Friday, May 19, 2006

Does Inclusion of Irrelevant Details Show the Gospels to Be Non-Mythological?

An interesting article this morn over at OpinionJournal on the Taste Page, by Joseph Loconte, sparked in part by "the da Vinci Codes." The article is called "Debunking the Debunkers," and discusses C.S. Lewis' debunking of the debunkers in his own day who claimed the gospels were myth. From the article:
...
In a short yet brilliant 1959 essay, "Fern Seeds and Elephants," Lewis debunked the debunkers of his own day--those who held that the Gospels were the product of myth, legend and outright deception. He began by drawing attention to the "shattering immediacy" of the Gospel stories, the often brash realism of Jesus' encounters with ordinary people.
Mark's Gospel, for example, sets the scene of Jesus' arrest this way: "A young man, wearing nothing but a linen garment, was following Jesus. When they seized him, he fled naked, leaving his garment behind." We're never told who the man was or what happened to him. Luke describes a tax collector named Zacchaeus, who was too short to see over the crowds following Jesus. "So he ran ahead," Luke reports, "and climbed a sycamore tree to see him." It's irrelevant to what follows. Likewise, the Gospel of John tells of a woman caught in adultery and dragged before Jesus, who "bent down and started to write on the ground with his finger." Nothing, absolutely nothing, comes of it.

Any serious reader of the Gospels knows that their many references to the divinity of Jesus are thoroughly embedded in these earthy details. Here is a narrative style that anticipates the modern, realistic novel. "I have been reading poems, vision-literature, legends, myths all my life," Lewis wrote. "I know what they are like. I know that not one of them is like this."
The first example seems to be akin to an open canon approach. Since we hear of this man only here and nowhere else, he does not occur anywhere else (naturally), and so the inclusion of this random person, for no purpose whatsover, lends credence to the idea that an actual historical story is being related. The same for the other examples. Why have him draw in the dirt? Why have a short man climb a tree, when we hear nothing further about him.

This does not seem to me particularly convincing. The first case in particular, of the young man who abandons his garment is eerily reminiscent of Joseph when flees Potiphar's wife, leaving his garment in her hand. Genesis 39:

יא וַיְהִי כְּהַיּוֹם הַזֶּה, וַיָּבֹא הַבַּיְתָה לַעֲשׂוֹת מְלַאכְתּוֹ; וְאֵין אִישׁ מֵאַנְשֵׁי הַבַּיִת, שָׁם--בַּבָּיִת. 11 And it came to pass on a certain day, when he went into the house to do his work, and there was none of the men of the house there within,
יב וַתִּתְפְּשֵׂהוּ בְּבִגְדוֹ לֵאמֹר, שִׁכְבָה עִמִּי; וַיַּעֲזֹב בִּגְדוֹ בְּיָדָהּ, וַיָּנָס וַיֵּצֵא הַחוּצָה. 12 that she caught him by his garment, saying: 'Lie with me.' And he left his garment in her hand, and fled, and got him out.
יג וַיְהִי, כִּרְאוֹתָהּ, כִּי-עָזַב בִּגְדוֹ, בְּיָדָהּ; וַיָּנָס, הַחוּצָה. 13 And it came to pass, when she saw that he had left his garment in her hand, and was fled forth,
יד וַתִּקְרָא לְאַנְשֵׁי בֵיתָהּ, וַתֹּאמֶר לָהֶם לֵאמֹר, רְאוּ הֵבִיא לָנוּ אִישׁ עִבְרִי, לְצַחֶק בָּנוּ: בָּא אֵלַי לִשְׁכַּב עִמִּי, וָאֶקְרָא בְּקוֹל גָּדוֹל. 14 that she called unto the men of her house, and spoke unto them, saying: 'See, he hath brought in a Hebrew unto us to mock us; he came in unto me to lie with me, and I cried with a loud voice.
טו וַיְהִי כְשָׁמְעוֹ, כִּי-הֲרִימֹתִי קוֹלִי וָאֶקְרָא; וַיַּעֲזֹב בִּגְדוֹ אֶצְלִי, וַיָּנָס וַיֵּצֵא הַחוּצָה. 15 And it came to pass, when he heard that I lifted up my voice and cried, that he left his garment by me, and fled, and got him out.'
טז וַתַּנַּח בִּגְדוֹ, אֶצְלָהּ, עַד-בּוֹא אֲדֹנָיו, אֶל-בֵּיתוֹ. 16 And she laid up his garment by her, until his master came home.
I would argue that it is a common tendency to echo details of Biblical (="Old Testament") stories, given a viewpoint of the Bible as a setup for the sequel. One of the clearest examples of this is the placing in Pontius Pilate's mouth words from the Biblical eglah arufa ceremony, and having him wash his hands, just as in the eglah arufa ceremony. Thus, that a young man (just as Joseph is a young man) flees the scene, leaving his garment in their hands, is not unexpected, and is not an irrelevant detail. Just because the import of a specific action is not immediately understandable to the modern reader does not mean that it had no relevance to the ancient reader.

Similarly with drawing in the ground. Who knows what the relevance of this action was back then. To me, at least, it is a critical element of the story. It seems meant to show nonchalance. He is occupying himself with other matters, craftily getting out of the "trap" set for him by the questioners. Is he going to agree with Leviticus 20:10 (though perhaps a very literal and non-Pharisee interpretation of it) and condemn the woman to death? Or will he nullify the Law, making clear that he rejects Mosaic law? Thus he draws on the ground initially rather than answering them, seemingly occupied with his own matters, and only answers when pressed. Thus (John chapter 8),
"But Jesus stooped down, and with his finger wrote on the ground, as though he heard them not. So when they continued asking Him, He lifted up Himself, and said unto them, He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her. And again He stooped down, and wrote on the ground."
It is clear from context that this act is done in both instances to show nonchalance. In the latter case, he pretends to agree to the Mosaic law, and so appears unconcerned as they go off to stone her. For he knows that there is none without sin.

Of course we don't find out what he is writing. The contents of the writing is in fact irrelevant to the story. But the fact that he wrote with his finger on the ground, an act which within the cultural norms of the day showed nonchalance, is absolutely relevant.

The story with the short man who ascends the sycamore might have some metaphorical meaning, or else simply shows how much Zacharias wanted to see Jesus. This calls to mind a similar story told about Hillel, who was poor and could not afford the fee to enter the study hall (imposed to provide for the upkeep of the study hall.) Therefore he ascended on the skylight and listened in, and one time nearly froze to death when it snowed upon him. The story of ascending the sycamore presents the image of a devoted follower, and thus certainly is not irrelevant in terms of narrative role.

haftarat Emor - Yechezkel the Torah Scholar, Yechezkel the Prophet

In the haftarah of Emor, found in Yechezkel 44, we find a verse that appears to contradict verses in parshat Emor (or at the very least our interpretation of it).

The halacha is roughly that a regular kohen may marry any woman from any tribe of Israel who is not a prostitute (with specific definitions of this), nor may he marry a divorcee. The kohen gadol, in addition to this, must only marry a virgin (or perhaps/or in addition a woman under a certain age) of any tribe and may not marry a divorcee or a widow.

כב וְאַלְמָנָה, וּגְרוּשָׁה, לֹא-יִקְחוּ לָהֶם, לְנָשִׁים: כִּי אִם-בְּתוּלֹת, מִזֶּרַע בֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל, וְהָאַלְמָנָה אֲשֶׁר תִּהְיֶה אַלְמָנָה, מִכֹּהֵן יִקָּחוּ. 22 Neither shall they take for their wives a widow, nor her that is put away; but they shall take virgins of the seed of the house of Israel, or a widow that is the widow of a priest.
Who is this verse about? Can it be about the kohen gadol? No, for it states that these may marry widows. Can it be about a regular kohen? Why then the insistence on the widow of a kohen?

There are ways of making this work - an extra chumra taken upon them, or some other solution - see the relevant gemara. We might present (and others have) other possibilities.

In Vayikra 21, we have two sections of relevant verses. The first:

ז אִשָּׁה זֹנָה וַחֲלָלָה לֹא יִקָּחוּ, וְאִשָּׁה גְּרוּשָׁה מֵאִישָׁהּ לֹא יִקָּחוּ: כִּי-קָדֹשׁ הוּא, לֵאלֹהָיו. 7 They shall not take a woman that is a harlot, or profaned; neither shall they take a woman put away from her husband; for he is holy unto his God.
This gives us the law that a regular kohein may not marry a divorcee.

There is a section about the kohein gadol which ends Ani Hashem. Then, we have:

יג וְהוּא, אִשָּׁה בִבְתוּלֶיהָ יִקָּח. 13 And he shall take a wife in her virginity.
יד אַלְמָנָה וּגְרוּשָׁה וַחֲלָלָה זֹנָה, אֶת-אֵלֶּה לֹא יִקָּח: כִּי אִם-בְּתוּלָה מֵעַמָּיו, יִקַּח אִשָּׁה. 14 A widow, or one divorced, or a profaned woman, or a harlot, these shall he not take; but a virgin of his own people shall he take to wife.
טו וְלֹא-יְחַלֵּל זַרְעוֹ, בְּעַמָּיו: כִּי אֲנִי יְהוָה, מְקַדְּשׁוֹ. {ס} 15 And he shall not profane his seed among his people; for I am the LORD who sanctify him. {S}
The simplest explanation, in light of the fact that this follows the law of kohein gadol, and the law for marriage of kohein hedyot was already specified, and the fact that there is no petucha or setuma separating this from the section of kohein gadol, and the fact that this is specified in the singular, while the previous section was specified in the plural -- is that this law is only to the kohein gadol.

Thus, a kohein gadol may not marry a widow or divorcee, but only a virgin (or young woman) from his nation - kosher Israelites.

Yet we can just begin to understand Yechezkel's point. Namely, what is the meaning of מֵעַמָּיו? If we take this as from the tribe of kohanim, then this matches the point that a kohein gadol may only marry a virgin for the tribe of kohanim.

Turning now to the common kohein, we see he has a relaxation of this requirement. He may marry a virgin from any tribe, since no such restriction is mentioned. Thus Yechezkel may spell out כִּי אִם-בְּתוּלֹת, מִזֶּרַע בֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל , as opposed to מֵעַמָּיו. Now, perhaps this exemption is only as regards virgins. The kohein gadol was prohibited from taking a widow (in addition to divorcee) from amav, his people, the tribe of kohanim. But this is a restriction on only him, so regular kohanim are exempt. Yet we might assume meamav distributes for the kohein gadol. That is, from those women who are in his tribe, כִּי אִם-בְּתוּלָה, his is only allowed the betulah.

