Wednesday, December 19, 2007

Setting A Table For Fortune, part i

Note: Not intended halacha lemaaseh. Consult your local Orthodox rabbi.

In Yeshaya, perek 65, we read:

יא וְאַתֶּם עֹזְבֵי ה, הַשְּׁכֵחִים אֶת-הַר קָדְשִׁי--הַעֹרְכִים לַגַּד שֻׁלְחָן, וְהַמְמַלְאִים לַמְנִי מִמְסָךְ. 11 But ye that forsake the LORD, that forget My holy mountain, that prepare a table for Fortune, and that offer mingled wine in full measure unto Destiny,
יב וּמָנִיתִי אֶתְכֶם לַחֶרֶב, וְכֻלְּכֶם לַטֶּבַח תִּכְרָעוּ--יַעַן קָרָאתִי וְלֹא עֲנִיתֶם, דִּבַּרְתִּי וְלֹא שְׁמַעְתֶּם; וַתַּעֲשׂוּ הָרַע בְּעֵינַי, וּבַאֲשֶׁר לֹא-חָפַצְתִּי בְּחַרְתֶּם. {פ} 12 I will destine you to the sword, and ye shall all bow down to the slaughter; because when I called, ye did not answer, when I spoke, ye did not hear; but ye did that which was evil in Mine eyes, and chose that wherein I delighted not. {P}
This can be understood in different ways. Rashi writes:
who forsake the Lord The wicked of Israel who adopted paganism and died in their wickedness.

who set a table for Gad The name of a pagan deity on the name of the zodiac, and in the language of the mishnah, (Shabbath 67b) “May my fate be lucky (גָד גַּדִּי) and not fatigued.”

for a number Heb. לַמְנִי. According to the number of the computation of the priests, they would fill basins of mingled wine.

mingled wine wine mingled with water as was customary. Comp. (Prov. 23: 30) “To search for mingled wine” Also (ibid. 9:2), “She mingled (מָסְכָה) her wine.” Some interpret לַמְנִי, to the pagan deities that you appointed (מִנִּיתֶם) over yourselves, but אֶתְכֶם וּמָנִיתִי, which is not punctuated וּמִנִּיתִי with a ‘dagesh,’ indicates that it is an expression of counting.
Thus, Rashi understands this as paganism, and worshiping the deity of the zodiac, Gad. However, Rashi understands "LaMeni" as "for a number." He is apparently unaware that, just as Gad, Meni was also a pagan deity. (But read on a bit to see that he is aware of this.)

As noted in Wikipedia, "Gad was the name of the pan-Semitic god of fortune, and is attested in ancient records of Aram and Arabia[.]" And Meni "was the pan-Semitic god of destiny," mentioned "in archeaological records of Aram and Arabia." There is thus Biblical parallelism in play, with Gad placed in parallel to Meni.

Now, need this really be paganism1?

While Gad and Meni (cut and apportion, or thereabouts) are the names of deities which were worshiped by pagans, perhaps Yeshaya is speaking poetically, and exaggerating. He is speaking of those who abandoned Hashem and forget his Holy mountain2 -- וְאַתֶּם עֹזְבֵי ה, הַשְּׁכֵחִים אֶת-הַר קָדְשִׁי. There are two reasons one might do this. One might abandon Hashem in order to worship pagan deities. Or one might stop believing in Divine intervention in the world, and leave all happenings in this world to Fate and Destiny. And this might be the metaphorical intent of the end of the pasuk, הַעֹרְכִים לַגַּד שֻׁלְחָן, וְהַמְמַלְאִים לַמְנִי מִמְסָךְ.

This is brought down practically in the gemara, in Sanhedrin 92a:
ואמר רבי אלעזר כל שאינו משייר פת על שלחנו אינו רואה סימן ברכה לעולם שנאמר אין שריד לאכלו על כן לא יחיל טובו והאמר רבי אלעזר כל המשייר פתיתים על שלחנו כאילו עובד ע"ז שנאמר (ישעיהו סה) העורכים לגד שלחן והממלאים למני ממסך לא קשיא הא דאיכא שלימה בהדיה הא דליכא שלימה בהדיה
R. Eleazar also said: He who leaves no bread on the table [at the end of his meal] will never see a sign of blessing, as it is written, There be none of his meat left; therefore shall he not hope for his prosperity. But did not R. Eleazar say: He who leaves crumbs on his table is as though he engaged in idol worship, for it is written, That prepare a table for Gad, and that furnish the drink offering unto Meni? — It is no difficulty: in the latter case a whole loaf is left therewith [i.e., with the pieces], but in the former there is no whole loaf left therewith.
As an interesting digression to modify what we said about Rashi above, here locally on the gemara he asserts that Meni is the name of a particular deity:
שכן עושין, שמניחין שלחן ערוך במאכל ומשתה לשם אותה עבודה זרה שקורין גד, וממלאים כוסות של מרקחים נסוכים לעבודה זרה ששמה מני.
Besides Fortune receiving a table, he also gets a bed. While this pasuk in Yeshaya appears to be criticizing a practice (though perhaps not, as above), a passage in Nedarim 56a-b speaks about setting a bed for fortune:
דף נו, א משנה הנודר מן המטה מותר בדרגש דברי רבי מאיר וחכ"א דרגש בכלל מטה הנודר מן הדרגש מותר במטה:

דף נו, א גמרא מאי דרגש אמר עולא ערסא דגדא אמרו ליה רבנן לעולא הא דתנן כשהן מברין אותו כל העם מסובין על הארץ והוא מיסב על הדרגש כולה שתא לא יתיב עלה ההוא יומא יתיב עלה מתקיף לה רבינא מידי דהוה אבשר ויין דכולה שתא אי בעי אכיל ואי בעי לא אכיל ההוא יומא אנן יהבינן ליה אלא הא קשיא דתניא דרגש לא היה כופהו אלא זוקפו ואי אמרת ערסא דגדא
הוא והתניא הכופה את מטתו לא מטתו בלבד הוא כופה אלא כל מטות שיש לו בתוך הבית הוא כופה הא לא קשיא

מידי דהוה אמטה המיוחדת לכלים דתניא אם היתה מטה המיוחדת לכלים אין צריך לכפותה אלא אי קשיא הא קשיא דתניא רשב"ג אומר דרגש מתיר קרביטיו והוא נופל מאליו ואי דרגש ערסא דגדא הוא קרביטין מי אית ליה כי אתא רבין אמר שאילתיה לההוא מרבנן ורב תחליפא בר מערבא שמיה דהוה שכיח בשוקא דצלעי ואמר לי מאי דרגש ערסא דצלא איתמר איזהו מטה ואיזהו דרגש אמר רבי ירמיה מטה מסרגין אותה על גבה דרגש מסרגין אותו מגופו מיתיבי כלי עץ מאימתי מקבלין טומאה המטה והעריסה משישופם בעור הדג ואי מטה מסתרגת על גבה למה לי שיפת עור הדג אלא הא והא מגופן מטה אעולי ואפוקי בבזיני דרגש אעולי ואפוקי באבקתא א"ר יעקב בר אחא אמר רבי מטה שנקליטיה יוצאין זוקפה ודיו א"ר יעקב בר אידי אמר ר' יהושע בן לוי הלכה כרשב"ג:

MISHNAH. ONE WHO VOWS [ABSTINANCE] FROM A BED IS PERMITTED DARGESH: THIS IS R. MEIR'S VIEW. BUT THE SAGES SAY: DARGESH IS INCLUDED IN 'BED'. IF HE VOWS [ABSTINENCE] FROM A DARGESH, HE IS ALLOWED [THE USE OF] A BED.

GEMARA. What is dargesh? — 'Ulla said: A bed reserved for the domestic genius. Said the Rabbis to 'Ulla: But we learnt, When he [sc. the High Priest] was given the mourner's meal, all the people sat on the ground, whilst he reclined on the dargesh. Now, in normal times he does not sit upon it, yet on that day he does! Rabina demurred to this: Let it be analogous to meat and wine, of which at other times he partakes or not, as he pleases, whereas on that day we give them to him? But this is the difficulty. for it was taught: The dargesh was not lowered but stood up [on its legs]. Now if you say that it is the bed of the domestic genius, has it not been taught: He who lowers his bed, lowers not merely his own bed [as mourner], but all the beds of the house? — This is no difficulty:
for it may be similar to the trestle reserved for utensils. For it was taught, If there was a trestle reserved for utensils [in the house], he need not lower it. But if there is a difficulty, it is this: For it was taught: R. Simeon b. Gamaliel said: As for the dargesh, its thongs are untied and it automatically collapses; but if the dargesh is the bed of the domestic genius, has it then thongs? When Rabin came, he said, I consulted one of the scholars named R. Tahlifa b. Tahlifa of the West, who frequented the leather-workers' market, and he told me, What is dargesh.? A leather bed. It has been stated: What is a mittah, and what a dargesh? — R. Jeremiah said, [In] a mittah [a bedstead] the strapwork is drawn on top; a dargesh has the strapwork inside.

Thus, the dargesh might be an ערסא דגדא, an arsa degada. What is that? Soncino translates as A "bed reserved for the domestic genius," where by "genius" he means tutelary spirit of the house. Rashi gives it as the mazal of the house.

This comes from Gad, meaning Fortune. And thus can be translated as Mazal. It shares a name with the deity Gad, but that does not mean that it is the deity. But rather, we can interpret this as some quasi (or wholly) superstitious practice, on par with belief in shedim (demons). And this one is reserves for this tutelary spirit which brings good luck to the house. Or perhaps we could say that it is merely a "bed of luck," without elaboration that it is actually for some spirit.

Regardless, it would seem that this ערסא דגדא is not prohibited, for the Mishna is permitting people who vowed off beds to use a darga (because it is not classified as such), and does not mention that a darga in general should not be in someone's house. And Ulla, who introduces it, gives no sense that it is negative.

I could offer four different explanations for why setting a table is negative while a bed is not negative:

1. The pasuk was speaking about a deity, with the result of a violation of avoda zara, while the gemara was speaking about good luck in general, or else was speaking of a "domestic genius," which is on par with shedim -- in that Chazal believed in them, and permitted some interaction with them.

2. The pasuk was speaking about setting a table and mixing drinks for Gad and Meni, which it thus takrovet avoda zara. Having a special bed for the domestic genius to sleep in does not approach this. Even to shedim, sacrifice is a no-no. Devarim 32:

יז יִזְבְּחוּ, לַשֵּׁדִים לֹא אֱלֹהַּ-- {ר} אֱלֹהִים, לֹא יְדָעוּם; {ס} חֲדָשִׁים מִקָּרֹב בָּאוּ, {ר} לֹא שְׂעָרוּם אֲבֹתֵיכֶם. {ס} 17 They sacrificed unto demons, no-gods, gods that they knew not, new gods that came up of late, which your fathers dreaded not.


3. This is not really what ערסא דגדא means. Or Ulla is defining something that was present, but is not saying that it is really a good thing to possess for that reason.

