You may wish to first read part one and part two of this article.

What and When: An Academic Approach
We now approach the same issue from an academic approach. We argue here that the brayta actually intended nullification of actual chametz, even during Pesach, that the Amoraim agree to this fact, and that the reinterpretation of the brayta comes solely from the setama digmara. There is a slight problem with this, in that Rav Acha bar Yaakov, an Amora, is the one who gives the reinterpretation, but we will partially resolve this in this section and fully resolve this at a later stage. The end result of all this is that the brayta definitively states that nullification of actual chametz should be used rather than leaving the study hall, an approach that we will later see contradicts other Tannaitic sources.

Once again, the brayta in question reads:

The simplest reading of this brayta is that it refers to nullification of actual chametz, even on Pesach itself. However, the setama digmara finds such a statement problematic, since he maintains that once the chametz becomes prohibited, nullification is also ineffective.

Let us consider the gemara in Pesachim 6b-7a:

The gemara begins with Rav Yehuda citing Rav that even though one searched for chametz, he should still nullify the chametz. What is the reason for this requirement? Apparently, small crumbs of chametz which are considered unimportant by the owner are of no consequence. Thus, one does not violate for owning them on Pesach. If so, why bother to nullify if all that will be left after a thorough search will be these crumbs? Rava answers that this is all a Rabbinic decree lest the owner find a tasty loaf which he considers important and not like small crumbs.

The setama digmara is bothered by Rava's answer, for if he indeed finds a tasty loaf, let him nullify it then! The setama digmara answers that the concern which Rava is highlighting is that he might find it after the prohibition has already set in, and based on a certain Tannaitic source, once the prohibition has set in, nullification is not effective.

However, we should consider whether the setama digmara's question is a strong one. The simplest understanding of Rava's statement is that this is a decree lest he find a tasty loaf during Pesach, rather than mere crumbs, and thus violate the sin of owning chametz on Pesach. If he finds it during Pesach (rather than just from the time that the prohibition has set in at 6 hours on erev Pesach), then until this point he was an owner of chametz on Pesach. Who cares, then, that he can nullify it when he finds it?! He has already violated bal yeraeh and bal yimatzei before this point! Thus, Rava needs no explanation, and the setama digmara's explanation may actually take us away from the truth of the matter.

The setama digmara does not understand Rava's statement as referring to someone who found chametz on Pesach, but rather to someone who found chametz on erev Pesach. Thus, the setama can ask, "let him nullify the loaf at four hours or at five hours?" This is only a question assuming that the finding of the chametz was done on erev Pesach, and so the setama's answer is that the person will neglect doing this for whatever reason. However, I posit that Rava is actually talking about the owner finding the tasty loaf on Pesach itself, and would thus be in violation of Biblical law, and so they made a decree to prevent this from happening. If so, the setama digmara is asking based on an incorrect reading of Rava, and we need no explanation of Rava's statement.

The setama digmara explains Rava's statement based on a statement of Rabbi Eleazar who was citing Rabbi Yishmael. This statement is: דא"ר אלעזר שני דברים אינן ברשותו של אדם ועשאן הכתוב כאילו ברשותו ואלו הן בור ברשות הרבים וחמץ משש שעות ולמעלה. This statement is actually transferred from a sugya in Bava Kamma 29b-30a, where the primary point of discussion is the pit in the public domain: דר"א הוא דאמר חייב דאמר רבי אלעזר משום רבי ישמעאל שני דברים אינן ברשותו של אדם ועשאן הכתוב כאילו הן ברשותו ואלו הן בור ברשות הרבים וחמץ משש [שעות] ולמעלה.

We should consider two points in terms of this statement by Rabbi Eleazar citing Rabbi Yishmael. We should consider a) whether this actually was intended to mean that one cannot nullify chametz once the prohibition has set in and b) whether we actually rule in accordance with this citation of Rabbi Yishmael. Indeed, a careful analysis of our sugya and of the sugya in Bava Kamma reveals that a) it is quite likely that Rabbi Yishmael did not mean to invalidate nullification once the prohibition had set in, and b) even if the statement of Rabbi Eleazar means what the setama digmara claims it does, not only does the gemara in Bava Kamma rule against (the first portion of) the statement of Rabbi Eleazar citing Rabbi Yishmael, but even Rabbi Yishmael rules against the statement and is only citing the opinion of his teacher while he himself rules differently. If so, statement by Rabbi Eleazar should not be used to explain Rava, as it is uncertain that Rava would agree to it, or that the other Amoraim would agree that this should be used to set the halacha.

Bava Kamma 29b-30a:

We can see how one can get the impression from this that Rabbi Eleazar is stating that nullification is ineffective from six hours and on. After all, the statement is that שני דברים אינן ברשותו של אדם ועשאן הכתוב כאילו הן ברשותו ואלו הן בור ברשות הרבים וחמץ משש [שעות] ולמעלה. This speaks of items not in his possession. If chametz from six hours and on is not in his possession, then it may easily follow that he cannot nullify it. Yet, Scriptures places it as if it is in his possession, and so he violates owning chametz on Pesach. Or alternatively, even though he nullifies it from six hours and on, thus making it not in his possession, Scriptures places it back in his possession such that he violates.

