The Moshiach Crossword Trick

Rabbi Lazer Brody as Lazer Beams writes about a "moshiach code" going around:

נ	ח	מ	ן
ח	י	ש	מ
מ	ש	י	ח
ן	מ	ח	נ

My esteemed and cherished friend, Rav Yehoshua Sofer the Abir Aluf, showed me the above code that's now circulating all over the place. Any way you read the letters, from right to left, left to right, up to down, or down to up, you get "Nachman" or "Moshiach".

A suppose that the connotation for R' Lazer, a Breslover chassid, is that there is some connection between Rav Nachman of Breslov and mashiach. Perhaps that Rav Nachman is mashiach, or will predict mashiach, or something like that.

Is this compelling? Is it more, or less compelling, than the prediction of Erez Levanon's murder? First, let us fact check. The claim is that

Any way you read the letters, from right to left, left to right, up to down, or down to up, you get "Nachman" or "Moshiach"

Is this truly so? Try reading the first column going down. We get NAMCHAN, which is not NACHMAN. Try the second column going up. We get CHISHAM, which is not MASHIACH. And so on. These are not palindromes, the fact that "Nachman" begins and ends with an N notwithstanding.

What have we here? A simple crossword trick. Take any four letter word or name, and write it around the edges the same way NACHMAN was written above. Then, take the two middle letters of that four letter word and find any four letter word that starts with one middle letter and ends with the other. Write that word in. This is trivial to construct, and you can see many different eerie messages.

Some examples? Sure, I never thought you'd ask. While on the topic of Mashiach, let us prove that the Lubavitcher Rebbe smelled nice. I choose this because it shares many letters with the crossword above:

מ	נ	ח	ם
נ	ח	ו	ח
ח	ו	ח	נ
ם	ח	נ	מ

Whichever way we read this, we get "Menachem," or "Nichoach," savory fragrance.

My wife's name is Racheli. Let us prove that she is part of the Maaseh Merkava, or that she should be an electrician:

ר	ח	ל	י
ח	ש	מ	ל
ל	מ	ש	ח
י	ל	ח	ר

Whichever way you read this, in any direction, it either reads "Racheli" or "Chashmal."

Finally, I've obviously made a mistake somewhere here, because I can construct a crossword puzzle that matches JOSH with OOPS:

H	S	O	J
S	P	O	O
O	O	P	S
J	O	S	H

Whichever way you read it ... well, you know the drill...

Further Perils of Taking Midrashim Figuratively -- Vashti's Tail

I think that there are midrashim that were intended allegorically. Just as (I think) there are midrashim that were intended literally. But articles like this demonstrate the perils of this approach.

Vashti had a tail, and that was why she refused to appear before the king. What? That is ridiculous! A human being does not suddenly develop a tail! How are we, as rational human beings, to make sense of this?

At lookstein.org, a teacher in a Jewish girls junior high school teacher explains how she deals with this thorny issue in general, and with this difficult midrash in particular:

However, I have another alternative. If I can take this midrash and interpret the words in such a way that an inner meaning emerges which conforms to reason and reveals a hidden truth, and thereby highlights the purpose of midrash and the wisdom and insight of our Rabbis, then I will choose to teach and share this midrash with my class.

What is this interpretation of the midrash that shows the inner meaning?

In this vein, I have offered the following suggested interpretation to my classes concerning the midrash of Vashti’s tail. Who has a tail? A horse, a dog, a cat, a cow... in short ,animals have tails. When Vashti was called to appear before Ahasverosh and his guests, she became so enraged that she lost all sense of reason and logical thought and grew a tail. She became as irrational as an animal, and as emotionally caught up in getting back at her attacker as any animal naturally would.

Snort.

I'll address in a moment the reason for the snort, and how this interpretation has nothing to do with the midrash. I want to first highlight the next paragraph, which is much to the writer's credit:

This is my own interpretation of the midrash, and I emphasize to my classes that it is only my understanding, and therefore they are free to accept or reject it, just as you the reader are free to do. What is important here is not this particular midrashic interpretation, but rather the approach to midrash which I am trying to convey.

Thus, she realizes that her interpretation is just that, an interpretation, and leaves the possibility of other interpretation open. Her point is that an allegorical option is open, and this particular example was just an illustration of how one might so interpret.

The problem with her interpretation is that it is really really bad. It does not conform to the theme the midrash is trying to convey, as would have been apparent had she looked at the midrash in its original context, in Megillah 12b:

אמר להם אחשורוש כלי שאני משתמש בו אינו לא מדיי ולא פרסי אלא כשדיי רצונכם לראותה אמרו לו אין ובלבד שתהא ערומה שבמדה שאדם מודד בה מודדין לו מלמד שהיתה ושתי הרשעה מביאה בנות ישראל ומפשיטן ערומות ועושה בהן מלאכה בשבת היינו דכתיב אחר הדברים האלה כשוך חמת המלך אחשורוש זכר את ושתי ואת אשר עשתה ואת אשר נגזר עליה כשם שעשתה כך נגזר עליה ותמאן המלכה ושתי מכדי פריצתא הואי דאמר מר שניהן לדבר עבירה נתכוונו מ"ט לא אתאי א"ר יוסי בר חנינא מלמד שפרחה בה צרעת במתניתא תנא [בא גבריאל ועשה לה זנב]

What is going on here? Achashverosh wanted Vashti to appear before them naked. This was picked up from the theme of appearing before them to show off her beauty, as well as quite possibly from:

יא לְהָבִיא אֶת-וַשְׁתִּי הַמַּלְכָּה, לִפְנֵי הַמֶּלֶךְ--בְּכֶתֶר מַלְכוּת: לְהַרְאוֹת הָעַמִּים וְהַשָּׂרִים אֶת-יָפְיָהּ, כִּי-טוֹבַת מַרְאֶה הִיא.

11 to bring Vashti the queen before the king with the crown royal, to show the peoples and the princes her beauty; for she was fair to look on.

leharot - to display, as well as from beketer malchut - with her crown, and nothing else. Agree or disagree with this theme being developed as actual intent of the text, this is the sort of theme being developed. Thus, the gemara states ובלבד שתהא ערומה . This is cast as middah kineged middah, especially as this is also a major theme in Chazal, in midrashim, and in the plain text of the megillah, since the hidden hand of God directs events such that all the evildoers are getting their just desserts {from French - just deserves) while the righteous prevail. Thus, she is being cast here as an evildoer, and so the gemara elaborates on what the did wrong in the past. The specific derasha is made on ואת אשר עשתה ואת אשר נגזר עליה, what she had done and was was decreed upon her, as a reference to middah kineged middah.

Finally, the gemara states: ותמאן המלכה ושתי מכדי פריצתא הואי דאמר מר שניהן לדבר עבירה נתכוונו מ"ט לא אתאי א"ר יוסי בר חנינא מלמד שפרחה בה צרעת במתניתא תנא [בא גבריאל ועשה לה זנב.

