Daf Yomi Ketubot 20b-21a: Do the Sages Really Say That He Is Tesifying About the Money?

In Ketubot 20b-21a, citing my translation of the Rif:

{Ketubot 20b}
Mishna:

זה אומר זה כתב ידי וזה אומר זה כתב ידי צריכין שיצטרף אחר עמהן דברי רבי
וחכמים אומרים אין צריכין לצרף אחר עמהן אלא נאמן אדם לומר זה כתב ידי:

This one says "this is my handwriting" and this one says "this is my handwriting," they require that another combine with them. These are the words of Rabbi.
And the Sages say: They do not require another to combine with them, but rather a man is believed to say "this is my handwriting."

Gemara:

כשתמצא לומר לדברי רבי על כתב ידן הן מעידין ולפיכך צריך לצרף עמהם אחר ולדברי חכמים על מנה שבשטר הן מעידין ובתרוייהו סגיא וקי"ל כרבנן:

If you find to say according to the words of Rabbi, they are testifying about their own handwriting and therefore they require another to combine with them {such that there are two witnesses testifying about each signature},
{Ketubot 21a}
and according to the words of the Sages, they are testifying regarding the 100 zuz in the contract, and thus with the two of them it is sufficient.
And we establish like the Sages.

אמר רב יהודה אמר רב שנים חתומים על השטר ומת אחד מהם צריכים שנים מן השוק להעיד עליו כי היכי דלא ליפוק נכי ריבעא דממונא אפומא דחד סהדא

וכן הלכתא

ואי ליכא אלא חד מאי
אמר אביי ליכתוב חתימת ידיה אחספא ושדי ליה בבי דינא ומחזקי ליה ולא צריך איהו לאסהודי אחתימות ידיה ואזיל איהו והאי ומסהדי אאידך ודוקא אחספא אבל אמגילתא לא דילמא משכח לה אינש דלא מעלי וכתיב עליה מאי דבעי ותנן הוציא עליו כתב ידו שהוא חייב לו גובה מנכסים בני חורין

א"ר יהודה אמר שמואל עד ודיין מצטרפין
אמר רמי בר חמא כמה מעליא הא שמעתא
א"ל רבא מאי מעליותא מאי דמסהיד סהדא לא מסהיד דיינא ומאי דמסהיד דיינא לא מסהיד סהדא אלמא לא מצטרפי
וכן הלכתא:

Rav Yehuda cited Rav: Two are signed on the document and one of them dies, they require two {rather than one} from the marketplace to testify as regard to him.
So that 3/4 of the money would not go out based on the word of a single witness.
And so is the halacha.

And if there is one one {other witness}, what?
Abaye said: Let him write his signature on a piece of clay and cast it forth in the court, and they will establish it, and he will not be required to testify about his own handwriting, and then he and this other one will go and testify on the other {signature}.
And specifically on a piece of clay, but on a scroll, no, lest an untoward man find it and write upon it what he wishes, and they have learnt: If he takes out against him his handwriting that he is obligated {money} to him, he may collect from the assets with no lien on them.

Rav Yehuda cited Shmuel: A witness and judge can combine.
Rami bar Chama said: How sublime is this statement.
Rava said to him: What is the excellence? This that the witness testifies {the transaction}, the judge does not testify to, and that which the judge testifies {his own signature} to the judge does not testify to. Therefore, they do not combine.
And so is the halacha.

This is somewhat difficult for me. The presumption of the gemara seems to be against the Mishna. The gemara begins by stating that ולדברי חכמים על מנה שבשטר הן מעידין ובתרוייהו סגיא, that "according to the words of the Sages, they are testifying regarding the 100 zuz in the contract, and thus with the two of them it is sufficient." Yet, if they are really testifying about the money and not about the signatures, then why does the Mishna explain the words of the Sages as אלא נאמן אדם לומר זה כתב ידי, such that we are granting each of then neemanut? That indeed would be a valid explanation why we do not need another witness to combine with them.

And indeed, Abaye certainly seems to read it as testifying about signatures. As does Rav Yehuda citing Shmuel. Rava surely does not -- that is the point of his statement.

Perhaps there is some other way of understanding it -- and indeed there is! It is a girsological dispute between the Mishna as learned by Shmuel and the Mishna as learned by Rav.

We have the Mishna as above. But, Rabbi Zera notes that in the Bet Midrash of Rav, they have a different girsa of the Mishna in which a different explanation is offered. I'll excerpt the Yedid Nefesh Yerushalmi (Yerushalmi Ketubot 11b):



We would only know this by reading Yerushalmi Ketubot. We then may resolve that Shmuel is based on our girsa of the Mishna, as is Abaye. Meanwhile, Rav has a different version of the Mishna which he learns in his academy. And this is why Rami bar Yechezkel came -- presumably meaning from Eretz Yisrael -- he said not to heed the words of his brother Yehuda in the name of Shmuel.

If I may boast, I was bothered by this issue first, and only saw this Yerushalmi that resolves it last.

And a slight concern -- what is the true basis of Abaye? I can understand him based on our Mishna, but if the point is not the signatures, how do we understand this? Rif cites him lehalacha. I need to think more about this.

As Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur Approach, It Is Appropriate To Begin Saying Selichot

But specifically selichot outside of shul. We should work on our bein adam lachaveiro, and try not to hurt/annoy other people. If we do, a selicha (excuse me) is appropriate.

// short thought

Daf Yomi Ketubot 16b-17a: Chut Shel Chesed

From my translation of the Rif:

בית שמאי אומרים כלה כמות שהיא
ובית הלל אומרים כלה נאה וחסודה

The Sages learnt {in a brayta}: How do we dance before the bride?
Bet Shammai say: {Ketubot 17a} The bride as she is.
And Bet Hillel say: Beautiful and graceful bride.

Thus, they danced before the bride while singing her praises.

What is the definition of chasuda? Morfix defines it as demure, modest, god-fearing (female).

Rashi notes on chasuda that chut shel chesed mashuch aleha. Elsewhere, this has been defined as loving-kindness, but here, it seems that it means something else -- that is, a quality of beauty such that she can be described as chasuda. Thus, we can learn what chut shel chesed means from here. Grace seems an appropriate translation. Demure also looks good. Or charming.

Article on the Aguna Problem in the Wall Street Journal

The Wall Street Journal carries an article about the aguna issue, written by Ms. Bari Weiss. It covers many of the issues, but I think also illustrates how difficult it is to correctly capture religious complexity and properly convey it to an audience unfamiliar with the issues.

Some examples, where I think there are problems:

In the 12th century, a rabbinic court might have sentenced Mr. HaCohen to flogging. While according to Jewish law the get must be given without coercion, the Jewish philosopher Maimonides justified flogging as merely beating the evil inclination out of the recalcitrant husband, reminding him of his own desire to do the right thing.

As written, this paragraph suggests that Jewish law is one way (without coercion) but the philosopher Maimonides felt free to supersede Jewish law with a justification. Thus, the reader might deduce, in modern times we should also be free to supersede Jewish law via some justification. First and foremost, while Maimonides was speaking here not as philosopher, but as halachist, judicial expert in Jewish law and compiler of Jewish law. Furthermore, Rambam was basing himself on a gemara, and on a Mishna about someone who vows to bring a sacrifice. The Biblical verse is analyzes to disallow coercion but then again to allow coercion, such that the conclusion is that they force him until he says "I want." The Mishna continues that the same is true for divorce.

Therefore, it is not the case that "Jewish law says X" and Maimonides says "Y." Rather, Jewish law says sometimes X and sometimes Y, and Maimonides understood flogging to be within the realm of Y already within Jewish law. Read the paragraph I cited again, in context, and you can see how the reader unfamiliar with this will get an entirely different impression.

Here is another problem in the article:

There is a way around the get trap: annulment. Rabbi Michael Broyde, a law professor at Emory University and a member of the Beit Din of America, one of the largest rabbinic courts, argues that cases where annulment is appropriate are extremely rare, and include sexual incapacity. "The more core the defect is to a marital relationship, the easier it is to prove annulment," says Rabbi Broyde. The challenge is proving that the defect was present at the time of marriage and that "had one party or another known about it, they wouldn't have entered into the marriage," he says.

Ms. Rosenfeld can get her marriage annulled on the grounds that she didn't know about her husband's violent temper when they were married. But few Orthodox men would be willing to date a woman with an annulled marriage. Still, there aren't many other options at this point. Four months of trying to convince the rabbi who performed Ms. Rosenfeld's marriage to persuade her husband to grant her a divorce went nowhere.

This is a reference to afkinu rabanin kiddushin mineih. While it appears (I believe) three times in the gemara, it is a big question and debate whether this is a closed set, or whether we can include other cases in it as well. From what I understand of Rabbi Rackman's position, he has a tradition that any place the gemara says kofin oto, since we cannot nowadays, we can annul the marriage. Others require a much narrower scope. From the quote from Rabbi Broyde, he says that it is extremely rare that it is applicable.

