Friday, May 10, 2013

Bamidbar: Daas Soferim and random sparked thoughts


For parashat Bamidbar, let us focus on a few things from Daas Soferim, by Rav Chaim Dov Rabinowitz (1909-2001). You can read about Rabbi Rabinowitz on Wikipedia or at Dei'ah veDibur.

I've never learned through Daas Soferim, but here is how Wikipedia characterizes the work:
Rabinowitz's magnus opum (Daat Sofrim), a commentary on all of the Hebrew Bible. There are several distinguishing features to this work. The first is his courageous attempt to de-emphasize the negative aspects of ancient Jewish life that appear in the Bible. R' Rabinowitz in his role of "Defender of Israel" emphasizes that seen within the correct context, and with a proper understanding of the historical background, the negative stories are scarcely as bad as they appear. (See for example his explanation defining the differences between the story of the levite concubine at Giveah and the story of Sodom)
A second interesting feature are his (possibly the only Haredi) attempts to resolve some of the issues raised by Biblical criticism. Thus he identifies the second part of the book of Isaiah as possibly being written by a different author based on an Oral tradition from Isaiah.
Let us hook at a few of his comments on parshas Bamidbar. Of course, this won't really give us enough of a sense of the work, first because it is a small sample and second because of selection bias, in that I am choosing those bits that I find most interesting. That reflects more upon me than upon him.

Also, in terms of my interspersed comments, these are not necessarily a reflection on the underlying thought-process of Daas Soferim. My comments are more along the lines of free-association.

Reading it in Hebrew books, the form of it is as a typical Chumash, with the pesukim, Rashi, and Unkelos on each opposing page. And then, on a single page or a few pages by themselves, he writes his own commentary. This is useful because one can read the relevant pesukim and get the standard traditional commentary first.

The first comment I will highlight is regarding the keruay ha'eidah, who were appointed to perform the counting. The pasuk in the first perek of Bemidbar reads:
טז  אֵלֶּה קריאי (קְרוּאֵי) הָעֵדָה, נְשִׂיאֵי מַטּוֹת אֲבוֹתָם:  רָאשֵׁי אַלְפֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, הֵם.16 These were the elect of the congregation, the princes of the tribes of their fathers; they were the heads of the thousands of Israel.

The ketiv has a yud, as if the word were keri'ei, while the krei has keru'ei, with a shuruk. We could understand this in different ways. One is that there was no regularized spelling, such that we often find hi (meaning "her" or "she") spelled with a vav, and we see final heh even where it should make an o sound. Alternatively, this reflects a change in Biblical usage, such that the form (an adjective, but working as a passive verb, "those who were called") used to be spelled and pronounced with a chirik but now is pronounced and spelled with a vav. May of the extremely rare kal passive form discussed by Biblical Hebrew linguists? Alternatively, that there are different messages encoded in the consonantal written form and the pronounced form, e.g., callers vs. callees. See what various meforshim had to say about this issue here. For example, see Targum that they called others, rather than that they were called.

Here is what Daas Sofrim has to say about it:

"These are the קריאי of the congregation: The Torah returns and testifies that the men who were appointed for this purpose based on the say-so of God were extremely honored. They were "kri'ey ha'eida", that is, men who because of their wisdom were ready / designated at any time, so that they were ready to render advice.

There is here a krei and a ketiv. The ketiv is kri'ey and the krei is kru'ei. This is because of Zimri ben Salu, who was called here by the name Shlumiel ben Tzurishadai, for he was fit for this purpose at this time, but not based on his actions in the future. He caused the reduction of the honor of the princes of Israel."

The basis of equating Zimri with Shlumiel is that they are both designated as nasi of Shimon. See my discussion here. Thus, he handily relates the krei and ketiv switchoff with the Zimri / Shlumiel switchoff, with one explaining the other. And does it in a way consistent with Chazal, who equate the two and explain the names based on actions.

I am not sure how he is precisely defining kru'ei vs. kri'ei. Is he suggesting this is past tense vs. future tense? Or is he saying something about the name change, such that kri'ei or kru'ei means that the person is called by something other than his actual name? Or is one a lesser level of honor than the other. I admit I am left a bit confused.

