The author: With you sleeps your wisdom, and I am a fool and do not know. I do not see in the language of the Zohar any of the signs of forgery.The guest: But this do not say that you do not know, for the idiom of "do not take stones of pure marble to be other stones (Zohar, chelek 1, page 26b) is not the language of our Rabbis at all, but it is the language of these nations, such as in your Italian language prendere una cosa per un' altra {=take one thing for another}. And so too את השמים לאסגאה שמים תתאי (there, in chelek 1, page 39b) is a messed-up language, and our Rabbis did not say לאסגאה except to expand or to include.
And so too Bar Bizmana who took {נסב} the cure (page 40a), the drinking of the cure is not called "taking" in the language of Raz"al, but rather in non-Jewish language {laaz}, and in the language of the later composers.
And so too מכאן אוליפנא {to mean "from here we learn"} (page 49a ??} in the hif'il construction, and he should have said מהכא ילפינן. And so too ואם לאו לא יבית לגבה (there, there), the intent is on one who has intercourse, but the root בות {used in יבית} does not connote intercourse, but rather only sleeping {lina}, and so too he malon {an inn} is translated mevatha.
The author: This is nothing, for perhaps in order to speek in a clean language he mentioned sleeping {lina} in place of intercourse {shechiva}.
The guest: And so too ומתעבראן מתלת בנין {"and she became pregnant from three sons,"} (page 73a) and he should have said "with three sons," as they said (in Sotah daf 46) שנתעברה בהן אמן, and so too (Bemidbar Rabba parasha 3) Yocheved, her mother was pregnant bah {with her}, but the mem after the language of pregnancy returns to refer to the man who had intercourse, and not to the child who is born. As they say (Bemidbar Rabba, parasha 9), "mimecha {from you} I am pregnant."And so too דמתיא ידעי בעלמא דאתי מיקרא דצדיקיא ומעלמא תתאה (page 81b), also this mem is a mix-up, and is only based on the way of non-Jewish language, but in the holy tongue and in Aramaic they say "he knew bo {in him}," and they do not say "he knew mimenu {of him}."
10 comments:
Do you agree with Shadal about the ZOhar? IF so, how do you explain all the big kabbalists throughout our history? Were they all following the wrong path and if so how could they have become such big people. I am not talking about those palm readers, etc. but about those kabbalists such as baba sali and others who people felt kedusha and many "saw" miracles. Is it all false?
I know that Shadal talks about this with regard to the Nais Yosef and the Magid Meisharim and addresses the question that I am asking - the author asks the guest - but there were so many gedolim - how can you accuse them of following falsehood?
I am curious as to how you deal with this.
It is a valid, and good question.
At the moment, yes, I think Shadal makes a compelling argument about the Zohar not being from Rashbi. Of course, his argument goes deeper than that, as in the earlier chapters he more or less calls kabbalah in general Avodah Zarah.
And there are many answers I could offer you, but I will chose one, restricted one. This represents a subset of my thoughts on the matter. And I am not sure it will answer you question, even after I write what I write. And I am not really sure that my opinion matters, anyway.
But if we restrict ourselves to the Zohar, we can realize that this pseudonymous authorship of sefarim, and assuming the name of an actual or nonexistent Tanna or Amora was not unheard of, and perhaps even some contemporaries understood this. (Perhaps even as Shadal suggests that the maggid in Maggid Meisharim was really his own thoughts, and that Rav Yosef Karo suggests this al derech remez, and that Rav Moshe Cordevero understood as much.) Or perhaps he was trying to be mezakkeh the rabbim, like the author of the Kyle story I reprinted was trying to do. Or perhaps he was a rasha gamur. I don't know, but I see the first possibility.
The Zohar was not created in a vacuum, but develops kabbalistic thought as it existed at the time of R' Moshe de Leon. Presumably there are some innovations, we might fit it into a developing kabbalistic framework. Of course, the fact that people thought it was from Rashbi perhaps gave it undue influence which perhaps it should not have had, and kabbalah might have developed in a different direction. And the same for its undue influence of halacha, if Shadal is correct -- which bothers me more.
And Lurianic kabbalah is very Zohar / Tikkunim based, so yes, it puts us into a difficult spot.
(But there were pre-Zoharic kabbalists, and there was kabbalah before the Zohar as well.)
Shadal would (and does) say yes, all those kabbalists were deluding themselves into thinking and claiming that they had ruach hakodesh.
Yet he talks about how his own father used the kabbalistic mechanism of asking a question in a dream, and how he received a response. He suggests that this was not the result of the mechanism, but rather the result of his father's tzidkus, that Hashem wanted him to know of the impending dangers, etc.
"Feeling" kedusha is not concrete, as there may be various psychological influences on such feeling. I am sure many religious Christians feel spirituality and holiness, but that does not mean I do not think it is avoda zara, and that such feelings are rooted in delusions.
The same might well be true for miracles, in terms of psychological influence, in many, *though not all*, situations. I've heard miracle stories which were not very impressive when you actually think about it. And further, there are cases where you only hear the successes, and not the failures, because that is what ends up being reported.
