Interesting Posts and Articles #121

1. The YU Commentator has an article by Dr. Bernstein on Kugel speaking on campus. (ht: Hirhurim)
   
   
2. Highway robbery.
   
   
3. Kankan Chadash presents the continuation of the argument on Lookjed about teaching Rambam's position and teaching that Hashem is gratified by our mitzvos.
   
   
4. Frum Satire wonders why the rabbis hate Lipa so much. Though it is not all rabbis.
   
   
5. Rabbi Slifkin, on his blog Zoo Torah, posts about the New York Times on Nishtaneh Hateva. And how animals are growing to smaller sizes and giving birth at earlier ages, which is precisely how Tosafot on Avodah Zarah 24b applies it.
   
   
   

Posts so far for parshat Mishpatim

2009

1. Mishpatim sources, with links to an online Mikraos Gedolos, and many meforshim on the parsha and haftarah. Great for preparing the parsha.
   
   
2. Now these are the laws ... Is there room and legitimacy for a peshat commentary? This as a preface to Mishpatim, and so is part of the running commentary.
   
   
3. When you purchase a Hebrew slave... Does leOlam mean until Yovel? Who is being spoken of here? How the theme is the balancing of the financial interests of the master and the human, personal interests of the servant. Also part of the running commentary.
   
   
4. Permission for a doctor to heal, based on Rabbenu Bachya -- is the permission only for external wounds? is psychological treatment being excluded here? Plus, some troubling approaches to the legitimacy of psychology.
   
   
5. The Satan dancing between the ox's horns, also based on a Rabbenu Bachya. What is the meaning of the statement in the gemara? And is that the same as Rabbenu Bachya's interpretation?

2008

1. Was the "Malach" Metatron or Moshe? A machlokes. And who exactly is this "Metatron?"
   
   
2. Do not oppress the widow and the orphan -- the message in the threat being one of empathy.
   
   
3. Marriage as penalty -- for a man who seduces a virgin. And how Shadal explains it as a matter of social standing.
   
   
4. In Shadal's vikuach, a pasuk at the end of mishpatim with ambiguous parsing is used as a basis for showing that they did not have trup.
   

2007

• Leaning on his staff, as we lean on Chazal
• and the interpretation of this legal point by pashtanim, as it might clash with established halacha.
• Acharei Rabbim LeHatos
• and how Rashi gives a peshat against the traditional, and halachic reading, but in line with the trup on the verse.

2005

1. Twice Betrayed: A Case Study in Multivalence - part 1
• by her husband, by her father. how Rashi presents them as simultaneously correct.
  
2. Implementing Biblical Law in Florida
• an attempt at implementing ba bamachteret, such that homeowners can use lethal force on home intruders.
  

2004

1. HaAm = Ziknei HaAm as synecdoche
• in which the whole refers to the part. In Mishpatim, Moshe ascends with Aharon, Nadav and Avihu and the elders, and it subsequently refers to them as the Am. So too in Yitro, Moshe asks the elders a question and the Am responds.
  
2. Ayin Tachat Ayin as metaphor
• In which I argue that saying that it means monetary payment is actually peshat, because it actually is a metaphor in which the punishment fits the degree of the crime.
  
3. From parshat Behar-Bechukotai, a discussion of serving LeOlam/until Yovel for the perpetual servant mentioned in the beginning of Mishpatim.
• and how two apparently opposing verses actually show different facets of the same law.
  
4. from parshat Ki Teitzei, Eshet Yefat To`ar As Progressive Feminist Legislation, where in the course of discussion, I compare it to Amah Ivriya, the Hebrew maidservant, mentioned in the beginning of Mishpatim.
• how it represents a reform of existing practice, and implements protections for the captive woman.
  

to be continued...

The Satan dancing between its horns in the month of Nisan

An anonymous commenter posed a bunch of interesting questions based on Rabbenu Bachya on Mishpatim. While I won't get to most of them, I covered the first one in a previous post. Another one:

2) Then in כא, כז by "סקל יסקל השור" he says I believe it’s a Chazal in Nissan the Satan dances on the bull's horns what does that mean?

Here is the relevant Rabbenu Bachya.

