Some thoughts on the Semicha "scandal"

See the Jewish Week, and then the Forward... Also the actual letter at the Jewish Channel.

Some thoughts, now that it is over and resolved.

1) As I wrote on Facebook:

I looked it up in the dictionary, and surprisingly, "scandal" was not defined as "someone's principled decision that I happen to disagree with".  

Interesting...

Yes, some people used "Semicha Scandal" to describe it. But even without using such words, I think that this is how this was framed in the news articles, etc., covering the story.

2) When trying to set legal precedent, it is common to find the most appealing, heart-wrenching case.

And I am sorry that Shalom's wife had been ill. But that doesn't make it "Your Semicha Or Your Wife".

The RIETS student in question, who asked to remain anonymous at this point, told The Jewish Week that his intention had been to have a one-time partnership minyan in his home so that his wife, who had been ill, could be called to the Torah and recite a blessing of gratitude after her recovery.

I may be reading it wrong, but it seems like he was working on the assumption that she could only say birchas hagomel if she herself was called to the Torah for an aliyah. Meanwhile, in my local shul, a woman said hagomel without receiving an aliyah.

And if she was not yet healthy enough to attend shul, or his local shul did not allow women to make this blessing, he could have had a normal minyan in his house, rather than a partnership minyan.

Did he not know this? Was he looking for a pretext? Or was the being called to the Torah also an important aspect of what she wished to do?

Then there is this:

In the meantime, the rabbinic student in question said that while his intent had been to host the partnership minyan just once, at the request of his wife, he is now is unwelcome in his community’s Orthodox synagogue, and he has held subsequent services in his home. Compounding the situation: “The people who came like it,” he said.

In the comment section, some "Anonymous coward" claims to be from his community and says he is indeed welcome in the shul. I don't know that we can trust Anonymous about this. But then again, the entire article is populated with anonymous sources.

Professor Lawrence Kaplan also in the comment section, writes how the student has what to base himself on, because:

If, as the story indicates, the student organized a one-time partnership minyan in his house to enable his wife to receive an aliyah and bentch Gomel, then Rabbi Penner's statement that no recognized posek allows such a services simply is NOT true. Rav Yehudah Herzl Henkin, the author of Bnai Banim and a recognized posek, in a response to to the original essay of Rabbi Mendel Shapiro allowing partnership minyanim, clearly states that while regular partnership minyanim in a synagogue or other public venue are not permitted an ad hoc partnership minyan held in a home or private venue may be permitted

But that assumption that it is just a "one-time partnership minyan" seems somewhat unwarranted. He has held other services (presumably partnership minyanim) in his home, and if he claims that is not welcome in the community's Orthodox synagogue, then these seem to be regular services. (Though it was left unclear where this lies, as it is not really a public venue, but it is regular and not ad-hoc.)

That "the people who came like it" should not "compound[] the situation". A leader does not follow the crowd's desire.

3) I wonder if this letter was leaked as a means to apply pressure to YU to cave. I hope not. They were already in discussion with him.

4) RIETS has a right to insist, if they are honestly professing their belief and imprimatur, that a student is מהתלתים שהגיעו להוראה, that the student will work within a certain framework of halacha.

And if this was before the rabbinical student received the semicha and he was already operating out of (what they believed is) that framework, then they should not grant him semicha. (That is not the same as revoking semicha for those who have already received it.)

5) A few points regarding Rabbi Josh Yuter's comment to the Forward:

Rabbi Josh Yuter, who received ordination from Y.U. in 2003 and now serves as the rabbi of Manhattan’s Stanton Street Synagogue, took issue with the assumptions underlying Penner’s letter, particularly that Y.U.-ordained rabbis do not have the authority to make Jewish legal decisions and are instead expected to defer to more recognized arbiters. 

“That’s not what semikha is,” Yuter told the Forward by phone. “That actually contradicts what it says on the semikha certificate.” He explained that the certificate’s wording makes clear that he has the authority to render decisions about what is forbidden and what is permitted according to Jewish law.

Rabbi Menachem Penner wrote (among other things, read the letter in full):

Ordination is a “stamp of approval” through which an institution asserts that its graduates represent the principles of its Yeshiva. The language written upon the klaf of each musmakh – “Yoreh Yoreh” does not imply unlimited permission to guide others in matters of Jewish law; it assumes that the musmakh will provide such hora’ah in keeping with the principles of the granting institution. Semikha is a “leaning upon” – a transfer of authority for Jewish law passed from one generation to the next, conferred upon the graduates of RIETS as they take their place in the Jewish community.

He might well be deriving that from what it says on the semicha certificate: וסמכנו אותו בסמיכת חכמים להורות לבני ישראל. With the leaning on the chachamim. (One can of course disagree with that diyuk, but it need not contradict, at least on this point.)

