Was the naara betrothed at the time?

Summary: And, is this required in order to apply the death penalty? Shadal, Ibn Ezra and Karaites, and Chazal, take different approaches as to when this occurs in the timeline, and the certainty of it.

Post: In Ki Teitzei, there is discussion of a new husband and wife, where he lays charges that she was not a virgin. If it be found to be true, then:

21. they shall take the girl out to the entrance of her father's house, and the men of her city shall pelt her with stones, and she shall die, for she did a disgraceful thing in Israel, to commit adultery [in] her father's house. So shall you clear away the evil from among you.

כא. וְהוֹצִיאוּ אֶת הַנַּעֲרָ אֶל פֶּתַח בֵּית אָבִיהָ וּסְקָלוּהָ אַנְשֵׁי עִירָהּ בָּאֲבָנִים וָמֵתָה כִּי עָשְׂתָה נְבָלָה בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל לִזְנוֹת בֵּית אָבִיהָ וּבִעַרְתָּ הָרָע מִקִּרְבֶּךָ:

Regarding this girl, who committed the sin of לִזְנוֹת בֵּית אָבִיהָ, does this mean that she was entirely unmarried when she did this? Or was she betrothed, and so staying still in her father's house before nuptials? How do we know, then, when the offense was committed?

The traditional interpretation of this pasuk may be found in the Sifrei.

. נאמר כאן אביה
 ונאמר להלן (ש מ  בא )  אביה מה אביה האמור
 א)  (להלן) זנות עם זיקת הבעל אף אביה האמור
 (כאן) זנות עם זיקת הבעל. ( ס ״ פ ) :


Thus, the husband already had zika, so she was betrothed. And earlier, it speaks of eidim to this effect.

Ibn Ezra has it as more of a doubt:

[כב, כא]
וסקלוה -שיתכן שאחר שארסה שכב איש אותה כי המארס לא ארס אותה רק היא אומרת שהיא בתולה ומעתיקי הדת בארו הדבר באר היטב

"And they stone her. For it is possible that after she was betrothed, a man slept with her. For her betrothed only betrothed her because she said that she was a virgin. {Yahel Or: And therefore, after she was betrothed she slept with someone else. Therefore, she is liable to stoning.} And the transmitters of the law explained the matter quite well. {Karnei Or, citing HaMaamar: And there is no doubt that the received tradition of Chazal is true and correct, {namely} that she is not executed if witnesses do not come forward that she committed adultery while betrothed, for this is not of the righteous law to execute her just because she concealed from him that she was no virgin {at the time of betrothal}, or upon the doubt that perhaps she committed adultery when betrothed {HaMaamar}. And see Em Lamikra who explains well all of this. {Josh: I don't have access to that sefer.}}

I am not sure that Ibn Ezra intends to explicitly reject Chazal here. Rather, he is doing his best to support the narrative of Chazal, that it is a betrothed woman, but on a peshat level. That is, the groom's assumption at betrothal makes the plain text's assumption that לִזְנוֹת בֵּית אָבִיהָ refers to actions in her father's household, but only once she was betrothed. This is then a rejection, both by Ibn Ezra and Chazal, that לִזְנוֹת בֵּית אָבִיהָ refers to her actions before even betrothal. Of course, then comes, via developed rabbinic law or via careful diyuk into the pesukim, other requirements. For instance, no literal spreading out of a stained blanket; also, witnesses. That is fine, and part of halachic derash. Ibn Ezra puts us into Chazal's capable hands for that portion. (He certainly is at odds with the application of sekilah based only on a doubt.)

Ibn Ezra often does not arrive precisely at halacha as paskened in the gemara, but in general tries to combat a Karaitic approach and approximates what we find in halacha, arriving at it by peshat methods. (Not that this seems to be the approach of the Karaites here. Rather, they say like Ibn Ezra, as we shall see.)

HaMaamar has an objection to Ibn Ezra, just as Karnei Or mentioned. See the translation above.

Shadal has another developed peshat, in which it is indeed referring to an unmarried and unbetrothed woman, for otherwise they would say לנאוף instead of לזנות, and furthermore, they should execute the adulterer as well. And further the law is trying to curb a primitive society's instinct to punish her for misleading her husband in this way. Thus, it is reformative in nature. I translate, analyze, and in the end reject this idea, in this other parshablog post.

Here is Aharon ben Eliyahu; and here is Aharon ben Yosef. Both are Karaites, and they present more or less the same as Ibn Ezra suggested. He also discusses a related machlokes Chazal in this. Aharon ben Yosef also says that the execution based on the mere doubt is enough to impose the punishment, such that it is appropriate for the Israelites to exert effort to guard their daughters. And if the virginity is spoiled due to some other incident (mukas etz), they should reveal this information to the groom-to-be.

