Fisking "Teshuva Through Change"

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The Jewish Week last week carried an opinion piece by Rabbi Michael Strassfeld, the "spiritual leader of SAJ, the Society for the Advancement of Judaism." The article argues, among other things, for the changing of halacha in terms of its attitude towards other religions - namely, that we no longer consider them idolatry. In this regard, it is similar in attitude to the one put forth a while back by Eliyahu Stern, also in the Jewish Week.

I feel that this article is wrong and wrongheaded, and I think a fisking ("a point-by-point refutation of a blog entry or a news story") is in order.

Teshuvah Through Change
Rabbi Michael Strassfeld
We live in an increasingly dangerous world because of people who are out to attack Jews and Western civilization in the name of their God. A variety of fundamentalists believe that they are the sole carriers of God’s truth and are thus committed to creating their vision of God’s kingdom here on earth, no matter what the cost to others. For a fundamentalist who believes he holds all the truth, there is no room for compromise. Can the competing vision of a pluralistic society that allows for many versions of God’s truth as well as for secular visions for the world prevail? Each of us plays some small role in this struggle on behalf of our Western values.

In this first paragraph he brings up the point of Islamic terrorism and blames it on the fact that they think they are right, everyone else is wrong, and that they are "acting in the name of their God." This is true enough.

However, he proceeds to charge that all fundamentalism is dangerous, as a result. Pluralism is much nicer and safer and as Westerners we must struggle for pluralism, even within our own society.

1) Firstly, the argument that because X (Islamic terrorism) is founded on belief Y (belief that you are right and everyone else is wrong), then belief Y is all forms is dangerous (and wrong) is fallacious. Consider: Nazism was founded on nationalism, and therefore all nationalism is evil. Socialism was founded on the notion of equality, so therefore the notion of equality is dangerous. Thieves steal because the want to amass wealth so capitalism is evil. A jealous husband killed his wife because she cheated on him, so insistence on marital fidelity as a value is wrong.

Obviously, this is nonsense. Similarly, the idea that the belief that you are correct and the sole carrier of God's truth on earth is just that - a belief. In certain instances, it has led to fanaticism and violence. But this does not mean that all forms of this belief is therefore dangerous and must be eradicated. It is possible that there is an innocuous manifestation of this belief, and it is unfair to impugn Orthodox Judaism because of the actions of Islamic extermists.

2) Within this article, Rabbi Strassfeld puts forth a belief that everyone who is non-pluralistic is a dangerous fundamentalist, and that such a fundamentalist belief is wrong. Thus, we are left with the idea that only pluralism is the right way, and the true way of carrying God's truth. Is he thus not guilty of the very thing of which he charges others?

Part of the pluralism he propounds is accepting other cultures, and a central aspect of Jewish belief is that the Torah is the true expression of God's will. If Rabbi Strassfeld cannot tolerate this, I think perhaps he does not understand pluralism.

3) This, I think, is the most important point. Even if the belief that only you are right is dangerous, as he charges, that does not make it incorrect. If the belief is correct, then one should not abandon it just because it is potentially dangerous, or because it is not politically correct, or because it makes us look bad in the eyes of practitioners of other religions.

If I were to sum up the Jewish faith, I would put it so: A belief in God; a belief that God gave the Torah to us, and that we are obligated to follow it; a belief in Chazal as the interpreters of Torah. The Torah dictates to us the proper way to serve God and to interact with our fellow man. Abandoning these principles, as Rabbi Strassfeld suggests in this article, is not advancing Judaism, but abandoning its most basic principles.

It is critical that Jews give voice to our commitment to a modernity that has freed the Jewish people from centuries of oppression and discrimination.

Uh oh. He is trying to guilt the reader into accepting pluralism (which for him equals modernity) because it has done something for us - freed us from centuries of oppression and discrimination.

Unfortunately, we have a prior committment. Throughout Torah, we are told to fulfill various commandments as an act of gratitude towards Hashem who, to quote Rabbi Strassfeld, has "freed the Jewish people from centuries of oppression and discrimination" in Egypt, where we were slaves.

By his logic, we Jews should assimilate entirely to the modernity which freed us. Why should we specifically this tenet of Jewish faith?

Further, I agree certain aspects of modernity freed us. But, was it really "pluralism" that freed us? When Napolean emancipated the Jews in 1808 was is because of pluralism? We can be committed to modernity without necessarily conceding that we may not be correct in the most basic aspect of our faith.

But we are not free from fundamentalists within our community. We also need to examine our own texts and teachings to see whether there are places that we align ourselves with the forces of those who crusade against others (and us) in God’s name.

Having set up that fundamentalism is wrong, he is going to give examples of this wrongheaded attitude. As I will try to show, he is just plain wrong in his examples.

(And just to note again, just because they (Islamic terrorists) are wrong in that they follow the wrong religious doctrine does not mean that the absolutist thoughts within our own texts are wrong as well.)

Just recently, we’ve read of disturbing positions taken by religious authorities in our community. A prominent rosh yeshiva said that Jews are spiritually superior to other people because Jews and non-Jews “have different genes, DNA, and instincts.”

He has read? I assume he means read in the Jewish Week, where in the attack piece on Rav Schachter about monkeys and ketubot (based on an ignorant misunderstanding of halachic terminology, I might add), Gary Rosenblatt wrote: "This comes several months after the rabbi, an influential posek (decisor of religious law), described Jews as spiritually superior to other people, noting that Jews and non-Jews “have different genes, DNA and instincts.”"

I do not know if it is to Rabbi Strassfeld's credit or discredit that he is unwilling to take Rav Schachter on directly. To his credit, if it is some part within him that realizes that what he is doing is wrong and smacks of chutzpa, and to his discredit if this is a way trying to smear (or "fundamentalists" in general) and getting away with it.

Again, he has read? This strongly suggests to me that he did not hear the original shiur, which was available on the web, and which I did listen to. That is absolutely not what Rav Schachter said.

A quick summary of what Rav Schachter did say: There is a theme is Jewish tradition that the Jews are the עם הנבחר, the Chosen People. What does this mean? Rav Schachter turned to a statement in Pirkei Avot, the Ethics of Our Fathers, where there is a statement that Man is Beloved because he was created in the image of God, and the nation of Israel has an extra quality that they are called בנים למקום, Children of God.

Rav Schachter takes this metaphorically, that there is an extra spiritual relationship between man and God. To this end he used the metaphor of DNA and genes. That is, all humanity is created in God's image. However, the Jewish nation has a spiritual quote unquote DNA that connects them to God, such that they are more directly related to God - they are metaphorically "children" to God.

Is this a racist idea? Not at all! Converts can join the Jewish people and become part of the Jewish people, and then have the same connection and relation to God,

How does this extra connection manifest? One thing Rav Schachter noted was that Chazal say that Israel are merciful, possess the trait of shame, and do deeds of loving-kindness.

Even though there is this belief in an extra connection of the Jews to God, this does not mean that non-Jews are, God forbid, sub-human. Rav Schachter explicitly made this point when he said that the Mishna in Pirkei Avot says that all humanity is created in the image of God, but there is an extra connection that we are called "Children to God."

(Note: SIW made this mistake is his original take on Rav Schachter's speech. You can see the comment section off protocols here.)

Yet, Rabbi Strassfeld does not mention any of this, but just cites what he read in the Jewish Week, leading the reader to believe (as I think he himself believes) that these are racist comments, talking about actual DNA and genetics!

Further proof that he did not actually hear Rav Schachter speak is evident in two other quotes in the article. He writes:

and statements that proclaim the superiority of Jews over non-Jews will be denounced as contrary to the Torah’s statement in Genesis that all human beings are created in the image of God.

This is a fairly dumb statement, considering that Rav Schachter started with the statement that all humans are created in the image of God, and was just talking about the extra "Children of God" level. It shows he did not listen at all to Rav Schachter's actual speech, but is willing to malign him on the basis of hearsay. I think that since he is thinking about Teshuva, he should think about the sin of motzi shem ra, slander, and should consider asking Rav Schachter mechila, forgiveness.

He ends the article:

it is critical that elements in the Orthodox community call upon the important organizations and legal decisors of that community to clearly proclaim that one can be true to the Torah and still proclaim the equality of all of us descended from Adam and Eve.

This again gains momentum from his earlier, ignorant and false charge.

Back to where I left off in the article:

The recent controversy over wigs made from the hair of Hindu woman in India is based on the concept that Hinduism is avodah zarah — idolatry — and therefore forbidden.

Yes, it is. Is this in the same category of what he made the above - bigotry? I would say no. Judaism believes in God, and forbids the worship (and benefits from the worship) of other Gods. It is so important that the first of the 10 Commandments is "I am Hashem Your God" and the second is "You shall have no other gods before me."

Clearly some other religions - probably all - at that time were considered idolatry. Stating that the Jewish belief that Hinduism is avoda zara is bigoted - well, one can state it, but that does not prove it.

The issue with Indian wigs was that of tonsure, in which worshippers grew their hair long and then had a barber cut it off. The hair, and the act of cutting, was dedicated to the deity Vishnu. Is Vishnu equal to Hashem? I doubt it. Do they consider him a god? Yes. (At least many do.) Is the act of cutting off the hair considered worship, and therefore forbidden? Perhaps yes, and perhaps no. But would bringing sacrifices to an idol representing a deity who is not Hashem be considered idolatry? Unless the word has changed all meaning, absolutely! So how can Rabbi Strassfeld protest that we consider it idolatry?

Note also that the wig issue does not really affect the Hindus. Monetarily, the possible ban of Indian sheitels has not put a dent in the wig industry. This is an internal matter - that is, does Judaism consider this belief and act idolatry, and if so, may we or may we not use these items. We are not oppressing Hindus. We are not destroying their idols. Sure, the Torah commands this, but is anyone actively doing it? Come on, Rabbi Strassfeld - live and let live, and let the Jews practice their own religion, just as the Jews let the Hindu's practice their own religion!

A true story: a friend of S.L. went to a Hindu restaurant with some co-workers. They ordered a bottle of wine. They noticed that there was a bit missing from the top of the wine bottle, so they called over the waiter and asked him what the story was. He explained that they had a little Budda idol in the back room, and before serving any bottle of wine, they opened it and poured a little off the top as a wine libation to him. This is yayin nesech, wine libations to an idol, in the present day. And you are going to tell me that it is absolutely not idolatry?!

These examples reflect longstanding texts and halacha — Jewish law — that portray non-Jews in inferior ways. For example, in the Mishnah Avodah Zara 2:1, Jews are advised not to lend their domestic animals to non-Jews because they are suspected of bestiality.

Another ignorant statement. Yes, Jews are "advised" - actually forbidden - from lending specific animals to non-Jews because they are suspected of bestiality. Is this bigotry, and considering non-Jews inferior, or rather an apt assessment of a significant minority of their contemporary neighbors. The Torah, when it forbids bestiality, notes that this abomination was practiced by the previous residents of Israel, whom God expelled in part because of it. That is, some non-Jewish people back then practiced bestiality. In various Ancient Near Eastern Laws, there are proscriptions against sleeping with various domestic animals - sheep, cattle, and camels. This is not the Torah, but secular laws. Why make such laws if people were not violating them? People practice bestiality today, in America, and across the world.

Therefore, a statement that there is enough prevalence of this practice in non-Jewish society, which does not have the Torah's proscriptions and penalties, is not a bigoted statement. It certainly does not mean that non-Jews are inferior. It is an assessment of society to determine how Jews must conduct themselves when interfacing with said society.

Next example:

The halachic decision to categorize non-Jews as idol worshippers has meant that wine poured by a non-Jew is unkosher, based on the notion that the wine may have been offered as a libation on some pagan altar.

Well, it is based in part on that. It is also based on the concept that galui, uncovered wine, water, and milk, may have been sipped by a snake, who might have injected its venom into it. mevushal, or cooked wine, is sweet, according to a yerushalmi I read, and sweet wine would not be sipped by a snake. But regular wine is not mevushal, and your average gentile would have no reason not to leave his wine uncovered and unmonitored as some point. So that would be another reason for prohibiting it, even not considering the aspect of idolatry.

{Update: Also, another reason stam yeinam, wine of a gentile, is prohibited, is to prevent intermarriage. This reason would also stand, even ignoring the possibility of idolatrous libations.}

But he considers the suspicion of pouring a libation as another instance of Jewish thought considering non-Jews inferior. It is not. It is merely Chazal's assessment of reality, and the possibility that wine may be poured as a libation.

