Thursday, August 24, 2006

The Learner/Burner Question -- part 7

Read the previous parts of this series:
Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Part 4
Part 5
Part 6


Conclusion

In summation, there is a brayta on Pesachim 7a which states:

היה יושב בבית המדרש ונזכר שיש חמץ בתוך ביתו מבטלו בלבו אחד שבת ואחד יום טוב

We analyzed this brayta in terms of two related issues. First, we attempt to discover is the true meaning of the brayta in terms of what is being nullified and when it may be nullifed. Second, we consider whether this brayta contradicts other Tannaitic sources in terms of whether one should leave the study hall in order to physically destroy chametz, and offer two resolutions to the apparent contradiction.

In analyzing the brayta, we declared that there are two laws that this brayta is primarily trying to teach. One is that one is allowed to perform nullification on either Shabbat or Yom Tov even though acquisitions (kinyan) is forbidden on Shabbat and Yom Tov by Rabbinic decree. The other is that if one is sitting in the study hall learning and recalls that he possesses chametz (or something about to become chametz) he should not stop learning but should rather nullify the chametz in his heart.

This brayta is understood by the gemara to refer to nullifying dough which is about to become chametz, rather than actual chametz. Analyzing this brayta from a traditional standpoint, we argued that even so, the brayta either explicitly or implicitly agrees that on Shabbat erev Pesach, one should nullify actual chametz as well, rather than leaving the study hall in order to destroy it physically.

Analyzing this brayta and the surrounding gemara from an academic standpoint, we undermined the setama digmara's basis for reinterpreting the brayta as referring to dough which had not yet become chametz rather than chametz itself. That is, Rava had stated that the reason Rav requires nullification in addition to searching is lest one find a tasty loaf, rather than mere insignificant crumbs. The setama objected that if one finds a tasty loaf, he could nullify it then, and answers that, in fact, nullification is ineffective one the prohibition sets in. We suggest that Rava meant that if one finds the significant tasty loaf on Pesach, he would already have violated the prohibition of owning chametz on Pesach, and so subsequent nullification is irrelevant.

The setama mustered up a statement by Rabbi Eleazar citing Rabbi Yishmael as stating that nullification of chametz after six hours on erev Pesach (the time when the prohibition sets in) is ineffective. It does the same for a statement of Rav Gidel citing Rav that states that betrothal using prohibited chametz from six hours and on on erev Pesachis totally ineffective. We suggested that the true meaning of this statement of Rabbi Eleazar is that even though, because of its extreme status of being prohibited in benefit, it is as if it had no substance and is not truly in his possession (as per Rav Gidel), he still is in violation for owning it on Pesach, for the Torah places it as if it in his possession. Rabbi Eleazar was not explicitly stating that one could not nullify it, but perhaps one could derive from Rabbi Eleazar and Rav Gidel's statements that any transfer of ownership, including hefker, would be invalid. This would effectively declare nullification impossible once the prohibition had set in. However, we pointed out that this would be true only if nullification was equal to declaring something hefker, or ownerless, but whether nullification is the same as hefker is subject to debate by Rishonim. Indeed, that the brayta in question states that one may nullify even on Shabbat and Yom Tov suggests that nullification is not a declaration of hefker but rather works to transform the significant tasty loaf into the equivalent of insignificant crumbs. That the same brayta also talks, at least on the simple level before reinterpretation, of nullifying on Yom Tov (once the prohibition has set in) bolsters the idea that this is what nullification is.

Finally, a statement by Rav Yaakov bar Acha was cited which reinterpreted that brayta. We pointed out the irregularity of an Amora answering to issues that until now were entirely in the (assumed to be later) setama, pointed out the setama's hand in the switch from Hebrew to Aramaic, pointed out how there were extraneous irrelevant details in Rav Yaakov bar Acha's statement, and showed how the diyuq from the words of the brayta to support the idea that was nullified was not yet chametz did not really follow. We suggested that Rav Yaakov bar Acha was answering a different question, and that he was really stating the first part of his statement -- that the case in the brayta was one in which one was specifically sitting before his teacher. We bolstered this with related language in the Tosefta which shows that יושב in the study hall means sitting before one's teacher. This cryptic statement by Rav Yaakov bar Acha is really the main link between the two issues and analyses, for we eventually show how he is attempting to resolve an apparent contradiction between Tannaitic sources.

We then turned to the second issue, of the contradiction in Tannaitic sources. While this brayta in Pesachim 7a stated that one should not leave the study hall to physically destroy chametz, other sources implied otherwise. A Tosefta stated that Rabbi Eleazar bar Tzadok, his father, and presumably Rabban Gamliel, left the study hall in order to physically destroy chametz. The Tosefta derives from this the law, stated in a Mishna (in the third perek of Pesachim) as well, that if one is engaged in an important mitzvah and recalls that he has chametz in his house, he should stop what he is doing and destroy the chametz, assuming he has time, and otherwise should nullify it in his heart. Thus, the Tosefta states, and the Mishna implies, that one should leave the study hall in order to physically destroy chametz. A brayta leading up to that Mishna detailing a similar incident with Rabbi Eleazar bar Tzadok may or may not imply the same.

We then noted that Rav Yaakov bar Acha's statement exactly answers this contradiction. Rav Yaakov bar Acha understands the brayta in Pesachim 7a to refer to someone sitting before his teacher, such that there is an additional obligation and critical aspect. Someone merely learning in study hall (such as Rabbi Eleazar and his father after Rabban Gamliel had left to destroy his own chametz) should stop learning to physically destroy chametz. Someone sitting before his teacher who recalls that he (and not others, who have already destroyed their chametz) still has chametz in his possession should not leave his teacher, but should simply nullify the chametz. We thus have found the question that Rav Yaakov bar Acha was trying to answer.

We then point out that a cryptic and troublesome statement in the Yerushalmi on that same Mishna seems to actually be giving the same answer as Rav Yaakov bar Acha -- that while typical learning has the same law as voluntary action in that one would in all instances stop learning to physically destroy the chametz, the case of one sitting before his teacher or before one greater than him in wisdom is not similarly considered voluntary, and therefore, it follows, one should not leave his teacher but should rather nullify it in his heart.