Interesting Posts and Articles #237

1. At Snopes, it was false that lobsters freed by Buddhists were swiftly recaught by fishermen. Well, the Buddhists freed them, but the video showing the recatching was faked. I believed the news story.
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2. Rationalist Judaism has a response to a query about circumcision, and discusses kanoi terrorism in Bet Shemesh.
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3. Related, at Life In Israel, pashkevilim targeting the individual chareidi protesters. I say good.
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4. Menachem Mendel notes how Saudi officials spotted a new moon that was actually Saturn, since they would not have been able to spot the moon at that time. See this followup about how the Saudi officials are angry at being doubted by astronomers.
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5. A book review of The How and Why of Jewish Prayer, at Hirhurim.
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6. Shirat Devorah, a slight clarification by Lazer Beams, a post at Mystical Paths, and a post by Yeranen Yaakov, about the latest wolf sighting. Help! A wolf!
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7. DovBear has the actual contents of the Big Bad Binah article.
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8. Over at Judaism.StackExchange, I answered a question about the Jewish midrashic origin of the constellation Virgo.
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9. This week's Haveil Havalim.
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10. Here on parshablog, the reformative laws of Ki Teitzei. And my parsha source roundup.

YU Torah on parashat Ki Seitzei

Audio Shiurim on Ki Teitzei Rabbi Chaim Brovender: Hashavat Aveida  Rabbi Ally Ehrman: Learning Mercy  Rabbi Chaim Eisenstein: Marriage as a Metaphor for Torah  Rabbi Joel Finkelstein: The Jewish Attitude to Divorce  Rabbi Shalom Hammer: Sincere Relationships  Rabbi Aryeh Lebowitz: Rachmanim, Bayshanim, v'Gomlei Chasadim  Rabbi Shmuel Marcus: Hashavas Aveida  Rabbi Yaakov Neuburger: Shiluach HaKan  Rabbi Yonason Sacks: Milchemes Reshus vs. Milchemes Mitzva, What was the Issur of Eishes Yefas To'ar?  R' Dr. Jacob J Schacter: Why is Moav forbidden to enter Klal Yisrael?  Rabbi Baruch Simon: The Importance of Tzius and Kedusha  Mrs. Shira Smiles: The Ultimate Battle  Rabbi Moshe Taragin: The Prison of our Plans  Rabbi Michael Taubes: Paying workers on Time  Rabbi Yaacov Thaler: Give!  Rabbi Mordechai Willig: The Importance of Listening  Rabbi Ari Zahtz: Yefas Toar  Articles on Ki Teztzei Rabbi Avraham Gordimer: Make the Correct Decisions Rabbi Dovid Gottlieb: Spiritual Warfare Rabbi Maury Grebenau: Is Sensitivity for the Birds? Rabbi Yehuda Henkin: Amalek and its Legacy Rabbi David Horwitz: Mitzvot concerning Gifts to the Poor Rabbi Yitzchak Korn: Lessons from Hashavat Aveida Rabbi Avigdor Nebenzahl: Defeating the Yetzer Hara Rabbi Jeffrey Saks: Parenting Secrets of the Ben Sorer u-Moreh Rabbi Jeremy Wieder: Laining for Parshat Ki Teitzei See all shiurim on YUTorah for Parshat Ki Teitzei

New This Week Rav Kook: Understanding the "Segulah" of Every Jew  Rabbi Benny Eisner Intro to the Melachos  Rabbi Daniel Z. Feldman Why Jews Become Comedians  Rabbi Lawrence Hajioff Tefillah - M'Drabanan or M'Doraysa  Rabbi Eliakim Koenigsberg The Avoda of Elul: Creating an "Am"  Rabbi Dovid Miller Elul and distractions: the challenge of our generation Rabbi Eli Ozarowski Halakhic Issues Resulting from the World Trade Center Tragedy  Rabbi Yona Reiss Rambam Hilchos Yesodai HaTorah Ch. 1 Part 1  Rabbi Netanel Wiederblank

The reformative laws of Ki Teitzei

Summary: In inheritance law, in treatment of rebellious children, and in giving women a voice. HaMaamar on some of the laws and their details, in parashat Ki Teitzei.

Post: In the past, I've written about how the laws in parashat Ki Teitzei should be viewed in light of prevailing customs of the day, and as corrective reforms to improve the rights of the weak and powerless. Thus, for eshet yefar toar, and for ben sorer umoreh.

In terms of ben sorer umoreh, I see that HaMaamar said something along the same lines. But he also develops this theme throughout other mitzvos and aspects of mitzvos, in the parashah. This includes familial inheritance and whether judges listen at all to the statement of the mother. Thus:

"(15) When there is to a man: It is known that in those days, each man was ruler in his house in accordance with his soul's desire, with none to stand in the way. He would oppress, in his anger, his wife and children, and no one could tell him what to do. However, our complete Torah, whose ways are all pleasant, did not grant permission to any man to pervert the rules of man, whatever they would be, and placed a statute and boundary both for the ruler of one's home and the ruler of nations. And therefore, it was not in the hands of the father to grant firstborn rights to one of his sons over that of his brother, who had the {true} rule of being firstborn. 