And were Chazal so wrong?! If you would tell me people would pour wine libations in this day and age, I would not have believed you. Yet they do. Some Hindus do, in an act of idolatry.

He chose a really bad example, if you ask me.

Since non-Jews are considered idolaters, it is forbidden to enter churches because they are seen as places of idolatry. (Imagine for a moment how we would react if the Catholic Church announced it was forbidden for Catholics to enter synagogues or if the Evangelical churches proclaimed that kosher meat is forbidden to be eaten because it was slaughtered in a “Jewish” way.)

Not because non-Jews are considered idolators. This is not a comment on their own worth, or as Rabbi Strassfeld put it, inferiority. It is Judaism's attitude towards their belief and religion. Christianity is considered idolatry, and therefore non-Jews who practice this are considered idolators, and it is forbidden to enter churches. Rabbi Strassfeld has transposed cause and effect.

This is an attitude towards Christian doctrine, not towards the individuals.

As for imagining how I would react, I would say BIG DEAL! This is an internal Christian matter. I would not be insulted. I know Christians do not believe the same things I do, and various actions I take might make them regard places and things in a different light. Live and let live. I guess I am a pluralist. I guess Rabbi Strassfeld is not.

If "the Evangelical churches proclaimed that kosher meat is forbidden to be eaten because it was slaughtered in a “Jewish” way?" I guess it would depend. If they did it because they hate Jews, I might be offended. If it was because of religious beliefs and practices that cause the specific acts taken in Jewish slaughter to make the meat unacceptable, why should I take offense? Are Muslims offended that Jews won't eat meat because it was slaughtered in a halal way, rather than in accordance to Jewish practice.

Also, is Rabbi Strassfeld really suggesting here we adopt halal, since it would offend Muslims? Because that is the logical conclusion of his statement.

We in the Jewish community, and particularly those in the community who feel bound by halacha, need to proclaim that yes, we have texts from the past that are difficult for our modern sensibilities. We will not excise them from the Talmud. Instead we will acknowledge that our understanding has changed, just as in the case when we study selections in the Talmud about other difficult issues that we have in fact reinterpreted.

At least this is a step above Eliyahu Stern. He suggested, in a published letter to the editor of the Jewish Week a while back, that we should actually erase problematic texts - that is, for example, we should remove the text of the commandment to destroy Amalek from our Torah scrolls.

Here he says we should keep the texts but ignore them, reinterpret them, or say we have moved past them.

But has our understanding in fact changed? Rabbi Strassfeld would like it to have. But his examples - bestiality, and wine libations, still exist. And idolatry is still idolatry - the worship of a god other than Hashem.

Also, he talks here of interpreting towards an end. That is, we want a specific conclusion, and we will provide an interpretation that will lead us where we want. This is intellectually dishonest and does not lead us towards truth. On the other hand, if truth is arbitrary, who cares what the result is? A very pluralistic thought. But for those of us for whom Torah is truth, we will study Torah in a truthful way.

But let us see his example...

The basic statement we need to make is there are no idol worshippers today, certainly not those in mainstream religions such as Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism, etc. This process of redefinition is a time-honored halachic principle used by Talmudic scholars like the Meiri and others to allow commerce with Christians in the Middle Ages, despite Talmudic statements to the contrary.

We need to make such a statement. Such a statement is a negation of Judaism, or at least one of its central tenets. We can talk about the second Yekum Purkan. :) (see footnote 1)

This process of redefinition we do find - for example, Tosafot on the first daf of Avoda Zara gives some reasons why we can conduct commerce with Christians. I did a post on this a while back. It is generally assumed that this is not intended as the best reading of the gemara, but rather as an attempt to justify existing practice. That is, I do not think Tosafot would suggest that this is the best thing in the world to do, but rather that since there is a prevalent practice to do this, and because otherwise people would starve (since forbidding doing business with them 3 days before and after their holy days would preclude all commerce, because Sunday is preceded and followed by 3 days). They were defending existing practice in a shaat hadechak.

In terms of the Meiri, perhaps he intended it the same way, or perhaps he actually believed what he said. I am not going to go into a detailed discussion of his position here. But it is not trivial to claim that they wanted to allow something that until then was forbidden, and so they came up with wrong or false halachic interpretations to achieve those ends. This forced example is not enough to claim precedent to erase something initially, in a non-forced situation, because it is not politically correct. It certainly is not enough precedent to erase one of the most basic tenets of Jewish faith.

I learned through masechet horayot - both in the Bavli and Yerushalmi. I also took two semesters of academic study of horayot with Dr. Steinfeld, in Bernard Revel Graduate School of Jewish studies. And I learned something very basic - that there are limits even to what Chazal can do.

The Sanhedrin can give a ruling, and if the ruling is erroneous, and the majority of people follow it, they are covered by the Sanhedrin's ruling. The people still sinned, but it was an accident, and the Snahedrin must bring a sacrifice to atone for the sin. That is, a ruling does not define halacha if it is incorrect.

Certain types of rulings, even when given by the Sanhedrin, are not considered rulings. Things which are explicit in the Torah, when denied by Sanhedrin, are not considered rulings, and one who violates the Torah law is considered not covered under the umbrella of their ruling, and each person must bring his own individual korban. Why? The gemara says, "go to cheder and learn." If it is an explicit verse, then their ruling is ignorance, and is not a ruling.

The ruling, to be a valid though erroneous ruling, must also exclude only part of the prohibition and not all of it. So, the Mishna says, if they rule that there is no prohibition against idolatry in the Torah, it is not a valid ruling. If they say their is a prohibition of idolatry, but someone who bows to an idol is patur - then is is a valid ruling, though an erroneous one.

Rabbi Strassfeld wants to rule that there is no idolatry in the Torah, or at least in the world today. That is either a farcical ruling, or an erroneous one. Just because people - rabbis - say things which are false, does not mean that I am permitted to follow them. And if rabbis intentionally introduce a false ruling, which they know to be not true, then they are causing the community to sin.

There are other examples of restrictions on the role of rabbis - Ain Koach BeYad Chachamim LaAkor Davar Min HaTorah - there is no power in the hands of the Sages to uproot a matter from the Torah, but I think I've touched on this enough.

The idea that rabbis can say, and falsely interpret, that various other religions are not idolatry, and this is binding, and frees us from the annoyance/discomfort that comes from considering them idolatry, is just wrong.

He continues:

If non-Jews are not idolaters then there should be no prohibition upon entering a church; kosher wine will only refer to the ingredients and manufacturing process that have been checked to make sure no non-kosher elements have been involved (the same as with kosher food); and statements that proclaim the superiority of Jews over non-Jews will be denounced as contrary to the Torah’s statement in Genesis that all human beings are created in the image of God.

This is an argument that we will get all these benefits from it, so why not abolish the halachic determination of non-Jews as idolators?

But are these ends really so great? I will examine them one by one.

1) If Jews can enter a church, we can be great friends with our non-Jewish neighbors and coworkers. We break down boundaries. We might become such great friends we will intermarry. Is intermarriage good? Ask Rabbi Strassfeld.

Now that Jews can enter a church, and the worship is not idolatry, can a Jew come to the church during services? Is this something we want to encourage? Might a weakly affiliated Jew decide to adopt this faith, which after all is now not idolatry according to his rabbi? Consider: a Jew enters a church during services, and the priest asks everyone to kneel, or to sing a prayer to Jesus. Would the Jew, who is in the church so as not to offend, comply so as not to offend?

2) If we need not worry about stam yeinam - uncooked wine touched by a non-Jew, because a non-Jew is not an idolator (we are not worrying about the halachic concern of uncovered wine in this hypothetical), then we will more freely associate with coworkers after work. We will go to hang out at the pub. Is this something to encourage?

We will become close to our drinking buddies. Which in turn leads to assimilation, and intermarriage. Great ends, which absolutely justify the means.

{In fact, the prevention of intermarriage is another reason given for the prohibition of stam yeinam, so even declaring the non-Jews not idolators would not be sufficient to remove the prohibition.}

And what about our Hindu friends who actually poured the wine to the Budda idol? We have stam yeinam in part lest we violate the Biblical prohibition of drinking wine libations. Is this truly not a concern today? Unfortunately it is. (Except of course Rabbi Strassfeld would say that worshipping Budda idol is not idolatry, so it is not wine libations to an idol, so it is no problem etc... C'mon!)

Some may argue that those of us in the non-Orthodox community are willing to change the halacha at the proverbially drop of a kipa, while the Orthodox community cannot change the rules even when they find them difficult.

Yup!

That is where Mel Gibson and “The Passion of the Christ” come in. Obviously, the treatment of Jews in the movie is a reminder to us of how we should treat others as we wish to be treated. More deeply, it reminds us that what was troubling about Gibson was that he was breaking from the contemporary teachings of the Church. For centuries Christianity had taught that Jews were responsible for the crucifixion of Jesus. The tragic results are well known. Yet, despite the centuries of this being the doctrinal truth and despite the scriptural support that “their torah,” the New Testament, gave to this view, Vatican II came along and said no more. Jews are not to be blamed.

I was actually very uncomfortable with the idea of telling others how they should practice their religion. It is not really the Jews' business what Christian's believe. That does not mean that when my fellow Jews are at risk, I will not try to influence them. Personally, I believe the Christians are wrong, and I can have proofs, and I can try to convince them. But it is not my legitimate place to dictate what is correct Christian doctrine. I might fake it if I think it would save lives.

I am pleased, and grateful that Christians changed their views, such that I and my coreligionists are not so much at risk. That does not mean I must change my own religion. Maybe yekum purkan (again, see footnote 1).

He finishes his article, writing:

Can we do any less? As we prepare for the High Holy Days, it is a time for both personal and communal teshuvah, or change. Using the ample precedents of re-definition in the halachic tradition, it is critical that elements in the Orthodox community call upon the important organizations and legal decisors of that community to clearly proclaim that one can be true to the Torah and still proclaim the equality of all of us descended from Adam and Eve.

Yes, we can do less, and must do less, because Christian doctrine and procedures are not the same as Jewish ones.

Teshuva does not mean change. It means return, and specifically, a return to God. Allowing idolatry is not a return to God.

We do not have ample precedents for redefinition or the sort he suggests. Certainly halacha has developed, but most often not in a way that can be categorized as intellectually dishonest, for that would be invalid, even if it were done. The precedents we do have are limited, done to justify existing practice where we cannot prevent it from happening anyway. It was to allow people to do business with their neighbors, not to allow them to drink their wine which might have been poured as a libation, and not to allow them to enter their houses of worship. It was not a change or a negation to a basic element of Judaism.

And it was done out of necessity. It was not done out of a desire to validate the other religions. It was not done out of political correctness.

He ends with a statement that is at the same time expansive in terms of appreciating all of human existence, and at the same same getting in a final bash at Rav Schachter.

"elements in Orthodox community" means the laity. "Should call upon organizations, and halachic decisors" - that is, those who do not know as much should apply pressure to those who do to get these "reforms" passed. Maybe we should let the leaders lead?

"to clearly proclaim that one can be true to the Torah and still proclaim the equality of all of us descended from Adam and Eve." - this is the expansive comment and final ignorant jab at Rav Schachter, who I documented above, never denied the equality of all of us descended from Adam and Eve.

There is a difference between equality of people and equality of ideas. Rabbi Strassfeld conflates the two. I have this to say: Non-Jews are human, just as Jews are. Of course. But as a Jew, I believe the Torah comes from God, and Christianity does not, and Hinduism does not.

_____________
Footnotes:
1) This is a reference to a famous joke. Representatives from the three major world religions, Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, meet, to try to ease tensions between their groups and promote peace. They agree that, to move closer together, they will each offer compromise. The priest gives it much thought, and after deliberation, says: OK, we are willing to give up Immaculate Conception. The imam is next, and after much reflection, says: OK, we are willing to give up the idea the Muhammad is God's messenger. Finally, it is the rabbi's turn. He goes off into a room, and is there for quite a while. Finally, he comes out, and is all sweaty from perspiration, and says, "We are willing to give up the second yekum purkan."

Explanation: On Shabbat, we have two short prayers in Aramaic, which start with the words yekum purkan. For the Jew, giving this apparently minor thing up in a major deal.

working on the yerushalmi compared with rambam post below

have some interesting things about Chanania ben Azzur's calculation...