What is means is subject to dispute. Rabbenu Bachya is very much a kabbalist, and he would read all sorts of kabbalistic interpretations into that gemara in Pesachim 112b. Though some statements are decidedly mystical, I would say that this gemara is not one of them, but rather was metaphorical, describing a specific zoological phenomenon that exists, or which they believed existed. Namely, that the ox is more worked up, because of the heat, or because it is breeding season. Perhaps more on that later.

To consider the psukim, the pasuk says סקול יסקל השור. Is this punishment for the owner or for the cow? There are two ways of looking at it. One is what Rabbenu Bachya labels as peshat, as does Ramban, that it is a monetary penalty for the ox's owner. It makes sense when we consider it in context, but perhaps that later, if I get to it in my running commentary. On the other hand, we should not forget Bereshit 9, in parshat Noach:

ה וְאַךְ אֶת-דִּמְכֶם לְנַפְשֹׁתֵיכֶם אֶדְרֹשׁ, מִיַּד כָּל-חַיָּה אֶדְרְשֶׁנּוּ; וּמִיַּד הָאָדָם, מִיַּד אִישׁ אָחִיו--אֶדְרֹשׁ, אֶת-נֶפֶשׁ הָאָדָם.

5 And surely your blood of your lives will I require; at the hand of every beast will I require it; and at the hand of man, even at the hand of every man's brother, will I require the life of man.

where there is an idea of penalty for the beasts for killing man. And so this could also be a peshat interpretation, even though Rabbenu Bachya does not mention it.

Rabbenu Bachya's other explanation is kabbalistically oriented, that somehow it is connected to the original serpent, etc., etc. I am out of my element, here. But he clearly is reading mystical significance into various gemaras. Thus, it is connected with pestilence based on how the brayta, within the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, links the establishing of pestilence with the establishing of a shor muad.

From a non-kabbalistic perspective, I would explain the linking of the two on the basis of the surface level of the two dinim. And by shor, it is because of a diyuk in the pasuk which states מִתְּמוֹל שִׁלְשֹׁם, where one is taken to mean yesterday, and the other to mean two days ago, such that it needs to be on separate days. And also something about the establishing of a chazaka, that a single intensive episode is not enough to make it a plague or a repetitively goring ox. There needs to be an aspect of consistency to the repetition. And this underlying principle influences both halachot, and so it makes sense to group them together.

What about the gemara about the Satan dancing between the horns. As far as I can understand, Rabbenu Bachya understands this literally. Note his comment at the very end about how the Satan was visible in the Talmudic times, such that they needed to request mercy that he be hidden from them. Putting that statement in that context strongly suggests to me that he understands that gemara literally, and thus that it reinforces his kabbalistic point that a shor specifically is connected to the original serpent, etc.

From a peshat perspective, I would most certainly take this gemara non-literally. And not because of any reluctance to understand things mystically, but because certain aspects of that gemara, in context, strongly suggest this to me.

In Pesachim 112b:

ואל תבריח עצמך מן המכס דילמא משכחו לך ושקלי מנך כל דאית לך
ואל תעמוד בפני השור בשעה שעולה מן האגם מפני שהשטן מרקד בין קרניו
אמר רבי שמואל בשור שחור וביומי ניסן
תני רב אושעיא מרחיקין משור תם חמשים אמה משור מועד כמלא עיניו

How do the classic commentators understand this? Rashi says on וביומי ניסן that it is שהצמחים עולין וגס לבו בהם ונגח. Rashbam on the daf says on שהשטן מרקד בין קרניו that this is lav davka, but rather that it is meshuga, as is later explained. And then on וביומי ניסן he explains the same thing Rashi explains.

Also, note the juxtaposition to Rabbi Oshaya about distancing oneself from various oxen, presumably because of fear of getting gored, as we see from the distinction made between tam and muad. And note the clarification of the statement that it is a specific type of ox (black) and at a specific time of year. I am sure kabbalists could find some mystical connection, perhaps with the zodiac (though Nisan is a kid), but on a peshat level it seems clear they are discussing a natural phenomenon, and the concern is of getting gored, not that the Satan will hurt you, or that the Satan will spark the shor to hurt you. {See the Arizal's explanation of it.}

I would add that Chazal elsewhere talk about dangers of specific types of animals -- e.g. a male horse into battle, or the bite of a white donkey, which IIRC one should not have in one's house. So if a black ox is meaner, Rabbi Shmuel's clarification would make sense. What about Nisan? Well, that is spring, which is mating season. See here:

Since pastures are usually at their peak of quality in spring and summer, a natural concentration of calving may occur in late winter and spring.