4. Indeed, Rabbi Eleazar, and Rabbenu Yerucham had he lived in those times, would have opposed the darga as well.

I favor (1) and (2), but whatever the source of distinction, it is time to move on to the next item. The custom apparently developed, in certain countries, to set up a table with different foods leMazal hattinnok. Rav Yosef Karo discusses this in Bet Yosef and then in Shulchan Aruch, but we will come to him eventually. He bases himself on Rabbenu Yerucham, who writes:

רבינו ירוחם - תולדות אדם וחוה נתיב יז חלק ה דף קנט טור ד

מה שנוהגין בארצות ידועות לערוך שלחן ולשים עליו מיני מאכלין בלילה שלמחרתו מלין התינוק ואומרי' שעושין אותו למזל התינוק הנולד ראיתי לרבותי שנוהגין בו איסור ומוחין בידם ואומרין שזה בכלל העורכין לגד שלחן כדאמרינן המשייר פתיתין על שלחנו
That which they have the custom in certain lands to set a table and to place upon it various foods on the night which, on its morrow, they circumcise the infant, and they say that they are doing it for the mazal of the infant who has born -- I have seen to my teachers that they treat it as prohibited, and they say that there is in this an issue of {Yeshaya 65} "that prepare a table for Fortune," as we say {in Sanhedrin 92a}, "One who leaves crumbs on his table."

Rav Natronai Gaon writes in a teshuva:
תשובות רב נטרונאי גאון - ברודי (אופק) אורח חיים סימן נג

והא דאמר ר' אלעזר (סנהדרין צב סע"א) כל המשייר פתיתין על שולחנו כעובד עבודה זרה, הוא דאמר "לגדא דביתא", דמשמע דעובד לשר הבית

This does not explicitly link it to the practice in the time of Rabbenu Yerucham, but is rather explaining the gemara in Sanhedrin. Note that he does say that when leaving the crumbs, he must explicitly say that it is for the domestic genius, such that the implication is that he is worshiping the officer {sar -- I would propose to emend the resh to a daled, so that it reads shed -- demon} of the house. And this in explaining the pasuk in Yeshaya. We thus have a link to Ulla about darga. And the difference is as I proposed above -- a bed vs. an offering to a shed.

We can extend this to the practice mentioned by Rabbenu Yerucham. They not only set the table, but say it is for the mazal of the infant, implying his tutelary spirit. And this is exactly what Rav Natronai Gaon is talking about, setting the table and making the dedication explicit.

Note that it is difficult to read the gemara, in my opinion, with Rav Natronai Gaon's explanation. After all, the setama digemara had opposed to statements by Rabbi Eleazar about leaving crumbs on the table, and offered the resolution of: "in the latter case a whole loaf is left therewith [i.e., with the pieces], but in the former there is no whole loaf left therewith." If Rav Natronai is right that it is only a problem where he explicitly says that it is for the domestic genius, then there is no contradiction to resolve -- and he has offered a better explanation than the gemara. I would suggest that this particular setamaic statement in the gemara was a rather late insertion, such that Rav Natronai is free to offer his own. But we would need to see more evidence on this one way or another.

Bet Yosef (Yoreh Deah 178:3) cites the issue of leaving crumbs on the table, and notes, and wonders, why all the poskim left out this din.

ולא ידעתי למה השמיטו הפוסקים דבר זה
He fixes this by reinstating it in Shulchan Aruch, on the same siman, and also mentioning the prohibition on the practice noted by Rabbenu Yerucham:
שולחן ערוך יורה דעה סימן קעח סעיף ג

מי שאכל ושייר פתיתין על שלחנו, ה (א) לא יביא פת שלימה ויניח על השלחן. הגה: ח] יש מקומות שנהגו לערוך שולחן ולשום עליו מיני מאכל בלילה שלמחר מלין תינוק, ו ויש בזה איסור משום העורכים לגד שלחן (ישעיהו סה, יא) (תא"ו ני"ז), ט] אבל לערוך מטה למזל התינוק יש מתירין. (כן כתבו האחרונים). ש

Radvaz opposes the prohibition, explaining that all the poskim, such as Rosh and Rif, omit this law, and nowadays even those who worshiped them forgot about it, and certainly us. And other elements which must be present, and so on. An excerpt:
שו"ת רדב"ז חלק ד סימן רא ד"ה תשובה גרסינן

תדע דהא בעלי הפסקים לא כתבוהו והרא"ש ז"ל בפסקיו כתב מימרא קמייתא דר' אלעזר ואידך השמיטה וכן הריא"ף ז"ל השמיטה ואיך נחוש אנחנו לגד ומני אשר אבד זכרם ואדרבא אני אומר כי המדקדק בזה לא טוב הוא עושה דמשמע דחששא אית בהו דקפיד שלא נעשה כאשר היו עושין. כללא דמלתא דהאידנא כבר נשתכח שם עכו"ם אפי' מעובדיה וכ"ש אנחנו. ותו דלא חיישינן להכי אלא כשהיו מניחים את השלחן ערוך כל היום כדי שיהיה מזומן לעניים אז איכא למיחש אם יביאו פת שלימה משום העורכים לגד שלחן שכן היו עושים מניחין שלחן ערוך במאכל ובמשתה לשם אותה ע"ז שקורין גד וכן כתב עלה רש"י ז"ל.

I am not so sure that this has truly been forgotten. If in the gemara the intent was the deities, then perhaps. But if like Rav Natronai's explanation, that the house demon is intended, many in those days, and even today, are superstitious in this manner.

Rav Yosef Karo appears to believe it has to do with shedim, for he lists it in Yoreh Deah 179:
שולחן ערוך יורה דעה סימן קעט סעיף יז

הנוהגים לערוך שלחן עם מיני מאכל בליל המילה ואומרים שהוא למזל התינוק, אסור (ועיין לעיל סוף סימן קע"ח). ש
and this is surrounded on both sides with rules about shedim, such as:
מעשה שדים, אסור. ויש מי שמתיר לישאל בהם כ על הגניבה.
on one side and
לקטר הבית בעשב שיש לו ריח טוב, יש מי כא שאוסר, אא"כ עושה כן כדי להסיר ריח רע.
on the other.

In Bet Yosef (YD 179), he discusses the prohibition of setting up the table:
בית יוסף יורה דעה סימן קעט אות יז ד"ה כתב רבינו

כתב רבינו ירוחם (ני"ז ח"ה קנט ע"ד) מה שנוהגין בארצות ידועות לערוך שלחן ולשים עליו מיני מאכל בליל המילה ואומרים שעושין אותו למזל התינוק הנולד ראיתי לרבותי שנוהגין בו איסור ומוחים בידם ואומרין שזה בכלל העורכים לגד שלחן (ישעיה סה יא) עכ"ל. ואיכא למידק עלה מדגרסינן בפרק הנודר מן הירק (נדרים נו.) מאי דרגש אמר עולא ערסא דגדא ופירשו המפרשים דהיינו שהיו נוהגין להציע מטה למזל הבית ומשמע התם דליכא איסורא במילתא דהא מייתי עלה ההיא דתנן (סנהדרין כ.) כשמברין כהן גדול מיסב על הדרגש וכן ההיא דדרגשא לא היה כופהו (שם) דדוחק לומר דהנך בדעבד איסורא מיירי וצריך לומר דשאני שלחן דמפרש ביה קרא העורכים לגד שלחן:


The Levush compares setting a bed to setting a table, and explains the difference, on the same siman:

הנוהגים לערוך שולחן עם מיני מאכל בליל המילה ואומרים שהוא למזל התינוק, כבר כתבנו לעיל סימן קע"ח סעיף ג' שהוא אסור משום העורכין לגד שלחן. אבל העורכים מטה ומציעים אותו למזל הבית אין בו איסור, שלא היה זה מעולם עבודה לעבודה זרה, דבפירוש אמר קרא [ישעיה סה, יא] העורכים לגד שולחן ולא מטה.

Thus, it is to the domestic genius both for darga and the table, but one is established in sefer Yeshayah as Avodah Zara while the other is not.

With all of this in place, we should take a step back and consider that setting up a table lemazal hatinnok can have many different implications.

1. The child is named Mazal, and it is being set up in his honor. (Yes, a joke, by my wife.)
2. Perhaps the (original) intent is not one of sacrifice. Rather than meaning "for the tutelary spirit of the infant," it means "for the good luck of the infant." Some have the custom as well on Rosh haShana, to set a table with various foods, for simanim. And even there on Rosh haShana, customs varied and in some places they just looked at the food but did not eat it.
3. Perhaps the intent was to the Zodiac sign, the constellation, of the infant. This would be really avodat kochavim umazalot.
4. Perhaps it meant the tutelary spirit of the infant, and would be similarly problematic.

I think it could be reason #2, but on the other hand, superstition and belief in shedim was unfortunately prevalent, so #4 certainly is quite plausible.

As such, I would agree with Bet Yosef that this is a problematic practice. And there is no reason to engage in this practice. And when people hear segulot and adopt them without knowing any background to them, they can easily stumble into a problematic practice like this one.

Another problem with segulot is that they evolve, and that new ones come in to being all the time. Bet Yosef, or Rabbenu Yerucham, might have succeeded in quashing this particular manifestation of this segula, new segulot are always being added, and old ones are being modified. Which means that Shulchan Aruch is out of date, and had he been writing today he would have been opposing some of our modern segulot, such as the kabbalah red string and instead of the nichush he writes about, he would have perhaps opposed facilitated communication and consulting Igros haKodesh.

Indeed, Birkei Yosef on YD 179 writes about a similar minhag associated sometimes with childbirth and setting up a table: The Table of Eliyahu. It is not presently in Bar Ilan, so I will type it:

יש שנוהגין לעשות שולחן של אליהו, ואחד קדוש ערעור על מנהג זה שהוא איסור גמור. אבל הרב מהר"ר אליהו כהן בספר מדרש אליהו דף נ"ג ע"ב דחה כל דברי הכוונת המערער וקיים המנהג ע"ש טעמו ונימוקו ויש להשיב קצת כאשר יראה המעיין ודוק היתיב

As Birkei Yosef notes, there may indeed be problems with setting it for Eliyahu. I have not yet seen the problems inside, but Eliyahu is a human who "ascended" in some form, and setting a table for him just might be like offering him, rather than Hashem, offerings.

Birkei Yosef says that a certain (unnamed) individual complained about this new custom, saying for many reasons that it is forbidden. But the sefer midrash Eliyahu contains a rebuttal. But a close inspection of the rebuttal reveals that one can rebut some of the rebuttal.

Lucky for us, HebrewBooks.org happens to have the sefer Midrash Eliyahu available. I will not translate it in this particular post but perhaps in a followup post.

This "table of Eliyahu" was apparently a custom in which women, in pain of labor, would vow to make this shulchan shel Eliyahu if Hashem saved them. I will not translate and analyze here, but will post scans. This is not really fair, since this defense in English does not appear in the same post as the offense, but on the other hand, the post is already quite long, and the defense will get its own post.

But I would also note that the kos shel Eliyahu we pour at the seder is not really a cup of wine for Eliyahu, and this is a mistaken belief based on a misinterpretation, as I explained in a prior post. Besides this, if setting up a table for him is problematic, so should setting out a mixed drink for him, for that is the second half of the pasuk in Yeshaya.

The following is from Midrash Eliyahu, Drush 11, page 142 in the aforementioned PDF on the bottom and on. Click on each image to see it larger:











Endnotes:
1) Also, were these deities worshiped in the Babylonian captivity, as has been asserted? The basis for this assertion would presumably be this pasuk. But I think this would assume a Deutero-Isaiah, since the known Yeshaya was pre-exilic:
א חֲזוֹן, יְשַׁעְיָהוּ בֶן-אָמוֹץ, אֲשֶׁר חָזָה, עַל-יְהוּדָה וִירוּשָׁלִָם--בִּימֵי עֻזִּיָּהוּ יוֹתָם אָחָז יְחִזְקִיָּהוּ, מַלְכֵי יְהוּדָה. 1 The vision of Isaiah the son of Amoz, which he saw concerning Judah and Jerusalem, in the days of Uzziah, Jotham, Ahaz, and Hezekiah, kings of Judah.
But regardless of whether pre-exilic or post-exilic, we may still wonder whether these deities are meant as deities.