And since the primary double-portion applied to inheritance of field and vineyards, and they have already said that the firstborn does not take from the potential just as by the muchzak, therefore the mitzvah appears in Mishneh Torah {Devarim}, as they entered the land.


(18) When a man has a rebellious son: This is further fencing in the power of the father, such that he should not rule as he wishes over his sons. And it stated that even if the son is stubborn and rebellious, and does not listen to his father's voice -- and according to the laws of the nations, it would be in the hand of his father to smite him unto death, such shall not be done in Israel. Rather, they will bring him before those who know religion and law, and upon their words it shall be.


And behold, the gist of this mitzvah is already encompassed in the mitzvah of honoring one's father and mother.


(19) And his father and mother shall seize him: It states 'his father and mother' to teach that in the laws of children, there is power to the mother just as to the father, in place of what existed in those days, that her words were not heard at all, and the judges only listened to the father."


He continues this in other explanations on this parashah, though I don't know that I agree with every detail.

The other day, on DovBear, I saw the following video of a frum father disciplining his daughter outside the kotel, until (secular) outsiders intervened. Subsequently, the father was deported outside of Israel:



This would seem to be an example of where society at large intervenes and prevents the over-disciplining by parents. On the other hand, in the pesukim of ben sorer umoreh, mention is made that prior to bringing him to the elders, ויסרו אותו ולא ישמע עליהם. Where Rashi defines for us this as:

ויסרו אותו: מתרין בו בפני שלשה ומלקין אותו.

Perhaps this is already a quasi-court? The nature of disciplining children has changed, and what was once acceptable no longer is. I think this is a good direction that Western society, as a whole, has taken.

Ibn Janach on כִּי הָאָדָם עֵץ הַשָּׂדֶה לָבֹא מִפָּנֶיךָ בַּמָּצוֹר

Summary: What I think may be a unique way of reading it.

Post: At the end of Shofetim, there is a rather famous pasuk (Devarim 20:19)

כ,יט כִּי-תָצוּר אֶל-עִיר יָמִים רַבִּים לְהִלָּחֵם עָלֶיהָ לְתָפְשָׂהּ, לֹא-תַשְׁחִית אֶת-עֵצָהּ לִנְדֹּחַ עָלָיו גַּרְזֶן--כִּי מִמֶּנּוּ תֹאכֵל, וְאֹתוֹ לֹא תִכְרֹת:  כִּי הָאָדָם עֵץ הַשָּׂדֶה, לָבֹא מִפָּנֶיךָ בַּמָּצוֹר.

אֲרֵי תְּצוּר עַל קַרְתָּא יוֹמִין סַגִּיאִין לְאָגָחָא קְרָבָא עֲלַהּ לְמִכְבְּשַׁהּ, לָא תְּחַבֵּיל יָת אִילָנַהּ לְאָרָמָא עֲלוֹהִי בַּרְזְלָא--אֲרֵי מִנֵּיהּ תֵּיכוֹל, וְיָתֵיהּ לָא תְּקוּץ:  אֲרֵי לָא כַּאֲנָשָׁא אִילָן חַקְלָא, לְמֵיעַל מִן קֳדָמָךְ בִּצְיָרָא.

Onkelos renders it (above): "For not like a man is the tree of the field, to enter before you into the siege."

There is no word "not" in the Biblical Hebrew original, so I would take this as a reworking of the idea in the Hebrew. Such as that Onkelos understood this as a question, and rephrased it as a negative statement.

Similarly, Rashi:

19. When you besiege a city for many days to wage war against it to capture it, you shall not destroy its trees by wielding an ax against them, for you may eat from them, but you shall not cut them down. Is the tree of the field a man, to go into the siege before you?		יט. כִּי תָצוּר אֶל עִיר יָמִים רַבִּים לְהִלָּחֵם עָלֶיהָ לְתָפְשָׂהּ לֹא תַשְׁחִית אֶת עֵצָהּ לִנְדֹּחַ עָלָיו גַּרְזֶן כִּי מִמֶּנּוּ תֹאכֵל וְאֹתוֹ לֹא תִכְרֹת כִּי הָאָדָם עֵץ הַשָּׂדֶה לָבֹא מִפָּנֶיךָ בַּמָּצוֹר:
		ימים: שנים:
		רבים: שלשה. מכאן אמרו אין צרין על עיירות של נכרים פחות משלשה ימים קודם לשבת. ולמד שפותח בשלום שנים או שלשה ימים. וכן הוא אומר (שמואל ב' א, א) וישב דוד בצקלג ימים שנים, ובמלחמת הרשות הכתוב מדבר:
		כי האדם עץ השדה: הרי כי משמש בלשון דלמא. שמא האדם עץ השדה להכנס בתוך המצור מפניך להתייסר ביסורי רעב וצמא כאנשי העיר למה תשחיתנו:

My translation: "Behold ki functions as a language of 'perhaps'. Perhaps a man is the tree of the field, to enter into the siege before you, to suffer the sufferings of hunger and thirst, like the men of the city? Why should you destroy it?"