That is, the natural mating season is when the pastures are at their peak, including in spring. And if there are these tzemachim coming up, as is reality, and as Rashi and Rashbam write, then is is not just that גס לבו בהם, but perhaps one does not want to disturb an ox during mating season, because he may take a challenge the wrong way and charge.

The idea of the Satan dancing on its horns -- literally, that would have to be a mighty small Satan. Rather, as Rashbam says, it means that it is making him crazy, with perhaps dancing on his horns implying that he is itchy to gore someone with them. Such seems to me to be clearly peshat in these gemaras. But as for kabbalistic interpretations -- either they are supporting themselves with consistent misinterpretations and misreadings of gemaras, as Shadal says, or else they have some sort of deeper insight into the meaning just below the surface, and recognize hints and make connections others cannot because they are privy to the connecting information.

Mishpatim: Permission for a doctor to heal

An anonymous commenter ("Anonymous") points out some interesting Rabbenu Bachyas this week. He writes:

Just a few Points of interest and questions from the Rabbenu Bachya for you.
1) First in כא, יט in his discussion on doctors he says only healing external wounds. Is that literal or does it mean Physical versus Psychological?

Literal. And this is clear from the parallel Ibn Ezra. But a fascinating Rabbenu Bachya and Ibn Ezra, so let us explore it.

The pasuk states:

יט אִם-יָקוּם וְהִתְהַלֵּךְ בַּחוּץ, עַל-מִשְׁעַנְתּוֹ--וְנִקָּה הַמַּכֶּה: רַק שִׁבְתּוֹ יִתֵּן, וְרַפֹּא יְרַפֵּא. {ס}

19 if he rise again, and walk abroad upon his staff, then shall he that smote him be quit; only he shall pay for the loss of his time, and shall cause him to be thoroughly healed. {S}

Rabbenu Bachya writes upon this:

'ורפא ירפא' - כל רפואה בבשר ודם לא מצאנוהו בכל הכתובים כי אם בדגש וכו', אבל בהקב"ה מצינו ברפה וכו', והטעם בזה כי הרפואה בבשר ודם אינה אלא על ידי צער וטורח והוא שיסבול הסם או המשקה המר, אבל רפואה של הקב"ה בנחת אין שם צער כלל כי ברכת ה' היא תעשיר ולא יוסיף עצב עמה. ומה שאמרו חז"ל 'ורפא ירפא' מכאן שנתנה רשות לרופא לרפאות לא אמרו אלא במכה שבחוץ שהכתוב מדבר בה, אבל חולי מבפנים אין זה תלוי ביד הרופא אלא ביד הרופא כל בשר אשר בידו נפש כל חי.

To explain this, and expand upon it. He first points out that when people heal, there is always a dagesh (chazak) in the word רפא. For example, the above pasuk. Or also in Yirmeyahu 51:

ט רִפִּאנוּ אֶת-בָּבֶל, וְלֹא נִרְפָּתָה--עִזְבוּהָ, וְנֵלֵךְ אִישׁ לְאַרְצוֹ: כִּי-נָגַע אֶל-הַשָּׁמַיִם מִשְׁפָּטָהּ, וְנִשָּׂא עַד-שְׁחָקִים.

9 We would have healed Babylon, but she is not healed; forsake her, and let us go every one into his own country; for her judgment reacheth unto heaven, and is lifted up even to the skies.

But when Hashem heals, the peh won't have a dagesh in it. This is because when people heal, there is an element of tzaar, but Hashem heals without this. Thus, for example:

יד רְפָאֵנִי יְהוָה וְאֵרָפֵא, הוֹשִׁיעֵנִי וְאִוָּשֵׁעָה: כִּי תְהִלָּתִי, אָתָּה.