+1 nidda;

הדרן עלך המפלת חתיכה!
(perek 3 of yerushalmi nidda)

Ki Teitzei #3:

I previously wrote about the case of motzi shem ra, where a man falsely accuses his wife of having committed adultery while she was betrothed and not yet in his house. The father and mother of the damsel bring proof on her behalf to the court:
Devarim 22:15:

וְלָקַח אֲבִי הַנַּעֲרָ, וְאִמָּהּ; וְהוֹצִיאוּ אֶת-בְּתוּלֵי הַנַּעֲרָ, אֶל-זִקְנֵי הָעִיר--הַשָּׁעְרָה.

"then shall the father of the damsel, and her mother, take and bring forth the tokens of the damsel's virginity unto the elders of the city in the gate."

While both mother and father come to court to defend her, the next verses only describes her father as presenting his claim in court:

Devarim 22:16-17:

וְאָמַר אֲבִי הַנַּעֲרָ, אֶל-הַזְּקֵנִים: אֶת-בִּתִּי, נָתַתִּי לָאִישׁ הַזֶּה לְאִשָּׁה--וַיִּשְׂנָאֶהָ
וְהִנֵּה-הוּא שָׂם עֲלִילֹת דְּבָרִים לֵאמֹר, לֹא-מָצָאתִי לְבִתְּךָ בְּתוּלִים, וְאֵלֶּה, בְּתוּלֵי בִתִּי; וּפָרְשׂוּ הַשִּׂמְלָה, לִפְנֵי, זִקְנֵי הָעִיר.

"And the damsel's father shall say unto the elders: 'I gave my daughter unto this man to wife, and he hateth her;
and, lo, he hath laid wanton charges, saying: I found not in thy daughter the tokens of virginity; and yet these are the tokens of my daughter's virginity.' And they shall spread the garment before the elders of the city."

If we look carefully, we see both father and mother come to the court, and both father and mother present evidence to the court. (That is, note the plural in וּפָרְשׂוּ הַשִּׂמְלָה, "and they shall spread the garment," the literal or else figurative spreading of the blood-stained sheets to show clearly that the damsel is innocent.) However only the "father of the damsel" speaks to the elders of the city. Why is this?

The sifrei on Ki Teitzei writes:
ואמר אבי הנערה אל הזקנים מכאן שאין רשות לאשה לדבר במקום האיש:
"And the father of the damsel says to elders" - from here that there is no saction for a woman to talk in place of the man.

To be continued... This is an important post.

+1=masechet sanhedrin;+2 horayot;+2 nidda

!הדרן עלך ואילו הן הנחנקין
וסליקא לה מסכת סנהדרין!
(perek 11 of yerushalmi sanhedrin)

הדרן עלך הורו בית דין!
הדרן עלך כהן משיח!
(prakim 1-2 of yerushalmi horayot)

הדרן עלך שמאי אומר!
הדרן עלך כל היד!
(prakim 1-2 of yerushalmi nidda)

Just one more perek of horayot to finish seder nezikin, and two more prakim of nidda to finish seder taharot!

Ki Teitzei #2:

Ki Teitzei has the interesting case of motzi shem ra. The case: a man betrothes a woman, which means they have completed the first stage of a Jewish marriage (kiddushin). Then, they take the next step of marriage, nisuin, in which she leaves her father's house and moves in with him, and they consumate the marriage. He claims to have found her not a virgin and alleges that she committed adultery while she was married to him but still in her father's house (thus while betrothed). This is a capital offense if they can prove she did it, but if they show that the husband has spoken falsely, the judges lash him (the verse says they chastise him), plus he pays a fine of 100 shekel and may not divorce his wife in the future.
Devarim 22:13-21:

<>כִּי-יִקַּח אִישׁ, אִשָּׁה; וּבָא אֵלֶיהָ, וּשְׂנֵאָהּ.
וְשָׂם לָהּ עֲלִילֹת דְּבָרִים, וְהוֹצִא עָלֶיהָ שֵׁם רָע; וְאָמַר, אֶת-הָאִשָּׁה הַזֹּאת לָקַחְתִּי, וָאֶקְרַב אֵלֶיהָ, וְלֹא-מָצָאתִי לָהּ בְּתוּלִים.
וְלָקַח אֲבִי הַנַּעֲרָ, וְאִמָּהּ; וְהוֹצִיאוּ אֶת-בְּתוּלֵי הַנַּעֲרָ, אֶל-זִקְנֵי הָעִיר--הַשָּׁעְרָה.
וְאָמַר אֲבִי הַנַּעֲרָ, אֶל-הַזְּקֵנִים: אֶת-בִּתִּי, נָתַתִּי לָאִישׁ הַזֶּה לְאִשָּׁה--וַיִּשְׂנָאֶהָ.
וְהִנֵּה-הוּא שָׂם עֲלִילֹת דְּבָרִים לֵאמֹר, לֹא-מָצָאתִי לְבִתְּךָ בְּתוּלִים, וְאֵלֶּה, בְּתוּלֵי בִתִּי; וּפָרְשׂוּ, הַשִּׂמְלָה, לִפְנֵי, זִקְנֵי הָעִיר.
וְלָקְחוּ זִקְנֵי הָעִיר-הַהִוא, אֶת-הָאִישׁ; וְיִסְּרוּ, אֹתוֹ.
וְעָנְשׁוּ אֹתוֹ מֵאָה כֶסֶף, וְנָתְנוּ לַאֲבִי הַנַּעֲרָה--כִּי הוֹצִיא שֵׁם רָע, עַל בְּתוּלַת יִשְׂרָאֵל; וְלוֹ-תִהְיֶה לְאִשָּׁה, לֹא-יוּכַל לְשַׁלְּחָהּ כָּל-יָמָיו.
וְאִם-אֱמֶת הָיָה, הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה: לֹא-נִמְצְאוּ בְתוּלִים, לַנַּעֲרָ.
וְהוֹצִיאוּ אֶת-הַנַּעֲרָ אֶל-פֶּתַח בֵּית-אָבִיהָ, וּסְקָלוּהָ אַנְשֵׁי עִירָהּ בָּאֲבָנִים וָמֵתָה--כִּי-עָשְׂתָה נְבָלָה בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל, לִזְנוֹת בֵּית אָבִיהָ; וּבִעַרְתָּ הָרָע, מִקִּרְבֶּךָ.

"If any man take a wife, and go in unto her, and hate her,
and lay wanton charges against her, and bring up an evil name upon her, and say: 'I took this woman, and when I came nigh to her, I found not in her the tokens of virginity';
then shall the father of the damsel, and her mother, take and bring forth the tokens of the damsel's virginity unto the elders of the city in the gate.
And the damsel's father shall say unto the elders: 'I gave my daughter unto this man to wife, and he hateth her;
and, lo, he hath laid wanton charges, saying: I found not in thy daughter the tokens of virginity; and yet these are the tokens of my daughter's virginity.' And they shall spread the garment before the elders of the city.
And the elders of that city shall take the man and chastise him.
And they shall fine him a hundred shekels of silver, and give them unto the father of the damsel, because he hath brought up an evil name upon a virgin of Israel; and she shall be his wife; he may not put her away all his days.
But if this thing be true, that the tokens of virginity were not found in the damsel;
then they shall bring out the damsel to the door of her father's house, and the men of her city shall stone her with stones that she die; because she hath wrought a wanton deed in Israel, to play the harlot in her father's house; so shalt thou put away the evil from the midst of thee."

How certain details of the laws I described above (and others I did not) come from the text is a long story. As an example, כִּי-יִקַּח אִישׁ אִשָּׁה, "If any man take a wife" together with descriptions of her "playing the harlot in her father's house" presumably form the basis for her being betrothed at the time of her sin. (Also that we know from elsewhere that there is not capital punishment for a single unwed woman who sins in this way.) I'm not going to get into all of this here, but suffice it to say that everything here is subject to examination and explanation on a pshat and drash level in order to really understand it.

The punishment to the man is interesting. Would the woman wish to stay married to the man who tried to kill her in this way? Perhaps, and perhaps not. It might depend upon the times. However, I would like to suggest that an element of his punishment also serves as a deterrence to him bringing the false charges.

Lashes would certainly be an impediment. But consider. The man marries a woman and dislikes her. Why not just divorce her at this time? Why try to get her killed? I would suggest that if he divorces her, he would have to pay her ketuba. There is a financial motive at play. Thus, besides lashes, there are two further penalties. He has to pay a fine. Thus he knows he risks money if he does this. Further, he wants to be rid of this wife, and now he has the threat of being stuck with her in most instances for life. This would give pause to someone contemplating this course of action, and decide to either stick with the marriage or else take the path of divorce.

(Belated) Ki Teitzei #1

Devarim 25:11-12

כִּי-יִנָּצוּ אֲנָשִׁים יַחְדָּו, אִישׁ וְאָחִיו, וְקָרְבָה אֵשֶׁת הָאֶחָד, לְהַצִּיל אֶת-אִישָּׁהּ מִיַּד מַכֵּהוּ; וְשָׁלְחָה יָדָהּ, וְהֶחֱזִיקָה בִּמְבֻשָׁיו.
וְקַצֹּתָה, אֶת-כַּפָּהּ: לֹא תָחוֹס, עֵינֶךָ.
"When men strive together one with another, and the wife of the one draweth near to deliver her husband out of the hand of him that smiteth him, and putteth forth her hand, and taketh him by the secrets;
then thou shalt cut off her hand, thine eye shall have no pity."

According to Chazal these verses do not actually speak of a case in which woman injures a man's testicles, but rather that she grabbed them in a fight and did not damage them. (Consider that it just says וְהֶחֱזִיקָה , which can mean she grabbed, perhaps also connoting force, but does not state any damage.) The concern is the embarrassment she caused him in grabbing him there. (Thus, perhaps, the word בִּמְבֻשָׁיו - "embarrassments.") Furthermore, the punishment is not actually cutting off her hand, but rather the payment of a fine for this embarrassment. (How this comes from the verse via a gezeira shava you can see later.)

That is the more commonly known drasha Chazal give on this case. However, the sifrei has a different explanation:
(Note: edited the text a bit to give the proper pronoun. Changes her --> him.)

ש [והחזיקה] במבושיו אין לי אלא מבושיו מנין לרבות [כל] דבר שיש בו סכנה ת"ל והחזיקה מכל מקום: וקצותה את כפה מלמד שאתה חייב להציל' [בכפה] מנין שאם אין אתה יכול להצילו בכפה הצילו בנפשה ת"ל לא תחוס עינך ר' יהודה אומר נאמר כאן לא תחוס
"And she grabs him by the testicles" - this only tells me his testicles. From where to include all other things which have in there danger to life? Therefore the verse states "and she grabs" - in all cases.
"then thou shalt cut off her hand" - this teaches that you are required to save him with {by cutting off} her hand. From where that if you are not able to save him with {by cutting off} her hand that we save him by {taking} her life? Therefore the verse states "thine eye shall have no pity."
Rabbi Yehuda says, it says here "thine eye shall have no pity" and it says elsewhere {by a nefesh tachat nefesh case} "thine eye shall have no pity." Just as there it means monetary payment, so too here it means monetary payment.

So we see the derivation of monetary payment, from Rabbi Yehuda.

However, we also see another approach to the verses, which is closer, if not equal, to what we might call the peshat layer of the text. Chazal take the verses as follows:
Two men are fighting. The wife of one of them grabs the other man by the testicles. If she were to crush his testicles, this would constitute a serious injury - one which brings the very real possibility of causing his death.
There is a law of rodef. If someone comes to kill you, you can kill them first to prevent this. And if you see someone running after someone else to kill them (or, as we derive from other verses, in many instances, to rape them), you should kill the pursuer to save his intended victim.
Here, this woman is considered a rodef. Therefore you should cut off her hand, while it is still grasping his testicles, in an attempt to save his life.
You should take the minimal action first, before the maximal action. Thus, if you need to, you should cut off her hand. The same would be true in any case involving threat to the victim's life. Further, if that would not be sufficient, "your eye should not spare," but you should even take her life.

Note that there is a similar law in the Middle Assyrian Laws (A8), in which if a woman grabs a man by the testicles, then if she crushes one of them she loses a finger, and if she crushes both, or if she crushes one and physicians try to save the other but from complications he loses the other, some parts of her body are cut off.