The next sentence that

Ms. Rosenfeld can get her marriage annulled on the grounds that she didn't know about her husband's violent temper when they were married.

is a legal argument which may well be accepted by Rabbi Rackman's Bet Din, but would likely be dismissed as untrue by Rabbi Broyde. Yet by transitioning like this, it gives the impression that even Rabbi Broyde would accept this tenuous argument. Indeed, in the next sentence, she writes that

But few Orthodox men would be willing to date a woman with an annulled marriage.

strongly implying that the annulled marriage is indeed unquestionably annulled, but it is the bias of many Orthodox men standing in the way. In reality, since the basis for this annulment is tenuous -- since any marriage which does not work out due to "incompatibilities" might just as well be declared a mistaken mekach, legal acquisition, we could nullify all marriages -- because it is tenuous, many Orthodox men would have good reason to believe that she is still technically a married woman, and forbidden for them to marry. I do not know if this was deliberate fuzzing or accidental, but it gives entirely the wrong impression.

Finally, she writes that

While Ms. Rosenfeld is held hostage, Mr. HaCohen can go about his life as usual. He can even remarry another woman without giving Ms. Rosenfeld the get, and his children would not be deemed mamzerim.

This is true, but once again misleading (unless there are facts of the case I am unaware of). He can civilly marry, but to religiously marry, with a rabbi officiating as a mesader kiddushin, he would need to give his wife a get. Otherwise, the Cherem deRabbenu Gershom would apply, prohibiting bigamy. Of course, if he went against Jewish law, since Biblical law does not prohibit bigamy, we will not be mean to his children, who by the way have no fault in it, and declare them bastards, and forbid them from marrying non-bastards, and permit them to marry actual bastards. But he would be going outside the bounds of Jewish law to do this. Unless he got 100 rabbis to sign, allowing him to circumvent this Rabbinic edict against bigamy -- an allowance only for Rabbinic law to deal with exceptional cases such as where the first wife is insane.

What kind of editor do you get to look over articles such as these? Very specific knowledge is required to catch this type of thing.

Hopefully, at some point someone will come up with a good solution for the future to the terrible plight of these, and any future agunot. So far, the rabbinic pre-nup seems effective. But perhaps other innovations will come up.

Reading Pitum HaKetoret From A Klaf

Reading Aruch HaShulchan the other day, I saw a cute practice. He writes (IIRC he was citing someone) that because by saying korbanot it is like offering it, one should be careful to say pitum haketoret, the list of the ingredients that make of the incense offering, without omitting any ingredient. Indeed, one should say it from a text. This is because we say at the end of it ve-im chisar achat mikol sammaneha chayav mita, "and if he left out one of the ingredients he is liable to death."

Thus, it is a bad thing to leave out any ingredient, even by accident (though the Aruch haShulchan obviously would not say we would administer the death penalty to someone who misspoke, even when capital punishment was in existence). Aside from this, it is a list of arcane ingredients, and if one wants to say over the list correctly, it is appropriate to do it from a text. All in all, cute, good encouragement of Jewish practice, and taking certain halachic principles to their logical conclusion.

My father pointed out a practice which he believes stems from this. At the relevant part of davening, when it comes to this point, he has seen people put down their siddur and take a rolled up parchment out of their pocket. This parchment has the relevant text, written in ketav ashurit, but as would be written in a sefer Torah. They read pitum haketoret from this.

Indeed, in my shul, someone donated a parchment, framed and behind glass, which has the text of pittum hakketoret on it, so that people can go over to it and read it from the parchment.

If this is indeed the source of this new custom (and it surely seems so), then it is silly. The requirement to read from a ketav is not meant as a requirement to read from a kelaf. The entire purpose is so as not to make a mistake of omission, and this is accomplished just as well from a siddur. It would provide insight into how new custom develops.

Hafrashat Challah Segulah

One of the things that drives peoples to segulot are dire circumstances. When a loved one is seriously ill, in desperation, sometimes people are willing to try anything, things they would not normally consider to have any likelihood of being efficacious. And to rip away that shred of hope is quite mean, and possibly harmful. After all, even if the segula is silly, or even if the kabbalist happens to be a charlatan, it/he is providing hope, and with change of attitude may come change of condition -- the placebo effect in action.

This is similar to the way precedent is set in the American legal system. Precedent is key, and so often people find the most heart-wrenching case and put that case forward. But, even though the decision may be legally dubious, once precedent is set in that case, it is used in many other cases, which are not as heart-wrenching. So too, though we feel for the predicament of the person and family, it is questionable whether we should remain silent and allow extensions of Jewish practice into dubious territory.

Such is the case here. I saw the following posted for a certain choleh:

The instructions again are 43 women must commit to making challah. You need to use at least 5 pounds of flour so that challah can be taken.
There are diffferent customs regarding how to say the bracha. This is what I follow. Please do what you're comfortable with. The most important part is to say the bracha of hafrashat challah and to daven for the choleh.

INSTRUCTIONS (these are the one i have, if you know different ones, go right ahead and use it)

There are three steps that should not be interrupted after the dough is made:

1. You need four coins (dimes or quarters only). Give each coin in the zechus of the Rabbeim listed below and say this before giving the coins for tzedukah:
1st coin in the zechus of Rebbi Meir Ba'al HaNess
2nd coin in the zechus of Rebbi Shimon Bar Yochai
3rd coin in the zechus of Rebbi Levi Yitzchak ben Sara Sasha
4th coin in the zechus of Rebbi Menachem Mendel ben Reb Yosef Mayriminov

2. Say the Yehe Ratzon from the Shacharis Shmoneh Esrei -it is below the Rifa'aynu paragraph. In the gray area, say the choleh's name (it's at the bottom of the page in the Artscroll siddur).

3. Immediately take challah and say the challah bracha

Some of the details here are understandable, at least from a halachic perspective. Thus, the requirement for 5 pounds of dough is approximately that of the Chazon Ish, in terms of how much dough one must have before one would take off challah with a blessing. (Minhag Yerushalayim is about 3 pounds.) Similarly, the act in #3 of taking off the challah and saying the blessing for hafrashat challah is the carrying out of the (Rabbinic) command.

Why specifically women? When a male baker does it (as he surely does, on a more consistent basis) it is also a mitzvah. There is a Mishna in Shabbat 31b which states that for violating these three things, women die in childbirth. Thus, some suggest, the opposite, being careful doing this, is great to ensure safety. This does not really follow. However, these are three things typically entrusted to women, and when women want to create new ritual and imbue them with meaning, they are likely to seize upon these things.

However, just as an aside, Moach Kemo Ephroach has been looking for excuses for avoiding diaper changes. I have a great one for him. In the gemara on that Mishna, we have another reason given for women dying in childbirth:

Our Rabbis taught: For three sins women die in childbirth. R. Eleazar said: women die young. R. Aha said, As a punishment for washing their children's napkins {of excrement} on the Sabbath. Others say, Because they call the holy ark a chest.

Therefore, based on Rav Acha's words, I have a great new segulah! Women can arrange together to change diapers halachically on Shabbat (in groups of 67 exactly, because why not?), having in mind a specific choleh. Of course, the husband should not volunteer for this duty, for it is specifically a woman's mitzvah.

So we have specific practice, with halachic basis and fulfilling a halachic requirement. The dough has to be disposed of in a specific, careful manner, and is also being wasted. It is no sin to regularly bake less, but OK, they are deliberately putting themselves into this specific situation so that they can take off challah.

In terms of these three sins mentioned in the Mishna in Shabbat, by regularly baking less than the halachic requirement, she never puts herself into a situation in which she may serve someone bread from which challah has not been taken off, which is another way of being careful about the prohibition.

So some of these instructions make sense, or at least are justifiable. I still don't buy the bit about specifically women, since if it is the merit of doing the mitzvah, a man gets that merit as well. It is only this extra reading to transform the opposite into a segulah. Other instructions seem to come out of nowhere, though:

1. Why specifically 43 women? Is it because it is one more than the Meaning of Life, the Universe, and Everything?
   
   No. If I had to guess, it is gematria-zation. That is, challah has the gematria of 43. The ches is 8, the lamed is 30, and the heh is 5.
   
   So we are now coming up with meaningful, magical numbers, yesh me'ayin. So specifically 43 members of the coven must participate in order to get the desired results from this ritual. 42, despite being tremendous merit, is nowhere near as great as 43, which enables you to get challah squared. 44 is straight out as well. 43 shall be the number.
   
   Whenever I see such particularism, I begin to suspect superstition or segulah-ism.
   
   
2. Why specifically 4 coins, each one given with in the zechus of a particular rabbi? These particular rabbis are required? Some, I have seen elsewhere, like Rabbi Meir Baal HaNes in order to perform the incantation of recovering lost articles. Rav Menachem Mendel MiRiminov is the source of the reciting of parshat haman at certain points in time. Rav Levi Yitchak ben Sara Sasha is more popularly known as the Berdichever Rebbe, or Rav Levi Yitzchak of Berdichev, but there is a segulah when traveling, or when in trouble while traveling, to say his name לוי יצחק בן שרה סאשה מברדיטשב. And Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai is the one to whom the Zohar is attributed. There is a special segulah for people to give tzedakka to "Tzidkas Rashbi," for those who support charity at the kever of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai. (Which is different from just invoking his name.)
   