"Vashti the queen refused" - let us see. She was a prutza! For Master said: both of them (Vashti and Achashverosh) intended to sin. If so, for what reason did she not come? Rabbi Rossi bar Chanina said: This teaches that she developed an outbreak of leprosy. In a brayta they teach that (the angel) Gavriel came and fashioned for her a tail."

Compare this which what this teacher wrote in explaining this midrash:

Who has a tail? A horse, a dog, a cat, a cow... in short ,animals have tails. When Vashti was called to appear before Ahasverosh and his guests, she became so enraged that she lost all sense of reason and logical thought and grew a tail. She became as irrational as an animal, and as emotionally caught up in getting back at her attacker as any animal naturally would.

In this account and "explanation" of the midrash, Vashti disliked the king's suggestion and was offended by it. Her reaction is one of rage. Meanwhile, if the author had simply looked at the original context, she would have seen that this "explanation" is entirely implausible, for the introduction emphasised how Vashti liked the idea of displaying herself in a lewd manner. Why would she then become so "enraged?"

From context, it is clear that the felt ashamed because of some new development which marred her beauty and made her embarrassed to appear nude in public.

We cannot really fault this teacher, because in many Jewish schools for girls, opening up a gemara is strongly discouraged. She probably never saw it inside in the gemara, and did not think to look it up in the original context. And probably would not give the students in her class gemaras to look at this source inside. Or perhaps she would. I don't know her or her teaching methodology.

In this instance, though, she did not. The result was that she proposed an allegorical explanation that sounds good (to some people, at least - my reaction was a snort), but which bears no relation to the intent of Chazal.

A better approach would be to see the original context in which the statement occurs, to see what theme Chazal are developing there, and to examine what cues they are picking up from the text.

Did they mean it allegorically? Perhaps. Perhaps not. They are deriving all the details from derashot on the text. Thus, as Tosafot points out, the derasha for leprosy from Esther 2:1:
וְאֵת אֲשֶׁר-נִגְזַר עָלֶיהָ, where the word nigzar occurs here as well as in 2 Chronicles 26, in describing King Uzziyah who developed leprosy. See there, and see Tosafot. I would suggest that the source for developing a tail was at least in part from the earlier phrase, וְאֵת אֲשֶׁר-עָשָׂתָה, which shares the word asah with the statement בא גבריאל ועשה לה זנב. Thus, we might interpret/translate "and that which he (Gavriel) had made for her (the tail)." Why a tail? I have not as of yet discovered the basis of every detail of the midrash, but fairly regularly they are derived in some way from a verse in some place.

So, did they actually believe it? This teacher subscribes to the view that a miracle would have been mentioned explicitly in the text had it occurred. Indeed, Ibn Ezra agrees to this. But he argued with contemporaries who held the opposite. Thus, his contemporaries maintained that Yocheved gave birth to Moshe at the tender age of 130. If Ibn Ezra's disputants could hold this, perhaps earlier Chazal could have held this as well.

We need to realize that we might have a very different general worldview than they did back then. If so, taking what was intended literally (if it was indeed intended literally) and consistently reinterpreting it as allegory simply because we disagree with it destroys original intent. Chazal, we believed in sheidim, could well believe (or perhaps they did not) that an angel made Vashti grow a tail in order to advance the narrative and the hidden agenda of God, to get Esther into the palace.

Further, Chazal live in a world where truth in halacha is derived not explicitly from the verse, but from applying hermenuetical methods. That some detail is only revealed by a derasha might be reason for us to doubt it, because truth be told a lot of us are modern day Karaites in attitude. Chazal might have used derasha for homiletical purpose in case of narrative aggada sometimes, but it is quite possible that they felt they were revealing true hidden details that were meant to be exposed via derasha.

If I were to interpret allegorically, which is indeed a possibility, I would focus on theme, as above. Say it was not something as striking as a tail or leprosy. Say that she had an allergic reaction to the food at her banquet and developed a skin rash. Say she developed a mole or an unsightly growth on a place that would normally be covered -- such as where a tail might grow from. Say she had put on a little bit of weight recently. She thus had no problem conceptually with lewdly displaying herself, but did not think she would display herself to the best advantage at that time, while Achashverosh apparently did.

Thus, without adopting the tail or the leprosy entirely literally, we still maintain the effect and theme Chazal were trying to create.

Now, let us say I disagree with this theme. Or let us say I think Chazal meant it literally, and would consider such an interpretation as contrary to sechel. What should my reaction be?

Well, it depends who you ask. Some would think, or shout "koifer." Indeed, this "some" includes some big names, some Rishonim and Acharonim. Think Ran in derashot haRan. Think Alshich. They hold that midrashim are tradition passed from Sinai (or in this case from Esther), and we may not divert to the right or the left. (And that there is dispute about what happened? There is dispute about halacha as well. Perhaps one reflects the true tradition and the other is wrong.)

You have others upon whom to rely. For example, Shmuel haNaggid and R' Avraham son of the Rambam both say that only halacha is from Sinai from God's mouth, but narrative aggada was just the author of the aggada's personal opinion, and you have the right to argue. This approach, of course, has its own dangers, but where we diffuse the impact of interpreting the intent of Chazal as literal, we have opportunity to delve into what they actually meant, without worrying that we then must set aside our own judgments. Otherwise, if whatever we say was their intent we must believe, then either we believe what they actually believed or else we change what they say by appealing to allegory to first transform what they believed into what we believed.

There are perils of offering allegorical interpretations unbound by an examination of original context and influenced by one's own attitudes. I will end by offering some of my own "explanations" of the midrash. I will try to make them offensive so that there is no danger of them being taken seriously. But I want to show that you can come up with any nonsense and read it into the text, because that is exactly what the human brain is conditioned to do -- make up explanations.

As she wrote:

This is my own interpretation of the midrash, and I emphasize to my classes that it is only my understanding, and therefore they are free to accept or reject it, just as you the reader are free to do. What is important here is not this particular midrashic interpretation, but rather the approach to midrash which I am trying to convey.

So let us see. What has a tail? A monkey has a tail. Vashti was being punished for being "uppity," for wanting to expand the role of women. She was being punished for reading the ketubba under the chuppa at her friend's wedding. Indeed, this is why Vashti made her own party for the women, and why Achashverosh stressed that the man should be master in his household, underscoring how Vashti was trying to take control.

Alternatively -- another midrash relates that Chava was created from Adam's tail (not rib as translation of tzela). That she grew a tail is meant to convey how she was now separating from her husband, and becoming her own person. But she forgot that her role was to be ezer kenegdo!

Alternatively -- on Rosh haShana, we eat significant foods. We eat a head of lettuce (/sheep/fish), to show that we should be the rosh and not the zanav. The point here is that this was the cause of Vashti's downfall, and she would no longer be the head, as queen, but degraded, as the tail.

I can go on. Do any of these really relate to what Chazal intended? My reaction to these three suggestions above is -- quite properly -- Snort! But they are about on the same level as the author's suggestion. And this type of fluff and nonsense is what often enough passes for interpretation in some girls schools. I would trust myself to give an allegorical interpretation in many instances. But in choosing this particular interpretation, in an article advocating the approach, the author also demonstrates the perils of taking midrashim figuratively.