Thus, Rashi regards it as a rhetorical question, and the Judaica Press translation (above) follows this.

But then, we have the following explanation, by Rabbi Yonah Ibn Janach:

"That is to say, 'when a man abandons the tree of the field in order to go before you into the siege, you should not cut it down if it is a food-tree. And there is hidden-ness. (In other words, a shortened verse.)"

If so, the actor of going into the siege is the man, not the tree. And ki is not, as Rashi puts it, a language of דלמא, but rather a language of כאשר.

I still gravitate towards the rhetorical question reading. It just sounds right to me. But this alternative is an interesting one to consider.

Interesting Posts and Articles #236

Via xkcd

1. Via Daat Torah, how a perush to Kohelet by Yonah Barda"ch was misprinted as a discovered commentary of the Malbim. You can see the entry for this perush on Koheles here and here. Also on Daat Torah, unique chareidi issues with child molestation. And a statement from Rav Zilberstein that only rabbis can decide about child sexual abuse.

   There is a brief segment of several minutes - starting at about 34 minutes into the recording - in which he responds to a question about reporting child abuse to the police. He responds very harshly regarding psychologists (despite the fact that he was speaking to an audience of frum mental health workers. He said only rabbis can decide these issues. He mentions the case of a frum yid who is serving 15 years in jail because what he claims are false charges brought against him by a child which a psychologist validated with drawings. He claims that the rabbonim know 100% that the man is innocent while the police were totally dependent on the fantasies of the psychologist. Bottom line he insists only rabbis know what to do with charges of child abuse.

   One can, of course, bring examples of rabbis mistaken about sexual abuse, in the opposite direction. This assumes that the rabbis are correct in their 100% knowledge and the psychologists are wrong. My take is that certainly, historically, psychologists are responsible for terrible errors in this sphere. For instance, the nonsense with recovered repressed memories, in which people were accused of molesting children, with the backup of psychologists. Or facilitated communication, in which autistics accused parents of sexual molestation, backed by psychologists -- until the whole thing was shown to be incorrect, and not the true communications from the children. Or the sex abuse witchhunts in which psychologists, as authority figures accidentally persuaded children that they had been abused -- the day care sex abuse hysteria of the 80's and early 90's. Dorothy Rabinowitz wrote a book about such witch hunts. A bit of caution and humility is appropriate, especially in instances of psychologists deducing that sexual abuse has occurred.
   .
   Still, that does not mean that psychology, as a profession, has not learned from these errors. They have developed methodologies to prevent such mistakes. And rabbis have made some pretty egregious mistakes themselves. I don't know whether I believe him that the man in question was 100% innocent. I would need to know more details of the case. Recall that Rabbi Yizchok Zilberstein is the medical posek who approved a teenage girl's suggestion that she cut herself in order to be able to wear longer skirts. I am not certain that I would grant credence to his psychological insights. And he is the one who informed Rav Chaim Kanievsky, based on an urban legend about an anti-Semitic dentist, that Jews and gentiles have a different number of teeth. And it never occurred to him to ask a dentist whether this is true. So I am not certain that I would grant credence to his process of determining reality, the metzius. And I worry about such rabbis who are so confident in their ability to know the truth, over medical professionals. It seems that this is a recipe for disaster, just as it has been in the past.
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2. On Scribd, Ksav Yad Kodesh, containing a collection of letters to and from Rav Kook.
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3. One rabbi makes a statement that there is no justification for married men to abandon their families on Rosh HaShanah to go to Uman.
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4. On Bloomberg News, a review of two kosher restaurants. Heh.
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5. Mekubal on pied piper Chabad messianists.
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6. Rabbi Natan Slifkin is Bat Man, about a segulah for bats, based on Artscroll's identification of retzifi in Perek Shirah, based in turn on Rabbi Slifkin's innovative idea in Perek Shirah. But, he retracted! And actually let Artscroll know before they printed. In the comment section, he tells us what he wrote in the first vs. the second edition of the book.
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   In the second edition:

   In the first edition of this book, rather than positively identify the retzifi, it was simply explained in reference to the bat, since the way in which several of the commentaries explained the verse in Perek Shirah matched the bat’s habits. It was also pointed out that Pi Eliyahu identifies the retzifi as the tinshames of Scripture, which is sometimes identified as a bat; however, Pi Eliyahu itself was explaining tinshames as a type of owl. The retzifi is clearly not the bat, which has its own name in Hebrew – atalef.
   It turns out that it is possible to identify the retzifi, at least broadly. Tuv Ta’am, cited by Yashir Moshe, and Perek B’Shir, state that retzifi is a type of dove. This identification is supported by early manuscripts of Perek Shirah, which state yutzfi or dayutzfi in place of retzifi. Since the letters resh and dales are often interchanged, we can understand how this name became corrupted to become retzifi. The datzifi is mentioned in the Talmud (Chullin 62a) as being similar to a turtledove. Furthermore, Rabbeinu Chananel to Shabbos 81a states that the tziltzela, a bird mentioned in Shabbos 80b, is a type of small dove also called ritzifi (although Otzar HaGeonim states that the tziltzela is a bird the size of a dove with small eggs). It is not possible to conclusively determine which species of dove it is, but we are tentatively identifying it as the laughing dove, which is similar to the turtledove but smaller, and to which we can match an interpretation of the verse that is attached to it.