2) (which, by the way, might imply that the Har HaBayit was present but they did not go there, implying before the Babylonian captivity)

Vayechi: Mind The Gap: Is Vayechi Unique In Not Being Introduced With A Break?


According to the Karaite scholar Aharon ben Yosef, there also was no break before parshat Vayeitzei. And similar reasons of given/develop for this.

In the explanation (right), we see that the sefarim in hand all had the gap before Vayeitzei. The suggestion is that Ben Asher manuscripts only omit the gap by Vayechi, while Ben Naftali manuscripts omit the gap also by Vayeitzei.

Can anyone confirm this assertion by comparison to some known Ben Naftali manuscript?

Update: a slight clarification. The commentary on Torah is by the Karaite Aharon ben Yosef, and the only tradition he reports is one that lacks the gap by both Vayeitzei and Vayechi. And the supercommentary (by someone else) suggests that Aharon ben Yosef was working specifically off of a Ben Naftali tradition.

The supercommentary was by Yosef Shlomo Luzki, a 19th century Karaite. And all *his* manuscripts were ben Asher, which is why he suggests that the much earlier Aharon ben Yosef was working off Ben Naftali.

Tuesday, December 18, 2007

Spreading Out The Sheet, And Faking The Proof

In parshas Ki Seitzei, we read {Devarim 22}:
יז וְהִנֵּה-הוּא שָׂם עֲלִילֹת דְּבָרִים לֵאמֹר, לֹא-מָצָאתִי לְבִתְּךָ בְּתוּלִים, וְאֵלֶּה, בְּתוּלֵי בִתִּי; וּפָרְשׂוּ, הַשִּׂמְלָה, לִפְנֵי, זִקְנֵי הָעִיר. 17 and, lo, he hath laid wanton charges, saying: I found not in thy daughter the tokens of virginity; and yet these are the tokens of my daughter's virginity.' And they shall spread the garment before the elders of the city.
As Rashi notes, this is a figurative expression:
and they shall spread the garment This is a figurative expression, meaning: they shall clarify the matter as [“clear”] as a [new] garment. — [Sifrei 22:92, Keth. 46a]
But in that same gemara in Ketubot 46a, it is actually a dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, with the latter claiming it as literal.

Shadal also takes it literally, writing:

ופרשו השמלה
: דברים ככתבן ( דברי רבי אליעזר בן יעקב כתובות מ " ו ע " א ) אם כן איך ייתכן שיוציא אדם שם רע , מאחר שיודע שהשמלה מוכחת ? אבל כוונת התורה להרחיק שלא יהיה איש מוציא שם רע על אשתו , והאמינה ראיית הדמים , אף על פי שאולי יהיו מזוייפים , כדי לתת שלום בבית ולהציל ממיתה נערה שזינתה בבית אביה , אשר לפי התורה אין לה עונש , רק לפי מראה עיני אנשי הדורות ההם , אם היתה נישאת בחזקת בתולה , היתה זו מרמה שחייבים עליה מיתה , והתחכמה התורה להמתיק המידה הקשה הזאת בצוותה שנאמין לדמים , אעפ " י שהיא ראיה שיש אחריה פיקפוק .

That is, it was a reform issued by the Torah to the existing practice of the time. Back then, an accusation would condemn the girl. And further, would condemn a girl who lost her virginity before betrothal, and before marriage. Since she married under the presumption of being a virgin, disproof of this presumption would lead to death. Even though the Torah itself would not demand the death penalty in such a case. (In saying this, Shadal is sidestepping issues of literal reading vs. practiced halacha: avoiding saying that the Torah was speaking of a betrothed woman who cheated; or that the Torah demands the death penalty for a single woman who had intercourse out of marriage.) Here, it innovates to protect the woman that such proof is accepted, even though it might be possible to fake this proof.

The gemara records this in practice, usually with practical monetary results: The ketuba for a virgin is 200 while a non-virgin 100 zuz. But it accepts all sorts of excuses in this regard for the loss (or non-sensing) of the hymen. And some women, records the Talmud, used to bring in a stained kerchief in order to fake it.

Nowadays, I have not heard of any such case brought before a bet din: because they do not rule on capital matters; (because there is no time between betrothal and marriage anyway, though this is irrelevant); because practically, the ketuba is not really collected; or because our society has evolved out of this.

At any rate, Muslims apparently do keep this. And it is for all women, where they must prove they are virgins, to the female relatives of the groom. And there are all sorts of negative repercussions which result. All of which gives good backing, IMHO, to Shadal's explanation. Though I think it possible that since the Koran was post-Torah, they took a literal interpretation of it and ran with it.

Anyway, here is a news article about it, and about a trend in which they undergo an operation to restore the hymen, so as to be able to show the bloody sheets, and so as not to get murdered in an honor killing:

It is a drastic and costly measure but as she takes her husband's hand in marriage, she knows it is one which may - quite literally - save her life.

The horror and outrage that would ensue if it was discovered she had already slept with a man would be so damning that her own strictly religious relatives might kill her rather than face public shame.

"My virginity was restored in a delicate operation just last week, and I honestly view it as life-saving surgery," says Aisha.

"If my husband cannot prove to his family that I am a virgin, I would be hounded, ostracised and sent home in disgrace. My father, who is a devout Muslim, would regard it as the ultimate shame.

"The entire family could be cast out from the friends and society they hold dear, and I honestly believe that one of my fanatically religious cousins or uncles might kill me in revenge, to purge them of my sins. Incredible as it may seem, honour killings are still accepted within our religion.

...

"But as I said goodbye to my future husband and flew back to Birmingham, I really started to panic about my virginity.

"Muslim tradition demands that on my wedding night, my bridegroom will take the bloodied sheets to show his mother and aunts to prove that his bride is pure.

"If I do not bleed, the wedding will be annulled, and I will be sent home in disgrace.

"This was all I could think about. How could I fool my own husband and his family into believing that I was pure?"

Through friends, Aisha heard of a new operation to "restore" a torn hymen, and, in her desperation, she went onto the internet to find out more.

Asking For Health In The Yehi Ratzon On Shabbat Mevorchim

I thought I had a good response to a question on GlobalYeshiva, about why we do not ask Hashem for health in the Yehi Ratzon on Shabbos Mevorchim. And so I'll repeat it here.

My reply:
Great question!

I think the answer may be that we do!

In two places.

1) We say "Chayim shel chilutz atzamos." In Yevamos daf 102, Rabbi Eleazar says this was the best of the blessings (in the perek) and Rava says this refers to the strengthening of the bones. The basis is Yeshaya perek 58:11:
http://mechon-mamre.org/p/pt/pt1058.htm

וְנָחֲךָ ה, תָּמִיד, וְהִשְׂבִּיעַ בְּצַחְצָחוֹת נַפְשֶׁךָ, וְעַצְמֹתֶיךָ יַחֲלִיץ; וְהָיִיתָ, כְּגַן רָוֶה, וּכְמוֹצָא מַיִם, אֲשֶׁר לֹא-יְכַזְּבוּ מֵימָיו
"And the LORD will guide thee continually, and satisfy thy soul in drought, and make strong thy bones; and thou shalt be like a watered garden, and like a spring of water, whose waters fail not."

And strong bones is a symptom, or may be associated with, at least, good health.

2) We also say "Chayim Aruchim." Or perhaps "Chayim Arukkim." These mean different things.

Apparently, Arukkim, with a dagesh chazak in the kaf, it means long life. In and of itself this would indicate good health. Or if there is illness, at least not fatal illness, for the result is long life.

But this is not on par with the rest of the items in the list, which are about *quality* of life rather than quantity of life.

Furthermore, we may draw a parallel to the same perek in Yeshaya, where this "chilutz atzamos" was brought from. That was pasuk 11, but we should look to pasuk 8:

אָז יִבָּקַע כַּשַּׁחַר אוֹרֶךָ, וַאֲרֻכָתְךָ מְהֵרָה תִצְמָח; וְהָלַךְ לְפָנֶיךָ צִדְקֶךָ, כְּבוֹד ה יַאַסְפֶךָ
"Then shall thy light break forth as the morning, and thy healing shall spring forth speedily; and thy righteousness shall go before thee, the glory of the LORD shall be thy rearward."

וַאֲרֻכָתְךָ means "your healing." And Rashi says the same.

This would be what it would mean if it was Chayim Aruchim, rather than Chayim Arukkim. And I have heard in shul people saying Chayim Aruchim.

Vayechi: HaMelech HaGoel Oti

An interesting discussion about hamalach hagoel oti, in Shadal, that bears mentioning. The pesukim, in Bereishit 48, read:
טו וַיְבָרֶךְ אֶת-יוֹסֵף, וַיֹּאמַר: הָאֱלֹהִים אֲשֶׁר הִתְהַלְּכוּ אֲבֹתַי לְפָנָיו, אַבְרָהָם וְיִצְחָק--הָאֱלֹהִים הָרֹעֶה אֹתִי, מֵעוֹדִי עַד-הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה. 15 And he blessed Joseph, and said: 'The God before whom my fathers Abraham and Isaac did walk, the God who hath been my shepherd all my life long unto this day,
טז הַמַּלְאָךְ הַגֹּאֵל אֹתִי מִכָּל-רָע, יְבָרֵךְ אֶת-הַנְּעָרִים, וְיִקָּרֵא בָהֶם שְׁמִי, וְשֵׁם אֲבֹתַי אַבְרָהָם וְיִצְחָק; וְיִדְגּוּ לָרֹב, בְּקֶרֶב הָאָרֶץ. 16 the angel who hath redeemed me from all evil, bless the lads; and let my name be named in them, and the name of my fathers Abraham and Isaac; and let them grow into a multitude in the midst of the earth.'
Any time you have some active angel, doing something independent like blessing, there might some theological problems. I believe it was Gra who says not to say Barchuni Leshalom in Shalom Aleichem, because it appears to be a prayer to an angel. So what to make of pasuk 16?

On this, Shadal writes (my translation, with my commentary in {}, interspersed):
המלאך הגואל וגו' : מלאך הרגיל להשתלח אלי בצרתי ( רש"י ), הזכיר תחילה האל השולח ואח"כ הזכיר השליח, ואמר שהוא יברך בשליחות שולחו, ובאמרו המלאך כבר הודיע שאינו פועל ברצון עצמו, אלא ברצון שולחו, והנה איננו מתפלל אל המלאך, אלא כאומר יהי רצון מלפני האל לשלוח מלאכו לברך את הנערים ; וכל זה רמז רש"י בקוצר לשונו.

"the angel who hath redeemed me, etc."
: The angel who is accustomed to be sent to me in times of trouble (so, Rashi). He first mentions {in pasuk 15} the God who sends and afterwards mentions the agent, and says that he {the angel} will bless acting in the agency of his Sender; and when the angel speaks, he already makes known that he is not acting of his own will, but rather of the Will of his Sender. And behold, he {=Yaakov, in pasuk 16} is not praying to the angel, but rather is like one who says "May it be the Will before God to send His angel to bless the lads." And all of this is hinted at by Rashi in his short language.

{Note that Rashi states, in very abbreviated language:
the angel who redeemed me The angel who was usually sent to me in my distress, as the matter is stated: “And an angel of God said to me in a dream, ‘Jacob!…I am the God of Bethel’ ” (Gen. 31:11-13). - [after Targum Jonathan ben Uzziel]

but Shadal is expanding, and also explaining what is bothering Rashi. Also perhaps all that motivated Rashi is explaining where in the past an angel redeemed him, or rather, why the neutral, "present"-tense, connoting continuous action. That is, Rashi's motivations might not be theological at all.}

והשומרונים הגיהו : המלך הגואל.
And the Samaritans emend it to: The King Who Redeems.