   Hey, if they are good for these other segulot, then it can't hurt to add it to our segulah as well. And the giving of coins is something done to find a lost object, after invoking Rabbi Meir Baal HaNes.
   
   
   
   So, when coming up with this new ritual, they added these 4 names. Who cares if they are appropriate to the situation at hand.
   
   In the good old days, people had demonology or angelology, where specific demons or angels had specific powers and invoking their names brought certain mystical forces to the fore. Or people invoked various Sefirot from the Godhead. Now, with sainthood pervasive in Jewish practice, we invoke specific powers attributed to various Tannaim and chassidishe Rebbes.
   
   Of course, in Shemoneh Esrei, we invoke the zechut avot, but that has basis in pesukim that have promises to the descendants of the avot, the Jewish people. It does not feel the same to me.
   
   
3. Why dimes of quarters only? If I give a nickel or a penny for tzedakka in each of these people's zechut, it won't work? Only that specific American currency? What if I give a half-dollar, or a Susan B. Anthony dollar? What about paper money? The person passing the instructions along noted that the important part is really the actual hafrashat challah, and praying for the choleh, but I wonder at the particularism.
   
   My guess in this case is that this practice originated in Eretz Yisrael, and thus the instructions were to use a shekel or a half-shekel. Based on approximate conversion rates of dividing by 4, we have a quarter and a dime, approximately.
   

I am noting this because I am trying to oppose the segulah-ization of Judaism.

Enabling Hebrew Typing In Windows XP

A how-to. This takes you through the steps of:
1) Opening up the control panel and opening up the Regional and Language Settings Dialog Box.
2) Going to the Language tab and checking off the check box to enable complex right-to-left languages (including Thai).
3) Clicking on the "Details..." button and adding Hebrew to the list of languages.
4) Setting up the Language toolbar on the bottom of the screen.
5) Setting up the keyboard shortcut of Left Alt-Shift to toggle between your two languages.
6) A short example of typing in Hebrew and English, in notepad and in Microsoft Word.

So You Think "Yiddin" Is Something New??

The Yiddin song coming from Ghengis Khan is funny, but it is not something to get upset about. And indeed, many modern Jewish songs borrow melodies from non-Jewish sources.

The phenomenon of borrowing melodies from the gentiles in order to put Jewish songs to it is nothing new. Indeed, many niggunim come from Russian marching songs and the like.

Ah, but that is the Rebbe, who can elevate the impure and make it kadosh. But in general, oy-va-voy! All the old niggunim, no one objected to, for they had some spiritual core, and so it was all appropriate. But today, it is different, and everyone doing this is an oysvorf.

Not so. Some rabbonim were yelling about it even way back when, but others argued that it was permissible.

Here is an appropriate Chida (Rav Chaim Joseph David ben Isaac Zerachia Azulai (1724 – 21 March 1807)):

ברכי יוסף אורח חיים סימן תקס ס"ק ה ו. דין ג.
דברי דברי תשבחות או שיר של הודאות וכו'. בספר מעשה רוקח פ"ח מהלכות תפלה נשאל על המשוררים קדיש וקדושה לחן שירי נכרים, והאריך לאסור, ובכלל {דבריו} הביא דברי מהר"ם די לונזאנו בספר שתי ידות דף ק' שכתב בשם ספר חסידים (סי' תשסח) ויזהר מי שקולו נעים שלא יזמר ניגונים נכרים, ודקדק שלא כתב שירים נכרים, דזה פשיטא דאסור, אלא נגונים נכרים, כלומר אף דהשיר הוא קדוש, הניגון נכרי יפסידהו, וכו' ע"ש. ונעלם ממנו דברי מהר"ם די לונזאנו עצמו שם בספר שתי ידות דף קמ"ב שכתב וז"ל, וזאת היתה לי סיבה גורמת לחבר רוב שירי על ניגוני הישמעאלים, וכו' וראיתי קצת חכמים כמתאוננים רע על המחברים שירות ותשבחות לשי"ת על ניגונים אשר לא מבני ישראל המה, ואין הדין עמם, כי אין בכך כלום, עכ"ל. וע"ש מ"ש הרב מהר"ם די לונזאנו בענין זה, ומה שהשיג על מהר"י נאגר"ה בשירותיא.

He notes that is the Sefer Maaseh Rokeach in Hilchot Tefillah, he was asked about those who sand kaddish and kedusha to melodies of gentiles, and he forbids. And along the way he brings the words of the Maharam di Lonzano who cited the Sefer Chassidim that one whose voice is sweet should take heed not to sing gentile niggunim, and makes a diyuk from the fact that he did not say shirim (songs) but rather niggunim (melodies). Yet, points out the Chida, the Maharam di Lonzano writes elsewhere that he himself composed Hebrew lyrics to Arabic melodies.

Furthermore, he writes, a few Chachamim complain about those who compose Hebrew lyrics and praises to Hashem based on non-Jewish melodies, but the law is not like them.

So it is nothing new to compose Hebrew words to non-Jewish melodies. And it is nothing new for people to complain about it -- but ignore 'em.

Another important thing to note is that we see all these piyyitum, and zemirot. People nowadays put them to tunes, or try to adapt them to tunes. (Deror Yikra goes to almost anything, including "Can You Tell Me How To Get To Sesame Street?") But in fact, in many cases, they were initially composed to match the meter, beat, etc., of existing tunes. I wonder for how many of these we know the initial melody.

Note: and now I see this post from BlogInDm, who noted this Chida first, three weeks ago, though to a different purpose.

Chazzanut on Rosh Hashanah

Shulchan Aruch on Hilchot Rosh haShanah, siman 584:1

אין אומרים הלל בראש השנה ויום הכפורים. הגה: ונוהגין לומר אבינו מלכנו על הסדר, ואם הוא שבת אין אומרים אותו (ר"ן פ"ב דר"ה וריב"ש סימן תקי"ב). ומאריכים בפיוטים ותפלות עד חצות (מהרי"ל).

We do not say Hallel on Rosh haShana nor on Yom Kippur. Rema: And we have the custom to say Avinu Malkenu in the order, and if it is Shabbat we do not say it (Ran and Rivash). And we extent with poetry and prayers until midday (Maharil).

Thus, a nice long davening on Rosh haShana, until midday. And perhaps even longer. Magen Avraham writes:

עד חצות - לכל הפחו' (שם) וכ"כ ביש"ש בביצה שבר"ה יוכל להאריך יותר מחצות אם לא כשחל בשב' ונ"ל דוקא בפיוטים ותפלות ולא בניגונים עסי' תקכ"ט ס"א:

Thus, at least until chatzot, midday. This would seem to be a lower limit, then. But one is allowed to extend it even further than midday, so long as Rosh haShana does not fall on Shabbat. For it it fell on Shabbat, we would end up fasting past midday, and we should not fast on Shabbat. And, he writes, it appears to him that it is specifically with poetry and prayers, but not with melodies, niggunim.

It seems that the idea is chatzi lachem and chatzi laShem, and people have the inclination to extend it even further in the laShem portion. It would seem that he does not consider the niggunim to really be LaShem to the same extent as poetry and prayer are, and therefore it is not proper to delay the meal given the requirement of chatzi lachem. Thus, chazzanut which overly extends the davening, or, say, an overly long Carlebach davening, might not be good.

Does his exclusion of niggunim only apply to the extension after chatzot, or even up to chatzot as well? I would guess that he only means after chatzot, where there is conflict with chatzi lachem.

I also wonder at the value of extending davening via piyutim nowadays. For some people, it can be inspiring and motivate great feelings, appropriate for Rosh HaShanah. But for many, some piyutim are written in a very literary Hebrew, in which arcane flowery words are used, and even where plain words are used, they refer to things indirectly. Try to say the piyut with havana, that is understanding (never mind kavana), and you cover no ground by the time everyone else has finished zugging the entire piyyut. And just mumbling gobbledygook would seem to me to be no better than extending via niggunim. Perhaps if one decides to prepare beforehand, it is a different matter.

Daf Yomi Ketubot 35b: The Mature Woman's Claim of Virginity

Note: Not intended halacha lemaaseh. Somewhat mature context, but that is what happens in masechet Ketubot.

This post addresses issues of girsology and halacha, to a very common occurrence -- the marriage of a mature virgin who already menstruated at some point in her life. How many times during the wedding night might the new husband and wife have intercourse? According to standard current practice, after the first intercourse, we assume that any blood we see was not blood resulting from the torn hymen, but rather is menstrual blood, and so she is a niddah. Therefore, he must separate after the first intercourse, and they don't touch each other again during the seven days during which she is supposed to be rejoicing with her new husband. Furthermore, even if they do not see blood, we assume it was there but was tiny, and perhaps covered by semen, and so the same rules apply -- we treat her as a niddah.

I do not believe that this halacha is correct (though of course this post is not halacha lemaaseh), but I see how it developed. And it developed through unfortunate girsology.