Let us consider another comment by Rav Rabinowitz, on the pasuk in perek 3. First, the pesukim:

ב  וְאֵלֶּה שְׁמוֹת בְּנֵי-אַהֲרֹן, הַבְּכֹר נָדָב, וַאֲבִיהוּא, אֶלְעָזָר וְאִיתָמָר.2 And these are the names of the sons of Aaron: Nadab the first-born, and Abihu, Eleazar, and Ithamar.
ג  אֵלֶּה, שְׁמוֹת בְּנֵי אַהֲרֹן, הַכֹּהֲנִים, הַמְּשֻׁחִים--אֲשֶׁר-מִלֵּא יָדָם, לְכַהֵן.3 These are the names of the sons of Aaron, the priests that were anointed, whom he consecrated to minister in the priest's office.
ד  וַיָּמָת נָדָב וַאֲבִיהוּא לִפְנֵי ה בְּהַקְרִבָם אֵשׁ זָרָה לִפְנֵי ה, בְּמִדְבַּר סִינַי, וּבָנִים, לֹא-הָיוּ לָהֶם; וַיְכַהֵן אֶלְעָזָר וְאִיתָמָר, עַל-פְּנֵי אַהֲרֹן אֲבִיהֶם.  {פ}4 And Nadab and Abihu died before the LORD, when they offered strange fire before the LORD, in the wilderness of Sinai, and they had no children; and Eleazar and Ithamar ministered in the priest's office in the presence of Aaron their father. {P}


How many sons did Aharon have? Only four? Consider the explosive growth of bnei Yisrael, moving in a short 210 years from seventy souls to six hundred thousand males of an age fit to head a household. Chazal said that this was because the Israelite women had six children in each birth. So why are there only four?

If I may, I will advance a position, only to provide contrast to Daas Soferim. (Though I don't know that he was reacting to this possibility.)

We can say that Aharon really had more than four sons. These other sons came along with the beit av of the other brothers for the sake of nachala. Compare to Yaakov's blessing of Ephraim and Menasheh, that these two are to be reckoned as his own sons, and any future children shall be accrued to Ephraim and Menashe.

If so, we can read pasuk 3 as stating that the four mentioned sons in pasuk 2 are specifically those sons הַמְּשֻׁחִים--אֲשֶׁר-מִלֵּא יָדָם, לְכַהֵן. But there were others. Otherwise, there is apparent repetition for no purpose. Unless it is to relate the famous personages in the genealogy to Biblical events and to point out the importance of this or that figure, which does seem to be a common approach.

Separate from this, note that the Leviim were not included in the count. The Torah explains that they are counted separately. But the overall count of the tribe of Levi is twenty-two thousand, which is much less than  other tribes. How are we to account for this?

Here is what Daas Soferim has to say:

"2. And these are the names, etc.: Aharon only had four sons. All the families of the Leviim were small. Similar to this was the family of Yitzchak [with only two sons], and even the house of Yaakov grew only because of the actions of Lavan [such that he married two wives] and the barrenness of Rachel [such that he also took Rachel and Leah's maidservants in order to have more children]. In the eminent families, they only married a single woman, and it is possible that they only married at not-a-young age because of their involvement in Torah, just as we find by Yitzchak and Yaakov. And so it appears that Hashem's blessing of the fruit of the womb has hidden rules, which drive the precise barrenness and fruitfulness. This is the portion of the select people in all generation, and see later on in 39 in the count of the Leviim."

These are good words of comfort to those who have fertility problems.

He also addresses the seeming repetition from pasuk 2 to pasuk 3, as follows:

"3. אֵלֶּה, שְׁמוֹת בְּנֵי אַהֲרֹן, הַכֹּהֲנִים, etc.: The first four words in this pasuk are similar to the first words in the previous pasuk. The Torah does not spare words here, wherever there is in them to establish the idea with greater clarity the lineage of the families of the Kohanim, who served in the Mikdash of Hashem for all generations. "אֵלֶּה שְׁמוֹת" [with eileh rather than with a vav, that is, ve'eileh]-- the intent is to restrict and 'invalidate' all those who preceded, including Moshe and his descendants, that they not be anointed to serve as kohanim."