{But we should not pay heed to that, because the Samaritan Torah often engages in exactly this stuff, harmonizing left and right and smoothing over irregularities that, it turns out, should not be smoothed over. Here, lectio difficilior is in play, and the emendation is quite likely motivated by theological concerns.}

ואני מתחילה הייתי מפרש האלהים אשר מלאכו הוא הגואל אותי מכל רע (כמו עיניכם הרואות, למעלה מ"ה י"ב ) כטעם הוא ישלח מלאכו אתך והצליח דרכך ( למעלה כ"ד מ' ) והוא כמו עם אשר תמצא את אלהיך ( בראשית ל"א ל"ב ) שענינו אשר עמו תמצא, ועיין שם
And I initially would explain: The God, whose angel was the one who redeemed me from all harm. (Just like "Your eyes have seen, earlier on Bereishit 45:12)

{That pasuk reads:

יב וְהִנֵּה עֵינֵיכֶם רֹאוֹת, וְעֵינֵי אָחִי בִנְיָמִין: כִּי-פִי, הַמְדַבֵּר אֲלֵיכֶם. 12 And, behold, your eyes see, and the eyes of my brother Benjamin, that it is my mouth that speaketh unto you.
Shadal thus appears to be saying that we can separate the actor from the action, just like Binyamin is after ro'ot. So too, Hashem blesses, and the sending of the angel is a clarifying interjection.
}

In the sense of "He will send forth his angel and make your way succeed" (earlier, Bereishit 24:40). And it is like Bereishit 31:32:

לב עִם אֲשֶׁר תִּמְצָא אֶת-אֱלֹהֶיךָ, לֹא יִחְיֶה--נֶגֶד אַחֵינוּ הַכֶּר-לְךָ מָה עִמָּדִי, וְקַח-לָךְ; וְלֹא-יָדַע יַעֲקֹב, כִּי רָחֵל גְּנָבָתַם. 32 With whomsoever thou findest thy gods, he shall not live; before our brethren discern thou what is thine with me, and take it to thee.'--For Jacob knew not that Rachel had stolen them.--
with the words עִם אֲשֶׁר תִּמְצָא אֶת-אֱלֹהֶיךָ, whose implication is "the one with whom you find," and see there.

וידגו : מן דג, וזה כי הדגים משרצים לרוב מאד ; ודעת קוצעיוס כי מן דגה נגזר שם דגן.
"and let them grow":
From "fish," and this is because the fish swarm into a large multitude. And the opinion of Cotsius (??) is that "grain" {dagan} is from daga.

ור"ש דובנא פירש האלהים הנזכר ישלח המלאך הגואל, וזה רחוק ;
And Rabbi S. Dubno explained: "The God" who is mentioned should send the redeeming angel, and this is farfetched.

ור' עובדיה ספורנו פירש האלהים דרך קריאה : אתה האלהים, שאתה הוא שהתהלכו אבותי לפניו, (עיין פירושי לישעיה א' ד') אתה האלהים, הרועה אותי וגו' אתה הואל נא שהמלאך הגואל יברך את הנערים ; וזה פירוש נחמד ונעים, ועדיין קשה לי מה צורך שיהיה המלאך הוא המברך ולמה לא שאל שיברכם האל ? והוא ר"ע ספורנו תירץ ואמר "אם אינם ראוים לברכתך בלתי אמצעי" וזה הבל, כי כל ישראל מאז מקדם אומרים זה לזה יברכך ה' וכל ישראל מבקשים מהאל שיברכם ומעולם לא מצאנו הברכה מיוחסת למלאך.
And Rabbi Ovadia Seforno explains haElokim as a way of calling {Evocative?}: "You are God, for You are He before whom my fathers traveled" (see my explanation to Yeshaya 1:4:
ד הוֹי גּוֹי חֹטֵא, עַם כֶּבֶד עָו‍ֹן--זֶרַע מְרֵעִים, בָּנִים מַשְׁחִיתִים; עָזְבוּ אֶת-ה, נִאֲצוּ אֶת-קְדוֹשׁ יִשְׂרָאֵל--נָזֹרוּ אָחוֹר. 4 Ah sinful nation, a people laden with iniquity, a seed of evil-doers, children that deal corruptly; they have forsaken the LORD, they have contemned the Holy One of Israel, they are turned away backward.
)

"You are God, who has been my shepherd, etc."
"You will now (/please) put forth that the redeeming angel bless the land."
{Shadal now says:} This is a dear and sweet explanation, but it is still difficult to me, what is the reason that the angel specifically be the one who blesses, and how come he did not ask that God bless them?
And he, Rabbi Ovadia Seforno, answered and said, "If you are not fit to be blessed except via an intermediary." And this is nonsense, for all of Israel from then, early on, said one to another "may Hashem bless you," and all of Israel requested of God that He bless them. And we never find the blessing ascribed to an angel.

ואדוני אבי ז"ל היה דבר זה קשה בעיניו עד מאד, והוא נדחק לפרש שיהיה המלאך לא המברך, אלא המקבל הברכה, ואמר כי יעקב כינה את יוסף בכינוי המלאך הגואל אותי מכל רע, ושיעור הכתובים האלה כך הוא : האלהים אשר וגו' הוא יברך את המלאך הזה (יוסף) עם הנערים.
And my Master, my father, z"l, this matter was extremely troubling in his eyes, and he was pressed to explain that the mal`ach was not the one blessing, but rather the one receiving the blessing, and he said that Yaakov nicknamed Yosef with the nickname, "the malach {agent} who redeemed me from all ill." And the intent of these verses are as follows: The God who, etc., he should bless this agent (Yosef) together with the lads.

ודח"א ז"ל אומר כי הכוונה על המלאך הנאבק עמו ( ל"ב כ"ג ) ובירכו וקרא שמו ישראל, והנה יעקב מתפלל שאותו המלאך שבירך אותו יברך גם אותם וייקראו גם הם בני ישראל, וכמו שהיה, שהיו אפרים ומנשה שני שבטים
And (???) says that the intent is to the angel who wrestled with him (in Bereishit 32:23), and blessed him and called his name Israel. And behold, Yaakov prayed {to Hashem} that that same angel who blessed him should also bless them, and should call them as well "the children of Israel," as it was, and that Ephraim and Menashe should be two tribes.

It is all quite interesting. I am not sure I would discount the somewhat troubling position that it is allowed to request blessings from an angel, as Yaakov did earlier. The question returns to whether the peshat of the Biblical narrative defines acceptable belief, or whether we view the Biblical narrative through the lens of established theology, which would in turn restrict the available peshat interpretations.

Regardless, a fascinating presentation, with all sorts of interesting parses.

Monday, December 17, 2007

Vayechi: The Missing Parsha Break

There is a missing parsha break between the end of Vayigash and Vayechi. There are many comments which base themselves on this and related facts.

But one interesting thing which results from this is the juxtaposition of two pesukim, the last pasuk of Vayigash and the first of Vayechi. Bereishit 47:

כז וַיֵּשֶׁב יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם, בְּאֶרֶץ גֹּשֶׁן; וַיֵּאָחֲזוּ בָהּ, וַיִּפְרוּ וַיִּרְבּוּ מְאֹד. 27 And Israel dwelt in the land of Egypt, in the land of Goshen; and they got them possessions therein, and were fruitful, and multiplied exceedingly.
כח וַיְחִי יַעֲקֹב בְּאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם, שְׁבַע עֶשְׂרֵה שָׁנָה; וַיְהִי יְמֵי-יַעֲקֹב, שְׁנֵי חַיָּיו--שֶׁבַע שָׁנִים, וְאַרְבָּעִים וּמְאַת שָׁנָה. 28 And Jacob lived in the land of Egypt seventeen years; so the days of Jacob, the years of his life, were a hundred forty and seven years.
Note how both pesukim begin. And there is an interchange throughout all this, weaving Yaakov with Yisrael. But here, Yisrael dwelt in the land of Egypt. And Yaakov lived in the land of Egypt. Of course, reading to the end of pasuk 27, we discover that Yisrael meant here is presumably the Nation of Israel, rather than the person. But this juxtaposition and parallelism is empowered by the missing petucha or setuma.

Besides this, there may well be a conceptual link such that pasuk 27 is really within the same topic as pasuk 28, such that we want to avoid severing the link. But exploring that would be, perhaps, for another post.

Sunday, December 16, 2007

The Trup On Asher Kana Avraham

A question on the Yahoo Leining Group about two pesukim with similar words but different trup, both in parshat Vayechi.

The answer for why the trup would differ is that there is a slight shift in a phrase, la`achuzat kever, to earlier in the verse. Based on William Wickes, trup is a continuous dichotomy, subdividing phrases and subphrases so long as a subphrase has at least three words in it, and the specific trup used to divide the subphrase is dependent on the disjunctive trup at the end of that phrase. Lengthen the phrase or shorten it, and naturally different words will get the particular signs. But it does not really matter, since the disjunctive trup on a given word is not an absolute mark of pause, but rather relative to the overall continuous dichotomy in the verse.

The first pasuk is in Bereishit 49:30:
בַּמְּעָרָ֞ה אֲשֶׁ֨ר בִּשְׂדֵ֧ה הַמַּכְפֵּלָ֛ה אֲשֶׁ֥ר עַל־פְּנֵֽי־מַמְרֵ֖א בְּאֶ֣רֶץ כְּנָ֑עַן אֲשֶׁר֩ קָנָ֨ה אַבְרָהָ֜ם אֶת־הַשָּׂדֶ֗ה מֵאֵ֛ת עֶפְרֹ֥ן הַֽחִתִּ֖י לַֽאֲחֻזַּת־קָֽבֶר׃

The trup tree for the second half of the pasuk is pictured to the right:


The second pasuk is Bereishit 50:13.
וַיִּשְׂא֨וּ אֹת֤וֹ בָנָיו֙ אַ֣רְצָה כְּנַ֔עַן וַיִּקְבְּר֣וּ אֹת֔וֹ בִּמְעָרַ֖ת שְׂדֵ֣ה הַמַּכְפֵּלָ֑ה אֲשֶׁ֣ר קָנָה֩ אַבְרָהָ֨ם אֶת־הַשָּׂדֶ֜ה לַֽאֲחֻזַּת־קֶ֗בֶר מֵאֵ֛ת עֶפְרֹ֥ן הַֽחִתִּ֖י
עַל־פְּנֵ֥י מַמְרֵֽא׃
The picture to the right is its trup tree.

Though in both cases, we might want to draw an extra subdivision at the point of the telisha ketana.

Comparing the two pictures, we can see that in the second pasuk and picture, we separate off al-penei mamrei immediately. (That phrase was entirely absent from the first pasuk and picture.) This gives us the left branch, which is roughly parallel to the first picture. However, what is branched off immediately in the first pasuk in laachuzat kaver. Thus, in the first picture this has been taken care of, but that same phrase is still in the middle of the second picture.

But then, in the second picture, and the first, we branch off mei'eis efron hachiti. Then, in the second picture, we still have laachuzat kever to branch off.

In general, to give a sense of what we are doing: in both instances, we have a long half-pasuk, and in both cases, they end with a bunch of PPs, that is, Prepositional Phrases. We simply repeatedly, recursively branch them off as the right branch, until we branch off no more.