Other kohanim would be allowed others. Which ones? Well, for betula, we relax meamav, and for the others -- namely almana (since gerusha is explicitly ruled out earlier) we relax the "only betula" restriction.

And which almana -- widow - is considered from his tribe? We see elsewhere that marriage changes tribal affiliations for women - in terms of ability to eat terumah, for example. Therefore, only a widow of another kohein is from amav.

Thus, in this -- or some similar -- way, Yechezkel can be in accord with our parsha in Emor.

However, we now have a problem. Namely, this does not accord with the halachic explanation of the pesukim!

One answer - we are Pharisees, and the derash level of Emor and Yechezkel is what we consider truth. Not some literal interpretation which ignores the important hermeneutical rules from which truth in Torah/Nach may be derived. On a derash level, we do not interpret either Emor or Yechezkel as outlined above and there is no contradiction. See the gemara. There is merit to this approach, and perhaps other approaches should be considered heretical. (A later post on this, and the very nature of derash and peshat, and how our understanding of such terminology has deviated, is in the works -- but who knows when...)

For the rest of this devar, I will omit some explicit Scriptural passages and gemaras, since it is quite late, and I need to get some sleep.

Assuming that Yechezkel meant what I outlined above, what are we to do? Is Yechezkel wrong and halacha right? Is halacha right and halacha wrong?

My solution, in brief, is this. In any generation (perhaps up to Rav Ashi, perhaps up to Rabbi), the Torah may be interpreted. The law follows this interpretation. (See Devarim 17:8ff).
ח כִּי יִפָּלֵא מִמְּךָ דָבָר לַמִּשְׁפָּט, בֵּין-דָּם לְדָם בֵּין-דִּין לְדִין וּבֵין נֶגַע לָנֶגַע--דִּבְרֵי רִיבֹת, בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ: וְקַמְתָּ וְעָלִיתָ--אֶל-הַמָּקוֹם, אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בּוֹ. 8 If there arise a matter too hard for thee in judgment, between blood and blood, between plea and plea, and between stroke and stroke, even matters of controversy within thy gates; then shalt thou arise, and get thee up unto the place which the LORD thy God shall choose.
ט וּבָאתָ, אֶל-הַכֹּהֲנִים הַלְוִיִּם, וְאֶל-הַשֹּׁפֵט, אֲשֶׁר יִהְיֶה בַּיָּמִים הָהֵם; וְדָרַשְׁתָּ וְהִגִּידוּ לְךָ, אֵת דְּבַר הַמִּשְׁפָּט. 9 And thou shall come unto the priests the Levites, and unto the judge that shall be in those days; and thou shalt inquire; and they shall declare unto thee the sentence of judgment.
י וְעָשִׂיתָ, עַל-פִּי הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר יַגִּידוּ לְךָ, מִן-הַמָּקוֹם הַהוּא, אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר יְהוָה; וְשָׁמַרְתָּ לַעֲשׂוֹת, כְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר יוֹרוּךָ. 10 And thou shalt do according to the tenor of the sentence, which they shall declare unto thee from that place which the LORD shall choose; and thou shalt observe to do according to all that they shall teach thee.
יא עַל-פִּי הַתּוֹרָה אֲשֶׁר יוֹרוּךָ, וְעַל-הַמִּשְׁפָּט אֲשֶׁר-יֹאמְרוּ לְךָ--תַּעֲשֶׂה: לֹא תָסוּר, מִן-הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר-יַגִּידוּ לְךָ--יָמִין וּשְׂמֹאל. 11 According to the law which they shall teach thee, and according to the judgment which they shall tell thee, thou shalt do; thou shalt not turn aside from the sentence which they shall declare unto thee, to the right hand, nor to the left.
יב וְהָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר-יַעֲשֶׂה בְזָדוֹן, לְבִלְתִּי שְׁמֹעַ אֶל-הַכֹּהֵן הָעֹמֵד לְשָׁרֶת שָׁם אֶת-יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ, אוֹ, אֶל-הַשֹּׁפֵט--וּמֵת הָאִישׁ הַהוּא, וּבִעַרְתָּ הָרָע מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל. 12 And the man that doeth presumptuously, in not hearkening unto the priest that standeth to minister there before the LORD thy God, or unto the judge, even that man shall die; and thou shalt exterminate the evil from Israel.
In Yechezkel's time, this was the law. Indeed, the very next statement of Yechezkel, in perek 44, is
כג וְאֶת-עַמִּי יוֹרוּ, בֵּין קֹדֶשׁ לְחֹל; וּבֵין-טָמֵא לְטָהוֹר, יוֹדִעֻם. 23 And they shall teach My people the difference between the holy and the common, and cause them to discern between the unclean and the clean.
Thus, just as in Devarim 17, they have a role of determining the halacha.

As Chazal point out, ובָאתָ, אֶל-הַכֹּהֲנִים הַלְוִיִּם, וְאֶל-הַשֹּׁפֵט, אֲשֶׁר יִהְיֶה בַּיָּמִים הָהֵם - each court in its generation. Yiftach in his generation is like Shmuel in his generation. And it need not be the kohen but may be the general shofet, judge.

Any legitimate interpretation has the force of law and the Divine stamp of approval. Eilu veEilu Divrei Elokim Chayim. Yechezkel is entitled to his interpretation and we are entitled to ours.

But what of the fact that Yechezkel was saying this prophetically? Shouldn't that trump any later alternative interpretation?

No. Lo Bashamayim Hi. To cite Devarim 30:12:

יא כִּי הַמִּצְוָה הַזֹּאת, אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי מְצַוְּךָ הַיּוֹם--לֹא-נִפְלֵאת הִוא מִמְּךָ, וְלֹא רְחֹקָה הִוא. 11 For this commandment which I command thee this day, it is not too hard for thee, neither is it far off.
יב לֹא בַשָּׁמַיִם, הִוא: לֵאמֹר, מִי יַעֲלֶה-לָּנוּ הַשָּׁמַיְמָה וְיִקָּחֶהָ לָּנוּ, וְיַשְׁמִעֵנוּ אֹתָהּ, וְנַעֲשֶׂנָּה. 12 It is not in heaven, that thou shouldest say: 'Who shall go up for us to heaven, and bring it unto us, and make us to hear it, that we may do it?'
It is not in Heaven, and post-Mosaic prophetic messages do not determine the law. This is not a matter of adding to the law or detracting from it via a prophet - the prohibition against which involves other verses. No. Even where this is a clarifying statement, perhaps we do not listen to what is determined in the heavenly academy, for the Torah is no longer in heaven, but in the hands of man to interpret a la Devarim 17. Thus, in the case of the Tanur shel Achnai, even though a bat kol (literally an "echo" rather than a voice, from on high) stated that the halacha was like Rabbi Eliezer, this was rejected because the Torah is not in heaven. (See Bava Metzia 59b).

Yechezkel has authority as a prophet, but as regards statements about Torah, he has as much authority as any other sage, and his interpretations of law must be considered and debated within the halachic (midrashic) framework and then accepted or rejected. Thus, prophetic law is allowed to differ with current, Tanaaitic, or Amoraic law. And halacha kebatrai - the halacha is like the later ones.

Now, this seems to be against the current in the gemara which seeks to harmonize many things in Nach with Pharisaic/Rabbinic interpretion of Biblical law. Yet we may attribute this to a general trend/desire to harmonize apparent contradictions in Bible and in Oral Tradition. Also, to the trend/desire of a type that states the Avot kept the Torah even including Rabbinic enactments (an opinion not universally held by Chazal, BTW).

parshat Emor and parshat Matot: No Punishment For Cursing? And Excusing The Woman Who Vows

The following is just a creative endeavor without the bounds of halachic and narrative drash. Not to be taken halacha lemaaseh. The story of the meqallel - Vayikra 24:10-12:
י וַיֵּצֵא, בֶּן-אִשָּׁה יִשְׂרְאֵלִית, וְהוּא בֶּן-אִישׁ מִצְרִי, בְּתוֹךְ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל; וַיִּנָּצוּ, בַּמַּחֲנֶה, בֶּן הַיִּשְׂרְאֵלִית, וְאִישׁ הַיִּשְׂרְאֵלִי. 10 And the son of an Israelitish woman, whose father was an Egyptian, went out among the children of Israel; and the son of the Israelitish woman and a man of Israel strove together in the camp.
יא וַיִּקֹּב בֶּן-הָאִשָּׁה הַיִּשְׂרְאֵלִית אֶת-הַשֵּׁם, וַיְקַלֵּל, וַיָּבִיאוּ אֹתוֹ, אֶל-מֹשֶׁה; וְשֵׁם אִמּוֹ שְׁלֹמִית בַּת-דִּבְרִי, לְמַטֵּה-דָן. 11 And the son of the Israelitish woman blasphemed the Name, and cursed; and they brought him unto Moses. And his mother's name was Shelomith, the daughter of Dibri, of the tribe of Dan.
יב וַיַּנִּיחֻהוּ, בַּמִּשְׁמָר, לִפְרֹשׁ לָהֶם, עַל-פִּי יְהוָה. {פ} 12 And they put him in ward, that it might be declared unto them at the mouth of the LORD. {P}
First off, two salient ambiguities.

The first is what is the meaning of וַיִּקֹּב, and how does it differ from וַיְקַלֵּל? Ibn Ezra gives two possibilities for וַיִּקֹּב. It can mean "specify." Thus, Bemidbar 1:17:
יז וַיִּקַּח מֹשֶׁה, וְאַהֲרֹן, אֵת הָאֲנָשִׁים הָאֵלֶּה, אֲשֶׁר נִקְּבוּ בְּשֵׁמֹת. 17 And Moses and Aaron took these men that are pointed out by name.
or it can mean "curse," as we see by Bilaam, in Bemidbar 23:7-8:
ז וַיִּשָּׂא מְשָׁלוֹ, וַיֹּאמַר: מִן-אֲרָם יַנְחֵנִי בָלָק מֶלֶךְ-מוֹאָב, מֵהַרְרֵי-קֶדֶם--לְכָה אָרָה-לִּי יַעֲקֹב, וּלְכָה זֹעֲמָה יִשְׂרָאֵל. 7 And he took up his parable, and said: From Aram Balak bringeth me, the king of Moab from the mountains of the East: 'Come, curse me Jacob, and come, execrate Israel.'
ח מָה אֶקֹּב, לֹא קַבֹּה אֵל; וּמָה אֶזְעֹם, לֹא זָעַם יְהוָה. 8 How shall I curse, whom God hath not cursed? And how shall I execrate, whom the LORD hath not execrated?
where it stands in place of אָרָה matching זֹעֲמָה in Biblical parallelism.