Note that pasuk 1 in this perek mentioned the generations of Moshe and Aharon, and in fact we never see descendants of Moshe listed later:
א  וְאֵלֶּה תּוֹלְדֹת אַהֲרֹן, וּמֹשֶׁה:  בְּיוֹם, דִּבֶּר ה אֶת-מֹשֶׁה--בְּהַר סִינָי.1 Now these are the generations of Aaron and Moses in the day that the LORD spoke with Moses in mount Sinai.

And Rashi (/Chazal) often make a distinction between eileh and ve'eileh, and the first pasuk has the inclusive ve'eileh while this has the exclusive eileh. There is also the assumption which guides much of midrash that the Torah does not generally waste words. It is therefore a 'big deal' when the Torah repeats the story with Eliezer (because of Hashem's great love for the avos) or uses extra words to choose clean language ("that which is not tahor' rather than 'that which is tamei'). Indeed, if extra words are always just dibra Torah kilshon benei Adam, then we could not deduce anything from those extra words.

If I may propose another explanation for this "needless" repetition. The Torah was written in 'megillot', and then organized into a single unit at the end. And it quotes extra-Biblical material, such as contemporary poems (see Cheshbon, or Kayin). I suspect that genealogical scrolls existed separate from the Torah material, and this is a quote. The larger original scroll recorded the full genealogy of Moshe and Aharon, in like manner to what we find in I Divrei Hayamim 5, but with Moshe included. And it did not see fit to quote the portion about Moshe's descendants. And pasuk 3, besides being in the original source, discussing the role of the specific named people. And pasuk 4, in discussing who had children, is critical for establishing the genealogical lines.

Note that the statement that they had no children:
ד  וַיָּמָת נָדָב וַאֲבִיהוּא לִפְנֵי ה בְּהַקְרִבָם אֵשׁ זָרָה לִפְנֵי ה, בְּמִדְבַּר סִינַי, וּבָנִים, לֹא-הָיוּ לָהֶם; וַיְכַהֵן אֶלְעָזָר וְאִיתָמָר, עַל-פְּנֵי אַהֲרֹן אֲבִיהֶם.  {פ}4 And Nadab and Abihu died before the LORD, when they offered strange fire before the LORD, in the wilderness of Sinai, and they had no children; and Eleazar and Ithamar ministered in the priest's office in the presence of Aaron their father. {P}


is taken by a midrash as an explanation of their "hidden" true sin. E.g. that they refused to marry, because they were better than any candidates. On a peshat level, we are not being told their sin. The purpose of mentioning it has entirely to do with establishing genealogy.

Thursday, May 09, 2013

YUTorah on parashat Bamidbar

parsha banner





Audio Shiurim on Bamidbar
Articles on Bamidbar
Parsha Sheets on Bamidbar
Haftorah shiurim on Bamidbar
Rabbi Jeremy WiederLaining for Parshat Bamidbar
See all shiurim on YUTorah for Parshat Bamidbar
New This Week

Wednesday, May 08, 2013

Hair covering: a 179 page article vs. an offhand comment by Rav Shach

Regarding one of the recent controversies, the Mostly Kosher blog writes as follows:
Allegedly a fake letter was sent to Tradition (the magazine which published the essay) where:

Someone claiming to be David Tzvi Keter wrote one of those letters to Tradition from a Gmail account, establishing a biography in which he claimed he had “moved to Israel in 1949 after graduating from Columbia,” and that he then went on to learn at one of the most prestigious yeshivas in the world at the time, Jerusalem’s Etz Chaim yeshiva, under a major sage of the time, Rabbi Isser Zalman Meltzer.

The Keter character then goes on to provide a history in which he gathered the oral testimony of several prominent sages of the mid-20th-century on the topic of women’s hair covering. His letter provides their comments 60 years later to add them to the historical record Broyde had been analyzing in the Tradition article.

Simon Lerner on Twitter askes the following question:

This question reveals much about our current state of affairs. It would seem that people are more likely to accept a position, if they can ascribe it to Rav Shach's offhand comment, then if they can ascribe it to a 179 page study. 
I think the answer to this lies in Rabbi Broyde's initial apology and clarification.
Stories that were told using that pseudonym were all stories that one of us had heard as a child from a generation of torah scholars now gone; the stories about Rav Moshe are particularly so.
Namely, that these actually were the positions of Rav Shach and others, but were only heard second-hand, and so he did not put it into the 179 page paper. But still he thought it to be an important part of the conversation, and so he invented someone to give firsthand testimony to the Internet, corresponding to the firsthand testimony he had heard as a child. In this way, he promoted it from hearsay and still included it as part of the conversation. (Unless you take the position that he is lying even in this, which is certainly possible.)