Finally, we interpret the remainder of the Yerushalmi to provide another resolution to the contradiction in Tannaitic sources. All sources deal with simply learning in the study hall, but the opinion that states that one should leave in order to physically destroy chametz is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda haNasi who maintains that action in performance of mitzvot has greater priority than learning Torah. Meanwhile, the opinion that states that one should not leave the study hall but should rather rely on nullification is the opinion of the Sages who concluded in a vote in Lud that Torah study takes priority. The clarification by the Sages of Caesaria that this is only when the necessary activity (such as burial of the dead) would be otherwise accomplished is in keeping with staying in the study hall, for removal of the chametz is accomplished by means of the nullification.

The Learner/Burner Question -- part 6

Read the previous parts of this series:
Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Part 4
Part 5

"haTalmud Kodem leMaaseh"

We might offer an alternative resolution to the contradiction between Tannaitic sources as to whether to stop learning in order to physically destroy chametz. We need not say that the Tannaitic sources are dealing with different circumstances. Instead, we can claim that there truly is a Tannaitic debate on the matter, based on the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda haNasi and the Sages who voted in Lud, regarding whether learning Torah or actual actions fulfilling Torah takes precedence. Yerushalmi Pesachim 24a states:

כך שנה רבי המעשה קודם לתלמוד. נמנו בעליית בית אריס בלוד התלמוד קודם למעשה. ר' אבהו שלח לרבי חנינה בריה יזכי בטיבריה. אתון ואמרין ליה גמל הוא חסד שלח ומר ליה המבלי אין קברים בקיסרין שלחתיך לטבריא. שכבר נמנו וגמרו בעליית בית אריס בלוד שהתלמוד קודם למעשה. רבנין דקיסרין אמרין הדא דתימר בשיש שם מי שיעשה אבל אם אין שם מי שיעשה המעשה קודם. דלמא ר' חייא רבי יוסי ר' אימי ענון למיתי גבי רבי אלעזר אמר לון אן הויתון. אמרין ליה גמל חסד. אמר לון ולא הוה תמן חורנין אמרין ליה מגור היה


Thus, Rabbi Yehuda haNasi, redactor of the Mishna, maintains that actual actions performing mitzvot takes priority over the learning of Torah. Meanwhile, in Lud, they voted and concluded that learning Torah takes priority over actual performance of mitzvot described in the Torah. The halacha is thus in accordance with the Sages in Lud and against Rabbi Yehuda haNasi. The Sages of Caesaria clarified this decision as referring to a case when the required activity would not otherwise get done. Thus, for example, if there is no one else to do the gemilat chesed of burying the dead, then he should take initiative and do it, even if this takes time away from learning.

The Tosefta, and perhaps by extension the Mishna (footnote: which records the law derived from the case in the Tosefta -- even though the Mishna does not overtly discuss the case), are in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda haNasi's opinion. Thus, performance of mitzvot is the ultimate goal, and so one should break off studying in the study hall in order to physically remove the chametz, actively fulfilling (Shemot 12:15) תשביתו שאור מבתיכם. However, we rule against Rabbi Yehuda haNasi, and the brayta reflects that. Since learning Torah takes priority over action, if he is sitting in the study hall and recalls that he still has chametz, he should not break off learning in order to physically dispose of it.

Now, the Sages of Caesaria clarified that this idea that learning Torah takes priority over action is only when there is not another to do it. However, when there is no other to do it, then action has priority. Why, then, should he stay in the study hall? We would propose that the point of the the Sages of Caesaria's statement is that Torah study has priority so long as what is necessary will be accomplished by other means. In this instance, the other means is not someone performing the physical destruction of chametz, but rather the nullification in his heart that the brayta instructs him to perform. Once he nullifies it, there is no more chametz in his possession, and so the goal has been accomplished.

Wednesday, August 23, 2006

The Learner/Burner Question -- part 5

Read the previous parts:
Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Part 4

"We Are Dealing With A Student Standing Before His Teacher"

How are to resolve this difficulty of conflicting Tannaitic sources? On one side of the divide, the brayta states that one must not stop learning to physically destroy chametz but should rather nullify it. On the other side of the divide, the Tosefta clearly states that one should stop learning in order to physically destroy chametz, and derives from this the first law of the Mishna, which leads one to conclude that the Mishna is in agreement that one should stop learning in order to physically destroy chametz.

There are typically three paths to resolving apparent Tannaitic contradictions. One can claim that the sources are dealing with different cases. One can claim that this is in fact a matter of Tannaitic dispute. Or, one can emend the text of one of the sources, claiming that it was reported wrong.

I would posit that Rav Yaakov bar Acha was troubled by the apparent conflict between Tannaitic sources which we have discovered. The brayta argues with a stam mishna as well as with a Tosefta! His answer is that הכא בתלמיד יושב לפני רבו עסקינן. That is, the case in the brayta which states that one should not leave the study hall but should rather simply nullify is dealing with a student sitting in front of his teacher. There is the honor due his teacher as well as the opportunity to gain important Torah knowledge he might otherwise not gain. Staying before his teacher is so critical that it is just like the case of להציל מן הנכרים ומן הנהר ומן הלסטים ומן הדליקה ומן המפולת! Therefore, he should not leave the study hall but rather he should immediately nullify it in his heart.

Indeed, as the gemara notes, this can be derived from close analysis of the brayta.
דיקא נמי דקתני היה יושב בתוך בית המדרש שמע מינה
After all, the brayta begins היה יושב בבית המדרש (footnote: or, according to the gemara's citation, היה יושב בתוך בית המדרש) and the word יושב can have a technical meaning of someone "sitting" before his teacher. Indeed, in the Tosefta we cited above, we have Rabbi Eleazar bar Tzadok and his father sitting before Rabban Gamliel in the study hall, thus demonstrating this usage:
פעם אחת [היינו יושבין לפני רבן גמליאל בבית המדרש בלוד]ש
With the brayta referring to this specific case, there is no contradiction with sources that suggest that one should break from typical learning in order to physically remove chametz.