As to the specific trup in play, that is secondary, and is purely a function of the trup at the end of the phrase. And since there is one extra level of branching, because of the additional Prepositional Phrase (al penei mamrei), the relative trup chosen to designate the subdivision is one deeper level.

That is why in the first pasuk the revii was on hasadeh, while on the second one the revii was on the achuzat-kever. In both instances, it marked the same level of division in the tree, based on the number of PPs. And similarly for the rest of the trup, as we branch down lower.

The Segulah of Divorce Then Marriage

DafNotes has an interesting post of a practical halachic question involving a segulah for a childless couple:
A couple who did not merit having children came to Rav Yitzchak Zilberstein with the following inquiry: Should they get divorced and then remarried, for they had heard that this is a segulah for having children? The woman, however, was refusing because getting divorced was degrading to her. What should they do?

He cited proof from our Gemora {Kesuvos 81b} that a divorce, even just for a few moments is degrading and therefore, the wife has grounds to refuse the divorce.

...

The Steipler Gaon, when asked the same question, said that a childless couple may try to divorce and remarry (and the husband need not be concerned that after the divorce, the wife will refuse to remarry); however, he personally never heard that this is a valid segulah and he has no opinion regarding its veracity.
I excerpted the post, so check out the rest of it over there.

Personally, I think that they should not do it for many reasons, foremost that (a) segulah-ism in general is bad, and (b) this is a mean thing to do to one's wife, to divorce, and any feeling that it is degrading to her is based on her personal feelings, which have validity, rather than any question of whether the degradation has valid halachic status.

Furthermore, in putting this segulah into practice in this instance, one hits against a technical violation of the Cherem deRabbenu Gershom, which forbids divorcing one's wife against her will. For even if the conclusion is that it is not halachically degrading, for her it is so, and so her feeling is that she does not wish to get divorced.

The Steipler's response about whether one must worry that the wife will refuse to remarry seems off to the question of whether it is degrading. I wonder if it was a separate couple who asked him this, or the same couple.

What of the origin of this segulah? I have my strong suspicions that it is rooted in Ketubot, in the halacha, no longer enforced, that if a man is married to a woman for ten years and they do not have children, they must get divorced. As we write there (translation from my Rif blog):
{Ketubot 77a}
א"ר יהודה א"ר אשי אין מעשין אלא לפסולות
כי אמריתה קמיה דשמואל אמר כגון אלמנה לכהן גדול גרושה וחלוצה לכהן הדיוט ממזרת ונתינה לישראל בת ישראל לממזר ולנתין אבל נשא אשה ושהה עמה עשר שנים ולא ילדה אין כופין אותו
(ורב תחליפא בר אבימי אמר שמואל אפילו נשא אשה ושהה עמה עשר שנים ולא ילדה כופין אותו להוציא)
וכולהו בין הני דרבנן דתנן במתני' שכופין אותן להוציא ובין הני דאורייתא כגון אלמנה לכה"ג גרושה וחלוצה לכהן הדיוט כולהו היו כייפינן להו בשוטים דבדברים לא יוסר עבד
וכל הני דמדרבנן אי אמרה הוינא בהדיה שבקינן לה בר ממוכה שחין ומי שנשא אשה ושהה עמה עשר שנים ולא ילדה
מוכה שחין אי אמרה דיירנא בהדיה בסהדי שבקינן לה
ומי שנשא אשה ושהה עמה עשר שנים ולא ילדה אע"ג דאמרה דיירנא בהדיה בסהדיה לא שבקינן לה אלא יוציא ויתן כתובה ומותרת לינשא לאחר אע"פ שאין לו בנים
כדגרסי' בפ' הבא על יבמתו
ת"ר נשאת לראשון ולא היו לו בנים לשני ולא היו לו בנים לשלישי לא תנשא אלא למי שיש לו בנים ואם נשאת למי שאין לו בנים תצא בלא כתובה:
Rav Yehuda cited Rav Ashi {this makes no chronological sense; emend to our gemara's Rav Assi, or to Rosh's Rav}: We do not force {divorce} except to invalid {/tainted} women.
When this was stated before Shmuel, he said: Such as a widow to a kohen gadol, a divorcee or chalutza to a regular kohen, a bastardess and female descendant of Gibeonites to an Israel, the daughter of an Israelite to a bastard or to a descendant of Gibeonites. However, if he married a woman and remained with her for 10 years and she did not bear children, we do not force him.

(*And Rav Tachlifa bar Avimi cited Shmuel: Even if he married a woman and remained with her for 10 years and she did not bear children, we force him to divorce. *)

And all of them, whether the Rabbinic ones which we taught in the Mishna that we force them to divorce, and whether the Biblical ones, such as a widow to a kohen gadol, a divorcee or chalutza to a normal kohen, all of them they force them with whips, for {Mishlei 29:19}:
יט בִּדְבָרִים, לֹא-יִוָּסֶר עָבֶד: כִּי-יָבִין, וְאֵין מַעֲנֶה. 19 A servant will not be corrected by words; for though he understand, there will be no response.
{Ketubot 77b}
And all the Rabbinic ones, if she said "I wish to be with him," we leave her, with the exception of one afflicted with boils, and one who married a woman and remained with her 10 years, and she did not bear children.
One {= a man} afflicted with boils, if she says "I will dwell with him with witnesses," we leave her. And one who married a woman and remained with her ten years, and she did not bear children, even though she says "I will dwell with him with witnesses," we do not leave her, but rather he divorces and grants the ketuba. And she is permitted to marry another, even though he does not have children, and we learn in perek haba al yevimto: The Sages learnt {in a brayta}: If she was married to the first one and he did not have children, to the second and he did not have children, then to the third one she should not marry, except to one who already has children. And if she marries one who does not have children, she goes out {of the marriage} without a ketuba.
Now, nowadays we do not force such a divorce. But back then, they forced a divorce. But she could marry another person, even one who did not have children, because perhaps the lack of potency came from his side rather than hers. After three such tries, she may only marry someone who already had children.

My guess would be that though this divorce was not being enforced nor put into practice, some folks thought they would be clever and divorce and then remarry. This would be for one of two reasons. Either (a) they thought that this would restart the clock of ten years, or (b) they thought that they would thus fulfill the Talmudic obligation to divorce, though undoing the ill effects immediately thereafter.

I lean towards reason (b). However, note that the Talmudic formulation is ומותרת לינשא לאחר אע"פ שאין לו בנים, with a stress I would place on the word לאחר. The idea, and hope, is that perhaps with someone else she would be able to have children. But to the same man, it has already been established sufficiently that this union will likely not produce children. As such, I think the plain meaning of the gemara is that she is permitted to marry another, but of course she cannot remarry him.

Perhaps many couples in some area and time pulled this unnecessary formalism/trick, and a few of them finally conceived. And then, this practice was established as a segulah for having children, especially since ignorant people would not know the reason for the formalism.

At any rate, I would suggest that, at least for couples married a minimum of ten years without a child, not only is this segulah nonsense, but it may present halachic problems. It is not neutral but negative. For it is one thing to disregard the Talmudic instruction to divorce, and to remain in the marriage. This has an element of shev veAl taaseh, and has parallels in other cases where if the woman is married in a halachically troublesome scenario, we permit her to remain in the marriage. However, once they are divorced, it is no longer a shev veAl taaseh. The remarriage to someone to whom is is forbidden is a violation via a kum veAseh.

For the sake of a segulah, people are putting themselves into possibly questionable halachic territory. But alas, this is true of quite a number of segulot.

Thursday, December 13, 2007

Vayigash: The Trup and Nikkud Of "Bivechi"

A great example of how Shadal is willing to revocalize the nikkud or reassign the trup, and to make sense of different traditions of the same, in Bereishit 45:2:
ב וַיִּתֵּן אֶת-קֹלוֹ, בִּבְכִי; וַיִּשְׁמְעוּ מִצְרַיִם, וַיִּשְׁמַע בֵּית פַּרְעֹה. 2 And he wept aloud; and the Egyptians heard, and the house of Pharaoh heard.
Shadal writes:

ויתן את קולו בבכי: היה ראוי להנקד בבכי מפני האתנח, והנה לפי האמת אם היה האתנח תחת וישמעו מצרים היה ג"כ נכון, כי שמיעת המצרים היתה מיד ושמיעת בית פרעה היתה אח"כ. ואולי בעלי ניקוד היו מסופקים בזה וניקדו בבכי לפי השיטה האחת, ונתנו טעמים לפי השיטה האחרת.

That is, there is an etnachta on the word בִּבְכִי, and as such, it should be in pausal form -- probably בִּבֶכִי, with a segol under the second bet (the version of Shadal I got this from does not have nikkud.) But it makes sense -- like in Yirmiyahu 9:9, we find reference to בְכִי וָנֶהִי, and bechi would follow the same pattern as nehi. And in Yirmeyahu 48:5:
ד נִשְׁבְּרָה, מוֹאָב; הִשְׁמִיעוּ זְּעָקָה, צעוריה (צְעִירֶיהָ). 4 Moab is destroyed; her little ones have caused a cry to be heard.
ה כִּי מַעֲלֵה הלחות (הַלֻּחִית), בִּבְכִי יַעֲלֶה-בֶּכִי: כִּי בְּמוֹרַד חוֹרֹנַיִם, צָרֵי צַעֲקַת-שֶׁבֶר שָׁמֵעוּ. 5 For by the ascent of Luhith with continual weeping shall they go up; for in the going down of Horonaim they have heard the distressing cry of destruction.
such that we have bchi vs. bechi one next to the other, the distinction being pausal form or not.

Shadal's suggestion is that in truth the verse can be divided on logical grounds by trup at two distinct points -- at bchi or at mitzrayim. Because first the Egyptians heard his crying, and then Pharaoh's house knew of it. As such, two possible trups, and placing of the etnachta, were possible. And so, those who gave this particular nikkud were basing themselves on the other, just as valid, logical division, and wrote bchi with a sheva. So the trup and nikkud is inconsistent, but both are plausible in alternate configurations.

I would say that while pausal form is often used, it is by no means imposed across the board. There are exceptions, noted in masoretic notes by mention of things as patach despite the etnachta. Perhaps Shadal would emend those as well -- he does indeed in other places -- but language and how it is used is not always so systematic.

I would also note a problem with Shadal's resolution. If he wants to put the etnachta on Mitzrayim for the trup of the nakdanim, then the word Mitzrayim should be pausal, and we should expect a kametz there. But we don't. We have a patach. Obviously, the nakdan did not have the etnachta there.

Daf Yomi Ketubot 102b: When Did The Heirs Slaughter the Son?

From Ketubot 102, translation from my Rif blog:
לא יאמר הראשון כשתבא אצלי אזונה
אמר רב חסדא זאת אומרת בת אצל האם לא שנא גדולה ולא שנא קטנה
תניא מי שמת והניח בן קטן יורשי האב אומרים יהא גדל אצלנו והיא אומרת [יהא] גדל אצלי אין מניחין [אותו] אצל מי שראוי ליורשו מעשה היה ושחטוהו ער"ה
"The first husband is not entitled to plead, 'when she comes to me I will give her maintenance'":
Rav Chisda said: This says that the daughter must be living with her mother, with no difference whether she is an adult of a minor.
They learnt {in a brayta}: One who died and left a minor son, the heirs of the father say 'let him grow up with us,' and she says 'let him grow up with me,' we do not place him with anyone entitled to be an heir. There was an incident and they slaughtered him on erev Rosh haShana! {Note that after posting this on parsha blog, I changed my translation to match that of masoret haShas.}
It is strange that they would specifically slaughter him on Rosh haShana. To what end, specifically on that date?!

