One thing that has always interested me is the middot sheHaTorah nidreshet bahen, the hermeneutic rules by which halachah is derived from the text. It is somewhat impractical nowadays since our job is no longer to arrive at halachah directly from the text, but rather to make use of halachic facts already derived by such means in the mishna, tosefta, brayta, and gemara. Knowledge of these rules are handy when learning these sources, if one wants to fully understand them, but but they are more often forgotten until needed, and then one recalls the principles being used as they are used by the gemara. They are treated as purely mechanical devices, and I doubt many read a chumash, spot the place to apply these rules, and then apply them.
Shema Yisrael has a useful chart detailing the application of the rules of prat and klal, and ribbui and miut, which I want to make use of.
Looking at the rules of klal and prat, it strikes me that they are not merely mechanical, arbitrary rules used to produce halacha. They also make sense from the perspective of literary analysis. I offer here a possible justification and explanation of klal and prat, though my examples do not necessarily match every instance of klal and prat's appearance.
Klal means a general statement. Prat means a specific statement. Based on the presence and order of these features in a pasuk or group of psukim, certain things are included or excluded in a law.
1. Klal ufrat - general term followed by specific term or terms - the only elements in the law are those mentioned in the prat.
This makes a lot of sense. Consider the following sentence:
I went to the store and bought a bunch of produce: oranges, apples, grapes, and melons.
Note the colon. The list of specific items following the general description of all of them implies that what follows defines, and gives a comprehensive list, of the "bunch of produce" purchased.
2. Prat uchlal - specific term/s followed by general term - just look to the general term, and the list of specific terms do not limit at all.
This also makes sense. Consider the following sentence:
I went to the store and bought oranges, apples, grapes, melons, and a whole bunch of produce.
or
I went to the store and bought oranges, apples, grapes, melons - a whole bunch of produce.
Here we do not get the impression anymore that the list is meant to be comprehensive. Instead, we get a bunch of concrete examples of the general term, but the general term is what rules the day. Other types of produce - such as cucumbers, might have also been purchased.
(Why then write the prat - and in the first instance, why then write the klal? Tosafot offers an answer - see the chart mentioned above - but this is not an issue from our standpoint, which is purely that of literary analysis.)
3. Klal ufrat uchlal - general term, then specific, then general again - things such as that mentioned in the prat are included. One could say that the prat is being used twice, Once to form a klal ufrat, and then to form a prat uchlal, and so we find a compromise.
I would say that the prat serves to define the first klal, but that prat is being opened to include similar things by the final klal. Consider an example:
I went to the store and bought a whole bunch of produce: oranges, apples, grapes, melons - different crops.
Again, just as in the first example, we have the colon. What follows "produce" is meant to be a definitive list, defining what is meant by produce. However, "different crops" serves as a type of etectera, to say that this list is not comprehensive. Thus, the list, the prat, is definitive but not comprehensive. Since the list funtions to define the the klal, the etc. must be including things of the same type as those explicitly mentioned. Thus, the prat-klal formation at the end of the sentence serves to define and limit "produce" to fruit, as opposed to vegetables such as cucumbers (which I would have otherwise thought were included since they are also produce.)
4. Prat uchlal ufrat. Specific term, followed by general, followed by specific - same, or very similar to above. That is, things similar to the prat (or in this case, pratim) are included.
An example:
I went to the store and bought bananas, nectarines, and a whole bunch of [other] produce: [such as] oranges, apples, grapes, and melons.
Here, the progression to klal (produce) again implies an etcetera. Thus, not only what is mentioned, but everything in the conclusion is meant. But the conclusion is both a klal and a prat, so we are including not just the unrestricted produce, but a generic as defined by the particulars listed after the colon. Thus, the listed examples are examples and not a complete list, to give an idea of what is meant to be included in the general. Thus, once again we are including things similar to the prat.
{This last example and analysis leaves something to be desired, and perhaps I can update in the future with something better, than also captures the difference between 3 and 4, in that 4 must be similar in two respects rather than only one, according to the comments on the chart.
Any suggestions?
Also, many klal/prat situations do not involve the same sentence, but I am just laying out a possible motivation for the rules.
}
Monday, January 31, 2005
More on the ban
Gil Student posted a letter circulating via email about the ban. Ill repost it, and then explain why I think it is rather silly.
Assume for a moment that these famous rabbis actually believe that there is kefirah, heresy, in these books, and in these ideas. (I personally do not think there is, but that is well beside the point, which is that in their world view, it is.) I would guess that they do in fact believe this, or would not have signed the ban. (This is so even if they are in fact wrong - they would still believe that they are right.)
If so, would the fact that many have been affected and are hurt matter? Should it?
Imagine for a moment it were a more concrete, non-halachic matter.
Forgive me for making this comparison - no insult is intended - but imagine that rather than a group of roshei yeshiva, it were a group of doctors at Columbia Presbyterian Hospital, and rather than diagnosing heresy, they diagnosed syphilis, in a very popular prostitute. Let us say that many people will be affected - they will now know they contracted the disease, and passed it on to others. They will feel terrible, and terribly guilty. As a result, a letter goes out for the people showing the symptoms in question to phone up the doctors to let them know how much their diagnosis hurt them. If the doctors understood how much these people were being emotionally hurt, perhaps they would retract their diagnosis.
Would they? Should they?
Of course not. Knowing how many people were affected would encourage them more to let these people know that they have contracted a disease, so that they could receive treatment. Since the disease is spreading so much, and if not counteracted, will continue to spread, the doctors would make it even more widely known. If they silenced themselves, people would think there was no problem and still more would contract the disease.
Because we do not really give much care nowadays to theology, and especially because of an modern pluralistic ethic, we do not consider heresy as concrete and awful as syphilis, claims in that email to the contrary.
What if it were a halachic issue that did not have to do with theology. A slaughterhouse was found to be using shechita practices which were non-acceptable even bidi'eved, and a group of rabbis found out about it. Further, the slaughterhouse insisted that they would continue using the same process. The rabbis announce that meat from this slaughterhouse in not kosher, and will not be kosher in the future. In response, a group of people call them up to say how much they have been emotionally hurt by the ruling. They ate this meat in their chulent! They served the masses this meat at their kiddush! Further, a large group of meat-eaters who will exclusively eat this brand intends to continue to eat this brand, feeling that there is nothing wrong with it, and they are writing them out of the kosher-meat-eating community!
Would the rabbis change their psak? Should they.
Finally, imagine instead of the current issues and rabbis, the issue was the corporeality of God and the rabbi was the Rambam.
Would he be persuaded by the argument of: hurt feelings, and that many (including rabbis) hold this belief? He wasn't.
Now, I think that these rabbis who signed the ban are incorrect in labelling this heresy, and there are many rabbis who would feel the same. But they would probably be in the Modern Orthodox rather than yeshivish world, for there is a big distinction in how people in each group relate to science and modernity. This has not been the first time in our history that this type of dispute has played out. It should prove interesting.
Note that a major assumption in the email is that these rabbis are being played, and swayed, by people with more chutzpah than we, and that they have been misled into labelling this kefirah. It suggests letting them know of the pain and the extent of the issue regardless, and stresses the pain whether or not they are correct. I doubt they would sign a ban if they did not actually believe it to be kefirah, but I could always be wrong. But it strikes me as misguided. This petition is a bit better, but I have other issues with it...
I received from a friend this e-mail that seems to be circulating. Even though I am hesitant to put it up, particularly given my business considerations, I have decided to do so with a slightly edited version. I am also concerned about giving out personal information over the web, but since it only directs readers to the phone book I figure there is no harm in that.What do I find odd about it? The part where the fact that many are hurt by it, and are effected by it.The recent ban on Rabbi Slifkin's books has far-reaching repercussions that need to be expressed. When a matter of this nature is brought to the attention of a rosh yeshiva, the voices he hears most loudly and frequently are those of the people who have the time and desire (and sometimes chutzpah) to place themselves directly in his path. They call him at all hours and show up at his yeshiva and other functions he attends, all to press the issue and the viewpoint that they advocate.UPDATE: To clarify, this is not a call to harrass these eminent scholars. If you want to speak with them and express your thoughts and questions, call them on the phone. But do not harrass them or treat them disrespectfully.
The antagonists of Rabbi Slifkin have the time, ability and chutzpah to make their voices heard. All of the others who are affected by this ban must now make their voices heard.
The ban has caused immense pain among many. You, the reader, might be a rebbe or teacher who has been instructing students for years and trying to strengthen their faith in traditional Judaism. You have just been told that the views you were taught and are teaching is heresy. The hundreds of students who have passed through your classrom were taught kefirah by you. I can only imagine the distress you must be feeling. Were you and your rebbeim spreading lies? Have you, instead of increasing belief, been distancing students from Jewish belief? Is this not causing you to question the sacrifices you have made to teach students and whether you are fit to teach? I can only imagine the pain you must be going through.
Kiruv workers, NCSY advisors, friendly professionals who speak with non-observant colleagues, etc. Have you been spreading heretical beliefs? Have you, in your attempts to bring others closer to Judaism, actually been feeding them views that are counter to our tradition? In this group, I include myself and I feel the pain. Those who banned these books have just declared that I have been spreading heresy, and that hurts. They have just declared that I, and everyone I have influenced, are outside the pale of Orthodox Judaism. If they are right, then I am guilty of very serious offenses that make me shudder. If they are wrong, or never intended it this way, then I am even more hurt.
They have effectively announced that Rav Aryeh Kaplan and all of the many Jews who were influenced by him are heretics. Everyone who had some contact with him surely feels pain over this. Was Rav Kaplan really a heretic? All those college students who became frum because of him, are they really closet heretics? Is the frum community really so infected by this heresy? Baalei tshuvah, in particular, must be extremely hurt by this declaration that, in truth, they have never become truly frum.