For example, Rav Yonasan Eibeshetz was a writer of kameos, and a lot of times, people got better. The way Rav Yaakov Emden got a hold of one of his amulets, despite Rav Yonasan Eibeshetz's instructions that they should never be opened, was by being given it by the widower of a woman for whom an amulet did not work.
I should add that my father "saw" a miracle from Baba Sali. Perhaps we can ascribe this to tzidkus of those involved. Just as Shadal does for his own father's experiences. (If I haven't posted this yet, I will soon.)
Talmidei Chachamim, and tzaddikim, can make mistakes. We have masechet Horayot. We have Rabbi Akiva who thought Bar Kochba was mashiach, and many rabbonim and tzaddikim who thought the same of Shabbetai Tzevi. And once you are trained to think in a particular way, and grow up in it, such that it is part of your Judaism, it is difficult to break free yourself. The Gra was a genius, but he was also a kabbalist. And this is surely a strength -- I know almost zilch about kabbalah. But on the other hand, it might well be a weakness in being able to evaluate it.
Gedolim can be fooled by forgeries, and such can get enshrined in halacha. See the unfortunate influence the forgery known as hilchot eretz yisrael (really =amar yehoshua) had on some areas of halacha, for example shechita and geirut. And not only forgeries. Sometimes girsological errors, or particular (mis)understandings of gemaras. Yet they can all accidentally follow falsehood. And in later generations, we can perhaps correct that mistake.
I don't think that gedolim can pasken halachic reality. I had this argument with my chavrusa a while back, in terms of whether Rav Yonasan Eibeshitz was really a closet Sabbatean. I don't think that the fact that he is now accepted, and that the past few generations of gedolim thought he was not, has bearing on deciding historical reality.
This might get into hairy issues of the idea of Daas Torah, and what it means to you/me; and whether Daas Torah as commonly defined is true.
These are *some* of my thoughts on the matter. I don't know if it helpful or not.
Kol Tuv,
Josh
With regard to this question ('how can so many greats have been so wrong - if this opinion is correct'), I think the obvious response needs to be that we must accept the possibility that so many great people can be wrong about anything, and that's part of the human condition, whether or not we agree with Shadal. (For him this was a milchemes mitzvah. He felt that truth is the truth and idols must be knocked off their pedestal. Perhaps he was wrong and kabbalah was not idolatry and was even masores emes, but that's not the point.)
There were times in our history where we are all maskim that most of the greats were wrong (think of the Baal-syncretism in the time of Eliyahu, where he appears to have been virtually alone). The common consensus today is that the greatest godol of his time, the Gra, was wrong about Chassidus, and if you're misnagdish in outlook then by default "the gedolim" opposed Chassidus as a bloc. Obviously there were numerous greats of their time who were wrong about Sabbatei Svi, and so forth.
The question is, can someone be great if they've invested so much time and effort into a body of teaching which isn't true? Perhaps if that's all they've invested time and effort into. But many of the greatest kabbalists were also great halakhists and Talmudists and personalities in their own right, too. Furthermore, even if kabbalah isn't authentic Torah secrets passed from God to Moshe, there might still be value in its teachings, and thus there still might be value in kabbalists. We certainly find value in many things which were not communicated by God to Moshe!
"Feeling" kedusha is not concrete, as there may be various psychological influences on such feeling. I am sure many religious Christians feel spirituality and holiness, but that does not mean I do not think it is avoda zara, and that such feelings are rooted in delusions.
Judaism and Christianity have many things in common (not all of course) - perhaps their spiritual feelings testify to the shared orientation towards a revealed ethical all-powerful God, and not to the differences in theological details?
Of course exotic religions like Buddhism or Native American beliefs may also lead to intense "spiritual feelings". But I suspect that the nature of their experiences is quite different from what Jews and/or Christians experience. Trying to put myself into the shoes of, say, Bob Marley, I suspect his experiences were very distinct and certainly "spiritual", but alien to what one might experience in a traditional church, synagogue, or mosque.
The common consensus today is that the greatest godol of his time, the Gra, was wrong about Chassidus,
There are some who still think the Gra was right and see Chabad messianism, for example, as proof. There are those who are still anti-chassidic in theory but see no benefit in starting a war they can't win, especially when there are more dangerous enemies to be confronted. Do not forget that chassidism has become greatly moderated and "mainstreamed" since its inception, so many legitimate old criticisms would no longer apply. And it is not clear whether the extreme anti-chassidic comments were meant literally, or else as exaggerated polemic which somewhat achieved its purpose in inducing that "mainstreaming". Taking all this together, it is not at all clear whether most of our current leaders in fact think the Gra was mistaken.
Obviously there were numerous greats of their time who were wrong about Sabbatei Svi, and so forth.
R' Akiva and Bar Kochba is a better example. Anyway, I still think mistaken predictions about someone's future messianic accomplishments are more excusable than mistakes on deep questions of theology and the mesorah.