Soncino has an interesting, and true comment, about how this passage has been used to bolster the blood libel:
In order to secure his property. Now since there is nothing to prove that an older daughter (who is well capable of looking after herself) must also be maintained at her mother's house and cannot be compelled to live with the brothers and receive maintenance from them, an objection arises against R. Hisda. [Detractors of the Talmud, it may be mentioned, professed to find in this passage an allusion to the 'ritual' murder of 'Christian' children! The absurdity of this suggestion was pointed out by Eric Bischoff in his Talmudkatechismus, p. 38, where he describes it as 'sinnlos' (senseless). It is evident that this incident was recorded to emphasize the danger of entrusting a child to the care of one who stands to benefit by its death. For we see here that even the sanctity of the Festival did not deter the brothers from perpetrating a crime for the purpose of gain. This danger has also been recognized in the English Law of Insurance which lays down that a man cannot insure his child's life to derive a benefit on its death].
Note that despite the fact that our gemara has ער"ה (which I might plausibly expand to Erev Rosh Hashana), Soncino translates "Such a case once occurred and [the heirs] killed him on the eve of passover!" With such a girsa, one can see how it could be easy fodder for people trying to falsely accuse Jews of ritual murder. And invoking Pesach makes a bit more sense that Rosh haShana, at least, for slaughter in context here, since there is the typical slaughter of the pascal lamb.

Why this exchange between the Pesach and Rosh haShanah? Perhaps because Pesach made more sense for shechita? Or perhaps, in the other direction, there were blood libels arising from the reference to Passover, and so a scribe changed it to erev Rosh haShana, to prevent bloodshed from people attacking Jews, while maintaining the fact that it was a Jewish festival.

Masoret haShas has a an illuminating comment. First, Rabbi Yehoshua Boaz (16th century) writes that the printers made an error here, and it was really erev haRishon, meaning that the very first night the son came to live with them, the heirs killed him. This makes a lot more sense in context. But there were roshei teivot, and the printers made an error, to something which makes no sense in context.

(I would say that perhaps those letters were עה"ר, and the printers transposed them to ער"ה, which makes no sense in the context. But see what I write later.)

Also in masores hashas, in square brackets, Rabbi Yeshayahu Pick notes that there are other printed editions which have Passover.

Thus, the development might have been erev haRishon to erev Rosh haShanah to erev haPesach. (Or directly from erev haRishon to erev haPesach.)

It would be nice to see Kitvei Yad on this. Two I found: Ktav Yad Vatikan, Ebr 113, has erev Pesach. See the very last line, in the picture to the right.








Similarly, in Ktav Yad Vatikan, Ebr 130, we have the same. See the picture to the left, the first words on the third line.

Thus, it is understandable that Soncino selects erev haPesach as his girsa, as it is based on other printings and has basis in manuscript evidence.

Note the fact that this is just one small selection of manuscripts that I was able to look at online.

However, these particular manuscript are one piece of evidence. We can also make use of how Rishonim cite the gemara. In Tosafot Rid, he says ע"ה, without the ר. Both with and without the resh, it is understandable as erev haRishon. It is quite a stretch, in my humble opinion, that a scribe would take erev haPesach and make it into ע"ה or ע"רה, which makes the erev part clear (the first letter or first two letters), but only present the ה, the definite article, from the second word. How in the world did the scribe expect the reader to make sense of which holiday it was. It it was erev Rosh Hashana, then the ער"ה makes sense, since the ע (rather than ע"ר) stands for erev and the ר"ה stands for Rosh haShana. But, the presence of ע"ה without the resh in Tosafot Rid tells me that it could not be erev rosh hashana, at least in the manuscript before him, because the scribe would be omitting the rosh of rosh hashana.

Furthermore, I have seen nothing with erev rosh hashana spelled out in full, so this is quite likel a red herring I have introduced myself.

If we look in Rosh (1250-1328), he explicitly has erev haRishon. Thus, we see much earlier than masoret hashas that there was this reading of the gemara. Thus, together, I believe that Rosh and Tosafot Rid are sufficient to establish that this was the original reading, as put forth by Rabbi Yehoshua Boaz.

As an aside, it thus has nothing to do with Passover, and thus provides no bolster to the blood libel, even without the insightful comment in Soncino.

Vayigash: Have You A Father Or A Brother?

Sometimes, seeing other pashtanim address an issue can help clarify what is motivating Rashi, and what is motivating the midrash he cites. Such is perhaps the case on the following pasuk in parshas Vayigash. Yehuda approaches Yosef and says {Bereishit 44}:

יט אֲדֹנִי שָׁאַל, אֶת-עֲבָדָיו לֵאמֹר: הֲיֵשׁ-לָכֶם אָב, אוֹ-אָח. 19 My lord asked his servants, saying: Have ye a father, or a brother?

On this pasuk, Rashi cites Midrash Rabba:
My lord asked his servants From the beginning, you came upon us with a pretext. Why did you have to ask all these [questions]? Were we looking to [marry] your daughter, or were you looking to [marry] our sister? Nonetheless, “we said to my lord” (verse 20). We did not conceal anything. [From Gen. Rabbah 93:8]
This seems rather far off topic. To what peshat end does Rashi cite this aggada, and what peshat issue is he trying to resolve here?

One could say, as I mention about other elements elsewhere, that this is part of an overall thematic overhaul of the narrative, highlighting ambiguities in the implication and tone of Yehuda's words, in order to show that this is not mere supplication but rather argumentation and accusation of wrongdoing. And I think that to a large extent, this is true. But there is more to this as well.

It turns out there is a big peshat based difficulty with this verse. And that is that while Yehuda reports saying this here, we do not find Yosef actually asking this question to the brothers in the above narrative.

Shadal addresses the question, citing others who resolve it:
אדני שאל: באמת לא שאל אותם על כך, אך אמר להם מרגלים אתם והיה זה מה שהכריחם לומר לו שנים עשר עבדיך וגו', ויהודה לא רצה להזכיר מאומה ממה שדיבר איתם קשות, והחליף הסיפור מעט, בחכמה ובתבונה (אח"ם). ולדעת אוהב גר ז"ל באמת שאל אותם יוסף על כל זה והכתוב קיצר למעלה.

These two resolutions are sort of like the open canon/closed canon approach. We have new information that is not mentioned elsewhere in Tanach, and perhaps clashes. The first approach maps this new information, this new speech, to an existing speech that we find in the Biblical canon. Except we account for changes based on purpose of the speech -- Yehuda did not want to call to mind the harsh charges. Just as a newly introduced Biblical personality is equated with a previously known personality, with explanations for the shift in name. Yet this approach works here well on a peshat level, and so Shadal offers it.

The other answer offered is that this was indeed part of the actual events, but earlier, Scripture omitted it, keeping the narrative short. For not every single thing that happened needs be recorded in every place, or even at all. And so we find out this previous event from Yehuda's speech.

Aharon ben Yosef the Karaite says similarly, or the same -- that either Scripture summarized the narrative above, and did not happen to mention this point, or that he replaced the accusation of being spies with this oblique reference, since a smart person would not mention this negative aspect (so as not to revive the charge).

(I would guess, without bothering to look into it, that the Documentary Hypothesis would make distinctions between two stories of Yehuda and Reuven, and claim that the accusation of being spies was part of the Reuven narrative, and this is Yehuda speaking.)

Rashi, and indeed Midrash Rabbah, are perhaps addressing this same point. Quoting Rashi again:
My lord asked his servants From the beginning, you came upon us with a pretext. Why did you have to ask all these [questions]? Were we looking to [marry] your daughter, or were you looking to [marry] our sister? Nonetheless, “we said to my lord” (verse 20). We did not conceal anything. [From Gen. Rabbah 93:8]
That is, take it idiomatically. You asked us all these questions, as if you were trying to marry our sister, or we were trying to marry your daughter. Thus, the specific question need not have been asked above, because it is representative of over-inquiry into their personal affairs. Why this over-inquiry? For pretext to frame them, or to accuse them of being spies. And their response was to be entirely forthcoming, not concealing anything.

Wednesday, December 12, 2007

Women's Zimmun And Communist Zimmun

On a prior post about the proper nusach for zimmun, Lion of Zion made an interesting comment -- that on a kibbutz, rather than saying Rabbotai Nevarech, they say Chaveirai Nevarech.

My wife noted that when women make a mezuman, they say Chaveirotai Nevarech. Since after all, they are not rabbis.

It seems fairly obvious that the kibbutz version preceded, since Chaveirai there means "comrades." While the sources for women's zimmun certainly preceded communism, it is unclear that this was standard actual practice in the past. And even if it was at some point, as I noted in that post, this introduction of Rabbotai Nevarech is a fairly recent innovation, and where innovated, it was in Yiddish (though with the words Rabbotai).

Tuesday, December 11, 2007

Ketubot 99b: Did He Specify "To One" But No Further? Or Did He Not Specify At All?

In Rif on Ketubot 99b, I would offer the following translation, which diverts a bit off of the standard translation, all because of one missing word.

The Rif:
{Ketubot 99b}
וסוגייא דמעביר על דבריו הוי פשיטא אמר לחד קפידא ואי זבין לתרי לא הוי זביניה זביני
אמר סתמא מאי
רב הונא אמר לאחד ולא לשנים
רב חסדא ורבה בר רב הונא אמרי לאחד ואפילו לשנים לאחד ואפילו למאה
{note girsological differences with our gemara, such that the topic is where he said "one but not two," vs. saying simply "one" with no further specification}
And the sugya of violating his words is:
It is obvious that if he {=the owner} said {to his agent to sell} to one, it is a point of insistence, such that if he sold to two, his sale is not a sale. If he said it plainly {without specifying the number of purchasers}, what?
Rav Huna said: To one but not to two. {Alternatively, as our gemara: 'To one,' implying not to two.}
Rav Chisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna said: To one and even to two. To one and even to 100.

אקלע רב נחמן לסורא
עול לגביה רב חסדא ורבה בר רב הונא
אמרי ליה כה"ג מאי
אמר להו לאחד ואפילו לשנים ואפילו למאה
ואע"ג דטעה שליח
היכא דטעה שליח לא קאמינא
והא מר הוא דאמר אין אונאה לקרקעות
ה"מ היכא דטעה בעה"ב אבל שליח א"ל לתקוני שדרתיך ולא לעוותי
וכן הלכתא
Rav Nachman visited Sura. Rav Chisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna entered to him. They said to him: In such an instance, what?
He said to them: To one, and even to two, and even to one hundred.
"And even where the agent erred?"
"Where they agent erred, I am not speaking of."
"But Master is the one who said that there is no overreaching {ona'ah} by land."
"Those words are where the homeowner erred, but if the agent erred, he may say to him, 'I sent you so fix me and not to mess me up.'"
And so is the halacha.
Our gemara, meanwhile, has:
פשיטא אמר לאחד ולא לשנים האמר ליה לאחד ולא לשנים
א"ל לאחד סתמא מאי
רב הונא אמר לאחד ולא לשנים רב חסדא ורבה בר רב הונא דאמרי תרוייהו לאחד ואפילו לשנים לאחד ואפילו למאה איקלע רב נחמן לסורא עול לגביה רב חסדא ורבה בר רב הונא אמרו ליה כי האי גוונא מאי אמר להו לאחד ואפי' לשנים לאחד ואפילו למאה אמרו ליה אע"ג דטעה שליח אמר להו דטעה שליח לא קאמינא אמרו ליה והאמר מר אין אונאה לקרקעות הני מילי היכא דטעה בעל הבית אבל טעה שליח אמר ליה לתקוני שדרתיך ולא לעוותי

Thus, in our gemara, we have: "If he said to him, 'to one and not to two,' he has told him to one and not to two." "If he said to him, "to one" without further stipulation, what?

