewashing history.
- Vos Iz Neais covers the Yosef coin story, and there are some interesting comments in the comment section about Jewish sources regarding the institution of coinage.
And another story, about Rav Elyashiv's answer to someone who asked him about wearing crocs on Yom Kippur. Of course, he is not the posek for everyone. See the comment section, also. - Environmentalists seek to wipe out plush toilet paper.
- Avakesh posted a clip of this, and I liked it. From David Zasloff. Hatikva on the Shofar:
and Jumpin' In Jerusalem: - An African village believes that evil powers created a half-man, half-goat creature. Of course, this is because they lack medical knowledge.
- The Muqata discusses Rav Elyashiv et al. forbidding all Shabbos elevators, and Tzomet's reaction blasting the ruling without having at the very least contacted them. (See also at the Yeshiva World.)
They make a point which should resonate, and which is all too familiar:In addition, Rabbi Rosen questions those in the “court of the rabbonim”, explaining gedolim are obviously called upon to affix their signatures by rabbis who have access to them deciding to bring this specific issue to their attention. He asked how such a decision can be reached, quoting experts in the field, when Zomet, which is one of two institutes in the field working to find technological advances that can be incorporated into permitted shabbos use, was not contacted by any of the rabbonim who brought this to the attention of gedolei yisrael shlita. He stated, “I am not a ‘bal plugta’ with any of the gedolim” but question how such a ruling can be issued without even conferring with rabbinical experts such as those at Zomet.
Rabbi Rosen added that it is difficult for him to comment since the p’sak circulating in chareidi circles is not detailed.
Rabbi Rosen told Kol Chai Radio that he feels the gedolim at times are led by those who have access to them, pushing certain issues before them and in this case, opting to ignore the experts who address the issues for the past years, relying on torah giants such as Reb Shlomo Zalman.
- Here at parshablog, on mermaids and Yosef coins.
Tuesday, September 29, 2009
Interesting Posts and Articles #216
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32 comments:
So? Neither is post-Maimonidean philosophism, for all that many thinkers have embraced some form of it. Both are medieval grafts onto Judaism, replacing the authentic Jewish mysticism of the Heichalot literature with another theological system.
That you don't particularly like it, doesn't change the fact that Plato has roundly defeated Aristotle in the contest for the "authentic medieval Jewish theology" The Chasidim embrace it, the Sephardim embrace it, the Litvish ignore both it and philosophy, and the moderns ignore it and embrace philosophy.
The Litvish tried to replace Kabbalah with Mussar, but that died in the flames of Europe. So they have nothing to be their pnimiyus haTorah. Perhaps that explains their drive for chumra - having removed all substance, they try to substitute with more and more form.
Scientia vicit omnia? Apparently not.
I may be more of a rationalist than a neo-Platonist, but I recognize the reality that Kabbalah is here to stay, much as our "camps" try to ignore it away.
definitely true.
i think it makes a difference how one regards kabbalah. if one thinks it is a good thing, and a positive influence in Judaism, then perhaps we should try to encourage it, despite it not being "authentic". but if the opposite, then the opposite.
"The Chasidim embrace it, the Sephardim embrace it,"
And sefardim and chassidim are much more superstitious for it. The chassidim are rebbe-centric, and believe in segulos and the like. And much of Sefardi Judaism is similarly superstitious -- and dare I say it? primitive -- for their embracing of kabbalah.
*If* it is not authentic Chazal makes the "pnimiyus" interpretations they come up with falsehoods. But dangerous falsehoods, which might well be avoda zara. If the only "pnimiyus" that could exist would be Chassidus, I am not so certain the Gra would have been in favor of it. If the only pnimiyus available to us were e.g., Sabbatian kabbalah or worse, Christianity, I don't think you would embrace it. Even if you thought it was utter nonsense, such as a pnimiyus invented yesterday from someone who learned a bit of Torah and then escaped from Arkham asylum, you would not think it positive.
Similarly (and as one small example), if kabbalah is not authentically from Chazal, then believing in Sefirot and directing prayers to specific Sefirot may well be avodah zarah, no less than believing Shabtai Tzvi is part of the Godhead (Tiferes) or that Yushke is part of a Trinity.