As to Shimon Lerner's point, yup, that is indeed the current state of affairs, to accept an offhand comment from a Gadol (or hearsay of it from an 80 year old) more than a 179 page study.

I don't think that this attitude is necessarily a bad thing.

I am reminded of a joke. There are various formal methods of proving things in Computer Science. Proof by induction, proof by contradiction, etc. Then there is this one:

    Proof by eminent authority:
    "I saw Karp in the elevator and he said it was probably NP- complete."
This is Richard Karp:
Richard Manning Karp
Karp mg 7725-b.cr2.jpg
Richard Karp giving a talk at the EPFL on 13th of July 2009

Who is he?
Richard Manning Karp (born January 3, 1935) is a computer scientist and computational theorist at the University of California, Berkeley, notable for research in the theory of algorithms, for which he received a Turing Award in 1985, The Benjamin Franklin Medal in Computer and Cognitive Science in 2004, and the Kyoto Prize in 2008.[2]
Of course, proof by eminent authority is not a really valid proof. But if I had a rather complex, written proof by a relative unknown, which might have a mistake somewhere, that some problem was NP Complete, and on the other hand, I casually met Richard Karp in the elevator and he said that it seemed probable that it was NP complete, I would feel much more confident, before further investigation, that there was a good likelihood that the problem was NP complete. If you add that to the complex proof, I would again feel more confident.

I haven't read the 179 page study about hair covering. I have my own position on hair covering. But as scholarly as Rabbi Broyde is, without a careful read of the study, I don't know if he is twisting sources to say something other than what he presents, or if his leaps are valid or invalid leaps, or if the authorities he cites are normative, or accepted lehalacha.

Meanwhile, many of the Big Name authorities live and breath Torah. While they may argue with one another, they still develop an intuition based on the many sources they have studied in depth. And that intuition, expressed in an "offhand comment" is something that many people will lend credence to. As well they should. The offhand comment reflects an understanding [one of perhaps many] of the "spirit of the law".

Rav Shach was quoted as follows:
But it was Rav Shach who startled me with his halachic view. Rav Meltzer had told me to listen to Rav Shach closely, as “Rav Shach was married to his [Rav Meltzer's] niece and she did not cover her hair.” Rav Shach met me at some length, and told me very clearly and directly that whether hair covering was obligatory or not when most modest women did not cover their hair was a dispute between the Shulchan Aruch and the Rambam, since Rambam called hair covering a dat moshe andMechaber called it a dat yehudit. Rav Shach told me that it was better to be strict on this matter, but one who was makilyesh al ma lismoch. When I pressed Rav Shach about explaining the basis for the Mechaber‘s view, he told me that the Mechaber is adopting the view of the Tur, which must have been his view the Rosh as well, although Rav Shach indicated that he did not see that view in the Rosh himself.
Of course, whether Rav Shach actually said this is now up in the air.

At a recent wedding I attended, a rabbi who felt the impetus to defend a certain Gadol's politically incorrect statement said that he did not know how to do so. "If I say that outside the world of Torah, this Gadol is still living in the 1950's, then they will turn around and ask how we can rely upon him for any pesak." Personally, I don't know that the Gadol's politically incorrect statement was necessarily untrue. [Maybe yes, maybe no. In today's environment, there is no room for nuanced discussion of politically incorrect statements, for fear of being tarred as politically incorrect oneself.] Political correctness or politically correct methods of expression do not necessarily equal reality. And we need not be so fickle, following the zeitgeist and declaring it as the basis upon which all halacha may be decided. Some level of conservatism may be desired, as a link to past attitudes and past ways of understanding halacha as applied to practical situations. (See Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanus, who was the link to the past, and opposed the innovations of his colleagues, post churban. As the Mishna in Avos relates, he was the plastered cistern who never lost a drop, while Rabbi Elazar ben Arach was the innovator, the perennial spring.)

Yes, I indeed agree that incorrect grasp of metzius can impact on the validity of halachic rulings.  For example, rabbis reacting to the farce that was psychology in the past, and treating modern psychology as necessarily the same.