This might well be the peshat explanation of the verse. However, I have my own understanding of ain mikra yotzei miydei peshuto, that the verse does not go out from its intended meaning. Namely, that it is a rule of thumb, that the peshat level always contributes to the level of actual practiced halacha, even though there are also derashot on that pasuk. This rule of thumb is not binding, but a general guideline, and in cases where it does not, Chazal felt free to say that even though in general ain mikra yotzei miydei peshuto, here it does go out of its simple meaning, and the peshat is not applied to actual practice.

There was another explanation of the verse, I think from Ibn Ezra, to partially reconcile Chazal and what seems the pshat meaning of the verse. Namely, for doing something to him (grabbing, or maybe we can say crushing) the punishment is cutting off her hand. However, as in many cases where it is mentioned explicitly in the pasuk, there is a concept of kofer, in which you can redeem the life or injury via money. However, if the woman is poor and cannot pay the kofer, then your eye shall not spare, and you actually cut off her hand. I think it is clear that Chazal would not agree even in this case to cut off her hand, but it is a nice attempt to bridge the gap.

At any rate, the sifrei gave a great explanation which can even be taken on a peshat level for the verse. Each word in the verse is pregnant with meaning, as is the case in all of Torah, when Chazal examine a verse. But I think they would even consider this peshat.

yerushalmi sanhedrin daf 56b

דף נו, ב פרק יא הלכה ה משנה ונביא השקר והמתנבא מה שלא שמע ומה שלא נאמר לו אבל הכובש על נבואתו והמוות על דברי נביא ונביא שעבר על דברי עצמו מיתתו בידי שמים שנאמר אנכי אדרוש מעמו:

דף נו, ב פרק יא הלכה ה גמרא המתנבא מה שלא שמע כצדקיה בן כנענה ומה שלא נאמר לו כחנניה בן עזור. רבי יהושע בן לוי אמר חנניה בן עזור נביא אמת היה אלא שהיה לו קיבוסת והיה שומע מה שירמיה מתנבא בשוק העליון ויורד ומתנבא בשוק התחתון. אמר חנניה בן עזור כל סמא דמילתא לא דא היא אלא לפי מלאת לבבל שבעים שנה אפקוד אתכם. וכל ימיו של מנשה אינן אלא חמשים וחמש שנה צא מהן עשרים שנה שאין ב"ד של מעלה עונשין וכורתים ושתים של אמון ושלשים ואחד של יאשיה הדא היא דכתי' ויהי השנה ההיא בראשית ממלכת צדקיהו מלך יהודה בשנה החמישית בחדש החמישי אמר אלי חנניה בן עזור הנביא אשר מגבעון בית ה' לעיני הכהנים וכל העם לאמר כה אמר ה' אלהי צבאות אלהי ישראל לאמר שברת את עול מלך בבל בעוד שנתים ימים אני משיב אל המקום הזה את כל כלי בית ה' אשר לקח נבוכדנצר מלך בבל מן העיר הזאת ויביאם בבל. אמר לו ירמיה את אומר בעוד שנתים ימים אני משיב וגו' ואני אומר שנבוכדנצר בא ונוטל את השאר בבלה יובאו ושמה יהיו וגו'. אמר לו תן סימן לדבריך. א"ל אני מתנבא לרעה ואיני יכול ליתן סימן לדברי שהקב"ה אומר להביא רעה ומתנחם. ואתה מתנבא לטובה את הוא שאת הוא צריך ליתן סימן לדבריך. אמר לו לאו את הוא שאת צריך ליתן סימן לדבריך. אמר לו אין כיני הרי אני נותן אות ומופת באותו האיש השנה ההיא הוא מת כי סרה דבר על ה' והות ליה כן וימת חנניה הנביא בשנה ההיא בחדש השביעי. שנת אחרת היתה ותמר הכין. אלא מלמד שמת בערב ראש השנה וצוה את בניו ואת בני ביתו להסתיר את הדבר שיוציאוהו אחר ראש השנה בשביל לעשות נבואתו של ירמיה שקר

This is slightly at odds with the Rambam, perhaps. To be translated, continued, and elaborated upon...

From the perush of yedid nefesh, the gemara I use to learn yerushalmi. The bold black text is the text of the gemara, the gray and red is the commentary. (In the printed edition, the gray commentary is just not bolded and perhaps a bit smaller, and the red is usually in even smaller block print.)

ומה שלא נאמר לו כחנניה בן עזור. רבי יהושע בן לוי אמר חנניה בן עזור בתחילה נביא אמת היה, אלא שהיה לו קיבוסת צער ודאגה והיה שומע מה שירמיה מתנבא בשוק העליון ויורד ומתנבא בשוק התחתון. אמר חנניה בן עזור הוא ניבא שבעוד שנתים ימים הקב"ה ישיב את כלי הבית בחזרה, ולא שמע נבואה זו אלא טעה בחשבון. ומפרש במה טעה. כל סמא דמילתא לא דא היא סך חשבון הדברים כך הוא אלא (ירמיה כט) לפי מלאת לבבל שבעים שנה אפקוד אתכם והרי הגזרה
נגזרה כבר בימי חזקיה שאמר לו ישעיה הנה ימים באים ונשא את כל אשר בביתך. ולפי חשבונו שבעים שנות הגלות מתחילות אחר מות חזקיה כשהתחיל מנשה בנו להרשיע וכל ימיו של מנשה אינן אלא חמשים וחמש שנה. צא מהן עשרים שנה שאין ב"ד של מעלה עונשין וכורתים נשארו ל"ה שנים ושתים של אמון בנו ושלשים ואחד של יאשיה ביחד ס"ח שנים שהגזרה הייתה בפועל הדא היא דכתיב וזה שכתוב (ירמיה כח) ויהי השנה ההיא בראשית ממלכת צדקיהו מלך יהודה בשנה החמישית בחדש החמישי אמר אלי חנניה בן עזור הנביא אשר מגבעון בית ה' לעיני הכהנים וכל העם לאמר. כה אמר ה' אלהי צבאות אלהי ישראל לאמר. שברת את עול מלך בבל. בעוד שנתים ימים אני משיב אל המקום הזה את כל כלי בית ה' אשר לקח נבוכדנצר מלך בבל מן העיר הזאת ויביאם בבל כי לפי חשבונו בעוד שתי שנים באו לסוף שבעים שנה. אמר לו ירמיה, את אומר בעוד שנתים ימים אני משיב וגו' ואני אומר שנבוכדנצר בא ונוטל את השאר (ירמיה כז) בבלה יובאו ושמה יהיו וגו'. א"ל חנניה לירמיה תן סימן לדבריך. א"ל השיב ירמיה אני מתנבא לרעה ואיני יכול ליתן סימן לדברי שהקב"ה אומר להביא רעה ומתנחם. ואתה מתנבא לטובה, את הוא שאת הוא צריך ליתן סימן לדבריך. א"ל חנניה לירמיה לאו, את הוא שאת צריך ליתן סימן לדבריך שטעיתי בחשבון א"ל ירמיה אין כיני כן, כך אני לומד הרי אני נותן אות ומופת. באותו האיש השנה ההיא הוא מת (שם כח) כי סרה דבר על ה'. והות ליה כן וכך אכן היה וימת חנניה הנביא בשנה ההיא בחדש השביעי. שואל הירושלמי שנת אחרת היתה והרי החדש השביעי היה שייך לשנה אחרת ותמר הכין? ואתה אומר כך? בתמיה! עונה הירושלמי אלא מלמד שמת בערב ראש השנה וצוה את בניו ואת בני ביתו להסתיר את הדבר שיוציאוהו אחר ראש השנה בשביל לעשות נבואתו של ירמיה שקר שיחשבו שלא מת בתוך השנה, שהסימן של ירמיה לא יתקיים ויחשבו שאמת ניבא.

"And that which was not said to him" - like Chanania ben Azzur {the prophet who contested with Yirmiyahu.} Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said, Chanania ben Azzue was {initially} a true prophet, but he experienced a prophetic intermission, and he heard what Yirmiyahu prophesied in the upper market and descended and prophesied in the lower market. Chanania ben Azzur said {that is he prophesied that in another two years Hashem will return the vessels of the Temple, and he did not actually hear this prophecy from Hashem but rather he erred in calculation. And now the gemara will explain in what he erred.} The entire sum of the matters, is it not this? Only {citing Yirmiyahu 29:10}

לְפִי מְלֹאת לְבָבֶל שִׁבְעִים שָׁנָה, אֶפְקֹד אֶתְכֶם
"...After seventy years are accomplished for Babylon, I will remember you..."

{J: A word of explanation and context. Yirmiyahu 29 is the perek immediately following Yirmiyahu 28, which was the dispute between Yirmiyahu and Chanania ben Azzur. In Yirmiyahu 29 Hashem talks about false prophets and continues with when He will actually redeem Israel from Babylon. As the first pasuk of perek 29 notes, Yirmiyahu sent this as a letter to all the various captives, and so this is a well-publicized prophecy. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi appears to be taking this closeness of placement in the sefer and in subject matter of false prophecy and of time of redemption to explain that Chanania ben Azzur based and extrapolated his "prophecy" from that of Yirmiyahu. Further evidence that he did this is that one can calculate and see how you might mistakenly extrapolate this, plus perhaps various other things in the text that suggest that Chanania ben Azzur was originally a true prophet.

So Yirmiyahu had said that Hashem would remember tham after 70 years. /J

And the decree of exile had already been decreed in the days of King Chizkiyahu when the prophet Yeshayahu said to him, in Yeshayahu 39:6,

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הִנֵּה, יָמִים בָּאִים, וְנִשָּׂא כָּל-אֲשֶׁר בְּבֵיתֶךָ וַאֲשֶׁר אָצְרוּ אֲבֹתֶיךָ עַד-הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה, בָּבֶל: לֹא-יִוָּתֵר דָּבָר
"Behold, the days come, that all that is in thy house, and that which thy fathers have laid up in store until this day, shall be carried to Babylon; nothing shall be left, saith the LORD."

And according to Chanania ben Azzur's calculation, these 70 years of exile began after the death of King Chizkiyahu when his son Menasheh began to do evil.}

And all the days of Menashe were only 55 years. Subtract from them 20 years {the initial ones of Menashe's life} in which the Heavenly Court does not punish nor cut off {so 55 - 20 = 35} plus the 2 of Ammon {his son} plus the 31 of Yoshiyahu {35 + 2 + 31 = 68 years that the decree was in effect.} This is what is written {Yirmiyahu 28:1-3,

וַיְהִי בַּשָּׁנָה הַהִיא, בְּרֵאשִׁית מַמְלֶכֶת צִדְקִיָּה מֶלֶךְ-יְהוּדָה, בשנת (בַּשָּׁנָה) הָרְבִעִית, בַּחֹדֶשׁ הַחֲמִישִׁי; אָמַר אֵלַי חֲנַנְיָה בֶן-עַזּוּר הַנָּבִיא אֲשֶׁר מִגִּבְעוֹן, בְּבֵית יְהוָה, לְעֵינֵי הַכֹּהֲנִים וְכָל-הָעָם, לֵאמֹר
כֹּה-אָמַר יְהוָה צְבָאוֹת, אֱלֹהֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל--לֵאמֹר: שָׁבַרְתִּי, אֶת-עֹל מֶלֶךְ בָּבֶל.
"And it came to pass the same year, in the beginning of the reign of Zedekiah king of Judah, in the fourth year, in the fifth month, that Hananiah the son of Azzur the prophet, who was of Gibeon, spoke unto me in the house of the LORD, in the presence of the priests and of all the people, saying:
'Thus speaketh the LORD of hosts, the God of Israel, saying: I have broken the yoke of the king of Babylon.
Within two full years will I bring back into this place all the vessels of the LORD'S house, that Nebuchadnezzar king of Babylon took away from this place, and carried them to Babylon;"

{J: Two things to note here. First, the Yerushalmi changed the text of the first pasuk, in that the Yerushalmi says it happened in the 5th year, while the pasuk in our Tanachs state it happened in the fourth year. There is already slight uncertainty in the pasuk in terms of the krei/ketiv we have of bashana/bashanat.