Daf Yomi Moed Katan 2a: Is it Bet haShalchin or Bet haShalhin?

It is the name of the perek, after all. Almost everybody has the text with a ח rather than a ה. Thus, our Mishna and the subsequent discussion in our gemara. Thus, the Mishna states משקין בית השלחין במועד ובשביעית and the gemara states ומאי משמע דהאי בית השלחין לישנא דצחותא היא דכתיב (דברים כה) ואתה עיף ויגע ומתרגמינן ואת משלהי. So too the Mishna in Yerushalmi, and the Talmud Yerushalmi - e.g. א כל שהוא פסידה והולכת זו היא בית השלחין. So too Tosefta. So too Rashi and Rabbenu Chananel.

Still, if we look at the prooftext in the gemara, it is from Tg. Onkelos and has משלהי, with a heh. As (e.g.) Rashi points out, this is acceptable, for heh and chet switch off.

Particularly amusing in this regard is Rodkinson's Talmud online, which states

(The letter "h" is changeable for "'h"; and "mshalhi" is equivalent to "mshal'hi.")

Presumably two of those half of the occurrence of h had a dot underneath it, which did not not translate to electronic form, thus further proving the statement.
{Update: As Steg points out in the comments, chet is actually being encoded as single quote h. Thus, they are distinct.}

Why mention all this? Because Rif appears unique in all this, having a heh rather than chet in bet hashalhin, both in the Mishna and gemara. The Mishna:
כדתנן משקין בית השלהין במועד ובשביעית
and the gemara:

מאי משמע דהאי בית השלהין לישנא דצחותא הוא
כדכתיב עיף ויגע ומתרגמין משלהי ולאי

For Rif, the prooftext of the gemara needs no additional explanation. Later on, though, the word appears with a chet in Rif's citation of gemara.

Another interesting data point is Nimukei Yosef (sometimes mislabeled as Ran) in commenting on the Rif. His ד"ה has shalhin rather than shalchin, and he cites the derivation of the gemara. But he also cites a pasuk in Shir haShirim to show the word with a chet! {Shir haShirim 4:13}:

יג שְׁלָחַיִךְ פַּרְדֵּס רִמּוֹנִים, עִם פְּרִי מְגָדִים: כְּפָרִים, עִם-נְרָדִים.

13 Thy shoots are a park of pomegranates, with precious fruits; henna with spikenard plants,

then mentioning the heh and chet both being gutturals and thus switching off. Obviously, he is translating this verse differently than the English translation offered above.

Update: As S. notes in the comments, heh and chet are not just both gutturals but also share similar orthography, such that it is easy to account for a switch of one to another in the text. I would agree that this is the most likely path to arrive at Rif's girsa, or at our girsa from Rif's. Within the gemara itself, it shalchin and meshalhi are present, then the idea is that (at least at the time of the proof) the word with either letter had the same (or similar) meaning. This could arise due to either orthographic or phonological similarity, where I would lean towards the latter.

posts so far for parshat p̄əqûḏê

(2005)

• The Curtain over the Ark of Testimony
• Does Tg. Yonatan's translation as כפורתא for הַפָּרֹכֶת reflect a variant girsa which would resolve a difficulty with the text.
  

to be continued...

They Should Teach The Ikkarei Emuna In Schools

And now I'll probably get some wise guy bringing up Mark Shapiro's book. :) But seriously, they should spend some time on principles of faith, such that at least we understand what the default position is.

What brings this up? I read this post on Freelance Kiruv Maniac, in which he excerpted and then discussed this post on Mishmar. The salient point:

Also notworthy is the advice of the Klausenberger Rebbe concerning how CHUSH(Jewish Center for Special Education) should educate its students:

“...You and your teachers spend most of your time thinking about how to teach a child to read one more letter, one more line in the siddur, prayer book. You want him to learn one more verse in Chumash, or one more segment of Gemara. All this is very good. But, unless you make a conscious effort, you may be missing the point. Your children may grow up and never learn what it means to be a Jew, what a Jew believes, or what he prays and hopes for. I think you should teach these children the 13 Ikrim—Principles of Faith—of the Rambam. I would furthermore put up a big sign in the school reading: Da es Elokei avicha v’avdeihu!”

I was puzzled. “But they don’t even teach that in the regular Yeshivos?!” “You’re perfectly right,” the Rebbe answered. “However, the regular yeshivah bachur, as he grows older, will learn in the bais hamidrash, study hall. One day he will go to the bookshelf to get a Rambam on Hilchos G’zelah V’aveidah so as to better understand a piece of Gemara he is learning.
The Ribbono shel Olam, the Master of the universe, will help him and by mistake he will pick up the wrong volume of the Rambam. Back at his seat he will discover that he has
the first volume in his hand, the Sefer Hamada.

Being a little lazy to immediately get up and return to the bookshelf to look for the volume he originally sought, he will stay in his seat and begin to browse through the volume in front of him. Turning the pages he will find it interesting, spend some time reading it and thus gain at least a passing acquaintance with the foundations of our faith (Yesodos HaEmunah). The regular yeshivos can rely on this error occurring. Your children may never be zocheh to make this error (they may never learn independently in a Bais Hamidrash); thus you must take responsibility for teaching them what it means to be a Jew.”

Indeed, these basics are often ignored or not stressed, under the assumption that students will pick it up along the way. Instead, the focus is often on learning another machloket of Rava and Abaye, or Rashi's perush on another pasuk in Torah.

Quite possibly, ikkarei emuna are expected to be picked up, at least in part, from the fact that people say Yigdal, or say or thumb through the Ani Maamins at some point. This assumes that students have any kavana in what their saying, where their first language is not Hebrew and there is so much to say.

I'll relate a true story (though it is hard to believe!) that happened about five years ago to illustrate this unfortunate point. A high school student of a respectable yeshiva high school approached me and related the following story, in order to ask me a question.

His regular bus driver was replaced by a new bus driver, who was a devout Christian. This driver thought the opportunity was too good to pass up, and so he engaged the students in theological questions, presumably in the hopes of saving some souls.

This driver asked the students, "Does God have a body?" You can imagine where the conversation could go from there -- for example, from corporeality of God to God investing his presence in a physical body, to a man being God, to Jesus being God. The driver was presumably ready to cite Biblical verses to confound them into admission that God has a body.

Now, these high school kids were not on the level of da ma sheTashiv, nor would I expect them to be able to respond intelligently to disputations on interpretations of Biblical verses in TaNaCh (for example, Yehoshua's meeting of the angel, or Avraham in parshat Vayera). The stress is just not there, and even if it were, these are not the ones to engage in theological dispute.

But what astounded me was another student's response. He said: Of course God has a body! After all, there is a gemara that says that Hashem wears tefillin. How could God wear tefillin if he did not have an arm?