   Read about the nature of the segulah there. Meanwhile, three new bat species are discovered. None of them lay eggs. Related, an old parshablog post about how the atalef of the Torah and Chazal is really a type of owl, rather than a bat.
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7. Zimbabwe's male MPs are to be circumcised.
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8. The calm between the storms.
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9. At Dreaming of Moshiach, Connect the Dots. At Shirat Devorah, reading between the lines (a guest post); and whether the self-destruction of comet Elenin was seen in the Torah Codes.
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10. Here on parshablog, whether Nir Ben Artzi predicted Irene.

Ki Teitzei sources -- 2011 edition

by aliyah

rishon (Devarim 21:10)

sheni (21:22)

shlishi (22:8)

revii (23:8)

chamishi (23:25)

shishi (24:5)

shvii (24:14)

maftir (25:17)

haftara (Yeshaya 54; here with meforshim, on parshat Noach)

by perek

perek 22 ; perek 23 ; perek 24 ; perek 25

meforshim

Rashi, in English and Hebrew

Chizkuni

Shadal (here and here)
Mishtadel

Daat -- with Rashi, Ramban, Seforno, Ibn Ezra, Rashbam, Rabbenu Bachya, Midrash Rabba, Tanchuma+, Gilyonot

Gilyonot Nechama Leibovitz (Hebrew)

Tiferes Yehonasan from Rav Yonasan Eibeshitz (nothing on Ki Teitzei)

Toldos Yizchak Acharon, repeated from Rav Yonasan Eibeshutz

Chasdei Yehonasan

Divrei Yehonasan

Even Shleimah -- from Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Ehrenreich

R' Saadia Gaon's Tafsir, Arabic translation of Torah (here and here)

Collected commentary of Saadia Gaon on Torah

Abarbanel

Torah Temimah

Kli Yakar

Zohar, with English translation

Baal Haturim

Baal Haturim (HaAruch)

Ibn Janach

Rabbenu Ephraim

Ibn Caspi
Ibn Caspi - Tiras Kesef on Devarim

Ralbag

Dubno Maggid

Nesivos Hashalom

Imrei Shafer, Rav Shlomo Kluger

Ateret Zekeinim

Mei Noach

Arugat HaBosem

Malbim

Yalkut Perushim LaTorah

R' Yosef Bechor Shor

Meiri

Ibn Gabirol

Rabbenu Yonah

Rashbam -- and here

Seforno

Aderet Eliyahu (Gra)

Kol Eliyahu (Gra)

Mipninei Harambam -- nothing on sefer Devarim

Sefer Zikaron of Ritva -- not until veZot haBeracha

Chiddushei HaGriz

Noam Elimelech

Michlal Yofi

Tzror Hamor

R' Eleazer miGermayza -- not until veZot haBeracha

Tanach with He'emek Davar -- Netziv

Nachalas Yaakov -- R' Yaakov ben Yaakov Moshe of Lissa

Divrei Emes -- Chozeh mi-Lublin

Ramchal

Or Hameir, R' Zev Wolf of Zhitomir

Alshich

Chida

Akedat Yitzchak

Melo HaOmer

Baalei Bris Avraham

Rav Chaim Vital
Rav Yosef Karo
Chasam Sofer
Chasam Sofer al HaTorah
Tziyuni
Rikanti
Daat Soferim
Divrei Yaakov
Rabbi Yehoshua Ibn Shoiv, a student of the Rashba
Maharsham -- Techeilet Mordechai
Mat'amei Yitzchak
Hamidrash veHamaaseh

posts so far for parshat Shofetim

Print-friendly posts for Shoftim available here.