Secondly, we need to really figure out the accounting here. The subtraction of 20 years when the Heavenly Court does not punish seems strange and out of sorts in the accounting. The style is foreign to the text, and it is strange to be removing years from the count like this. Further, if you look in Divrei Hayamim, you will see that Menashe began ruling when he was 12 years old, and reigned for 55 years after that. So why would you remove a full 20 years from that, when he was already 12, and not 0, when he began to rule. You should remove 8 years, not 20! Further, why we do not remove sets of 20 years from the years of Yoshiyahu, for he began ruling at the age of 8, and ruled for 31 years. None of the other kings who ruled during this time began ruling before the age of 20.
I think we can answer this. Since Yoshiyahu was 8 at the beginning of rule, that discounts 12 years. And since Menashe was 12 at the beginning of his rule, that discounts 8 years. All other kings at this time were older than 20, so it is just these two kings, for a total of 20 discounted years. But why write this figure 20 by Menashe and not distribute this amongst the two kings?

Further, this assumes Tzidkiyahu began his reign immediately after Yoshiyahu, but see here, where it summarizes the reigns of the kings as listed in Divrei HaYamim, that after Yoshiyahu, first Yehoachaz for 3 months, then Yehoyakim reigned for 11 years, then Yehoyachin for 3 months, and only then Tzidkiyahu for 11 years. And it does seem that some reigned as co-kings, but still there seems to be some extra years here. And there are actually two Tzidkiyahu's in Divrei Hayamim, one and uncle of the other.

Further, if this happened in the 4th year of Tzidkiyahu, or if you want to take the Yerushalmi's girsa, the 5th, then it was not the 68th year of the decree, but rather the 68+4=72nd year, or the 68+5=73rd year. Thus, the accounting does not work out!

The answer certainly seems to be that Chazal understand "in the beginning of the reign of Zedekiah king of Judah" to mean just that - Tzidkiyahu's first year of rule. The fact that it is called the 4th or the 5th year is in some other system of counting. Thus, it would be 68 years.

We can also clarify the count as follows. Ignore the 20 years subtraction. We have 55 of Menashe, who was a bad king, plus the 2 of Ammon who was a bad king = 57. Yoshiyahu was a righteous king, so do not count his 31 years. Then there was Yehoachaz for 3 months which don't really count - they can be swallowed up in some other king's year. Then 11 of Yekoyakim who was a bad king = 68, and then another 3 months for Yehoyachin, which can be swallowed up in another king's year. Then, if we again assume it is the 1st and not the 4th or 5th year of Tzidkiyahu, then we are in year 68. And all the kings fit in, and there is no need for the subtraction of the 20 years.

A suspicion what happened is that it origianlly mentioned Menashe with his 55 years and Ammon with his 2, and the words Tzei Meihem, subtract from them, were written regarding the 31 years of Yoshiyahu. A sofer did not see how this added to 68, not realizing that after subtracting the 31, there were more unmentioned kings, who were not mentioned because all you needed to do was add their years, not omit their years. As a result, given these listed years, he saw that adding all the years mentioned was 88. To reach 68 you must remove 20, and he took the other saying of Chazal about not getting punishment for the first 20 years of life, even though it is strange since this is national and not personal punishment. He either blindly applied this to Menashe even though he was already 12 or insightfully came up with this figure by adding the pre-20 years of Menashe and Yoshiyahu. }

First Toilet And Sewer System Of Prehistoric Period Found In Van

VAN - The first toilet and sewer system of prehistoric period was found in an Urartian castle in Gurpinar town of eastern province of Van.

In an interview with the A.A correspondent, Istanbul University Eurasian Archaeology Institute Director Prof. Dr. Oktay Belli said on Saturday that they had unearthed a toilet in the western part of Cavustepe Castle built by Urartian King Sarduri II in 764 BC.

''We revealed that Urartian architects had formed a sewer system before building the castle. The toilet and sewer system in the castle is similar to today's toilets,'' he said.

During 764 BCE, they still had the first Bet HaMikdash, and the two divided kingdoms of Yehuda and Israel. The prophet Yeshayahu was born one year previous, in 765 BCE.

+7 sanhedrin;

הדרן עלך אחד דיני ממונות!
הדרן עלך היו בודקין!
הדרן עלך נגמר הדין!
הדרן עלך ארבע מיתות!
הדרן עלך בן סורר ומורה!
הדרן עלך אילו הן הנשרפין!
הדרן עלך חלק!
(prakim 4-10 of yerushalmi sanhedrin)

Shoftim #2: Double jeopardy

It turns out halacha has a concept of of double jeopardy - that once you have been acquitted of a crime, you cannot be tried for that same crime again. The yerushalmi sanhedrin had a derivation of this from psukim in Shemot. However, the sifrei has a nice derivation of this principle from the third pasuk in this week's parsha.

Devarim 16:20 states, צֶדֶק צֶדֶק, תִּרְדֹּף, "Justice, justice shalt thou follow." The full pasuk is:

צֶדֶק צֶדֶק, תִּרְדֹּף--לְמַעַן תִּחְיֶה וְיָרַשְׁתָּ אֶת-הָאָרֶץ, אֲשֶׁר-ה אֱלֹקֶיךָ נֹתֵן לָךְ.
"Justice, justice shalt thou follow, that thou mayest live, and inherit the land which the LORD thy God giveth thee."

צֶדֶק also denotes righteousness. First, the sifrei derives that even if someone has been condemned and they are leading him away to get capital punishment and he says he has new evidence or a new argument that would lead to acquittal, they take him back to be judged again. Further, they even will repeat this process one hundred times or more. They derive this from צֶדֶק צֶדֶק, תִּרְדֹּף. That is, righteousness (=innocence of the charges), righteousness you shall pursue. It says it two times to show you will pursue it even multiple times to get an acquittal.

However, the halacha is that once a man has been acquitted in a capital case, even if new evidence surfaces, or new witnesses appear, he cannot be retried. The sifrei gets it again from the same pasuk: צֶדֶק צֶדֶק, תִּרְדֹּף. Presumably the drasha is that only for acquittal - צֶדֶק - do you bring the case back to court, which implies that you don't to declare the man guilty.

I have an alternative suggestion to the one I proposed above as to how the sifrei understands the pasuk. We do not have to say that צֶדֶק = zakkai = innocent, but denotes judgement, showing that you will reconsider the case multiple times. There is a problem though: why retry it to declare the man innocent and save his life, but not to declare him guilty and thus take his life? Because the pasuk continues: לְמַעַן תִּחְיֶה, "that thou mayest live." That is, we will only reconsider the case so that he may live, by being acquitted, but not that he may die.

Establishing a false prophet according to the Rambam

The following is from the introduction to the perush hamishnayot of the Rambam:

[מתי ביטול נבואה פירושה שהנביא נביא שקר]

ונשאר בכאן פרק גדול ראוי לנו לבארו והוא שהנביא כשיתנבא בצרות ומאורעות לעם שהם חייבים, כגון שיזהירם ברעב או חרב, או שתהפך ארצם, או ירדו עליהם אבני אלגביש, וכדומה לו, ואחר כן לא יתקיים דבר מן העניין ההוא, ורוחמו מן השמים ועמדו כל ענייניהם בשלום ובשלוה, לא יודע בו כזב הנביא, ואין ראוי לומר שהוא נביא שקר, ושיהיה חייב מיתה, מפני שהקב"ה ניחם על הרעה ואפשר שעשו תשובה וסרו מנאצותם, או איחר גמולם הקב"ה בחמלתו, והאריך אפו להם עד זמן אחר. כמו שעשה לאחאב, באומרו ע"י אליהו (מלכים א' כא), לא אביא הרעה בימיו, בימי בנו אביא הרעה. או ירחם עליהם למען זכיות שקדמו להם. ולא אמר על דבר כזה (דברים יח) ולא יהיה הדבר ולא יבוא.

אבל אם הבטיח בבשורות טובות שיתחדשו לזמן קצוב, ויאמר בשנה זו יהיה השקט ושלוה, והיו בה מלחמות, או יאמר שנה זו תהיה גשומה וברוכה, ויהיה בה רעב ובצורת, וכדומה לו, נדע שהוא נביא שקר, והתקיים ביטול טענתו ושקרו. ועל זה אמר הכתוב (דברים יח), בזדון דברו הנביא, לא תגור ממנו, רוצה לומר: אל יפחידך ואל יבהילך מלהרוג אותו, אמונתו וישרו וחכמתו, אחרי אשר מלאו לבו להעיד דבר גדול כזה ודיבר סרה על השם יתברך.

שהקב"ה כשיבטיח אומה בבשורות טובות על ידי נביא, אי אפשר שלא יעשם, כדי שתתקיים נבואתו לבני אדם. והוא מה שאמרו ע"ה (ברכות ז.), כל דבר שיצא מפי הקב"ה לטובה, אפילו על תנאי, אינו חוזר בו.

[מדוע פחד יעקב לאחר שהובטח לו טוב?]

אבל עניין פחד יעקב, אחר שהבטיחו הקב"ה בבשורות טובות, כמו שנאמר (בראשית כח), והנה אנכי עמך ושמרתיך בכל אשר תלך, והיה מפחד פן ימות, כמו שנאמר (שם לב), ויירא יעקב מאוד וייצר לו, אמרו חכמים ז"ל בעניין ההוא, שהיה מפחד מעון, שמא יהיה גורם לו מיתה. והוא מה שאמרו (ברכות ד), קסבר שמא יגרום החטא. יורה זה שהקב"ה יבטיח בטובה ויגברו העונות ולא יתקיים הטוב ההוא.

ויש לדעת שעניין זה אינו אלא בין הקב"ה ובין הנביא. אבל שיאמר הקב"ה לנביא להבטיח בני אדם בבשורה טובה, במאמר מוחלט, בלא תנאי, ואחר כך לא יתקיים הטוב ההוא, זה בטל ואי אפשר להיות. בשביל שלא יהיה נשאר לנו מקום לקיים בו אמונה הנבואה, והקב"ה נתן לנו בתורתו עיקר, שהנביא ייבחן כשיאמנו הבטחותיו.

[ירמיהו במחלוקתו עם חנניה בן עזור]

ואל העיקר הגדול הזה רמז ירמיהו במחלוקתו עם חנניה בן עזור. מפני שירמיהו היה מתנבא לרעה ולמות, ואמר שנבוכדנצר יגבר ויצליח ויחריב בית המקדש, וחנניה בן עזור היה מתנבא לטובה ולשוב כלי בית ה' לירושלים המובאים בבלה.

ואמר לו ירמיהו, כשנתווכח עמו על דרך העקרים השמורים, שאם לא תתקיים נבואתו ולא יגבר נבוכדנצר, וישובו כלי בית ה', כמו שאתה אומר, אין זה הדבר מכחיש לנבואתי, אולי הקב"ה ירחם עליכם, אבל אם לא יתקיים דבריך ולא ישובו כלי בית ה', בזה יתברר שנבואתך שקר, ולא יתקיים לך נבואה, עד יתקיימו היעודים הטובים שהבטחת בהם.

והוא מה שאמר (ירמיה כח): אך שמע נא הדבר הזה אשר אנכי דובר באזניך ובאזני כל העם, הנביאים אשר היו לפני ולפניך מן העולם, וינבאו אל ארצות רבות ועל ממלכות גדולות, למלחמה ולרעה ולדבר, הנביא אשר ינבא לשלום בבא דבר הנביא יודע הנביא אשר שלחו ה' באמת. רוצה לומר בדבר הזה, שהנביאים ההם המתנבאים לטוב ולרע, לא נוכל לדעת מכל הדברים שהתנבאו לרע אם צדקו בעדותם או כזבו. אבל יודע אמונת דבריהם כשיבטיחו בטובה ותתקיים.

