+7 yevamot; +1 ketubot;

הדרן עלך ארבעה אחין!
הדרן עלך החולץ ליבמתו!
הדרן עלך רבן גמליאל!
הדרן עלך הבא על יבמתו!
הדרן עלך אלמנה לכהן גדול!
דרן עלך הערל!
הדרן עלך ש מותרות!
(perakim 3-9 of yerushalmi yevamot)

הדרן עלך בתולה נישאת!
(perek 1 of yerushalmi ketubot)

The Danger of Overemphasizing Parallel Surface Structure

A common thing Biblical academic scholars do is find parallel practices to those described in Tanach in the surrounding culture - that of the Ancient Near East. (Academic Talmudic scholars may do the same for the surrounding cultures of the rabbis of the Talmud.) Often this can provide illumination into the significance of rituals or items, and when a parallel is reinforced by something in the text or tradition, it has a likelihood of being true.

I think, though, there is a danger of being misled by archaeological evidence of the social context. That danger is being faced with a square peg and a round hole, and blunting the edges of the peg to force a matching. Sometimes it is obvious that one is doing it, but with enough ornate language and philosophizing, one can present a compelling yet ultimately false correlation.

To borrow a metaphor from the field of linguistics: Sometimes two words can have an identical surface manifestation, but may have entirely different derivations such that they are not related whatsoever. Consider the two words: boxes and boxes. The first refers to a noun - to a collection of wooden containers. The second is a verb: "He boxes in the boxing ring."

The first meaning of the word box comes from Late Latin buxis, from Greek pyxis, from pyxos "box tree," of uncertain origin. The second meaning, namely "a blow," perhaps come from Middle Dutch boke. See this etymological dictionary for more information.

That gives us the form box. But take this further. Boxes as the collection of wooden containers arrives in that form by taking the noun box, and adding the plural marker to it. Since the singular ends in an x, we add an es to the end instead of simply an s. Boxes as the verb adds the es to denote the present tense third person singular.

Thus, even though the two words boxes and boxes have the same surface form, the differ in their entirety when we examine their deep structure and etymology.

The same may well be true when examining cultural phenomena as well. Consider an historian/sociologist examining 21st century cultures. He might see parallels amongst various groups, and draw a connection. Judges wear robes as a mark of their honor. So do chassidic rebbes, so it too must be a mark of honor. So do housewives. So do people when they get out of the shower. Are all these instances a mark of honor. Or does the judge wear the robe because he often showers?

Judges and others wore powdered wig as a sign of honor. Orthodox women wear sheitels. A bad historian might, due to the fog created by a thousand years, conclude that the Jewish practice is based on that of the surrounding culture.

People concerned with lead and other impurities filter their water. Right now, many Jews are filtering their water for fear of copepods. There is a practice of some to filter the water for pesach for fear of consuming chametz in the water. These practices have entirely different motivating factors, but someone could come up with an explanations that the Jews, instructed to watch carefully over their health, shared the concern of those who feared lead and therefore mandated as halacha the filtering of water. When you do not have the facts, you can make up all sorts of rationalizations which sound good, especially if you speak academic.

Recently I had a post showing how just as Jews have tevilat kelim, immersing of vessels before use to remove some sort of ritual impurity, the Hindus have a tevilat eilim, where they immerse their idols in the water. I am sure some academician could come up with some link, but such a link would be false.

I am sorry to belabor the point, but I stress this with cause. What is obvious to us, as firsthand observers of events, is not obvious when viewed from afar.

Two examples. Tonight someone told me an interesting dvar torah about the institution of tzitzit. The purpose of tzitzit, perhaps, is to see them remember God's commandments and avoid sin (though perhaps I could argue that this is a side effect rather that the root cause of the commandment.) However, Milgrom has demonstrated that in the Ancient Near East, prominent people wore fringes on their garments. There is a lot of evidence to back this up. Techeilet is also a mark of nobility. Therefore, to cite Milgrom, ""Weaving a ...[blue] thread into the tsitsit enhances its symbolism as a mark of nobility. Further, since all Jews are required to wear it, it is a sign that Jews are a people of nobility. Their sovereign, however, is not mortal: Jews are princes of God." (see here)

The one who related this to me added the following insightful comment. Only the high priest (kohen gadol) was allowed to wear shaatnez in his priestly garments, yet here, every Jew was commanded to put techeilet, made of wool, on his linen garment (if the garment were made of linen). Thus each person is priestlike, reinforcing the idea that the Israelite nation is a mamlechet kohanim vegoy kadosh, "a kingdom of priests and a holy nation."

Thus the practice of putting on tzitzit is a democratic statement, that all the people are holy. We can link it to recalling the commandments in that it reminds the Israelite of his higher calling, of his priestly and noble stature, which requires a specific code of behavior. (see here for another formulation of this, in the review)

It all sounds very good. However, there is nothing in the Biblical command to suggest this explanation. This is all a rationalization; an attempt to fit the square peg of tzitzit as a reminder into the round hole of Ancient Near Eastern nobility wearing fringes.

Even the surface manifestations do not match. Did the Ancient Near Easterners wear one blue string in their fringes? No. they just wore fringes. The blue is taken by Milgrom from elsewhere to symbolize nobility.

Also, there are other possible explanations from fringes. In Mari, in the Ancient Near East, the prophet would enclose his hem and a lock of his hair with his report. The hem was also used as a signature, pressed into a clay tablet, and sometimes (according to Speiser) the fringe could serve duty in place of the hem. (see same link as above)

I might then offer the rationalization/fit that the fringe each Israelite wears represents the signature of the prophet, Moshe, on his prophecy, that is the entirety of Torah, and thus will serve to remind the average Israelite about all of the commandments. {OK, not the best explanation I could come up with, but it is possible, and corresponds to a different meaning the fringe had in Ancient Near Eastern culture.}

So which one is it? When you realize that there are other meanings to the fringe, Milgrom's explanation loses some of its force. And, need it be any of the above explanations? Think about it. Fringes became a style in the Ancient Near East for various personalities. Now there was a concept that someone could have a fringe on his garment. Different cultures might attach entirely different significance to this feature, just as the Jew and the Hindu immerses items in water, for entirely different causes.

A similar situation arises in terms of the piercing of the Israelite perpetual slave's ear. He says "I love my master" and his ear is pierce; he serves until the Jubilee year. Ancient Near Eastern law has similar laws in terms of slaves and ears. Maidservants get their ear mangled for not behaving as befit their place. A slave who denies his master has his ear cut off. So one can argue it is a punishment.

Or, as I suggested, and I found out later some Biblical scholars: the law seems the reverse. In ANE law the servant who denies his master is punished in his ear, while in Jewish law he loves his master and is punished similarly. Chazal don't ask this question (at least not explicitly) but say the reason is that the ear which heard "ki li benei yisrael avadim." "For to Me are the Children of Israel slaves." They are slaves to Me (God) and not slaves to slaves. Thus, I would suggest, by saying he love their human master, the perpetual Hebrew slave denies the Mastery of his true Master, God.

Perhaps. It certainly sounds nice. But that does not mean it is necessarily true.

Other features of slaves in Ancient Near Eastern law is that the master might carve a sign into the slave's foot so that if he ran away he could be tracked. Other slaves had marks of their status via a special hairdo. Perhaps the piercing of the ear served a similar function. This would go along with Ibn Ezra's suggestion that the piercing was a slave-mark, and not a punishment.

However, just because we find near or even exact parallels does not mean that their is any actual correspondence. It may very well be that the reason is as Chazal say in its simplest form - that it is a punishment to the ear which heard "For to Me are the Children of Israel slaves." The ear heard and disregarded so it is punished. (Perhaps this will serve as a reminder to him that he has disregarded this directive.)

Update: To elaborate a bit more on why I object to the explanation of tzitzit given above. If you browse through parshablog, you will see that not infrequently I suggest explanations based on Ancient Near Eastern parallels. So it is not the idea of parallels in its entirety that I find fault with. Rather, I think you have to be careful when making such parallels, and not just jump at any parallel and assume that it must be correct because one can make a parallel. In this instance, I think the parallel is superficial and a bit forced.

Specifically:

1. It is too general for my tastes. There is a difference between saying "look! Ancient Near Eastern law also has a maiming/amputation law on the books for a woman who crushes a man's testicles!" as per an earlier post of mine, and saying "look! the Torah commands fringes and fringes were worn by prominent members of society in the ANE!"
2. In line with the above, perhaps this was a style of garment and only the rich and prominent could keep up with the styles. If it is a Biblical commandment, then the common populace has reason to keep it.
3. It is also too general (and conceptual) of an explanation. "It is a sign of prominence and princeliness." This matches the wig example above.
4. It does not match in all of the details. They did not wear fringes with specifically a blue thread. He takes the meaning of techeilet from elsewhere and tacks it on.
5. The explanation of prominence does not jive with the reason for the commandment given explicitly in the verse. We are told the reason is that the wearer will see it and remember to fulfill all the commandments. What does this have to do with it being a princely style of dress? And, while one can may a connection, that connection will be somewhat forced, and the explanation in the verse will no longer be read in its most straightforward manner.
6. Worse, it does not even have a parallel in the Israelite practice. I would have an easier time accepting it had it been that only the prominent people in Israelite society wore this. Say, the head of each bet av, or the prophets, or the priests, or even the Levites. Then, it makes sense to say that here too this is a sign of prominence or princeliness.
   Instead, this is a command on everyone. So what do we have here? A match of the prominent people of the ANE in dress, to... even the common Israelite! This is no match at all! So Milgrom rescues it with a rationalization of the nation in general being a nation of priests and a holy nation... everyone is a prince of God.
   It just does not pass the smell test. If he had a sharp parallel, one might offer some a rationalization to rescue it, but here he has a parallel that does not match in all the details, is generic ("prominence") in nature, contradicts the reason explicitly given in the verse, and does not match the same situation in Israelite society. It is farfetched.
7. There seems to be at least one other function for the fringe in ANE society - as signature for a prophecy. This is not explicitly related to princeliness. Who knows what other functions it had.