They have disqualified just about every member of the Association of Orthodox Jewish Scientists. Should the group be disbanded? Every member of AOJS, and every Jew who respects the doctors and scientists who dedicate their lives to Torah and science, should be hurt by this.
Every shul rabbi who has discussed this topic has infected his congregants with heresy. Can that damage ever be undone? Has the rabbi unwittingly harmed the souls of the people who were placed in his charge? The distress many are going through is unimaginable.
It is likely that the roshei yeshiva have not yet heard from people who have been hurt by the ban. Shouldn't they hear from us how much pain and confusion people are suffering? If we want to balance out the personal influence that those with louder voices have on the roshei yeshiva, we need to voice our pain. Let the roshei yeshiva know that we have been hurt. With one fell swoop, thousands of Bnei Torah who have dedicated their lives to Yahadus have been written off. We, our rabbeim and our students have been pushed michutz lamachaneh. Let us call up Rav Dovid Feinstein, Rav Malkiel Kotler, Rav Matisyahu Salomon and the others, and, with all the tremendous respect that they deserve, express from our hearts how much we have been hurt. Let us pour out our souls, cry over the phone, share our grief over the position in which we have suddenly been placed. Let us express the enormous pain that this ban has caused and beg either for clarifications or at least sympathy.
I ask every reader to forward this message along to anyone to whom you think this may be relevant. Each one who signed the ban against Rav Slifkin should be called until you personally get through to him and express your personal pain. Be respectful. Be humble. Be honest. And be persistent. Keep calling until you get through to him. Leave specific messages and keep calling until you speak directly with the rosh yeshiva and relay to him your personal pain. He needs to hear it from each and every one of us.
I do not think it is appropriate to post phone numbers in this venue. However, try the phone book www.whitepages.com
Rav Malkiel Kotler is listed in Lakewood, NJ under the name A M Kotler
Rav Matisyahu Salomon is listed in Lakewood, NJ under the name M Salomon
Rav Elyah Wachtfogel is listed in Fallsburg, NY under the name Eli Wachtfogel
Rav Chaim Stein is listed in Wickliffe, OH under the name Chaim Stein
Rav Dovid Feinstein can be reached at his yeshiva, listed in NY, NY as Mesivtha Tifereth Jerusalem
Rav Meyer Hershkowitz is listed in Stamford, CT as Meyer Hershkowitz
Rav Raphael Schorr is listed in Monsey, NY as Raphael Schorr
Assume for a moment that these famous rabbis actually believe that there is kefirah, heresy, in these books, and in these ideas. (I personally do not think there is, but that is well beside the point, which is that in their world view, it is.) I would guess that they do in fact believe this, or would not have signed the ban. (This is so even if they are in fact wrong - they would still believe that they are right.)
If so, would the fact that many have been affected and are hurt matter? Should it?
Imagine for a moment it were a more concrete, non-halachic matter.
Forgive me for making this comparison - no insult is intended - but imagine that rather than a group of roshei yeshiva, it were a group of doctors at Columbia Presbyterian Hospital, and rather than diagnosing heresy, they diagnosed syphilis, in a very popular prostitute. Let us say that many people will be affected - they will now know they contracted the disease, and passed it on to others. They will feel terrible, and terribly guilty. As a result, a letter goes out for the people showing the symptoms in question to phone up the doctors to let them know how much their diagnosis hurt them. If the doctors understood how much these people were being emotionally hurt, perhaps they would retract their diagnosis.
Would they? Should they?
Of course not. Knowing how many people were affected would encourage them more to let these people know that they have contracted a disease, so that they could receive treatment. Since the disease is spreading so much, and if not counteracted, will continue to spread, the doctors would make it even more widely known. If they silenced themselves, people would think there was no problem and still more would contract the disease.
Because we do not really give much care nowadays to theology, and especially because of an modern pluralistic ethic, we do not consider heresy as concrete and awful as syphilis, claims in that email to the contrary.
What if it were a halachic issue that did not have to do with theology. A slaughterhouse was found to be using shechita practices which were non-acceptable even bidi'eved, and a group of rabbis found out about it. Further, the slaughterhouse insisted that they would continue using the same process. The rabbis announce that meat from this slaughterhouse in not kosher, and will not be kosher in the future. In response, a group of people call them up to say how much they have been emotionally hurt by the ruling. They ate this meat in their chulent! They served the masses this meat at their kiddush! Further, a large group of meat-eaters who will exclusively eat this brand intends to continue to eat this brand, feeling that there is nothing wrong with it, and they are writing them out of the kosher-meat-eating community!
Would the rabbis change their psak? Should they.
Finally, imagine instead of the current issues and rabbis, the issue was the corporeality of God and the rabbi was the Rambam.
Would he be persuaded by the argument of: hurt feelings, and that many (including rabbis) hold this belief? He wasn't.
Now, I think that these rabbis who signed the ban are incorrect in labelling this heresy, and there are many rabbis who would feel the same. But they would probably be in the Modern Orthodox rather than yeshivish world, for there is a big distinction in how people in each group relate to science and modernity. This has not been the first time in our history that this type of dispute has played out. It should prove interesting.
Note that a major assumption in the email is that these rabbis are being played, and swayed, by people with more chutzpah than we, and that they have been misled into labelling this kefirah. It suggests letting them know of the pain and the extent of the issue regardless, and stresses the pain whether or not they are correct. I doubt they would sign a ban if they did not actually believe it to be kefirah, but I could always be wrong. But it strikes me as misguided. This petition is a bit better, but I have other issues with it...
Friday, January 28, 2005
Acceptable and unacceptable "heresy"
I have what to say on the Rav Slifkin book ban issue, but I want to measure my words carefully, and so I don't know if I will ever got to posting something substantive on the matter. On the one hand, I would agree with many of the statements labelled heretical, while on the other hand I understand the impetus to declare the boundaries of acceptable Jewish theology. It is a non-trivial subject.
I would just like to point out, however, the contrast between people's reactions to bans/declarations of heresy on that which they agree with/feel comfortable with, and that which they do not.
Specifically, you have Rav Slifkin's views on the age of the universe and the fallibility/infallibility of Chazal when it comes to scientific matters. Many would agree with him (including Rishonim/Acharonim!), and consider attempts to label such an opinion as heretical as backwards and ill-advised.
Similarly, Marc Shapiro's book on the limits of Orthodox theology, which attempts to show that the Rambam's ikkarei emuna (principles of faith) were not universally held or accepted in their entirety, or as understood by the Rambam, is viewed favorably, perhaps in part because it supports privately held discomfort or disagreement with certain ikkarei emuna.
On the other hand, you have messianic Lubavitch, which holds that mashiach can come from the dead, and thus the Rebbe can still be mashiach. They also have sources, admittedly few, and in some cases not well known, but neither are Marc Shapiro's sources entirely mainstream. Yet the same people who would champion the first two would label this belief as heretical, and would write the belief as outside the pale of acceptable Orthodox theology. Dr. David Berger's book talks of the scandal of Orthodox indifference, in that we are not writing them outside of acceptable Orthodox belief, and the same folks who would denounce the idea that an idea could be labelled heretical in the first two cases would agree with, or at least find nothing wrong with, the idea in the final instance.
It is funny to see FailedMessiah.Com promoting on one sidebar Marc Shapiro's book and Rav Slifkin's book, and Dr. Berger's book on the other.
I would just like to point out, however, the contrast between people's reactions to bans/declarations of heresy on that which they agree with/feel comfortable with, and that which they do not.
Specifically, you have Rav Slifkin's views on the age of the universe and the fallibility/infallibility of Chazal when it comes to scientific matters. Many would agree with him (including Rishonim/Acharonim!), and consider attempts to label such an opinion as heretical as backwards and ill-advised.
Similarly, Marc Shapiro's book on the limits of Orthodox theology, which attempts to show that the Rambam's ikkarei emuna (principles of faith) were not universally held or accepted in their entirety, or as understood by the Rambam, is viewed favorably, perhaps in part because it supports privately held discomfort or disagreement with certain ikkarei emuna.
On the other hand, you have messianic Lubavitch, which holds that mashiach can come from the dead, and thus the Rebbe can still be mashiach. They also have sources, admittedly few, and in some cases not well known, but neither are Marc Shapiro's sources entirely mainstream. Yet the same people who would champion the first two would label this belief as heretical, and would write the belief as outside the pale of acceptable Orthodox theology. Dr. David Berger's book talks of the scandal of Orthodox indifference, in that we are not writing them outside of acceptable Orthodox belief, and the same folks who would denounce the idea that an idea could be labelled heretical in the first two cases would agree with, or at least find nothing wrong with, the idea in the final instance.
It is funny to see FailedMessiah.Com promoting on one sidebar Marc Shapiro's book and Rav Slifkin's book, and Dr. Berger's book on the other.
Thursday, January 27, 2005
just added peekaboo comments, so another page does not have to load to see the comment. Information on how to do this here.
Update: As per Eliyahu's suggestion, putting comments on the main page, but collapsable. Try it out! (How about posting a dvar on the parsha?)
Update: As per Eliyahu's suggestion, putting comments on the main page, but collapsable. Try it out! (How about posting a dvar on the parsha?)
Yisro #1: Hashem is greater than the other gods! Er... What other gods?
Yisro, upon being informed of the great things Hashem did for the Jews, says (Shemot 18:10-11):
There is in fact a dispute between two of the Targumim. Tg Yonatan translates the phrase in question straightly.
כדון חכימת ארום תקיף הוא ה על כל אלהיא
Though Tg Yonatan is typically more expansive and brings in more midrashim, for this phrase it does not. (It does, however, bring down the understanding of the remainder of the pasuk as referring to Hashem's greatness in punishing middah kineged middah.)
Tg Onkelos, in contrast, says כען ידענא ארי רב ה ולית אלה בר מיניה, which means "Now I know that Hashem is great/mighty, AND there is no god except for Him." This is not exactly the literal translation, but Onkelos, which adds extra words to avoid assigning anthropomorhism to God, could be expected to do the same here.