Thus, in our gemara, the question is about where he actually said the word "to one," but did not further specify.

Meanwhile, the Rif has two features which differ. He has:
פשיטא אמר לחד קפידא ואי זבין לתרי לא הוי זביניה זביני
אמר סתמא מאי

Here, in the "obvious" case, there is no word "and not to two." We might interpret לחד קפידא as "one, insistently," which would map to an explicit statement of "to one but not to two."

However, we could also interpret it, and parse it, as having the quotation marks at the beginning and end of the single word לחד. This, IMHO, is the better parsing, and would mean: If he said to to "{sell} to one," this is a point of insistence, such that if he sold to two, his sale was not a sale.

Furthermore, in the next statement in the Rif's gemara, the word לאחד is missing, as well as the word ליה. Therefore, the statement reads, "if he told him without stipulation." We can then read this as "he told him to sell" without stipulating to how many people to sell to. Thus, our gemara's question (where he said "to one") is Rif's gemara's peshitta.

This all colors how we read the subsequent gemara, and how we parse לאחד ואפילו לשנים לאחד ואפילו למאה. Is the word לאחד a quote, and ואפילו לשנים לאחד ואפילו למאה the implication. Or is it all an implication, and they are discussing the extent of the implication?

I also think it quite likely that this is the reason for the setama digmara's establishing of what the peshitta and what the question is. There was a dispute, perhaps even between manuscripts, on the matter, and so it is important to arrive at what the question is before approaching the Amoraic statements.

My feeling is that the gemara originally has סתמא מאי, and our gemara is elaboration on the point. But that the interpretation of our gemara (rather than Rif's) may well match the intention of the Amoraim more closely.

Daf Yomi Ketubot 98a: Who [Authorized] You To Make the Assessment?

From my Rif translation, on Ketubot 98a:
שלח ליה רבה בריה דרבא לרב יוסף מוכרת שלא בב"ד צריכה שבועה או אינה צריכה שבועה
ותיבעי לך הכרזה
אמר ליה הכרזה לא מיבעי לי
דאמר רבי זירא אמר רב נחמן אלמנה ששמה לעצמה לא עשתה כלום
היכי דמי אי דאכרוז אמאי לא עשתה כלום
אלא לאו דלא אכרוז לעצמה הוא דלא עשתה כלום הא לאחר מה שעשתה עשתה
לעולם דאכרוז ואמרינן לה מאן שם לך
Rabba son of Rava sent to Rav Yosef: If she sold not in front of bet din, does she require an oath or does she not require an oath?
{The reply}: And you should have asked about a public announcement {, if it is required}.
He said to him: I have no question about a public announcement. For Rabbi Zera cited Rav Nachman: A widow who assessed for herself accomplishes nothing.
How so? If there was a public announcement, why has she not accomplished anything? Rather, is it not that she did not make an announcement, and thus it is for herself that she did not accomplish anything, but for another, what she did was done?
{No.} In truth, she announced, and we say to her "Who told you to assess?"

כי ההוא גברא דאפקידו גביה כיסתא דיתמי אזל שמה לנפשיה בארבע מאה זוזי
לסוף אייקר וקם בשית מאה
אתו לקמיה דרב אסי
אמר ליה מאן שם לך
והלכתא צריכה שבועה ואינה צריכה הכרזה
Just like the certain man, to whom corals of orphans were deposited, and he went and assessed them for himself as worth 400 zuz. In the end, they increased in value and stood at 600 zuz. They came before Rav Assi. He said to him: Who told you to assess?

Soncino translates מאן שם לך as 'Who [authorized] you to make the assessment?'

This is a tricky phrase to translate, and that which makes it tricky is not spelled out explicitly, so I may as well attempt to spell it out. The case appears to be one in which the person made his/her own assessment. If we translate מאן שם לך as "who assessed for you," what sort of question is this? We know who assessed -- it was the person we are talking to! Of course, this is a rhetorical question, so this is acceptable.

But there is another tricky bit -- at least I think so. Let us compare Rashi with Tosafot.

Rashi writes, mimi kabalta mechira zo, from whom did you receive this price. Not from bet din nor from the orphans!

Thus, the word sham becomes mechira, or sale price, in Rashi's translation.


Tosafot, meanwhile, has kelomar, me hechezikcha beElu hanechasim -- "who put you in charge of these assets?"

In this translation of the statement, there is the same rhetorical effect. But which specific word does sham map to? It seems to map to nothing! The answer may well be that Tosafot says kelomar, and so it is not a word by word translation.

Soncino seems to try to satisfy both Rashi and Tosafot, by translating it as 'Who [authorized] you to make the assessment?' But it is difficult to see how the one translates to the other.

I believe that this is actually a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot as to whether the ש in שם is a sin or a shin. Rashi holds it is a shin. Bolstering him is the fact that the word sham in used in the immediate context, and is the topic of conversation here -- the assessment of the assets. Tosafot reads it as a sin, such that the phrase is man sam lach, "who appointed you?" Thus, the bracketed [authorized] in Soncino's translation is indeed the word sam in the phrase. But then, there is no explicit word sham in the phrase. Tosafot would place the word [assessment] in brackets and the word authorized out of brackets.

We have precedent for this phrase in Shemot 2, where an Israelite says to Moshe:
יד וַיֹּאמֶר מִי שָׂמְךָ לְאִישׁ שַׂר וְשֹׁפֵט, עָלֵינוּ--הַלְהָרְגֵנִי אַתָּה אֹמֵר, כַּאֲשֶׁר הָרַגְתָּ אֶת-הַמִּצְרִי; וַיִּירָא מֹשֶׁה וַיֹּאמַר, אָכֵן נוֹדַע הַדָּבָר. 14 And he said: 'Who made thee a ruler and a judge over us? thinkest thou to kill me, as thou didst kill the Egyptian?' And Moses feared, and said: 'Surely the thing is known.'
מִי שָׂמְךָ parallels man sam lach, and the question is who granted you this authority.

Which is correct? Truth be told, I am not sure, but I feel special affinity to this reconstructed nikkud in Tosafot's reading, because it works, because it does not require reordering of the words in the phrase, because it has Biblical parallel, and honestly, because I came up with it. But what Rashi really has working for him is context. But not every שם in context of sham needs to be assessment.

Thursday, December 06, 2007

Chanukka: What Is The Idea of Preferring Poppy-Seed Oil Or Olive Oil?

On Shabbat 23a:

אמר רב ששת אכסנאי חייב בנר חנוכה א"ר זירא מריש כי הוינא בי רב משתתפנא בפריטי בהדי אושפיזא בתר דנסיבי איתתא אמינא השתא ודאי לא צריכנא דקא מדליקי עלי בגו ביתאי: א"ר יהושע בן לוי כל השמנים כולן יפין לנר ושמן זית מן המובחר אמר אביי מריש הוה מהדר מר אמשחא דשומשמי אמר האי משך נהורי טפי כיון דשמע לה להא דרבי יהושע בן לוי מהדר אמשחא דזיתא אמר האי צליל נהוריה טפי ואריב"ל כל השמנים יפין לדיו ושמן זית מן המובחר איבעיא להו לגבל או לעשן ת"ש דתני רב שמואל בר זוטרא כל השמנים יפין לדיו ושמן זית מן המובחר בין לגבל בין לעשן רב שמואל בר זוטרא מתני הכי כל העשנים יפין לדיו ושמן זית מן המובחר אמר רב הונא כל השרפין יפין לדיו ושרף קטף יפה מכולם:

As Soncino translates:
R. Joshua b. Levi said: All oils are fit {for the Hanukkah lamp}, but olive oil is of the best. Abaye observed: At first the Master [Rabbah] used to seek poppy-seed oil, saying, The light of this is more lasting; but when he heard this [dictum] of R. Joshua b. Levi, he was particular for olive oil, saying, This yields a clearer light.

R. Joshua b. Levi also said: All oils are fit for ink, and olive oil is of the best. The scholars propounded: for kneading or for smoking? — Come and hear: For R. Samuel b. Zutra recited: All oils are fit for ink, and olive oil is of the best, both for kneading and for smoking. R. Samuel b. Zutra recited it thus: All soots are fit for ink: and olive oil is the best. R. Huna said: All gums are good for ink, but balsam gum is the best of all.

Despite the post-Talmudic suggestion, I do not agree with the assertion that olive oil is better for lighting the Chanukkah menorah because the miracle was done with olive oil. I do not think that this is readily read into the gemara, and furthermore that the gemara gives its own explicit reasons.

But why, pray tell, are these reasons persuasive. Frankly, who cares that poppy-seed oil lasts longer? Who cares that olive oil is clearer?

The answer (assuming that the context is indeed the Chanukkah lamp rather than the Shabbat lamp), is perhaps some issue of pirsumei nisa, publicizing the miracle. If it lasts longer, it reaches a wider audience. If the light is clearer or brighter, it is more noticeable.

But then, why exactly are we choosing one over the other. Each oil optimizes some aspect.

A digression -- I would suggest that both poppy-seed oil and olive oil are min hamuvchar, that is, preferable, in some way. Each oil optimizes some worthy aspect, and there is no oil which will optimize all aspects at once, over all other options. Rabba independently came up with this idea, which was a good idea. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi independently came up with a different idea. But the matter appears to be one of personality. Rabba was humble, and greatly admired Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, and wished to emulate him, and follow his halachic tradition about optimality. Rabba then offered a reason why olive oil is very good in this respect. I am not certain that this is a matter of pesak, such that someone who chooses poppy-seed oil, or some other oil for its own positive aspect, is not fulfilling the precept in a min hamuvchar fashion, at least to some extent, and such that every other person has some obligation to follow Rabba's new lead.

In terms of human beings as well, different people have different strengths, and we should not judge a person's value just on one criterion. Not everyone is the best Talmudic scholar, but others optimize other traits, such as artistic expression, honor, etc. Ner Hashem Nishmat Adam,
and these lamps might be min hamuvchar in different ways.

Now that we are done with that homiletic digression, we may return back to the point of this post. Why should these specific aspects be optimized, and why might we say that the optimization inherent in olive oil is a better optimization inherent in poppy-seed oil?

I think the answer might lie with a determination of which best captures the spirit of the nes chanukka being publicized by these lamps. According to the gemara, the miracle of Chanukka was that a small cruse of oil lasted a full eight days. Thus, according to Rabba's initial suggestion, poppy-seed oil is quite appropriate. Of all oils, it burns the longest, and so we can commemorate that particular aspect of the miracle. This is min hamuvchar.

But then, why not use impure oil? Tumah hutra beTzibbur, so it is quite likely that they could have. But the whole point was avoiding Hellenic influence, and they sought only the pure oil. It was this insistence on purity that led to the entire situation of lacking oil, which in turn necessitated the miracle. Therefore, it is perhaps even more appropriate that one should use olive oil, even though it will burn more quickly, if one chooses this in order to optimize the aspect of צליל, clarity and purity.

Sorry for the abundance of homiletics in this post, but this might actually be so.

Wednesday, December 05, 2007

The Proper Nusach For Zimmun

Note: Not intended halacha lemaaseh. It is merely an exploration of the issues.

Over Shabbat, I learned through some sources for the structure of zimmun, and came to some interesting conclusions.