My personal opinion is that it means both and the verse in deliberately multivalent. However, disregarding that option, it either means to specify the name of God or to curse. The JPS translation chooses the "curse option." Thus, "And the son of the Israelitish woman blasphemed the Name, and cursed." There seems to be repetition between וַיִּקֹּב and וַיְקַלֵּל, but perhaps there are shades of difference. The "specify" option works well because of immediate context -- וַיִּקֹּב בֶּן-הָאִשָּׁה הַיִּשְׂרְאֵלִית אֶת-הַשֵּׁם -- thus, he specifies the Name of God, and then curses. Ibn Ezra suggests both but prefers the "specify" option.

The second salient ambiguity is in the punishment God lays out for cursers and blasphemers. A short while later:
יג וַיְדַבֵּר יְהוָה, אֶל-מֹשֶׁה לֵּאמֹר. 13 And the LORD spoke unto Moses, saying:
יד הוֹצֵא אֶת-הַמְקַלֵּל, אֶל-מִחוּץ לַמַּחֲנֶה, וְסָמְכוּ כָל-הַשֹּׁמְעִים אֶת-יְדֵיהֶם, עַל-רֹאשׁוֹ; וְרָגְמוּ אֹתוֹ, כָּל-הָעֵדָה. 14 'Bring forth him that hath cursed without the camp; and let all that heard him lay their hands upon his head, and let all the congregation stone him.
טו וְאֶל-בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, תְּדַבֵּר לֵאמֹר: אִישׁ אִישׁ כִּי-יְקַלֵּל אֱלֹהָיו, וְנָשָׂא חֶטְאוֹ. 15 And thou shalt speak unto the children of Israel, saying: Whosoever curseth his God shall bear his sin.
טז וְנֹקֵב שֵׁם-יְהוָה מוֹת יוּמָת, רָגוֹם יִרְגְּמוּ-בוֹ כָּל-הָעֵדָה: כַּגֵּר, כָּאֶזְרָח--בְּנָקְבוֹ-שֵׁם, יוּמָת. 16 And he that blasphemeth the name of the LORD, he shall surely be put to death; all the congregation shall certainly stone him; as well the stranger, as the home-born, when he blasphemeth the Name, shall be put to death.
What is the meaning of וְנָשָׂא חֶטְאוֹ? The translation given above is that he shall bear his sin -- meaning that he shall suffer the consequences. Yet it is unclear that this is what this actually means. It can also mean that the sin shall be borne, in the passive. That is, he shall not suffer the consequences. This is the case for other parallel cases in Torah, with similar constructions which are taken in different ways.

nasa is clearly ambiguous, and the Torah makes delicious use of this ambiguity in the narrative of the butler and the baker who related their dreams to Yosef. (See Bereishit 40). To the butler Yosef says:

יג בְּעוֹד שְׁלֹשֶׁת יָמִים, יִשָּׂא פַרְעֹה אֶת-רֹאשֶׁךָ, וַהֲשִׁיבְךָ, עַל-כַּנֶּךָ; וְנָתַתָּ כוֹס-פַּרְעֹה, בְּיָדוֹ, כַּמִּשְׁפָּט הָרִאשׁוֹן, אֲשֶׁר הָיִיתָ מַשְׁקֵהוּ. 13 within yet three days shall Pharaoh lift up thy head, and restore thee unto thine office; and thou shalt give Pharaoh's cup into his hand, after the former manner when thou wast his butler.
while to the butler he says:
יט בְּעוֹד שְׁלֹשֶׁת יָמִים, יִשָּׂא פַרְעֹה אֶת-רֹאשְׁךָ מֵעָלֶיךָ, וְתָלָה אוֹתְךָ, עַל-עֵץ; וְאָכַל הָעוֹף אֶת-בְּשָׂרְךָ, מֵעָלֶיךָ. 19 within yet three days shall Pharaoh lift up thy head from off thee, and shall hang thee on a tree; and the birds shall eat thy flesh from off thee.'
so it is clear that the Author is well aware of the nasa ambiguity, and thus not only ambiguity but deliberate ambiguity and multivalence are possible.

Indeed, by the woman whose husband excuses her vow, we read וְנָשָׂא אֶת-עֲו‍ֹנָהּ. Rashi explains this means the he - the husband - will bear her iniquity. Yet we could also render (as here) that he removes/suspends her iniquity. Or, I would say, reading as a passive, we could render that her iniquity is removed.

Indeed, this is a great place to digress, to parshat Matot. Let us look at the verse in context, in Bamidbar 30:16. The context:

ג אִישׁ כִּי-יִדֹּר נֶדֶר לַיהוָה, אוֹ-הִשָּׁבַע שְׁבֻעָה לֶאְסֹר אִסָּר עַל-נַפְשׁוֹ--לֹא יַחֵל, דְּבָרוֹ: כְּכָל-הַיֹּצֵא מִפִּיו, יַעֲשֶׂה. 3 When a man voweth a vow unto the LORD, or sweareth an oath to bind his soul with a bond, he shall not break his word; he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth.
ד וְאִשָּׁה, כִּי-תִדֹּר נֶדֶר לַיהוָה, וְאָסְרָה אִסָּר בְּבֵית אָבִיהָ, בִּנְעֻרֶיהָ. 4 Also when a woman voweth a vow unto the LORD, and bindeth herself by a bond, being in her father's house, in her youth,
ה וְשָׁמַע אָבִיהָ אֶת-נִדְרָהּ, וֶאֱסָרָהּ אֲשֶׁר אָסְרָה עַל-נַפְשָׁהּ, וְהֶחֱרִישׁ לָהּ, אָבִיהָ--וְקָמוּ, כָּל-נְדָרֶיהָ, וְכָל-אִסָּר אֲשֶׁר-אָסְרָה עַל-נַפְשָׁהּ, יָקוּם. 5 and her father heareth her vow, or her bond wherewith she hath bound her soul, and her father holdeth his peace at her, then all her vows shall stand, and every bond wherewith she hath bound her soul shall stand.
ו וְאִם-הֵנִיא אָבִיהָ אֹתָהּ, בְּיוֹם שָׁמְעוֹ--כָּל-נְדָרֶיהָ וֶאֱסָרֶיהָ אֲשֶׁר-אָסְרָה עַל-נַפְשָׁהּ, לֹא יָקוּם; וַיהוָה, יִסְלַח-לָהּ, כִּי-הֵנִיא אָבִיהָ, אֹתָהּ. 6 But if her father disallow her in the day that he heareth, none of her vows, or of her bonds wherewith she hath bound her soul, shall stand; and the LORD will forgive her, because her father disallowed her.
ז וְאִם-הָיוֹ תִהְיֶה לְאִישׁ, וּנְדָרֶיהָ עָלֶיהָ, אוֹ מִבְטָא שְׂפָתֶיהָ, אֲשֶׁר אָסְרָה עַל-נַפְשָׁהּ. 7 And if she be married to a husband, while her vows are upon her, or the clear utterance of her lips, wherewith she hath bound her soul;
ח וְשָׁמַע אִישָׁהּ בְּיוֹם שָׁמְעוֹ, וְהֶחֱרִישׁ לָהּ: וְקָמוּ נְדָרֶיהָ, וֶאֱסָרֶהָ אֲשֶׁר-אָסְרָה עַל-נַפְשָׁהּ--יָקֻמוּ. 8 and her husband hear it, whatsoever day it be that he heareth it, and hold his peace at her; then her vows shall stand, and her bonds wherewith she hath bound her soul shall stand.
ט וְאִם בְּיוֹם שְׁמֹעַ אִישָׁהּ, יָנִיא אוֹתָהּ, וְהֵפֵר אֶת-נִדְרָהּ אֲשֶׁר עָלֶיהָ, וְאֵת מִבְטָא שְׂפָתֶיהָ אֲשֶׁר אָסְרָה עַל-נַפְשָׁהּ--וַיהוָה, יִסְלַח-לָהּ. 9 But if her husband disallow her in the day that he heareth it, then he shall make void her vow which is upon her, and the clear utterance of her lips, wherewith she hath bound her soul; and the LORD will forgive her.
י וְנֵדֶר אַלְמָנָה, וּגְרוּשָׁה--כֹּל אֲשֶׁר-אָסְרָה עַל-נַפְשָׁהּ, יָקוּם עָלֶיהָ. 10 But the vow of a widow, or of her that is divorced, even every thing wherewith she hath bound her soul, shall stand against her.
יא וְאִם-בֵּית אִישָׁהּ, נָדָרָה, אוֹ-אָסְרָה אִסָּר עַל-נַפְשָׁהּ, בִּשְׁבֻעָה. 11 And if a woman vowed in her husband's house, or bound her soul by a bond with an oath,
יב וְשָׁמַע אִישָׁהּ וְהֶחֱרִשׁ לָהּ, לֹא הֵנִיא אֹתָהּ--וְקָמוּ, כָּל-נְדָרֶיהָ, וְכָל-אִסָּר אֲשֶׁר-אָסְרָה עַל-נַפְשָׁהּ, יָקוּם. 12 and her husband heard it, and held his peace at her, and disallowed her not, then all her vows shall stand, and every bond wherewith she bound her soul shall stand.
יג וְאִם-הָפֵר יָפֵר אֹתָם אִישָׁהּ, בְּיוֹם שָׁמְעוֹ--כָּל-מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיהָ לִנְדָרֶיהָ וּלְאִסַּר נַפְשָׁהּ, לֹא יָקוּם: אִישָׁהּ הֲפֵרָם, וַיהוָה יִסְלַח-לָהּ. 13 But if her husband make them null and void in the day that he heareth them, then whatsoever proceeded out of her lips, whether it were her vows, or the bond of her soul, shall not stand: her husband hath made them void; and the LORD will forgive her.
יד כָּל-נֵדֶר וְכָל-שְׁבֻעַת אִסָּר, לְעַנֹּת נָפֶשׁ--אִישָׁהּ יְקִימֶנּוּ, וְאִישָׁהּ יְפֵרֶנּוּ. 14 Every vow, and every binding oath to afflict the soul, her husband may let it stand, or her husband may make it void.
טו וְאִם-הַחֲרֵשׁ יַחֲרִישׁ לָהּ אִישָׁהּ, מִיּוֹם אֶל-יוֹם, וְהֵקִים אֶת-כָּל-נְדָרֶיהָ, אוֹ אֶת-כָּל-אֱסָרֶיהָ אֲשֶׁר עָלֶיהָ--הֵקִים אֹתָם, כִּי-הֶחֱרִשׁ לָהּ בְּיוֹם שָׁמְעוֹ. 15 But if her husband altogether hold his peace at her from day to day, then he causeth all her vows to stand, or all her bonds, which are upon her; he hath let them stand, because he held his peace at her in the day that he heard them.
טז וְאִם-הָפֵר יָפֵר אֹתָם, אַחֲרֵי שָׁמְעוֹ--וְנָשָׂא, אֶת-עֲו‍ֹנָהּ. 16 But if he shall make them null and void after that he hath heard them, then he shall bear her iniquity.
Note the repeated use of וַה' יִסְלַח-לָהּ after every vow the husband or father is able to cancel. There is a change at the end to וְנָשָׂא, אֶת-עֲו‍ֹנָהּ which may parallel or oppose the other refrain.