This is particularly the type of midrash that Rambam would say was intended allegorically, and fools would take it literally. (I don't want to get off point, but people over apply this Rambam to any midrash they disagree with, which is not necessarily what Rambam meant.) The point of that midrash, that Hashem wears tefillin that says Mi KeAmcha Yisrael Goy Echad BaEretz, is approximately that just as Israel is committed to God wholeheartedly and singularly, such that Hashem Elokeinu Hashem Echad, so does Hashem reciprocate the sentiment such that He has only one nation (whatever that means). It does not mean that Hashem actually has an arm.

This high school student who I know related this story, and then asked if this other student was correct? I pointed out the Ani Maamin, to which he replied that they did not teach this in school. At least he knew enough to wonder if this was really so, such that the midrash which was presented literally was off enough that it had to be resolved.

A while ago, Rav Schachter was on a panel where the question was whether to teach girls gemara. He responded that that was not the question. The question was whether to teach boys gemara! The education in girls schools is not yet messed up. Indeed, in my sister's school they had classes in which they memorized all sorts of Jewish facts and factoids like this - Yidiot Kelaliyot. I would assume they covered the ikkarei emuna besides just memorizing things like all the names of the parshiyot and sefarim in Tanach.

How to do this effectively, and not make it just more of the same? I don't know. I'm not in education. But perhaps saying instead of, or in addition to, davening, if they could say in English parts of the daily prayers (including Yigdal). In Hebrew, many American kids have no real chance at true kavana, since they don't know what the prayers are supposed to mean. (Unlike Israeli kids who have some chance at kavvana, knowing at least the meaning of the words in order to as some point really intend them.) Rote memorization of the prayers in English could be a step in the right direction, perhaps more than even a formal class teaching "meaning of prayers," or ikkarei emunah.

Did Rav Nachman of Breslov Prophesy About the Murder of Erez Levanon?

I've seen this at many places, but it traces back to Lazer Beams.

"200 years ago, Rebbe Nachman of Breslev told us that his fire would burn until the coming of Moshiach. He wasn't kidding...

* In Likutei Moharan, first section, Discourse 38:7, Rebbe Nachman makes several astounding allusions to the untimely death of his disciple, Erez Levanon of saintly and blessed memory. First, Rebbe Nachman quotes the Gemara from tractate Bchorot 57 that says, "Erez fell in our place"; terrorists murdered Erez in the groves right below his mountaintop home - "in our place" - in other words, he was a holy public sacrifice for all of Israel as an atonement for the nation's sins.

* Rebbe Nachman writes, "...the tzaddik is known as the Erez (Hebrew for cedar - LB) of Levanon (Heb. for Lebanon - LB).

* Rebbe Nachman mentions "Bat Ayin", the name of Erez's settlement, twice. The second time he mentions Bat Ayin, he juxtaposes it to "Arba Parshiot" - Erez was murdered during the time of year that we call "Arba Parshiot", when we read the "parshiot" of Shekalim, Zchor, Para, and Chodesh.

* Rebbe Nachman says, "The illumination of his face was revealed." Earlier today, I heard the details of the two young men who found Erez's body; their story sends chills up your spine: Sunday, February 25th after dark, when Erez didn't come home, they organized a search for him. They began searching in the orchard where Erez liked to go for hitbodedut (personal prayer). The night was cold, dark, and foggy with poor visibility; in the distance, between the trees, they saw a glow. Erez lay in a pool of his own blood; there was barely a place on his lean and holy body that wasn't pierced by terrorist daggers. Yet, his face was unscathed. Erez was lifeless, but his face glowed like that of Moses when he descended from Mount Sinai.

Moses? Erez was killed on 7 Adar, the anniversary of the death of Moses. Erez Levanon is the numerical equivalent of Moshe, Hebrew for Moses. (משה עם הכולל = 346, ארז לבנון = 346). Erez was undoubtedly a spark of Moses' soul.

Here's something even more mindboggling: Erez used to teach lessons in Likutei Moharan at Bat Ayin. The very last lesson he said in his life was - you guessed it - Likutei Moharan, first section, Discourse 38:7!

My heart tells me that I'm not even scratching the surface. May Erez's blessed memory arouse Divine compassion for his exile-weary people, amen."

Truth be told, I would have found this to be a much more inspiring story had Erez Levanon read this segment of Likeutei Maharan, understood its prophetic message, and worn a Kevlar vest that day. As it was, Rav Nachman is taunting us with this foreknowledge from beyond the grave.

Mystical Paths summarizes it thusly: "There is Hashgacha Pratis (Divine Providence) in this world, make no mistake that every detail of our lives is written..."

Let us examine these extraordinary apparent coincidences, and see if they are really as surprising as it seems at first.

The most extraordinary match-up of them all is that Rav Nachman refers explicitly to the very name of the murdered man, Erez Levanon, writing והצדיק נקרא ארז בלבנון.

Is this really so surprising, though? Note firstly that he does not say והצדיק נקרא ארז בלבנון, but rather Erez BaLevanon. What gives? Well, on a plain text level, Rav Nachman is not talking about a murder at all, but rather intends to explain a cryptic aggada in Bechorot 57b:

העיד רבי ישמעאל בן סתריאל מערקת לבינה לפני רבי במקומנו מפשיטין את המתה ומלבישין את החי אמר רבי נתגלה טעמא של משנתינו חזירין שבמקומנו יש להם ששים רבוא קלפים בבית המסס שלו
פעם אחת נפל ארז אחד שבמקומנו ועברו שש עשרה קרונות על חודו אחת
פעם אחת נפלה ביצת בר יוכני וטבעה ששים כרכים ושברה שלש מאות ארזים ומי שדיא ליה והא כתיב (איוב לט) כנף רננים נעלסה אמר רב אשי ההוא מוזרתא הואי:

The aggada is clearly allegorical, and Rav Nachman explains that it refers to a tzaddik, a righteous man, who descended a madrega, a level, but is still on a higher level than we are on.

(Rav Nachman of Breslov does not mention it, but there is a somewhat likely connection to Zechariah 11:

א פְּתַח לְבָנוֹן, דְּלָתֶיךָ; וְתֹאכַל אֵשׁ, בַּאֲרָזֶיךָ.	1 Open thy doors, O Lebanon, that the fire may devour thy cedars.
ב הֵילֵל בְּרוֹשׁ כִּי-נָפַל אֶרֶז, אֲשֶׁר אַדִּרִים שֻׁדָּדוּ; הֵילִילוּ אַלּוֹנֵי בָשָׁן, כִּי יָרַד יַעַר הבצור (הַבָּצִיר).	2 Wail, O cypress-tree, for the cedar is fallen; because the glorious ones are spoiled; wail, O ye oaks of Bashan, for the strong forest is come down.

which itself is clearly allegorical itself. The tanna is expanding or making use of the theme of the fallen cedar.)

To bolster the idea that the erez represents the tzaddik, Rav Nachman says that a tzaddik, or the tzaddik, is called an Erez BaLevanon. Thus, erez stands for tzaddik. Where does he get this from? From Tehillim 92:13:

יג צַדִּיק, כַּתָּמָר יִפְרָח; כְּאֶרֶז בַּלְּבָנוֹן יִשְׂגֶּה.