I cite the following from my ongoing translation of the Rif:

גרסינן בפ' אלו נערות
החרשת והשוטה והבוגרת ומוכת עץ אין להן טענת בתולים
הסומא והאילונית יש להן טענת בתולים
ומקשינן ובוגרת אין לה טענת בתולים
והאמר רב בוגרת נותנין לה לילה הראשונה אלמא אית לה טענת בתולים דאי לית לה אמאי נותנין לה לילה ראשונה הא דם נדה הוא
ומפרקינן אי דקא טעין טענת פתח פתוח הכי נמי דיש לה טענת בתולים דכל בתולה בוגרת פתחה סתום
אלא הכא במאי עסקינן דאין לה טענת בתולים דקא טעין טענת דם
דאמרינן האי בתולה היא אלא שכלו דמיה
והא דרב אוקימנא פרק תינוקת בבוגרת שעדיין לא ראתה דם אבל בוגרת שראתה ועודה בבית אביה אין לה אלא בעילת מצוה ופורש
וכן הלכה
נמצאו עכשיו שהבתולות הבוגרות יש מהן שיש להן דמים והיינו דאמר רב נותנין לה לילה הראשון ויש מהן שאין להן דמים והיינו דקתני הבוגרת אין לה טענת בתולים הא טענת פתח פתוח יש לה
וכן הלכתא

We learn in perek Elu Naarot {Ketubot 35b-36a}:
The female deaf-mute, the female imbecile, the mature woman, and the one wounded by wood {such that she tore her hymen} -- they do not have to them a claim of virginity {able to be lodged against them}. The blind woman and the aylonit {who never developed signs of maturity} do have to them a claim of virginity.
And we ask: And does a mature woman not have a claim of virginity? But Rav said, "A mature woman, we give her the first night {to continue to have intercourse}." Thus it is clear that she does have a claim of virginity, for if she does not, why do we give her the first night -- it is surely menstrual blood?!
And we answer: If he lodges the complaint the "I found the opening open," indeed she does have a claim of virginity {able to be lodged against her}, for all virgin mature women, her opening is closed. Rather, with what are we dealing when we say that she has no claim of virginity {against her}? Where he claimed a claim of {absence of} blood. That we say that she was a virgin, but her blood {which would come from breaking the hymen} was finished {used up}.
And this of Rav, we establish it in perek tinoket {Niddah 64b} as referring to a mature woman who had not yet seen {menstrual} blood, but a mature woman who had seen {menstrual} blood when she was still in her father's household, she only has the intercourse of precept and then he separates.
And so is the halacha.
We now find that mature virgins, some of them have blood {since it was not "finished"} and this is what Rav said that we give them the first night, and some of them do not have blood {since it has "finished"}, and this is what they teach that the mature woman does not have {against her} a claim of virginity {based on absence of blood}, but a claim of "an open opening" she does have.
And so is the halacha.

This is quite a long and elaborate Rif, especially when we compare it with the gemara(s) he is citing. The overwhelming majority of text above is the Rif's elaboration and explanatory comments. And when so much commentary is needed, this is often enough a clue that something is wrong.

The plain text of the gemara in Ketubot is simply:

והבוגרת אין לה טענת בתולים: והאמר רב בוגרת נותנין לה לילה הראשון
אי דקא טעין טענת דמים הכי נמי הכא במאי עסקינן דקטעין טענת פתח פתוח

This gemara can be very simply explained:

"A mature woman has no claim of virginity {against her}." But Rav said that a mature woman, they give her the entire night {to have intercourse}. {Thus, we assume that her torn hymen will bleed, and this is not menstrual blood, and so she may continue to have intercourse that first night despite the blood.} If he claimed a claim that she lacked blood, indeed {it would be a valid claim}. In what case are we dealing {where the mature woman has no claim against her}? Where he claimed that "the opening was open" {for she will not be as "tight" as a minor}.

This works out quite well locally, though there would be some problems with the gemara in Niddah (which we will eventually address). Why does the Rif not simply give this explanation we have just offered?

The answer is that the Rif has a different girsa of the gemara than we have. While we have אי דקא טעין טענת דמים הכי נמי הכא במאי עסקינן דקטעין טענת פתח פתוח, Rif has the two clauses reversed. Thus, instead of אי דקא טעין טענת דמים הכי נמי, he has אי דקא טעין טענת פתח פתוח הכי נמי, and instead of our הכא במאי עסקינן דקטעין טענת פתח פתוח, he has הכא במאי עסקינן דקטעין טענת דמים. This causes all sorts of problems with the straightforward reading of the gemara, which I will list shortly.

Indeed, Rashi explicitly puts a hachi garsinan, that this should be our girsa (as we have in our gemara rather than as in Rif), at the top of Ketubot 36a, so he was aware of this competing girsa. And Tosafot notes Rashi's choice in girsa and notes that Rabbenu Chananel differs and gives the opposite girsa (parallel to what we have in Rif).

We have the following difficulties assuming the Rif's girsa:

1. The objection to the statement that she has no claim of virginity against her is made from Rav's statement that she has the whole night. The implication of Rav's statement was that she would bleed. The response of the gemara should a harmonization -- that the claim that cannot be made against her has nothing to do with blood, but rather about "an open opening." However, of course there should be blood, so such a complaint can indeed be lodged against her. This is the obvious harmonization, which our girsa of the gemara has.
   Instead, the gemara agrees that a complaint about blood cannot be brought. This just reinforces the contradiction with Rav's statement.
2. Furthermore, what cause is there to conclude that a claim of "an open opening" is not a valid claim?? It would make sense if it were a harmonization with Rav's statement, but if it is not forced in this manner, why should I believe that any claim about a mature virgin is valid? We only have the Tannaitic statement that a claim about virginity is not valid. This claim about "an open opening" being a valid claim now comes from nowhere.
3. Furthermore, we are left with no harmonization. The gemara does not say שכלו דמיה. It is the Rif's statement and elaboration, that comes from nowhere. Unless we say that because of this difficulty, this was actually in the text of his gemara, perhaps added by some Savora. I would point out that שכלו דמיה is clearly Hebrew, with she- as a prefix to kalu, while the statement in the gemara it is explaining is clearly Aramaic, with de- as a prefix to ka ta'in.
4. We have to appeal to a somewhat odd medical theory that she ran out of blood, such that an injury to the hymen would not cause it to bleed. It is one thing to claim that her hymen was worn away, or is not as tight, such that we should not expect blood. But we are explicitly saying, in Rif's version, that a mature virgin's opening is closed. Thus, why should we not expect blood. The answer is once again an odd medical theory, that menstruation might have caused her to "run out" of blood. This despite the fact that next month, she will indeed menstruate, such that she did not run out of blood for menstruation. But somehow, having menstruated before, while betrothed, caused specifically the hymen not to bleed when torn.
5. In order to bolster this explanation, Rif explains the gemara in Niddah against its simple reading. Niddah 64b read:
   
   אמר רב בוגרת נותנין לה לילה הראשון
   וה"מ שלא ראתה אבל ראתה אין לה אלא בעילת מצוה ותו לא
   
   The simple meaning of this clarification in gemara, based on context and other factors, is that this, where she may continue to have intercourse the entire night, is where she did not see blood during the intercourse, but if she indeed saw blood, she only has this first intercourse of precept.
   Instead, Rif must explain that this is whether she ever in her life saw blood before, during the normal course of menstruation. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of mature women would have seen menstrual blood at some earlier point in their lives. This is an awkward reading in the gemara in Niddah. (See Ketubot 6a, though, about the tinoket shehiga zemana lir`ot. I don't think this forces Rif's explanation, however.)

This next point should be a point #6, but it was important enough to take it out of the list and treat independently. That is that, according to the setama digmara according to the Rif's version, a mature virgin's opening is closed. This is explicitly contradicted by a Yerushalmi, in Yerushalmi Ketubot 2a:

רבי יונה בשם רבי קריספא בוגרת כחבית פתוחה היא
הדא דאת אמר שלא להפסידה מכתובתה אבל לקיימה אינו רשאי משום ספק סוטה
ואתייא כיי דרבי חנינא דרבי חנינא אמר מעשה באשה אחת שלא נמצאו לה בתולים ובא מעשה לפני רבי אמר לה איכן הן אמרה ליה מעלותיו של בית אבא היו גבוהין ונשרו והאמינה רבי
הדא דתימר שלא להפסידה מכתובתה אבל לקיימה אינו רשאי משום ספק סוטה

Rabbi Yona cited Rabbi Krispa: A mature woman {virgin} is like an open cask.
This that you say is so as not to deprive her of her ketuba, but to maintain her {as a wife}, he is not permitted, because of her being a doubtful adulteress {who cheated while betrothed}.
And this goes like this of Rabbi Chanina. For Rabbi Chanina said: There was an incident with a certain woman who they did not find virginity, and the incident came before Rabbi. He said to her: Where are they? She said to him: The steps of my father's house her steep and they wore {/tore} away. And Rabbi believed her.
This was said in terms of not depriving her of her ketuba, but to maintain her, he is not permitted, because of her being a doubtful adulteress.

An open cask most certainly has the implication of finding her opening open, rather than lack of blood.