Thus, we resolve the contradiction in Tannaitic sources, and we also match Rav Yaakov bar Acha's answer with its appropriate question.

I would posit that Rav Yaakov bar Acha is not the only one who sees this contradiction between the Mishna and the brayta and proposes this solution. I would suggest that the Yerushalmi on this Mishna does so as well.

The Yerushalmi Pesachim 23b-24a has a cryptic statement which is interpreted in a rather forced manner by the commentators. It states:
אפילו יכול לחזור ולבער ולילך ולהציל
אפילו יכול לילך ולשבות לחזור ולבטל
שאין שביתת הרשות אצל רבו או אצל מי שהוא גדול ממנו בחכמה.
כך שנה רבי המעשה קודם לתלמוד. נמנו בעליית בית אריס בלוד התלמוד קודם למעשה
...
This citation begins by explaining the Mishna that even if he has time to destroy his chametz and return to do the saving, he should not, but rather he should immediately nullify the chametz and proceed to save. Similarly, for the third category, something that is entirely voluntary, even if he has enough time to do the voluntary act before physically removing the chametz, he should immediately physically destroy the chametz. Note that the printed editions of the Yerushalmi have the girsa as אפילו יכול לילך ולשבות לחזור ולבטל, but as cited in the dibbur hamatchil of the Penei Moshe and as is evident from the comment of the Korban haEidah, the girsa before them was אפילו יכול לילך ולשבות לחזור ולבער.

What is unclear is the role of the statement שאין שביתת הרשות אצל רבו או אצל מי שהוא גדול ממנו בחכמה. Why is the Yerushalmi suddenly discussing someone sitting by his teacher or someone greater than himself. And why would we think this is שביתת הרשות?

Korban haEidah explains this cryptic statement as a question. Of course, everyone knows that when the Mishna stated the third category, ולשבות שביתת הרשות יחזור מיד, it was speaking about someone going to greet his teacher! (How this was obvious is unclear.) But, we all know that שאין ,שביתת הרשות אצל רבו או אצל מי שהוא גדול ממנו בחכמה greeting his teacher or someone greater than him in wisdom is not a voluntary matter. The answer is that this is Rabbi Yehuda haNasi who redacted the Mishna, and he holds that המעשה קודם לתלמוד. Learning is equated here with greeting one's teacher, and thus it falls under the category of שביתת הרשות.

In my opinion, this interpretation of this cryptic phrase is quite forced. It does not seem at first glance like a question.

Penei Moshe has a slightly less forced explanation of this cryptic phrase. He claims it is a separate statement. The third category in the Mishna was שביתת הרשות. One might think that travelling to his teacher or to one greater than him in wisdom in order to learn Torah would be considered שביתת הרשות. Therefore it tells us that it is not שביתת הרשות but rather is obligatory. Indeed, initially Rabbi Yehuda haNasi held that המעשה קודם לתלמוד. However, when they voted in Lud (Lydda) that התלמוד קודם למעשה, Rabbi Yehuda haNasi reversed his opinion to agree with them. Therefore this should not be listed as שביתת הרשות.

It is interesting to note that the incident mentioned in the Tosefta, in which Rabban Gamliel, Rabbi Eleazar bar Tzadok, and his father all left off learning in order to destroy the chametz, also occurred in Lud.

Ridvaz quotes the Rosh who has an alternate girsa of this Yerushalmi. Instead of שאין שביתת הרשות אצל רבו או אצל מי שהוא גדול ממנו בחכמה, the Rosh has מהו שביתת הרשות? ההולך אצל רבו או מי שהוא גדול ממנו בחכמה. כאו שנה רבי וכו. Thus, by removing שאין and replacing it with מהו, we have a place in the gemara where they establish going to his teacher and learning as רשות. The transition to Rabbi Yehuda haNasi's opinion about the primacy of action over study, which explains why he considers it a רשות, is then quite smooth. Of course, we need to consider whether the Rosh actually had this girsa or proposed this as what the text should read.

I would propose another solution to all of this. The Yerushalmi is aware of apparently conflicting Tannaitic sources on the matter. The case of typical study in the study hall is not enough to avoid physical destruction of chametz. While it is a mitzvah, it is not a passing mitzvah like slaughtering the Pesach sacrifice. There is therefore no issue of not having enough time to return to complete the mitzvah of learning. Therefore, one should conduct himself regarding it in the same way he would conduct himself if he were performing a wholly voluntary act -- he should destroy the chametz and then return to his learning.

However, there is also the brayta which states that one who is sitting in the study hall and remembers that he has chametz in his house should not leave the study hall but should rather nullify it in his heart. I would suggest that just like Rav Yaakov bar Acha, the Yerushalmi deduced from the word יושב that it meant someone sitting before his teacher. In such a case, this is no mere or voluntary act. There is a critical aspect to this, שאין שביתת הרשות אצל רבו או אצל מי שהוא גדול ממנו בחכמה.

It is true that the brayta is not explicitly cited, but I would suggest that it was in the body of Tannatic works before them when they wrote the Yerushalmi. (The Mishna was recorded separately from the Yerushalmi and the Bavli that comments on it, so perhaps this brayta or something similar was in the "Mishna" before them.)

Of course, the problem with this resolution of the contradiction in Tannaitic sources as given by Rav Yaakov bar Acha and the Yerushalmi is that the Tosefta is also a case of people sitting אצל רבו או אצל מי שהוא גדול ממנו בחכמה, yet they leave the study hall in order to destroy their chametz. I believe that the answer to this is that it was Zonin, the deputy to Rabban Gamliel, who came and told them that the time had arrived to destroy the chametz. Zonin was nt simply doing Rabbi Eleazar bar Tzadok and his father a favor. They were sitting before Rabban Gamliel. Presumably, Rabban Gamliel wished to study Torah and told his deputy to inform him when the time to destroy chametz had arrived. For Rabban Gamliel, there was no issue of sitting אצל רבו או אצל מי שהוא גדול ממנו בחכמה. Therefore, when the time came, he left to physically destroy his chametz. If Rabban Gamliel was not staying, then it was no longer an issue of sitting אצל רבו או אצל מי שהוא גדול ממנו בחכמה for Rabbi Eleazar bar Tzadok and his father either, but just one of studying Torah, and so they would also leave. Meanwhile, the case of the brayta is one in which he is sitting in the study hall before his teacher and he remembers that he has chametz in his house. This is not specifically the time of destroying chametz, and so presumably his teacher has already destroyed his own chametz.