On the most literal level, we might arrange this as follows. In general, the father or husband may cancel the vow if he hears it and cancels it the same day. Pasuk 16, "after he has heard them," means after that day. Taking it to mean "he shall bear her iniquity," the implication is that he still has the power to make them null and void, such that she does not violate and bears no guilt, but he does for her violations. I do not think that this is what we assume lehalacha, but rather that he does not have the power to cancel after the first day, and therefore, as Rashi, quoting Sifrei on Matot, helpfully explains:
He takes her place. We learn from here that if someone causes his fellow to stumble, he bears his punishments in his place. — [Sifrei Mattoth 30]
As some explain, he causes her to sin, or because she is in his reshut (see commentaries for more details).

We might read it, though, as a summary, and as an opposition. That is, perhaps it should be read, even on a peshat level, entirely differently. There are two levels to this law. The original statement of facts, and the revision of this law to reflect a new aspect of it that was previously undiscussed.

Looking at the first section of law as literature, we see that there is no mention of 1st day/second day variation in terms of her father. Indeed, there is no mention of 1st day/2nd day in terms of her husband, up to and including verse 9.

Verse 10 begins a new segment, which is one of compare and contrast. We discussed a woman in her father's house or married. Verse 10 shows that a woman who is divorced or widowed is under no-one's domain. She does not return to the domain of her father, and thus her vow stands.
In contrast, we have verses 11 through 13, the case of the woman who is married (as opposed to widowed/divorced). Here, her husband can sustain or cancel the vow. But we already said this, in verses 8 and 9! Well we need this here for contrast to the widow/divorcee.
We introduced twice the idea of the husband sustaining or nullifying.
The end of this second section, I would argue, is at the end of verse 13:
אִישָׁהּ הֲפֵרָם, וַה יִסְלַח-לָהּ.

A new, third section, begins in verse 14:
יד כָּל-נֵדֶר וְכָל-שְׁבֻעַת אִסָּר, לְעַנֹּת נָפֶשׁ--אִישָׁהּ יְקִימֶנּוּ, וְאִישָׁהּ יְפֵרֶנּוּ. 14 Every vow, and every binding oath to afflict the soul, her husband may let it stand, or her husband may make it void.
טו וְאִם-הַחֲרֵשׁ יַחֲרִישׁ לָהּ אִישָׁהּ, מִיּוֹם אֶל-יוֹם, וְהֵקִים אֶת-כָּל-נְדָרֶיהָ, אוֹ אֶת-כָּל-אֱסָרֶיהָ אֲשֶׁר עָלֶיהָ--הֵקִים אֹתָם, כִּי-הֶחֱרִשׁ לָהּ בְּיוֹם שָׁמְעוֹ. 15 But if her husband altogether hold his peace at her from day to day, then he causeth all her vows to stand, or all her bonds, which are upon her; he hath let them stand, because he held his peace at her in the day that he heard them.
טז וְאִם-הָפֵר יָפֵר אֹתָם, אַחֲרֵי שָׁמְעוֹ--וְנָשָׂא, אֶת-עֲו‍ֹנָהּ. 16 But if he shall make them null and void after that he hath heard them, then he shall bear her iniquity.
We are discussing subcases of the married woman. This is a new section, and we are specifying the meaning of the ability of the husband to sustain or nullify. Thus, verse 14 says that the husband has the ability to sustain and he has the ability to make it void. We will expect an explanation in that order. First, how he can sustain, and second, how he can make it void.

The Torah does not disappoint. There are two subsections, each beginning with וְאִם. The first, in verse 15, is how he sustains. If he waits from day to day. The second, how he nullifies, is in verse 16! If he makes them null - and the verse is telling us explicitly that he has the ability and succeeds in making them null - after he hears them - this does not mean after as in the next day, but immediately after -- then, וְנָשָׂא אֶת-עֲו‍ֹנָהּ, her iniquity shall be sustained (in the passive). This is in direct parallel to וַיהוָה יִסְלַח-לָהּ and means the same thing.

The only reason for the change in terminology is that this twist on the law was perhaps said to Moshe at a different times. Note that these levels are not contradictory, but rather supplementary. It makes overt what was previously implicit. And make no mistake that this was once implicit. Namely, בְּיוֹם שָׁמְעוֹ which was repeated earlier means that immediately after hearing it -- that is, the same day -- which is exactly equal to אַחֲרֵי שָׁמְעוֹ at the end. I would argue that this is in fact the simple meaning of the verse, and actually accords 100% with practiced halacha.

At any rate, we see here the nasa can be ambiguous.

A famous other ambiguity of nasa is in Kayin (Cain)'s plea to God after hearing his sentence. He states: (Bereishit 4:13):

יג וַיֹּאמֶר קַיִן, אֶל-יְהוָה: גָּדוֹל עֲו‍ֹנִי, מִנְּשֹׂא. 13 And Cain said unto the LORD: 'My punishment is greater than I can bear.
A midrash interprets this as a question - "is my sin too great to bear?"

Similarly locally in Emor, we see:
טו וְאֶל-בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, תְּדַבֵּר לֵאמֹר: אִישׁ אִישׁ כִּי-יְקַלֵּל אֱלֹהָיו, וְנָשָׂא חֶטְאוֹ. 15 And thou shalt speak unto the children of Israel, saying: Whosoever curseth his God shall bear his sin.
טז וְנֹקֵב שֵׁם-יְהוָה מוֹת יוּמָת, רָגוֹם יִרְגְּמוּ-בוֹ כָּל-הָעֵדָה: כַּגֵּר, כָּאֶזְרָח--בְּנָקְבוֹ-שֵׁם, יוּמָת. 16 And he that blasphemeth the name of the LORD, he shall surely be put to death; all the congregation shall certainly stone him; as well the stranger, as the home-born, when he blasphemeth the Name, shall be put to death.
In this instance, the interpretation of "he shall suffer the consequences" is immediately understandable - it is elaborated upon in the next verse - he shall be put to death.

Can we understand it as "his sin shall be borne" such that he receives no punishment? I would suggest yes. We can once again take verses 15 and 16 (though in sefer Vayikra rather than Bemidbar) as opposites. And we can take the יְקַלֵּל vs. וְנֹקֵב distinction as key. One who just does kelala - cursing - his sin shall be borne and he will not be but to death. However, וְנֹקֵב שֵׁם-יְהוָה מוֹת יוּמָת - one who is nokev the name of God will surely be put to death.

If we assume that such a distinction exists, how to explain it? See Sanhedrin daf 56 and 60, with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha and Rav Acha bar Yaakov. It is entirely possible that the punishment is only meted out to one who specifies a specific Name of God and curses. Thus, "yakkeh Yossi et Yossi." Taking nokev to mean "specify" a la Ibn Ezra (and the Targumim, etc.), a regular mekallel would not get the death penalty (verse 15). However, if he was nokev -- specified - the Name of God in the process of such cursing, then he would be put to death (verse 16).

Alternatively, there are two forms of cursing, and kelala does not get it but the nokev does get it.

Alternatively - and I love this the best as narrative neo-midrash, though I will be the first to tell
it is not true -- the mekalel was upset at Hashem and at Moshe. (Cue midrashim about losing the court case in Moshe's court, and of Moshe killing his father with the Ineffable Name.) I would posit that in verse 11, וַיִּקֹּב בֶּן-הָאִשָּׁה הַיִּשְׂרְאֵלִית אֶת-הַשֵּׁם means that he blasphemed the Name of God. וַיְקַלֵּל means that he cursed Moshe.

Thus, he was brought to court to find out the appropriate punishment for each of these crimes.

אִישׁ אִישׁ כִּי-יְקַלֵּל אֱלֹהָיו, וְנָשָׂא חֶטְאוֹ.
One who curses Elohav - perhaps this is Chol rather than Kodesh. In other words, Elohav means his judges. (And perhaps this was yet another influence on the midrash of the court case about a establishing a tent amongst Dan - see previous post.)

Meanwhile:
וְנֹקֵב שֵׁם-ה מוֹת יוּמָת
the punishment for blaspheming the Name of God was death.

Thus, it is a contrast.

And how do I know that Elohav in the context of kelala can mean judges? Well, from parshat Mishpatim, with another beautiful multivalent verse. Shemot 22:27:
כז אֱלֹהִים, לֹא תְקַלֵּל; וְנָשִׂיא בְעַמְּךָ, לֹא תָאֹר. 27 Thou shalt not revile God, nor curse a ruler of thy people.
Chazal understand this to simultaneously be an injunction against cursing (or reviling) God, and against cursing a judge. This is among a few pesukim showing that Elohim can mean judges (e.g. beKerev Elohim yishpot). There is a Biblical parallelism to the end of the pasuk, and so we expect them to mean similar things, and a judge is similar to a ruler.

Wednesday, May 17, 2006

Ki Teitzei: VeKatzota Et Kappah

I've written about this in the past, but a recent news story lends evidence and credence to this particular midrashic interpretation:

In Devarim 25:11:
יא כִּי-יִנָּצוּ אֲנָשִׁים יַחְדָּו, אִישׁ וְאָחִיו, וְקָרְבָה אֵשֶׁת הָאֶחָד, לְהַצִּיל אֶת-אִישָׁהּ מִיַּד מַכֵּהוּ; וְשָׁלְחָה יָדָהּ, וְהֶחֱזִיקָה בִּמְבֻשָׁיו. 11 When men strive together one with another, and the wife of the one draweth near to deliver her husband out of the hand of him that smiteth him, and putteth forth her hand, and taketh him by the secrets;
יב וְקַצֹּתָה, אֶת-כַּפָּהּ: לֹא תָחוֹס, עֵינֶךָ. {ס} 12 then thou shalt cut off her hand, thine eye shall have no pity. {S}
There are several interpretations of this besides the obvious, most literal. One such interpretation which approaches quite close to peshat is that this is an application of din rodef. If you see someone trying to kill another, you may kill the murderer to prevent him from murdering the victim. If killing the attempted murderer is what must be done to prevent the act, you do that. If you can prevent the murder with a lesser injury (such as loss of a limb), you must do that instead.