2011

1. Shofetim sources -- links to an online Mikraos Gedolos by perek and aliyah, as well as a slew of meforshim on the parsha and haftara. Now, further expanded. For instance, many more meforshei Rashi.
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2. How is the failed negative prophecy exclusion encoded in Shofetim? part i -- Rav Chaim Kanievsky addresses it, with a remez based on beShem Hashem. And I analyze some of the pesukim in parashat Shofetim and sefer Yirmeyah myself.
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3. And part ii -- The same issue as before. How shall we resolve the exclusion of negative prophecy from a prophet test, with the absence of such an exclusion in the plain meaning of the pasuk? This bothers Rabbi Yosef Ibn Caspi, as a pashtan, and so he puts forth a different elaborate theory from that of the Rambam. Namely, there is no distinction between a positive or negative prophecy. Rather, the distinction is whether there is an explicit condition attached or not.
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4. YUTorah on parashat Shoftim.
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5. Was Ibn Ezra killed by demons? So goes the story, showing how Ibn Ezra got his comeuppance, after claiming that demons did not exist. Though whether he actually claimed this is uncertain. I don't really believe the story, though.
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6. The trail of worms -- Is the pasuk about abolishing the shedding of blood really relevant by the eglah arufah, where we don't know the identity of the murderer? Yes. It depends on what you think it means. But even if you believe it refers to catching the murderer, there is a good reading according to Rashi and according to Rav Chaim Kanievsky.
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2010

1. More on Ibn Ezra and sheidim -- Considering an Ibn Ezra that might, once again, indicate disbelief in sheidim.
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2. "Or any of the host of the heavens, which I have not commanded": What is bothering Rashi? What did Hashem not command? Rav Moshe Feinstein on how to interpret a Rashi (or a pasuk according to Rashi). And how Rashi might interpret that Rashi.

2009

1. A fun story of bribery in Sefarad -- from the Meiri, and how it ties in to tzedek tzedek tirdof.
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2. Are all matzeivot forbidden, or just idolatrous ones? The dispute between Rashi and Ibn Ezra works out to one in dikduk, and how to understand asher.
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3. Why send back the betrothed man, if all is preordained? How different meforshim look at this issue of fate and fatality, and how Divine Providence works on the battlefield.
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4. What is the point of the Eglah Arufah? According to Rambam, to prompt an investigation. Ramban's objection to this, Abarbanel's defense, and finally, Shadal's take on all this.

2008
In The Role of the Shoter and the Shofet, I explain Shadal's position that the shoteir is not an enforcement officer of bet din, with a rod to strike people.

In "How does לִשְׁבָטֶיךָ bind?" Shadal states that he (and Rashi) deviate from trup, and thus that it means a shofet and shoter from the tribe.

In Capital Punishment Based On Two Or Three Witnesses, and the False vs. Failed Witness, I address what three witnesses adds over two, and what the pasuk is trying to tell us here. Furthermore, how this interacts with the single eid zomem, rather than eidim zomemim.

If you want to learn through the parsha in Mikraot Gedolot, I broke apart an online one for Shoftim by perek and by aliyah in Shofetim Sources.

2004

In Double Jeopardy, I discuss how the Sifrei derives from צֶדֶק צֶדֶק, תִּרְדֹּף--לְמַעַן תִּחְיֶה that a court should retry a case after a guilty verdict if subsequently evidence is found that clears the accused, but should not retry a case once the person has been found innocent if subsequently evidence is found that would convict him. I propose two derashot: either צֶדֶק means innocent - zakkai, and so multiple times we should run after finding his innocent; or צֶדֶק means justice, but we should run after it multiple times only לְמַעַן תִּחְיֶה, if we will save the accused life.

2003

In "Was The Lubavitcher Rebbe a Navi Sheker?", I explain why if the Rebbe was actually stating as prophecy that he was mashiach or that mashiach would come in his generation, as some in Chabad claim, then he would be a navi sheker. I don't think that the Rebbe was a navi sheker.

On the other hand, here is evidence that the Rebbe did consider himself a navi.

Related, from 2004: The Rambam on how one establishes a navi sheker, in Hebrew and in my translation.

Yiftach Bedoro keShmuel Bedoro -- A joke I heard in Rav Schachter's shiur.

Turning to the Right / Left - I analyze this famous derasha in the Sifrei, and then examine Rashi, Siftei Chachamim, and Ramban, to see how they understand it. Then, in A Conflicting View of יָמִין וּשְׂמֹאל, I consider the aternate version of this statement which is cited in Yerushalmi Horayot, which states that one should only follow them if they say that right is right and left is left, but not vice versa. I should really go back now and analyze all these sources again. I think I would have a very different take now.

to be continued...

The trail of worms

Summary: Is the pasuk about abolishing the shedding of blood really relevant by the eglah arufah, where we don't know the identity of the murderer? Yes. It depends on what you think it means. But even if you believe it refers to catching the murderer, there is a good reading according to Rashi and according to Rav Chaim Kanievsky.