13 The righteous shall flourish like the palm-tree; he shall grow like a cedar in Lebanon.

On the level of plain text, Rav Nachman is most decidedly not saying that the given name of the tzaddik who will die (interpreting fall thusly) is Erez Balevanon. Rather, alluding to the pasuk in Tehillim, he is saying that a tzaddik can be called erez, a cedar, and we can then read this into the statement of the Tanna, in order to figure out the allegorical meaning of his statement.

What about Erez Lavanon? What are the odds that he would have that name? Actually, his name is a deliberate pun. His last name was Levanon, and presumably his parents, or the parents of his namesake, decided to make reference to the famous Biblical phrase when giving the name. The ba portion of baLevanon would not be kept, since the last name was Levanon.

So is this really so surprising? Both Rav Nachman of Breslov, in a discussion about a gemara about a fallen erez {which itself, if Zechariah is the initial source of the idea, is an erez of Lebanon) refers to the famous Biblical phrase, and the fellow who died was named after the famous Biblical phrase. One need not ascribe this to prophecy.

While on the subject of those pesukim in Zechariah, I would point out that those pesukim refer to a cedar falling in Lebanon, and the Tanna as well is referring to a cedar falling in Lebanon. Once again, העיד רבי ישמעאל בן סתריאל מערקת לבינה לפני רבי is how that gemara begins, and ערקת לבינה would appear to be Levanon (or so I would guess). And he says פעם אחת נפל ארז אחד שבמקומנו, such that mekomeinu would be arkat Leveina. As such, Zechariah 11:

א פְּתַח לְבָנוֹן, דְּלָתֶיךָ; וְתֹאכַל אֵשׁ, בַּאֲרָזֶיךָ.	1 Open thy doors, O Lebanon, that the fire may devour thy cedars.
ב הֵילֵל בְּרוֹשׁ כִּי-נָפַל אֶרֶז, אֲשֶׁר אַדִּרִים שֻׁדָּדוּ; הֵילִילוּ אַלּוֹנֵי בָשָׁן, כִּי יָרַד יַעַר הבצור (הַבָּצִיר).	2 Wail, O cypress-tree, for the cedar is fallen; because the glorious ones are spoiled; wail, O ye oaks of Bashan, for the strong forest is come down.

is quite a good connection to make.

Which brings us to the next point. Rav Nachman refers twice to Bat Ayin. However, this is in a citation, and he connects it to bein einecha of Tefillin. It is not meant to be a place where a murder takes place, at least not in the plain meaning of his words, in explanation of the cryptic tannaitic statement. Indeed, mekomeinu should be Lebanon, where the tzaddik fell. (And indeed, had an Erez with a different last name been slain in Lebanon, they might be making this very derivation.)

The four parshiyot intended by Rav Nachman are the four parshiyot of tefillin. It happens to also be a phrase that refers to four parshiyot of Shekalim, Zachor, haChodesh, Para. This year, there was a gap, so it spanned a period of five weeks.

The shining face is meant to connote busha.

The fact that is ended up on Moshe's yartzheit (with the shining face), and that the last derasha in Lukutei Mohoran was in this discourse that people try to find connections to, are less probable, but still within the realm of accepted probability.

What we need to consider is that there are many, many, many details associated with this event, and many, many, many details in this discourse. If A does not match up with B, it can still match up with C, and this is important for calculating probabilities. Had he not been slain on Adar 7th, he could have been born on Adar 7. Or he could have been born prematurely at 6 months. If such a detail does not match up, that is not taken as evidence against, but is just not part of the eerie coincidence, and is not mentioned.

As is pointed out, his name is the same gematria as Moshe. Gematria's are easily fudged, as many a person coming up with a silly gematria devar Torah for a simcha knows well. Erez Levanon = Moshe. Why include the last name? If it had not worked out, they could have tried Erez ben X = Moshe. Or Moshe ben Amram. Or Tuviah ben Amram.

And had this particular instance not seemed eerily apt, there are unfortunately many such incidents of Israelis killed by Palestinians. Eventually, a case where you can find such correspondences will pop up.

In sum, I am not at all persuaded.

It is similar to the famous list of similarities between the Kennedy and Lincoln assassinations:

Lincon had a secretary named Kennedy who told him not to go to the theater
Kennedy had a secretary named Lincoln who told him not to go to Dallas

Lincoln was elected President in 1860, while Kennedy was elected President in 1960.
Lincoln's successor - Andrew Johnson - was born in 1808, while Kennedy's successor - Lyndon Johnson - was born in 1908.
Lincoln's killer - John Wilkes Booth - was born in 1839, while Kennedy's killer - Lee Harvey Oswald - was born in 1939.

The names Lincoln and Kennedy each contain seven letters.
Lincoln's secretary was called Kennedy, while Kennedy's secretary was called Lincoln.
Lincoln's and Kennedy's successors both had the surname Johnson.
The names Andrew Johnson and Lyndon Johnson each contain thirteen letters.
The names John Wilkes Booth and Lee Harvey Oswald each contain fifteen letters.

Lincoln and Kennedy were both killed on a Friday.
Both were killed in the presence of their wives.
Both were shot from behind and in the head.
Booth shot Lincoln in a theatre and hid in a warehouse, while Oswald shot Kennedy from a warehouse and hid in a theatre.
Lincoln was shot at a theatre named 'Ford', Kennedy was shot in a car named 'Lincoln,' made by 'Ford'.
Both assassins were killed before being brought to trial.
Lincoln and Kennedy were both directly concerned with Civil Rights.
Booth and Oswald were both Southerners favouring unpopular ideas.

Abraham Lincoln was elected to Congress in 1846.
John F. Kennedy was elected to Congress in 1946.
Abraham Lincoln was elected President in 1860.
John F. Kennedy was elected President in 1960.
Both wives lost their children while living in the White House.
Both were succeeded by Southerens.
Both successors were named Johnson.
Both assassins were known by their three names.
Both names compromise fifteen letters.

John Wilkes Booth's brother once save the life of Abe Lincoln's son - Robert Todd Lincoln (son of U.S. President Abraham
Lincoln) Edwin Booth, brother of man who assassinated President Lincoln, rescued this Lincoln from a train accident.

A week before Lincoln was shot, he was in Monroe, Maryland.
A week before Kennedy was shot, he was in Marilyn Monroe.

which (a list in similar form) is debunked here on Snopes, showing why the parallels are not so compelling.

As they write at the end:

So what are we to make of all this? How do we account for all these coincidences, no matter how superficial they may be, and why do so many people find this list so compelling?

The coincidences are easily explained as the simple product of mere chance. It's not difficult to find patterns and similarities between any two marginally-related sets of data, and coincidences similar in number and kind can be (and have been) found between many different pairs of Presidents. Our tendency to seek out patterns wherever we can stems from our desire to make sense of our world; to maintain a feeling that our universe is orderly and can be understood. In this specific case two of our most beloved Presidents were murdered for reasons that make little or no sense to many of us, and by finding patterns in their deaths we also hope to find a larger cosmic "something" that seemingly provides some reassuring (if indefinite) rhyme or reason why these great men were prematurely snatched from our mortal sphere.