We see the same thing in Yerushalmi Yevamot 36b:

לא ישא את הבוגרת ר' לעזר ורבי שמעון מכשירין בבוגרת שוין שלא יקח את מוכת עץ. מה בין בוגרת. מה בין מוכת עץ. בוגרת כלו בתוליה במעיה מוכת עץ יצאו בתוליה לחוץ. ואית דמחלפין לא ישא את מוכת עץ רבי לעזר ורבי שמעון מכשירין במוכת עץ. ושוין שלא ישא את הבוגרת. מה בין בוגרת מה בין מוכת עץ. בוגרת עברו ימי הנעורים. מוכת עץ לא עברו ימי הנעורים אחות מוכת עץ

Thus, both the woman injured by wood and the mature woman do not possess her hymen, though due to different causes. This does not have to do with lack of blood, but rather with lack of hymen. This goes well with our version of our Bavli Ketubot, but directly contradicts Rif's version.

Under Occam's Razor, our girsa of gemara is correct, and Rif's is incorrect. Therefore, we should not be basing halacha on Rif's (and Rabbenu Chananel's) girsa of the gemara.

Thus, it is a claim of "an open opening I found" that has no validity, just as we find in these two Yerushalmi's. The Rif's assertion that a mature woman's opening is closed is untrue. Her opening is open, as Rabbi Krispa stated, and thus the claim is invalid. However, the claim of finding no blood does indeed have validity.

But if her opening is open, how could a claim of finding no blood be valid. Only if her opening is closed will he tear the hymen with intercourse, so perhaps her opening was open and so she had no blood?! The harmonization appears to be invalid.

Indeed, I would argue that the harmonization, offered by the setama digmara, is in fact invalid. This difficulty could well have been what caused some scribe to reverse the two claims.

But if the harmonization is invalid, what do we do with Rav's statement?

I would suggest two possibilities.

1) I am wrong, and the harmonization is indeed valid. Perhaps the hymen will give way readily, such that he thinks he found an open opening, but in reality it was present and tore, such that there is blood. So carry on. (That is, you do not have to accept this particular portion of my argument.)

2) I am right, and the harmonization is indeed invalid. So how do we square the two statements?

Simply put, there is no contradiction. No claim against virginity can ever be brought against a mature woman, because she is like an open cask, as Rabbi Krispa stated. One cannot bring against her a claim of "an open opening I found," and therefore, certainly no claim of absence of blood may be brought against her either.

However, that she is like an open cask does not mean that she must be like an open cask. In certain cases, her opening might be closed and she might therefore see blood from a torn hymen. Indeed, this is the case bechol yom. All the Mishna is saying is that if she does not see blood from this, or if he finds an open opening, he should not attribute it to infidelity, but in enough cases it is simply because she is like an open cask that no claim of virginity may be brought. But blood, or a closed opening would not be considered a nes by Chazal.

On to Rav's statement. A tinoket, that is a younger woman, has a certain number of days in the beginning of marriage during which blood seen during intercourse is attributed to the torn hymen rather than menstrual blood. A bogeret, a more mature woman, only has this first night to have intercourse as long as she likes. That, clarifies the setama digmara, is if she did not see blood, but if she did see blood, that is the end of the intercourse.

The blood here is blood seen because of the intercourse. (Note that I am taking a different interpretation here than the Rif, who says "saw blood" meant that she saw menstrual blood at some point in her life before marriage, while yet in her father's house.) A bogeret might well not see any blood -- after all, she is like an open cask. And so she may continue the entire night. But, clarifies the setama digmara, if she does indeed see blood, we do not attribute it to a torn hymen. Perhaps this is because of the likely possibility that she is an open cask, in which any blood might well be menstrual blood.

Nowadays, not only if she saw blood she must separate, even if she didn't she must separate after the first intercourse. This would be against my understanding of Rav. But it might work with Rif's troublesome interpretation, since any woman married nowadays has menstruated in the past, such that Rav's leniency does not apply. (Though perhaps Rif would require also that she saw blood on the wedding night, and would then attribute it to menstrual blood since her blood as per the hymen "finished.") And it can even be a newfound requirement according to my understanding of Rav, if we say this is an additional imposition of chumra. We would require it only if she saw actual blood, but we are really really worried about the possibility, such that even if she did not see actual blood, maybe she saw it and it was covered up.

I would also note that this explanation, that this is where she did not see blood, is the explanation of a setama digmara, perhaps influenced by trying to harmonize with other concepts. However, the pashut peshat of Rav's statement is that of course, if she saw blood, she may continue to have intercourse. That is his leniency. Some mature women are like an open cask. But not all women are. Therefore, if she is a virgin and this is her first night of intercourse, and she sees blood at the time of intercourse, it stands to reason that she is one of these women who is not an open cask, and the blood she sees is in all likelihood the result of her torn hymen. And throughout that entire night, when she sees blood, she may attribute it to the torn hymen. However, the next day, if she has intercourse and sees blood, she may no longer attribute it to the tearing of her hymen. This is the plain meaning of the statement that she is given that entire night, as is apparent from reading associated gemaras. She is given that entire night to attribute blood she sees to the torn hymen.

Therefore, if it is a mature woman's wedding night, and she has first intercourse and does not see blood, she should certainly be allowed to have further intercourse. And even if she does see blood, she should be allowed to have further intercourse, for that is Rav's leniency. And she may continue to have intercourse the next day and the rest of the week, so long as she does not see blood.

The Talmud does explicitly mention a requirement for a bachur to rejoice with a betula for the first week. Requiring in all instances, even absent seeing any blood, that they have only that first intercourse and afterwards not even touch each other for the next seven days seems contrary to this requirement, or at least its spirit. Especially if we do so on the basis of a faulty girsa, and/or in order to be machmir.

Final Note: Once again, don't act based on this. I am exploring the sugya, thinking of it in terms of halacha because that it part of my methodology, but this is all without intention of halacha lemaaseh. I may have made egregious errors of oversights. As usual, consult your local Orthodox rabbi.

Update: From my next post:
And now let me take the opposite position, and show how I am wrong. Again, this is why I say is not halacha lemaaseh.

Assuming we sever the Rif's connection between the gemara in Ketubot 35b and in Niddah 64b, we still should read the gemara in Niddah as referring to having seen menstrual blood previous to this.

The Rif had drawn a relationship between his girsa in Ketubot and Niddah. The Rif's girsa in Ketubot said that a bogeret has no claim of missing virginity against her, but this was only where she had menstruated in the past. Thus, kalu dameha, her blood had been finished up. A bogeret who had not yet menstruated was able to have such a claim lodged against her. And similarly in Niddah, Rav gave a bogeret that entire night, and the gemara clarifies that this is where she had not seen blood. Thus, it is a woman who had never before seen menstrual blood, but if she had, perhaps we would say kalu dameha and so she has no blood from a torn hymen, and so we would attribute it to menstrual blood and she would have to separate immediately.

I questioned the Rif's girsa in Ketubot for several reasons, including a much simpler and straightforward available girsa and an otherwise contradictory Yerushalmi. But further, I noted that this was a strange medical theory linking previous menstruation to kalu dameha such that she would not see blood from tearing her hymen.

However, as I noted in my introduction to this, even assuming we sever the connection between Ketubot and Niddah, we still may read it as above. Indeed, it may be the most plausible reading.

If you recall, the gemara in Niddah 64b read:

אמר רב בוגרת נותנין לה לילה הראשון
וה"מ שלא ראתה אבל ראתה אין לה אלא בעילת מצוה ותו לא

Rav said that for a bogeret, we give her the entire first night.
And the gemara clarifies: And these words were where she did not see, but if she did see, she only has the intercourse of the precept and no further.

The Rif summarizes this -- or perhaps it is his girsa -- as

והא דרב אוקימנא פרק תינוקת בבוגרת שעדיין לא ראתה דם אבל בוגרת שראתה ועודה בבית אביה אין לה אלא בעילת מצוה ופורש

Thus, that she saw blood of menstruation in the past in her life. I suggested it meant that she saw blood during the wedding night.

Even rejecting the connection between sugyot and rejecting the strange medical theory, we can explain this as the Rif does.

That is, if she has even seen blood in the past, then we know that she menstruates. Therefore, we have reason to fear that this blood we see now is not blood from the torn hymen but rather menstrual blood. However, if she has not menstruated in the past, why should we assume it is such now. We have an even stronger case to assume that it is from the torn hymen.

Indeed, this is the reading of the setama's restriction that makes sense. After all, granting her the entire night, or in other cases, granting her until Shabbat, means that even if she sees blood, we can attribute it to the torn hymen. So how in the world are we "granting" her this night is she has to stop when she sees blood. It would be have to be a reinterpretation of granting, such that we grant her so long as we do not see blood. But if she does not see blood, she should theoretically be allowed to continue for much longer. But if she sees blood on the second day, we no longer grant her this.

And indeed, there is precedent for such an interpretation. For example, in Ketubot 6a:

R. Hisda objected: If a girl, whose period to see [blood] had not arrived yet, got married, Beth Shammai say: One gives her four nights, and the disciples of Hillel say: Until the wound is healed up. If her period to see [blood] had arrived and she married, Beth Shammai say: One gives her the first night, and Beth Hillel say: Until the night following the Sabbath [one gives her] four nights

Thus, we have a girl {= a virgin} whose period to see menstrual blood has arrived and married, and she gets the first night, says Bet Shammai. It is not exact but pretty close in terminology.