There were a number of assertions in the letter, so read the whole thing. I want to expand on some of the points.

A) When some rabbinical students receive semicha, even though the klaf says they were הגיעו להוראה, they weren't really.

I think that this is true, not just about Y.U. ordained rabbis but about rabbis in general, from a swath of other institutions, on both the right and the left. The text of semicha is fixed, but that doesn't mean that it is literally true in every case.

What do you call a rabbinical student who scored a 65 on all his semicha bechinos? "Rabbi."

Sometimes it is just time for a student to move on. Sometimes they will have a fulfilling career as an elementary school rebbe, or a high-school administrator, and they need and should receive the degree. And this is what the klaf happens to say. But they have no business paskening, despite what the klaf says.

B) There is a time and place to recognize when you are out of your element, and such humility is critical. So for relatively "minor" matters within the accredited fields, sure, you have the ability and granted authority to pasken. But not necessarily for the really big issues.

I will present a source or two which appears to demonstrate this idea, along the lines of וְשָׁפְטוּ אֶת-הָעָם, בְּכָל-עֵת:  אֶת-הַדָּבָר הַקָּשֶׁה יְבִיאוּן אֶל-מֹשֶׁה, וְכָל-הַדָּבָר הַקָּטֹן יִשְׁפּוּטוּ הֵם.

Sanhedrin 86b, the Mishna:

זקן ממרא על פי ב"ד שנאמר (דברים יז) כי יפלא ממך דבר למשפט שלשה בתי דינין היו שם אחד יושב על פתח הר הבית ואחד יושב על פתח העזרה ואחד יושב בלשכת הגזית באין לזה שעל פתח הר הבית ואומר כך דרשתי וכך דרשו חבירי כך לימדתי וכך לימדו חבירי אם שמעו אמר להם ואם לאו באין להן לאותן שעל פתח עזרה ואומר כך דרשתי וכך דרשו חבירי כך לימדתי וכך לימדו חבירי אם שמעו אמר להם ואם לאו אלו ואלו באין לב"ד הגדול שבלשכת הגזית שממנו יוצא תורה לכל ישראל שנאמר (דברים יז) מן המקום ההוא אשר יבחר ה' חזר לעירו שנה ולמד בדרך שהיה למד פטור ואם הורה לעשות חייב שנאמר (דברים יז) והאיש אשר יעשה בזדון אינו חייב עד שיורה לעשות תלמיד שהורה לעשות פטור נמצא חומרו קולו:

AN ELDER REBELLING AGAINST THE RULING OF BETH DIN' [IS STRANGLED],¹⁷  FOR IT IS WRITTEN IF THERE ARISE A MATTER TOO HARD FOR THEE FOR JUDGEMENT [etc.].¹⁸  THREE COURTS OF LAW WERE THERE,¹⁹  ONE SITUATE AT THE ENTRANCE TO THE TEMPLE MOUNT,²⁰  ANOTHER AT THE DOOR OF THE [TEMPLE] COURT,²¹  AND THE THIRD IN THE HALL OF HEWN STONES.²²  THEY²³  [FIRST] WENT TO THE BETH DINWHICH IS AT THE ENTRANCE TO THE TEMPLE MOUNT, AND HE [THE REBELLIOUS ELDER] STATED, THUS HAVE I EXPOUNDED AND THUS HAVE MY COLLEAGUES EXPOUNDED; THUS HAVE I TAUGHT, AND THUS HAVE MY COLLEAGUES TAUGHT. IF [THIS FIRST BETH DIN] HAD HEARD [A RULING ON THE MATTER], THEY STATE IT. IF NOT, THEY GO TO THE [SECOND BETH DIN] WHICH IS AT THE ENTRANCE OF THE TEMPLE COURT, AND HE DECLARES, THUS HAVE I EXPOUNDED AND THUS HAVE MY COLLEAGUES EXPOUNDED; THUS HAVE I TAUGHT AND THUS HAVE MY COLLEAGUES TAUGHT. IF [THIS SECOND BETH DIN] HAD HEARD [A RULING ON THE MATTER]. THEY STATE IT; IF NOT, THEY ALL PROCEED TO THE GREAT BETH DIN OF THE HALL OF HEWN STONES WHENCE INSTRUCTION ISSUED TO ALL ISRAEL, FOR IT IS WRITTEN, [WHICH THEY] OF THAT PLACE WHICH THE LORD SHALL CHOOSE [SHALL SHEW THEE].²⁴  IF HE RETURNED TO HIS TOWN AND TAUGHT AGAIN AS HERETOFORE, HE IS NOT LIABLE. BUT IF HE GAVE A PRACTICAL DECISION, HE IS GUILTY, FOR IT IS WRITTEN, AND THE MAN THAT WILL DO PRESUMPTUOUSLY,²⁵  [SHEWING] THAT HE IS LIABLE ONLY FOR A PRACTICAL RULING. BUT IF A DISCIPLE²⁶  GAVE A PRACTICAL DECISION [OPPOSED TO THE BETH DIN], HE IS EXEMPT:²⁷  THUS THE VERY STRINGENCY OF HIS [ORDINATION] IS [A SOURCE OF] LENIENCY FOR HIM.²⁸