14 Heal me, O LORD, and I shall be healed; save me, and I shall be saved; for Thou art my praise.

Now, people object to this Rabbenu Bachya with examples of Hashem healing and there being a dagesh. For example, by Avimelech, in Bereshit 20:17:

יז וַיִּתְפַּלֵּל אַבְרָהָם, אֶל-הָאֱלֹהִים; וַיִּרְפָּא אֱלֹהִים אֶת-אֲבִימֶלֶךְ וְאֶת-אִשְׁתּוֹ, וְאַמְהֹתָיו--וַיֵּלֵדוּ.

17 And Abraham prayed unto God; and God healed Abimelech, and his wife, and his maid-servants; and they bore children.

One answer is that this is a dagesh kal, after the shva nach, and so this is not what Rabbenu Bachya means. However, here is a counter-example, with a dagesh chazak. In II Melachim 2:21:

כא וַיֵּצֵא אֶל-מוֹצָא הַמַּיִם, וַיַּשְׁלֶךְ-שָׁם מֶלַח; וַיֹּאמֶר כֹּה-אָמַר יְהוָה, רִפִּאתִי לַמַּיִם הָאֵלֶּה--לֹא-יִהְיֶה מִשָּׁם עוֹד, מָוֶת וּמְשַׁכָּלֶת.

21 And he went forth unto the spring of the waters, and cast salt therein, and said: 'Thus saith the LORD: I have healed these waters; there shall not be from thence any more death or miscarrying.'

where even though it was via an agent, it was the miracle of Hashem, and yet there is a dagesh chazak in the peh. Yes, you can say that this is waters rather than humans, but still, how is it going to be harsher (read on for what I mean) for the water? I did not have the time to look through every example with a concordance, so perhaps this is true in general, except for this particular case. It would be worthwhile to accumulate such a list.

My impression was that Rabbenu Bachya did not necessarily mean that it could never have a dagesh when Hashem is involved. Rather, that specifically by basar vadam, it will always be with the dagesh.

How does Rabbenu Bachya divine the meaning of this dagesh? I would suggest that his midrashic motivation is:

1. In general, with the dagesh it is with a more intensive form. Compare שבר with and without a dagesh chazak -- break vs. shatter.
   
   
2. And even the רפה form (namely, without a dagesh chazak) means relaxed.
   
   
3. Also, the root רפא means to loosen, relax. Indeed, this is true for other languages as well. See disease as dis+ease. Without the dagesh, it more closely resembles רפא as relaxed. Add the dagesh, and perhaps sever that connection somewhat.

Not that I necessarily agree with this distinction. After all, there are some roots in Hebrew for which the intensive form has more or less the same meaning as the non-intensive form -- the intensive form is not really more intense. And sometimes, it is perhaps being used as a causative. And Tanach is a fairly limited corpus. Perhaps if there were more seforim in Tanach, we might have encountered an exception to the rule.

In the pasuk in Mishpatim, see how וְרַפֹּא יְרַפֵּא is translated by JPS: and shall cause him to be thoroughly healed. The duplication is what sparked the word "thoroughly," but the context plus the dagesh sparked the "cause him to be," rather that "and shall heal him."

Now, about this:

מה שאמרו חז"ל 'ורפא ירפא' מכאן שנתנה רשות לרופא לרפאות לא אמרו אלא במכה שבחוץ שהכתוב מדבר בה, אבל חולי מבפנים אין זה תלוי ביד הרופא אלא ביד הרופא כל בשר אשר בידו נפש כל חי

Thus, Chazal in Bava Kamma give permission to heal, or rather say that Hashem has given permission to heal. But Rabbenu Bachya restricts this to external rather than internal maladies. He is not assuring psychologists.

How do I know? Compare with Ibn Ezra, who says the same thing:

ורפא ירפא -
לאות שנתן רשות לרופאים לרפא המכות והפצעים שיראו בחוץ, רק כל חלי שהוא בפנים בגוף ביד השם לרפאתו.
וכן כתוב: כי הוא יכאיב ויחבש.
וכתוב באסא: וגם בחליו לא דרש את ה' כי אם ברופאים.
והנה הכתוב הפריש, כי לא אמר ורָפוֹא יִרְפָּא מן הבנין הקל. רק ורַפֹּא יְרַפֵא שהוא מהבנין הכבד.
ועוד אפרש זה היטב בפרשה הזאת.
וחכמינו קבלו דברים אחרים עם אלה שניהם. כאשר קבלו בשמים עם קטורת סמים. ואינם כתובים.