So, most women who marry, even virgins, are bogeret, and furthermore have had their periods. (One exception is the 20-year old woman mentioned in this teshuva from Rav Moshe in Igrot Moshe.) Thus, no one will get the full night mentioned by Rav. Rather, they are all subject to the second case:

אבל ראתה אין לה אלא בעילת מצוה ותו לא

What does this mean? It is where she saw menstrual blood before. But what does אין לה אלא בעילת מצוה ותו לא? We could read it that once she sees blood, she immediately separates. But it never said that she saw blood that night. So it might mean that she only gets that intercourse of precept ever, regardless of if she saw blood.

If so, we can read present practice into the gemara's words.

Whether this extra restriction is Talmudic {/stammaic} practice or post-Talmudic, we can find precedent with a certain incident in Ketubot 10a:

Some one came before Rabban Gamaliel the son of Rabbi [and] said to him, 'My master, I have had intercourse [with my newly-wedded wife] and I have not found any blood.' She [the wife] said to him, 'My master, I was a virgin.' He said to them: Bring me that cloth. They brought him the cloth, and he soaked it in water and he washed it and he found on it a good many drops of blood. [Thereupon] he [Rabban Gamaliel] said to him [the husband]: Go, be happy with thy bargain.

Thus, the idea that blood may have been covered by semen is one already introduced in the gemara.

Daf Yomi Ketubot 10b -- Hunger Leads to Dryness

From Ketubot 10b (translation taken from my Rif blog):

ההוא דאתא לקמיה דרבי א"ל בעלתי ולא מצאתי דם אמרה לו בתולה שלימה נבעלתי אלא שנת בצורת הוה

ראה רבי פניהם שחורות צוה עליהם והכניסום למרחץ והאכילום והשקום והכניסום לחופה ובעל ומצא דם
אמר ליה לך זכה במקחך
קרא עליהם צפד עורם על עצמם יבש היה כעץ

There was one who came before Rabbi. He said to him, "I had intercourse and did not find blood." She said to him, "I was a complete virgin when I had intercourse, but it is a year of famine." Rabbi saw their faces were black {from hunger}, and commanded regarding them, and they brought them to a bath, and fed them and gave them to drink, and brought them to a chuppa {bridal chamber}, and he had intercourse and he found blood.
He {=Rabbi} said to him: Go, you have done well in your acquisition.
He called upon them {Eicha 4:8}:

ח חָשַׁךְ מִשְּׁחוֹר תָּאֳרָם, לֹא נִכְּרוּ בַּחוּצוֹת; צָפַד עוֹרָם עַל-עַצְמָם, יָבֵשׁ הָיָה כָעֵץ. {ס}

8 Their visage is blacker than coal; they are not known in the streets; their skin is shrivelled upon their bones; it is withered, it is become like a stick. {S}

Here is an instance where the partial quote of the pasuk (the portion marked in red) does not do the "derasha" justice. The context fills in so much of the rest.

Firstly, it is clear that the context in Eicha is indeed hunger. As the next pasuk reads:

ט טוֹבִים הָיוּ חַלְלֵי-חֶרֶב, מֵחַלְלֵי רָעָב: שֶׁהֵם יָזֻבוּ מְדֻקָּרִים, מִתְּנוּבֹת שָׂדָי. {ס}

9 They that are slain with the sword are better than they that are slain with hunger; for these pine away, stricken through, for want of the fruits of the field. {S}

Furthermore, the uncited part of the verse reads חָשַׁךְ מִשְּׁחוֹר תָּאֳרָם -- "Their visage is blacker than coal." And indeed, this was the tip-off for Rabbi. She said she was hungry, and that it was a year of famine. And "Rabbi saw their faces were black {from hunger}." This would have caused her to be "dry," יָבֵשׁ הָיָה כָעֵץ.

zOchreinu lechaim?

In the previous post, I cited Magen Avraham. The part I did not discuss stated that kasveinu and zachreinu are with a chataf kametz, apparently citing the Levush:

זכרנו כתבנו בחטף קמ"ץ, בזכרנו לא יאמר לחיים טובי' רק לחיים עד וכתו' לחיים טובים כל וכו' (לבוש

Now, the vowel on the next letter in both cases is a sheva, so he could not mean a chataf kametz as in modern terminology, for that would form two shevas in a row in the beginning of a word. Rather, the designation is to what we call kametz katon, which is a reduced cholam, as to opposed to the usual kametz gadol. (Thus zoch... as opposed to zach.)

I guess this is because "remember us for life" is present tense, so the apparent kametz is reduced from the cholam of zocheir due to shift of stress. (Help requested on this syntactic and phonological analysis.)

The thing is, I checked my Siddur Shilo and they have a horizontal line over the chaf of zachreinu. Thus, they claim it should be pronounced zachereinu. They have similar notation for chathemeinu and katheveinu in Avinu Malkeinu. But, since a kametz katan is a short syllable, we should not expect a sheva na in the next letter. They would thus seem to be reading it as a kametz gadol.

I have not checked what Artscroll does here. Is there an alternative grammatical analysis? Does the Polish pronunciation actually make a distinction between the long and short kametz?

Update: I checked Artscroll and they do it right, with no sheva na.

Deviating From Dikduk To Avoid Negative Omens On Rosh Hashana

A great Magen Avraham in hilchot rosh haShana, in סימן תקפב ס"ק ד ד

אין מחזירין - ואפי' רצה להחזיר אסור בת"ה סי' קמ"ד ועי' סי' ק"ז (ד"מ), זכרנו כתבנו בחטף קמ"ץ, בזכרנו לא יאמר לחיים טובי' רק לחיים עד וכתו' לחיים טובים כל וכו' (לבוש) אבל י"א שגם בוכתוב א"א טובי' עד בספר (מט"מ), לחיים הלמ"ד בשב"א ולא בפת"ח דלא לשתמע לא חיים ודוקא בר"ה קפדי' אבל בכל השנ' אומרים השכיבנו לחיים בפת"ח תחת הלמ"ד ע"פ דקדוק דכשהשב"א באה בתחיל' התיב' באותיות שאינן אח"הע קורין בפת"ח (ב"ח מט"מ) ועמ"ש סי' ח', שהשלטן בקמץ תחת שי"ן שני, ואין לומ' באהב' מקרא קדש רק יום תרועה מקרא קדש, ודברך אמת ואין לומר מלכנו, וכופלין לעילא בכל הקדישים שאומרים (כ"ז במנהגים
ולבוש וב"ח

Thus, the word lechaim should be pronounced with a sheva under the lamed and not with a patach, even though in general, such as in Hashkiveinu, we say it with a patach, according to the rules of dikduk that when the sheva occurs at the beginning of a word on letters that are not gutturals, we read it with a patach. (Based on the Bach.)

The reason for avoiding the grammatically correct patach sound here is that it should not sound like lo chaim, such that it is almost as if we are saying (chas veshalom) "remember us not for life." Thus, he would have us stray from dikduk in order to not give rise to an improper implication, but particularly on Rosh Hashana.

The particular dikduk at issue, though, is one with which I am unfamiliar. It might help to note that the Magen Avraham was Rabbi Avraham Abele Gombiner, a 17th century Polish rabbi, so he is noting Polish (Galician) pronunciation patterns of Hebrew. The Bach, to whom he refers for the dikduk, is Rav Yoel Sirkis, 1561-1640, and also a Polish rabbi.

I am also unsure if he is talking about whether, even in written text, there would be a patach where he claims, or whether it would be written as sheva but just pronounced as patach. After all, in describing it, he writes לחיים הלמ"ד בשב"א ולא בפת"ח דלא לשתמע לא חיים ודוקא בר"ה קפדי' אבל בכל השנ' אומרים השכיבנו לחיים בפת"ח תחת הלמ"ד ע"פ דקדוק, which has strong connotations of the actual vowel under the letter. But he might just be using this as an indication of pronunciation. The end portion, where he cited the principle of dikduk at play, seems to make it clear that there is an actual sheva underneath the letter, but that it is just being pronounced as patach. Thus, ע"פ דקדוק דכשהשב"א באה בתחיל' התיב' באותיות שאינן אח"הע קורין בפת"ח.

I would offer the following interpretation, and welcome further insights in the comment section:

He is not speaking of an actual patach being written in. Indeed, in many cases we have transformation of sheva to full patach. This is due to influence of a chataf patach under the guttural which follows. Since a chataf patach counts as a sheva na, and we cannot have two sheva nas in a row, we upgrade the sheva in the first letter to a full vowel, and specifically the full version of the chataf in the next letter. lechaim is not a good example of this because there is a full patach under the chet, and not a chataf patach. Furthermore, the grammatical principle being cited is one which appears to exist in all letters, regardless of context.