Let us consider the first of the two cases, בור ברשות הרבים. The initial assumption of the gemara in Bava Kamma is that this statement is relevant to the case of מפקיר נזקיו. After all, a בור ברשות הרבים does not belong to him but rather to the public, yet Scriptures places it as if in his possession such that he is liable for any damage caused. The point is that this is an exception to the general rule that one must own what does the damage. Similarly, if one removes his ownership from some item that he owns that can do damage, he is still responsible for it. Yet, this is an extension of the original statement. Perhaps -- indeed, it is somewhat likely -- this is a novelty specifically by בור ברשות הרבים and should not be applied to damaging items which are explicitly declared out of the

In the end, perhaps the gemara establishes Rabbi Yochanan in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Eleazar citing Rabbi Yishmael. The setama digmara certainly establishes that Rabbi Eleazar actually declares מפקיר נזקיו exempt, and does not rely on this statement that בור ברשות הרבים is not in his domain but the Torah places it in his domain. He is only citing the opinion of his teacher, even as he disagrees with it. Yet we need not equate Rabbi Yishmael's statement to a statement that מפקיר נזקיו חייב. If so, Rabbi Eleazar could even agree with his teacher, while not relying on the statement one way or another in terms of the case of מפקיר נזקיו.

If the first case of the statement, of בור ברשות הרבים, is not actually telling us that one is legally incapable of declaring a damaging item hefker, then perhaps similarly, the second case in the statement, of חמץ משש שעות ולמעלה, is not actually telling us that one if legally incapable of declaring chametz after six hours hefker, or rather, batel.

Rather, the simplest meaning of the statement is this: After six hours into the day on erev Pesach, chametz is forbidden in benefit and as a result is as if it does not exist. As Rav Gidel stated: אמר רב גידל אמר ר' חייא בר יוסף אמר רב המקדש משש שעות ולמעלה אפילו בחיטי קורדניתא אין חוששין לקידושין. This is similar to what would happen if one attempted to marry a woman with an ashera or something from an ir hanidachat *{*confirm this to be true} -- it is forbidden in benefit, and in fact כתותי מכתת שיעוריה, so it is of no substance, and so of course one cannot marry with it. Rabbi Yishmael seems to be saying something similar here. If chametz is forbidden in benefit to the extent that one cannot even marry a woman with it -- either because it does not legally exist or because the prohibited benefit to him is such that it is not even in his possession to the extent that his betrothal would be effective -- then why should he violate bal yera`eh or bal yimatzei? The answer is the same as the answer for why one is liable for damages from a pit in the public domain, which he does not own -- Scriptures placed it in his possession to the extent that he does in fact violate these prohibitions.

Thus, the statement of Rabbi Eleazar citing Rabbi Yishmael does not explicitly address whether one is capable of nullifying chametz after the prohibition has set in. The question then becomes whether we can derive that bittul is legally ineffective either from Rabbi Eleazar's statement or from Rav Gidel's statement.

At first glance, this derivation should be straightforward. If prohibited chametz is not truly in one's possession in that he cannot, for example, betroth a woman with it, then other acquisitions and transfers of ownership may also be ineffective. Thus, it may well follow that one cannot declare it hefker, transferring ownership of the chametz out of his possession. (footnote?: Or alternatively, we may say that his inability to betroth a woman with it shows that he does not really own it now, so hefker adds nothing -- the Torah just reckons it as in his possession for the purpose of holding him liable.)

This derivation only follows if bittul is identical to hefker. Only then would it follow that bittul/hefker, as a type of acquisition/property transfer, would not take effect on the prohibited chametz. However, there is good reason to assume that bittul is not identical to hefker. The brayta under discussion in this paper reads:
and, as we mentioned earlier, one of the primary novel laws this brayta teaches is that even though in general, kinyan is prohibited on Shabbat by Rabbinic decree lest one come to write, bittul is effective on Shabbat and Yom Tov. Meanwhile, hefker is considered a kinyan and is prohibited on Shabbat and Yom Tov.

Whether bittul is the same as hefker is in fact the subject of a dispute among Rishonim. Bittul differs from hefker in this law, but perhaps this is an exception to the general decree. However, bittul differs from hefker in other respects as well (such as what type of act is required).

We might say that bittul is simply declaring it to be considered by him to be like the dust of the earth, and thus like the crumbs mentioned above, for which one does not violate. If bittul is not hefker, then it makes sense that one may perform bittul on Shabbat and Yom Tov. If bittul is not hefker, then it does not follow that one cannot perform it once the prohibition has set it. If so, then there is no reason to object to the brayta referring to nullification of actual chametz, rather than dough which is about to become chametz, on Pesach.