This is not to say that Onkelos is incorrect. In fact, one could read עַתָּה יָדַעְתִּי, כִּי-גָדוֹל ה מִכָּל-הָאֱלֹהִים ,כִּי בַדָּבָר, אֲשֶׁר זָדוּ עֲלֵיהֶם as follows: Now I know that Hashem is greater than all of the others purported to be gods, in that they (the Egyptians) tried to harm them [and Hashem prevented this from happening as mentioned in the previous pasuk].
In other words הָאֱלֹהִים refer to all who are regarded to be gods, and Hashem is greater because He actually has power.
Indeed, we see a close approximation to this in Tehillim 96:4-5: (and Divrei Hayamim 1 17:25)
Tg Onkelos, though, takes an extra step of dividing the phrase in two. First: for Hashem is great. It is not a measure compared to anything else - not "greater than X." That is a translation of עַתָּה יָדַעְתִּי, כִּי-גָדוֹל ה. Second: "AND there is no god except for Him" which translates מִכָּל-הָאֱלֹהִים, as "He exists, of all the gods." It is a slightly midrashic type of parsing, which is not really necessary in this case.
There is in fact a dispute between two of the Targumim. Tg Yonatan translates the phrase in question straightly.
כדון חכימת ארום תקיף הוא ה על כל אלהיא
Though Tg Yonatan is typically more expansive and brings in more midrashim, for this phrase it does not. (It does, however, bring down the understanding of the remainder of the pasuk as referring to Hashem's greatness in punishing middah kineged middah.)
Tg Onkelos, in contrast, says כען ידענא ארי רב ה ולית אלה בר מיניה, which means "Now I know that Hashem is great/mighty, AND there is no god except for Him." This is not exactly the literal translation, but Onkelos, which adds extra words to avoid assigning anthropomorhism to God, could be expected to do the same here.
This is not to say that Onkelos is incorrect. In fact, one could read עַתָּה יָדַעְתִּי, כִּי-גָדוֹל ה מִכָּל-הָאֱלֹהִים ,כִּי בַדָּבָר, אֲשֶׁר זָדוּ עֲלֵיהֶם as follows: Now I know that Hashem is greater than all of the others purported to be gods, in that they (the Egyptians) tried to harm them [and Hashem prevented this from happening as mentioned in the previous pasuk].
In other words הָאֱלֹהִים refer to all who are regarded to be gods, and Hashem is greater because He actually has power.
Indeed, we see a close approximation to this in Tehillim 96:4-5: (and Divrei Hayamim 1 17:25)
Tg Onkelos, though, takes an extra step of dividing the phrase in two. First: for Hashem is great. It is not a measure compared to anything else - not "greater than X." That is a translation of עַתָּה יָדַעְתִּי, כִּי-גָדוֹל ה. Second: "AND there is no god except for Him" which translates מִכָּל-הָאֱלֹהִים, as "He exists, of all the gods." It is a slightly midrashic type of parsing, which is not really necessary in this case.
posts so far on parshas Yisro
Year 1:
- Round Trip Tickets
- Ha'Am as Elders
- A Jewish Scholar Class?
- From parshat Bahaalotcha, but appropriate nonetheless: Who was Chovav? Who was Yisro?
- Also, on the same topic as above, in terms of what Choten might mean (father-in-law /brother in law), see Another interesting cognate from "Hebrew Cognates in Amharic"
Wednesday, January 26, 2005
Beshalach #3: Write it in the book. Which Book?
Towards the end of Beshalach, after we are told of Yehoshua's victory over Amalek, Moshe is told to write something in "the book." Shemot 17:8-16:
Perhaps it is equivalent to the phrase "mark my words." That is, Hashem is making it clear that this will happen. This could be the meaning even if the intent was to write it in an actual sefer.
Ibn Ezra claims that this command happened in the 40th year in the desert, the proof being the patach under the bet in basefer. It means the book, which would refer to the sefer Torah, written in the 40th year. (I think this means the command but not the war. It makes sense that this is just the command to write it, for as we read in pasuk 8, Amalek fought with Israel in Refidim, which was a fairly early encampment. Further, parshat Zachor speaks about Amalek attacking when they came out of Egypt. So, just the command. Indeed, there is break in the Torah between the war and the commandment, marked by פ.)
What, then, is referred to by sefer? It could be Devarim 25:17-19, in parshat Ki Teitzei:
I would suggest as an alternative that the pasuk is self referential. "Write it in a sefer!" And Moshe did so, by writing the command in sefer Shemot. Indeed, there is one opinion that the Torah was given on an ongoing basis and written in scrolls, combined at the end into the Torah as we have it today. If so, it could be Shemot. But if it is Shemot, it need not be (and it makes sense that it would not be) in the 40th year.
to be continued... (yes, I know it is parshat Yitro - I have a dvar for it I'll post shortly.)
Perhaps it is equivalent to the phrase "mark my words." That is, Hashem is making it clear that this will happen. This could be the meaning even if the intent was to write it in an actual sefer.
Ibn Ezra claims that this command happened in the 40th year in the desert, the proof being the patach under the bet in basefer. It means the book, which would refer to the sefer Torah, written in the 40th year. (I think this means the command but not the war. It makes sense that this is just the command to write it, for as we read in pasuk 8, Amalek fought with Israel in Refidim, which was a fairly early encampment. Further, parshat Zachor speaks about Amalek attacking when they came out of Egypt. So, just the command. Indeed, there is break in the Torah between the war and the commandment, marked by פ.)
What, then, is referred to by sefer? It could be Devarim 25:17-19, in parshat Ki Teitzei:
I would suggest as an alternative that the pasuk is self referential. "Write it in a sefer!" And Moshe did so, by writing the command in sefer Shemot. Indeed, there is one opinion that the Torah was given on an ongoing basis and written in scrolls, combined at the end into the Torah as we have it today. If so, it could be Shemot. But if it is Shemot, it need not be (and it makes sense that it would not be) in the 40th year.
to be continued... (yes, I know it is parshat Yitro - I have a dvar for it I'll post shortly.)
Beshalach #2: `ain muqdam um`uchar baTorah
The mechilta asks on the following psukim in the Shirat HaYam (Shemot 15:8-10):
I would suggest that what is happening here is actually pluperfect. Rather than "the enemy said," it is "the enemy had said." That is, pasuk 10 echoes or continues pasuk 8, and pasuk 9 it stressing the greatness of God and the ineffectiveness of man when faced with divine power. They had said they would accomplish all of the following (pursuing, dividing spoil, etc.), yet God just blew His wind and the sea covered them, and they sank as lead in the mighty waters. So the pasuk is in chronological order. (The same point of the intent of the pasuk would apply even if it is the normal perfect.)
Yet, the question itself seems silly. We are talking about a song! Of course things may be out of order in a song - the purpose is praise, not mere recounting of events.
I would say that that may be exactly the point, and exactly the meaning of אין מוקדם ומאוחר בתורה in general, in the thought of Chazal. The Torah is called Shirah, song, and its purpose is praise, not necessarily historical narrative and recounting of events. Just as we would not demand chronological order in a song, it is no big deal if the Torah's recounting of events deviates from chronological order.
I would suggest that what is happening here is actually pluperfect. Rather than "the enemy said," it is "the enemy had said." That is, pasuk 10 echoes or continues pasuk 8, and pasuk 9 it stressing the greatness of God and the ineffectiveness of man when faced with divine power. They had said they would accomplish all of the following (pursuing, dividing spoil, etc.), yet God just blew His wind and the sea covered them, and they sank as lead in the mighty waters. So the pasuk is in chronological order. (The same point of the intent of the pasuk would apply even if it is the normal perfect.)
Yet, the question itself seems silly. We are talking about a song! Of course things may be out of order in a song - the purpose is praise, not mere recounting of events.
I would say that that may be exactly the point, and exactly the meaning of אין מוקדם ומאוחר בתורה in general, in the thought of Chazal. The Torah is called Shirah, song, and its purpose is praise, not necessarily historical narrative and recounting of events. Just as we would not demand chronological order in a song, it is no big deal if the Torah's recounting of events deviates from chronological order.
Chumrot - Singing Hebrew in the Shower
Miriam over at Bloghd just posted about a chumra that made the news - you cannot sing Hebrew in the shower. Humming would be OK.
Naturally, people unfamiliar with this existing minhag/chumra would think it new and excessive. Such is true for many minhagim and chumrot. Those who don't practice it or never heard of it think it is strange and too strict. Those whose practice it might look at those who don't as inappropriately lenient.
But it's source is in Sefer Chasidim. As this website has it:
Naturally, people unfamiliar with this existing minhag/chumra would think it new and excessive. Such is true for many minhagim and chumrot. Those who don't practice it or never heard of it think it is strange and too strict. Those whose practice it might look at those who don't as inappropriately lenient.
But it's source is in Sefer Chasidim. As this website has it:
"The Taz (Ibid. Sif Katan 13) disagrees with this last point, citing the fact that the Shulchan Aruch rules elsewhere (Orach Chaim Siman 85 Sif 2) that one may speak in Hebrew about ordinary topics even in a place like a bathroom where Torah learning would be forbidden, but it should be noted that the Magen Avraham (Ibid. Sif Katan 2) quotes from the Sefer Chassidim (Siman 994) that it is indeed a sign of piety to avoid speaking Hebrew in such places."So it is not new, but an old practice. But it seems to be a middat chassidut rather than an absolute prohibition.
Tuesday, January 25, 2005
Monday, January 24, 2005
Yerushalmi Gittin #1: Jewish Geography
Where is Bavel in relation to Eretz Yisrael? The beginning of yerushalmi kiddushin defines the boundaries of the land of Israel, for if one conveys a bill of divorce from outside Israel to inside Israel, when handing over the bill of divorce he must say "Before me it was written and before me it was signed." (Why? Read the gemara.)