A similar approach is due here as well, in my opinion.

Daf Yomi Megillah 28a-b: Levity In Shul -- Followup and Counterpoint

As a follow up to the previous post, I thought I would present a counterpoint, to show why my last point, in particular, is not so convincing.

Firstly, cheshbonot and lachashov cheshbonot occurs elsewhere in Shas {in Shabbat 150a and Ketubot 5a}, where the context is clearly doing these sorts of accounting. Thus, י והא רב חסדא ורב המנונא דאמרי תרוייהו חשבונות של מצוה מותר לחשבן בשבת.

We can then say that cheshbonot are mundane and thus should not be performed on Shabbat and likewise should not be performed in shul.

What of the connection to Avodah Zara? I could still stand by my definition there, as regards to the permissibility of circuses. Where it said ובלבד שלא יחשב עמהם, we need not cast being a jester as being within the semantic inventory of חשב. Instead, we read יחשב as the niphal, as shelo yeichasheiv imahem, that you are not considered one of them, one of the performers, and thus are not in violation of moshav leiztim. This then bears no relation to our gemara in Megillah, occurrence of the phrase kallut rosh in Megillah. The halachic fallout would then need to be recalculated, but I cannot type this out at the moment, because I have a baby to put to bed.

Daf Yomi Megillah daf 28: What Kind Of Levity Cannot Be Done In A Synagogue?

On the Permissibility of Talking in Shul, of Having a Purim Play in Shul, and of Circuses

A brayta forbids levity, as well as eating, drinking, etc., in a shul. This was true of the shuls in Eretz Yisrael, but not in Bavel, where they made a precondition:

Rif citing Megillah 28a-b:

ועוד אמר ר' יהודה וכו'.
ת"ר בתי כנסיות ובתי מדרשות אין נוהגין בהן קלות ראש אין אוכלין בהן ואין שותין בהן ואין נאותין בהן ואין מטיילין בהן ואין נכנסין בהן בחמה מפני החמה ובגשמים מפני הגשמים אבל קורין בהן ושונין בהן ומספידין בהן הספד של רבים ומכבדים אותן ומרביצים אותן
א"ר יהודה אימתי בישובן אבל בחרבנן מניחין אותן ועולין בהן עשבים מפני עגמת נפש:

"And Rabbi Yehuda further said":
The Sages learnt {in a brayta}: Synagogues and study halls, we do not conduct ourselves with levity therein. We do not eat therein, nor drink therein, nor adorn ourselves therein, nor do we travel through them, nor do we enter them in sunny days to get out of the sun and on rainy days to get out of the rain. However, we read therein and learn therein, and deliver a eulogy of the public, and we sweep them and sprinkle water on them {after sweeping}.

R' Yehuda said: When? When they are extant, but when they are destroyed, we leave them alone and weeds grow in them, in order to cause anguish.

א"ר אסי בתי כנסיות שבבבל על תנאי הן עשויות ואעפ"כ אין נוהגין בהן קלות ראש
ומאי נינהו חשבונות
דאמר רב ששת בהכ"נ שמחשבין בה חשבונות לסוף מלינין בו מת מצוה:

Rabbi Assi said: The synagogues in Bavel were made with a precondition, and even so, we do not conduct ourselves with levity therein.
And what is that? Making calculations.
For Rav Sheshet said: A synagogue in which they make "calculations," in the end {in punishment} they will keep a met mitzvah overnight.

Note that the brayta does not mention sichat chullin, but it makes its way in there by the time it gets to Shulchan Aruch.

Let us turn our attention to the gemara and see what we can make of it. Firstly, the brayta.

ועוד אמר ר' יהודה וכו'.
ת"ר בתי כנסיות ובתי מדרשות אין נוהגין בהן קלות ראש אין אוכלין בהן ואין שותין בהן ואין נאותין בהן ואין מטיילין בהן ואין נכנסין בהן בחמה מפני החמה ובגשמים מפני הגשמים אבל קורין בהן ושונין בהן ומספידין בהן הספד של רבים ומכבדים אותן ומרביצים אותן
א"ר יהודה אימתי בישובן אבל בחרבנן מניחין אותן ועולין בהן עשבים מפני עגמת נפש:

"And Rabbi Yehuda further said":
The Sages learnt {in a brayta}: Synagogues and study halls, we do not conduct ourselves with levity therein. We do not eat therein, nor drink therein, nor adorn ourselves therein, nor do we travel through them, nor do we enter them in sunny days to get out of the sun and on rainy days to get out of the rain. However, we read therein and learn therein, and deliver a eulogy of the public, and we sweep them and sprinkle water on them {after sweeping}.

There are two ways to parse this brayta. In the first parsing, kalut rosh is disjoint from the other activities. Thus, we do not conduct ourselves with levity therein. Furthermore, do not eat therein, nor drink therein, nor adorn ourselves therein, nor do we travel through them, etc.. However, we do read therein and learn therein, etc.

In the second parsing, kalut rosh is not disjoint, but rather, the relationship is definitional. That is, synagogues and study halls, we do not conduct ourselves with levity therein. How so? We do not eat therein, etc., for this would be considered conducting ourselves with levity.

Proof for this second parsing is the lack of connective vav between levity and eating, and a connective vav introducing every subsequent activity. It is as if there is a colon present, such that the parse would be:

אין נוהגין בהן קלות ראש: אין אוכלין בהן ואין שותין בהן ואין נאותין בהן ואין מטיילין בהן ואין נכנסין בהן בחמה מפני החמה ובגשמים מפני הגשמים אבל קורין בהן ושונין בהן ומספידין בהן הספד של רבים ומכבדים אותן ומרביצים אותן

Still, even if this second parse of the brayta is correct, it would seem (at least at first glance) that the eventual halacha as formulated in the gemara views kalut rosh as disjoint, a separate activity from the rest.

Now let us turn to the gemara, and see how Amoraim interpret this brayta, and what novelties they add to the picture.

א"ר אסי בתי כנסיות שבבבל על תנאי הן עשויות ואעפ"כ אין נוהגין בהן קלות ראש
ומאי נינהו חשבונות
דאמר רב ששת בהכ"נ שמחשבין בה חשבונות לסוף מלינין בו מת מצוה:

Rabbi Assi said: The synagogues in Bavel were made with a precondition, and even so, we do not conduct ourselves with levity therein.
And what is that? Making calculations.
For Rav Sheshet said: A synagogue in which they make "calculations," in the end {in punishment} they will keep a met mitzvah overnight.

Rabbi Assi thus states that we have an exception to the stringencies stated in the brayta, because of preconditions made on the synagogues in Bavel. Even so, we do not conduct ourselves with levity therein.

How does Rabbi Assi view kalut rosh and its relationship with the remainder of the activities in the brayta? Are they disjoint, or are the activities definitional?

From Rav Assi's statement in and of itself, we have no help. It could be either. That is, the activities in the brayta might well be definitional of kalut rosh. If so, Rabbi Assi would be saying that in truth, because of preconditions made on synagogues in Bavel, all manner of activity is permitted in these synagogues, namely, those activities listed in the brayta are permitted. However, even so, we do not avail ourselves of this precondition and still do not do any of those activities. Thus, we may not eat or drink in a synagogue, etc.. Rabbi Assi's statement would then be a stringent one.

