Is the Ran an apikores, by his own definition? part three

(See part one and part two.)

There is a famous statement of the Ran, in Derush 5 of Derashot HaRan. (See here.)

וכמו שנצטוינו לילך אחר הסכמתם במשפטי התורה כן נצטוינו לכל מה שאמרו לנו על צד הקבלה מהדעות ומדרשי הפסוקים, יהיה המאמר ההוא מצווה או לא יהיה ,ישראל הנוטה מדבריהם אפי׳ במה שאינו מביאורי המצוות הוא אפיקורוס ואין לו חלק לעוה״ב

In English:

“As we were commanded to follow the consensus [of the Sages] in the laws of the Torah, so we were commanded to [follow] everything they say to us from the aspect of tradition [Heb. al ẓad ha- kabbalah], from among ideas and midrashim of [Scriptural] verses, whether that statement is a miẓvah or not. A Jew who deviates from their words — even in that which does not pertain to explaining miẓvot — is a heretic [Heb. appikoros] and has no share toward the World to Come.”

And yet, as I noted in part one and part two of this short series, Ran himself argues with midrash and presents his own novel "peshat" interpretation of pesukim and Biblical history. Thus, despite a midrash that extends makkat bechorot even to firstborns of their father, Ran insists that it was only the firstborns to the mother, and that some trait associated with developing in a pristine womb was exploited to target only those firstborns. And despite a midrash that states that those building Migdal Bavel sinned by trying to overthrow the Almighty, Ran says that people would have to morons to try this, and instead it was a preemptive matter by Hashem to protect the monotheists from a global government which would grant them no quarter to flee.

If he argues with midrashim, dismisses them as reality like this, and offers his own interpretation, is he an apikores? Does he lose his share in the world to come?

This is something to grapple with, especially if you put forth this quote from the Ran to argue that others must accept all midrashim. And so the previous two posts were about grappling with this question. In this post, I present what I believe to be a strong answer.

It is based on what the Ran writes in Drush 6. The following is my rough translation:

And as the generations became more deficient in the days of Yeshaya, he saw that this heelem {concealment} which David intended {by reducing the mitzvot to eleven} to restore the damage, for they did not complete the eleven, and they selected out for them a smaller number of mitzvot than these which were plentiful in benefits such that they would fulfill them and merit in them. And therefore they established them at six.

And in the days of Micha, where they became even more deficient in completeness, they therefore established them at three. And the three which Micha said were {Micha 6:8}:

ח הִגִּיד לְךָ אָדָם, מַה-טּוֹב; וּמָה-ה' דּוֹרֵשׁ מִמְּךָ, כִּי אִם-עֲשׂוֹת מִשְׁפָּט וְאַהֲבַת חֶסֶד, וְהַצְנֵעַ לֶכֶת, עִם-אֱלֹהֶיךָ. {ס}

8 It hath been told thee, O man, what is good, and what the LORD doth require of thee: only to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God. {S}

And Raza"l explained (there) that asot mishpat are the laws; ve`ahavat chesed -- this is performing acts of kindness; ve`hatznea lechet -- this is taking out {escorting} the dead body and escorting the bride.

And are not these matters a kal vachomer? If things which are not of their way to be performed with hatznea {modest, unassuming}, things whose way is to be performed with tzin'a, all the more so! The aim with this is that even the things which are usually only performed with pirsum {promulgation}, such as those things which they are accustomed to do at the festivities of bridegrooms, it is not proper to increase their pirsum, but rather it is proper to minimize the pirsum as much as possible.

And it is proper, according to this, after the custom has spread to made a derasha at the time of the wedding, that they make the derush in the house of the wedding {rather than in the synagogue to great attendance}, for even in matters where the normal way is not to perform them privately, the Torah said "veHatznea lechet."

So ends my quote and translation from Drashos HaRan. What does this mean? And what is his concern for the derush made at the time of the wedding?!

It is time for a history lesson. The text to the right is taken from People of the Book, by Moshe Halbertal. It is a short excerpt, enough to get across the point, but read the whole couple of pages over at Google Books.