Rabbi Chanina is in agreement with the opinion of Rav that Bavel is considered like the land of Israel as regards bills of divorce, and Rabbi Yochanan is arguing on him, based on the Mishna.
The problem is that from the gemara, it seems that Bavel is to the east of Israel, while traditionally we consider Bavel to be to the north of Israel. The reason for this is Yirmiyahu, who states (Yirmiyahu 1:14)
Yirmiyahu 25:9:
I would argue with them here. In truth, Bavel is to the east of Israel, not the north. For example, see this map of Babylonia.
Ancient Babylonia, to the east of Israel
If I recall correctly, there are other Talmudic sources which refer to Bavel as being to the east of Israel.
If so, how are we to understand Yirmiyahu? Well, that is a problem that many have dealt with. Some possibilities:
Thus, in pasuk 15 Hashem calls all the families of the North to encamp at the entrance to the gates of Jerusalem, but victory is not predicted. In 16, Hashem says this situation is a result of the Israelites having abandoned His worship in favor of that of other gods. In 17, we read:
Similarly,
is generally understood to refer to Yirmiyahu allegorically. He is like a fortified city, an iron pillar, etc., against all the residents of Israel. But perhaps we can say this too is directed toward
the Israelites - to the kings of Judah, and the princes, and the people - that their cities shall be like fortified cities, and like an iron pillar, that these invaders shall fight against them, but not prevail.
Just some wild speculation.
ד, ב פרק א הלכה ב משנה רבי יהודה אומר מרקם ולמזרח ורקם כמזרח מאשקלון ולדרום ואשקלון כדרום מעכו ולצפון ועכו כצפון ר' מאיר אומר עכו כארץ ישראל לגיטין:
Mishna: Rabbi Yehuda says: From Reqem and to the east, and Reqem is like the east {that is, it is considered outside Eretz Yisrael}; from Ashqelon and to the south, and Ashqelon is like the north; from Akko and to the north and Akko is like the north; Rabbi Meir says: Akko is like Eretz Yisrael for the purpose of bills {of divorce}.דף ד, ב פרק א הלכה ב גמרא ר' יוחנן אמר לציפורייא אתון אמרין בשם ר' <יוחנן> חנינה אף המביא מבבל לכאן אינו צריך לומר בפני נכתב ובפ"נ ואני אומר שהוא צריך דהיא מתניתא ר' יהודה אומר
דף ה, א פרק א הלכה ב גמרא מרקם ולמזרח ורקם כמזרח. ואפילו תימא חלוקין על ר"י שאין רקם כמזרח. שמא מבבל לכאןRabbi Yochanan said to the residents of Tzippori: They come and say in the name of Rabbi Chanina: even one who brings {a bill of divorce} from Bavel to here {Eretz Yisrael} need not say "Before me it was written and before me it was signed." And I {Rabbi Yochanan} say that he must, for it is the Mishna. "Rabbi Yehuda says: From Reqem and to the east, and Reqem is like the east. And even if you say that we argue on Rabbi Yehuda that Reqem is not like the east, would you say that from Bavel to here??!?! {since Bavel is surely even further in that direction.}
The problem is that from the gemara, it seems that Bavel is to the east of Israel, while traditionally we consider Bavel to be to the north of Israel. The reason for this is Yirmiyahu, who states (Yirmiyahu 1:14)
Yirmiyahu 25:9:
I would argue with them here. In truth, Bavel is to the east of Israel, not the north. For example, see this map of Babylonia.
Ancient Babylonia, to the east of Israel
If I recall correctly, there are other Talmudic sources which refer to Bavel as being to the east of Israel.
If so, how are we to understand Yirmiyahu? Well, that is a problem that many have dealt with. Some possibilities:
- Yirmiyahu did not mean to equate Bavel with the north. Indeed, the pasuk just cited talks of the families of the North and Nevuchadnezzar king of Bavel as two separate entities. Perhaps it is echoing, but other psukim talk of the families of the north attacking Bavel. We would be left with the issue though of Yirmiyahu's prophecy having to come true, and the if he predicted the North attacking, how come it was Yirmiyahu.
- Perhaps it was Nevuchdnezzar of Bavel, as well as various mercenaries from the North. Indeed, both are mentioned in the latter pasuk cited.
- Perhaps it means that Bavel will attack from the North - that is, enter Israel from the North, even though Bavel is situated to the east.
- I think it was Yeshaya Leibowitz (I hope I am not wrong in this identification or summary) who suggested that Yirmiyahu originally misunderstood the prophecy to refer to the North as opposed to Bavel, and later clarified/reinterpreted it to refer to Bavel. I think there was a threat of invasion/conquest from Assyria, which is to the North, at the time the prophecy was given, but it came to naught. Yirmiyahu continued to predict doom and gloom until Bavel conquered.
- From here on in is my own suggestions. Yerushalayim is around 31 degrees 30' latitude and Bavel is between 32 and 33 north latitude, which makes Bavel slightly north-east of Israel, so perhaps it can be described as North as well. Also, it is possible that Bavel extended even farther - eighth century Babylonian astronomical tablets give a longest day of 14 hours, 24 minutes, rather than what we expect for its latitude - 14 hours 10 minutes and 54 seconds. Based on this, some place ancient Bavel 2 and a 1/2 - at 35 degrees latitude. It is fairly close to the east of Israel, so increasing the latitude like this would lead to a north-easterly direction.
- Further, are we dealing with true east? Mizrach is literally "from where the sun rises." On the equinoxes, the sun rises from true east, but by the time it is fully over the horizon, it is slightly south of east if you live north of the equator. It will make an arc through the sky south of east, and it will not be directly overhead at noon, but rather to the south. (It would only be directly overhead at the equator.) At what point in its travels through the sky did they look at the sun and consider it rising from that direction? That might have been the definition of east, as opposed to true east. If slightly south-east becomes east, then slightly north-west becomes west, and slightly north-east becomes north, and slightly south-west becomes south. As a result, Bavel to the north-east might be more likely to be acceptably considered north. (Later understandings of Bavel to the east would assume true east and lower Bavel. Indeed, other ancient measures had Bavel lower down.)
{Update: In fact, on Eruvin 56a, there is discussion about how to determine the compass directions. The brayta bases North on the great bear (Ursa Major), which travels closely around the north star Polaris), north based on Scorpius (which can be southwest). The suggestion by Rabbi Yossi about east based on sunrise on the vernal and autumn equinoxes would be a bit off, as mention earlier.} - Perhaps Yirmiyahu himself is predicting a failed Assyrian/northern assault in the first perek
Thus, in pasuk 15 Hashem calls all the families of the North to encamp at the entrance to the gates of Jerusalem, but victory is not predicted. In 16, Hashem says this situation is a result of the Israelites having abandoned His worship in favor of that of other gods. In 17, we read:
The way this is typically taken is that the entirety is directed to Yirmiyahu. He should gird up his loins and speak to them, and should not be dismayed at them. But, what if we read "be not dismayed at them, lest I dismay thee before them" as the beginning of the command to the Israelites. They should not fear the invasion.
יז וְאַתָּה, תֶּאְזֹר מָתְנֶיךָ, וְקַמְתָּ וְדִבַּרְתָּ אֲלֵיהֶם, אֵת כָּל-אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי אֲצַוֶּךָּ; אַל-תֵּחַת, מִפְּנֵיהֶם--פֶּן-אֲחִתְּךָ, לִפְנֵיהֶם
17 Thou therefore gird up thy loins, and arise, and speak unto them all that I command thee; be not dismayed at them, lest I dismay thee before them.
Similarly,
is generally understood to refer to Yirmiyahu allegorically. He is like a fortified city, an iron pillar, etc., against all the residents of Israel. But perhaps we can say this too is directed toward
the Israelites - to the kings of Judah, and the princes, and the people - that their cities shall be like fortified cities, and like an iron pillar, that these invaders shall fight against them, but not prevail.
Just some wild speculation.
+2 = masechet sotah;
הדרן עלך משוח מלחמה!
הדרן עלך עגלה ערופה!
(prakim 8-9 of yerushalmi sotah)
וסליקא לה מסכת סוטה
הדרן עלך עגלה ערופה!
(prakim 8-9 of yerushalmi sotah)
וסליקא לה מסכת סוטה
Wednesday, January 19, 2005
Cooking milk and meat together
There is a famous joke:
But there is an extra twist to the joke - the extra restrictions are in fact derived in the Talmud from the fact that God repeats his command three times - in Exodus (Shemot) 23:19, Exodus 34:26, and Deuteronomy (Devarim) 14:21. The joke takes this repetition as exasperation.
This captures a feeling that I've seen several people have, one captured well in this blog post from a year ago (based on this website), in part thinking how seethe should not = consume. (Contrary to that post, tevashel encompasses more than just boil.)
A response to the joke, however.
Firstly, the examples given in the joke - mixing milk and meat, waiting three (or six) hours between eating meat and eating milk, and keeping two sets of dishes, are not in fact derived from the repetition, and are not in fact ascribed by the Talmud to God's intent. They are rather Rabbinic laws, or else customs adopted to ensure keeping of the Biblical and Rabbinic laws.
(Let us leave aside for a second the entire issue of whether a kid in its mother's milk encompasses all milk and all meat, because that would be another topic entirely. Assume for now that is means all meat and all milk.)
What is really derived from the repetition is not the examples given above, but rather the following three laws:
The Torah says not to cook milk and meat together. Assuming that a normal person told you that, what would you take that person's intent to be? That is, does the person envision you cooking milk and meat together in order to throw it in the trash? That would be a very silly thing to expect people to do, so a warning against doing it seems unnecessary.
Rather, cooking is an act done for the purpose of preparing food for consumption. A normal, not farfetched at all explanation, is that you should not be preparing a cooked dish consisting of milk and meat, because you are not supposed to eat such a dish.