The assumption is that in the instance described in the Biblical verses, the woman is still grabbed on to him. If she crushes the man's testicles, the man may well die from such a serious injury. Thus, you should cut off her hand if she is in the process of crushing. (And thus, it is not a punishment after the fact for permanent injury caused.) Your eye should not spare, because doing so is at the expense of the victim.

What called this to mind was the following story reported in the press. A woman attacked her husband by crushing his testicles, and he was in critical condition but is now in stable condition. The woman could have faced attempted murder, according to police.

From 6abc and Action News:
A Philadelphia woman is in police custody, accused of an attack against her own husband. Police say she grabbed him in a jealous rage so hard that he lies hospitalized and she is facing charges.

...

Police say the wife believed her husband, Howard Randall, was cheating on her. So, while he slept, police say the woman grabbed and squeezed a part of his male anatomy.

Randall was rushed to Einstein Hospital with severe bleeding. Doctors first labeled his condition critical but he is now listed in stable condition at the hospital.

His wife now faces aggravated assault and other related charges. At one point, authorities said she could have faced attempted murder.


Friday, May 12, 2006

Illuminated Prague Bible from 1489 Available Online

on the YU Libraries website. This complete Tanach is currently part of YU's collection, in the Rare Books and Manuscripts collection.

Every page of the manuscript is viewable online. Very cool. Check it out.

Big Day Today

First we took Meir to the doctor to get weighed and measured. Since he was sick last week, he lost almost a pound, and then recouped it with the aid of some chocolate cake, so not much of an overall gain. Meanwhile, the scale-table in the doctor's office freaks him out, since you have to lie prone on it and on more than one occasion he was given a shot while on that scale. They really should not combine equipment like that for children, given how it is so easy to make such negative associations. It is a struggle, and a terrible ordeal for everyone, everytime we need to get him weighed or measured.

Then I went to YU. Got myself a leave-of-absence for the current semester. I owe so many papers. Hopefully will get rid of a few of them this summer. Also asked for a transcript to send to Touro for job purposes. Also picked up my Klaf. Hooray!

Back to Queens, worked a bit with a coworker on adding delegates to handle events in C#. Still some problems on that end. Then off to teach the Programming Languages course at Lander College. I covered a bit more concurrency today, and finished concurrency in Ada.

I assigned an interesting problem to implement in Ada: the game of Spit. This involves both competitive and coordination synchronization, as they must lock the stack of cards to which they place a card, and both can see and write to this stack. They also must communicate to determine a winner of the round. And the best part is, Spit is not a turn-based card game, so it is perfect for a concurrency problem.

Next time I think I am going to introduce the programming language Inform. Inform 6 shows how to apply OOP principles to a vert specific domain, that of text adventure games/interactive fiction, and exactly how the language matches the requirements. Further, Inform 7 was recently released for Mac and PC. It compiles to Inform 6, but actually lets you program in English. This was a very dumb idea for COBOL, but it is an absolutely brilliant idea for the domain of interactive fiction.

Finally, I sat down to work on my linguistics final. I finished it, except I did the first problem a bit wrong, and have to redraw the trees and modify my answer somewhat. If I can finish it tomorrow, it will be a week ahead of the deadline, and I will be relieved and happy.

Good night!

Wednesday, May 10, 2006

parshat Emor: The Blasphemer Left ... But From Where?

I said I wouldn't have a chance to post on this parsha, but the pull was too strong. I present here a discussion of a grammatical point - but a non-boring one namely, from where did the blasphemer leave - how do we understand וַיֵּצֵא, and how do we understand בְּתוֹךְ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל. I present the approach that various classical interpreters take to this question, and try to provide a framework for understanding their respective approaches.

Of course I often digress along the way. These digressions are worthy of being posts in their own right, but I do not have the time.

In parshat Emor, we are introduced to the blasphemer. The English translation prejudices us somewhat, so disregard it for now. Vayikra 24:10:
י וַיֵּצֵא, בֶּן-אִשָּׁה יִשְׂרְאֵלִית, וְהוּא בֶּן-אִישׁ מִצְרִי, בְּתוֹךְ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל; וַיִּנָּצוּ, בַּמַּחֲנֶה, בֶּן הַיִּשְׂרְאֵלִית, וְאִישׁ הַיִּשְׂרְאֵלִי. 10 And the son of an Israelitish woman, whose father was an Egyptian, went out among the children of Israel; and the son of the Israelitish woman and a man of Israel strove together in the camp.
The verse begins וַיֵּצֵא. From where did he go out? If he left, he must have left from someplace. Indeed, when we see the transitive verb וַיֵּצֵא, we expect to have as the direct object the place from which he left. Thus in parshat Vayeitzei, vayeitzei yaakov mi-be`er sheva, Yaakov left from Beer Sheva. Vayelech has the connotation of destination. Thus it continues vayelech Charana, and he went to Charan. It is striking that it simply states וַיֵּצֵא and leaves it at that.

This is the prompt. Rashi, who is a pashtan who we consider a darshan based on modern definitions of peshat and derash, cites a few "midrashic" explanation of this strange construct. Namely, Rabbi Levi said that "he went from his world."

Just an interjection: from which world?
perhaps of religiousity, perhaps from Olam HaBa, by sinning, or perhaps from his life in this world.
I would note that Rabbi Levi says exactly the same thing in parshat Toldot, namely meOlamo yatza, but he says it on Bereishit 25:34, after Esav sells and despises his birthright:
לד וְיַעֲקֹב נָתַן לְעֵשָׂו, לֶחֶם וּנְזִיד עֲדָשִׁים, וַיֹּאכַל וַיֵּשְׁתְּ, וַיָּקָם וַיֵּלַךְ; וַיִּבֶז עֵשָׂו, אֶת-הַבְּכֹרָה. {פ} 34 And Jacob gave Esau bread and pottage of lentils; and he did eat and drink, and rose up, and went his way. So Esau despised his birthright.
Which implies that is a religious leaving, I suppose meaning that he lost his portion in the world to come.

Note a variant of Rabbi Levi's statement from the one cited from Torat Kohanim is one in Midrash Rabba 32:3, which continues by citing a verse similar in nature as an example:

מהיכן יצא?
ר' לוי אמר: יצא מעולמו, כמה דאת אמר: (ש"א י"ז): ויצא איש הבינים.

That is, it cites the pasuk by Goliath, who insults the Israelites and in the process insults God. We see this from David's characterization: (See Shmuel Aleph 17)
כו וַיֹּאמֶר דָּוִד, אֶל-הָאֲנָשִׁים הָעֹמְדִים עִמּוֹ לֵאמֹר, מַה-יֵּעָשֶׂה לָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יַכֶּה אֶת-הַפְּלִשְׁתִּי הַלָּז, וְהֵסִיר חֶרְפָּה מֵעַל יִשְׂרָאֵל: כִּי מִי, הַפְּלִשְׁתִּי הֶעָרֵל הַזֶּה, כִּי חֵרֵף, מַעַרְכוֹת אֱלֹהִים חַיִּים. 26 And David spoke to the men that stood by him, saying: 'What shall be done to the man that killeth this Philistine, and taketh away the taunt from Israel? for who is this uncircumcised Philistine, that he should have taunted the armies of the living God?'
There, about Goliath, it is written:

ד וַיֵּצֵא אִישׁ-הַבֵּנַיִם מִמַּחֲנוֹת פְּלִשְׁתִּים, גָּלְיָת שְׁמוֹ מִגַּת: גָּבְהוֹ, שֵׁשׁ אַמּוֹת וָזָרֶת. 4 And there went out a champion from the camp of the Philistines, named Goliath, of Gath, whose height was six cubits and a span.

If this verse is to be read in the same light, what does Rabbi Levi mean? He can mean that Goliath sinned with his insults, or perhaps that he will take leave of the world by dying. Thus, I will leave the meaning of Rabbi Levi's statement up from grabs until such time as a have enough time, and recall, to research the general meaning of this phrase.

Siftei Chachamim has a brilliant and insightful, though I am not certain true, explanation of Rabbi Levi's derivation. Namely, Rabbi Levi relied on semichut. Since a source location is not given, we look to what is immediately preceding. To cite the previous pasuk, in order to provide context:

ט וְהָיְתָה לְאַהֲרֹן וּלְבָנָיו, וַאֲכָלֻהוּ בְּמָקוֹם קָדֹשׁ: כִּי קֹדֶשׁ קָדָשִׁים הוּא לוֹ, מֵאִשֵּׁי יְהוָה--חָק-עוֹלָם. {ס} 9 And it shall be for Aaron and his sons; and they shall eat it in a holy place; for it is most holy unto him of the offerings of the LORD made by fire, a perpetual due.' {S}
י וַיֵּצֵא, בֶּן-אִשָּׁה יִשְׂרְאֵלִית, וְהוּא בֶּן-אִישׁ מִצְרִי, בְּתוֹךְ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל; וַיִּנָּצוּ, בַּמַּחֲנֶה, בֶּן הַיִּשְׂרְאֵלִית, וְאִישׁ הַיִּשְׂרְאֵלִי. 10 And the son of an Israelitish woman, whose father was an Egyptian, went out among the children of Israel; and the son of the Israelitish woman and a man of Israel strove together in the camp.
Thus, the immediately preceding word is עוֹלָם, and so the blasphemer went out from his עוֹלָם. Brilliant! And it used semichut from the previous parsha, which we shall see in a moment is exactly what Rabbi Levi's disputant, Rabbi Berechia, does. On the other hand, there is no such context of semichut by Esav selling the birthright, so we will have a situation of inconsistency of derasha, which is not optimal, though of course possible. That Rabbi Levi in the Midrash Rabba version cites the pasuk about Goliath suggests an alternate derivation - that this is an acceptable sense of vayeitzei, or in Esav's case, vayelech, when it stands alone without an NP complement designated from where or to where. It also suggests learning implication of verbs from their use elsewhere in Tanach, a sort of informal gezeira shava (though I think the original), which is clearly an alternate derivation to that of Siftei Chachamim. However, often derivations can work in tandem, reinforcing one another.