But is there really a good alternative? I am not so sure. We can rely on the 179 page articles by young whippersnappers, and discard the words of those who lived and live in the past, but then we lose the benefit of the intuition that comes from living and breathing Torah for so many years.

Monday, May 06, 2013

Do male lions hunt? Ain mikra yotzei miydei peshuto

Over at Rationalist Judaism, Rabbi Slifkin makes
the point that male lions don't hunt for their families, even though a pasuk in Nachum asserts that they do.
As he writes:
In the previous post, we saw a reference to the following verse:
[Where is] the lion that tore prey for his cubs, and strangled for his lionesses, and filled his lairs with prey, and his dens with mangled flesh? (Nachum 2:13)
Although this verse appears as part of a metaphor, metaphors are intended to be genuine, i.e. to reflect actual facts. Furthermore, the Gemara certainly takes it as expressing facts about lion hunting.

But, as one reader pointed out, lions do not in fact hunt for their cubs and lionesses. It's the lionesses who do all the work!

This is yet another example of the same phenomenon that appears with Scriptural descriptions of hares and hyraxes chewing cud, dew falling from the heavens, the heart and kidneys as housing the mind, and the sky as a solid dome. As Rambam says with regard to Yechezekel's account of the heavens, which Rambam saw as scientifically inaccurate, prophesy appears via the worldview of the prophet. Or, to use another phrase: Dibra Torah k'lashon bnei adam, "the Torah speaks in the language of man."
And thus, this demonstrates that the assumption is that it is the natural order for the males to work for a living and provide for their wives and families, rather than the opposite.

In the comment section, someone brings a nice objection, in that it helps flesh out the question of how to approach metaphor in Tanach:
I'm not sure the premise is correct, that the metaphor has to reflect a true reality to be a metaphor. If Rashi and Radak are correct, this is a lamentation about the downfall of kings, and so that certainly was male-oriented. The mashal is used for the nimshal, not really to be an accurate description in and of itself. 
To this comment, I got to reply, and this is my comment that I feel merits a post of its own. What should be one's methodology where there is mashal. Does the existence of nimshal entirely obliterate the truth of the mashal?

I wrote there:
That premise is the premise of Rav Kahana:
From Shabbat 63a:
מ"ט דר"א דאמר תכשיטין הן לו דכתיב (תהילים מה) חגור חרבך על ירך גבור הודך והדרך א"ל רב כהנא למר בריה דרב הונא האי בדברי תורה כתיב א"ל אין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו א"ר כהנא כד הוינא בר תמני סרי שנין והוה גמירנא ליה לכוליה תלמודא ולא הוה ידענא דאין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו עד השתא מאי קמ"ל דליגמר איניש והדר ליסבר:

Originally he thought that since the pasuk in Tehillim was a metaphor referring to divrei Torah, it need not be true on a literal level, so we cannot learn that a sword is a tachshit in terms of Shabbos. But then he learned that ain mikra yotzei miydei peshuto, that even where the intent is a metaphor, that does not mean that the literal level of the metaphor is not true. (And that, BTW, is the true basic meaning of ain mikra, before being modified by others.)
To add to that idea, I want to make an additional point. Ain mikra yotzei miydei peshuto only occurs three times in all of Shas:

סדר נשים, מסכת יבמות
  • דף כד, א גמרא: אין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו הכא אתאי גזרה שוה אפיקתיה מפשטיה לגמרי ואי לאו גזרה שוה הוה אמינא שם שם ממש למאן קמזהר רחמנא ליבם יקום על שם אחיך מיבעי ליה אי לבי דינא יקום על שם אחי אביו מיבעי
סדר מועד, מסכת שבת
  • דף סג, א גמרא: א"ל אין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו א"ר כהנא כד הוינא בר תמני סרי שנין והוה גמירנא ליה לכוליה <הש"ס> {תלמודא} ולא הוה ידענא דאין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו עד השתא מאי קמ"ל דליגמר איניש והדר ליסבר
סדר נשים, מסכת יבמות
  • דף יא, ב גמרא: הא צרתה תועבה כי תיבעי לך אליבא דרבנן אע"ג דאמור רבנן טומאה בסוטה הוא דכתיב אין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו או דלמא כיון דאיעקר איעקר איכא דאמרי אליבא דרבנן לא תיבעי לך כיון דאיתעקר איעקר כי תיבעי לך

I have seen this pointed out by folks trying to demonstrate that the Rishonim took this fairly limited principle* and made it into a broad methodological approach, and furthermore changed it from what Chazal meant by it. Rashi's ain mikra principle is not necessarily the same as Chazal's ain mikra principle. This is a good point, and true, I think. (Update: See here for a random example.)