Indeed, the context of one of the psukim discussing the prohibition, Deuteronomy 14:21, basically says this:
While one can make an argument that consuming such food - meat that has been cooked with milk - is never explicitly prohibited, the spirit of the law, and the clear intent of the law, seems to be to prohibit it. Attempts to limit it to cooking but not eating seem to be unconvincing hairsplitting.
Further, let us say you got someone else to violate and cook this food for you (or you got a gentile to cook it, such that there is no violation). Eating the food would also seem to violate the spirit of the law.
It is also not impossible that other benefit than your own personal eating would be frowned upon. After all, say you prepared it for a gentile. Or, say you prepared it for a pet. The prohibition is stated in terms of preparation, that is cooking, and not specifically your consumption of it. So the cooking of it would likely still be prohibited, even for other purposes, and as such, the end product of such cooking (as dog food, or as something to sell in your store) would also be frowned upon. This would give up something akin to the prohibition of all benefit. The context in Deuteronomy explicitly allows the giving of or selling of "that which dieth of itself" to the stranger who lives in the gate, but perhaps this would only apply to that - after all, if it "dieth of itself" you did nothing wrong, committed no sin, in its preparation. In contrast, here you are told not to cook it, so perhaps the end product would be penalized, and you could not give or sell it to the stranger in the gate.
I am not saying that this is the derivation of these laws, but rather that the laws spelled out above do not violate the spirit of, and what can be taken as the intent, of the explicit Biblical commandment. The laws are derived in a different way (or in fact, different ways - there are other ways given to derive these laws) because we believe that there is an encoded meaning in the terse Biblical text and that there are methods of systematically extracting that meaning. Only if we have a valid extraction method would we say these are Biblical (yet Rabinically derived) laws. But these derived laws don't contravene what may well be the implied, and understood, meaning of the text.
On to the examples given in the joke. First, all mixing of milk and meat, rather than just cooking. This is not taken to be Biblical law. If you take a cold piece of cheese and put it on top of a cold piece of meat, you have not violated the Biblical commandment. (In fact, if you then wash the meat and cheese well, you can eat them separately.) If you eat cold cheese with cold meat, you have not violated the Biblical commandment. However, if you put really hot cheese on top of really hot meat, are you cooking it? One could say yes. Furthermore, Rabbinic enactments forbid the consumption of mixed cold cheese and meat that has not been cooked together, perhaps because laxity in this may lead to someone eating hot cheese and meat together, and that would be a Biblical violation.
Waiting between eating meat and milk is not Biblical. It may not even be Rabbinic, but may in fact be binding custom, taken as an additional restriction but gaining the force of law through wide acceptance.
Separate sets of dishes are also not taken to be Biblical. In fact, it is not even Talmudic. You can have one set of dishes. As long as you only eat cold food. If you put hot food on a plate, though, particles are absorbed into the plate. Later, if you put hot food of the other meat/milk type, particles are expelled from the plate (depending on the material of the plate). Such would be taken to be "cooking" milk and meat together, and so as long as you remember which was used for which, or you kasher the plates in between, you are fine. To solve potential problems arising from confusion, the current practice is to have two sets of dishes, when those dishes are of materials that absorb/expel materials. But an obligation to have separate sets of dishes is by no means Biblical (though rooted in Biblical law).
God: Thou shalt not seethe a kid in its mother's milk.What the joke is poking fun at is the extra restrictions on consumption of meat and milk not spelled out directly in the Torah. We have God giving a very specific command and Moses misinterpreting the command until an exasperated God finally gives up.
Moses: You mean we should not mix meat and milk?
God: THOU SHALT NOT SEETHE A KID IN ITS MOTHERS MILK!
Moses: You mean we should wait three hours between meat and milk?
God: THOU SHALT NOT SEETHE A KID IN ITS MOTHER'S MILK!
Moses: You mean we should have two complete sets of dishes?
God: Okay, have it your way.
But there is an extra twist to the joke - the extra restrictions are in fact derived in the Talmud from the fact that God repeats his command three times - in Exodus (Shemot) 23:19, Exodus 34:26, and Deuteronomy (Devarim) 14:21. The joke takes this repetition as exasperation.
This captures a feeling that I've seen several people have, one captured well in this blog post from a year ago (based on this website), in part thinking how seethe should not = consume. (Contrary to that post, tevashel encompasses more than just boil.)
A response to the joke, however.
Firstly, the examples given in the joke - mixing milk and meat, waiting three (or six) hours between eating meat and eating milk, and keeping two sets of dishes, are not in fact derived from the repetition, and are not in fact ascribed by the Talmud to God's intent. They are rather Rabbinic laws, or else customs adopted to ensure keeping of the Biblical and Rabbinic laws.
(Let us leave aside for a second the entire issue of whether a kid in its mother's milk encompasses all milk and all meat, because that would be another topic entirely. Assume for now that is means all meat and all milk.)
What is really derived from the repetition is not the examples given above, but rather the following three laws:
- One should not cook meat with milk. (This encompasses all forms of cooking.)
- Meat that has been cooked with milk may not be consumed.
- Not only may it not be consumed, but no benefit may be had from it whatsoever.
The Torah says not to cook milk and meat together. Assuming that a normal person told you that, what would you take that person's intent to be? That is, does the person envision you cooking milk and meat together in order to throw it in the trash? That would be a very silly thing to expect people to do, so a warning against doing it seems unnecessary.
Rather, cooking is an act done for the purpose of preparing food for consumption. A normal, not farfetched at all explanation, is that you should not be preparing a cooked dish consisting of milk and meat, because you are not supposed to eat such a dish.
Indeed, the context of one of the psukim discussing the prohibition, Deuteronomy 14:21, basically says this:
לֹא תֹאכְלוּ כָל-נְבֵלָה לַגֵּר אֲשֶׁר-בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ תִּתְּנֶנָּה וַאֲכָלָהּ, אוֹ מָכֹר לְנָכְרִי--כִּי עַם קָדוֹשׁ אַתָּה, לַיהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ; לֹא-תְבַשֵּׁל גְּדִי, בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ.Immediately preceding this verse is a list of which animals may and may not be eaten. The context is clearly not just preparing the food, but also consuming such food.
"Ye shall not eat of anything that dieth of itself: thou shalt give it unto the stranger that is in thy gates, that he may eat it; or thou mayest sell it unto an alien: for thou art an holy people unto the LORD thy God. Thou shalt not seethe a kid in his mother's milk."
While one can make an argument that consuming such food - meat that has been cooked with milk - is never explicitly prohibited, the spirit of the law, and the clear intent of the law, seems to be to prohibit it. Attempts to limit it to cooking but not eating seem to be unconvincing hairsplitting.
Further, let us say you got someone else to violate and cook this food for you (or you got a gentile to cook it, such that there is no violation). Eating the food would also seem to violate the spirit of the law.
It is also not impossible that other benefit than your own personal eating would be frowned upon. After all, say you prepared it for a gentile. Or, say you prepared it for a pet. The prohibition is stated in terms of preparation, that is cooking, and not specifically your consumption of it. So the cooking of it would likely still be prohibited, even for other purposes, and as such, the end product of such cooking (as dog food, or as something to sell in your store) would also be frowned upon. This would give up something akin to the prohibition of all benefit. The context in Deuteronomy explicitly allows the giving of or selling of "that which dieth of itself" to the stranger who lives in the gate, but perhaps this would only apply to that - after all, if it "dieth of itself" you did nothing wrong, committed no sin, in its preparation. In contrast, here you are told not to cook it, so perhaps the end product would be penalized, and you could not give or sell it to the stranger in the gate.
I am not saying that this is the derivation of these laws, but rather that the laws spelled out above do not violate the spirit of, and what can be taken as the intent, of the explicit Biblical commandment. The laws are derived in a different way (or in fact, different ways - there are other ways given to derive these laws) because we believe that there is an encoded meaning in the terse Biblical text and that there are methods of systematically extracting that meaning. Only if we have a valid extraction method would we say these are Biblical (yet Rabinically derived) laws. But these derived laws don't contravene what may well be the implied, and understood, meaning of the text.
On to the examples given in the joke. First, all mixing of milk and meat, rather than just cooking. This is not taken to be Biblical law. If you take a cold piece of cheese and put it on top of a cold piece of meat, you have not violated the Biblical commandment. (In fact, if you then wash the meat and cheese well, you can eat them separately.) If you eat cold cheese with cold meat, you have not violated the Biblical commandment. However, if you put really hot cheese on top of really hot meat, are you cooking it? One could say yes. Furthermore, Rabbinic enactments forbid the consumption of mixed cold cheese and meat that has not been cooked together, perhaps because laxity in this may lead to someone eating hot cheese and meat together, and that would be a Biblical violation.
Waiting between eating meat and milk is not Biblical. It may not even be Rabbinic, but may in fact be binding custom, taken as an additional restriction but gaining the force of law through wide acceptance.
Separate sets of dishes are also not taken to be Biblical. In fact, it is not even Talmudic. You can have one set of dishes. As long as you only eat cold food. If you put hot food on a plate, though, particles are absorbed into the plate. Later, if you put hot food of the other meat/milk type, particles are expelled from the plate (depending on the material of the plate). Such would be taken to be "cooking" milk and meat together, and so as long as you remember which was used for which, or you kasher the plates in between, you are fine. To solve potential problems arising from confusion, the current practice is to have two sets of dishes, when those dishes are of materials that absorb/expel materials. But an obligation to have separate sets of dishes is by no means Biblical (though rooted in Biblical law).
Tuesday, January 18, 2005
Iyyov Lo Haya VeLo Nivra/Atid Lihyot
Another interesting yerushalmi Sotah (25b, perek 5 halacha 6):
Anyway, the harmonization/resolution is an interesting one: real people, but a fictional account.