The Learner/Burner Question -- part 4

See previous parts of this article:
part 1
part 2
part 3

The Tannaitic Dispute


The brayta on Pesachim 7a states:
היה יושב בבית המדרש ונזכר שיש חמץ בתוך ביתו מבטלו בלבו אחד שבת ואחד יום טוב

thus stakes out a particular claim -- that one should not interrupt learning for the sake of destroying chametz, but rather one should rely on nullification. This seems at odds with some other Tannaitic statements. For example, the Mishna on Pesachim 49a discusses other cases in which he is already involved, or on his way, to perform a commandment and then recalls that he has chametz in his house:

ההולך לשחוט את פסחו ולמול את בנו ולאכול סעודת אירוסין בבית חמיו ונזכר שיש לו חמץ בתוך ביתו
אם יכול לחזור ולבער ולחזור למצותו יחזור ויבער ואם לאו מבטלו בלבו
להציל מן הנכרים ומן הנהר ומן הלסטים ומן הדליקה ומן המפולת יבטל בלבו
ולשבות שביתת הרשות יחזור מיד

Thus, there are three situations listed in the Mishna. The first is a category of mitzvah. {ftnote: two of the cases in this first category carry a karet penalty for omission while the third is a requirement for shalom. Based on the gemara's discussion, it seems that this first category is just one of general mitzvah.} Therefore, if he has time to physically destroy the chametz and will still be able to complete the required task at hand, he should physically destroy the chametz first. However, if he does not have the time to complete both tasks, he can simply nullify it in his heart. The second category is that of an even more important activity, where he is trying to save from gentiles, from the river, from bandits, from a fire, or from a collapsed building. Who knows what the future will bring, and so it is inacceptable to delay even if he is sure that he has enough time to first destroy the chametz. The third category is one of some non-required activity. In such a situation, he should physically destroy his chametz even if he is sure that he will not have enough time to return to his activity.

Into what category does learning Torah fall? One might consider it in the first category, since learning Torah is a mitzvah. Perhaps learning Torah is so important that it fits into the second category? This would be quite surprising, since these are cases of saving someone from danger. Perhaps one might consider it in the third category, since it is not a commandment such that one violates karet for upon its omission.

The brayta states that one should not stop learning but should instead ab initio nullify it in his heart. This seems to grant learning Torah the same status as the second category in the Mishna. Yet a simple reading of the Mishna would cause one to think that learning Torah falls into the first category, that of a regular mitzvah, and so one should stop learning to physically destroy the chametz and then resume learning later. Indeed, we shall see that there is reason to think so based on the Tosefta.

{footnote: One answer suggested to me by Eliyahu Segal is that learning is a full time obligation, and even though he will never complete it, he must constantly learn. As Rabbi Tarfon states in the second perek of pirkei Avot, לא עליך המלאכה לגמור ולא אתה בן חורין להבטל ממנה. He can thus not return to complete his mitzvah of learning Torah -- that time should be spent learning Torah anyway, and so that learning is forever lost.}

Another source also might be read to suggest that one should stop learning in order to physically destroy his chametz. A brayta is cited on Pesachim 49a, leading up to the Mishna:

תניא ר"א בר צדוק אומר פעם אחת שבת אבא ביבנה וחל ארבעה עשר להיות בשבת ובא זונין ממונה של ר"ג ואמר הגיע עת לבער את החמץ והלכתי אחר אבא וביערנו את החמץ

Rabbi Eleazar bar Tzadok relates that one Shabbat erev Pesach, he and his father Tzadok were in Yavneh, the site where Rabban Gamliel led the Sanhedrin. Zonin, Rabban Gamliel's deputy, interrupted them in whatever they were doing and Rabbi Eleazar bar Tzadok and his father went and destroyed the chametz. One might say that they were learning Torah at the time -- for what else would Rabbi Eleazar bar Tzadok and his father be doing on a Shabbat in Yavneh? A similar incident described in the Tosefta may help us decide whether or not this is so. Yet if so, this important fact is missing from the brayta, and it is akin to proofs that our forefather Yaakov wore a yarmulke based on the words ויצא יעקב.

Indeed, this brayta is specifically cited in the gemara a different law in the preceding Mishna on Pesachim 49a -- that one destroys chametz on Shabbat:
ארבעה עשר שחל להיות בשבת מבערין את הכל מלפני השבת דברי ר"מ וחכמים אומרים בזמנו ר"א בר צדוק אומר תרומה מלפני השבת וחולין בזמנן

Rabbi Eleazar bar Tzadok thus reinforces his opinion that chullin is destroyed on Shabbat with an incident in which he did just that, with the agreement of Rabban Gamliel (though we do not know if this applies to terumah as well).

There is a similar incident brought down in the Tosefta which more definitively states that one should stop his learning in order to physically destroy chametz. In Tosefta Pesachim 3:9 and 3:10:

אמר רבי אלעזר בר' צדוק פעם אחת [היינו יושבין לפני רבן גמליאל בבית המדרש בלוד ובא זונין הממונה ואמר] הגיע עת לבער החמץ [הלכתי] אני ואבא לבית רבן גמליאל וביערנו את החמץ.
ג,י איזה הוא [צופה] הרואה ואינו מפסיק מכאן אתה אומר ההולך לשחוט את פסחו ולמול את בנו ולאכול סעודת ארוסין בבית חמיו ונזכר שיש לו חמץ בתוך הבית אם יש לו שהות כדי שיחזור חוזר ואם לאו אינו חוזר

In this account, Rabbi Eleazar beRabbi Tzadok and his father were sitting in Lud. Lud, or Lydda, was the location of a major Rabbinic college.In this instance, no mention is made of the fact that it is Shabbat, and so it is likely erev Pesach on a weekday. Here, they are sitting in the study hall before Rabban Gamliel when Zonin, Rabban Gamliel's deputy, comes to tell them that the time to physically destroy the chametz has arrived. As a result, they stop their learning and went to Rabban Gamliel's house to destroy the chametz.