In my first red underline, we see that the famous controversy approximately that time was about a particular rationalist method of interpretation, extreme philosophical derash, in which the Biblical narrative was not historically true but was purely an allegory. Thus, Avraham and Sarah did not exist, but were merely allegories for the Aristotelian concepts of form and matter, tzurah and chomer. Abba Mari, as the text notes, was willing to accept allegorical interpretations of difficult Talmudic passages, presumably aggadah, in accordance with the Rambam. But this was taking it too far!

And this possibly heretical derasha which spurred Abba Mari to begin his campaign against this pattern and method of philosophical derash was one given at a wedding.

Turning back to the text of Derashot HaRan, IIRC, I've seen (I think in a critical edition of it) that the Ran, in discussing the propriety of making the derasha of a wedding feast in public or in private, was referring obliquely to this famous incident.

The next underlined text (above) refers to the great antinomial (against law, that is, undermining halacha) potential of this method of allegorical interpretation. If Avraham and Sarah can be said to be fictional and not intended literally, a next logical step would be to do the same for mitzvot and aveirot.

And the next underlined text (right), that there is a fine line between these two, and the allegorizers were accused of harboring a secret intention to cross that line.

Turning back to the Ran's condemnation of certain people who deny the truth of Chazal's traditional interpretation of Scriptures, he wrote:

“As we were commanded to follow the consensus [of the Sages] in the laws of the Torah, so we were commanded to [follow] everything they say to us from the aspect of tradition [Heb. al ẓad ha- kabbalah], from among ideas and midrashim of [Scriptural] verses, whether that statement is a miẓvah or not. A Jew who deviates from their words — even in that which does not pertain to explaining miẓvot — is a heretic [Heb. appikoros] and has no share toward the World to Come.”

Assuming that he is targeting the allegorizers of Scripture, as I strongly suspect, he is saying that of course if they allegorize the commandments, and in doing so undermine and reject the traditional understanding and interpretation of pesukim relating to mitzvot, they are certainly apikorsim. There is no novelty there. But even if they don't, but just restrict themselves to allegorizing narrative, against the tradition of meaning of those verses, they are already heretics. But the connection was already there because of the aforementioned "fine line."

Abba Mari lived towards the end of the 13th century, and was joined in this by Rashba (1235-1310), who strongly opposed this new method of interpretation which allegorized Biblical history; and imposed a restriction on young men, under the age of 30, from learning secular philosophy or the sciences, except for medicine. (Much as was done in other contexts for the study of kabbalah.) Ran lived in Barcelona just after Rashba (1320-1380), and he would presumably be very cognizant of this dispute. Yet he himself knows philosophy, especially that of Rambam and Ibn Ezra, and Derashot HaRan is a philosophical work.

Even so (if I may put forth the argument), there is philosophy and there is philosophy. Cleaving to philosophy in a way that makes the Biblical text entirely fiction in pursuit of an allegory not only "falsifies" Scripture, but also effectively denies all of the narrative midrash of Chazal. Unless of course one finds a "pnimiyus" interpretation in every single midrash assuming the existence of Biblical figures. I don't know if they were doing this, though Shadal does speak of philosophical derash reinterpreting psukim as well as maamarei Chazal. Even if one does this and is not explicitly against Chazal, for someone who does not believe that such reinterpretation indeed true, then they are in effect arguing against Chazal and putting in place a foreign belief system.

If all this is correct, then it makes perfect sense that while labelling as heretics those who would dismiss and argue with aggada, or the traditional interpretation of pesukim, Ran could still offer his own novel insights and midrashic interpretations. Ibn Ezra, who Ran speaks of positively in derashot haRan, is no heretic, despite arguing on quite a number of occassions with the midrashic interpretation, in ways in which the midrash could not be simultaneously true. This is all no problem, because Ran's target is a much more drastic one. Individual medieval parshanim might argue on a given midrash all the time, and some might even reject many midrashim and adopt a more peshat-oriented approach as most truthful. But they are working within a framework of pardes. And at the very least, they accept that there is a peshat. But these allegorizers would deny that there is any peshat at all, undermining quite a fundamental. It is all to be interpreted on the level of philosophical derash. It is easy to see how he might label an allegorizer an apikores.