Allepo Codex - parashat Haazinu 

Haazinu Recap

You can check out my post for last year on parashat haazinu. It is all about Devarim 32:6, and more specifically the first word in that pasuk.

I am going to try to rework that devar torah.

First, some preliminaries:

1. A shva na is a moving shva. That is, one that is pronounced. The general rule for a shva na is that is occurs at the beginning of a syllable. Thus, at the start of a word or at the start of a new syllable in a word.
2. A shva nach is a resting shva. It is not pronounced. It occurs at the end of a syllable.
3. If there are two shvas in sequence, the first it the shva nach of the preceding syllable, and the next is the shva na at the start of the new syllable.
4. The exception to the above (rule 3) is a consonant cluster at the end of a word. E.g. the word ארד, Ard. Then, there is a shva under the resh and the daledh, but both are restive shva nach.
5. When a shva na occurs under a gutteral - אהחע, and perhaps ר, it is difficult to pronounce. So it converts to a chataf (means fast). The shva symbol is places next to a patach, kametz, or segol, and the vowel is pronounced like a very quick version of the full vowel. We would not expect a regular shva na under a gutteral, and if we see it there, it makes sense to assume that it is a shva nach, a restive shva, instead.
   

Now on to the main subject matter. Devarim 32:5 states:
שִׁחֵת לוֹ לֹא, בָּנָיו מוּמָם: דּוֹר עִקֵּשׁ, וּפְתַלְתֹּל.
"Is corruption His? No; His children's is the blemish; a generation crooked and perverse."

The trup, or cantillation, first divides the verse at מוּמָם, or blemish.
So we have:
"Is corruption His? No; His children's is the blemish;"
and
"a generation crooked and perverse."

But that first part of the verse is divided by trup into:
"Is corruption His? No;"
and
"His children's is the blemish;"

It it interesting that the translation gave it as a question. "Is corruption His?" It could be read as "Corruption is His." Followed by an emphatic No! to that suggestion. If not for the trup I might have actually attributed the No! to the second part of the phrase. "No, but rather the blemish belongs to His children." But it belongs to the first part: "Corruption is His. Not!"

The next verse reads:
הַ לְיְקוָק, תִּגְמְלוּ-זֹאת-- עַם נָבָל, וְלֹא חָכָם: הֲלוֹא-הוּא אָבִיךָ קָּנֶךָ, הוּא עָשְׂךָ וַיְכֹנְנֶךָ.
"Do ye thus requite the LORD, O foolish people and unwise? is not He thy father that hath gotten thee? hath He not made thee, and established thee?"

I would read this either as a complaint against the people for misbehaving. תִּגְמְלוּ-זֹאת will then mean that you are repaying Hashem for the good He has done for you by doing bad. The other possibility is that הַ לְיְקוָק, תִּגְמְלוּ-זֹאת is asking if you are indeed attributing to Hashem this. That is, would you attribute evil to Hashem? This is then a response to the previous verse where the suggestion was made that corruption was His.

If you read Haazinu carefully the following is on of the major themes: Hashem did good things for us and established us as a nation. However, if we rebel in the future, Hashem will punish us.

Someone might look at this punishment and say that it is coming because Hashem is acting in a not-nice manner. They claim He is corrupt. Thus, we are told that No, the fault lies not in our God but in ourselves, that we corrupted our way. Before going on to tell us the good things Hashem did for us, the suggestion that the fault lies in God in mocked, as coming from a foolish and unwise people.

Alternatively, the ingratitude and rebellion towards a benevolent God is mocked as coming from an unwise people. This would be הַ לְיְקוָק, תִּגְמְלוּ-זֹאת as "would you do this to God" as opposed to "would you attribute this to God."

The word הַ is strange, though. It seems to be functioning as the ha which expresses wonder, transforming the following statement into a question. Indeed, in the second half of the verse, this ha occurs:

הֲלוֹא-הוּא אָבִיךָ קָּנֶךָ

However, there is a difference. In the first half of the verse, we have הַ with a full patach as a vowel. In the second half, as is the case in all other instances, we have הֲ with a chataf patach, which is a shva adapted under a gutteral as explained in rule 5 above. Certain transformative rules can change a chataf patach into a full patach, but it is still strange. Further, the הַ in the beginning of the verse is a separate word, whereas in the second half of the verse it is as it usually is, joined to the word.

There is a tradition, recorded in the gemara, that this heh is a word in and of itself.

I think this may be the answer: There is a possibility that this strange word הַ does not actually serve as the heh expressing wonder, or a question. I would point out that this is a song, in which poetic terms are used. In Biblical poetry, we would expect, and in fact find, archaic terms. Sometimes these terms are extremely rare in normal Biblical Hebrew. Sometimes we only know of their existence by comparison to other Semitic languages.
In this case, there is a cognate word in Aramaic: הָא
This word means "behold," and would also fit the context.

In fact, two of the Targumim, Targum Onkelos and Targum Yerushalmi, write הָא as the translation of this strange ha. Only Targum Pseudo-Yonatan does not.

This suggests that there was a knowledge of this fact that the meaning of the word was that of the Aramaic cognate, way back in the time of Chazal. This would account for the tradition and insistence that it should be written as its own word. In fact, it is its own word.

Since it is its own word, we would certainly not expect a chataf patach under the heh, since it is not a heh expressing wonder. And it needs a full vowel to stand as its own word.

Now, a patach does not usually stand in an open syllable. It is a short vowel, so appears in a short syllable, that is, with a consonant following it. That is why in the Aramaic word הָא the aleph does not truly close it, and the vowel patach in lengthened to be a kametz. In this case, this does not happen, but this should not us, for since we are speaking of an archaic word with an archaic form in Biblical poetry, linguistic phonetic rules which would have lengthened the patach into a kametz would not necessarily have taken effect on the word. That phonetic rule may have developed after the word fell out of vogue and so the word was not around to be changed. People still know of this rare word and used it in poetry, in its archaic and unchanged form.

However, the commentators I've seen seem to assume this is actually a heh expressing wonder, which should have a shva na under it, which would be promoted to chataf patach under rule (5). But it actually, at least in our chumashim, has a full patach. (The Leningrad Codex has a chataf patach under the heh.) So, for our chumashim, some promotion rule to a full patach would need to come into play.

The next word, having been separated from word ha, at least in printed form, also has its difficulties, which I addressed in the post linked to above.

I would say that with הַ being the cognate of the Aramaic הָא, the next word should be pronounced and vowelized the way it would normally. That is, = לַאְדֹנָי - לַיֽקוָק"La`do," with a full patach under the lamedh. It it not vowelized that way in our chumashim, nor in the Aleppo Codex. Rather, there is a shva under the lamedh : לְ

Here is what it looks like in the Aleppo Codex:

Aleppo Codex - parashat Haazinu

However, even though I would say at first that this is how the next word should be vowelized, another factor comes into play. That is that, on a phonological level, unstressed syllables in Hebrew with short vowels are usually closed. That is, if C = consonant and V = vowel, a closed syllable is CVC, while an open syllable is CV. Now, the patach is a short vowel, and it is in הַ which is an open syllable. There is a desire, phonologically speaking, so close this vowel.

At the same time, the next word started initially as אְדֹנָי with a shva na under the א. (Of course in general this would be promoted to the chataf patach as described above, but we are talking initially, before doing any promotion.) A לְ was added to this, with a shva na under the lamedh. (Now, we cannot have two shva na's in a row, so promotion of some sort usually happens, but we are talking here initially.)

So there are three demands - the aleph usually would get a chataf patach, and in the proximity for the Divine Name the lamedh would aquire the full symbol - a patach and the shva under the aleph would quiesce to a shva nach. However, this would be to solve phonetic difficulties, but at the same time we have the demand of the short open syllable in the previous word for closure.

What happens next is beautiful. The shva under the lamedh quiesces to a shva nach, and it is used to close the previous syllable - the הַ. Once this happens, we no longer have two shva na in a row. Then, the shva na under the the aleph, rather than quiescing to a shva nach, remains a shva na. Since it is under a gutteral, it gets promoted to a chataf patach.

Therefore, the word is pronounced: הַ-לְאֲדֹנָי. What the specific pause between letters is is another issue - where the word boundary is, when the lamedh is closing the syllable of the previous word, but I would put the slightest pause, to let it close the syllable while still marking the word boundary.

I would say that this is not the only time we see this phenomenon of the first letter of the subsequent word. Consider the famous pasuk from the אשרי prayer, in Tehillim 84:5:

אַשְׁרֵי, יוֹשְׁבֵי בֵיתֶךָ-- עוֹד, יְהַלְלוּךָ סֶּלָה.

Note the dagesh forte in the סּ of the last word סֶּלָה.