So, I'm not so sure we can feel comfortable about the possibility of kabbalah being non-authentic.
I think I'm a pretty normal Orthodox Jew of the type who would read and comment on this blog. Much of my hashkafa comes from the Ramban, much of my halacha from the Mechaber, and much of my derech halimud from the Gra. All three had significant involvement in kabbalah. While I personally have little desire to learn kabbalah, I find it hard to totally reject a body of knowledge which was so central to all of the people on whom my Judaism is based. Presumably I'm not the only one in this situation.
"R' Akiva and Bar Kochba is a better example. Anyway, I still think mistaken predictions about someone's future messianic accomplishments are more excusable than mistakes on deep questions of theology and the mesorah."
But Shabtai Tzvi (the example given) was not merely about predictions about someone's future messianic accomplishments. There was a whole developed Sabbatean kabbalah.
On a related note, would you reject Rav Yonasan Eibeshutz's chiddushei Torah if you determined he was a closet Sabbatean, as Rav Yaakov Emden alleged?
Perhaps other replies later, perhaps not.
Kol Tuv,
Josh
If the criteria for "accepting divrei torah" is (a) reasonableness or (b) past historical acceptance by our tradition, I see
I did not know Shabtai Tzvi had his own kabbalah; I mentioned Bar Kochba because R' Akiva is considered greater than any rabbi in SZ's time, yet was still wrong in an apparently similar situation.
But I don't think the fact that someone invented false "kabbalistic" material at some point necessarily threatens the reliability of earlier kabbalistic traditions. You could say: Look how easy it was to invent things once; undoubtedly it could have happened other times. And indeed it could have, we have no proof otherwise. But that is not the same as saying we *know* it happened. And it does not change the level of theological difficulty we might have if kabbalah were, in fact, apparently proven to be baseless.
Regarding R' Eibeshutz (if messianic), there are several questions that would have to be answered before passuling his chidushim.
1) Was he in fact a heretic, or just legitimately mistaken on the messianic issue? (The same question is relevant today regarding Chabad)
2) To what extent do we value Torah thoughts based on reasonableness of the thoughts vs. the identity of their owner?
3) To what extent do we say that "halachic history has accepted/rejected a thought" and therefore accept/reject it regardless of how it came about?
Ignore the first incomplete sentence. I meant to delete it (and then meant to press "preview"), oops.
Hi.
Part of the reason I am focused on Shabbtai Tzvi is not that someone can invent kabbalah, but rather in response to "Anyway, I still think mistaken predictions about someone's future messianic accomplishments are more excusable than mistakes on deep questions of theology and the mesorah."
It was not that Shabbetai Tzevi (or Nathan of Gaza, his prophet) invented Sabbatean kabbalah. It was also that this Sabbatean kabbalah was widespread. Which makes it not just "mistaken predictions about someone's future messianic accomplishments" but rather "mistakes on deep questions of theology and the mesorah."
The allegations against Rav Yonasan Eibeshutz was not just that he believed Shabbetai Tzevi was to be the mashiach (this, many years after Shabtai Tzvi's death). Rather, Rav Yaakov Emden (himself a kabbalist) alleged that Rav Yonasan Eibeshitz was a Sabbatean *kabbalist*, and that he was writing amulets in accordance with Sabbatean kabbalah.
It is not just Rav Yonasan Eibeshutz. We are talking about many many, overt and covert, in Shabtai Tzvi's day, and after his day. And many who are apparently on our bookshelves. Rav Yonasan Eibeshutz is just the most well-known in this regard, because of the controversy.
So it would seem that it is possible for many rabbonim to make this mistake even in regard to matters of deep theology. (Such as the role of Tiferes and Ein Sof, which is where Sabbatean kabbalah differed.)
Another interesting tie-in is that Shadal suggests later in the addendum, following Landauer, that Rav Moshe de Leon did not author the Zohar. Rather, Landauer "proves" that it was written by Avraham Abulafia, who was a false prophet and false messiah. (I'll get to this section of Shadal in a week or so.)
There definitely is a bump for many Orthodox Jews to accept this judgement about the Zohar and/or kabbalah. But this may be a visceral, emotional or sociological reaction, rather than an attitude dictated and required by halacha / hashkafa -- and it might just require contemplation over time to reevaluate.
Perhaps more later.
Kol Tuv,
Josh
In terms of:
"Much of my hashkafa comes from the Ramban, much of my halacha from the Mechaber, and much of my derech halimud from the Gra"
I think it depends if we are attacking just the Zohar or kabbalah in general. Shadal definitely does both, trying (earlier) to show that kabbalah is avodah zara and deviates from the theology of Chazal. But just in terms of the Zohar being a forgery, you need not say that Ramban was misled. Indeed, he was pre-Zohar.
In terms of mechaber, if you are an Ashkenazi, perhaps one could say that you are more influenced in halacha by the Rema. Even so, Rema was himself a kabbalist. :)
As I said, perhaps more later.
Kol Tuv.
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