Rather, I believe that he is speaking of a different rule. In some communities, they pronounce (or pronounced) all sheva nas as if they were chataf patachs. And we already know that consistently across the board, a sheva na under a guttural is pronounced as a chataf patach. The grammatical, phonological principle of the Bach appears to be that of course, a sheva under a guttural in the beginning of a word would be pronounced as a patach (that is, as a chataf patach, but who says they make a distinction in vowel length). The chiddush is that for all other letters besides gutturals, even though if a sheva na appeared under it in the rest of the word it would be pronounced in its normal way, as a sheva na, in this particular context of being in the beginning of the word, it is also pronounced as patach (or chataf patach). A slightly variant explanation is that they indeed pronounce chataf patachs, but would only pronounce it under a guttural, while under any other letter it will be a full patach.

It would be illuminating to see the full list of grammatical rules of the Bach, such that we could make a better determination.

Not that this matters to us, since we (or at least I) do not pronounce this as a patach or chataf patach.

Non-Halachic "Pegam"

The Kvetcher picks up on a topic being discussed on several blogs, the chareidi principal who purportedly disallowed Sefardi kids in his school, as being "damaged goods," in this particular case a kid who was 1/4 Sefardi. (This might not be genealogical issue, but rather a hashkafic issue for him.) He links it to the issue of Ben Niddah-ism, which is problematic for allowing baalei teshuva to marry.

It strikes me that non-halachic "pegam" has a long history in that we can even read it into the story of Ruth the Moabitess. As the pasuk states in Ruth 4:

ה וַיֹּאמֶר בֹּעַז, בְּיוֹם-קְנוֹתְךָ הַשָּׂדֶה מִיַּד נָעֳמִי; וּמֵאֵת רוּת הַמּוֹאֲבִיָּה אֵשֶׁת-הַמֵּת, קניתי (קָנִיתָ)--לְהָקִים שֵׁם-הַמֵּת, עַל-נַחֲלָתוֹ.	5 Then said Boaz: 'What day thou buyest the field of the hand of Naomi--hast thou also bought of Ruth the Moabitess, the wife of the dead, to raise up the name of the dead upon his inheritance?'
ו וַיֹּאמֶר הַגֹּאֵל, לֹא אוּכַל לגאול- (לִגְאָל-) לִי--פֶּן-אַשְׁחִית, אֶת-נַחֲלָתִי; גְּאַל-לְךָ אַתָּה אֶת-גְּאֻלָּתִי, כִּי לֹא-אוּכַל לִגְאֹל.	6 And the near kinsman said: 'I cannot redeem it for myself, lest I mar mine own inheritance; take thou my right of redemption on thee; for I cannot redeem it.'--

What is this marring of inheritance, or marring of heritage? Rashi explains:

lest I mar my heritage my offspring, like (Ps. 127:3): “Behold the heritage of the Lord is sons,” to give my offspring a stigma, as it is said (Deut. 23: 4): “An Ammonite or a Moabite shall not enter the congregation of the Lord,” but he erred by [not interpreting it as] “an Ammonite but not an Ammonitess.”

Rashi thus interprets this as a assuming that this is an halachic error. We may further interpret this as knowledge of this halachic conclusion but adopting the stringent non-halachic position anyway because, when it comes to pegam, people do that.

Update: Just to clarify, I know many people who have absolutely no problem dating and marrying baalei teshuva because of a problem of "ben-nidda-ism." But just as surely, I have heard of/encountered people who will not.

Suspected Child Molesters As Teachers

There is an important Mishna, and related gemara, in Kiddushin 82a:

דף פב, א משנה לא ילמד אדם רווק סופרים ולא תלמד אשה סופרים רבי אלעזר אומר אף מי שאין לו אשה לא ילמד סופרים ר' יהודה אומר לא ירעה רווק בהמה ולא יישנו שני רווקין בטלית אחת וחכמים מתירים:

דף פב, א גמרא מאי טעמא אילימא משום ינוקי והתניא אמרו לו לר' יהודה לא נחשדו ישראל על משכב זכור ולא על הבהמה אלא רווק משום אמהתא דינוקי אשה משום אבהתא דינוקי

Mishna:
A bachelor should not teach children, nor should a woman teach children.
Rabbi Eleazar says: Also one who does not {presently} have a wife should not teach children.
Rabbi Yehuda says: A bachelor should not graze animals, nor should two bachelors sleep under one cloak.
And the Sages permit.

Gemara:
What is the reason {for prohibiting bachelors teaching}? If you say because of the children {that they are suspect of sleeping with} -- but they learnt {in a brayta}: They said to Rabbi Yehuda: Israel is not suspect on sodomy, nor on bestiality. Rather, a bachelor because of the mothers of the children; a woman because of the fathers of the children {who come to drop them off and pick them up from school}.

Thus, the Tanna Kamma states that bachelors and women should not teach children. This Tanna Kamma is presumably identical to the Chachamim who argue with Rabbi Yehuda in the end of the Mishna. Yet those same Sages, in a brayta, argue to Rabbi Yehuda that bachelors should be allowed to graze animals, or sleep under a single cloak, since "Israel is not suspect on sodomy, nor on bestiality." Therefore, the reason bachelors and women may not teach children must be something else, and the gemara concludes that it is to avoid fraternizing with parents of the opposite sex.

From the shakla veTarya of the gemara, it appears that if there would indeed be chashad, suspicion, of bachelors that they would commit sodomy, this would be sufficient cause to disallow them from being teachers. Thus, according to Rabbi Yehuda, there is no question why bachelors should not be teachers. However, we are trying to understand the Tanna Kamma. Yet, in other situations where there is indeed genuine chashad, of course it makes sense to disallow them from interacting with the children. Therefore, in a case where serious allegations have been made by multiple students, even in the absence of valid witnesses (or to cite one case, where there was no penetration), there would be chashad and we may well say that they should not be teachers any more. The Chachamim were just saying that Israel in general are not suspect on sodomy, and being a confirmed bachelor should not be sufficient to remove him from that general category.

Where in the world does the gemara get this alternative cause? From the continuation of the Mishna, though in our Bavli it is separated by a piece of gemara. That continuation in the Mishna is:

כל שעסקיו עם הנשים לא יתיחד עם הנשים

It is therefore easy to extrapolate from that the problem is fraternizing with women.

However, I do not believe that this is the correct interpretation of our Mishna, and would offer an alternative.

The Sages permit bachelors to graze animals and to sleep together under one cloak, because, as the brayta says, as Israelites they are not suspected of sodomy. But they say that bachelors and women, and according to Rabbi Eleazar, men who do not have a wife, may not be teachers. Why is this so? Are they not free of suspicion of sodomy?

I would proffer a few answers:

1. Bachelors are not suspected of sodomy, but they are indeed suspected of pederasty -- that is, sleeping with young boys. In ancient times, and in modern times as well, these are two different things. Thus, Greek men would sleep with women and young boys. And it often occurred in an educational structure, as a ritual part of education. Citing again,
   

   Pederastic relationships were dyadic mentorships. These mentorships were sanctioned by the state, and consecrated by the religious establishment. See Mythology of same-sex love. The pederastic relationship also had to be approved by the boy's father. Boys entered into such relationships in their teens, around the same age that Greek girls were given in marriage. The mentor was expected to teach the young man or to see to his education, and to give him certain appropriate ceremonial gifts.

2. Bachelors are not suspected of sodomy, and in usual cases are not suspected of pederasty, but a bachelor who seeks out specifically the profession of teacher would indeed be suspected of pederasty.
   
   
3. Bachelors are not suspected of sodomy in general. However, the protection of innocent children is such an important aim that, while the slight chashad would not be sufficient to disallow work with animals or sleeping under a single cloak, this slight chashad would be sufficient to disallow teaching of children.
   

If so, bachelors, women, and perhaps men who do not {presently} have wives should not teach male children for the immediately obvious reason, based on the context in which it appears -- so that they should not sleep with the children. And we may expand this set to include any teacher who is seriously suspected of inappropriate behavior.

While discussing this sugya, we may as well analyze the parallel Yerushalmi, in Kiddushin 47b:

ולא ילמד רווק סופרים ולא תלמד אשה סופרים רבי אליעזר אומר אף מי שאין לו אשה לא ילמד סופרים ר' יהודה אומר לא ירעה רווק את הבהמה ולא יישנו שני רווקים בטלית אחד וחכמים מתירין

It is Rabbi Eliezer rather than Rabbi Eleazar.
The gemara on this {48a} states:

פיס'. ולא ילמד רווק סופרים ולא תלמד אשה סופרים כו'.
תני ר' אלעזר אומר אף מי שיש לו אשה ובנים. ואינן עמו באותו מקום לא ילמד סופרים.
ר' יודן בי רבי ישמעאל עבד חד מתניין הכן.
פיס'. ר' יהודה אומר לא ירעה רווק את הבהמה ולא יישנו שני רווקין בטלית אחד וחכמים מתירין.
יאות אמר ר' יודה. מה טעמא דרבנין. חס ושלום לא נחשדו ישראל לא על הזכור ולא על הבהמה.
והתנינן לא ילמד רווק סופרים. משם שאמו באה עמו אחותו באה עמו

This has the same discussion as in the Bavli. Rabbi Eleazar's position, cited in a brayta, is that even if he has a wife and children, but they are not with him in that particular place, he should not teach children.