And that we are not inculcated in it gives us a chance to escape it, and that it is not promoted as one of the ikkarei emunah gives us a chance to recognize the dangers of it, and perhaps feel free to reject it.
True, our Judaism is poorer for not having a nistar and pnimiyus, and it may be less inspirational. But even so, I enjoy and appreciate the status quo.
I also think that there is a "spirit of the law" present in nigleh, and that if we just focus enough on the overt and try to appreciate it, then we can also have a very rich Judaism. We can appreciate shiluach hakan for its nigleh aspects, for example; I would guess those aspects get obscured when everything is being done to accomplish things in hidden worlds, in order to fix klipot and the like, and in order to stop gilgul.
kol tuv,
josh
"which is good because [kabbalah] is not, theologically speaking, the authentic Judaism of Chazal."
Why does it not equally offend you that Chazal's Judaism is not, theologically speaking, the authentic Judaism of the Bible's authors?
"An African village believes that evil powers created a half-man, half-goat creature. Of course, this is because they lack medical knowledge."
So if a person believes that a sea split it's because they lack physics knowledge?
`which is good because it is not, theologically speaking, the authentic Judaism of Chazal
Practically speaking, it is no different than the philosophical interpretations in relation to Chazal. However, whoever believes in any one stream, or a combo of both, should think of it as the original, "authentic", Judaism of our forefathers.
Otherwise, it has little place in Judaism.
BTW, mystical interpretations do have to replace regular pshat, similar to midrashim, in a sense.
There goes one big argument against Kabbalah.
"Why does it not equally offend you that Chazal's Judaism is not"
it needs to indeed be different, and additionally, it needs to be false. (and perhaps it needs to be false it a rather offensive or damaging way.)
absent both those conditions, it does not. if e.g. due to the limitations of the times, people of old believed in a corporeal God, but Chazal did not, BUT in fact God is non-corporeal, then it does not offend me.
but i guess i am weird. do you think so?
"So if a person believes that a sea split"
no. if they see a physical phenomenon accurately and adequately described by science but lacking that knowledge believe that it could only be because of evil spirits, then it is because they lack physics knowledge. your analogy is very far off. it should be along the lines of seeing a sea split, which is perfectly understandable to the alien race of Kryptonians, but which mere humans can only attribute to Divine Providence.
kol tuv,
josh
to continue:
however, i would fully understand if a Karaite felt that way, and wouldn't think that his feelings in this regard made him an oisvorf. so too some bloggers out there. do i think, for example, that littlefoxlings is "bad" for feeling the way he does, if he does in fact feel so? i don't see why. taking as axioms that which he believes, his conclusions and feelings seem to be absolutely justified.
so i would sever process from conclusion, and though i don't agree with the particular conclusions, i can certainly understand and respect the process.
i hope this answered what you were asking...
yosef:
a good and interesting point. i'll try to address it, perhaps tomorrow.
kol tuv,
josh
Whoops!
My comment above should have read: BTW, mystical interpretations do not have to replace regular pshat, similar to midrashim, in a sense.
I think you might disagree, but that's what I meant.
"Practically speaking, it is no different than the philosophical interpretations in relation to Chazal."
i agree. if the philosophical interpretations corrupt and misinterpret Chazal, then it is not a good thing. and Shadal, for example, was greatly upset at both kabbalistic pnimiyus interpretations and philosophical drash.
"However, whoever believes in any one stream, or a combo of both, should think of it as the original, "authentic", Judaism of our forefathers."
perhaps.
"Otherwise, it has little place in Judaism."
again perhaps. i'm not so certain. what if one believes X is true and also knows full well that Chazal didn't hold X to be true. for example, that Chazal and the Avos thought that heaven was a physical place in the sky, but that we have advanced past there?
or that the world was not yet ready for the "revelation" of kabbalah in the days of the Rishonim, but the Arizal revealed so much more than was outside the mindset of many if not all of Rishonim, and also of Chazal?
also, perhaps one can argue there is some malleability within the system.