His examples are {Yirmiyahu 5:18}:

יח כִּי הוּא יַכְאִיב וְיֶחְבָּשׁ; יִמְחַץ, וְיָדָו תִּרְפֶּינָה.

18 For He maketh sore, and bindeth up; He woundeth, and His hands make whole.

But I would say based on context that this is not meant literally: הִנֵּה אַשְׁרֵי אֱנוֹשׁ, יוֹכִחֶנּוּ אֱלוֹהַּ; וּמוּסַר שַׁדַּי, אַל-תִּמְאָס. This could well refer to troubles in general, and the healing is metaphorical.

King Asa it indeed criticized for consulting with doctors and not turning towards Hashem. In II Divrei Hayamim 16:2:

יב וַיֶּחֱלֶא אָסָא בִּשְׁנַת שְׁלוֹשִׁים וָתֵשַׁע לְמַלְכוּתוֹ בְּרַגְלָיו, עַד-לְמַעְלָה חָלְיוֹ; וְגַם-בְּחָלְיוֹ לֹא-דָרַשׁ אֶת-יְהוָה, כִּי בָּרֹפְאִים.

12 And in the thirty and ninth year of his reign Asa was diseased in his feet; his disease was exceeding great; yet in his disease he sought not to the LORD, but to the physicians.

How this is internal, I don't know. But perhaps we are speaking of disease as opposed to injury. So we are not discussing psychological ailments here.

How to deal with this pasuk in Neviim, and this world-view, may indeed be troubling. Though one might give a teretz that he only saw them as his hope, instead of also turning to Hashem.

One way to resolve these two contrasting ideas is to say that the one permitted is for external injuries, while the one forbidden is for internal injuries and sickness. Indeed, the pasuk in Mishpatim is where one person smote the other, such that there was an external injury. So this might have been the motivation for making this particular distinction.

(A digression: giving reshut for the physician to heal I would consider to be pashut peshat. Hashem would not instruct one to heal another, or pay for him to be healed (note the causative form) is healing another person is forbidden.)

As is mentioned in the critical edition of Rabbenu Bachya from Mossad Harav Kook, the sefer Mateh Moshe takes this to task, pointing out cases in the gemara of Tannaim and Amoraim healing. Thus, in Bava Metzia 85b:

Samuel Yarhina'ah 20{=the Babylonian Amora Shmuel} was Rabbi's physician. Now, Rabbi having contracted an eye disease, Samuel offered to bathe it with a lotion, but he said, 'I cannot bear it.' 'Then I will apply an ointment to it,' he said. 'This too I cannot bear,' he objected. So he placed a phial of chemicals under his pillow, and he was healed.21 Rabbi was most anxious22 to ordain him, but the opportunity was lacking.

This {eye disease} would seem to be considered an internal disease, and yet the Tanna went to a physician, which should be prohibited as to Assa, if were indeed a problem, and the Amora actually healed him. And the Talmud actually records many remedies to internal diseases. Even if they are nonsense, and not to be trusted, as per Rambam, they still intended them to be used. So, as Mateh Moshe says, chas veshalom to say this and malign our great rabbis!

It is a good question, and I wonder at this -- whether they intended it as halacha, or simply to solve some internal Biblical contradiction. I would guess more about Rabbenu Bachya that he intended it as halacha. But then, they are offering it as a clarification of this statement of Chazal, so perhaps it is clarification rather than contradiction. How would they resolve it with these other gemaras? I don't know. And I suspect it is not lehalacha.

While on the topic, since the suggestion was raised that this prohibits psychology, I will note a troubling guest-post on the Daas Torah blog. An excerpt:

There are two parts to your question, one is halakhic and the other is haskafic. However, the hashkafa has to be settled before we move on to the halacha.

For instance you want a guilty party to have to make some kind of reparations for mental health care. You are assuming that mental health care is a valid form of healing and that it is in line with Torah values. Take for instance this:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QS2G4_CeMCY

I post that because I know the Rosh Yeshiva he learned that from.