Post: At the end of parashat Shofetim, in Devarim 21, we read of Eglah Arufa:

6. And all the elders of that city, who are the nearest to the corpse, shall wash their hands over the calf that was decapitated in the valley;		ו. וְכֹל זִקְנֵי הָעִיר הַהִוא הַקְּרֹבִים אֶל הֶחָלָל יִרְחֲצוּ אֶת יְדֵיהֶם עַל הָעֶגְלָה הָעֲרוּפָה בַנָּחַל:
7. And they shall announce and say, "Our hands did not shed this blood, nor did our eyes see [this crime]."		ז. וְעָנוּ וְאָמְרוּ יָדֵינוּ לֹא [שפכה] שָׁפְכוּ אֶת הַדָּם הַזֶּה וְעֵינֵינוּ לֹא רָאוּ:
8. "Atone for Your people Israel, whom You have redeemed, O Lord, and lay not [the guilt of] innocent blood among your people Israel." And [so] the blood shall be atoned for them.		ח. כַּפֵּר לְעַמְּךָ יִשְׂרָאֵל אֲשֶׁר פָּדִיתָ ה וְאַל תִּתֵּן דָּם נָקִי בְּקֶרֶב עַמְּךָ יִשְׂרָאֵל וְנִכַּפֵּר לָהֶם הַדָּם:
9. And you shall abolish the [shedding of] innocent blood from among you, for you shall do what is proper in the eyes of the Lord.		ט. וְאַתָּה תְּבַעֵר הַדָּם הַנָּקִי מִקִּרְבֶּךָ כִּי תַעֲשֶׂה הַיָּשָׁר בְּעֵינֵי ה:

In terms of this last pasuk, how are we to understand 'and you shall abolish the innocent blood from among you', וְאַתָּה תְּבַעֵר הַדָּם הַנָּקִי מִקִּרְבֶּךָ? On a peshat level, I would say it is extremely straightforward. We should understand the pasuk based on the previous pasuk. There is blood-guilt upon the people, because of the shedding of the blood of the innocent murder victim. And, by performing this ceremony -- which has ritual aspects but perhaps also conceptual, psychological aspects -- we have done what is proper in the eyes of Hashem,  הַיָּשָׁר בְּעֵינֵי ה. We have done what is required of us by Hashem and so, this ceremony has expunged the blood-guilt, הַדָּם הַנָּקִי.

So too Ibn Ezra:

[כא, ט]
ואתה תבער הדם הנקי -פירושו: עונש הדם הנקי, או יהיה הדם - דם הנקי.

ויש אומרים:
אתה חייב לבער שפיכות דמים.
והנכון בעיני: הוא אשר הזכרתי, כי לא ישפך דם נקי בארצך אם תעשה הישר בעיני ה', כסוד שכר עבירה עבירה ושכר מצוה מצוה.

My translation: "Its explanation: the punishment for the innocent blood, or the blood -- is the blood of the innocent. And some say: you are required to abolish the shedding of blood. And what is correct in my eyes is that which I have mentioned, that innocent blood will not be shed in your land, if you do what is correct in the eyes of Hashem, as in the sod that the reward of a sin is a sin, and the reward of a mitzvah is a mitzvah."

Rashi gives a different explanation, but I would label this midrash he cites as derash rather than peshat. I am not sure if Rashi himself regards it as peshat, derash, or something in between. Rashi writes:

		ואתה תבער: מגיד שאם נמצא ההורג אחר שנתערפה העגלה הרי זה יהרג, והוא הישר בעיני ה':

My translation: "And you shall abolish: This teaches that if the murderer is found after the calf is decapitated, he is killed. And this is 'what is proper in the eyes of Hashem'."

This, then, is a separate action than what is described in the previous pesukim, and a slightly different scenario as well. What could prompt this? Well, ואתה תבער seems like it is introducing new action. Also, back in perek 19, we encountered this phrase as well. Thus,

13. And you shall not pity him, but you shall abolish [the shedding of] the blood of the innocent from Israel, and it will be good for you.

יג. לֹא תָחוֹס עֵינְךָ עָלָיו וּבִעַרְתָּ דַם הַנָּקִי מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל וְטוֹב לָךְ:

One can read this as the death penalty imposed upon the murderer abolishing the shedding of blood, since it acts as a deterrent. Or one can read it as an expiation of blood-guilt of the community. Or one can read this as removing the one tinged with blood-guilt from the community of Israel. Regardless, we see this phrase used in the context of executing a deliberate murderer, and so it makes sense to transfer that meaning to perek 21 as well.

Even if this is midrasho-peshat, it still seems to the casual peshat reader as coming out of nowhere. No explicit mention is made in the pasuk of finding the murderer afterwards.

Rav Chaim Kanievsky, in Taama de-Kra, offers another explanation of this pasuk:

"And you shall abolish the innocent blood from your midst: It seems like the place of this verse is not here, for here it is not known who the murderer is. And in the gemara they darshen that 'from here, if the murderer is found after the calf is decapitated, he is killed'. And it still requires clarification, namely that which it ends 'when/for you do what is proper in the eyes of Hashem'.


And there is to say further, based on what the Shalah wrote in the name of Rabbenu Menachem (and similar to this is in Targum Yonasan and in the Rishonim) that if Israel in that generation are are righteous, then worms go out from the calf and travel to the house of the murderer, and Bet Din takes him and judges him. (And see in Paneach Raza, who writes a hint to this, that  וְאַתָּה תְּבַעֵר הַדָּם הַנָּקִי, taking the end letters {and permuting them} yields rima, worminess.) And this is what is stated, 'and you will merit to abolish the innocent blood via the calf, when you do what is proper in the eyes of Hashem', which is when the generation is righteous."