"BTW, mystical interpretations do [not] have to replace regular pshat, similar to midrashim, in a sense."
even if they don't, they might add new theology which the original theology would hold false and/or repugnant. and they might well contradict explicit theology of Chazal.
for example, I covered just such an instance a short while back. In Bava Metzia, Rabbi Yochanan darshens: that thine exit from the world shall be as thine entry therein: just as thou enterest it without sin, so mayest thou leave it without.
Yet gilgul is against this!
A tanna tells his students that there is no reality to tumah and tahara, but it is just fulfilling the ratzon of the King to treat it as if it were so. And the Zohar overturns this!
There are probably many instances where they are supplemental rather than simply overturning. But due to the idea of having "proper" kavanos, the emphasis is on the kabbalistic rather than the arguably real. For example, the kabbalistic focus of sefirat haOmer has likely entirely overwhelmed the original intent, which nowadays is rather uninspirational.
kol tuv,
josh
` again perhaps. i'm not so certain. what if one believes X is true and also knows full well that Chazal didn't hold X to be true. for example, that Chazal and the Avos thought that heaven was a physical place in the sky, but that we have advanced past there?
Is this true in religious aspects as well?
Are you willing to say that Chazal erred in matters of hashkafah. If so you're extending what I though was limited to scientific matters.
In other words, chazal are just cooked up some ideas and its up to us to agree or disagree. Whenever we want. All they're giving us is a guide, but the final decision is completely ours. Which meant I can correctly be a karaite, according to this da'as Torah (oops).
Slippery.
or that the world was not yet ready for the "revelation" of kabbalah in the days of the Rishonim, but the Arizal revealed so much more than was outside the mindset of many if not all of Rishonim, and also of Chazal?
Well, in Kabbalah as well, the claim goes that Chazal of course, did have it but it was hidden, either from them, or from hamon am.
But they're still not diverging from the view above, that in matters of religion, chazal are above us to disagree.
even if they don't, they might add new theology which the original theology would hold false and/or repugnant. and they might well contradict explicit theology of Chazal.
Again, according to the philosophical view. Kabbalah, however, is bound to resolve it, because they had the same questions as you.
True, you might disagree with their terutzim, but the goal is still there.
A tanna tells his students that there is no reality to tumah and tahara, but it is just fulfilling the ratzon of the King to treat it as if it were so. And the Zohar overturns this!
Betcha there's a terutz to this! I can even guess my own. That there is no physical reality to tumah/taharah.
For example, the kabbalistic focus of sefirat haOmer has likely entirely overwhelmed the original intent, which nowadays is rather uninspirational.
Similar to what we've done to succos and pesach in regards to their original intent. Probably only because it doesn't apply to us much in a sense.
Should we move back to agriculture, we might revert to the original intent.
Oh, and this was done, I think, with kabbalah intervening.
Sorry again; the last statement should read
"Oh, and this was done, I think,
without kabbalah intervening."
indeed, a dangerous slippery slope; i'll try to clarify tomorrow.
good night,
josh
i apologize in advance at the choppiness. i haven't crystallized all these thoughts yet, and later formulations might be smoother and more accurate.
there is indeed a danger in the idea of continuing revelation, that there was Torat Moshe and nowadays there is Torat Miriam, to borrow a phrase. such may well be heretical.
hashkafa, by which broadly we may mean theology and morality, might be considered non-halachic material. while halacha is binding, perhaps the particular theology and morality is not.
as an example, Rambam offers different views on Hashgacha Pratis. He lists a bunch, including that of various Arab philosophors (which seems to be the modern "frum" view), that of heretics, that of Chazal, and his own view, which differs somewhat.
Or Rambam's interpretation of the role and purpose of korbanos, which I think differs from that of Chazal.
Extreme medieval Jewish philosophers reinterpreted many psukim entirely allegorically, as speaking about Aristotelean concepts, such that Avraham lo haya velo nivra, against Chazal. Of course, they were condemned by some major rabbinical figures for it.