[When is the explanation of the non-fulfillment of a prophecy that the prophet is a false prophet?]
And there remains here a large chapter which is fitting for us to explain, and that is that the prophet when he prophesies about drought and {bad} events that will befall the nation that they deserve, such as that he warns them of famine or the sword, or that the land will be overturned, or of hailstones [/ a meteor shower] or the like, and after this some portion of the matter does not come to pass, {then} there was mercy from heaven and all the matters stopped in peace and quiet, and {so} it is not known falsehood in the prophet, and it is not fitting to say that he is a false prophet, and that he deserves the death penalty, for Hashem recanted on the bad {events}, and it is possible that they {those addressed by the prophet} did repentance and turned from their bad deeds. Or else Hashem postponed their recompense in his Mercy, and extended {bringing forth} his anger for them until a later time. Just as He did to {King} Achav when he said via {the prophet} Eliyahu in 1 Kings 21:29, לֹא-אָבִי הָרָעָה בְּיָמָיו--בִּימֵי בְנוֹ, אָבִיא הָרָעָה עַל-בֵּיתוֹ, {after Eliyahu told Achav of impending doom to his family, and Achav fasted, tore his clothes, put on sackcloth, and went softly: 'Seest thou how Ahab humbleth himself before Me? because he humbleth himself before Me,} I will not bring the evil in his days; but in his son's days will I bring the evil upon his house.' Or else He will have mercy on them because of the merit of those who preceded them. And so we do not say regarding something like this {woe not happening, the pasuk about establishing a false prophet}, in Dvarim 18:29, וְלֹא-יִהְיֶה הַדָּבָר וְלֹא יָבֹא, {"When a prophet speaketh in the name of the LORD,} if the thing follow not, nor come to pass {, that is the thing which the LORD hath not spoken; the prophet hath spoken it presumptuously, thou shalt not be afraid of him."}

But if he promises good tidings that will come to be in a set time, and he says "In this year there will be peace and quiet," and there is in fact wars, or he says "This year will be rainy and blessed, and there is in it {that year} famine and drought, and the like, {then} it is known that he is a false prophet, and it is fulfilled the nullification of his condition and he is false. And on this the verse says, in Dvarim 18:29, בְּזָדוֹן דִּבְּרוֹ הַנָּבִיא, לֹא תָגוּר מִמֶּנּוּ, "the prophet hath spoken it presumptuously, thou shalt not be afraid of him." This means to say, do not fear and do not be confounded from killing him - of his faith and his righteousness and his wisdom, after he filled his heart to witness such a great thing as this and said rebellion on Hashem.

For Hashem when He promises good tidings to a nation via a prophet, it is impossible that He will not do them, so that His prophecy will be fulfilled to Man. And this is what they said in Bavli Brachot 7a, "Any thing that leaves the Mouth of Hashem for good, even on a condition, he does not retract."

{The gemara there states: וא"ר יוחנן משום ר' יוסי כל דבור ודבור שיצא מפי הקב"ה לטובה אפי' על תנאי לא חזר בו מנא לן ממשה רבינו שנא' (דברים ט) הרף ממני ואשמידם וגו' ואעשה אותך לגוי עצום אע"ג דבעא משה רחמי עלה דמלתא ובטלה אפ"ה אוקמה בזרעיה שנא' (דברי הימים א כג) בני משה גרשום ואליעזר ויהיו בני אליעזר רחביה הראש וגו' ובני רחביה רבו למעלה וגו' ותני רב יוסף למעלה מששים רבוא אתיא רביה רביה כתיב הכא רבו למעלה וכתיב התם (שמות א) ובני ישראל פרו וישרצו וירבו
}

[{If this is so, } Why did Yaakov fear {Esav} after good was promised him {by Hashem}?]
However, the matter of Yaakov's fear, even after Hashem had promised him good tidings, as it states in Bereishit 28:15, וְהִנֵּה אָנֹכִי עִמָּךְ, וּשְׁמַרְתִּיךָ בְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר-תֵּלֵךְ, וַהֲשִׁבֹתִיךָ, אֶל-הָאֲדָמָה הַזֹּאת: כִּי, לֹא אֶעֱזָבְךָ, עַד אֲשֶׁר אִם-עָשִׂיתִי, אֵת אֲשֶׁר-דִּבַּרְתִּי לָךְ, "And, behold, I am with thee, and will keep thee whithersoever thou goest {, and will bring thee back into this land; for I will not leave thee, until I have done that which I have spoken to thee of.}' " And {still} he feared lest he die, as it states in Bereishit 32:8, וַיִּירָא יַעֲקֹב מְאֹד, וַיֵּצֶר לוֹ, "Then Jacob was greatly afraid and was distressed..."

Chazal say in this matter that he was fearful of sin, that perhaps it caused him {to be worthy} of death. And this is what they said in Bavli Brachot 4a, "He thought 'lest sin cause' {that he be worthy of death.}

{The word kasavar is not in our girsa. The gemara there states: ודוד מי קרי לנפשיה חסיד והכתיב (תהילים כז) לולא האמנתי לראות בטוב ה' בארץ חיים ותנא משמיה דרבי יוסי למה נקוד על לולא אמר דוד לפני הקב"ה רבש"ע מובטח אני בך שאתה משלם שכר טוב לצדיקים לעתיד לבוא אבל איני יודע אם יש לי חלק ביניהם אם לאו שמא יגרום החטא כדר' יעקב בר אידי דר' יעקב בר אידי רמי כתיב (בראשית כח) והנה אנכי עמך ושמרתיך בכל אשר תלך וכתיב (בראשית לב) ויירא יעקב מאד אמר שמא יגרום החטא כדתניא (שמות טו) עד יעבור עמך ה' עד יעבור עם זו קנית עד יעבור עמך ה' זו ביאה ראשונה עד יעבור עם זו קנית זו ביאה שנייה מכאן אמרו חכמים ראוים היו ישראל ליעשות להם נס בימי עזרא כדרך .שנעשה להם בימי יהושע בן נון אלא שגרם החטא:
}

This shows that Hashem can promise good and the sins {of man} can overpower and this good will not come to pass.

And there is to know that this matter {of a sin causing a promise of good not coming to pass} is only when it is between Hashem and the prophet. However, that which Hashem tells the prophet to assure people about a good tiding, in a clear straightforward statement, without a condition, and after this the good does not come to pass, this is annulled and it is not possible to be. For {if it were so} then there would not be left for us a way to establish faith in the prophecy, and Hashem has given us in his Torah a principle that the prophet can be tested so that we can trust in his assurances.

[Yirmiyahu in his dispute with Chanania ben Azzur]
And to this great fundamental principle Yirmiyahu hinted in his dispute with Chanania ben Azzur. For Yirmiyahu prophesied for bad and death, and said that Nevuchadnezzar would grow in strength and be successful, and destroy the Temple, and Chanania ben Azzur prophesied for good and that the vessels of the House of Hashem which had been brought to Babylon would return to Yerushalayim.

And Yirmiyahu said to him, when he argued with him via the kept principles, that if his {Yirmiyahu's} prophecy did not come to pass and Nevuchadnezzar did not grow strong and rather the vessels of the the House of Hashem returned, as you {Chanania} say, this thing would not prove false my prophecy, for perhaps Hashem will have mercy on you {the Israelites}. However, if your words do not come to pass and the vessels of the House of Hashem do not return, in this it will be clear that your prophecy is false, and prophecy will not be established for you until those positive things you have prophesied come to pass.

And this is what is said in Yirmiyahu 28:7-9:

אַךְ-שְׁמַע-נָא הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה, אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי דֹּבֵר בְּאָזְנֶיךָ, וּבְאָזְנֵי, כָּל-הָעָם.
הַנְּבִיאִים, אֲשֶׁר הָיוּ לְפָנַי וּלְפָנֶיךָ--מִן-הָעוֹלָם: וַיִּנָּבְאוּ אֶל-אֲרָצוֹת רַבּוֹת, וְעַל-מַמְלָכוֹת גְּדֹלוֹת, לְמִלְחָמָה, וּלְרָעָה וּלְדָבֶר.
הַנָּבִיא, אֲשֶׁר יִנָּבֵא לְשָׁלוֹם--בְּבֹא, דְּבַר הַנָּבִיא, יִוָּדַע הַנָּבִיא, אֲשֶׁר-שְׁלָחוֹ יְהוָה בֶּאֱמֶת.
"Nevertheless hear thou now this word that I speak in thine ears, and in the ears of all the people:
The prophets that have been before me and before thee of old prophesied against many countries, and against great kingdoms, of war, and of evil, and of pestilence.
The prophet that prophesieth of peace, when the word of the prophet shall come to pass, then shall the prophet be known, that the LORD hath truly sent him.'"

That is to say, in this matter, that those prophets prophesied for good or bad, it is not possible to know from those things they prophesied for bad if they were righteous in their witness, or if whey lied. However, you know the trustworthiness of their words when they promise good and it comes to pass.

+3 sanhedrin;

הדרן עלך דיני ממונות!
הדרן עלך כהן גדול!
הדרן עלך דיני ממונות בשלשה!
(prakim 1-3 of yerushalmi sanhedrin)




er... or something like that...

I was somewhat disheartened to read the following news:

California’s Supreme Court on Thursday nullified the nearly 4,000 same-sex marriages that San Francisco sanctioned this spring, ruling that the city did not have the authority to take such action in defiance of state law.

I had hoped that these same-sex marriages marked the אתחלתא דגאולה, the beginning of the Redemption. After all, in the haftara of Nachamu, which we lained about two weeks back, is a description of the situation at the end of days, and it states (Yeshayahu 40:4):

כָּל-גֶּיא יִנָּשֵׂא

Oh well...

מֵעִם מִזְבְּחִי, תִּקָּחֶנּוּ לָמוּת

Presidential candidate Senator John Kerry recently claimed he would fight "a more sensitive war on terror". In the abstract, that's a frightening prospect. Because in reality, President Bush is already taking too sensitive an approach. Right now in Iraq, we're allowing the cultural and religious aspects of the Imam Ali shrine to protect murderous cleric al-Sadr from our full powers. It's said we're doing so to avoid "alienating" the dominant, Iraqi Shiite population. But how much will we alienate the population from respecting us if we keep handling killers like al-Sadr with kid gloves?

more at coxandforkum.com

My take on this:
Shemot 21:14
וְכִי-יָזִד אִישׁ עַל-רֵעֵהוּ, לְהָרְגוֹ בְעָרְמָה--מֵעִם מִזְבְּחִי, תִּקָּחֶנּוּ לָמוּת.
"And if a man come presumptuously upon his neighbour, to slay him with guile; thou shalt take him from Mine altar, that he may die."

The Torah here is making a distinction between someone who committed accidental manslaughter and one who deliberately killed another. The deliberate killer is not protected by an Ir Miklat, a city of refuge. Even if he were on the altar of the Mishkan or Bet Hamikdash, either seeking refuge there, or else serving as a priest doing the service, this will not save him from his deserved punishment.

This seems to address the tension between the religious nature of the site (the altar of the Temple) and the obligation to wipe out evil. I think that in an instance like this, the moral thing to do is to attack and not pay heed to the fact that a mosque is there. (On the other hand, there are other factors at play here, such as whether this course of action would alienate many Iraqis and make winning the peace more difficult.) The same issue is at hand as regards the standoff between the terrorists and the Israeli Defense Force in 2002 at the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. People were concerned that in the fight the church would get damaged, and felt this would be morally wrong. As a result, the Israelis conducted negotiations and let the terrorists leave the church in peace. I feel that the morally correct action would be to kill the terrorists, and if the church is harmed, it is harmed. Lives of the innocent are more important than architecture, even if it has some historic/religious significance. Similarly here, it looks like the Iraqis are willing to allow al-Sadr to escape if he leaves the mosque peacefully.

Idealogian seems to take the opposite opinion, also referring to psukim, making the case that we should be "sensitive warriors." I do not entirely agree with him. He claims we should be merciful in war, and refers to certain precedents. However, I would point out that the precedent is to propose peace first, but once you fight a war, you fight a war to win. Mercy in war, especially with those who see this mercy as a weakness and take advantage of it, is self-destructive. Overwhelming force serves to end it quickly and demoralize the enemy so that they surrender, at which point you can have peace.

+3=masechet bava batra

הדרן עלך יש נוחלין !
הדרן עלך מי שמת !

הדרן עלך גט פשוט !
(prakim 8-10 of yerushalmi bava batra)
וסליקא לה מסכת בבא בתרא !

Reeh #1: The blessing and the curse

Parshat Reeh begins with Moshe laying out a choice for the Israelites:

Devarim 11:26-28:

רְאֵה, אָנֹכִי נֹתֵן לִפְנֵיכֶם--הַיּוֹם: בְּרָכָה, וּקְלָלָה.
אֶת-הַבְּרָכָה--אֲשֶׁר תִּשְׁמְעוּ, אֶל-מִצְו‍ֹת ה אֱלֹקֵיכֶם, אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי מְצַוֶּה אֶתְכֶם, הַיּוֹם.
וְהַקְּלָלָה, אִם-לֹא תִשְׁמְעוּ אֶל-מִצְו‍ֹת ה אֱלֹקֵיכֶם, וְסַרְתֶּם מִן-הַדֶּרֶךְ, אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי מְצַוֶּה אֶתְכֶם הַיּוֹם: לָלֶכֶת, אַחֲרֵי אֱלֹהִים אֲחֵרִים--אֲשֶׁר לֹא-יְדַעְתֶּם.
"Behold, I set before you this day a blessing and a curse:
the blessing, if ye shall hearken unto the commandments of the LORD your God, which I command you this day;
and the curse, if ye shall not hearken unto the commandments of the LORD your God, but turn aside out of the way which I command you this day, to go after other gods, which ye have not known."