[* well, though I say fairly limited, note in Yevamos 24, Rava starts his statement with 'though in kol haTorah kulah we say ain mikra... here we don't.]

But further than this, two out of the three applications of ain mikra are not (necessarily) true applications of ain mikra either. In Shabbos is a true application. In Yevamos 24, Rava is saying that this is an exclusion. And Yevamos 11 is a stama degemara.

Could we argue based on Shabbos for a definition of ain mikra limited to pure mashal and nimshal. I am pretty sure of it, though we would still need to handle Yevamos 24.

Friday, May 03, 2013

Is self-esteem against the Torah?

If I wanted to, I could stress the importance of self-esteem in avodas Hashem by citing sources. For instance, I could cite Sanhedrin 37a:

THE HOLY ONE, BLESSED BE HE, FASHIONED EVERY MAN IN THE STAMP OP THE FIRST MAN, AND YET NOT ONE OF THEM RESEMBLES HIS FELLOW. THEREFORE EVERY SINGLE PERSON IS OBLIGED TO SAY: THE WORLD WAS CREATED FOR MY SAKE.43
And because of this concept of bishvili nivra haolam, we have an impetus to act appropriately. And I could point to the Mishna in Avos of al tehi rasha bifnei atzmecha, be not wicked in your own eyes, because (as Rambam explains it) this will lead to you acting like a rasha, and argue that this is an example of low self-esteem which can lead to negative consequences. And I am sure I could point to many other such sources, if I spent more than two minutes thinking about it.

What has me thinking about it is the following ridiculous statement at the Daas Torah blog:



I am currently trying to understanding the recent transition from interpersonal relations governed by Torah concepts and the current replacement by secular psychological values and processes. Currently one of the most important psychological concepts is that of self-esteem. Despite the fact that there is no such concept in Torah we have here a call by Rav Reuven Feinstein to institute programs and methodology in yeshivos to fight against the "pandemic of low self-esteem" in our yeshivos. Furthermore he indicates that this secular attribute of self-esteem is critical for spirituality and serving G-d! This widespread and uncritical acceptance in our community of the importance of psychology - not only to be a healthy person but to develop sprituality - is in strong contrast with Rav Dessler (Vol 3 page 360).
Oy. Do you think that most of what is understood as "interpersonal relations governed by Torah concepts" is inherent to the Torah, such that we must hew closely to it and avoid what modern sensibilities tell us is good? It isn't so. Societies evolve, and they have evolved in the past. And in each generation, as they evolved, rabbis might have tied those sensibilities to pesukim, or interpreted gemaras and rishonim and acharonim in various ways to bolster it.

For example, the Mussar movement, which is strongly self-critical, and which Daas Torah is putting up as the example of Torah-based interpersonal relations, by invoking Rav Dessler. The Mussar movement was a revolution, obviously based on earlier Torah works, but not the standard approach. Or Rav Nachman of Breslov's movement, with a focus on mitzvah gedolah lihyot besimcha tamid. He also has sources to rely upon. But these, and other approaches, swelled based in part on the zeitgeist, and turned to classic Jewish sources to present it and explain it as a Torah path. (But they are not really the same approach of Chazal, for example, or of Moshe Rabbenu.)

Given enough time, and some degree of lack of self-awareness and awareness of the process, frum rabbis of  our times will write works deriving a more modern approach to interpersonal relations from Torah sources. They probably have already -- see Rav Reuven Feinstein and Rabbi Dr. Twersky, in the linked Daas Torah post! And then, 200 years from now, if modern psychology evolves further, some other frum blogger, blissfully unaware of the fluidity of the process, will point to today's psychology as the "Torah-true" path, and criticize rabbonim for following the science and psychology of their day.