In terms of practical theology and morality, I am almost positive that we differ from Chazal in a whole bunch of areas. For just one example in the realm of morality, what do you think about marriage, and the idea of taking a tzara? Do you think Rav acted admirably by having a new "wife" in every town?
We differ, yet because we feel bound to be saying the same as Chazal, and so we creatively reinterpret. For example, see how Dixie Yid claims that the Rambam holds of Hashgacha Pratis on Every Detail of Creation, that is, agrees with the Baal HaTanya. Meanwhile, Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim attributes this to certain frum Arab philosophers and argues against it; and says Chazal and he hold differently.
But it is not just Chassidim, and kabbalists, who reinterpret. Look at Berachot 7a, and how the ideas of tzaddik vera lo etc. as stated in Biblical theology as well as in the theology of named Chazal are "reinterpreted" and undermined in the section starting Amar Mar, from tzadik ben tzadik to tzadik gamur.
And it is also the philosophers, the rationalists, well, basically everyone.
The question is: what if you don't really "buy" the process of harmonization, and historical evidence suggests otherwise? you may be creative enough to play the game others are playing, either consciously or subconsciously. but what if you don't?
well, is there pesak in hashkafa? on the other hand, if not, what are the bounds of this freedom? how is it still Judaism, if you can make up any hashkafa you choose?
*perhaps* one can say that Judaism is a religion of truth; and that just as in a matter of halacha, if you (as a competent authority in this regard) are convinced that rishonim erred (or even that Tannaim and Amoraim erred), you are obligated to act in accordance with truth, so too here.
but i don't have easy answers, and it is indeed a difficult question.
in terms of tuma, see here. I would consider the teretz to be more or less what Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai told the gentile, to push him off with a reed.
It seems, btw, that you agree that certain things have shifted historically? So are you pretending otherwise or not? Do you agree shifting is acceptable, or do you think that it is not acceptable?
And I restate here my apologies for the rambling nature of this comment.
kol tuv,
josh
Part 1: (Blogger doesn't let me post more.)
hashkafa, by which broadly we may mean theology and morality, might be considered non-halachic material. while halacha is binding, perhaps the particular theology and morality is not.
Still, I think you would agree that some concepts in hashkafah are halachically binding. For example, the unity of God. I think this is a universal Jewish concept with no real wiggle room. Therefore, while there might be issues with sefirot, kabbalist attempt to resolve it. In other words, they, and you agree on the same premise. You might disagree with their method, or maybe even their conclusion, but the finish line will always end with one God, no "but's".
In simpler terms, there are general outlines that everyone religious will have to abide by to be considered religious. Even with differing methods.
Extreme medieval Jewish philosophers reinterpreted many psukim entirely allegorically, as speaking about Aristotelean concepts, such that Avraham lo haya velo nivra, against Chazal. Of course, they were condemned by some major rabbinical figures for it.
Exactly my point. They went beyond what these Rabbanim considered proper.
You can somewhat compare it to the Slifkin controversy. Some Rabbanim considered it over the top, some don't. While all of us would consider the above mentioned shittah on Avraham overboard.
In terms of practical theology and morality, I am almost positive that we differ from Chazal in a whole bunch of areas. For just one example in the realm of morality, what do you think about marriage, and the idea of taking a tzara? Do you think Rav acted admirably by having a new "wife" in every town?
Do I? Maybe. My morality is decided by the Torah, not the other way around. Rather, thats the way it should be. In my mind, if the Torah has no issue with it, I don't as well. True, I might bend the pshat according to my bias, but thats because I don't notice it. I adjust as I notice.
If morality is something I decide on my own, it doesn't exist.
Kiddushin through bi'ah was banned because the nature of people changed, (ie. they became immoral,) not the Torah.
Meanwhile, Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim attributes this to certain frum Arab philosophers and argues against it; and says Chazal and he hold differently.
True, but I don't think the Rambam would agree that we can disagree with chazal whenever we feel like it. Hence his position on Techias Hameisim.
Part 2:
The question is: what if you don't really "buy" the process of harmonization, and historical evidence suggests otherwise?