Then there is the perspective of others such as R' Mordechai Goldstein Shlit"a, who claims that psychology/psychiatry can diagnose accurate problems but is useless to resolve or heal them. He claims that is the shitta of the Yeshiva where he learned(Chafetz Haim), and has passed that on to each of his students at his own Yeshiva. Furthermore each of his former students that have started their own Yeshivas(at least each of the one's I have spent any time at) hold the same opinion. They have passed this on to their students, some of whom are Dayyanim that will hear cases.

It is troubling that such determinations of metzius, which belong in the realm of those capable of assessing the metzius, are being made on hashkafic bases by people who likely do not know the science and the data. Certainly people have been treated successfully by drugs proscribed by psychiatrists. And psychologists have also been successful. There are ways of measuring this. Half of psak is knowledge of halacha. The other half is an accurate understanding of metzius. And if ideological concerns get in the way, then the result is terribly flawed psak. As the famous saying by George Fuechsel goes, "Garbage in, garbage out."

Here, by the way, is the ignorant video linked to above. I could debunk it if need be -- but don't have the patience. (For starters, Freud is not the same as modern psychology/psychology, which rejects him; and he had oral cancer causing him much pain.) This is scary and sad:

Interesting Posts and Articles #120

1. The Daily Mail on how a Saudi judge sentenced an unmarried, pregnant, gang-rape victim to 100 lashes, and a year in jail, for adultery.
   
   
2. Shadchun with a joke on "Torah dating"
   
   
3. Free Jewish music from Aryeh Kunstler. See the post at Jewish Music blog.
   
   
4. Overlawyered on the CPSIA and its impact on vintage books. There are actually many posts on that blog on that subject.
   
   
5. Anti-semitism in Venezuela.
   

Rabbis interpreting the Gospels

The idea makes me uncomfortable. It is not our religion, and there is a danger of familiarity as we interpret another religion's scriptures. But there were two posts on this subject recently on different blogs, and rather than simply putting it into a blog roundup, I thought it might be nice to deal with them at greater depth.

The first is at Avakesh, where he notes that Rav Yaakov Emden wrote an unpublished commentary on the New Testament. And Rav Yaakov Emden had a teretz for a "stirah" in the Gospels. To quote:

"Many have asked that Paul appears to contradict himself here. In the Acts of the Apostles (Acts 16), it is mentioned that Paul circumcised his disciple Timothy. And they found this very puzzling, for this act seems to contradict the later text which seems to indicate that he considered circumcision a temporary commandment until the Messiahs arrival; but this took place after the time of the Nazarene!"

He answers that they were not really antinomian. After all, they have statements against fornication, one person of sleeping with his father's wife. And Jesus elsewhere says he is not coming to destroy one letter of the Torah. Rather, for gentiles the 7 Noachide commandments, and for Jews the Torah and Mitzvot. And since in Acts 16 it states that Timothy's mother was a believer and his father was Greek, and since Judaism follows the mother, he was Jewish and required berit milah.

The thing is that there are many "setirot" in Gospels, as they were different accounts of people who lived long after the purported events. And different people may have had different aims in the direction of early Christianity.

In terms of the particular resolution, I don't know that I buy it. It is possible, but not necessarily the only explanation. (See this Wikipedia article on Antinomianism.) Opposing fornication, a moral law, is different from e.g. requiring tefillin which are black and perfectly square. They are different kinds of commandments. If so, why circumcision for Timothy? My impression of the plain meaning of the text is that it was for pragmatic purposes. Just as Jews for Jesus pretends to be Jewish in order to convert Jews, Paul circumcised Timothy so that people would consider him one of them and then be receptive to his teachings. Thus, the text is:

¹He came to Derbe and then to Lystra, where a disciple named Timothy lived, whose mother was a Jewess and a believer, but whose father was a Greek. ²The brothers at Lystra and Iconium spoke well of him. ³Paul wanted to take him along on the journey, so he circumcised him because of the Jews who lived in that area, for they all knew that his father was a Greek. ⁴As they traveled from town to town, they delivered the decisions reached by the apostles and elders in Jerusalem for the people to obey. ⁵So the churches were strengthened in the faith and grew daily in numbers.