We see it also in the next statement in, from אשרי Tehillim 144:15:

אַשְׁרֵי הָעָם, שֶׁכָּכָה לּוֹ: אַשְׁרֵי הָעָם, שֱׁיְהוָה אֱלֹהָיו.

Note the dagesh forte in the לּ of the word לּוֹ.

In both cases, the previous syllable, that is the final syllable of the previous word, is an unstressed syllable. (Specifically it is pretonically = mile'el stressed.) Further, it is an open syllable, since יְהַלְלוּךָ has the kametz final and the heh in שֶׁכָּכָה is not pronounced and thus does not close it. {Even though the kametz is a long vowel and usually need not be closed, there still seems to be a need for closure.} Further, there is conjunctive rather than disjunctive trup, another factor I claim is necessary to this phenomenon to manifest. I would therefore say that the dagesh forte at the start of the following word serves to double the first letter, as a dagesh forte always does. One of duo then serves to close the previous syllable, and the second serves to begin the new syllable.

Here in Haazinu there is no need for a dagesh forte because there are factors in play (namely the desire not to see two shva na in a row) that do not want the first letter to begin a syllable anyway. As a result, all that happens is the shva na under the lamedh quiesces and it serves to close the previous word. So, while not exactly similar, the situations are analagous.

I want to now turn to the opinion of Ibn Ezra, as brought down by the super-commentary Avi Ezer. This will bring evidence as to how the word was pronounced in medieval times.

אבי עזר

הלה' תגמלו זאת וגו': וכבר פירשתי טעם הה"א בספר מאזנים)
וזה לשון הרב בספר מאזנים.
אמר ר' שמואל הנגיד
נתברר אצלנו שה"א הלה' לבדה והיא זרה
והנה זה הה"א יגלה סוד גדול
והוא ששה"א לא יתכן להיות בשו"א ובפת"ח
כי אין יכולת באדם לקרוא שו"א נע אם לא יהיה אחריו אות בתנועה.
ע"כ יהיה הה"א בפת"ח כדרך ההאי"ן התמהין
וידוע כי הלמ"ד יהיה שו"א נע כמשפט כל למ"ד נוסף, כמו ליעקב.
ואל תשים אל לבך הקריאה שאנו קוראין
כי הוצרכנו להניח להלמ"ד שהיא שו"א נע בעבור היות שו"א נע תחת אל"ף אדון עד כאן לשונו.
ועיין א"ת
ושלש מחלוקות בדבר:
לסיראי ה' לחוד.
ולנהרדאי הל' לחוד.
ולמדינחאי הלה' מלה אחת.
ובחבירי אם מטעמים אאריך אם ירצה השם בזה ברצות ה' דרכי

הלה' תגמלו זאת וגו: Ibn Ezra writes, "And I already explained the reason of the ה in Sefer Moznayim."
And this is the language of the Rav {Ibn Ezra} in Sefer Moznayim:
Rabbi Shmuel HaNaggid said,
it is clear by us that the heh of הלה' is by itself, and it is out of the ordinary.
And behold this heh reveals a great secret,
and that is that the heh cannot bear to have a chataf patach (with shva and with patach)
For man does not have the ability to read a shva na if it does not have after it a consonant with a vowel. {phonologically speaking}
Perforce the heh must have a {full} patach like the heh's expressing wonder.
And it is known that the lamedh has a shva na according to the rule of all lameds added on, such as leYa'akov.
And do not take to heart the {actual} reading that we read {i.e. pronounce}
For we must quiesce the lamedh which was originally a shva na, in order to have a shva na (that is, chataf patach) under the aleph of אֲדֹן.
End quote.
And see א"ת. (??)
And there is a three way dispute in the matter {of how it is written in a sefer torah}:
The Syrians have the first heh by itself. {as its own word, as the yerushalmi says.}
The Nehardaians have the heh lamedh by itself. {and the name of Hashem as the other word.}
The Easterners have both as a single word.
And in my treatise on taamim I will elaborate on this, G-d-willing, on this, if Hashem desires my path.

Analyzing this, we see that Shmuel HaNagid assumed that the heh was one expressing wonder, rather than the Aramaic cognate I suggested. As a result, he has an original heh shva na lamedh shva na aleph shva na. Then he must posit various promotions to the he shva to heh chataf patach to heh patach, as he does, and explain why the lamedh shva na must quiesce.

I, on the other hand, start with a heh patach lamedh shva na aleph shva na. Then, everything else falls into place, with the patach seizing the shva of the lamedh to close it, and the shva na of the aleph remaining, requiring of course promotion to a chataf patach.

In terms of the three way dispute, I think I can explain. The Syrians have exactly what it says in the yerushalmi. That is, the heh is a word in and of itself. As we would expect, since Aleppo is in Syria, the Aleppo Codex reflects this. {And I explained above that the meaning of this tradition.}

Those from Nehardaa have the heh lamedh as its own word. This reflects the pronunciation, as described by Shmuel HaNaggid. That is, the shva na under the lamedh quiesces, and thus there is a pronunciation hal. A careful reader would make sure to pronounce it such, and might put a separation after because the heh is supposed to be a word in and of itself, or just because for such a difficult word they spoke deliberately, putting a slight pause after the syllable that should not really be there. It is reflected in the text.

The Eastern tradition is to hae it as a single word, perhaps because of a lack of a tradition that the heh is a word in and of itself, or because once the lamedh shva na quiesces, it is almost pronounced like a single word.

At any rate, the way I suggested it should be pronounced seems borne out both by Shmuel HaNaggid's description of how it is read, and by the strange tradition from Nehardaa.

I've registered for an interesting set of classes this semester

In CUNY:

1. Introduction to Robotics
2. Data Mining on the Web
3. Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics
4. Some research work in Linear Algebra
   

In Revel:

1. Halachic Literature of Spanish Jewry, 10th-14th century
2. Introduction to Tannaitic Literature
   

In RIETS:

1. Pastoral Psychology
   

They Should've Listened to Shimon Ben Shetach

As Pirkei Avot 1:9 states:

שמעון בן שטח אומר: הוי מרבה לחקור את העדים, והוי זהיר בדבריך שמא מתוכם ילמדו לשקר.
Shimon ben Shetach says: Increase in interrogating your witnesses, and be careful in your words, lets from them they learn how to lie.

In terms of Rathergate and the bogus 60 Minutes memos, I just read the following, from The American Spectator:

PERHAPS MOST TROUBLING to the CBS News staff looking into how its story went off the rails is the timing of the memos' appearance. "Some 60 Minutes staffers have been working on this story for more than three years off and on," says the CBS News producer. "There have been rumors about these memos and what was in them for at least that long. No one had been able to find anything. Not a single piece of paper. But we know that a lot of people here interviewed a lot of people in Texas and elsewhere and asked very explicit questions about the existence of these memos. Then all of a sudden they show up? In one nice, neat package?"

This CBS New producer went on to explain that the questions 60 Minutes folk were asking were specific enough that people would have been able to fabricate the memorandums to meet the exact specifications the investigative journalists were looking for. "People were asking questions of sources like, 'Have you ever seen or heard of a memo that suspended Bush for failing to appear for a physical?' and 'Have you heard about or know of someone who has any documentation from back in the 1970s that shows there was pressure to get Bush into the National Guard?' It was like they were placing an order for a ready-made product. That is the biggest problem I have with this. It's all too neat and perfect for what we needed. Without these exact pieces of paper, we don't have a story. Dan has as much as admitted that. Everyone knows it. We were at a standstill on this story until these memos showed up."

Little Green Footballs has a good series of posts about the whole issue.

+1 yevamot;

הדרן עלך כיצד אשת אחיו!
(perek 2 of yerushalmi yevamot)

Nitzavim - Vayelech #3: A source for Daf Yomi

The midrash expands on the attainability of Torah, mentioned in the verses below:

Devarim 30:11-14

כִּי הַמִּצְוָה הַזֹּאת, אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי מְצַוְּךָ הַיּוֹם--לֹא-נִפְלֵאת הִוא מִמְּךָ, וְלֹא רְחֹקָה הִוא.
לֹא בַשָּׁמַיִם, הִוא: לֵאמֹר, מִי יַעֲלֶה-לָּנוּ הַשָּׁמַיְמָה וְיִקָּחֶהָ לָּנוּ, וְיַשְׁמִעֵנוּ אֹתָהּ, וְנַעֲשֶׂנָּה.
וְלֹא-מֵעֵבֶר לַיָּם, הִוא: לֵאמֹר, מִי יַעֲבָר-לָנוּ אֶל-עֵבֶר הַיָּם וְיִקָּחֶהָ לָּנוּ, וְיַשְׁמִעֵנוּ אֹתָהּ, וְנַעֲשֶׂנָּה.
כִּי-קָרוֹב אֵלֶיךָ הַדָּבָר, מְאֹד: בְּפִיךָ וּבִלְבָבְךָ, לַעֲשֹׂתוֹ.

"For this commandment which I command thee this day, it is not too hard for thee, neither is it far off.
It is not in heaven, that thou shouldest say: 'Who shall go up for us to heaven, and bring it unto us, and make us to hear it, that we may do it?'
Neither is it beyond the sea, that thou shouldest say: 'Who shall go over the sea for us, and bring it unto us, and make us to hear it, that we may do it?'
But the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth, and in thy heart, that thou mayest do it."