This Tosefta seems directly in conflict with the brayta on Pesachim 7a. After all, that brayta stated that if one is sitting in the study hall, he should not stop his learning but should rather simply nullify the chametz in his heart. Meanwhile, this Tosefta states that one should stop his learning in order to physically destroy the chametz.

This Tosefta may shed light onto what is meant by the similar incident at Yavneh described i Pesachim 49a. On the one hand, we see in the Tosefta that Rabbi Eleazar bar Tzadok and his father were learning before Rabban Gamliel in Lydda when Rabban Gamliel's deputy interrupted them. The same situation of learning before Rabban Gamliel may have occurred in Yavneh, except that the brayta in Pesachim 49a declines to mention it because the focus there is that one destroys chametz even on Shabbat. On the other hand, the fact that the brayta in Pesachim 49a omits this information while the Tosefta has it may mean that they were not learning at the time.

The Tosefta also sheds light on the law brought down in the Mishna. The Tosefta states, following the incident with Rabbi Eleazar bar Tzadok, מכאן אתה אומר ההולך לשחוט את פסחו ולמול את בנו ולאכול סעודת ארוסין בבית חמיו ונזכר שיש לו חמץ בתוך הבית אם יש לו שהות כדי שיחזור חוזר ואם לאו אינו חוזר. This is the same law as in the first category of the Mishna. The Tosefta states that we derive from this story of Rabbi Eleazar bar Tzadok that if he was going to slaughter his Pesach sacrifice, circumcise his son or to eat a feast of betrothal at his father-in-law's house and recalls that he has chametz in his house, if he has enough time to return and destroy it (and then return to the task at hand), he should, but otherwise he should not return (and presumably, nullify it in his heart instead).

Thus, the law for the first category in the Mishna appears to be derived directly from the incident with Rabbi Eleazar bar Tzadok at Lydda. This would lead us to naturally place one who is studying in the study hall in the first category, that of the general mitzvah. If so, not only the Tosefta but the Mishna as well would contradict the brayta in Pesachim 7a.

The Learner/Burner Question -- part 3

You may wish to first read part one and part two of this article.

What and When: An Academic Approach
We now approach the same issue from an academic approach. We argue here that the brayta actually intended nullification of actual chametz, even during Pesach, that the Amoraim agree to this fact, and that the reinterpretation of the brayta comes solely from the setama digmara. There is a slight problem with this, in that Rav Acha bar Yaakov, an Amora, is the one who gives the reinterpretation, but we will partially resolve this in this section and fully resolve this at a later stage. The end result of all this is that the brayta definitively states that nullification of actual chametz should be used rather than leaving the study hall, an approach that we will later see contradicts other Tannaitic sources.

Once again, the brayta in question reads:
היה יושב בבית המדרש ונזכר שיש חמץ בתוך ביתו מבטלו בלבו אחד שבת ואחד יום טוב

The simplest reading of this brayta is that it refers to nullification of actual chametz, even on Pesach itself. However, the setama digmara finds such a statement problematic, since he maintains that once the chametz becomes prohibited, nullification is also ineffective.

Let us consider the gemara in Pesachim 6b-7a:
אמר רב יהודה אמר רב הבודק צריך שיבטל
מאי טעמא אי נימא משום פירורין הא לא חשיבי
וכי תימא כיון דמינטר להו אגב ביתיה חשיבי
והתניא סופי תאנים ומשמר שדהו מפני ענבים סופי ענבים ומשמר שדהו מפני מקשאות ומפני מדלעות בזמן שבעל הבית מקפיד עליהן אסורין משום גזל וחייבין במעשר בזמן שאין בעל הבית מקפיד עליהן מותרין משום גזל ופטורין משום מעשר
אמר רבא גזירה שמא ימצא גלוסקא יפה ודעתיה עילויה
וכי משכחת ליה לבטליה
דילמא משכחת ליה לבתר איסורא ולאו ברשותיה קיימא ולא מצי מבטיל
דא"ר אלעזר שני דברים אינן ברשותו של אדם ועשאן הכתוב כאילו ברשותו ואלו הן בור ברשות הרבים וחמץ משש שעות ולמעלה
וניבטליה בארבע וניבטליה בחמש
כיון דלאו זמן איסורא הוא ולאו זמן ביעורא הוא דילמא פשע ולא מבטל ליה
וניבטליה בשית כיון דאיסורא דרבנן עילויה כדאורייתא דמיא ולאו ברשותיה קיימא ולא מצי מבטיל
דאמר רב גידל אמר ר' חייא בר יוסף אמר רב המקדש משש שעות ולמעלה אפילו בחיטי קורדניתא אין חוששין לקידושין
ולבתר איסורא לא מצי מבטיל ליה?
והא תניא היה יושב בבית המדרש ונזכר שיש חמץ בתוך ביתו מבטלו בלבו אחד שבת ואחד יום טוב
בשלמא שבת משכחת לה כגון שחל ארבעה עשר להיות בשבת אלא יום טוב בתר איסורא הוא
אמר רב אחא בר יעקב הכא בתלמיד יושב לפני רבו עסקינן ונזכר שיש עיסה מגולגלת בתוך ביתו ומתיירא שמא תחמיץ קדים ומבטיל ליה מיקמי דתחמיץ
דיקא נמי דקתני היה יושב בתוך בית המדרש שמע מינה

The gemara begins with Rav Yehuda citing Rav that even though one searched for chametz, he should still nullify the chametz. What is the reason for this requirement? Apparently, small crumbs of chametz which are considered unimportant by the owner are of no consequence. Thus, one does not violate for owning them on Pesach. If so, why bother to nullify if all that will be left after a thorough search will be these crumbs? Rava answers that this is all a Rabbinic decree lest the owner find a tasty loaf which he considers important and not like small crumbs.