I would like to make a drasha. The blessing is in fact the keeping of the Torah. By living a lifestyle in accordance with God's command, one lives a blessed and elevated life.

Of course, context (pasuk 29) describes the blessing and the curse as associated with Mount Grizim and Mount Eival, and we can take the blessing and curse to be worldly or next-wordly reward/punishment associated with being true to God and keeping his commandments.

However, and not to deny the existence of reward and punishment, the elevation of man as a result of conducting himself in accordance with the divine plan, as opposed to that of his own whims (a recurring theme in this week's parasha), can be a reward and a blessing all its own.

We can see this in the second verse. It does not state "the blessing, if - אם - ye shall hearken unto the commandments of the LORD your God, which I command you this day, but rather that - אשר you shall hearken.

(Obviously at the simplest level of reading the text the word אשר serves many functions, including both "that" and "if/since.)

ערוך השלחן אורח חיים, סימן תרה: מנהג הכפרות בערב יום הכיפורים, ובו ה סעיפים

א: המנהג מכפרות שנוהגים לשחוט על כל בן זכר תרנגול ועל כל נקיבה תרנגולת, כמה גדולים אין דעתם נוחה מזה והרמב"ן והרשב"א ז"ל ביטלו המנהג הזה משום ניחוש ומשום דרכי האמורי כמה שכתוב בתשובת הרשב"א [סימן תצ"ה ועיין בית יוסף] ולכן כתב רבינו הבית יוסף דיש למנוע המנהג

1: The custom of Kapparot that they practice to slaughter for each male a male chicken and for each female a female chicken, many of the gedolim were not pleased with this. And the Ramban and the Rashba, z"l, abolished this practice because of augury and the ways of the Emorites (superstition), as is written in the responsa of the Rashba (Siman 495, and see the Bet Yosef). And therefore Our Teacher the Bet Yosef wrote that there is to refrain from this practice.

ב: אמנם כמה מהגדולים קיימו המנהג וגם בתשובות הגאונים נמצא זה וגם ברשי שבת [פ"א:] הביא מתשובות הגאונים שהיו עושין כפרות בזרעים ובערב ראש השנה היו מסבבין על הראש ואומרים זה חליפתי עיין שם, אך הטור הביא שהיו עושין בתרנגולים ובאילים ובערב יום הכיפורים

2: However, many of the gedolim kept/established the practice, and also in the responsa of the geonim this is found. And also in Rashi in Bavli Shabbat 81a he brings from the responsa of the geonim that they made Kapparot with plants, and on erev Rosh HaShana they would encircle it about the head and say "this is my substitute," see there. However the Tur brings that they would do {Kapparot} with chickens and rams, and on erev Yom Kippur.

{J: I have to check this out inside the Tur again. Does this mean the slaughter of these served as Kapparot, or that they swung it about the head as well? It is hard to imagine them doing this with rams, and if I recall correctly the reason for the prevalence of chickens is that they are cheaper, not easier to swing about one's head. Yet the current minhag is to swing the chickens! As I said, to be looked into.}

ג: וזה לשון רבינו הרמ"א: ויש מהגאונים שכתבו מנהג זה וכן כתבו אותו רבים מן האחרונים וכן נוהגין בכל מדינות אלו ואין לשנות כי הוא מנהג וותיקין. ונוהגין ליקח תרנגול זכר לזכר, ולנקבה לוקחין תרנגולת (ב"י בשם תשב"ץ), ולוקחין למעוברת ב' תרנגולים אולי תלד זכר; ובוחרין בתרנגולים לבנים, על דרך שנאמר: אם יהיו חטאיכם כשנים כשלג ילבינו (ישעיה א:יח) ונהגו ליתן הכפרות לעניים, או לפדותן בממון שנותנים לעניים (מהרי"ל). ויש מקומות שנוהגין לילך על הקברים[/ות] ולהרבות בצדקה, והכל מנהג יפה. ויש להסמיך שחיטת הכפרות מיד לאחר שהחזירו עליו, וסמך ידיו עליו, דמות הקרבן; וזורקין בני מעיהם על הגגות או בחצר, מקום שהעופות יכולין לקחת משם (טור ). עד כאן לשונו.א

3: And this is the language of the Rama: And there were among the geonim who recorded this practice, and so did many of the acharonim record it, and so is the practice in all these countries, and there is not to change, for it is a practice of the early ones.
And the practice is to take a male chicken for a male and for a female a female chicken, and for a pregnant woman two chickens, since perhaps she will give birth to a male child. And they chose {specifically} white chickens {!!}, in the way that it states in Yeshayahu 1:18:

לְכוּ-נָא וְנִוָּכְחָה, יֹאמַר ה; אִם-יִהְיוּ חֲטָאֵיכֶם כַּשָּׁנִים כַּשֶּׁלֶג יַלְבִּינוּ, אִם-יַאְדִּימוּ כַתּוֹלָע כַּצֶּמֶר יִהְיוּ.
"Come now, and let us reason together, saith the LORD; though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be as white as snow; though they be red like crimson, they shall be as wool."

And the practice is to give the kapparot to poor people, or to redeem them with money which is then given to poor people. And there are places where the practice is to go to the graves, and to increase in charity, and it is all a nice custom. And there is to slaughter the kapparot immediately after they return it to him, and he rests his hands upon it, in a manner reminiscent of a sacrifice.

{J: punctuation mine. Punctuation in Hebrew text I took the Rama from seems to dissociate the semicha from the shechita, but this seems a reference to the statement in bavli and yerushalmi that there are three tekefs - immediately's: immediately following geula (the final blessings of shema) is tefilla (shemoneh esrei); immediately following semicha is shechita (talking about by a sacrifice); immediately following netilat yadayim - washing of hands - is beracha, the blessing, though which washing of hands and which blessing we are talking about is a matter of dispute, and context. At any rate, they are saying to do the slaughter immediately after semicha, patterned after korbanot.}

And they throw their innards upon the roofs or in the courtyard, the place that the birds are able to take them from there. Endquote of the Rama.

ד: ובאיזה דברים פקפקו הדגולים והיינו בהידור אחרי לבנים דזהו כעין דרכי האמורי שהיו מחפשין אחר תרנגול לבן כדאיתא בפרק לפני אידיהן [עבודה זרה י"ד.] ולכן לא יהדר אחר לבן אלא אם אירע לידו יקניהו [מגן אברהם סעיף קטן ג' וב"ח] וגם לא יקח תורים ובני יונה הראוים להקרבה דלא ליתחזי כקרבן [שם] וכן מה שכתב לסמוך ידיו אין לעשות כן דמיחזי כסמיכה בקרבנות, ואף דתרנגולים אינם ראויים לקרבן, מכל מקום לא גרע מבשר זה לפסח דאסור, ואיך נעשה זה לכתחילה, ולכן אין לעשות כן [טורי זהב סעיף קטן ז'] והטעם לזריקת המעיים להעופות כדי לרחם על הברואים וגם מן השמים ירחמו עלינו, וכתבו שטוב לשחוט באשמורת שהוא זמן הרחמים ויאמרו זה חליפתי זה תמורתי זה כפרתי, ראשי תיבות חת"ך על שם החותך חיים לכל חי, והעניין דאם נגזר מיתה חס ושלום יהיה זה תמורתי [ולדעתי היה יותר ראוי לומר זה תחתי ולא לשון תמורה ששניהם נשארים בקדושתן, עיין תמורה כו: ודו"ק] א

And in certain matters the gedolim had issues, and these are: in the considering it better and then seeking after specifically white chickens, for this appears like the ways of the Emorites, that they sought after specifically a white chicken, as is brought in the chapter lifnei eidehem (Avoda Zara 14a). And therefore he should not insist upon going after a white one, but rather if one comes to his hand he should take it (magen avraham, seif katan 3, and Bach). And also he should not take two turtle-doves and doves which are appropriate for sacrifice, so that it will not appear like a sacrifice (see there). And so too that which he wrote to lean his hands {on the animal}, one should not do this, because it looks like semicha by korbanot. And even though chickens are not fit for sacrifice, even so they are no worse that {saying} "this meat for Pesach" which is forbidden, and so how can we do this lechatchila, and therefore one should not do this (Taz 7). And the reason for the throwing of the innards to the birds is in order to have mercy on the creations, and so too from Heaven they should have mercy on us. And they wrote that it is good to do the slaughter at dawn {ashmoret} since this is a time of mercy, and they say "this is my substitute, this is my replacement {temurati}, this is my atonement - the first letters for חתך - which refers to "who 'apportions' life to all the living.' And the idea is that if death is decreed, Heaven forefend, this should be my temura = replacement. [And to my mind it would be more appropriate to say "this is tachti - instead of me" and not the language of temura, in which both remain in their consecrated state, see bavli temura 21a, and it is a bit difficult.]

ה: וכל זה בעצם הדבר אבל בעוה"ר אנו רואים הקלקול בשחיטה מריבוי הכפרות והלחץ ואין שוחטים משגיחים מפני העייפות והטורח וכמה טריפות יצאו מתחת ידם וגם הסכין אי אפשר להיות בדוק כראוי וגם ידי השוחט כבדות, ועתה בזמן הזה מצוה וחובה להמעיטן ולא ליכנס ליום הקדוש בחשש שחיטה, וכבר טרחו גם בדורות שלפנינו לבטלן ולא עלתה בידן כי ההמון דבוק בזה כמו על מצות אתרוג ועוד יותר, ולכל הפחות לראות להתחיל בשחיטתן איזה ימים מקודם ולמנוע האשמורת שידי השוחט
כבידות אז. א

5: And all this is in the principles of the matter, but in the real world we see the mess up in the slaughtering from the large amount of kapparot and the pressure, and the slaughterers are not monitoring because of the exhaustion and the difficulty, and many treifot go out from under their hands; and also it is impossible for the knife to be inspected properly, and also the hands of the slaughterer are heavy. And now at this time, it is a mitzvah and a chova (commandment and obligation) to reduce them and not to enter into the holy day with suspect slaughter. And they have already labored, also in the generations before us, to annul this practice and it was not successful, for the general populace clings to this as if on the commandment of etrog and even more. And at the very least one should see that they begin the slaughter some days before, and to hold back {from slaughtering during} the dawn {ashmoret}, for the hands of the slaughterer are heavy then.

{To be continued. This follows the discussion of the Kabbalah red string, mentioned in an earlier post, and a class I gave on superstitious practices.}

+6=masechet bava kamma; +10=masechet bava metzia; +7 bava batra

הדרן עלך שור שנגח את הפרה!
הדרן עלך הכונס צאן לדיר!
הדרן עלך מרובה!
הדרן עלך החובל!
הדרן עלך הגוזל עצים!
הדרן עלך הגוזל ומאכיל!
(prakim 5-10 of yerushalmi bava kamma)

הדרן עלך שנים אוחזין בטלית!
הדרן עלך אלו מציאות!
הדרן עלך המפקיד!
הדרן עלך הזהב!
הדרן עלך איזהו נשך!
הדרן עלך השוכר את האומנין!
הדרן עלך השוכר את הפועלים!
הדרן עלך השואל את הפרה!
הדרן עלך המקבל שדה מחבירו!
הדרן עלך הבית והעלייה!
(prakim 1-10 of yerushalmi bava metzia)

הדרן עלך השותפין!
הדרן עלך לא יחפור אדם!
הדרן עלך חזקת הבתים!
הדרן עלך המוכר את הבית!
הדרן עלך המוכר את הספינה!
הדרן עלך המוכר פירות!
הדרן עלך האומר לחבירו!
(prakim 1-7 of yerushalmi bava batra)

Kabbalah Red String

This week Target offered (and then took of their website) Kabbalah Red String, for 26 dollars, presumably because the gematria of Hashems name is 26.