As we have already discussed, the phrase וְאַתָּה תְּבַעֵר הַדָּם הַנָּקִי מִקִּרְבֶּךָ does have a plausible explanation in its place, without appealing to the gemara. But if one rejects that explanation, then indeed it is out of place and can prompt this other explanation about catching and executing the murderer. Rav Kanievsky's concern seems to be how to explain the close of the pasuk of כִּי תַעֲשֶׂה הַיָּשָׁר בְּעֵינֵי ה, given the gemara's interpretation of the first part. We should point out that Rashi himself addressed this concern by saying והוא הישר בעיני ה, that the execution of the murderer is the yashar in the eyes of Hashem. Ki is taken, then, as "for". In Rav Kanievsky's alternate explanation, I think that ki is being taken as ka'asher, "when". When you do the yashar in the eyes of Hashem, then you are a righteous generation, and this supernatural occurrence will happen, to allow you do catch the murderer.

I wonder if one can really take a supernatural indicator to execute the murderer, absent other evidence. In the case of Achan, even though the Urim veTumim indicated his guilt, Yehoshua still beseeched that he confessed. What is supposed to happen is Bet Din judges him. And a worm trail is no better than circumstantial evidence. I suppose they can execute him extra-judicially, as they do in other instances where it is certain. Still, this seems a bit strange.

Where can we find this in targum Pseudo-Yonasan? It is actually on the close of pasuk 8, rather than 9:

[8] And the priests shall say: Let there be expiation for thy people Israel, whom Thou, O Lord, hast redeemed, and lay not the guilt of innocent blood upon Thy people Israel; but let him who hath done the murder be revealed. And they shall be expiated concerning the blood; but straightway there will come forth a swarm of worms from the excrement of the heifer, and spread abroad, and move to. the place where the murderer is, and crawl over him: and the magistrates shall take him, and judge him. [9] So shall you, O house of Israel, put away from among you whosoever sheddeth innocent blood, that you may do what is right before the Lord.

In this manner, it is the context and background for the 'putting away' mentioned in pasuk 9.

There is an interesting parallel between this miraculous resolution to the rationalist explanation offered by the Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim. See my discussion of that Rambam in this parshablog post. The Rambam offered a naturalistic explanation, that the 'weird' ceremony would attract attention to the murder and get people talking, and in that manner, perhaps the murderer would be exposed. And according to the worm explanation as well, the purpose of the ceremony -- or at least one purpose -- was to expose the murderer.

Was Ibn Ezra killed by demons?

Summary: So goes the story, showing how Ibn Ezra got his comeuppance, after claiming that demons did not exist. Though whether he actually claimed this is uncertain. I don't really believe the story, though.

Post:

As discussed in a previous post on Shofetim, there is a good probability that Ibn Ezra dismissed the existence of sheidim, demons. This based on his use of the word האומרים, such that it is only their claim that they consult demons. And earlier, in a post about a pasuk in Acharei Mot, because Ibn Ezra describes them as thinking demons have power (rather than it being something that is true) and because those who see them are crazy people. Note that there is a possibly good counter-argument in terms of Ibn Ezra's belief. It is often difficult to determine Ibn Ezra's beliefs.

Rabbi Moshe Taku, though, thought that Ibn Ezra clearly asserted that demons do not exist. But he asserts something else as well. To cite from Jewish Magic and Superstition, by Joshua Trachtenberg,

If we are to believe Moses of Tachau,3 Ibn Ezra paid dearly for
p. 27
his hardihood in denying the existence of demons. "Ibn Ezra wrote in his book," he says, "'Of a surety there are no demons in the world!' .Verily he erred in this matter, for they were ever at his side . . . and indeed they proved their existence to at him. I have heard from the people of Iglant [England?], where he died, that once when he was travelling through a forest he came upon a large band of black dogs who glared at him balefully; undoubtedly these were demons. When he had finally passed through their midst he fell seriously ill, and eventually he died of that illness." This incident was apparently evidence enough for R. Moses, though we may question whether, if it occurred, it sufficed to convince the doughty Ibn Ezra.

So too in the book Prophetic inspiration after the prophets:

As well as in the JQR, volume 6.

The different citations give different flavors. Did he deny their existence? Did he willfully make use of them? Was it accidental.

It is just so difficult for rationalists! After their death, when they can no longer defend themselves, people can deliberately or accidentally make up personal stories that prove the opposite of their positions. If Ibn Ezra knowingly consulted with demons, he makes no mention of this in his commentary which denies their existence. And I suppose that if he was killed after an encounter with hell-hounds, he would not have lived long enough to print a retraction of his views.

For me, this has the flavor of an urban legend, or else a story with some basis but embellished to prove a point. And it is specifically the non-rationalists who would take that story and accept it, uncritically, as truth.