First off, more or less, the current structure is as pictured to the right:
Leader: Rabbotai, Mi Vellen Bentchen. (Or: Rabbotai, Nevarech.)
Others: Yehi Shem Adonai mevorach meAta veAd Olam.
Leader: Yehi Shem Adonai mevorach meAta veAd Olam.
Leader: BeReshut Maranan, veRabbanan veRabotai, Nevarech (Eloheinu -- if there are 10) sheAchalnu miShelo.
Others: Baruch (Eloheinu) sheAchalnu miShelo uveTuvo Chayyinu.
Leader: Baruch (Eloheinu) sheAchalnu miShelo uveTuvo Chayyinu.
(Single person omits:)
Baruch hu uvaruch shemo.

Now, after looking through the sources, I saw three interesting things.

1) I am fairly convinced that we should not be saying "Rabbotai, Mi Vellen Bentchen," but should start straight off with "Nevarech sheAchalnu miShelo."
2) That there was an expansion which was quashed, to have "Nevarech sheAchalnu miShelo uveTuvo Chayinu."
3) That I should probably not be saying "Baruch Hu uVaruch shemo" at the end.

Each of these points in turn. First, note that I oppose feature creep in Judaism. Feature creep in software engineering is where there is some initial plan for the software, but during development, more and more features are suggested and incorporated, which were not part of the original design. This can yield unwieldy, bloated software. And even where it does not, when the deadlines are not also extended as well, there is often not enough time to meet the extended demands.

There is a natural historical process of feature creep into Judaism as well, and I think that the Rabbis of each generation must be vigilant against this. At times they were, at times they were not. This bloat can lead to excessive chumrot, extension of tefillah for people who have short attention spans as it is, etc. And once adopted, it is difficult to discard, for various halachic and extra-halachic reasons.

The nusach of zimmun appears to be one such example, where all sorts of things were added, some of which were opposed forcefully enough to obliterate the addition, and some which were not. As it presently stands, the zimmun is twice as long as it was initially.

Which brings us to point 1, "Rabbotai Mir Vellen Bentchen."

1) If you look in the gemara, in the Rishonim, in Tur, in Shulchan Aruch, the zimmun begins with "Nevarech sheAchalnu miShelo." There is no "Rabbotai, Mir Vellen Betchen" present. Where does this come from?

We see this mentioned in the Magen Avraham. He cites the Zohar, that because it is proper to do a hazmana, introduction, to any matter of mitzvah, one should introduce this with Hav Lan Unevarech. Therefore, says the Magen Avraham, we say in Lashon Ashkenazi, "Rabbotai, Mir Vellen Bentchen." (Or, if you wish to say this in Hebrew, we have a version that goes Rabbotai, Nevarech.)

There are a few problems with this. Firstly, isn't the zimmun by definition, the hazmana to say Birkat haMazon, in order to fulfill the Biblical precept?

Secondly, we can ask the question that the Pri Megadim asks. He notes that some, such as the Levush, say that the reason the leader repeats "Baruch (Eloheinu) sheAchalnu miShelo uveTuvo Chayyinu" after the others is that his original statement of "Nevarech sheAchalnu miShelo" was not the blessing of Hashem, but rather a "Hazmana." If so, asks the Pri Megadim, what do we need with a hazmana beforehand?

Thirdly, if this was indeed so, and based on Zohar, how come we do not see this as accepted standard nusach in other, earlier sources?

Fourthly, since when do we rely on kabbalistic sources for halacha? We might optionally add it, based on kabbalistic sources, but it is strange to establish it as the accepted nusach just based on Zohar. (There are indeed some things that are based on Zohar and kabbalah.)

To answer the fourth question, we need not say that this is based on the Zohar. Rather, the basis would be in Talmud Bavli, such as in Pesachim 103a-b:
דרב ברונא ורב חננאל תלמידי דרב הוו יתבי בסעודתא
קאי עלייהו רב ייבא סבא א"ל הב לן וניבריך
לסוף אמרו ליה הב לן ונישתי
אמר להו הכי אמר רב כיון דאמריתו הב לן וניבריך איתסרא לכו למישתי
מאי טעמא דאסחיתו דעתייכו
Thus, we see that Amoraim, students of Rav, used this formula of "Hav Lan veNivrech (/univarech)."

Then, given that the Zohar states that this is a hazmana, with this particular formula, we may interpret the gemara as showing that this is an obligatory, or at least recommended, formula.

However, I would reject this, for two reasons. First, the question comes down to whether the Zohar preceded the gemara or the gemara preceded the Zohar. The more "frum" opinion is that the Zohar preceded the gemara, that it is Tannaitic, from Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai. If so, when the Amoraim in this event said "Hav Lan veNivrech," they were following what was established in Zohar, and thus this is a hazmana. However, if we say that the Zohar is post-Talmudic, from Rav Moshe de Leon, then the Zohar is basing itself on the gemara. In which case the Zohar may be interpreting the gemara correctly, or else it could be interpreting the gemara incorrectly.

In this case, I believe the Zohar misinterprets this gemara. After all, הב לן וניבריך is not the only thing they say. They also say הב לן ונישתי. And this was a request for wine to drink, so as to prolong the meal. What davar shebikedusha was this, that it requires a hazmana? Furthermore, this is not an invitation to themselves. Rather, it is an instruction to Rav Yeva Sava, who is the waiter. First they ask him to bring the wine, the kos shel beracha, so that they can bless. Then they say to him to instead bring them wine so that they can drink. And note this is אמרו ליה, where they are talking to the waiter, rather than being directed towards the others, as in "Rabbotai, Nevarech." So this translation into Ashkenazic speech (=German) is not a very accurate translation and indeed, the entire phrase is unwarranted.

The Aruch haShulchan explains the הב לן ונבריך in Zohar as a hazmana, in the sense of "let us," as in "let us bless." He compares it to such Biblical usage as Hava Nitchakma Lo. The problem with that is that it does not match the usage in the gemara, as I pointed out above. Meanwhile, Mishna Berura offers two explanations -- the same as the Aruch HaShulchan, that it is an invitation to others to bless, and another explanation, that it is a request for the wine for the kos shel beracha. I already showed that the former explanation has problems. If it is the second explanation, then how does this match the words "Rabbotai Mir Vellen Bentchen," or "Rabbotai Nevarech?" Maybe we should only say this when bentching over a cup of wine! And anyway, the words do not match. Perhaps we can simply say that that was one form of hazmana, but this is another form of hazmana.

In Rabbi Friedman's shul, where I sometimes daven, I noticed that when beginning the zimmun, he actually has someone hand him the kos shel beracha and then say Hav Lan Unvarech. This would accord well with the practice mentioned in the gemara, even though I don't think that the practice in the gemara was intended as obligation or custom, but rather just a recording of the actual conversation. But it also accords with Zohar who says to say this, as it is a hazmana. Of course, after that, he goes into Rabbosai, Mir Vellen Bentchen. So we have duplication of this extraneous hazmana.

I don't know if Rabbi Friedman does this, but I have noticed in some siddurim that in addition to Hav Lan and Rabbotai, there is a kabbalistic introduction of "Behold, I am about to fulfill the mitzvah of..." This would be a third extraneous hazmana, over that which is already included in the original mezuman.

Also, this accounts for Rabbotai, but not "Yehi Shem Hashem..." by the others and then repeated. This is not a hazmana, but rather the entire unit seems to be a zimmun before the actual zimmun, with a different girsa, and a girsa at that which deviates from the matbeia shetav'u bah chachamim, which in other contexts in this topic we object to.

(Furthermore, regardless of the length of the zimmun, typically you will have discussion at the table beforehand among the participants of the meal, in English, as to whether they want to bentch. This is yet another hazmana, in the common language, serving much the same purpose as Rabbotai in Yiddish.)

In sum, this is feature creep, a natural phenomenon of increasing the liturgy, and I oppose it on those grounds. Otherwise, this, and many other parts of tefillah will grow until there is no time for chatzi lachem.

2) This feature creep manifested itself elsewhere within the Zimmun, but these additions were
quashed. Thus, some said Amen at the end, but this was put down. Some said "Nevarech sheAchalnu miShelo uveTuvo Chayyinu." These extra words, uveTuvo Chayyinu, put into the mouth of the leader, are not in the gemara. They are borrowed from later on, from the response to the leader and the leader's repetition. This deviates from the coinage of the liturgy. As Aruch haShulchan notes, this was successfully quashed, such that nobody has this custom anymore.

3) One thing that I have been saying for years, but am reevaluating, is Baruch Hu UVaruch Shemo at the end of the Mezuman. Our bentchers say "A single person omits," meaning that it is omitted by a person not part of a mezuman. Yet this is not simply part of the standard zimmun, or else they would have included it as such, without this cryptic comment.
"Rabbotai, Nevarech" is also omitted by a single person, and so it is included in the standard text without this comment about single people omitting it.

In fact, this comment covers a dispute as to whether one should say it or not. Some say that one should say it with 3 people, some only with 10, and some never. Regardless, they all seem to agree that a single person should omit this. I have seen in some siddurim that it says in the instructions that a single person omits, but in a mezuman, it is subject to different opinions.

This part of the liturgy is not mentioned in the gemara. We first see it in Tur, where he places it right after the leader's repetition of Baruch sheAchalnu miShelo uveTuvo Chayyinu, and right before the first blessing of Birkat haMazon.

Bach asks on this, wondering where this came from. First he suggests that it is a taut sofer, a scribal error (perhaps based on baruch that follows, as the first blessing of Birkat haMazon). But then he rejects this suggestion, noting that both the sefer Rokeach and the Avudraham have this text. Bach comes to the conclusion that its basis is in a mezuman involving 10 people, where they say "Elokeinu." There, they mention God's name. And as the pasuk says, Ki Shem Hashem Ekra, Havu Godel Leilokeinu. When I mention Hashem's name, ascribe greatness to our God. And this is taken to practical halacha that one should say some praise of Hashem there.

Now, apparently, people back then were saying it even when bentching by themselves. This is incorrect. (And thus the instruction "single person omits.") But the Tur has it even for 3 people. Bach says that one should only say this for 10+ people.

Aruch haShulchan brings down all of this in his own words, and decides that it is indeed a taut sofer. He is furthermore of the opinion that here, and elsewhere, Baruch Hu uVaruch Shemo is a hefsek. Therefore, one should not say it even with 10+ people.

Personally, I am not so convinced of Aruch haShulchan's opinion in general, since if something is included in the liturgy, even if it creeps in, I am not so sure that it should be considered a hefsek. However, it is, shall we say ... useful. After all, a certain approach has developed (which is seen e.g. in Mishna Berura) that one should try to satisfy all positions. In general, this leads to chumra in action and incorporation of more nusach into tefillah. Yet here, if the Aruch haShulchan holds it is a hefsek, then we cannot include these words while still satisfying his position.

I personally think that one probably should not say it, since it is another example of feature creep, but not because of any reasons of hefsek.

4) I have to give more thought to the BiReshut portion, and learn more about it inside. After all, often this is done after being explicitly invited to do so. Yet it is good to have, and develop, manners bein adam lachaveiro.

5) Finally, this past Shabbat I described all this to my father-in-law. And at the end of the meal, he asked me to lead. I am not yet sure I should act in practice as described above, but I asked him whether he wanted me to start from the beginning (from Rabbotai). He stated his preference that I do so. And after all, it was his table, and his home, and he who dispensed this honor. And to impose my own practice on others, where he wanted a standard nusach, is a different story than selecting what I think is the correct nusach. There are bein adam lachaveiro aspects to consider.

And so I started with Rabbotai. And I included Baruch Hu uvaruch shemo, despite the fact that he personally holds like Aruch haShulchan, that it is a hefsek. A good time was had by all.

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