It was possible for members of a Bet Din (who had received real semicha, and were higiu lehoraah) to not know the matter of law. And so they would consult with a greater Bet Din, and then an even greater Bet Din, and then an even greater Bet Din.

Because they had the humility and sense of responsibility to know that they are out of their element, and to consult with their rabo muvhak, or some other acknowledged expect, on the big questions. And that to act otherwise, even though they might have the certificate, would be rabbinic malpractice.

(Yes, we don't technically have a Sanhedrin nowadays. But the ethos is there and could be readily applied to present day situations.)

And there are issues (resolvable) of a student, even competent to rule, not ruling in the place of his Rav. E.g. Sanhedrin 5a:

Tanhum son of R. Ammi happened to be at Hatar, and in expounding the law to its inhabitants, taught them that they might soak the grain before grinding for Passover.¹⁰  But they said to him: Does not R. Mani of Tyre live here, and has it not been taught that a disciple should not give an halachic decision in the place where his teacher resides, unless there is a distance of three parasangs — the space occupied by the camp of Israel — between them? He answered: The point did not occur to me.

And Eruvin 62b:

Said Abaye to R. Joseph: We have a tradition, that ‘the teaching of R. Eliezer b. Jacob is small in quantity20 but well sifted’;21 and Rab Judah also laid down in the name of Samuel, ‘The halachah is in agreement with R. Eliezer b. Jacob;22 is it then permitted23 to a disciple24 to give a ruling accordingly25 in a district that is under the jurisdiction of his Master? — ‘Even’,the other replied, on the question of the permissibility of eating an egg26 with kutha,27 which I28 have been asking him29 throughout the lifetime of R. Huna,30 R. Hisda gave me31 no decision’.32

 R. Jacob b. Abba asked Abaye: Is it permitted to a disciple in a district under his Master's jurisdiction to give a ruling that was as authoritative as those contained in the Scroll of Fast-Days,33 which is a written and generally accepted document?34 — Thus, the other replied, said R. Joseph: Even on the question of the permissibility of eating an egg26 with kutha,27 which I28 have been asking him29 throughout the lifetime of R. Huna,30 R. Hisda gave me30 no decision.

 R. Hisda decided legal questions at Kafri35 in the lifetime of R. Huna.36 [Josh: This place wasn't in Rav Huna's direct jurisdiction]

R. Hamnuna decided legal points at Harta1 di Argiz2 during the lifetime of R. Hisda.3 Rabina examined the slaughterer's knife4 in Babylon.5 Said R. Ashi to him, ‘Why does the Master act in this manner?’ ‘Did not,’ the other replied: ‘R. Hamnuna decide legal points at Harta di Argiz during the lifetime of R. Hisda?’6 — ‘It was stated’, the first retorted: ‘that he did not decide legal points’. ‘The fact is’, the other replied: ‘that one statement was made that he did decide legal points while another was that he did not do so, and the explanation is that only during the lifetime of his Master R. Huna did he decide no legal points but during the lifetime of R. Hisda, who was both his colleague and disciple, he did decide legal points, and I too am the Master's colleague as well as disciple’

I would assume that these Amoraim were higiu lehoraah, and yet they did not decide matters of halacha -- even minor matters, it seems, within their rebbe's lifetime, when in the same vicinity. It was assumed that they would consult with and indeed defer to their teachers.

I wonder, if Rabbi Yuter had lived back then, if he would have objected to the assumption that

[Sura and Pumpedita]-ordained rabbis do not have the authority to make Jewish legal decisions and are instead expected to defer to more recognized arbiters. 

Presumably, Rabbi Yuter has a valid response and competing system of halacha, and an explanation of how this present-day situation is different. And also how deferring that these Amoraim did towards their teachers is not symptomatic of a "vertically-organized, pagan society", to cite one prominent Hakham.

But my point is that there is surely room for others (such as perhaps some roshei yeshiva in RIETS) to legitimately disagree, and there are plenty of Talmudic sources to lend their position credence.

And the Forward and their readership are not interested in, or capable of, providing such a nuanced picture. As such, giving them ammo to criticize YU is not something I would advise.