So don't. But find me one acceptable Rishon or achron that doesn't. You won't. Because these that do were rejected as maskilim/enlightened/etc. just like these extreme philosophers. This historical filter forces harmonization. True, its only to an extent. But this as a whole represents the outer limits of kosher orthodox theology. You can go further, but you're leaving orthodoxy.
*perhaps* one can say that Judaism is a religion of truth; and that just as in a matter of halacha, if you (as a competent authority in this regard) are convinced that rishonim erred (or even that Tannaim and Amoraim erred), you are obligated to act in accordance with truth, so too here.
Not always. If for example, all Rishonim held a certain position and knew all the arguments against it (if they write it clearly, for example), and they still reject it, I wouldn't pit myself against them and would defer. Again, if it is indeed universal.
It seems, btw, that you agree that certain things have shifted historically? So are you pretending otherwise or not? Do you agree shifting is acceptable, or do you think that it is not acceptable?
I'm unsure what you mean with this question. I'll assume you meant what I wrote in regards to the yamim tovim.
Have they? The changes we have are quite similar to the general shift toward limud hatorah (and tefillah?) after the churban. I would venture to say that the shift is more towards emphasizing different aspects of the yom tov. Similarly, R' Yochanan ben Zakkai, changed the emphasis in Judaism towards Torah. Did Jusaism change per se? I would say no.
Here too, Shavuos is indeed the day of mattan torah, we did go out of mitzra'im on pesach, we do eat matzah and we build a sukkah. While the original emphasis in Yerushalayim was more agriculture based, since we no longer have that emphasize other aspect of the yom tov.
Did we drop the originals. I don't think so. Its just not stressed.
I was living at aish hatorah back in 1983 and decided to count the seeds in a pomegranate. It came to way more than 613 and my roomies refused to believe that I counted properly or suggested that perhaps that I cut some seeds in half by accident. Sheesh.
>My morality is decided by the Torah.
Really? So you don't think it's wrong to keep non-Jewish slaves in almost as much degradation as existed in the antebellum South? Or to pursue the accidental killer with a posse which will kill him in revenge?
I mean, I know one or two people who do hold that way, but most others regard them as somewhat kooky.
As for the pnimiyus hatorah subthread, I started to respond, but it got really long, so I spun it off back onto thanbook.
I just realized - until the time of the Tannaim, or perhaps the 2nd Temple, the Jews didn't need a pnimiyus haTorah to provide a context for the mitzvot. We had the Beis ha /F/r/i/k/k/i/n/' Mikdash. We had the opportunity for annual or monthly communion with the Divine.
The constructed spiritualities, starting with the Heichalot literature, seems to have started in the post-biblical period, when the Divine connection (miracle fire, aron hakodesh, etc.) was missing from the 2nd Bayit.
I think that's the thesis of Elior's book "The Three Temples", which I have not yet read - the kohanim created the heichalot as an amplification of, and finally a substitute for, the Temple experience.
` Really? So you don't think it's wrong to keep non-Jewish slaves in almost as much degradation as existed in the antebellum South?
Absolutely not. Neither does the Torah allow it.
Or to pursue the accidental killer with a posse which will kill him in revenge?
This too, is a machlokes (in the Gemara) whether it is the recommended approach or not.
I (should) find it shocking that someone would consider his morality better that the avos.
perhaps i'll make another post about this. this is really too tough to discuss within the limits of comments responding to comments.
yosef:
two people with *identical* hashkafot, learned from their various teachers, which they both believe absolutely to be true. but one believes that these true beliefs were identical to those of chazal, while the other thinks that these true beliefs are not entirely the same as the beliefs of chazal. it certainly is possible that only the latter is a heretic. but it is certainly an interesting proposition.
i suppose one can also argue something akin to the view attributed to the Chazon Ish, that halacha, or in this case hashkafah, developed historically in a certain way under Divine guidance, such that this is eventually of the Divine plan.
in terms of arguing with hashkafah, i might be able to point to Shmuel Hanagid in mevo latalmud, where he asserts that only halachic tradition was mipi hagevurah, but in other realms of haggadah, this was the personal views of the rabbinic figures, Tannaim and Amoraim, and one can accept or reject what makes sense or does not.