Rashi cites another explanation, that of Rabbi Berechia. Namely, he went out from the previous parsha (section bracketed by petuchot and setumot). That section is:

ה וְלָקַחְתָּ סֹלֶת--וְאָפִיתָ אֹתָהּ, שְׁתֵּים עֶשְׂרֵה חַלּוֹת; שְׁנֵי, עֶשְׂרֹנִים, יִהְיֶה, הַחַלָּה הָאֶחָת. 5 And thou shalt take fine flour, and bake twelve cakes thereof: two tenth parts of an ephah shall be in one cake.
ו וְשַׂמְתָּ אוֹתָם שְׁתַּיִם מַעֲרָכוֹת, שֵׁשׁ הַמַּעֲרָכֶת, עַל הַשֻּׁלְחָן הַטָּהֹר, לִפְנֵי יְהוָה. 6 And thou shalt set them in two rows, six in a row, upon the pure table before the LORD.
ז וְנָתַתָּ עַל-הַמַּעֲרֶכֶת, לְבֹנָה זַכָּה; וְהָיְתָה לַלֶּחֶם לְאַזְכָּרָה, אִשֶּׁה לַיהוָה. 7 And thou shalt put pure frankincense with each row, that it may be to the bread for a memorial-part, even an offering made by fire unto the LORD.
ח בְּיוֹם הַשַּׁבָּת בְּיוֹם הַשַּׁבָּת, יַעַרְכֶנּוּ לִפְנֵי יְהוָה--תָּמִיד: מֵאֵת בְּנֵי-יִשְׂרָאֵל, בְּרִית עוֹלָם. 8 Every sabbath day he shall set it in order before the LORD continually; it is from the children of Israel, an everlasting covenant.
ט וְהָיְתָה לְאַהֲרֹן וּלְבָנָיו, וַאֲכָלֻהוּ בְּמָקוֹם קָדֹשׁ: כִּי קֹדֶשׁ קָדָשִׁים הוּא לוֹ, מֵאִשֵּׁי יְהוָה--חָק-עוֹלָם. {ס} 9 And it shall be for Aaron and his sons; and they shall eat it in a holy place; for it is most holy unto him of the offerings of the LORD made by fire, a perpetual due.' {S}

The blasphemer mocked, since kings eat warm fresh bread every day while God is relegated to eating 9 day old bread. That led him eventually to blaspheme. Once again, looking to context to explain the same problem - from whence did the blasphemer leave?

Rashi also cited another midrashic explantion, that he left the courtroom of Moshe. He was upset at losing the verdict about living within Dan, the tribe of his mother. Analyzing how midrashim fit together based on a lot of scriptural cues is something I like to do, but would be too much of a digression here. Perhaps a later post. Just some pointers. The word בַּמַּחֲנֶה in the וַיִּנָּצוּ בַּמַּחֲנֶה. The word וַיִּנָּצוּ carrying the implication of a legal fight. The statement וְהוּא בֶּן-אִישׁ מִצְרִי בְּתוֹךְ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל giving the unique legal situation and problem, together with his claim. Perhaps וַיָּבִיאוּ אֹתוֹ אֶל-מֹשֶׁה in the next verse. The otherwise unnecessary statement וְשֵׁם אִמּוֹ שְׁלֹמִית בַּת-דִּבְרִי לְמַטֵּה-דָן. The connotation of shem to mean nachalah clearly on a peshat level in other contexts. Enough said. There is plenty of fodder here for analysis. Never think a midrash is pat, or that it creates details yesh meAyin.

Ibn Ezra has a simple answer. He left his tent. Ibn Ezra cites a verse of people leaving their tents.

Perhaps, one should not think this is a mere leaving of tents. Ibn Ezra's choice of verse may show the emotional implication of leaving. He cites Bamidbar (deliberate spelling) 16:27:
כז וַיֵּעָלוּ, מֵעַל מִשְׁכַּן-קֹרַח דָּתָן וַאֲבִירָם--מִסָּבִיב; וְדָתָן וַאֲבִירָם יָצְאוּ נִצָּבִים, פֶּתַח אָהֳלֵיהֶם, וּנְשֵׁיהֶם וּבְנֵיהֶם, וְטַפָּם. 27 So they got them up from the dwelling of Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, on every side; and Dathan and Abiram came out, and stood at the door of their tents, with their wives, and their sons, and their little ones.
about Datan and Aviram leaving their tents in order to rebel. Thus, there is deliberate choice in this word to convey the idea of rebellion. This man left his tent and rebelled against God. At least this is one way to read Ibn Ezra. Otherwise, he just left his tent, because where else would he be leaving from?

Alternatively, Ibn Ezra reads no emotion into it. Rather, this is an observation of how the word vayeitzei reflects life in the wilderness. Since the source from which he left is left implicit, we must look within Tanach, within the same situation, and see from another narrative section that people left from tents, so it is in association with homes that this verb occurs. I believe this detached reading of Ibn Ezra to be more accurate.

Targum Yonatan has a great answer, and it has great homiletic possibilies. He left froim Egypt. Pesumably this means he left from Egypt with the other Israelites (perhaps connecting this to בְּתוֹךְ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל later in the verse), or else is explanatory, that this man comes from somewhere - namely, he left Egypt in the Exodus, since he had an Israelite mother. The homiletic possibilities stem from the emphasis of the verse on the fact that the blasphemer is ungracious and unaffected by witnessing the miracles and loving-kindness directed towards the Israelites (and him) as he left Egypt.

Ramban has a compelling answer, in that we may omit the source location, which is implicit, and the word וַיֵּצֵא is to be connected with בְּתוֹךְ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל later in the verse. Thus he went out in public. From where he went out - well, it obviously must have been from a private location, presumably a house or tent. He cites another example of this, where source location is not specified while destination is, when Mordechai went out into the midst of the city. Esther 4:1:
א וּמָרְדֳּכַי, יָדַע אֶת-כָּל-אֲשֶׁר נַעֲשָׂה, וַיִּקְרַע מָרְדֳּכַי אֶת-בְּגָדָיו, וַיִּלְבַּשׁ שַׂק וָאֵפֶר; וַיֵּצֵא בְּתוֹךְ הָעִיר, וַיִּזְעַק זְעָקָה גְדוֹלָה וּמָרָה. 1 Now when Mordecai knew all that was done, Mordecai rent his clothes, and put on sackcloth with ashes, and went out into the midst of the city, and cried with a loud and a bitter cry;
We might emphasise here the result, which I believe is true. Namely, while beforehand I stated that we expect vayeitzei to specify from where he left and vayelech to specify to where he is going, in truth, we can specify either. That is, vayeitzei to someplace is acceptable, and we can leave the source location implicit. Further, this seems to be the case here. To cite the verse again, this time paying attention to the English translation:
י וַיֵּצֵא, בֶּן-אִשָּׁה יִשְׂרְאֵלִית, וְהוּא בֶּן-אִישׁ מִצְרִי, בְּתוֹךְ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל; וַיִּנָּצוּ, בַּמַּחֲנֶה, בֶּן הַיִּשְׂרְאֵלִית, וְאִישׁ הַיִּשְׂרְאֵלִי. 10 And the son of an Israelitish woman, whose father was an Egyptian, went out among the children of Israel; and the son of the Israelitish woman and a man of Israel strove together in the camp.
Note how "among the children of Israel" is given as a specification of the verb "went out."

How do other commentators make sense of בְּתוֹךְ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל? The connection to the verb וַיֵּצֵא is not immediately obvious, since it is distanced by several words. We might read בְּתוֹךְ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל in another light.

Namely, Rashi explains that בְּתוֹךְ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל means that he converted. Who converted? The standard assumption is that Rashi means that the blasphemer converted. Why would conversion be necessary? Did he not have an Israelite mother? And did not everyone "convert" at Mt. Sinai? See Siftei Chachamim for an explanation of this subject. In part we might view this as a defense. After all, Rashi, adopting a closed-canon approach, explains that the Egyptian father was the Egyptian man Moshe smote in Egpyt.

Digression to explain this excellent midrashic connection. Firstly, in both cases the phrase ish mitzri is used. In Shemot 2:14:
יא וַיְהִי בַּיָּמִים הָהֵם, וַיִּגְדַּל מֹשֶׁה וַיֵּצֵא אֶל-אֶחָיו, וַיַּרְא, בְּסִבְלֹתָם; וַיַּרְא אִישׁ מִצְרִי, מַכֶּה אִישׁ-עִבְרִי מֵאֶחָיו. 11 And it came to pass in those days, when Moses was grown up, that he went out unto his brethren, and looked on their burdens; and he saw an Egyptian smiting a Hebrew, one of his brethren.
Furthermore, there is a general pull to not leave any otherwise unknown person unidentified. And the closed canon approach tells us to look within Tanach to find someone. But what really influences the search here is that the Israelite mother is identified. וְשֵׁם אִמּוֹ שְׁלֹמִית בַּת-דִּבְרִי, לְמַטֵּה-דָן.

End digression within digression.

I would suggest that perhaps Rashi is stating that the Egyptian father is the one who converted, rather than the blasphemer. That is, the phrase is וְהוּא בֶּן-אִישׁ מִצְרִי, בְּתוֹךְ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל. To whom, and to what, does בְּתוֹךְ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל. We had assumed that Rashi meant that it attached to vehu. I posit it attaches to ish mitzri. This is an Egyptian man from amongst the Israelites.

The benefit of this is that we do not have a case of rape. We do not have a case of seduction. We do not have a case of intermarriage. Rather, the Egyptian properly converted and married Shlomit. However, as a convert, he had no tribal affiliation. Beautiful.

Note this accords with Ibn Ezra on a different word in this verse. He states on בֶּן-אִישׁ מִצְרִי - mityahed, that he converted. Presumably Ibn Ezra refers to the Egyptian father, not the blasphemer. Does Ibn Ezra read this phrase the same way Rashi does? I would suggest that yes, indeed he does!

Note that this interpretation of Rashi is in conflict with what he said just above, that the father was the Egyptian taskmaster killed by Moshe! Indeed, I believe it is a contradiction, and Rashi presents both a midrashic explanation and a peshat based interpretation side by side, just as he often does.

Another one who similarly interprets בְּתוֹךְ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל is Targum Yonatan. He states viledat bar bego benei yisrael, that the Egyptian taskmaster killed an Israelite (interesting twist on the midrash not often emphasized!) and had sex with wife, and had a son within the Benei Yisrael. Thus the phrase is connected with the birthing, the having of the son, and not with the word וַיֵּצֵא.