Indeed, the brayta itself is brought up as a contradiction to the assumption by the setama that one cannot nullify chametz once the prohibition has set it. After all, it states אחד שבת ואחד יום טוב, and Yom Tov must refer to Pesach. Rather than accept that the brayta directly contradicts this assumption that one cannot nullify, and then consider a different explanation of Rava's statement, Rav Yaakov bar Acha's statement is brought, which reinterprets the brayta as referring to dough which has not yet become chametz:


Even if we admit the reinterpretation of this brayta, we have other sources that appear to allow nullification even after the prohibition has set in. For example, the Mishna on Pesachim 49a begins:


If he is already about to slaughter his Pesach sacrifice, then it is already midday, which is the time of slaughtering. Perhaps this is before midday, and he is only "on his way" to slaughter? Yet, the Mishna mentions that he should nullify the chametz if he does not have time to return and destroy, and return and burn. This implies that it is after chatzot. (However, one could simply answer that his house is far away and he would not have time.) Perhaps this Mishna also refers to dough which is not yet chametz? Whereas Rav Yaakov bar Acha was able to make such a derivation by careful analysis from the words of the brayta, there is no similar derivation here.

We now returning to the issue of Rav Yaakov bar Acha's statement. This is the strongest evidence that the brayta does not refer to actual chametz, and thus to the setama's assumption that one cannot nullify chametz once the prohibition has set in. After all, this is an interpretation by an Amora. The Amora thus clearly accepts the setama's assumptions about the efficacy of nullification, and so the setama is just making this assumption explicit when analysing the statement of Rava and interpreting the statements of Rabbi Eleazar and Rav Gidel. Alternatively, this is evidence that the setama here is not post-Amoraic.

Yet Rav Yaakov bar Acha's statement is not without difficulties. Firstly, why should an Amora respond do and reinterpret a brayta to fit with the setama digmara which is not yet in existence (though of course, this is begging the question).

Secondly, the close analysis of the brayta does not seem to logically produce the fact that we are dealing with dough rather than chametz. The close analysis is דיקא נמי דקתני היה יושב בתוך בית המדרש שמע מינה. Why should the fact that he was sitting in the study hall produce the result that chametz referred to in the brayta is dough which is not yet chametz?

Thirdly, there is extraneous material in Rav Yaakov bar Acha's statement. He states הכא בתלמיד יושב לפני רבו עסקינן ונזכר שיש עיסה מגולגלת בתוך ביתו ומתיירא שמא תחמיץ קדים ומבטיל ליה מיקמי דתחמיץ. Why mention that this case is one of a student sitting before his teacher? What relevance does this have to the fact that chametz refers to dough and not actual chametz?

Fourthly, there is a sudden shift between Hebrew and Aramaic in Rav Yaakov bar Acha's statement. הכא בתלמיד יושב לפני רבו עסקינן ונזכר שיש עיסה מגולגלת בתוך ביתו is basically Hebrew, with the exception of the bracketing הכא and עסקינן. Meanwhile, ומתיירא שמא תחמיץ קדים ומבטיל ליה מיקמי דתחמיץ is clearly Aramaic. Sudden shifts from Hebrew to Aramaic often reveal that the setama has been at word explicating the brief words of the named Amora. Further, stylistically, the statement is so constructed that הכא בתלמיד יושב לפני רבו עסקינן appears as one unit, with עסקינן closing it, and the continuation (in Hebrew) of ונזכר seems additional. Why put the irrelevant statement before the עסקינן and the main point -- that chametz it is not actually chametz, afterwards.

I would suggest that Rav Acha bar Yaakov's statement was originally הכא בתלמיד יושב לפני רבו עסקינן and the rest is simply elaboration and explanation by the setama. Rav Acha is trying to establish this case as referring to someone not merely sitting in the study hall, but rather sitting before his teacher. This is reinforced by careful analysis of the brayta. After all, it states that he was יושב within the study hall. This word יושב can be read as a technical term referring to sitting before one's teacher. Thus, he was sitting before his teacher in the study hall.

What would impel Rav Yaakov bar Acha to interpret the brayta to refer to this specific case? And, what is the relevance of the specific case of sitting before one's teacher? We have here an answer to a specific difficulty, but we have not yet learned what the difficulty is! In the next part of this paper, we will discover exactly what this difficulty is -- a seeming contradiction between this brayta and other Tannaitic sources as to whether one should leave off study in order to dispose of chametz or whether he should rather continue his study and rely upon nullification. The setama took Rav Yaakov bar Acha resolution to a different question on the brayta and applied as a resolution to his own question of the brayta stating that one can nullify chametz on Pesach itself. This reinterpretation of Rav Yaakov bar Acha led to all the irregularities and difficulties mentioned above.

If so, we should not adopt the reinterpretation of the brayta that it refers to dough about to become chametz. The brayta means exactly what it says, and is proof that one is in fact capable of nullifying chametz even after the prohibition has set in. This also removes the need to establish אחד שבת as Shabbat as specifically Shabbat erev Pesach. Thus, the brayta refers to nullification of actual chametz both on erev Pesach and throughout Pesach, whether on Shabbat or a weekday.