This is a different version that that presented in the Bavli in two ways. First, we have this harmonization such that Iyyov did exist though the events did not, while in Bavli Iyyov is left nonexistent.
In Bavli Bava Batra 15a we have the following:
The second difference is in the specific language. In Bavli, we have Lo Haya VeLo Nivra. But In yerushalmi we have Lo Haya Velo Atid Lihyot = he will not exist in the future.
This perhaps has a different connotation. The Bavli's language just suggests Iyyov is fictional. The Yerushalmi's language, that he will not exist in the future, might suggest an impetus for ascribing the story of Iyyov to allegory - namely, a difficulty coming to grips with, or else a refusal to accept, the idea that a tzaddik veRa' Lo (righteous person who has bad things befall him) story such as that described in Iyyov, and to the extent described in Iyyov, could actually occur, for Hashem would not allow this to happen. Iyyov could then only be theoretical.
Indeed, this wording of Lo Haya VeLo Atid Lihyot only occurs in one other place: Bavli Sanhedrin 71a, where it is used to deny the existence of Ben Sorer UMoreh (the rebellious son), Ir HaNidachat (the Idolatrous City), and Bayit HaMenuga (the Leprous House). Ben Sorer UMoreh, because of incredulity that parents would bring their son to such a fate for so little cause, the Idolatrous city, since if there were one mezuza it would be spared, and the Leprous House, because the appearance of leprosy has to be very specific. Why are they written? In order to be learned and darshened in order to accept reward for doing so. Thus, they are purely theoretical.
(In each case, someone argues with anecdotal evidence of at least one instance, thus disproving that it is purely theoretical. Twice this is Rabbi Yochanan. I would say this contradicts my post about proof by contradiction in the thought of Chazal, but I would point out that there it is R Yochanan who appeals to proof by contradiction, and it is he that here argues for the existence of these Biblically described cases. Further, by Ben Sorer UMoreh, Ir HaNidachat, and Bayit HaMenuga, the objections are that the cases are so farfetched so as to be practically impossible, such that it never came to be nor would come to be, while in that post, the cases are such that they could could not exist theoretically.)
I would have answered the question differently - that one is Resh Lakish citing a different opinion, that of Bar Kappara, with whom he does not agree, and the other is Resh Lakish's own opinion. Indeed, this is actually an answer given on occassion by the gemara.
רבי שמעון בן לקיש אמר איוב לא היה ולא עתיד להיות.
מחלפה שיטתיה דר' שמעון בן לקיש.
תמן אמר רבי שמעון בן לקיש בשם בר קפרא בימי אברהם אבינו היה
והכא הוא אמר הכין
אלא הוא היה וייסורין לא היו.
ולמה נכתבו עליו
אלא לומר שאילולי באו עליו היה יכול לעמוד בהן.
Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Iyyov did not exist and he will not exist in the future
Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish's statements are contradictory
There Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said in the name of Bar Kappara that he {Iyyov} existed in the days of our forefather Avraham
And here he says this!?
Rather, he existed and his sufferings did not exist.
And {if so} why were they written about him?
Rather to say that if they had come upon him he would have been able to withstand them.
Anyway, the harmonization/resolution is an interesting one: real people, but a fictional account.
This is a different version that that presented in the Bavli in two ways. First, we have this harmonization such that Iyyov did exist though the events did not, while in Bavli Iyyov is left nonexistent.
In Bavli Bava Batra 15a we have the following:
Thus, the R Shmuel bar Nachmeni rejects the suggestion that Iyyov was allegorical, and we have not the harmonization of him being real with the story being fictional.יתיב ההוא מרבנן קמיה דר' שמואל בר נחמניA certain rabbi sat before R Shmuel bar Nachmeni
ויתיב וקאמר איוב לא היה ולא נברא אלא משל היה
א"ל עליך אמר קרא איש היה בארץ עוץ איוב שמו.
אלא מעתה (שמואל ב יב) ולרש אין כל כי אם כבשה אחת קטנה אשר קנה ויחיה וגו' מי הוא?
אלא משל בעלמא
הכא נמי משל בעלמא
א"כ שמו ושם עירו למה
And he said and said: Iyyov did not exist and was not created; rather he is allegorical.
He {R Shmuel bar Nachmeni} said to him: To you the Scriptures state (Iyyov 1:1) "There was a man in land of Utz; Iyyov was his name."
{The gemara objects}
But now, in 2 Shmuel 12:3: And to the poor man there was nothing except one little ewe, which he had bought and nourished... Who was he?
Rather he was entirely allegorical.
So too here he was entirely allegorical.
{The gemara answers}
If so, his name and the name of his city {really, his land, but שמו ושם עירו is idiomatic, from the laws of contracts} what for?
The second difference is in the specific language. In Bavli, we have Lo Haya VeLo Nivra. But In yerushalmi we have Lo Haya Velo Atid Lihyot = he will not exist in the future.
This perhaps has a different connotation. The Bavli's language just suggests Iyyov is fictional. The Yerushalmi's language, that he will not exist in the future, might suggest an impetus for ascribing the story of Iyyov to allegory - namely, a difficulty coming to grips with, or else a refusal to accept, the idea that a tzaddik veRa' Lo (righteous person who has bad things befall him) story such as that described in Iyyov, and to the extent described in Iyyov, could actually occur, for Hashem would not allow this to happen. Iyyov could then only be theoretical.
Indeed, this wording of Lo Haya VeLo Atid Lihyot only occurs in one other place: Bavli Sanhedrin 71a, where it is used to deny the existence of Ben Sorer UMoreh (the rebellious son), Ir HaNidachat (the Idolatrous City), and Bayit HaMenuga (the Leprous House). Ben Sorer UMoreh, because of incredulity that parents would bring their son to such a fate for so little cause, the Idolatrous city, since if there were one mezuza it would be spared, and the Leprous House, because the appearance of leprosy has to be very specific. Why are they written? In order to be learned and darshened in order to accept reward for doing so. Thus, they are purely theoretical.
(In each case, someone argues with anecdotal evidence of at least one instance, thus disproving that it is purely theoretical. Twice this is Rabbi Yochanan. I would say this contradicts my post about proof by contradiction in the thought of Chazal, but I would point out that there it is R Yochanan who appeals to proof by contradiction, and it is he that here argues for the existence of these Biblically described cases. Further, by Ben Sorer UMoreh, Ir HaNidachat, and Bayit HaMenuga, the objections are that the cases are so farfetched so as to be practically impossible, such that it never came to be nor would come to be, while in that post, the cases are such that they could could not exist theoretically.)
Is Carrying the Torah Around the Shul Appropriate?
Another interesting yershualmi (which also involves the Resh Geluta, the Exilarch) occurs in yerushalmi Sotah 33a (perek 7 halacha 6)
gemara:
...
בכל אתר את אמר הולכין אצל התורה. והכא את אמר מוליכין את התורה אצלן.
אלא על ידי שהן בני אדם גדולים התורה מתעלה בהן.
והא תמן מויבלין אורית' גבי ריש גלותא.
אמר רבי יוסי בי ר' בון על ידי שזרעו של דוד משוקע שם אינון עבדין לו כמנהג אבהתהון
Everywhere else you say they go after the Torah. Yet here you say they bring the Torah to them!?
Rather, since they are great people, the Torah is elevated by them.
Q: But over there {in Bavel} they bring the Torah to the Resh Geluta (Exilarch}?!
Rabbi Yossi son of Rabbi Avun said: since the seed of David is settled there {they are descendants of the house of David} they do to him in the custom of their fathers.
mishna:
...
ברכת כהן גדול כיצד
חזן הכנסת נוטל ספר התורה ונותנו לראש הכנסת
ראש הכנסת נותנו לסגן
והסגן נותנו לכהן גדול
כהן גדול עומד ומקבל וקורא עומד
...
...
ברכת כהן גדול כיצד
חזן הכנסת נוטל ספר התורה ונותנו לראש הכנסת
ראש הכנסת נותנו לסגן
והסגן נותנו לכהן גדול
כהן גדול עומד ומקבל וקורא עומד
...
The blessing of the High Priest - how?
The Chazan HaKnesset takes the Sefer Torah and gives it to the Head of the Knesset.
The Head of the Knesset gives is to the Sgan (assistant to the High Priest)
And the Sgan gives it to the High Priest.
The High Priest stands and accepts it and reads while standing.
...
The Chazan HaKnesset takes the Sefer Torah and gives it to the Head of the Knesset.
The Head of the Knesset gives is to the Sgan (assistant to the High Priest)
And the Sgan gives it to the High Priest.
The High Priest stands and accepts it and reads while standing.
...
gemara:
...
בכל אתר את אמר הולכין אצל התורה. והכא את אמר מוליכין את התורה אצלן.
אלא על ידי שהן בני אדם גדולים התורה מתעלה בהן.
והא תמן מויבלין אורית' גבי ריש גלותא.
אמר רבי יוסי בי ר' בון על ידי שזרעו של דוד משוקע שם אינון עבדין לו כמנהג אבהתהון
Everywhere else you say they go after the Torah. Yet here you say they bring the Torah to them!?
Rather, since they are great people, the Torah is elevated by them.
Q: But over there {in Bavel} they bring the Torah to the Resh Geluta (Exilarch}?!
Rabbi Yossi son of Rabbi Avun said: since the seed of David is settled there {they are descendants of the house of David} they do to him in the custom of their fathers.
Based on this gemara, is seems that the sefer Torah should not be brought, out of its way, all around the shul so that every person can kiss it - such may be disrespectful to the sefer Torah.
Rav Schachter said something similar a few years ago in shiur. He said that (if I recall correctly) the Rav was not happy with the taking of the Torah out of its way, around the shul, saying: Why are they treating the sefer Torah like a Sotah? Rather, they should bring the Torah to the bima, and if people want to intercept it to kiss it, they can.