Thus, we may array the mighty army of Rashi, Ibn Ezra, and Targum Yonatan, who all divorce וַיֵּצֵא from בְּתוֹךְ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, against Ramban, who connects the two quite convincingly.

(Of course, Ibn Ezra might agree with Ramban. We cannot really tell based upon what he wrote explicitly. See what I wrote above though.)

And, whether we connect the two can lead us to whether we need to grant one or both of the two a different explanation.

My Solution
The above is my initial analysis of the commentators. Each has pros and cons. Now I present my own take on the pasuk, in which I suggest an alternative.

From where did the blasphemer leave? He didn't. And the verse does not say that he does. The word וַיֵּצֵא is empty.

Let me explain. There is a related word, halach, which sometimes means travelled, and sometimes serves another, special purpose. It modified another verb, suggesting that it is a continuous action. Thus, in I Shmuel 2:26:

כו וְהַנַּעַר שְׁמוּאֵל, הֹלֵךְ וְגָדֵל וָטוֹב: גַּם, עִם-יְהוָה, וְגַם, עִם-אֲנָשִׁים. {פ} 26 And the child Samuel grew on, and increased in favour both with the LORD, and also with men.
Shmuel does not walk and grow, rather he continued to grow.

You might dispute this one, but anyway, from the fight with Goliath in I Shmuel 17:41:

מא וַיֵּלֶךְ, הַפְּלִשְׁתִּי, הֹלֵךְ וְקָרֵב, אֶל-דָּוִד; וְהָאִישׁ נֹשֵׂא הַצִּנָּה, לְפָנָיו. 41 And the Philistine came nearer and nearer unto David; and the man that bore the shield went before him.
it is not that he walked and came closer, but rather, he continuously came closer - that is, nearer and nearer.

In II Shmuel 3:1:
א וַתְּהִי הַמִּלְחָמָה, אֲרֻכָּה, בֵּין בֵּית שָׁאוּל, וּבֵין בֵּית דָּוִד; וְדָוִד הֹלֵךְ וְחָזֵק, וּבֵית שָׁאוּל הֹלְכִים וְדַלִּים. {ס} 1 Now there was long war between the house of Saul and the house of David; and David waxed stronger and stronger, but the house of Saul waxed weaker and weaker. {S}
Did David walk an become stronger. Firstly, David here means the house of David. He grew stronger and stronger. Continuous action is implied.

There are many many other such examples, which you may feel free to explore on your own. Thus holech does not always describe its own action, but may support another action.

I will now claim, and support the claim, that vayeitzei can also serve as a support verb. It is used in the resumptive case, when one wants to convey action, but must digress with some lengthy element, before resuming.

Thus, vayeitzei is not connected with betoch benei yisrael. Rather, it is connected with וַיִּנָּצוּ (or perhaps even with וַיִּקֹּב in the next verse.) One of the participants in this action, the son of the Israelite woman, needed a deep introduction, so once he is mentioned, the verse digresses to give further details. The action resumes in וַיִּנָּצוּ.

Or somewhat more awkwardly, but better syntactically (since number then matches), the action resumes with וַיִּקֹּב, which after all was what we wanted to get to. The digression then not only includes the background of the person but the background of the action.

Thus, וַיֵּצֵא does not stand alone denoting leaving, nor is is connected with בְּתוֹךְ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, but rather served as an auxiliary verb to introduce the subject when there is a lengthy description of the subject, or some other necessary digression.

Meanwhile, בְּתוֹךְ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל could attach as it does in my Ibn Ezra/Rashi interpretation.

The current verse is perhaps not the best place to argue for this construction of the auxiliary vayeitzei. Let me present another two, where it is perhaps clearer.

The best example, I would think, is in Shemot 2:1, though with the word vayelech serving in this role:

א וַיֵּלֶךְ אִישׁ, מִבֵּית לֵוִי; וַיִּקַּח, אֶת-בַּת-לֵוִי. 1 And there went a man of the house of Levi, and took to wife a daughter of Levi.
As I have discussed elsewhere, there is a stylistic and narrative reason within the narrative to avoid giving actual names in this section. Had the verse named Amram and Yocheved by name, it could have said:

vayyiqqah amram et Yocheved leIsha

or the equivalent.

However, once we call him an ish miBet Levi, a man from the house of Levi, we have a complex Noun Phrase, involving a noun specifier, a Prepositional Phrase, a preposition, another noun phrase, a noun specifier and Noun Phrase complement, and finally a noun. (Just describing the X-bar tree construction of the NP.)

Once we have all this intervening syntactic structure, we want to help this out by using the auxiliary. Thus, we introduce the fact that there is an action and that there is a subject. Vayelech Complex-Subject
then we resume with Verb Object, Vayikach Object.

Otherwise, what will we say to explain the exact meaning of vayelech? Did he leave somewhere? Is he going somewhere. The fact that it states וַיֵּלֶךְ אִיש מִבֵּית לֵוִי does not mean that he left the physical house of Levi with Levi's daughter, though that would make an awesome midrash! Rather, it is as I said.

Another possible example of this, with the word vayeitzei, is in parshat Vayeitzei. In Bereishit 28:10:
י וַיֵּצֵא יַעֲקֹב, מִבְּאֵר שָׁבַע; וַיֵּלֶךְ, חָרָנָה. 10 And Jacob went out from Beer-sheba, and went toward Haran.
The exact peshat and midrashic implications of this pasuk are complex, and I have discussed it in some detail elsewhere. However, perhaps this is another instance of vayeitzei as an auxiliary verb, where the vayelech is from Beer Sheva to Charan. On the other hand, here vayeitzei has an obvious meaning in context.

All of this is of course speculative.

In terms of which I think is correct, I believe all are possible and have merit. Simplest of course is Ramban, but I just love the Ibn Ezra as vayeitzei = leaving unspecified location and Ibn Ezra/Rashi reconstruction for the meaning of betoch benei yisrael.

An explanation for the hiatus

As much as I love parshablogging, I have other obligations as well, and so in crunch times, I come to neglect it, since it takes a lot of time to put my ideas down in a readable, understandable form.

Among these other obligations:
Work - getting monitoring an agent to work. Showing a colleague how to make ActiveX controls in C#.
Teaching - Grading a bunch of Excel exams, creating a sample Access exam, for an Understanding Personal Computers class; Preparing lectures on Concurrency in Ada and Java for a Programming Languages class. Getting my ID for both schools, getting transcripts (from YU), letters of recommendations, to one of those schools, getting my paperwork for hiring done (I've delayed this).
School - Finishing a take-home Linguistics final. Applying for "Masters Research" at Revel so that I am a continuous student, which means going to YU and meeting with people. Try to figure out my PhD thesis and get an advisor.
Family - Making sure Meir eats enough, so that he can gain some needed wait; figure out how to get rid of the (second) mouse that moved into the closet as a result of construction next door; figure out how to get rid of the family of birds that established a nest in the air conditioner and wake up Meir every morning at 5 AM (though they have been better recently, or Meir has gotten more used to it).
Etc - ...

Anyway, I don't expect to post any new thoughts on the parsha for this week or next week.

Oh ... And the latest in the Absence of Evidence is Not Evidence of Absence files - the fact that we have not found WMDs in Iraq does not mean that they do not, or did not exist. As I have noted before, there are reasons to think they were moved to Syria. Here is a recent article in the NY Sun (Jan 2006) about this:

The man who served as the no. 2 official in Saddam Hussein's air force says Iraq moved weapons of mass destruction into Syria before the war by loading the weapons into civilian aircraft in which the passenger seats were removed.

The Iraqi general, Georges Sada, makes the charges in a new book, "Saddam's Secrets," released this week. He detailed the transfers in an interview yesterday with The New York Sun.

"There are weapons of mass destruction gone out from Iraq to Syria, and they must be found and returned to safe hands," Mr. Sada said. "I am confident they were taken over."

Mr. Sada's comments come just more than a month after Israel's top general during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Moshe Yaalon, told the Sun that Saddam "transferred the chemical agents from Iraq to Syria."

Democrats have made the absence of stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq a theme in their criticism of the Bush administration's decision to go to war in 2003.

Thursday, May 04, 2006

Daf Yomi Pesachim 103b-104a: No Less Than X, No More Than Y. What About Number In Between?

In Pesachim 103b, there is a very informative story. It it meant to teach us about the number of "divisions" one should make in havdalah, but it also seems to teach us the meaning of a specific construct of
__ הפוחת לא יפחות מ_ והמוסיף לא יוסיף על. Specifically, what about numbers in between? This has relevance to tzitzit, where we have such an instruction and we indeed do use numbers between the bounds.

First, the gemara in Pesachim.

Pesachim 103b:
פתח ואמר המבדיל בין קודש לחול בין אור לחשך בין ישראל לעמים בין יום השביעי לששת ימי המעשה
א"ל למה לך כולי האי? והאמר רב יהודה אמר רב המבדיל בין קודש לחול זו היא הבדלתו של רבי יהודה הנשיא
א"ל אנא כהא סבירא לי דאמר ר"א אמר רבי אושעיא הפוחת לא יפחות מג' והמוסיף לא יוסיף על ז'
אמר ליה

104a:
והא מר לא תלתא אמר ולא שבע אמר
א"ל איברא בין יום השביעי לששת ימי המעשה מעין חתימה היא
ואמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל המבדיל צריך שיאמר מעין חתימה סמוך לחתימתו ופומבדיתאי אמרי מעין פתיחתן סמוך לחתימתן

In English (as I translated for the Rif):
When they came to havdala, his {=Rava's} attendant arose to light a torch {avuka} from a candle.
He {=Rav Yaakov} said {Bach: to him = Rava}: Why does Master need all this? There is a candle resting before us!
He {Rava} said to him: so said Rav: a torch for havdala is the best fulfillment of the precept.
He began, saying, "who divides holy from profane, and between light and darkness, and between Israel and the nations, and between the seventh day and the six days of work."
He said to him: Why does Master need all this? Rav Yehuda cited Shmuel that "who divides between holy and profane" is the havdala of Rabbi Yehuda haNasi.
He said to him: This is what I hold - for Rabbi Eleazer cited Rabbi Hoshaya: he who decreases should not decrease to less than three, and he who increases should not increase more than seven.
He said to him: But Master did not say three and did not say seven! {but rather four!}
He said to him: The division between the seventh day and the six days of work are like the closing.
{Pesachim 104a}
For Rav Tachlifa bar Avdimi cited Shmuel: For all blessing must say something similar to their closing in proximity to their closing.
And those of Pumpedita say similar to the opening in proximity to its closing.
And we establish like Shmuel. Therefore, Yom Tov which occurs after Shabbat, one needs to say "between the holiness of Shabbat and the holiness of Yom Tov you have divided.