The text itself tells us exactly why. The Jews in the area would already consider Timmy suspect, since he was not really Jewish. He had that Greek father, and his mother slept with a non-Jewish person to have him, so his family was not so religious, it would seem. If an outsider comes to lecture you, you might reject him. Especially as he does not even have a bris -- he is gentile, like his father! So give Timothy a bris and make the Jews in that area consider him fully Jewish, and they will be receptive. That would be my reading of the text, at least.

The other example of a rabbi interpreting gospels is more recent, and is discussed at Mystical Paths. The exchange with a priest at the Kosel:

I started with my usual explanation that only G-d is everywhere, so we must not worship a limited being. He agreed.

“But your messiah is limited,” I said.

“No. He is everywhere,” he said.

I quoted from his bible. “When they went to the grave where he (yashke) was buried he was not there.”

“That’s right,” he said. “He was glorified.”

“Then he was not there.”

“That’s right. He was not there,” he said.

“Then he isn’t everywhere.”

“No. He is everywhere,” he insisted.

“Wait a minute. You just said that he was not in the grave, that he was taken up. If so, if he really was not in that grave like you say, then he is not everywhere. So don’t worship him.”

“He is everywhere,” he said, as he backed up and walked away.

I confess that in general, in other discussions he has posted, I don't find Rabbi Locks' arguments convincing. And here as well, in terms of the meaning of the words in the gospels, I think that the priest's position has more merit. Not, chas veshalom, that I would think there is merit to Christianity. But in terms of interpreting this Christian text, the priest is closer to the mark. Rabbi Locks is attempting to make a derasha on the words, but besides not being the meaning of the words, who says you can should derashot on New Testament?! And why would you think your derasha would be accepted by a priest, who does not accept the middot sheHaTorah nidreshet bahen?!

Here are some of their texts:
Matthew 28:

Responding to the women, the angel said, "Stop being frightened! I know you're looking for Jesus, who was crucified. He is not here. He has been raised, just as he said. Come and see the place where he was lying.

Luke:

¹On the first day of the week, very early in the morning, the women took the spices they had prepared and went to the tomb. ²They found the stone rolled away from the tomb, ³but when they entered, they did not find the body of the Lord Jesus. ⁴While they were wondering about this, suddenly two men in clothes that gleamed like lightning stood beside them. ⁵In their fright the women bowed down with their faces to the ground, but the men said to them, "Why do you look for the living among the dead? ⁶He is not here; he has risen! Remember how he told you, while he was still with you in Galilee: ⁷'The Son of Man must be delivered into the hands of sinful men, be crucified and on the third day be raised again.' " ⁸Then they remembered his words.

The idea in the text is that the physical body was not in the grave, because it had ascended. The intent might be to resurrection, or to apotheosis, or simply to ascending to heaven. I can make a compelling argument for any of these opinions. It does not mean that therefore there is some location which the spirit is not present. Rabbi Locks was trying to make a diyuk, that because the angel said that he (meaning the physical body) was not in some location, Yushke is not everywhere -- and the priest was having none of it. He was understanding it as being "glorified," such that he was not only there, and bound by some physicality. Perhaps something akin to Eliyahu ascending in the fiery chariot, such that when they looked for him (physically), they could not find him.

I don't really see the point in debating with Christian clergy, not to mention the potential problematic halachic aspects of it. But I think I would end with a more successful discussion between an old Jew and a priest:

An old Jewish man gets on the subway in New York and sees a priest.

He notices the white collar, and decides to ask what it's about.

"Why do you wear your collar backwards?" The old Jewish man asks.

The Priest, being polite, responds

"Well, Sir, because I'm a father."

"I am a father too, but I wear my collar normal."

"Yes," the Priest begins, "but I am father of many"

The old Jewish man shakes his head. "I have 8 children, and so many grandchildren I don't know most their names, and still my collar isn't backwards"

The priest, aggitated, slams his fist in his palm "Sir! I am the father of hundreds!"

The elderly Jewish man, beweildered, stands to get off the subway, and leans over to the priest "Mister, maybe you should start wearing your pants backwards."