Why mention "and children" in this brayta? It would strongly seem that suspicion of homosexual tendencies is at issue, despite the conclusion of the gemara. You might think that having a wife and kids would take him out of the realm of suspicion, for not only does he have a wife, but she is not a beard, for he has fathered children by her. Even so, when his wife is not present, his yetzer may get the better of him.

We could also read it according to the gemara's conclusion. Rabbi Eleazar's reason is that the issue is not suspicion of sodomy, and so the existence of his wife and children helps nothing. Rather, since he is presently unattached, he may flirt with the mothers bringing their children.

The Yerushalmi confirms and understands Rabbi Yehuda's position about grazing and sleeping under one cloak. Yet, because of a parallel to the Bavli's brayta, that chas veshalom that Israel is not suspect of sodomy or bestiality, what are we to make of the Tanna Kamma's prohibition on a bachelor being a teacher? The Yerushalmi answers that it is because of the mothers and sisters who come along with the child. The Yerushalmi does not make any explicit extension to this being the reason women are not to teach children.

Daf Yomi Yevamot: Begin vs. Permitted

I realize that daf yomi has moved on the Ketubot (and indeed, so has Rif Yomi), but there is a bit of Yevamot material I never had opportunity to post.

Citing from my translation of the Rif:

{Yevamot 116b}

איבעיא להו התירוני להנשא ותנו לי כתובתי מהו
כיון דקאמרה תנו לי כתובה אדעתא דכתובה אתיא או דילמא כל מילי דאית ליה לאיניש קאמר להו בבי דינא
ואם תימצי לומר כל מילי דאית ליה לאיניש קאמר להו בבי דינא תנו לי כתובתי והתירוני להנשא מהו
הכא ודאי אדעתא דכתובה אתאי ולא מהימנא או דילמא משום דלא ידעה במאי משתריא מאי
תיקו
ועבדינן לחומרא

It was a question to them: "permit me to remarry and grant me my ketuba," what?
Since she said "give me the ketuba," she is coming for the sake of the ketuba? Or perhaps every matter that a person has, he will state it before Bet Din?
And if you say that every matter that a person has, he will state it before Bet Din, "grant me my ketuba and permit me to remarry" {in that order}, what? Here, is it certain that she came for the sake of the ketuba and therefore is not believed? Or perhaps because she does not know with what she becomes permitted? What?
The question stands.
And we conduct ourselves stringently.

I would offer another potential translation above. The standard translation of או דילמא משום דלא ידעה במאי משתריא appears to be "Or perhaps because she does not know with what she becomes permitted." That is, perhaps she has the misconception that via the granting of the ketuba, she is now permitted to be married.

I would note that tishri, or tishrei, the month, is called this because it means "to begin," and this is the beginning of the year. Here as well, she knows that she is supposed to lay out all her claims before bet din, but does not know which among her claims she is supposed to begin with. So, do we say that even though she mentioned remarriage, since she started with the ketuba that is her only real interest? Or, do we say that she is flustered in court and does not know how to present her case, and does not know with what to begin, לא ידעה במאי משתריא, and happened to choose to begin with the monetary aspect of the case, but we should not make a big deal out of it.

The Danger of Bashert

We read in Kohelet 7:

כז רְאֵה זֶה מָצָאתִי, אָמְרָה קֹהֶלֶת; אַחַת לְאַחַת, לִמְצֹא חֶשְׁבּוֹן.	27 Behold, this have I found, saith Koheleth, adding one thing to another, to find out the account;
כח אֲשֶׁר עוֹד-בִּקְשָׁה נַפְשִׁי, וְלֹא מָצָאתִי: אָדָם אֶחָד מֵאֶלֶף, מָצָאתִי--וְאִשָּׁה בְכָל-אֵלֶּה, לֹא מָצָאתִי.	28 which yet my soul sought, but I found not; one man among a thousand have I found; but a woman among all those have I not found.

I would darshen this as follows: If you try to only find one woman among these, you will not find. And finding one man among a thousand is also quite difficult. But that is because you are trying to find the one in a thousand, rather than the one who will complement you.

The fact of the matter is that bashert is a matter of dispute among Chazal, whether 40 days before birth it is set, or whether it is according to one's actions, and whether someone else can preempt. The gemara resolves a lot of this with a harmonization about first match and second match, but I do not really buy into that. (I think it is really a machloket.)

Even if one accepts bashert as a phenomenon, this is a phenomenon which is in the hands of Heaven, and not in the hands of man, to find this one bashert or else miss out. If one tries to find אַחַת לְאַחַת לִמְצֹא חֶשְׁבּוֹן, he may very well not be successful.

Rather, a man and a woman each try to find an appropriate person to marry. Look for a person who is kind, who complements you, who will be an ally in life, who you are attracted to, who you can or do love. Then, while dating and then within the marriage, work to make the relationship work. Do chessed for the other person. Figure out what you can do to help and support the other person. That is man's role. Since it is fated to be, this person is your bashert, who God, in his role, sent to you.

In past generations, there were often arranged marriages. Yet those people ended up together. Thus, it was who they were bashert to marry.

Focusing on bashert can drive you nuts. Should I marry this person? He/she has all these positive qualities, but is he/she the best possible match? After all, maybe the one who was "meant-to-be" will come by later. Let us see the next one, and decide. The next person is also nice, but in retrospect, the person I was dating three times ago was nicer in various respects, so why should I "settle" for this one? This is the danger on focusing on bashert.

Perhaps a better attitude would be not to find the "best" one, but to find someone who you really like/love, who is a good person, and with whom you can make a nice Jewish home and a wonderful Jewish life with. Then, if bashert is a real phenomenon, this is your bashert, but it is God's assignment, not your own.

This is of course my own opinion, and what do I know?

Daf Yomi Ketubot: Al Yedei Chuppa veKiddushin - What Is A Post-Talmudic Nusach Doing In Our Gemara?

Here is an interesting case of girsology and possible post-Talmudic addition. The gemara in Ketubot 7b records the nusach of the blessing of betrothal:

ברכת האירוסין מאי מברך רבין בר רב אדא ורבה בר רב אדא תרוייהו משמיה דרב יהודה אמרי בא"י אמ"ה אשר קדשנו במצותיו וצונו על העריות ואסר לנו את הארוסות והתיר לנו את הנשואות על ידי חופה וקדושין

רב אחא בריה דרבא מסיים בה משמיה דרב יהודה בא"י מקדש ישראל על ידי חופה וקדושין
מאן דלא חתים מידי דהוה אברכת פירות ואברכת מצות ומאן דחתים מידי דהוה אקידושא

[As to] the benediction of betrothal — what does one say? — Rabin b. R. Adda and Rabbah son of R. Adda both said in the name of Rab Judah: Blessed art Thou, O Lord our God, King of the Universe, who has sanctified us by his commandments and has commanded us concerning the forbidden relations and has forbidden unto us the betrothed and has allowed unto us the wedded through [the marriage] canopy and sanctification. R. Aha 'the son of Raba, concludes it in the name of Rab Judah, [with the words]: Blessed art Thou, O Lord, who sanctifies Israel through canopy and sanctification. He who does not seal [holds that] it is analogous to the blessing over fruits and to the benediction [said on performing] religious commandments. And he who seals [holds that] it is analogous to the kiddush

Of slight issue is the ending of the blessing -- בא"י מקדש ישראל על ידי חופה וקדושין -- Blessed art Thou, O Lord, who sanctifies Israel through canopy and sanctification.

In the Rif, we do not have this full ending. Instead, we have בא"י מקדש ישראל -- Blessed art Thou, O Lord, who sanctifies Israel. And the same from Rav Achai Gaon. And so with the Rosh:

אשר קדשנו במצותיו וצונו על העריות ואסר לנו את הארוסות והתיר לנו את הנשואות על ידי חופה וקידושין ברוך מקדש ישראל וכו' ונהגו האידנא מקדש ישראל על ידי חופה וקידושין.

Thus, he makes it clear that the nusach of the blessing did not include על ידי חופה וקדושין, for that is the nusach that he had then. The "etc." is presumably the continuation of the gemara, as the Rif would continue. The obvious difference between the blessing as formulated by the gemara and as practiced in the time of the Rosh would seem to be the time division between betrothal and nuptials, of a year. Since there is no chuppa present, some explain, it would be odd to include it in the closing. Once they are placed together, with the betrothal under the bridal canopy, it is more fitting.

But if this is so, what is this girsa of the blessing doing in our gemara? Is this not a post-Talmudic nusach? This might be another example to late editing, where someone filled in on the margins the ending of the blessing as practiced later, and it thus entered into our Talmudic manuscripts.

Might be find another answer? I would propose the following: The closing we have in our girsa makes sense, since it echoes the text of the body with its Al Yedei Chuppa veKiddushin. Sure, Rosh and Rif and Rav Achai Gaon had this nusach, but there was a parallel nusach of which they were unaware. This early nusach formed the basis of the nusach that the Rosh witnessed in his day. Yet, there was a distinction that the Rif witnessed between his own Talmudic text and the nusach of the blessing in his day. His assumption was that, rather than being a girsological difference, somehow the nusach had changed from the time of the gemara, such that he would label it haIdna.