The Rif adds: And the halacha is that a torch for havdala is the best way of fulfilling the precept. And one who makes havdala should not decrease less than three nor increase more than seven. And even though Rav Yehuda cited Shmuel that "who divides between holy and profane" is the havdala of Rabbi Yehuda haNasi, and Ulla also conducted himself like him, and in perek Shoel Adam meChaveiro {Shabbat 150b, perek 23} Rav Ashi said, "when we were in the house of Rav Kahana we {our gemara: he} said "who divides between holy and profane," and then we chopped up logs, even so, the nation is accustomed to say three. And we establish in something like this that custom is relevant. Therefore, he needs to say three: "who divides between holy and profane, and between light and darkness, and between Israel and the nations." And "between the seventh day and the six days of work" is like the closing, and is not part of the count.
Thus, there is a statement that one should not decrease less than three nor increase more than seven, and an objection was raised when four, a number in between, seemed to be said. Why should this even be a question if any number within the bounds is acceptable?

Now, perhaps one can give an answer, but I am reluctant to offer the answer because I think that this may indeed be a valid point, and that one should not use numbers within the bounds. However, perhaps one can say that since the specific number was not specified, Rava could have either wanted to make the havdalah short or long. Rav Yaakov merely wanted to know what exactly caused Rava to use a number in the middle of the bounds, which of course would be perfectly acceptable had Rava indeed done so. Was there some other Rabbinic statement influencing Rava? As it turned out, that was not Rava's intention, and it was good Rav Yaakov asked this, so that we could understand the exact construction of this havdalah. But it would have been acceptable had there actually been four divisions.

I do not think that the aforementioned explanation is the simplest, but rather think that the question presupposes that a number in the middle of the two bounds is not acceptable, a somewhat surprising result.

There is a middle ground, which I think is the correct answer. That is, this is not a matter of personal preference, but rather there is a bare minimum, a maximum imposed by certain circumstances, and perhaps middle grounds also imposed by specific circumstance. But one is not free to choose how many on a whim. We shall see this by analyzing how this construction is used in other sugyot.

Another, related construction appears in the fourth perek of Rosh Hashana, 32a:
רבי יוחנן בן נורי אומר אם אמר שלש שלש מכולן יצא: איבעיא להו היכי קתני שלש מן התורה שלש מן הנביאים ושלש מן הכתובים דהוו תשע ואיכא בינייהו חדא או דלמא אחד מן התורה ואחד מן הנביאים ואחד מן הכתובים דהויין להו שלש ואיכא בינייהו טובא ת"ש דתניא אין פוחתין מעשרה מלכיות מעשרה זכרונות מעשרה שופרות ואם אמר שבע מכולן יצא כנגד שבעה רקיעים רבי יוחנן בן נורי אמר הפוחת לא יפחות משבע ואם אמר שלש מכולן יצא כנגד תורה נביאים וכתובים ואמרי לה כנגד כהנים לוים וישראלים אמר רב הונא אמר שמואל הלכה כר' יוחנן בן נורי:
in terms of the number of pesukim which should be cited relevant to Malchiyot, Zichronot, and Shofarot in Shemoneh Esrei. But an upper bound is not given within this construct, so we will not discuss this case further.

In Succah 53b, in the Mishna:

דף נג, ב משנה אין פוחתין מעשרים ואחת תקיעות במקדש ואין מוסיפין על ארבעים ושמנה בכל יום היו שם עשרים ואחת תקיעות במקדש שלש לפתיחת שערים ותשע לתמיד של שחר ותשע לתמיד של בין הערבים ובמוספין היו מוסיפין עוד תשע ובערב שבת היו מוסיפין שש שלש להבטיל את העם ממלאכה ושלש להבדיל בין קדש לחול ערב שבת שבתוך החג היו שם ארבעים ושמנה שלש לפתיחת שערים שלש לשער העליון ושלש לשער התחתון ושלש למילוי המים ושלש על גבי מזבח תשע לתמיד של שחר ותשע לתמיד של בין הערבים ותשע למוספין שלש להבטיל את העם מן המלאכה ושלש להבדיל בין קודש לחול:
In the Temple they never blew the trumpet less than twenty-one times a day, nor oftener than forty-eight times. They daily blew the trumpet twenty-one times: thrice at opening the gates, nine times at the daily morning offering, and nine times at the daily evening offering. When additional offerings were brought, they blew nine times more. On the eve of the Sabbath, they blew six times more: thrice to interdict the people from doing work, and thrice to separate the holy day from the work day. But on the eve of the Sabbath, during the festival (of Tabernacles) they blew forty-eight times: thrice at the opening of the gates, thrice at the upper gate, thrice at the lower gate, thrice at the drawing of water, thrice over the altar, nine times at the daily morning offering, nine times at the daily evening offering, nine times at the additional offerings, thrice to interdict the people from doing work, and thrice to separate the holy day from the work day.
This is also not exactly the same construction, but it is close -- אין פוחתין מעשרים ואחת תקיעות במקדש ואין מוסיפין על ארבעים ושמנה. Yet, there are clearly situations described in the Mishna in which value between the two bounds occur.

Further, in the gemara we see a brayta which makes clear that the two constructions are identical, for Rabbi Yehuda says the same thing, but divided by a third, because he maintains that a set of tekia terua tekia are considered one rather than three separate ones like the Tanna of our Mishna. Thus:
מתניתין דלא כרבי יהודה דתניא ר"י אומר הפוחת לא יפחות משבע והמוסיף לא יוסיף על שש עשרה במאי קא מיפלגי ר"י סבר תקיעה תרועה תקיעה אחת היא ורבנן סברי תקיעה לחוד ותרועה לחוד
Our Mishna is not in accordance with R. Jehudah of the following Boraitha: According to those who say they were few, they were not less than seven; and according to those who say that they were many, they were not more than sixteen.

What is the point on which they differ? R. Jehudah holds that blowing and alarming are one and the same thing, while the sages hold that they are two separate things.

Here, the construct used is הפוחת לא יפחות משבע והמוסיף לא יוסיף על שש עשרה, the same construction used by Rabbi Eleazar (the Amora) citing Rabbi Hoshaya (who arranged braytot). Yet, there are clearly situations described in the Mishna in which value between the two bounds occur, and Rabbi Yehuda would agree in these situations.

At the same time, these are clearly defined situations. The construction is such that it is clear this is not a matter of reshut, personal preference. Rather, there is a base case in the Mishna of 21. There is a maximum, caused by various other requirements. And, there are middle cases, also caused by specific circumstances. Absent these special circumstances, it would be improper to make use of one of the middle numbers. For example, one would look askance if on a normal day they blew 24, or 48. We will return to our sugya in Pesachim later to see how this works out.

In the fourth perek of Menachot, 39a:
תאנא הפוחת לא יפחות משבע והמוסיף לא יוסיף על שלש עשרה הפוחת לא יפחות משבע כנגד שבעה רקיעים והמוסיף לא יוסיף על שלש עשרה כנגד שבעה רקיעין וששה אוירין שביניהם
One who decreases should not decrease less than 7 and one who increases should not increase more than 13. One who decreases should not decrease less than 7 - corresponding to the 7 firmaments (heavens). And one who increases should not increase more than 13 - corresponding to the 7 firmaments and the 6 sections of airspace between them.

This is a discussion of the number of sets of coils, though at various point people thought this referred to the number of coils in a set. A bit of explanation is in order first. Here is a picture -- a scan of my talit katan, which does not have techelet:

Thus, there are coils. A coil is a single winding around. There are also sets of coils. A single set of coils occurs between two knots on the tzitzit.

The true meaning of the aforementioned statement (as understood by Rishonim) is regarding the sets of coils. When one makes tzitzit, one might make few sets of coils or many sets of coils. One who decreases should not have less than seven sets of coils. This would mean that there are seven sets of coils, between 8 knots. One who chooses to increase should not increase more than thirteen. That would be thirteen sets of coils, between fourteen knots.

There is a separate statement concerning how many coils should be in a set, at a minimum:
וכמה שיעור חוליא תניא רבי אומר כדי שיכרוך וישנה וישלש
that there should be at least three coils in a set.

Now, looking at the picture above, this is clearly not the case. Rather, there are four sets of coils, between five knots. Meanwhile, in each set, there are clearly more than three coils - between 7 and 13.

The minhag which the above picture depicts is one in which there are four sets of coils, and the coils count up from 7 to 13. Namely, 7-8-11-13. This is called (Ashkenazic - there is also Sefardic) Tal, because Tal = 9 + 30 = 39, the total number of coils. There is another, apparently Sefardic custom, of 10-5-6-5, in which the number of coils in each set in turn is equal to the letters of the Tetragrammaton, the Divine 4-letter name.

(You can buy both of these options here, at haSofer.com.)

Now, the "Tal" option is at least based on the gemara. Alas, it misinterprets the statement referring to sets of coils and believes it to be discussing coils in a set. This is perhaps not such a big deal, since this is on a pair of tzitzit which does not contain techelet anyway. However, once we have techelet, we really should tie it appropriately (so Rav Schachter says), which means that there should be between 7 and 13 sets of coils. Each set should have no less than 3 coils. Indeed, this is how I tie the tzitzis on my tallis godol, which has techeles, except that I add more than 3 coils per set, so that it looks more normal. (Perhaps I'll post a scan of my
talis gadol later.)

The 10-5-6-5 seems not to correspond to the gemara at all - for the set of coils are not between 7 and 13 (but are rather 4, just like the "Tal"), and the number of coils in each set is once between 7 and 13 (that is, the 10), but otherwise is less than 7!

Even if we were to assume the "Tal" interpretation is correct, should we include some number between 7 and 13? The gemara gives cause for 7 and gives cause for 13, but does not give cause for 8 or 11! Presumably there are other, post-Talmudic reasons given for the 8 and 11.

What about when I tie my tzitzit with techelet, and want to tie it correctly, where the statement refers to sets of coils. Obviously I cannot count up from 7 to 13, since this is the number of sets on a given corner (and it would be strange to make differences between different corners). I tied mine with 7. I could have increased to 13. Could I have done 8, 9, 10, 11, or 12 sets?

I would think not, because after all, there is significance given to 7 and 13, but no number in between. This would work well with the interpretation of "he who increases" and "he who decreases" given above, not lending credence to numbers in the middle unless there is specific cause.

To be continued in another post, where I hope to return to the sugya in Pesachim and give further analysis.
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Monday, May 01, 2006

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