The midrash rabba on nitzavim-vayelech states:

זש"ה (משלי כד:ז) רָאמוֹת לֶאֱוִיל חָכְמוֹת; בַּשַּׁעַר, לֹא יִפְתַּח-פִּיהוּ. מהו רָאמוֹת לֶאֱוִיל חָכְמוֹת? א"ר תנחומא הטיפש הזה נכנס לבית הכנסת והוא רואה אותן שנושאים ונותנים בתלמוד והוא אינו יודע מה הן אומרין הוא מתבייש שנא' בַּשַּׁעַר, לֹא יִפְתַּח-פִּיהוּ ואין שער אלא סנהדרין דכתיב (דברים כה:ז) וְעָלְתָה יְבִמְתּוֹ הַשַּׁעְרָה אֶל-הַזְּקֵנִים.

This {what the pesukim above talk about the attainability of Torah} is what it stated by the verse in Mishlei 24:7: "Wisdom is {as unattainable} to a fool as corals; he openeth not his mouth in the gate." What is meant by רָאמוֹת לֶאֱוִיל חָכְמוֹת, "Wisdom is {as unattainable} to a fool as corals?"

Rabbi Tanchuma said, this is the fool who enters the synagogue and sees those who are involved in the give and take of Talmud, and he does not know what they are saying, and is embarrassed, as it states {in the end of the verse in Mishlei} "he openeth not his mouth in the gate." And the word "gate" is a reference to the Sanhedrin, as it states in Devarim 25:7, {about levirate marriage, in the case when the man refuses to marry his brother's widow: }

וְאִם-לֹא יַחְפֹּץ הָאִישׁ, לָקַחַת אֶת-יְבִמְתּוֹ; וְעָלְתָה יְבִמְתּוֹ הַשַּׁעְרָה אֶל-הַזְּקֵנִים, וְאָמְרָה מֵאֵן יְבָמִי לְהָקִים לְאָחִיו שֵׁם בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל--לֹא אָבָה, יַבְּמִי.
And if the man like not to take his brother's wife, then his brother's wife shall go up to the gate unto the elders, and say: 'My husband's brother refuseth to raise up unto his brother a name in Israel; he will not perform the duty of a husband's brother unto me.'

{Thus we see the word שער, gate, refers to the place where the court convenes.}

{A suggestion: the word ramot may serve a dual purpose, that is, as a pun, in the verse in Mishlei. It refers to some rare gem, what the standard translation renders coral. But unspecified is in what way is wisdom to the fool comparable to coral. One answer is that as a rare gem is is difficult to get access to. But ramot (especially without the aleph, which is quiescent in the word) also means "high up," and thus it is high up and unattainable. "Wisdom is high up for the fool." The contrast is then immediately obvious to that of Moshe's speech to the Israelites: The Torah is not in Heaven, that you need someone to go up and bring it down for you. It is attainable. The midrash continues...}

ד"א רבנן אמרי הטיפש הזה נכנס לבית הכנסת ורואה אותן עוסקים בתורה והוא אומר להן היאך אדם למד תורה תחלה אומרים לו תחלה קורא במגילה ואח"כ בספר ואח"כ בנביאים ואח"כ בכתובים משהוא גומר את המקרא שונה את התלמוד ואח"כ בהלכות ואח"כ באגדות כיון ששומע כך אומר בלבו אימתי אני למד כל זאת וחוזר מן השער הוי בַּשַּׁעַר, לֹא יִפְתַּח-פִּיהוּ.

Another explanation: The Rabbis said, this fool enters the synagogue and sees them involved in Torah and he says to them, "how does one learn Torah in the first place?" They say to him {in reply} "first he reads in megilla {Esther, or the 5 Megillot?? - or is this some text used to teach reading Hebrew?}, then in the sefer {Pentateuch - 5 Books of Moshe}, then in Neviim {Prophets}, and then in Ketuvim {Writings}. Once he finishes the Written Torah, he learns the Talmud, and after that halachot {laws} and after that aggadot {homiletic and narrative interpretations of Torah}. When he hears this, he says in his heart, "When will I learn all of this?!", and turns from the gate. This is what is written, בַּשַּׁעַר, לֹא יִפְתַּח-פִּיהוּ, "In the gate, he does not open his mouth."

{I would add that the focus is perhaps on the fact that he does not even begin - לֹא יִפְתַּח means he did not begin, or open. Or opening his mouth connotes a very limited step, just the learning megilla stage, which he does not do. He does not do the slightest, because the final goal - Wisdom - seems so far off. Rabbi Yannai will give a recommendation how to proceed even in the face of the immensity of the task...}

א"ר ינאי למה"ד לככר שהיה תלוי באויר טיפש אומר מי יוכל להביאו ופקח או' לא אחד תלה אותו מביא סולם או קנה ומוריד אותו כך כל מי שהוא טיפש אומר אימתי אקרא כל התורה ומי שהוא פיקח מהו עושה שונה פרק אחד בכל יום ויום עד שמסיים כל התורה כולה אמר הקדוש ב"ה לא נפלאת היא ואם נפלאת היא ממך שאין אתה עסוק בה הוי כי המצוה הזאת

Rabbi Yannai said, to what is this matter comparable? To a loaf of bread which is suspended in the air {presumably from a string from the ceiling}. The fool says, "who is able to bring it?" And the rational man says, "Did not someone suspend it there?" {And if someone was able to access that space to suspend it there then it must be possible for others to access it as well.} He brings a ladder, or a pole, and brings it {down}. So too he who is foolish says "When will I {have time to} read all the Torah.

And he who is rational, what does he do? He learns a single perek {chapter} every day until he finishes the entirety of Torah.

So says Hashem, לֹא-נִפְלֵאת הִוא מִמְּךָ, " it is not too hard for thee." That is, לֹא-נִפְלֵאת הִוא, "it is not too hard." And if it is too hard, מִמְּךָ, "it is from you" that you are not invliving yourself in it. This is what is meant by the verse כִּי הַמִּצְוָה הַזֹּאת.

{That's why daf yomi is such a great idea. You take a very small chunk every day, and after about seven years, finish bavli. But you can do this with any think you want to learn. A while ago, I decided that I should learn through Tanach, and went through it 3 times so far, by simply setting aside time every day to learn at least some small amount - be it a chapter, or more, or less. The same with yerushalmi. I try to learn a bit each day, and don't shift my attention to some other material, and eventually I'll get through it - I recently started the final seder, seder nashim. And when I'm done I'll have been exposed to all if it, and this exposure is useful for getting to the depths of any single sugya. I recommend this approach highly.}

Nitzavim - Vayelech #2:

Devarim 30:11-14

כִּי הַמִּצְוָה הַזֹּאת, אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי מְצַוְּךָ הַיּוֹם--לֹא-נִפְלֵאת הִוא מִמְּךָ, וְלֹא רְחֹקָה הִוא.
לֹא בַשָּׁמַיִם, הִוא: לֵאמֹר, מִי יַעֲלֶה-לָּנוּ הַשָּׁמַיְמָה וְיִקָּחֶהָ לָּנוּ, וְיַשְׁמִעֵנוּ אֹתָהּ, וְנַעֲשֶׂנָּה.
וְלֹא-מֵעֵבֶר לַיָּם, הִוא: לֵאמֹר, מִי יַעֲבָר-לָנוּ אֶל-עֵבֶר הַיָּם וְיִקָּחֶהָ לָּנוּ, וְיַשְׁמִעֵנוּ אֹתָהּ, וְנַעֲשֶׂנָּה.
כִּי-קָרוֹב אֵלֶיךָ הַדָּבָר, מְאֹד: בְּפִיךָ וּבִלְבָבְךָ, לַעֲשֹׂתוֹ.

"For this commandment which I command thee this day, it is not too hard for thee, neither is it far off.
It is not in heaven, that thou shouldest say: 'Who shall go up for us to heaven, and bring it unto us, and make us to hear it, that we may do it?'
Neither is it beyond the sea, that thou shouldest say: 'Who shall go over the sea for us, and bring it unto us, and make us to hear it, that we may do it?'
But the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth, and in thy heart, that thou mayest do it."

The pshat meaning of the above section might be that the Torah is accessible to the people. Moshe already did the hard work of going up to Heaven and bringing it down for the people. Also, it is not far off generally - not all the way up in heaven or across the sea. Further, it now resides much closer to them - they speak it, and it occupies their thought processes. (The heart as the seat of thought.)

The midrash takes off on the phrase לֹא בַשָּׁמַיִם הִוא, "It is not in heaven," as referring to Moshe's taking of the Torah from Heaven:

כִּי הַמִּצְוָה וגו' לא לֹא בַשָּׁמַיִם, הִוא: אמר להן משה שלא תאמרו משה אחר עומד ומביא לנו תורה אחרת מן השמים כבר אני מודיע אתכם לא בשמים היא שלא נשתייר הימנה בשמים.
"For this commandment ... It is not in heaven..." - Moshe said to them, "that you should not say that another Moshe will stand and bring us another Torah from heaven, I therefore preempt this by informing you that there is not left of it in heaven."

Perhaps this midrash was a response to Christianity's New Testament - that no later figure can give a new Torah. The Torah we have is final, and Hashem is not holding something back that He will later give.

It could also be a response to later attempts at reforming the religion - say, false prophets who claim they have new halachot to teach. We can see this line of thought earlier, in Devarim 13, where we learned of the prohibition of adding to mitzvot, immediately before a discussion of a false prophet.