The setama digmara is bothered by Rava's answer, for if he indeed finds a tasty loaf, let him nullify it then! The setama digmara answers that the concern which Rava is highlighting is that he might find it after the prohibition has already set in, and based on a certain Tannaitic source, once the prohibition has set in, nullification is not effective.

However, we should consider whether the setama digmara's question is a strong one. The simplest understanding of Rava's statement is that this is a decree lest he find a tasty loaf during Pesach, rather than mere crumbs, and thus violate the sin of owning chametz on Pesach. If he finds it during Pesach (rather than just from the time that the prohibition has set in at 6 hours on erev Pesach), then until this point he was an owner of chametz on Pesach. Who cares, then, that he can nullify it when he finds it?! He has already violated bal yeraeh and bal yimatzei before this point! Thus, Rava needs no explanation, and the setama digmara's explanation may actually take us away from the truth of the matter.

The setama digmara does not understand Rava's statement as referring to someone who found chametz on Pesach, but rather to someone who found chametz on erev Pesach. Thus, the setama can ask, "let him nullify the loaf at four hours or at five hours?" This is only a question assuming that the finding of the chametz was done on erev Pesach, and so the setama's answer is that the person will neglect doing this for whatever reason. However, I posit that Rava is actually talking about the owner finding the tasty loaf on Pesach itself, and would thus be in violation of Biblical law, and so they made a decree to prevent this from happening. If so, the setama digmara is asking based on an incorrect reading of Rava, and we need no explanation of Rava's statement.

The setama digmara explains Rava's statement based on a statement of Rabbi Eleazar who was citing Rabbi Yishmael. This statement is: דא"ר אלעזר שני דברים אינן ברשותו של אדם ועשאן הכתוב כאילו ברשותו ואלו הן בור ברשות הרבים וחמץ משש שעות ולמעלה. This statement is actually transferred from a sugya in Bava Kamma 29b-30a, where the primary point of discussion is the pit in the public domain: דר"א הוא דאמר חייב דאמר רבי אלעזר משום רבי ישמעאל שני דברים אינן ברשותו של אדם ועשאן הכתוב כאילו הן ברשותו ואלו הן בור ברשות הרבים וחמץ משש [שעות] ולמעלה.

We should consider two points in terms of this statement by Rabbi Eleazar citing Rabbi Yishmael. We should consider a) whether this actually was intended to mean that one cannot nullify chametz once the prohibition has set in and b) whether we actually rule in accordance with this citation of Rabbi Yishmael. Indeed, a careful analysis of our sugya and of the sugya in Bava Kamma reveals that a) it is quite likely that Rabbi Yishmael did not mean to invalidate nullification once the prohibition had set in, and b) even if the statement of Rabbi Eleazar means what the setama digmara claims it does, not only does the gemara in Bava Kamma rule against (the first portion of) the statement of Rabbi Eleazar citing Rabbi Yishmael, but even Rabbi Yishmael rules against the statement and is only citing the opinion of his teacher while he himself rules differently. If so, statement by Rabbi Eleazar should not be used to explain Rava, as it is uncertain that Rava would agree to it, or that the other Amoraim would agree that this should be used to set the halacha.

Bava Kamma 29b-30a:
איתמר מפקיר נזקיו
רבי יוחנן ור"א חד אמר חייב וחד אמר פטור
לימא מאן דמחייב כר"מ ומאן דפטר כרבנן אליבא דר"מ
כ"ע לא פליגי כי פליגי אליבא דרבנן מאן דפטר כרבנן ומאן דמחייב
אמר לך אנא דאמרי אפי' לרבנן עד כאן לא פטרי רבנן אלא במפקיר נזקיו
דהכא משום דאנוס הוא אבל מפקיר נזקיו דעלמא מחייבי
תסתיים דר"א הוא דאמר חייב
דאמר רבי אלעזר משום רבי ישמעאל שני דברים אינן ברשותו של אדם ועשאן הכתוב כאילו הן ברשותו ואלו הן בור ברשות הרבים וחמץ משש [שעות] ולמעלה תסתיים
ומי אמר רבי אלעזר הכי והא אמר רבי אלעזר איפכא
דתנן ההופך את הגלל ברה"ר והוזק בהן אחר חייב בנזקו
ואמר ר"א לא שנו אלא שנתכוין לזכות בהן אבל לא נתכוין לזכות בהן פטור
אלמא מפקיר נזקיו פטור
אמר רב אדא בר אהבה שהחזירה למקומה
אמר רבינא משל דרב אדא בר אהבה למה הדבר דומה למוצא בור מגולה וכסהו וחזר וגילהו
א"ל מר זוטרא בריה דרב מרי לרבינא מי דמי התם לא אסתלק להו מעשה ראשון הכא אסתלק להו מעשה ראשון הא לא דמי אלא למוצא בור מגולה וטממה וחזר וחפרה דאסתלקו להו מעשה ראשון וקיימא לה ברשותו
אלא אמר רב אשי כשהפכה לפחות משלשה ומאי דוחקיה דר"א לאוקמיה כגון שהפכה לפחות מג'
וטעמא דכי נתכוין לזכות בה הא אין מתכוין לזכות בה לא לוקמה למעלה מג' ואע"ג דלא נתכוין לזכות בה חייב
אמר רבא מתני' קשיתיה מאי אריא הפך לתני הגביה אלא ש"מ כל הפך למטה משלשה הוא
ומדרבי אלעזר אמר חייב ר' יוחנן אמר פטור
ומי א"ר יוחנן הכי והתנן
המצניע את הקוץ ואת הזכוכית והגודר גדרו בקוצים וגדר שנפל לרשות הרבים והוזק בהן אחר חייב בנזקו
ואמר רבי יוחנן לא שנו אלא במפריח אבל במצמצם פטור מצמצם
מאי טעמא פטור לאו משום דהויא ליה בור ברשותו מכלל דחיובא דבור ברשות הרבים הוא
אלמא מפקיר נזקיו חייב
לא לעולם אימא לך מפקיר נזקיו פטור ומצמצם מ"ט פטור משום דאתמר עלה אמר רב אחא בריה דרב איקא לפי שאין דרכן של בני אדם להתחכך בכתלים
ומי אמר ר' יוחנן הכי והא א"ר יוחנן הלכה כסתם משנה
ותנן החופר בור ברה"ר ונפל לתוכו שור או חמור ומת חייב
אלא לעולם רבי יוחנן אמר חייב ומדרבי יוחנן אמר חייב ר"א אמר פטור
והאמר ר"א משום רבי ישמעאל כו' לא קשיא הא דידיה הא דרביה