Thursday, May 02, 2013

YUTorah on Behar / Bechukosai


parsha banner



Audio Shiurim on Behar-Bechukotai
Articles on Behar-Bechukotai
Parsha Sheets on Behar-Bechukotai
Haftorah shiurim on Behar-Bechukotai
Rabbi Jeremy WiederLaining for Parshat Behar-Bechukotai
See all shiurim on YUTorah for Parshat Behar-Bechukotai
New This Week

Wednesday, May 01, 2013

Daf Yomi: The Doubled Cave

In yesterday's Daf Yomi, we encounter this gemara (Eruvin 53a):

מערת המכפלה רב ושמואל חד אמר שני בתים זה לפנים מזה וחד אמר בית ועלייה על גביו בשלמא למאן דאמר זה על גב זה היינו מכפלה אלא למאן דאמר שני בתים זה לפנים מזה מאי מכפלה שכפולה בזוגות (בראשית לה, כז) ממרא קרית ארבע א"ר יצחק קרית הארבע זוגות אדם וחוה אברהם ושרה יצחק ורבקה יעקב ולאה (בראשית יד, א) 

"The Mearas Hamachpela [doubled cave], Rav and Shmuel, one said it was two rooms [caves], one within the other, and one said it within another was a house and an attic over it [that is, one cave over the other]. All is well according to he who says one over the other, this is Machpela [doubled]. But according to he who said two houses, one within the other, what is Machpela? That it is doubled with pairs. [How so? The pasuk says] Mamrei Kiryat Arba -- Rabbi Yitzchak said: Kiryat haArba Zugot [of the four pairs]: Adam and Chava, Avraham and Sara, Yitzchak and Rivkah, Yaakov and Leah."

When I was learning the above gemara with my son, he asked a good question. How could there be an argument over the definition of the Mearas Hamachpela? Let them go and look!

Indeed, both of them studied in Eretz Yisrael at some point. And there were other Amoraim who were traveling back and forth. Isn't this dispute readily resolvable?

Perhaps the answer is that they didn't know precisely where the Mearas Hamachpela is. (And if so, maybe neither do we, despite an identified site.)

According to Wikipedia (because I haven't researched this), Herod built a structure over Mearas Hamechpela:
Situated beneath a large rectangular Herodian era structure, the series of subterranean chambers is located in the heart of Hebron(Al-Khalil)'s old city in the Hebron Hills. According to tradition that has been associated with both the Book of Genesis and the Quran, the cave and adjoining field were purchased by Abraham, and Abraham, IsaacJacobSarah,Rebecca, and Leah, considered the Patriarchs and Matriarchs of the Jewish people, are all believed to be buried there. 
And further:
Herod the Great built a large, rectangular enclosure over the caves, the only fully surviving Herodian structure. Herod's building, with 6-foot-thick stone walls made from stones that were at least 3 feet tall and sometimes reach a length of 24 feet, did not have a roof. Archæologists are not certain where the original entrance to the enclosure was located, or even if there was one.[6]
This could then be the answer, that it was already obstructed in the days of Rav and Shmuel.

In terms of the continuation of the gemara, I don't think the question the stama degemara poses to one of the Amoraim, Rav or Shmuel, is a strong one. Indeed, the reason they have a dispute of whether it was a cave one over the other or one within the other is that they are arguing about the definition of machpela, whether it meant doubled internally or one over the other. So whoever said one room inside of another was interpreting machpela. It is therefore invalid to assert that that Amora has no way of explaining machpela.

What is happening, I think, is that the setama is operated on a different assumption than the original Amoraim. Firstly, not necessarily taking the bayis ve'aliya as an interpretation of machpela. But more so, operating under the methodology by which a derasha needs to be impelled by the absence of another viable interpretation. Since they have this hanging derasha, of machpela referring to the pairs of patriarchs and matriarchs buried there, it would be either optimal or required to associate this with one of the two Amoraim in this dispute. And so they identify the "pairs" with habayis vealiya al gabav. But the Amoraim could well have said -- and I think they do generally in Midrash not first processed by gemara -- that there are two interpretations upon the words of the pasuk. If you want, one as peshat and one as derash. (Or else you could even say that there is a third position, that the cave was not doubled at all, in which case it is strange for Avraham at his point to refer to it as Mearas Hamachpela.)

LinkWithin

Blog Widget by LinkWithin