Perhaps part of what influences this interpretation is the peshitta, or "of course!" factor. Moshe tells them that the Torah is not in Heaven that they need to get it. Of course! Moshe went up to Har Sinai and brought it down. Everyone in the audience knows this. Moshe would not have to specify something so obvious. The answer this particular midrash gives it that not only did Moshe bring it down, but none is left above, so this Torah is complete.

Thus, the midrash continues:

ד"א אמר רבי חנינא היא וכל כלי אומנותה ניתנה ענותנותה צדקה וישרותה ומתן שכרה.

"Another explanation: Rabbi Chanina said: "it" and all the crafts of its trade were given: Its humility, righteousness, and uprightness, and the giving of its reward."

This also seems based on the idea that the pasuk must be telling us something more than just that the Torah was brought from Heaven. Rather, it was completely brought down from heaven.

One final takeoff, which seems like a commentary of Tora UMadda! And a somewhat negative one at that!

ד"א מהו לא בשמים היא שמואל אמר אין התורה מצויה באיסטרולוגין שאומנותן בשמים אמרו לשמואל הרי אתה איסטרולוגין וגדול בתורה אמר להן לא הייתי מביט באיסטרולוגים אלא בשעה שהייתי פנוי מן התורה אימתי כשהייתי נכנס לבית המים.

Another explanation: It is not in heaven..." - Shmuel said, "the Torah is not to be found in astrologers, whose craft is in the heaven." They said {protested} to Shmuel - "But you are an astrologer and are great in Torah!" He said to them, I only look at astrology at the time I am free from {the obligation/ability to learn} Torah. When is that? When I enter into the house of water. {Presumably the bathhouse}

It is actually a pretty good strategy - I'm learning through yerushalmi, but also have to read through various papers, or work on programs, for courses. By shifting some of the course reading to the bathroom (instead of reading, e.g. a newspaper or novel), I create more time that I can learn torah. I still read secular subjects outside of the bathroom. but this creates a bit more time.

Note Shmuel is not against astrology, or secular subject matter. It seems to me to be more of an observation that you cannot be truly great in Torah if your attention is divided, and are focusing a lot of intellectual energy in another direction.

Nitzavim - Vayelech #1:

The midrash rabba on this week's parsha gives a neat derivation, or else hint, to the practice of saying a bracha, blessing, before and after being called up in shul for an aliya to the Torah:

הַמִּצְוָה הַזֹּאת: הלכה אדם מישראל שעומד לקרות בתורה כיצד מברך כך שנו חכמים הפותח והחותם בתורה מברך לפניה ולאחריה ומנין שטעונה ברכה לפניה ולאחריה שכתוב (שם קיט) בא"י ואח"כ למדני חקיך הרי ברכה לפניה. ומנין שטעונה ברכה לאחריה. א"ר שמואל בר נחמן בשם ר' יונתן שכתוב אחר השירה וְזֹאת הַבְּרָכָה מששנה להן את התורה ואח"כ בירך הרי ברכה לאחריה.
A halacha (law): when a Jewish man gets up to read from the Torah, how does he bless? The Sages learned: One who opens and finishes reading the Torah blesses before it and after it.
And from where do we know that it requires a blessing before it and after it? Since it is written in Tehillim 119:12, בָּרוּךְ אַתָּה ה, "Blessed art Thou, O LORD" and afterwards, לַמְּדֵנִי חֻקֶּיךָ, "teach me Thy statutes." Thus the blessing before it.
And from where do we know that it requires a blessing after it? Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachman cited Rabbi Yonatan: after the Shira {song = haazinu = Devarim perek 32, which is introduced in Devarim 31:30 as וַיְדַבֵּר מֹשֶׁה, בְּאָזְנֵי כָּל-קְהַל יִשְׂרָאֵל, אֶת-דִּבְרֵי הַשִּׁירָה, הַזֹּאת--עַד, תֻּמָּם - "And Moses spoke in the ears of all the assembly of Israel the words of this song, until they were finished"} is וְזֹאת הַבְּרָכָה, "And this is the blessing." {Devarim 33:1}
Once he {Moshe} taught them the Torah, after that he blessed. Thus the blessing following it.

+1 yevamot;

הדרן עלך חמש עשרה נשים!
(perek 1 of yerushalmi yevamot)

Fisking "Teshuva Through Change"

{Note: you may have to double click on the title bar of Internet Explorer to get the whole post - otherwise IE will only let you scroll partially down the article.}

The Jewish Week last week carried an opinion piece by Rabbi Michael Strassfeld, the "spiritual leader of SAJ, the Society for the Advancement of Judaism." The article argues, among other things, for the changing of halacha in terms of its attitude towards other religions - namely, that we no longer consider them idolatry. In this regard, it is similar in attitude to the one put forth a while back by Eliyahu Stern, also in the Jewish Week.

I feel that this article is wrong and wrongheaded, and I think a fisking ("a point-by-point refutation of a blog entry or a news story") is in order.

Teshuvah Through Change
Rabbi Michael Strassfeld
We live in an increasingly dangerous world because of people who are out to attack Jews and Western civilization in the name of their God. A variety of fundamentalists believe that they are the sole carriers of God’s truth and are thus committed to creating their vision of God’s kingdom here on earth, no matter what the cost to others. For a fundamentalist who believes he holds all the truth, there is no room for compromise. Can the competing vision of a pluralistic society that allows for many versions of God’s truth as well as for secular visions for the world prevail? Each of us plays some small role in this struggle on behalf of our Western values.

In this first paragraph he brings up the point of Islamic terrorism and blames it on the fact that they think they are right, everyone else is wrong, and that they are "acting in the name of their God." This is true enough.

However, he proceeds to charge that all fundamentalism is dangerous, as a result. Pluralism is much nicer and safer and as Westerners we must struggle for pluralism, even within our own society.

1) Firstly, the argument that because X (Islamic terrorism) is founded on belief Y (belief that you are right and everyone else is wrong), then belief Y is all forms is dangerous (and wrong) is fallacious. Consider: Nazism was founded on nationalism, and therefore all nationalism is evil. Socialism was founded on the notion of equality, so therefore the notion of equality is dangerous. Thieves steal because the want to amass wealth so capitalism is evil. A jealous husband killed his wife because she cheated on him, so insistence on marital fidelity as a value is wrong.

Obviously, this is nonsense. Similarly, the idea that the belief that you are correct and the sole carrier of God's truth on earth is just that - a belief. In certain instances, it has led to fanaticism and violence. But this does not mean that all forms of this belief is therefore dangerous and must be eradicated. It is possible that there is an innocuous manifestation of this belief, and it is unfair to impugn Orthodox Judaism because of the actions of Islamic extermists.

2) Within this article, Rabbi Strassfeld puts forth a belief that everyone who is non-pluralistic is a dangerous fundamentalist, and that such a fundamentalist belief is wrong. Thus, we are left with the idea that only pluralism is the right way, and the true way of carrying God's truth. Is he thus not guilty of the very thing of which he charges others?

Part of the pluralism he propounds is accepting other cultures, and a central aspect of Jewish belief is that the Torah is the true expression of God's will. If Rabbi Strassfeld cannot tolerate this, I think perhaps he does not understand pluralism.

3) This, I think, is the most important point. Even if the belief that only you are right is dangerous, as he charges, that does not make it incorrect. If the belief is correct, then one should not abandon it just because it is potentially dangerous, or because it is not politically correct, or because it makes us look bad in the eyes of practitioners of other religions.

If I were to sum up the Jewish faith, I would put it so: A belief in God; a belief that God gave the Torah to us, and that we are obligated to follow it; a belief in Chazal as the interpreters of Torah. The Torah dictates to us the proper way to serve God and to interact with our fellow man. Abandoning these principles, as Rabbi Strassfeld suggests in this article, is not advancing Judaism, but abandoning its most basic principles.

It is critical that Jews give voice to our commitment to a modernity that has freed the Jewish people from centuries of oppression and discrimination.

Uh oh. He is trying to guilt the reader into accepting pluralism (which for him equals modernity) because it has done something for us - freed us from centuries of oppression and discrimination.

Unfortunately, we have a prior committment. Throughout Torah, we are told to fulfill various commandments as an act of gratitude towards Hashem who, to quote Rabbi Strassfeld, has "freed the Jewish people from centuries of oppression and discrimination" in Egypt, where we were slaves.

By his logic, we Jews should assimilate entirely to the modernity which freed us. Why should we specifically this tenet of Jewish faith?

Further, I agree certain aspects of modernity freed us. But, was it really "pluralism" that freed us? When Napolean emancipated the Jews in 1808 was is because of pluralism? We can be committed to modernity without necessarily conceding that we may not be correct in the most basic aspect of our faith.

But we are not free from fundamentalists within our community. We also need to examine our own texts and teachings to see whether there are places that we align ourselves with the forces of those who crusade against others (and us) in God’s name.

Having set up that fundamentalism is wrong, he is going to give examples of this wrongheaded attitude. As I will try to show, he is just plain wrong in his examples.

(And just to note again, just because they (Islamic terrorists) are wrong in that they follow the wrong religious doctrine does not mean that the absolutist thoughts within our own texts are wrong as well.)

Just recently, we’ve read of disturbing positions taken by religious authorities in our community. A prominent rosh yeshiva said that Jews are spiritually superior to other people because Jews and non-Jews “have different genes, DNA, and instincts.”

He has read? I assume he means read in the Jewish Week, where in the attack piece on Rav Schachter about monkeys and ketubot (based on an ignorant misunderstanding of halachic terminology, I might add), Gary Rosenblatt wrote: "This comes several months after the rabbi, an influential posek (decisor of religious law), described Jews as spiritually superior to other people, noting that Jews and non-Jews “have different genes, DNA and instincts.”"