We can see how one can get the impression from this that Rabbi Eleazar is stating that nullification is ineffective from six hours and on. After all, the statement is that שני דברים אינן ברשותו של אדם ועשאן הכתוב כאילו הן ברשותו ואלו הן בור ברשות הרבים וחמץ משש [שעות] ולמעלה. This speaks of items not in his possession. If chametz from six hours and on is not in his possession, then it may easily follow that he cannot nullify it. Yet, Scriptures places it as if it is in his possession, and so he violates owning chametz on Pesach. Or alternatively, even though he nullifies it from six hours and on, thus making it not in his possession, Scriptures places it back in his possession such that he violates.

Let us consider the first of the two cases, בור ברשות הרבים. The initial assumption of the gemara in Bava Kamma is that this statement is relevant to the case of מפקיר נזקיו. After all, a בור ברשות הרבים does not belong to him but rather to the public, yet Scriptures places it as if in his possession such that he is liable for any damage caused. The point is that this is an exception to the general rule that one must own what does the damage. Similarly, if one removes his ownership from some item that he owns that can do damage, he is still responsible for it. Yet, this is an extension of the original statement. Perhaps -- indeed, it is somewhat likely -- this is a novelty specifically by בור ברשות הרבים and should not be applied to damaging items which are explicitly declared out of the

In the end, perhaps the gemara establishes Rabbi Yochanan in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Eleazar citing Rabbi Yishmael. The setama digmara certainly establishes that Rabbi Eleazar actually declares מפקיר נזקיו exempt, and does not rely on this statement that בור ברשות הרבים is not in his domain but the Torah places it in his domain. He is only citing the opinion of his teacher, even as he disagrees with it. Yet we need not equate Rabbi Yishmael's statement to a statement that מפקיר נזקיו חייב. If so, Rabbi Eleazar could even agree with his teacher, while not relying on the statement one way or another in terms of the case of מפקיר נזקיו.

If the first case of the statement, of בור ברשות הרבים, is not actually telling us that one is legally incapable of declaring a damaging item hefker, then perhaps similarly, the second case in the statement, of חמץ משש שעות ולמעלה, is not actually telling us that one if legally incapable of declaring chametz after six hours hefker, or rather, batel.

Rather, the simplest meaning of the statement is this: After six hours into the day on erev Pesach, chametz is forbidden in benefit and as a result is as if it does not exist. As Rav Gidel stated: אמר רב גידל אמר ר' חייא בר יוסף אמר רב המקדש משש שעות ולמעלה אפילו בחיטי קורדניתא אין חוששין לקידושין. This is similar to what would happen if one attempted to marry a woman with an ashera or something from an ir hanidachat *{*confirm this to be true} -- it is forbidden in benefit, and in fact כתותי מכתת שיעוריה, so it is of no substance, and so of course one cannot marry with it. Rabbi Yishmael seems to be saying something similar here. If chametz is forbidden in benefit to the extent that one cannot even marry a woman with it -- either because it does not legally exist or because the prohibited benefit to him is such that it is not even in his possession to the extent that his betrothal would be effective -- then why should he violate bal yera`eh or bal yimatzei? The answer is the same as the answer for why one is liable for damages from a pit in the public domain, which he does not own -- Scriptures placed it in his possession to the extent that he does in fact violate these prohibitions.

Thus, the statement of Rabbi Eleazar citing Rabbi Yishmael does not explicitly address whether one is capable of nullifying chametz after the prohibition has set in. The question then becomes whether we can derive that bittul is legally ineffective either from Rabbi Eleazar's statement or from Rav Gidel's statement.

At first glance, this derivation should be straightforward. If prohibited chametz is not truly in one's possession in that he cannot, for example, betroth a woman with it, then other acquisitions and transfers of ownership may also be ineffective. Thus, it may well follow that one cannot declare it hefker, transferring ownership of the chametz out of his possession. (footnote?: Or alternatively, we may say that his inability to betroth a woman with it shows that he does not really own it now, so hefker adds nothing -- the Torah just reckons it as in his possession for the purpose of holding him liable.)

This derivation only follows if bittul is identical to hefker. Only then would it follow that bittul/hefker, as a type of acquisition/property transfer, would not take effect on the prohibited chametz. However, there is good reason to assume that bittul is not identical to hefker. The brayta under discussion in this paper reads:
היה יושב בבית המדרש ונזכר שיש חמץ בתוך ביתו מבטלו בלבו אחד שבת ואחד יום טוב
and, as we mentioned earlier, one of the primary novel laws this brayta teaches is that even though in general, kinyan is prohibited on Shabbat by Rabbinic decree lest one come to write, bittul is effective on Shabbat and Yom Tov. Meanwhile, hefker is considered a kinyan and is prohibited on Shabbat and Yom Tov.

Whether bittul is the same as hefker is in fact the subject of a dispute among Rishonim. Bittul differs from hefker in this law, but perhaps this is an exception to the general decree. However, bittul differs from hefker in other respects as well (such as what type of act is required).

We might say that bittul is simply declaring it to be considered by him to be like the dust of the earth, and thus like the crumbs mentioned above, for which one does not violate. If bittul is not hefker, then it makes sense that one may perform bittul on Shabbat and Yom Tov. If bittul is not hefker, then it does not follow that one cannot perform it once the prohibition has set it. If so, then there is no reason to object to the brayta referring to nullification of actual chametz, rather than dough which is about to become chametz, on Pesach.