i could point to Shmuel ben Chofni Gaon, who certainly knew that Chazal believed in witchcraft, yet asserted that witchcraft was nonsense.
i would guess you might consider witchcraft and sheidim (as per Rambam) to be scientific disputes, but in my view they are certainly hashkafic.
in terms of differing morality, i agree that you certainly believe that you are guided purely by Torah law as understood by the Amoraim; but i don't believe this is the case.
rav, in having a wife in every city (something different than mere kiddushin al yedei bia), was not a lecher. if one studies sassanian law and persian culture, what he did was entirely within the norm. and certainly your perspective is different than that of the time of David haMelech, where people went around carrying swords and used them, even on other Jews. your morality is not the same of the Chashmonaim either.
if you live in America, I would guess that you have absorbed parts of American culture and ethics. and perhaps good evidence is this is how your morality and ethics differs from Torah-Jews of other cultures. yours are not the same as that of a Teimani; or of a French Jew.
I would guess you value democracy, and subscribe to some notion that all people are created equal. I would guess that you would feel the need to grapple with, and morally justify the historical destruction of men, women and children in wars against Amalek and Midian. I seriously doubt that Chazal grappled with the same.
If I gave you a talmudic statement that major natural disasters with massive human casualties are caused as a way for God to sweep clean all the bastards from illicit unions, you would not be comfortable with it. You would probably take pains to reinterpret it in a satisfactory manner. That you claim otherwise is just evidence of this fairly common instinct and approach, of reinventing Chazal in our own image so that we can feel religiously comfortable acting as we do and believing what we believe. But I don't think that in reality this is the case, that Chazal, or "Torah", provides your entire compass.
thanbo:
interesting points. i'll think about it, and might try to address it here in the comment section, or in another post.
kol tuv, and chag sameach,
josh
just to highlight other "hashkafic" issues where we might differ from chazal, besides witchcraft and sheidim, i would point to dream interpretation and astrology.
kol tuv,
josh
1 If I gave you a talmudic statement that major natural disasters with massive human casualties are caused as a way for God to sweep clean all the bastards from illicit unions, you would not be comfortable with it.
Quite possible.
You would probably take pains to reinterpret it in a satisfactory manner.
Right. And because I believe that chazal felt differently as well. I does come from my bias, but thats how most people work, whether s/he knows it or not.
That you claim otherwise is just evidence of this fairly common instinct and approach, of reinventing Chazal in our own image so that we can feel religiously comfortable acting as we do and believing what we believe.
True, it might not. However, if I cannot reconcile the (my) differences in morality, I will defer to chazal.
Of course. But what I keep on saying is that when I get stuck, I have no choice but defer.
Take Amalek for example. A clear Torah commandment. While I might feel a need to justify it, and Rashi tries to as well, in the end, even if I can't, I'll accept it. And I'll accept it as the true and proper derech as well.
Are you trying to say that we have advanced to a society that is *better* than Torah mesinai? If so, drop it!
"Quite possible."
so how would you explain it? i didn't make that quote up, after all.
"I does come from my bias"
but by admitting that this comes from your bias, you are stepping outside yourself and admitting that it is possible that your morality is not the same as chazal. this appears self-contradictory!
"But what I keep on saying is that when I get stuck"
but that you would *feel* stuck, and that you would grapple with it, is evidence that your morality is not the same as chazal / the avos. they would not be "deferring". they would agree wholeheartedly that this is the correct approach. thus, that you must grapple means that your hashkafot -- your internal sense of morality -- is not the same as that of chazal.
"Take Amalek for example."