I do not know if it is to Rabbi Strassfeld's credit or discredit that he is unwilling to take Rav Schachter on directly. To his credit, if it is some part within him that realizes that what he is doing is wrong and smacks of chutzpa, and to his discredit if this is a way trying to smear (or "fundamentalists" in general) and getting away with it.

Again, he has read? This strongly suggests to me that he did not hear the original shiur, which was available on the web, and which I did listen to. That is absolutely not what Rav Schachter said.

A quick summary of what Rav Schachter did say: There is a theme is Jewish tradition that the Jews are the עם הנבחר, the Chosen People. What does this mean? Rav Schachter turned to a statement in Pirkei Avot, the Ethics of Our Fathers, where there is a statement that Man is Beloved because he was created in the image of God, and the nation of Israel has an extra quality that they are called בנים למקום, Children of God.

Rav Schachter takes this metaphorically, that there is an extra spiritual relationship between man and God. To this end he used the metaphor of DNA and genes. That is, all humanity is created in God's image. However, the Jewish nation has a spiritual quote unquote DNA that connects them to God, such that they are more directly related to God - they are metaphorically "children" to God.

Is this a racist idea? Not at all! Converts can join the Jewish people and become part of the Jewish people, and then have the same connection and relation to God,

How does this extra connection manifest? One thing Rav Schachter noted was that Chazal say that Israel are merciful, possess the trait of shame, and do deeds of loving-kindness.

Even though there is this belief in an extra connection of the Jews to God, this does not mean that non-Jews are, God forbid, sub-human. Rav Schachter explicitly made this point when he said that the Mishna in Pirkei Avot says that all humanity is created in the image of God, but there is an extra connection that we are called "Children to God."

(Note: SIW made this mistake is his original take on Rav Schachter's speech. You can see the comment section off protocols here.)

Yet, Rabbi Strassfeld does not mention any of this, but just cites what he read in the Jewish Week, leading the reader to believe (as I think he himself believes) that these are racist comments, talking about actual DNA and genetics!

Further proof that he did not actually hear Rav Schachter speak is evident in two other quotes in the article. He writes:

and statements that proclaim the superiority of Jews over non-Jews will be denounced as contrary to the Torah’s statement in Genesis that all human beings are created in the image of God.

This is a fairly dumb statement, considering that Rav Schachter started with the statement that all humans are created in the image of God, and was just talking about the extra "Children of God" level. It shows he did not listen at all to Rav Schachter's actual speech, but is willing to malign him on the basis of hearsay. I think that since he is thinking about Teshuva, he should think about the sin of motzi shem ra, slander, and should consider asking Rav Schachter mechila, forgiveness.

He ends the article:

it is critical that elements in the Orthodox community call upon the important organizations and legal decisors of that community to clearly proclaim that one can be true to the Torah and still proclaim the equality of all of us descended from Adam and Eve.

This again gains momentum from his earlier, ignorant and false charge.

Back to where I left off in the article:

The recent controversy over wigs made from the hair of Hindu woman in India is based on the concept that Hinduism is avodah zarah — idolatry — and therefore forbidden.

Yes, it is. Is this in the same category of what he made the above - bigotry? I would say no. Judaism believes in God, and forbids the worship (and benefits from the worship) of other Gods. It is so important that the first of the 10 Commandments is "I am Hashem Your God" and the second is "You shall have no other gods before me."

Clearly some other religions - probably all - at that time were considered idolatry. Stating that the Jewish belief that Hinduism is avoda zara is bigoted - well, one can state it, but that does not prove it.

The issue with Indian wigs was that of tonsure, in which worshippers grew their hair long and then had a barber cut it off. The hair, and the act of cutting, was dedicated to the deity Vishnu. Is Vishnu equal to Hashem? I doubt it. Do they consider him a god? Yes. (At least many do.) Is the act of cutting off the hair considered worship, and therefore forbidden? Perhaps yes, and perhaps no. But would bringing sacrifices to an idol representing a deity who is not Hashem be considered idolatry? Unless the word has changed all meaning, absolutely! So how can Rabbi Strassfeld protest that we consider it idolatry?

Note also that the wig issue does not really affect the Hindus. Monetarily, the possible ban of Indian sheitels has not put a dent in the wig industry. This is an internal matter - that is, does Judaism consider this belief and act idolatry, and if so, may we or may we not use these items. We are not oppressing Hindus. We are not destroying their idols. Sure, the Torah commands this, but is anyone actively doing it? Come on, Rabbi Strassfeld - live and let live, and let the Jews practice their own religion, just as the Jews let the Hindu's practice their own religion!

A true story: a friend of S.L. went to a Hindu restaurant with some co-workers. They ordered a bottle of wine. They noticed that there was a bit missing from the top of the wine bottle, so they called over the waiter and asked him what the story was. He explained that they had a little Budda idol in the back room, and before serving any bottle of wine, they opened it and poured a little off the top as a wine libation to him. This is yayin nesech, wine libations to an idol, in the present day. And you are going to tell me that it is absolutely not idolatry?!

These examples reflect longstanding texts and halacha — Jewish law — that portray non-Jews in inferior ways. For example, in the Mishnah Avodah Zara 2:1, Jews are advised not to lend their domestic animals to non-Jews because they are suspected of bestiality.

Another ignorant statement. Yes, Jews are "advised" - actually forbidden - from lending specific animals to non-Jews because they are suspected of bestiality. Is this bigotry, and considering non-Jews inferior, or rather an apt assessment of a significant minority of their contemporary neighbors. The Torah, when it forbids bestiality, notes that this abomination was practiced by the previous residents of Israel, whom God expelled in part because of it. That is, some non-Jewish people back then practiced bestiality. In various Ancient Near Eastern Laws, there are proscriptions against sleeping with various domestic animals - sheep, cattle, and camels. This is not the Torah, but secular laws. Why make such laws if people were not violating them? People practice bestiality today, in America, and across the world.

Therefore, a statement that there is enough prevalence of this practice in non-Jewish society, which does not have the Torah's proscriptions and penalties, is not a bigoted statement. It certainly does not mean that non-Jews are inferior. It is an assessment of society to determine how Jews must conduct themselves when interfacing with said society.

Next example:

The halachic decision to categorize non-Jews as idol worshippers has meant that wine poured by a non-Jew is unkosher, based on the notion that the wine may have been offered as a libation on some pagan altar.

Well, it is based in part on that. It is also based on the concept that galui, uncovered wine, water, and milk, may have been sipped by a snake, who might have injected its venom into it. mevushal, or cooked wine, is sweet, according to a yerushalmi I read, and sweet wine would not be sipped by a snake. But regular wine is not mevushal, and your average gentile would have no reason not to leave his wine uncovered and unmonitored as some point. So that would be another reason for prohibiting it, even not considering the aspect of idolatry.

{Update: Also, another reason stam yeinam, wine of a gentile, is prohibited, is to prevent intermarriage. This reason would also stand, even ignoring the possibility of idolatrous libations.}

But he considers the suspicion of pouring a libation as another instance of Jewish thought considering non-Jews inferior. It is not. It is merely Chazal's assessment of reality, and the possibility that wine may be poured as a libation.

And were Chazal so wrong?! If you would tell me people would pour wine libations in this day and age, I would not have believed you. Yet they do. Some Hindus do, in an act of idolatry.

He chose a really bad example, if you ask me.

Since non-Jews are considered idolaters, it is forbidden to enter churches because they are seen as places of idolatry. (Imagine for a moment how we would react if the Catholic Church announced it was forbidden for Catholics to enter synagogues or if the Evangelical churches proclaimed that kosher meat is forbidden to be eaten because it was slaughtered in a “Jewish” way.)

Not because non-Jews are considered idolators. This is not a comment on their own worth, or as Rabbi Strassfeld put it, inferiority. It is Judaism's attitude towards their belief and religion. Christianity is considered idolatry, and therefore non-Jews who practice this are considered idolators, and it is forbidden to enter churches. Rabbi Strassfeld has transposed cause and effect.

This is an attitude towards Christian doctrine, not towards the individuals.

As for imagining how I would react, I would say BIG DEAL! This is an internal Christian matter. I would not be insulted. I know Christians do not believe the same things I do, and various actions I take might make them regard places and things in a different light. Live and let live. I guess I am a pluralist. I guess Rabbi Strassfeld is not.

If "the Evangelical churches proclaimed that kosher meat is forbidden to be eaten because it was slaughtered in a “Jewish” way?" I guess it would depend. If they did it because they hate Jews, I might be offended. If it was because of religious beliefs and practices that cause the specific acts taken in Jewish slaughter to make the meat unacceptable, why should I take offense? Are Muslims offended that Jews won't eat meat because it was slaughtered in a halal way, rather than in accordance to Jewish practice.

Also, is Rabbi Strassfeld really suggesting here we adopt halal, since it would offend Muslims? Because that is the logical conclusion of his statement.

We in the Jewish community, and particularly those in the community who feel bound by halacha, need to proclaim that yes, we have texts from the past that are difficult for our modern sensibilities. We will not excise them from the Talmud. Instead we will acknowledge that our understanding has changed, just as in the case when we study selections in the Talmud about other difficult issues that we have in fact reinterpreted.