On the other hand, Rabbi Assi might consider kalut rosh and the other activities to be disjoint. Indeed, that is the common reading of his statement, supporting in large part by the setama digmara's definition which immediately follows (and which we shall discuss in short order). If so, there are preconditions made on synagogues that allow all manner of activity mentioned in the brayta to be performed in those synagogues. However, perhaps those preconditions did not cover, or could not cover, such extreme disrespect to the sanctity of the synagogue as kalut rosh, whatever that may be. Alternatively, perhaps those preconditions do indeed cover kalut rosh, but even so, as an extra stringency, we refuse to conduct ourselves with kalut rosh therein.

Regardless, the way Rabbi Assi uses the term kalut rosh is not necessarily identical with or indicative of how he parses kalut rosh in the brayta.

The setama digmara clearly considers Rabbi Assi's definition of kalut rosh to be disjoint from the other activities in the brayta. Thus, the setama defines kalut rosh as "calculations," cheshbonot, whatever they may be.

What influences the setama to give such a definition? There are two factors I would point out (among possibly others). First, there is the juxtaposition of Rabbi Assi's statement with that of Rav Sheshet, disallowing cheshbonot. Secondly, what was cited above was the Rif's girsa of the gemara, and has Rav Sheshet making this second statement. However, our girsa of the gemara has Rabbi Assi making both statements. If this girsa is the original and what the setama had before him, it makes sense to view Rabbi Assi's second statement as definitional of the first.

Let us now turn to Rav Sheshet (/Rav Assi's second) statement:

ומאי נינהו חשבונות
דאמר רב ששת בהכ"נ שמחשבין בה חשבונות לסוף מלינין בו מת מצוה

And what is that? Making calculations.
For Rav Sheshet said: A synagogue in which they make "calculations," in the end {in punishment} they will keep a met mitzvah overnight.

What are cheshbonot, and how is one mechashev cheshbonot? The standard translation is "business calculations." This definition, however, gives me extreme pause. After all, the setama uses this as a definition of levity, kalut rosh. Somehow, when I imagine a bunch of accountants going over the books, levity is not the first thing that comes to mind. On the other hand, we need not take kalut rosh as the English term of levity, but rather as not treating the synagogue with the utmost respect and awe it deserves, in which case doing mundane business calculations can well be a definition of kalut rosh. If so, one can readily extend this prohibition to other mundane treatments and uses of a synagogue -- perhaps including sichat chullin. Still, this is not the first interpretation I would seize upon, if there was another interpretation available.

I have another problem with Rav Sheshet's statement. What in the world is the relationship between accountants doing business calculations in a synagogue and keeping a met mitzvah overnight? Sure, the met mitzvah might be viewed as punishment of death for what was done, but isn't this punishment somewhat random? I would expect some sort of poetic justice, some sort of middah kineged middah in Rav Sheshet's statement!

Indeed, I have another explanation of cheshbonot that renders Rav Sheshet's statement much more poetic, and which helps explain what the setama saw to make the statement definitional of kalut rosh.

In July 2005, I wrote a post about the permissibility of circuses, considering the gemara which appears to outlaw in, in tandem with a contemporary Christian writing which did the same (and used some of the same "derashot" and many of the same terms), in order to determine what exactly was being forbidden and in what contexts. It is a good post -- check it out.

One part of that gemara {Avodah Zarah 18b} reads:

ורמינהי [הולכין] לאיצטדינין מותר מפני שצווח ומציל ולכרקום מותר מפני ישוב מדינה ובלבד שלא יתחשב עמהם ואם נתחשב עמהם אסור
קשיא איצטדינין אאיצטדינין קשיא כרקום אכרקום
בשלמא כרקום אכרקום ל"ק כאן במתחשב עמהן כאן בשאין מתחשב עמהן
אלא איצטדינין אאיצטדינין קשיא
תנאי היא [דתניא] אין הולכין לאיצטדינין מפני מושב לצים ור' נתן מתיר מפני שני דברים אחד מפני שצווח ומציל ואחד מפני שמעיד עדות אשה להשיאה

It is permitted to go to stadiums, because by shouting one may save [the victim]. One is also permitted to go to a camp for the purpose of maintaining order in the country, providing he does not conspire [with the Romans], but for the purpose of conspiring it is forbidden.

There is thus a contradiction between [the laws relating to] stadiums as well as between [those relating to] camps! There may indeed be no contradiction between those relating to camps, because the one may refer to where he conspires with them, and the other to where he does not; but the laws relating to stadiums are surely contradictory! — They represent the differing opinions of [two] Tannaim. For it has been taught: One should not go to stadiums because [they are] 'the seat of the scornful', but R. Nathan permits it for two reasons: first, because by shouting one may save [the victim], secondly, because one might be able to give evidence [of death] for the wife [of a victim] and so enable her to remarry.

The business of going to a karkom for the purpose of conspiring with the Romans is a bit strange. Perhaps it is like going to the horse races in order to deal with the mob. Still, the strangeness depends on how one defines karkom. Ran defines karkom as a place to go for amusements, while Rashi defines it as a siege works. Still, it is somewhat difficult.

I do some deep analysis of the gemara, and compare what is going on in the derashot there with a derasha from Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi, and arrive at the following conclusion, entirely independent of this gemara in Megillah:

I will now offer an answer according to the Ran, who translated karkom as a circular structure built like seigeworks for the purpose of amusement. As I asked before, "Why would one think one conspires there?"

I believe the answer is that the work נתחשב should not be translated as "conspire." Rather, it means perform feats of skill. As I noted before, Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi referred to תחבולה. Soncino rendered this as an evil planning - that is, the act of consipiring. Artscroll meanwhile, translated this as "trick or strategem - feats of skill." That is, the performances mentioned in the brayta about the sorcerers and enchanters, or of bukion and mukion, lulion and mulion, blurin or salgurin {various jesters} performing in the karkom.

Thus, נתחשב does not mean to conspire, but rather to perform feats of skill and jest for entertainment. If so, this is a possible meaning for the root חשב.

Let us now return to Megillah daf 28, and to Rav Sheshet's derasha. He writes: בהכ"נ שמחשבין בה חשבונות לסוף מלינין בו מת מצוה.

This now makes perfect sense, and it quite poetic, actually. He states that a synagogue in which they perform this feats of extreme comedy, in the end it will be a house for extreme tragedy. If jesters perform therein, it will eventually hold a corpse overnight. Recall that a synagogue was a place where people saw fit to congregate, so they might have held a sort of jester / entertaining sorcerer exhibition there. Of course, all sorts of meanings from the semantic inventory are available to us for the root חשב, but given the poetic nature of the statement, and the context of kalut rosh, I would select this as the most likely meaning.