Please! ;)
"Are you trying to say that we have advanced to a society that is *better* than Torah mesinai?"
i am saying a lot of things. among them that dibra Torah kilshon benei adam, and so the Torah was given to people with values which developed in the Ancient Near East. and yes, there have been major improvements not just in science and thinking since then but also in morality.
for example, rambam thought the korbanot were a necessary compromise to a people that needed to relate to Hashem in that particular way. is heartfelt tefillah "better" than that? yes.
the gemara itself has Menasheh chastising Rav Ashi that were Rav Ashi living in his time, he would have lifted up the skirts of his robe to run after them to worship. different culture led to different yetzer haras.
also, while you claim you would accept Amalek, I have my severe doubts that if someone were to point out a certain innocent member of Amalek and established that it were a chiyuv upon you, that you would act upon it. you are no murderer, even if intellectually you may try to convince yourself that you would so act in a hypothetical case.
kol tuv,
josh
` so how would you explain it? i didn't make that quote up, after all.
I'd accept it. Uncomfortably, or course, but I'll have no choice.
but by admitting that this comes from your bias, you are stepping outside yourself and admitting that it is possible that your morality is not the same as chazal. this appears self-contradictory!
Indeed it might not be. But my goal is for it to be that way. I shouldn't feel uncomfortable with your example above (If I gave you a talmudic statement that major natural disasters with massive human casualties are caused as a way for God to sweep clean all the bastards from illicit unions, you would not be comfortable with it.), but I do. In the end, I hope not to.
but that you would *feel* stuck, and that you would grapple with it, is evidence that your morality is not the same as chazal / the avos. they would not be "deferring". they would agree wholeheartedly that this is the correct approach. thus, that you must grapple means that your hashkafot -- your internal sense of morality -- is not the same as that of chazal.
Thats right! It isn't. that doesn't mean that it shouldn't be. Hopefully I get there eventually.
"Take Amalek for example."
Please! ;)
You brought it up first! :)
among them that dibra Torah kilshon benei adam, and so the Torah was given to people with values which developed in the Ancient Near East.
Are you sure your'e not stretching it a bit?
for example, rambam thought the korbanot were a necessary compromise to a people that needed to relate to Hashem in that particular way. is heartfelt tefillah "better" than that? yes.
Should mashiach come now, would we still bring korbanos? Most definitely, I would think. But you're saying no, were now way ahead of these *primitive* ideas.
the gemara itself has Menasheh chastising Rav Ashi that were Rav Ashi living in his time, he would have lifted up the skirts of his robe to run after them to worship. different culture led to different yetzer haras.
Different yetzer hora's? Yes. Different morality? No.
also, while you claim you would accept Amalek, I have my severe doubts that if someone were to point out a certain innocent member of Amalek and established that it were a chiyuv upon you, that you would act upon it.
You're not proving anything. If someone would come with a gun and threaten you with death if you don't commit one of the 3 aveiros, you *might* fail. Does that change one iota of halachah (in this case)?
Its an issue with the yetzer.
Chag Same'ach!
according to Rav Kook, we will offer vegetable sacrifices rather than animal sacrifices.
chag sameach,
josh
oops:
http://www.ottmall.com/mj_ht_arch/v39/mj_v39i44.html
kt,
josh
` according to Rav Kook, we will offer vegetable sacrifices rather than animal sacrifices.
Do you agree with that?
To further explain:
Russel Hendel writes
> Ari Kahn in v39n22 gives a source for Rav Kooks statement that we
> will offer vegetables in the Messianic world.
> However the generally accepted position is that ALL OF MOSAIC LAW
> will be operative in the times of the Messiah. INDEED, the whole
> purpose of the Messiah is to allow us to practice commandments.
> In this case Rav Kooks statement of cessation of animal sacrifices
> would destroy and abrogate several Biblical commandments.
> It therefore seems to me that in cases like this we are obligated to
> simply say he was wrong."
While no rabbi is infallible I find it outrageous that one would accuse
R. Kook of not knowing basic laws that Russel claims holds. First of
all R. Kook's position on korbanot in the days of Mosiach is not
entirely clear. However, accepting R. Ari Kahn there are still many
midrashim that talk about laws being abrogated in the days to come.
There is the famous midrash that in the days of Moshiach most holidays
will be abrogated except for Purim.