At least this is a step above Eliyahu Stern. He suggested, in a published letter to the editor of the Jewish Week a while back, that we should actually erase problematic texts - that is, for example, we should remove the text of the commandment to destroy Amalek from our Torah scrolls.

Here he says we should keep the texts but ignore them, reinterpret them, or say we have moved past them.

But has our understanding in fact changed? Rabbi Strassfeld would like it to have. But his examples - bestiality, and wine libations, still exist. And idolatry is still idolatry - the worship of a god other than Hashem.

Also, he talks here of interpreting towards an end. That is, we want a specific conclusion, and we will provide an interpretation that will lead us where we want. This is intellectually dishonest and does not lead us towards truth. On the other hand, if truth is arbitrary, who cares what the result is? A very pluralistic thought. But for those of us for whom Torah is truth, we will study Torah in a truthful way.

But let us see his example...

The basic statement we need to make is there are no idol worshippers today, certainly not those in mainstream religions such as Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism, etc. This process of redefinition is a time-honored halachic principle used by Talmudic scholars like the Meiri and others to allow commerce with Christians in the Middle Ages, despite Talmudic statements to the contrary.

We need to make such a statement. Such a statement is a negation of Judaism, or at least one of its central tenets. We can talk about the second Yekum Purkan. :) (see footnote 1)

This process of redefinition we do find - for example, Tosafot on the first daf of Avoda Zara gives some reasons why we can conduct commerce with Christians. I did a post on this a while back. It is generally assumed that this is not intended as the best reading of the gemara, but rather as an attempt to justify existing practice. That is, I do not think Tosafot would suggest that this is the best thing in the world to do, but rather that since there is a prevalent practice to do this, and because otherwise people would starve (since forbidding doing business with them 3 days before and after their holy days would preclude all commerce, because Sunday is preceded and followed by 3 days). They were defending existing practice in a shaat hadechak.

In terms of the Meiri, perhaps he intended it the same way, or perhaps he actually believed what he said. I am not going to go into a detailed discussion of his position here. But it is not trivial to claim that they wanted to allow something that until then was forbidden, and so they came up with wrong or false halachic interpretations to achieve those ends. This forced example is not enough to claim precedent to erase something initially, in a non-forced situation, because it is not politically correct. It certainly is not enough precedent to erase one of the most basic tenets of Jewish faith.

I learned through masechet horayot - both in the Bavli and Yerushalmi. I also took two semesters of academic study of horayot with Dr. Steinfeld, in Bernard Revel Graduate School of Jewish studies. And I learned something very basic - that there are limits even to what Chazal can do.

The Sanhedrin can give a ruling, and if the ruling is erroneous, and the majority of people follow it, they are covered by the Sanhedrin's ruling. The people still sinned, but it was an accident, and the Snahedrin must bring a sacrifice to atone for the sin. That is, a ruling does not define halacha if it is incorrect.

Certain types of rulings, even when given by the Sanhedrin, are not considered rulings. Things which are explicit in the Torah, when denied by Sanhedrin, are not considered rulings, and one who violates the Torah law is considered not covered under the umbrella of their ruling, and each person must bring his own individual korban. Why? The gemara says, "go to cheder and learn." If it is an explicit verse, then their ruling is ignorance, and is not a ruling.

The ruling, to be a valid though erroneous ruling, must also exclude only part of the prohibition and not all of it. So, the Mishna says, if they rule that there is no prohibition against idolatry in the Torah, it is not a valid ruling. If they say their is a prohibition of idolatry, but someone who bows to an idol is patur - then is is a valid ruling, though an erroneous one.

Rabbi Strassfeld wants to rule that there is no idolatry in the Torah, or at least in the world today. That is either a farcical ruling, or an erroneous one. Just because people - rabbis - say things which are false, does not mean that I am permitted to follow them. And if rabbis intentionally introduce a false ruling, which they know to be not true, then they are causing the community to sin.

There are other examples of restrictions on the role of rabbis - Ain Koach BeYad Chachamim LaAkor Davar Min HaTorah - there is no power in the hands of the Sages to uproot a matter from the Torah, but I think I've touched on this enough.

The idea that rabbis can say, and falsely interpret, that various other religions are not idolatry, and this is binding, and frees us from the annoyance/discomfort that comes from considering them idolatry, is just wrong.

He continues:

If non-Jews are not idolaters then there should be no prohibition upon entering a church; kosher wine will only refer to the ingredients and manufacturing process that have been checked to make sure no non-kosher elements have been involved (the same as with kosher food); and statements that proclaim the superiority of Jews over non-Jews will be denounced as contrary to the Torah’s statement in Genesis that all human beings are created in the image of God.

This is an argument that we will get all these benefits from it, so why not abolish the halachic determination of non-Jews as idolators?

But are these ends really so great? I will examine them one by one.

1) If Jews can enter a church, we can be great friends with our non-Jewish neighbors and coworkers. We break down boundaries. We might become such great friends we will intermarry. Is intermarriage good? Ask Rabbi Strassfeld.

Now that Jews can enter a church, and the worship is not idolatry, can a Jew come to the church during services? Is this something we want to encourage? Might a weakly affiliated Jew decide to adopt this faith, which after all is now not idolatry according to his rabbi? Consider: a Jew enters a church during services, and the priest asks everyone to kneel, or to sing a prayer to Jesus. Would the Jew, who is in the church so as not to offend, comply so as not to offend?

2) If we need not worry about stam yeinam - uncooked wine touched by a non-Jew, because a non-Jew is not an idolator (we are not worrying about the halachic concern of uncovered wine in this hypothetical), then we will more freely associate with coworkers after work. We will go to hang out at the pub. Is this something to encourage?

We will become close to our drinking buddies. Which in turn leads to assimilation, and intermarriage. Great ends, which absolutely justify the means.

{In fact, the prevention of intermarriage is another reason given for the prohibition of stam yeinam, so even declaring the non-Jews not idolators would not be sufficient to remove the prohibition.}

And what about our Hindu friends who actually poured the wine to the Budda idol? We have stam yeinam in part lest we violate the Biblical prohibition of drinking wine libations. Is this truly not a concern today? Unfortunately it is. (Except of course Rabbi Strassfeld would say that worshipping Budda idol is not idolatry, so it is not wine libations to an idol, so it is no problem etc... C'mon!)

Some may argue that those of us in the non-Orthodox community are willing to change the halacha at the proverbially drop of a kipa, while the Orthodox community cannot change the rules even when they find them difficult.

Yup!

That is where Mel Gibson and “The Passion of the Christ” come in. Obviously, the treatment of Jews in the movie is a reminder to us of how we should treat others as we wish to be treated. More deeply, it reminds us that what was troubling about Gibson was that he was breaking from the contemporary teachings of the Church. For centuries Christianity had taught that Jews were responsible for the crucifixion of Jesus. The tragic results are well known. Yet, despite the centuries of this being the doctrinal truth and despite the scriptural support that “their torah,” the New Testament, gave to this view, Vatican II came along and said no more. Jews are not to be blamed.

I was actually very uncomfortable with the idea of telling others how they should practice their religion. It is not really the Jews' business what Christian's believe. That does not mean that when my fellow Jews are at risk, I will not try to influence them. Personally, I believe the Christians are wrong, and I can have proofs, and I can try to convince them. But it is not my legitimate place to dictate what is correct Christian doctrine. I might fake it if I think it would save lives.

I am pleased, and grateful that Christians changed their views, such that I and my coreligionists are not so much at risk. That does not mean I must change my own religion. Maybe yekum purkan (again, see footnote 1).

He finishes his article, writing:

Can we do any less? As we prepare for the High Holy Days, it is a time for both personal and communal teshuvah, or change. Using the ample precedents of re-definition in the halachic tradition, it is critical that elements in the Orthodox community call upon the important organizations and legal decisors of that community to clearly proclaim that one can be true to the Torah and still proclaim the equality of all of us descended from Adam and Eve.

Yes, we can do less, and must do less, because Christian doctrine and procedures are not the same as Jewish ones.

Teshuva does not mean change. It means return, and specifically, a return to God. Allowing idolatry is not a return to God.

We do not have ample precedents for redefinition or the sort he suggests. Certainly halacha has developed, but most often not in a way that can be categorized as intellectually dishonest, for that would be invalid, even if it were done. The precedents we do have are limited, done to justify existing practice where we cannot prevent it from happening anyway. It was to allow people to do business with their neighbors, not to allow them to drink their wine which might have been poured as a libation, and not to allow them to enter their houses of worship. It was not a change or a negation to a basic element of Judaism.

And it was done out of necessity. It was not done out of a desire to validate the other religions. It was not done out of political correctness.

He ends with a statement that is at the same time expansive in terms of appreciating all of human existence, and at the same same getting in a final bash at Rav Schachter.

"elements in Orthodox community" means the laity. "Should call upon organizations, and halachic decisors" - that is, those who do not know as much should apply pressure to those who do to get these "reforms" passed. Maybe we should let the leaders lead?

"to clearly proclaim that one can be true to the Torah and still proclaim the equality of all of us descended from Adam and Eve." - this is the expansive comment and final ignorant jab at Rav Schachter, who I documented above, never denied the equality of all of us descended from Adam and Eve.

There is a difference between equality of people and equality of ideas. Rabbi Strassfeld conflates the two. I have this to say: Non-Jews are human, just as Jews are. Of course. But as a Jew, I believe the Torah comes from God, and Christianity does not, and Hinduism does not.