The Kabbalah Centre had previously attempted to trademark the phrase "Kabbalah Red String." Here is the Centre's explanation of the red string. And from the description from Target:

'believed to protect against the evil eye.' Each is guaranteed to have 'traveled to Israel, to the ancient tomb of Rachel the Matriarch, and returned imbued with the essence of protection.'

At kever Rachel, widows circle the tomb reciting Tehillim and making this string. People give charity to the women and they give the red string in exchange. How this protects from the "evil eye?" The best explanation I've seen is that the merit of the charity supporting widows and orphans serves to give an extra merit which can protect in certain situations, including ayin hara, "the evil eye."

(This "evil eye" is also not of necessity something superstitious - one classic explanation is that if one (person X) behaves ostentatiously and causes someone to think to himself, 'Why does that person deserve these riches,' Hashem then sits in judgement to see if that person (X) really does deserve that wealth.)

I've seen these red strings given out now in other locations, such as the kotel. It smacks of superstition, given the explanation that it protects against the evil eye, and given that in India red strings are put around the wrists of a bride and groom-to-be as a good luck charm. A bubba maaseh that sprung up among some seminary girls in Israel is that the girl wears the red string on her wrist, and the first man she sees when it finally breaks is her bashert!

Jewish law does not like superstition. We are commanded to be complete with Hashem, and direct prayers towards Him, and not attempt magic or charms or any superstitious practices. There is a Biblical prohibition to avoid going in the ways of the Emorites. based either on Vayikra 18:13, according to Rashi on Bavli Shabbos 67a:

כְּמַעֲשֵׂה אֶרֶץ-מִצְרַיִם אֲשֶׁר יְשַׁבְתֶּם-בָּהּ, לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ; וּכְמַעֲשֵׂה אֶרֶץ-כְּנַעַן אֲשֶׁר אֲנִי מֵבִיא אֶתְכֶם שָׁמָּה, לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ, וּבְחֻקֹּתֵיהֶם, לֹא תֵלֵכוּ
And the LORD spoke unto Moses, saying: Speak unto the children of Israel, and say unto them: I am the LORD your God. After the doings of the land of Egypt, wherein ye dwelt, shall ye not do; and after the doings of the land of Canaan, whither I bring you, shall ye not do; neither shall ye walk in their statutes.

or Shemot 23:24, according to Rashi on Bavli Chullin 77a or Ramban on that pasuk:

לֹא-תִשְׁתַּחֲוֶה
לֵאלֹהֵיהֶם וְלֹא תָעָבְדֵם, וְלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה כְּמַעֲשֵׂיהֶם: כִּי הָרֵס תְּהָרְסֵם, וְשַׁבֵּר תְּשַׁבֵּר מַצֵּבֹתֵיהֶם
Thou shalt not bow down to their gods, nor serve them, nor do after their doings; but thou shalt utterly overthrow them, and break in pieces their pillars.

(I recently gave a shiur on the concept of Chukat Emori/superstition.)

<>At any rate, in Tosefta Shabbos, 7:1, the red string is in fact listed as a superstition/chukat Emori.

ז,א אלו דברים מדרכי האמורי ... והקושר [מטולטלת על יריכו וחוט אדום על אצבעו והמונה ומשליך צרורות לים או לנהר הרי זה מדרכי] האמורי המספק והמטפח והמרקד לשלהבת ה"ז מדרכי האמורי.
These things are from the ways of the Emorites ... attaching a precious stone to the girdle above the thigh or a red thread to one’s finger; counting pebbles while throwing them into the sea or into a river [and observing their manner of sinking for omens]. These are the ways of the Emorites. Striking hips, clapping hands, and dancing before a fire [in order to extinguish it] - these are ways of the Emorites.

עֵקֶב - Parshat Eikev: Man does not live on bread alone

An insight into this week's parsha, eikev. First, Moshe tells them how Hashem deprived them, and then gave them the manna for 40 years in the Wilderness.
In Devarim 8:3,

וַיְעַנְּךָ, וַיַּרְעִבֶךָ, וַיַּאֲכִלְךָ אֶת-הַמָּן אֲשֶׁר לֹא-יָדַעְתָּ, וְלֹא יָדְעוּן אֲבֹתֶיךָ: לְמַעַן הוֹדִיעֲךָ, כִּי לֹא עַל-הַלֶּחֶם לְבַדּוֹ יִחְיֶה הָאָדָם--כִּי עַל-כָּל-מוֹצָא פִי-ה, יִחְיֶה הָאָדָם.
And He afflicted thee, and suffered thee to hunger, and fed thee with manna, which thou knewest not, neither did thy fathers know; that He might make thee know that man doth not live by bread only, but by every thing that proceedeth out of the mouth of the LORD doth man live.

This can be taken allegorically to mean that one should not just focus on the physical, but rather on the spiritual. The Torah = that which proceedeth out of the mouth of the Lord. One lives a real life by giving attention to the spiritual besides the physical.

In can be taken literally in one of two ways. First, not only bread, and what you would normally consider food, is what sustains man. They learned that Hashem can provide sustenance in other ways - namely, the manna mentioned earlier in the verse.

Secondly, and I think a main point of the verse, is that Hashem wanted them to realize that He was the source of sustenance. Thus first He afflicted them, by exposing them to hunger, and then provided them with this food, the manna. Why? If they had bread, they would not have learned this all-important lesson. Bread is but one instance of it, but man does not live on bread. He lives on whatever Hashem deigns to grant - כָּל-מוֹצָא פִי-ה.

This lesson was drilled into them day in and day out in the Wilderness when Hashem provided them with food. However, once they entered into the land and got food for themselves, the norma way - al derech hateva - they could, and likely would, think that they were providing for themselves and Hashem had nothing to do with it.

Thus, the perek continues, in Devarim 8:7-18:

כִּי ה אֱלֹקֶיךָ, מְבִיאֲךָ אֶל-אֶרֶץ טוֹבָה: אֶרֶץ, נַחֲלֵי מָיִם--עֲיָנֹת וּתְהֹמֹת, יֹצְאִים בַּבִּקְעָה וּבָהָר.
אֶרֶץ חִטָּה וּשְׂעֹרָה, וְגֶפֶן וּתְאֵנָה וְרִמּוֹן; אֶרֶץ-זֵית שֶׁמֶן, וּדְבָשׁ.
אֶרֶץ, אֲשֶׁר לֹא בְמִסְכֵּנֻת תֹּאכַל-בָּהּ לֶחֶם--לֹא-תֶחְסַר כֹּל, בָּהּ; אֶרֶץ אֲשֶׁר אֲבָנֶיהָ בַרְזֶל, וּמֵהֲרָרֶיהָ תַּחְצֹב נְחֹשֶׁת.
וְאָכַלְתָּ, וְשָׂבָעְתָּ--וּבֵרַכְתָּ אֶת-ה אֱלֹקֶיךָ, עַל-הָאָרֶץ הַטֹּבָה אֲשֶׁר נָתַן-לָךְ.
הִשָּׁמֶר לְךָ, פֶּן-תִּשְׁכַּח אֶת-ה אֱלֹקֶיךָ, לְבִלְתִּי שְׁמֹר מִצְו‍ֹתָיו וּמִשְׁפָּטָיו וְחֻקֹּתָיו, אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי מְצַוְּךָ הַיּוֹם.
פֶּן-תֹּאכַל, וְשָׂבָעְתָּ; וּבָתִּים טֹבִים תִּבְנֶה, וְיָשָׁבְתָּ.
וּבְקָרְךָ וְצֹאנְךָ יִרְבְּיֻן, וְכֶסֶף וְזָהָב יִרְבֶּה-לָּךְ; וְכֹל אֲשֶׁר-לְךָ, יִרְבֶּה.
וְרָם, לְבָבֶךָ; וְשָׁכַחְתָּ אֶת-ה אֱלֹקֶיךָ, הַמּוֹצִיאֲךָ מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם מִבֵּית עֲבָדִים.
הַמּוֹלִיכְךָ בַּמִּדְבָּר הַגָּדֹל וְהַנּוֹרָא, נָחָשׁ שָׂרָף וְעַקְרָב, וְצִמָּאוֹן, אֲשֶׁר אֵין-מָיִם; הַמּוֹצִיא לְךָ מַיִם, מִצּוּר הַחַלָּמִישׁ.
הַמַּאֲכִלְךָ מָן בַּמִּדְבָּר, אֲשֶׁר לֹא-יָדְעוּן אֲבֹתֶיךָ: לְמַעַן עַנֹּתְךָ, וּלְמַעַן נַסֹּתֶךָ--לְהֵיטִבְךָ, בְּאַחֲרִיתֶךָ.
וְאָמַרְתָּ, בִּלְבָבֶךָ: כֹּחִי וְעֹצֶם יָדִי, עָשָׂה לִי אֶת-הַחַיִל הַזֶּה.
וְזָכַרְתָּ, אֶת-ה אֱלֹקֶיךָ--כִּי הוּא הַנֹּתֵן לְךָ כֹּחַ, לַעֲשׂוֹת חָיִל: לְמַעַן הָקִים אֶת-בְּרִיתוֹ אֲשֶׁר-נִשְׁבַּע לַאֲבֹתֶיךָ, כַּיּוֹם הַזֶּה.
"For the LORD thy God bringeth thee into a good land, a land of brooks of water, of fountains and depths, springing forth in valleys and hills;
a land of wheat and barley, and vines and fig-trees and pomegranates; a land of olive-trees and honey;
a land wherein thou shalt eat bread without scarceness, thou shalt not lack any thing in it; a land whose stones are iron, and out of whose hills thou mayest dig brass.
And thou shalt eat and be satisfied, and bless the LORD thy God for the good land which He hath given thee.
Beware lest thou forget the LORD thy God, in not keeping His commandments, and His ordinances, and His statutes, which I command thee this day;
lest when thou hast eaten and art satisfied, and hast built goodly houses, and dwelt therein;
and when thy herds and thy flocks multiply, and thy silver and thy gold is multiplied, and all that thou hast is multiplied;
then thy heart be lifted up, and thou forget the LORD thy God, who brought thee forth out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage;
who led thee through the great and dreadful wilderness, wherein were serpents, fiery serpents, and scorpions, and thirsty ground where was no water; who brought thee forth water out of the rock of flint;
who fed thee in the wilderness with manna, which thy fathers knew not, that He might afflict thee, and that He might prove thee, to do thee good at thy latter end;
and thou say in thy heart: 'My power and the might of my hand hath gotten me this wealth.'
But thou shalt remember the LORD thy God, for it is He that giveth thee power to get wealth, that He may establish His covenant which He swore unto thy fathers, as it is this day."

Thus, Moshe is trying to address the issue mentioned above. The land of Israel will have all sorts of good food, and sources of water, such that there will not be this direct dependence on Hashem anymore. One might deny Hashem's role in any of this, and think that all his wealth is his own doing. That is why Moshe is reminding them of the lesson of the manna once again. Man lives and gets his sustenance at the direction of Hashem. In the Wilderness, it was through overt miracles, in order to make this clear. But Hashem also directs the world in less direct ways - by controlling weather conditions, the growth of plants, etcetera. Further, they were in this land in the first place because Hashem took them from Egypt, and helped them conquer the land.

Thus, Moshe says, after you have eaten and are satisfied, they should bless Hashem who has given them the land. Recall all this current wealth is also a gift of God, just like the manna.

This verse - "And thou shalt eat and be satisfied, and bless the LORD thy God for the good land which He hath given thee" - is also the Biblical source for birkat hamazon, Grace After Meals. I think it is a good kavana, intent, to have in mind when benching - that man does not live on bread alone, but this bread, and the rest of the meal, was a gift from Hashem, for which we should thank Him.

Techelet / Argaman Spotting

So it seems that in tonight's episode of Summerland, reference was made to the murex. Dr. O'Keif was showing Aunt Eva various sea creatures, and he shows her a snail. She recognizes it as the murex, used to dye royal robes purple. (She learned it in fashion school.)

Siyum on Seder Moed

Shabbos before last (July 24th), I had a siyum on Moed Katan and thus on Seder Moed during a seuda shlishit for the 9th of Av yartziet of my paternal grandfather, for whom I am named. The siyum went well, and was well-attended, even though no meat was served. (See post citing the Aruch HaShulchan on making a siyum during the 9 days.)

הדרן עלך אלו מגלחין!
3rd perek of yerushalmi moed katan
וסליקא לה מסכת מועד קטן וכולא סדרא מועד