Please note: please don't take this as a psak halacha.
Rav Schachter said something similar a few years ago in shiur. He said that (if I recall correctly) the Rav was not happy with the taking of the Torah out of its way, around the shul, saying: Why are they treating the sefer Torah like a Sotah? Rather, they should bring the Torah to the bima, and if people want to intercept it to kiss it, they can.
Please note: please don't take this as a psak halacha.
Monday, January 17, 2005
Using geometry to cheat on taxes
The last few chapters of yerushalmi sotah contain some interesting and amusing aggadic material. One such example occurs on yerushalmi Sotah 24a-b, perek 5 halacha 3:
The gemara is discussing the measure of migrash and techum of a city, where the migrash extends 1000 cubits from the city, and techum extends 2000 cubits. The definition of this extension, especially in terms of migrash, is non-trivial, but in the course of the discussion, use is made of the fact that if you compare two squares, one with a length (and therefore width) of A and the other with a length (and therefore width) of 2A, the area of the larger square will be 4 times rather than 2 times the area of the smaller square. This is because since you are maintaining the ratio of length : width so that it is a square, you double both length and width.
Which brings us to the gemara. After stating this principle in order to explain migrash and techum, it says
The gemara is discussing the measure of migrash and techum of a city, where the migrash extends 1000 cubits from the city, and techum extends 2000 cubits. The definition of this extension, especially in terms of migrash, is non-trivial, but in the course of the discussion, use is made of the fact that if you compare two squares, one with a length (and therefore width) of A and the other with a length (and therefore width) of 2A, the area of the larger square will be 4 times rather than 2 times the area of the smaller square. This is because since you are maintaining the ratio of length : width so that it is a square, you double both length and width.
Thus, the area of the smaller square is A x A = A2 and that of the larger square is 2A x 2A = (2A)2= (2)2 x A2 = 4A2, that is, 4 times the area of the smaller square. In general, if you create a sqaure whose side is B times the side of a square with length A, the area will be B2 as large.
Image 1: Doubling the length (and width) of each side causing a quadrupling of the area of the resulting square
Which brings us to the gemara. After stating this principle in order to explain migrash and techum, it says
כהדא ריש גלותא
איטלק עילוי חד טריקלין ארבעין על ארבעין דימליניה חיטין
אתא לגבי רב הונא
אמר ליה פייסון דיסבון מינך עשרין על עשרין כדון.
ועשרין על עשרין בתר זמן ואת מיתגר פלגא
Like this story with the Exilarch
Who owed as tribute a room 40 by 40 {cubits} filled with wheat
He came before Rav Huna
He {Rav Huna} said to him: appease them that they will take from you 20 by 20 now
and 20 by 20 after a time, and you will thus profit half.
The room must have been a standard height. (If we were talking about a cube whose height also doubled, doubling a side would mean a volume of 2A x 2A x 2A = 23 x A3 = 8 x A3 which would mean that he would he would profit a lot more than half.)
We don't know whether the Resh Geluta took Rav Huna's advice, or what happened afterwards. But this seems to rely on the fact that the collectors, or else the Persian government, did not know their geometry.
This should not be taken as support for cheating on taxes.
We don't know whether the Resh Geluta took Rav Huna's advice, or what happened afterwards. But this seems to rely on the fact that the collectors, or else the Persian government, did not know their geometry.
This should not be taken as support for cheating on taxes.
parshat Beshalach #1: Puns in the Parsha
Last year I posted some jokes based on parshat Beshalach. The first:
One looks like the perfect (past tense) and the other imperfect (future tense) of the root nh.m. In truth, the first verb is just nh., with the mem ending meaning "them." We see it used again later in the perek:
qarobh means "near," but qrb can also connote battle, in which case the first part of the verse would echo the second.
Q) What was the name of the single Jewish person who stayed in Egypt?I did not mention at the time that the Torah makes its own pun in the verse, on the same word:
A) Nacham, as it states in Shemot 13:17
וַיְהִי, בְּשַׁלַּח פַּרְעֹה אֶת-הָעָם, וְלֹא-נָחָם
| יז וַיְהִי, בְּשַׁלַּח פַּרְעֹה אֶת-הָעָם, וְלֹא-נָחָם אֱלֹהִים דֶּרֶךְ אֶרֶץ פְּלִשְׁתִּים, כִּי קָרוֹב הוּא: כִּי אָמַר אֱלֹהִים, פֶּן-יִנָּחֵם הָעָם בִּרְאֹתָם מִלְחָמָה--וְשָׁבוּ מִצְרָיְמָה. | 17 And it came to pass, when Pharaoh had let the people go, that God led them not by the way of the land of the Philistines, although that was near; for God said: 'Lest peradventure the people repent when they see war, and they return to Egypt.' |
| יז וַיְהִי, בְּשַׁלַּח פַּרְעֹה אֶת-הָעָם, וְלֹא-נָחָם אֱלֹהִים דֶּרֶךְ אֶרֶץ פְּלִשְׁתִּים, כִּי קָרוֹב הוּא: כִּי אָמַר אֱלֹהִים, פֶּן-יִנָּחֵם הָעָם בִּרְאֹתָם מִלְחָמָה--וְשָׁבוּ מִצְרָיְמָה. | 17 And it came to pass, when Pharaoh had let the people go, that God led them not by the way of the land of the Philistines, although that was near; for God said: 'Lest peradventure the people repent when they see war, and they return to Egypt.' |
+3 sotah;
הדרן עלך כשם שהמים!
הדרן עלך מי שקינא!
הדרן עלך אילו נאמרין!
(prakim 5-7 of yerushalmi sotah)
הדרן עלך מי שקינא!
הדרן עלך אילו נאמרין!
(prakim 5-7 of yerushalmi sotah)
Last year I posted for parshat Beshalach an essay I wrote for a Revel class. That class was Rashi as An Exegete, by Prof. Maori. He is giving that class again this coming semester. The entire Revel schedule can be seen here. I am considering taking Topics in the Talmudic Order of Mo'ed by Prof. Steinfeld.
Friday, January 14, 2005
parshat Bo #2: Yoel to Moshe: My Locusts Can Beat Up Your Locusts
In parshat Bo, the Torah declares that the locust plague was the most intense ever. Shemos 10:14:
Yoel 2:2, we see that Yoel's locust plague is the most intense ever:
This seems to be a contradiction, for how can both be the worst?
I would summarize the traditional answer as the difference in measuring the locust swarm as a scalar or as a vector. (Examples of scalars: speed, distance, mass, temperature; Example of vector: velocity, which has speed and angle.) If as a scalar, then the measure is a single number, and there can be only one maximum - only one worst. If as a vector, then the measurement can be resolved into components, and you can define more than one maximum.
So, measure locust swarms as vectors, with components such as ferocity, appetite, number, number of different species. A can be more ferocious than B, and B can have a bigger appetite than A. Rashi explains that Yoel's was worse than the one in Egypt because it had a greater number of species. For in Egypt, in parshat Bo, we only read of one species: Arbeh, locusts (see pasuk cited above). In Yoel, we read of 4 different species: Yoel 1:4:
The Torah's message to us here is clear. Just as swarms of locusts have different maalot and chisronot, different qualities that make them best, so too different individuals have different qualities which are their strong point. We should develop ourselves to reach our own personal zenith in our own outstanding qualities.
:)
OK, I was just spoofing some other prominent weekly dvars. Onwards!
The problem with this is, as Ramban points out, that there seems to be more than one species in Egypt as well. (Note: I consulted a bit at this point with this dvar torah on Parshat Bo by HaRav Yosef Carmel.) As we read in Tehillim 78:46:
and in Tehillim 105:34:
חָסִיל, אַרְבֶּה, יֶלֶק.
I would say immediately that even if we include these three species, we have a total of three. Yoel's locusts still outrank Moshe's, because they also contain גָּזָם.
However, Rashi did mention that there was only one species in Egypt. Gur Aryeh and Mizrachi save the day by saying that Rashi in fact knew of the other species, but that there was mainly arbeh and relatively few of the other species, whereas in Yoel's case it was equal measures of each. (One might bolster this by pointing out that this could be why only arbeh are mentioned in Torah, with the other two species mentioned as afterthoughts in two separate locations in Tehillim. Meanwhile by Yoel there is each species mentioned on its own, in separate waves, such that one might argue that they are therefore in equal measure.) It is strange though to create what is essentially a neo-midrash for the sole purpose of rescuing Rashi's language. More likely Rashi, or Rashi's source did not consider the scattered mentions of the locust plagues in Tehillim, or did not consider them significant (I'll explain what I mean by this shortly.)
Rashi on Yoel offers a different explanation, that in Yoel they came in waves. (That which the palmer-worm hath left hath the locust eaten; and that which the locust hath left hath the canker-worm eaten; and that which the canker-worm hath left hath the caterpiller eaten.) This feature is enough to make them worse than the plague in Egypt.
I would rescue Rashi in a different way. Looking just at sefer Shemot, all we see are arbeh. None of the other species of locust are present. Sure, in one place in Tehillim in mentions another species, and in another place in Tehillim it mentions a still other species. But, are we to take these mentions in Tehillim as absolutely referring to the existence of other species? In Shemot, again, all we see are arbeh. And in Tehillim, we have Biblical poetry.
One element of Biblical poetry is the repetition of the same idea in one pasuk, using different language. (The same is true in contemporary extra-Biblical poetry. For example, in the Baal Chronicles, "He held the bowl in his hand, he held the cup in his right hand." He is not holding a bowl in his left and a cup in his right, but rather hand/right hand refer to the same hand, and bowl/cup refer to the same entity.) Ibn Ezra says this about Biblical poetry, such that one should not necessarily consider a repetition to convey two separate and distinguishable thoughts. Malbim on the other hand, would consider this heretical, as the Torah does not waste words. (Perhaps we could compare this to a Rabbi Akiva/Rabbi Yishmael dispute, where Rabbi Akiva derives laws from doubling of language, while Rabbi Yishmael dismisses this approach, saying dibra torah kilshon benei adam, that the Torah speaks in the language of people.)