_____________
Footnotes:
1) This is a reference to a famous joke. Representatives from the three major world religions, Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, meet, to try to ease tensions between their groups and promote peace. They agree that, to move closer together, they will each offer compromise. The priest gives it much thought, and after deliberation, says: OK, we are willing to give up Immaculate Conception. The imam is next, and after much reflection, says: OK, we are willing to give up the idea the Muhammad is God's messenger. Finally, it is the rabbi's turn. He goes off into a room, and is there for quite a while. Finally, he comes out, and is all sweaty from perspiration, and says, "We are willing to give up the second yekum purkan."

Explanation: On Shabbat, we have two short prayers in Aramaic, which start with the words yekum purkan. For the Jew, giving this apparently minor thing up in a major deal.

working on the yerushalmi compared with rambam post below

have some interesting things about Chanania ben Azzur's calculation...

+1 nidda;

הדרן עלך המפלת חתיכה!
(perek 3 of yerushalmi nidda)

Ki Teitzei #3:

I previously wrote about the case of motzi shem ra, where a man falsely accuses his wife of having committed adultery while she was betrothed and not yet in his house. The father and mother of the damsel bring proof on her behalf to the court:
Devarim 22:15:

וְלָקַח אֲבִי הַנַּעֲרָ, וְאִמָּהּ; וְהוֹצִיאוּ אֶת-בְּתוּלֵי הַנַּעֲרָ, אֶל-זִקְנֵי הָעִיר--הַשָּׁעְרָה.

"then shall the father of the damsel, and her mother, take and bring forth the tokens of the damsel's virginity unto the elders of the city in the gate."

While both mother and father come to court to defend her, the next verses only describes her father as presenting his claim in court:

Devarim 22:16-17:

וְאָמַר אֲבִי הַנַּעֲרָ, אֶל-הַזְּקֵנִים: אֶת-בִּתִּי, נָתַתִּי לָאִישׁ הַזֶּה לְאִשָּׁה--וַיִּשְׂנָאֶהָ
וְהִנֵּה-הוּא שָׂם עֲלִילֹת דְּבָרִים לֵאמֹר, לֹא-מָצָאתִי לְבִתְּךָ בְּתוּלִים, וְאֵלֶּה, בְּתוּלֵי בִתִּי; וּפָרְשׂוּ הַשִּׂמְלָה, לִפְנֵי, זִקְנֵי הָעִיר.

"And the damsel's father shall say unto the elders: 'I gave my daughter unto this man to wife, and he hateth her;
and, lo, he hath laid wanton charges, saying: I found not in thy daughter the tokens of virginity; and yet these are the tokens of my daughter's virginity.' And they shall spread the garment before the elders of the city."

If we look carefully, we see both father and mother come to the court, and both father and mother present evidence to the court. (That is, note the plural in וּפָרְשׂוּ הַשִּׂמְלָה, "and they shall spread the garment," the literal or else figurative spreading of the blood-stained sheets to show clearly that the damsel is innocent.) However only the "father of the damsel" speaks to the elders of the city. Why is this?

The sifrei on Ki Teitzei writes:
ואמר אבי הנערה אל הזקנים מכאן שאין רשות לאשה לדבר במקום האיש:
"And the father of the damsel says to elders" - from here that there is no saction for a woman to talk in place of the man.

To be continued... This is an important post.

+1=masechet sanhedrin;+2 horayot;+2 nidda

!הדרן עלך ואילו הן הנחנקין
וסליקא לה מסכת סנהדרין!
(perek 11 of yerushalmi sanhedrin)

הדרן עלך הורו בית דין!
הדרן עלך כהן משיח!
(prakim 1-2 of yerushalmi horayot)

הדרן עלך שמאי אומר!
הדרן עלך כל היד!
(prakim 1-2 of yerushalmi nidda)

Just one more perek of horayot to finish seder nezikin, and two more prakim of nidda to finish seder taharot!

Ki Teitzei #2:

Ki Teitzei has the interesting case of motzi shem ra. The case: a man betrothes a woman, which means they have completed the first stage of a Jewish marriage (kiddushin). Then, they take the next step of marriage, nisuin, in which she leaves her father's house and moves in with him, and they consumate the marriage. He claims to have found her not a virgin and alleges that she committed adultery while she was married to him but still in her father's house (thus while betrothed). This is a capital offense if they can prove she did it, but if they show that the husband has spoken falsely, the judges lash him (the verse says they chastise him), plus he pays a fine of 100 shekel and may not divorce his wife in the future.
Devarim 22:13-21:

<>כִּי-יִקַּח אִישׁ, אִשָּׁה; וּבָא אֵלֶיהָ, וּשְׂנֵאָהּ.
וְשָׂם לָהּ עֲלִילֹת דְּבָרִים, וְהוֹצִא עָלֶיהָ שֵׁם רָע; וְאָמַר, אֶת-הָאִשָּׁה הַזֹּאת לָקַחְתִּי, וָאֶקְרַב אֵלֶיהָ, וְלֹא-מָצָאתִי לָהּ בְּתוּלִים.
וְלָקַח אֲבִי הַנַּעֲרָ, וְאִמָּהּ; וְהוֹצִיאוּ אֶת-בְּתוּלֵי הַנַּעֲרָ, אֶל-זִקְנֵי הָעִיר--הַשָּׁעְרָה.
וְאָמַר אֲבִי הַנַּעֲרָ, אֶל-הַזְּקֵנִים: אֶת-בִּתִּי, נָתַתִּי לָאִישׁ הַזֶּה לְאִשָּׁה--וַיִּשְׂנָאֶהָ.
וְהִנֵּה-הוּא שָׂם עֲלִילֹת דְּבָרִים לֵאמֹר, לֹא-מָצָאתִי לְבִתְּךָ בְּתוּלִים, וְאֵלֶּה, בְּתוּלֵי בִתִּי; וּפָרְשׂוּ, הַשִּׂמְלָה, לִפְנֵי, זִקְנֵי הָעִיר.
וְלָקְחוּ זִקְנֵי הָעִיר-הַהִוא, אֶת-הָאִישׁ; וְיִסְּרוּ, אֹתוֹ.
וְעָנְשׁוּ אֹתוֹ מֵאָה כֶסֶף, וְנָתְנוּ לַאֲבִי הַנַּעֲרָה--כִּי הוֹצִיא שֵׁם רָע, עַל בְּתוּלַת יִשְׂרָאֵל; וְלוֹ-תִהְיֶה לְאִשָּׁה, לֹא-יוּכַל לְשַׁלְּחָהּ כָּל-יָמָיו.
וְאִם-אֱמֶת הָיָה, הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה: לֹא-נִמְצְאוּ בְתוּלִים, לַנַּעֲרָ.
וְהוֹצִיאוּ אֶת-הַנַּעֲרָ אֶל-פֶּתַח בֵּית-אָבִיהָ, וּסְקָלוּהָ אַנְשֵׁי עִירָהּ בָּאֲבָנִים וָמֵתָה--כִּי-עָשְׂתָה נְבָלָה בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל, לִזְנוֹת בֵּית אָבִיהָ; וּבִעַרְתָּ הָרָע, מִקִּרְבֶּךָ.

"If any man take a wife, and go in unto her, and hate her,
and lay wanton charges against her, and bring up an evil name upon her, and say: 'I took this woman, and when I came nigh to her, I found not in her the tokens of virginity';
then shall the father of the damsel, and her mother, take and bring forth the tokens of the damsel's virginity unto the elders of the city in the gate.
And the damsel's father shall say unto the elders: 'I gave my daughter unto this man to wife, and he hateth her;
and, lo, he hath laid wanton charges, saying: I found not in thy daughter the tokens of virginity; and yet these are the tokens of my daughter's virginity.' And they shall spread the garment before the elders of the city.
And the elders of that city shall take the man and chastise him.
And they shall fine him a hundred shekels of silver, and give them unto the father of the damsel, because he hath brought up an evil name upon a virgin of Israel; and she shall be his wife; he may not put her away all his days.
But if this thing be true, that the tokens of virginity were not found in the damsel;
then they shall bring out the damsel to the door of her father's house, and the men of her city shall stone her with stones that she die; because she hath wrought a wanton deed in Israel, to play the harlot in her father's house; so shalt thou put away the evil from the midst of thee."

How certain details of the laws I described above (and others I did not) come from the text is a long story. As an example, כִּי-יִקַּח אִישׁ אִשָּׁה, "If any man take a wife" together with descriptions of her "playing the harlot in her father's house" presumably form the basis for her being betrothed at the time of her sin. (Also that we know from elsewhere that there is not capital punishment for a single unwed woman who sins in this way.) I'm not going to get into all of this here, but suffice it to say that everything here is subject to examination and explanation on a pshat and drash level in order to really understand it.

The punishment to the man is interesting. Would the woman wish to stay married to the man who tried to kill her in this way? Perhaps, and perhaps not. It might depend upon the times. However, I would like to suggest that an element of his punishment also serves as a deterrence to him bringing the false charges.

Lashes would certainly be an impediment. But consider. The man marries a woman and dislikes her. Why not just divorce her at this time? Why try to get her killed? I would suggest that if he divorces her, he would have to pay her ketuba. There is a financial motive at play. Thus, besides lashes, there are two further penalties. He has to pay a fine. Thus he knows he risks money if he does this. Further, he wants to be rid of this wife, and now he has the threat of being stuck with her in most instances for life. This would give pause to someone contemplating this course of action, and decide to either stick with the marriage or else take the path of divorce.