1. Its a midrash. I'll let you crush that.
There is no the disagreement
between the Rabbis and R. Eliezer ben Azariah whether one is required to
mention the exodus from Eygpt at night or in the days of Moshiach. In
fact R. Chaim Soloveitchik states that Rambam does not mention the
mitzvah because since it does not hold (according to Rambam) in the days
of the Moshiach it is not an eternal mitzvah and Rambam does not mention
temporary (i.e. not in the days of Moshiach) mitzvot.
Hence, not only does R. Kook not know of the elementary principle of
Russel but even R. Chaim Soloveitchik was not aware of this either.
Um, the Rambam does indeed bring the halachos of the Moadim. And animal korbanos.
Given the choice I prefer to decide that Russel was wrong and not R.
Kook and Rav Chaim Soloveitchik and the midrashim and many other sources
Prof. Eli Turkel, turkel@... on 05/21/2003
Department of Mathematics, Tel Aviv University
I don't.
Regardless, according to your view above, why would we need even veggies. Or a Beis Hamikdash?
BTW:
The Chasam Sofer has a great answer on the Moadim.
He writes that there will be new moadim that are so much 'bigger' that the old ones will be 'batel beshishim'.
"Do you agree with that?"
no, but my point was that one *could*, and it seems that one prominent rabbi did. and this is along the line with a belief in the moving part the morality of the avos.
(who says i agree with rambam that this is the reason for korbanot?)
"1. Its a midrash. I'll let you crush that."
but what do we know about yemos hamoshiach except for midrashim? and that one can "interpret" midrashim does not make such midrashim convincing. (yet the interpretation might be true...)
"Um, the Rambam does indeed bring the halachos of the Moadim. And animal korbanos."
while rif only brings things halacha lemaaseh, is it certain that all things brought down in Rambam are things which will eventually be practices?
regardless, i agree that Rambam anticipated bringing korbanot. i cited this as an example for rav kook.
but all of this is a distraction. rather:
"Its an issue with the yetzer."
that is indeed my point. that you would be even "tempted" otherwise (to act in a morally correct way, which by the way you would) betrays the fact that your hashkafot are not the same hashkafot as Chazal. You "fix" that by saying that given an explicit contradiction, because of frum feelings that they are authoritative in halacha and hashkafa and are therefore right, you would give way to them. But that the contradiction arises in the first place, and would arise not just in you but in almost every Jew today (perhaps not certain Chareidim) shows that practically, your moral compass differs from that of Chazal.
And not just in these clear-cut extreme cases. In hundreds of daily interactions and thought-processes, where you don't *realize* you are at odds with Chazal, and would not take corrective measures. And this in terms of frum innovations in hashkafa, such as the mussar movement, or in secular values as well.
to summarize, you do not share Chazal's morality or theology entirely. if you did, there would not be a yetzer to disagree. chazal would not have had such a yetzer, because what they believed was obviously the truth.
kol tuv,
josh
I don't get what you're saying. Are you saying that chazal had no yetzer?
I'm not saying that my hashkafah is the correct one. I'm saying that chazal's hashkafah is correct. The fact that my hashkafah is still in practice different means that I have to correct it. But this is going entirely off topic.
Our discussion is whether chazal's hashkafos were right. Not whether mine is right.
"Are you saying that chazal had no yetzer?"
no, i'm saying that your 'yetzer' == your true hashkafa. because your reason for reluctance, and your grappling with chazal, is that your developed sense of morality and theology is not a match for the morality and theology of chazal. chazal certainly had a yetzer, but not one in which their mind would recoil from the stated morality and theology because their first inclination and gut feeling was that that the stated morality and theology was 'evil'.
indeed, if they had the sense that a given morality was evil, or that a given theology was false, they would have propounded a different theology or morality, and that different theology or morality would have been the one you would have needed to contend with. chazal's yetzer == chazal's morality and theology.
kol tuv,
josh
yosef: I was talking Eved Knaani, not Eved Ivri. Eved Knaani, you can work them hard, you can beat them, you just can't maim them, if maimed, they have to be released. Otherwise, they cannot be released, they're perpetual avadim and your property. IOW, almost as much degradation as the American South.
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