Now reexamine the citations in Tehilliim, cited above.
Tehillim 78:46:
Chasil is matched with arbeh, and increase with labor. In the next pasuk, we have barad/chanamal (hail/frost), and vines/sycamore trees. In the next, we have barad/reshaphim (hail/fiery bolts) {there were two aspects to the hail} and cattle/flocks. In pasuk 51, we have first-born/first-fruits, ad Egypt/tents of Cham. These refer to the same. In 52, we have sheep/flock.
In Tehillim 105:34:
That is, just because the pasuk uses a different word, it does not preclude referring to the same item, even if the word can have another connotation.
Similarly, even though it uses specialized terms for locust, it is matching them with locust in the other half of the verse, and so it does not mean (or necessarily mean) that a different species is in play. And so, it is very possible that, referencing in Tehillim notwithstanding, there was only a single species in Egypt.
By Yoel, in contrast, the reference to different species of locust is deliberate and separate. As mentioned earlier, they are separate waves, such that after the gazam comes the arbeh, after which comes the yelek, followed finally by the chasil. One cannot say that they are poetic repetition.
Ramban, after rejecting Rashi, suggests that the locust plague in Egypt was the worst for Egypt, but not overall. Yoel's would be worst overall. {Perhaps we could similarly restrict it to Eretz Yisrael.} There is indeed a focus on Egypt's borders, and it mentions it being the worst since their ancestors were on the land {of Egypt}. Shemot 10:
I would offer other explanations. The first thing to realize, IMHO, is that Yoel knew parshat Bo. Torah preceded his prophecy he was presumably familiar with its contents. As such, Yoel would realize that his statement seems to come in conflict with that of the Torah.
More than that. I would say the choice of description of the locusts as the worst fromever and forever is a deliberate echoing of parshat Bo. Had the Torah not described the locusts in Egypt as the worst ever, Yoel would not have described them as such either. That is, Yoel wants to describe a forthcoming plague of locusts, and makes a Biblical allusion, describing them the same way that the plague in Egypt was describes.
If so, perhaps the description in Yoel can be taken non-literally. He means to say it will be a grievous plague indeed, and to stress how awful it will be, takes a page out of his Chumash. But he does not really mean that they will be the worst ever, for Moshe's are already that.
Also, there is the possibility that Yoel's locust plague is metaphorical in its entirety, and is being used to describe forthcoming destruction. The descriptions of features of the locusts, in Yoel 2:4-5:
Yoel 2:2, we see that Yoel's locust plague is the most intense ever:
| ב יוֹם חֹשֶׁךְ וַאֲפֵלָה, יוֹם עָנָן וַעֲרָפֶל, כְּשַׁחַר, פָּרֻשׂ עַל-הֶהָרִים; עַם, רַב וְעָצוּם--כָּמֹהוּ לֹא נִהְיָה מִן-הָעוֹלָם, וְאַחֲרָיו לֹא יוֹסֵף עַד-שְׁנֵי דּוֹר וָדוֹר. | 2 A day of darkness and gloominess, a day of clouds and thick darkness, as blackness spread upon the mountains; a great people and a mighty, there hath not been ever the like, neither shall be any more after them, even to the years of many generations. |
I would summarize the traditional answer as the difference in measuring the locust swarm as a scalar or as a vector. (Examples of scalars: speed, distance, mass, temperature; Example of vector: velocity, which has speed and angle.) If as a scalar, then the measure is a single number, and there can be only one maximum - only one worst. If as a vector, then the measurement can be resolved into components, and you can define more than one maximum.
So, measure locust swarms as vectors, with components such as ferocity, appetite, number, number of different species. A can be more ferocious than B, and B can have a bigger appetite than A. Rashi explains that Yoel's was worse than the one in Egypt because it had a greater number of species. For in Egypt, in parshat Bo, we only read of one species: Arbeh, locusts (see pasuk cited above). In Yoel, we read of 4 different species: Yoel 1:4:
The Torah's message to us here is clear. Just as swarms of locusts have different maalot and chisronot, different qualities that make them best, so too different individuals have different qualities which are their strong point. We should develop ourselves to reach our own personal zenith in our own outstanding qualities.
:)
OK, I was just spoofing some other prominent weekly dvars. Onwards!
The problem with this is, as Ramban points out, that there seems to be more than one species in Egypt as well. (Note: I consulted a bit at this point with this dvar torah on Parshat Bo by HaRav Yosef Carmel.) As we read in Tehillim 78:46:
and in Tehillim 105:34:
חָסִיל, אַרְבֶּה, יֶלֶק.
I would say immediately that even if we include these three species, we have a total of three. Yoel's locusts still outrank Moshe's, because they also contain גָּזָם.
However, Rashi did mention that there was only one species in Egypt. Gur Aryeh and Mizrachi save the day by saying that Rashi in fact knew of the other species, but that there was mainly arbeh and relatively few of the other species, whereas in Yoel's case it was equal measures of each. (One might bolster this by pointing out that this could be why only arbeh are mentioned in Torah, with the other two species mentioned as afterthoughts in two separate locations in Tehillim. Meanwhile by Yoel there is each species mentioned on its own, in separate waves, such that one might argue that they are therefore in equal measure.) It is strange though to create what is essentially a neo-midrash for the sole purpose of rescuing Rashi's language. More likely Rashi, or Rashi's source did not consider the scattered mentions of the locust plagues in Tehillim, or did not consider them significant (I'll explain what I mean by this shortly.)
Rashi on Yoel offers a different explanation, that in Yoel they came in waves. (That which the palmer-worm hath left hath the locust eaten; and that which the locust hath left hath the canker-worm eaten; and that which the canker-worm hath left hath the caterpiller eaten.) This feature is enough to make them worse than the plague in Egypt.
I would rescue Rashi in a different way. Looking just at sefer Shemot, all we see are arbeh. None of the other species of locust are present. Sure, in one place in Tehillim in mentions another species, and in another place in Tehillim it mentions a still other species. But, are we to take these mentions in Tehillim as absolutely referring to the existence of other species? In Shemot, again, all we see are arbeh. And in Tehillim, we have Biblical poetry.
One element of Biblical poetry is the repetition of the same idea in one pasuk, using different language. (The same is true in contemporary extra-Biblical poetry. For example, in the Baal Chronicles, "He held the bowl in his hand, he held the cup in his right hand." He is not holding a bowl in his left and a cup in his right, but rather hand/right hand refer to the same hand, and bowl/cup refer to the same entity.) Ibn Ezra says this about Biblical poetry, such that one should not necessarily consider a repetition to convey two separate and distinguishable thoughts. Malbim on the other hand, would consider this heretical, as the Torah does not waste words. (Perhaps we could compare this to a Rabbi Akiva/Rabbi Yishmael dispute, where Rabbi Akiva derives laws from doubling of language, while Rabbi Yishmael dismisses this approach, saying dibra torah kilshon benei adam, that the Torah speaks in the language of people.)
Now reexamine the citations in Tehilliim, cited above.
Tehillim 78:46:
Chasil is matched with arbeh, and increase with labor. In the next pasuk, we have barad/chanamal (hail/frost), and vines/sycamore trees. In the next, we have barad/reshaphim (hail/fiery bolts) {there were two aspects to the hail} and cattle/flocks. In pasuk 51, we have first-born/first-fruits, ad Egypt/tents of Cham. These refer to the same. In 52, we have sheep/flock.
In Tehillim 105:34:
That is, just because the pasuk uses a different word, it does not preclude referring to the same item, even if the word can have another connotation.
Similarly, even though it uses specialized terms for locust, it is matching them with locust in the other half of the verse, and so it does not mean (or necessarily mean) that a different species is in play. And so, it is very possible that, referencing in Tehillim notwithstanding, there was only a single species in Egypt.
By Yoel, in contrast, the reference to different species of locust is deliberate and separate. As mentioned earlier, they are separate waves, such that after the gazam comes the arbeh, after which comes the yelek, followed finally by the chasil. One cannot say that they are poetic repetition.
Ramban, after rejecting Rashi, suggests that the locust plague in Egypt was the worst for Egypt, but not overall. Yoel's would be worst overall. {Perhaps we could similarly restrict it to Eretz Yisrael.} There is indeed a focus on Egypt's borders, and it mentions it being the worst since their ancestors were on the land {of Egypt}. Shemot 10:
| ד כִּי אִם-מָאֵן אַתָּה, לְשַׁלֵּחַ אֶת-עַמִּי--הִנְנִי מֵבִיא מָחָר אַרְבֶּה, בִּגְבֻלֶךָ. | 4 Else, if thou refuse to let My people go, behold, to-morrow will I bring locusts into thy border; |
I would offer other explanations. The first thing to realize, IMHO, is that Yoel knew parshat Bo. Torah preceded his prophecy he was presumably familiar with its contents. As such, Yoel would realize that his statement seems to come in conflict with that of the Torah.
More than that. I would say the choice of description of the locusts as the worst fromever and forever is a deliberate echoing of parshat Bo. Had the Torah not described the locusts in Egypt as the worst ever, Yoel would not have described them as such either. That is, Yoel wants to describe a forthcoming plague of locusts, and makes a Biblical allusion, describing them the same way that the plague in Egypt was describes.
If so, perhaps the description in Yoel can be taken non-literally. He means to say it will be a grievous plague indeed, and to stress how awful it will be, takes a page out of his Chumash. But he does not really mean that they will be the worst ever, for Moshe's are already that.
Also, there is the possibility that Yoel's locust plague is metaphorical in its entirety, and is being used to describe forthcoming destruction. The descriptions of features of the locusts, in Yoel 2:4-5:
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
LinkWithin