If so, it is easy to see how the setama saw Rav Sheshet's (/second Rabbi Assi's) statement as definitional of kalut rosh (especially if both statements were made by Rabbi Assi and were juxtaposed). Rabbi Assi said that in a synagogue, despite preconditions, we do not conduct ourselves with levity. Then, we have a statement discussing jesters (rather than accountants) in the synagogue, with the opposite extreme of tragedy as punishment for doing so. Indeed, the setama's reading of this as definitional is quite convincing.

Halachic fallout
What then, would be the practical fallout, were we to pasken in accordance with my analysis here? We would simultaneously have a big chumra and a big kulla.

First, the kulla. How do we parse the brayta? I would parse it as definitional, rather than disjoint. However, how we parse the brayta is irrelevant, since our synagogues are made with preconditions. How do we parse Rabbi Assi and Rav Sheshet (/Rav Assi's second statement)? I would say that they treat kalut rosh as disjoint from the other activities, with the definition of kalut rosh minimized to only this extreme type of conduct of levity, that of jesters performing. Therefore, if accountants wished to congregate in a synagogue and perform their calculations, it would be permitted. Similarly, other types of personal activities, as well as sichat chullin, would be permitted in a synagogue. Only the extreme levity as defined by Rav Sheshet is prohibited.

Next, the chumra. Here is where I disallow what is done year after year in some shuls. In one shul I know of in KGH, they have a magic show, for the children, in the shul, by an entertainer, on the night of Purim. In one yeshiva I know of, they hold a Purim play in the shul/bet midrash. This would be the very definition of kalut rosh as given in the gemara. Therefore, we should avoid doing so.

Now, for the Disclaimer. Though I had this post in mind a few weeks before Purim, I deliberately held back until after, so as not to get in anyone's way. (I did a similar thing with Tu Beshvat seders, whose post I still have to get to.) And remember, this discussion was not intended halacha lemaaseh. You might wish to consult your local Orthodox rabbi, perhaps printing out this post and the one about circuses.

Rabbi Michael Broyde As Scholar In Residence at Etz Chaim This Shabbat

SCHOLAR-IN-RESIDENCE: RABBI MICHAEL BROYDE on ETHICS UNDER FIRE – JEWISH ETHICS AT A TIME OF WAR

Shabbat, March 9-10

Join us for thought-provoking lectures and a spirited Motzaei Shabbat panel discussion:

Friday Night Shiur, 8:15 pm: The Ticking Bomb: Is Torture Ever Allowed According to Jewish Law?

Shabbat Afternoon Shiur, 5:55 pm (betw. Mincha & Ma’ariv): Proportional Response: Is It a Jewish Concept?

Motzei Shabbat Panel Discussion 8:15 pm: Should Israel Review its Policy and Allow for More Enemy Civilian Casualties in an Attempt to Better Protect the Lives of its Soldiers? Moderated by Dr. Bernard Firestone (dean at Hofstra and a founder of Etz Chaim), Rabbi Broyde and Lieutenant Dr. Eliezer Sariel (IDF Reserves) will discuss this vital question.

Daf Yomi Megillah daf 28a: Forgiving Before Sleeping - A Question on the Rosh Yosef

Yes, I know asking questions on homiletics is cheap, but in the process I send some traffic Daf Note's way.

From a post at DafNotes:

The Gemora states: Rabbi Nechunya ban Hakanah said that one of the meritorious acts that he performed earning him longevity was the fact that he never went to bed to go to sleep before forgiving anyone that harmed him in any manner.

The Rosh Yosef explains the reasoning for this: At night, a person's neshama ascends to the heavens to receive judgment on all the day's actions. While in heaven, the neshama, if the person merits, is able to enter into the room of Hashem and listen to hidden secrets. The Gemora in shabbos (149b) states: A person, that someone else is punished on his account, does not merit entering this private chamber. That is why it is integral to forgive anyone that harmed you before falling asleep. Rabbi Nechunya waited the entire day because he wanted to give the people that caused him harm a chance to repent on their own and to perform the mitzva of repenting.

...

In Aramaic/Hebrew, the gemara:

שאלו תלמידיו את רבי נחוניא בן הקנה במה הארכת ימים אמר להם מימי לא נתכבדתי בקלון חברי ולא עלתה על מטתי קללת חברי וותרן בממוני הייתי לא נתכבדתי בקלון חברי כי הא דרב הונא דרי מרא אכתפיה אתא רב חנא בר חנילאי וקא דרי מיניה א"ל אי רגילת דדרית במאתיך דרי ואי לא אתייקורי אנא בזילותא דידך לא ניחא לי ולא עלתה על מטתי קללת חברי כי הא דמר זוטרא כי הוה סליק לפורייה אמר שרי ליה לכל מאן דצערן

I would have simply said that this showed that while human, and thus being hurt and upset by people that aggravate him, he made sure not to bear a grudge for too long, and made his peace with them (perhaps with the declaration that Mar Zutra made). This is a positive thing to do, and seems to have little to do with entering into the room of Hashem. And does entering into this inner chamber have anything to do with longevity?

Indeed, it sounds much closer to the advice to married couples: "Don't go to bed angry!"

Or else something like "Lo siTor."

Furthermore, if "[a]t night, a person's neshama ascends to the heavens to receive judgment on all the day's actions," then shouldn't he make sure to forgive before the other person goes to sleep? It shouldn't be predicated on when he goes to sleep.

And what about that gemara in Shabbat? The gemara reads as follows:

וא"ר יעקב בריה דבת יעקב כל שחבירו נענש על ידו אין מכניסין אותו במחיצתו של הקב"ה מנלן אילימא משום דכתיב (מלכים א כב) ויאמר ה' מי יפתה את אחאב ויעל ויפול ברמות גלעד ויאמר זה בכה וזה אמר בכה ויצא הרוח ויעמוד לפני ה' ויאמר אני אפתנו וגו' ויאמר אצא והייתי רוח שקר בפי כל נביאיו ויאמר תפתה וגם תוכל צא ועשה כן ואמרינן מאי רוח א"ר יוחנן זה רוחו של נבות ומאי צא אמר רב צא ממחיצתי

R. Jacob son of Jacob's daughter also said: He through whom his neighbour is punished is not permitted to enter within the barrier [precincts] of the Holy One, blessed be He. How do we know this? Shall we say, because it is written, And the Lord said, Who shall persuade Ahab, that he may go up and fall at Ramoth-gilead? And one said on this manner; and another said on that manner. And there came forth a spirit and stood before the Lord, and said, I will persuade him. And he said, I will go forth and be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his Prophets. And he [the Lord] said, Thou shalt entice him, and shalt prevail also: go forth, and do so. Now we discussed, What spirit is meant? And R. Johanan answered: The spirit of Naboth the Jezreelite. And what does 'go forth' mean? Said Rab, Go forth from within My precincts!

In the above instance, it was already determined that Achav was going to be punished. The spirit of Navot was simply the mechanism by which to do it. It was because he was the mechanism, not the cause, that he was henceforth exiled from that precinct. And indeed, if it was because of the wrong done to Navot, that Navot had not yet forgiven {this is not established, and may not be tree}, that was the cause of Achav being punished, how could the spirit of Navot have been in the precinct of Hashem in the first place?