Indeed, the brayta itself is brought up as a contradiction to the assumption by the setama that one cannot nullify chametz once the prohibition has set it. After all, it states אחד שבת ואחד יום טוב, and Yom Tov must refer to Pesach. Rather than accept that the brayta directly contradicts this assumption that one cannot nullify, and then consider a different explanation of Rava's statement, Rav Yaakov bar Acha's statement is brought, which reinterprets the brayta as referring to dough which has not yet become chametz:

אמר רב אחא בר יעקב הכא בתלמיד יושב לפני רבו עסקינן ונזכר שיש עיסה מגולגלת בתוך ביתו ומתיירא שמא תחמיץ קדים
ומבטיל ליה מיקמי דתחמיץ
דיקא נמי דקתני היה יושב בתוך בית המדרש שמע מינה

Yet, interpreting chametz as not-yet-chametz seems a bit forced. Further, it is not at all clear how the careful analysis of the words היה יושב בתוך בית המדרש implies that we are dealing with dough rather than actual chametz.

Even if we admit the reinterpretation of this brayta, we have other sources that appear to allow nullification even after the prohibition has set in. For example, the Mishna on Pesachim 49a begins:

ההולך לשחוט את פסחו ולמול את בנו ולאכול סעודת אירוסין בבית חמיו ונזכר שיש לו חמץ בתוך ביתו אם יכול לחזור ולבער ולחזור למצותו יחזור ויבער ואם לאו מבטלו בלבו

If he is already about to slaughter his Pesach sacrifice, then it is already midday, which is the time of slaughtering. Perhaps this is before midday, and he is only "on his way" to slaughter? Yet, the Mishna mentions that he should nullify the chametz if he does not have time to return and destroy, and return and burn. This implies that it is after chatzot. (However, one could simply answer that his house is far away and he would not have time.) Perhaps this Mishna also refers to dough which is not yet chametz? Whereas Rav Yaakov bar Acha was able to make such a derivation by careful analysis from the words of the brayta, there is no similar derivation here.

We now returning to the issue of Rav Yaakov bar Acha's statement. This is the strongest evidence that the brayta does not refer to actual chametz, and thus to the setama's assumption that one cannot nullify chametz once the prohibition has set in. After all, this is an interpretation by an Amora. The Amora thus clearly accepts the setama's assumptions about the efficacy of nullification, and so the setama is just making this assumption explicit when analysing the statement of Rava and interpreting the statements of Rabbi Eleazar and Rav Gidel. Alternatively, this is evidence that the setama here is not post-Amoraic.

Yet Rav Yaakov bar Acha's statement is not without difficulties. Firstly, why should an Amora respond do and reinterpret a brayta to fit with the setama digmara which is not yet in existence (though of course, this is begging the question).

Secondly, the close analysis of the brayta does not seem to logically produce the fact that we are dealing with dough rather than chametz. The close analysis is דיקא נמי דקתני היה יושב בתוך בית המדרש שמע מינה. Why should the fact that he was sitting in the study hall produce the result that chametz referred to in the brayta is dough which is not yet chametz?

Thirdly, there is extraneous material in Rav Yaakov bar Acha's statement. He states הכא בתלמיד יושב לפני רבו עסקינן ונזכר שיש עיסה מגולגלת בתוך ביתו ומתיירא שמא תחמיץ קדים ומבטיל ליה מיקמי דתחמיץ. Why mention that this case is one of a student sitting before his teacher? What relevance does this have to the fact that chametz refers to dough and not actual chametz?

Fourthly, there is a sudden shift between Hebrew and Aramaic in Rav Yaakov bar Acha's statement. הכא בתלמיד יושב לפני רבו עסקינן ונזכר שיש עיסה מגולגלת בתוך ביתו is basically Hebrew, with the exception of the bracketing הכא and עסקינן. Meanwhile, ומתיירא שמא תחמיץ קדים ומבטיל ליה מיקמי דתחמיץ is clearly Aramaic. Sudden shifts from Hebrew to Aramaic often reveal that the setama has been at word explicating the brief words of the named Amora. Further, stylistically, the statement is so constructed that הכא בתלמיד יושב לפני רבו עסקינן appears as one unit, with עסקינן closing it, and the continuation (in Hebrew) of ונזכר seems additional. Why put the irrelevant statement before the עסקינן and the main point -- that chametz it is not actually chametz, afterwards.

I would suggest that Rav Acha bar Yaakov's statement was originally הכא בתלמיד יושב לפני רבו עסקינן and the rest is simply elaboration and explanation by the setama. Rav Acha is trying to establish this case as referring to someone not merely sitting in the study hall, but rather sitting before his teacher. This is reinforced by careful analysis of the brayta. After all, it states that he was יושב within the study hall. This word יושב can be read as a technical term referring to sitting before one's teacher. Thus, he was sitting before his teacher in the study hall.

What would impel Rav Yaakov bar Acha to interpret the brayta to refer to this specific case? And, what is the relevance of the specific case of sitting before one's teacher? We have here an answer to a specific difficulty, but we have not yet learned what the difficulty is! In the next part of this paper, we will discover exactly what this difficulty is -- a seeming contradiction between this brayta and other Tannaitic sources as to whether one should leave off study in order to dispose of chametz or whether he should rather continue his study and rely upon nullification. The setama took Rav Yaakov bar Acha resolution to a different question on the brayta and applied as a resolution to his own question of the brayta stating that one can nullify chametz on Pesach itself. This reinterpretation of Rav Yaakov bar Acha led to all the irregularities and difficulties mentioned above.

If so, we should not adopt the reinterpretation of the brayta that it refers to dough about to become chametz. The brayta means exactly what it says, and is proof that one is in fact capable of nullifying chametz even after the prohibition has set in. This also removes the need to establish אחד שבת as Shabbat as specifically Shabbat erev Pesach. Thus, the brayta refers to nullification of actual chametz both on erev Pesach and throughout Pesach, whether on Shabbat or a weekday.

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