Interesting Posts and Articles #119

1. Emes ve-Emunah has two posts on gedolim. One, about handlers manipulating gedolim by presenting the question in a specific way; another, a guest post on "why gedolim fail" -- how people are overloading the gedolim. Though the latter has been around for a while -- Wolfish Musings posted it a year ago.
   
   
2. One Frum Skeptic on how Bounty is not kosher, for straining food through. Not just on Pesach, for kitniyot concerns. Is there any basis for this, or is this a chumra that took off and stretched?
   
   
3. Snopes on the Freedom of Choice Act.
   
   
4. Noyam posts about the introduction of a sex-segregated policy in a Jerusalem store.
   
   
5. At Thanbook, a post on Jewish influences on Beethoven.
   
   
6. Purportedly a Honda commercial: Less fuel, less money for terrorists. My guess is someone made this and then appended the Honda logo at the end.
   
   

A great proof that it was Moshe who bowed to Yisro

In my treatment of this question, I was of the opinion that either Moshe bowed down to and kissed Yisro, or else that there was mutual bowing and kissing. Rashi brings down a Mechilta on that early pasuk in parshat Yisro with proof that it was Moshe, based on a gezera shava of ish-haIsh, here with Ish leRei'eihu, and there with veHaIsh Moshe.

But in this past week's parsha sheet, Torah Lodaas, we have the following great, and entertaining explanation, from the Cheshek Shlomo:

That is, we know from various midrashim that Moshe was 10 cubits tall. For example, in Nedarim 38a. Therefore, it is obvious who bowed and kissed whom. Moshe, who was 10 amos tall, had to bow (bend) down and kiss Yisro, who was of normal height and thus only 3 amos tall.

I am not sure whether the midrash found in the gemara was intended literally. That is one question. Another good question is whether Cheshek Shlomo understood that midrash literally. Another (and this is somewhat primary), whether he intended this answer as entertaining Purim Torah or as a real answer. If he is citing his father, perhaps it was not Purim Torah. Another question, what was Rabbi Matis Blum's intent in bringing down this question and answer. Does he mean this seriously? As filler? Because it is entertaining? I know of at least one person who told this over in all seriousness.

What are some problems with this? One "problem" is that Rashi purportedly does not subscribe to this idea of Moshe being 10 cubits tall (see here). First, I am not convinced by the proofs that Rashi rejects that midrash; and secondly, the point is to prove the Mechilta's understanding of the pasuk, rather than give an explanation Rashi would agree with.

A more serious issue -- Moshe was not actually 10 amos tall, despite the midrash that says so. (See link above, and scroll up a bit, for reasons to doubt this on a peshat level). The whole thing is ridiculous, to extend this midrash with further details to answer this question. (The midrash statig Moshe's height also gives an impossible height for Og.)

And even if Moshe were so tall, that is not the plain meaning of the bowing and kissing. The bowing was not bending over to accomplish the kissing. Indeed, we expect vayishtachu to mean that he prostrated himself on the ground, not that he leaned over. (See Megillah daf 22.) And this bowing was part of the greeting. See how Yaakov greets Esav in Bereishit 33, first with repeated prostrations on the ground and finally with a kiss.

All this is not peshat, and even though Rashi is citing a Mechilta to acheive his aims, Rashi wants to derive peshat, from analysis of textual features, not by stretches / kvetches of midrashim.

Kol HaOmer Davar Beshem Omro, and Tipshim, Hizharu BeDivreichem

I see that the warning to be careful with one's words is not only well applied to chachamim, but to lesser figures such as myself, as well.

On occassion, I like to joke. Sometimes those jokes are overt, and sometimes they are inside jokes. Sometimes, the only one who gets them is me.

Such was the case a while back in a post on the subject of "with great power comes great responsibility," and how one must keep in mind how others will interpret and apply one's words. (Indeed ironic.) I wanted to lead off with a quote from a Spiderman character, Uncle Ben -- "with great power comes great responsibility," because it was a popular quote which captured nicely my message in that post. Jokingly, I attributed what I figured was a well-known quote to a maamar of Ben Chaviva. Now, there is a Rabbi Chaviva, but I don't believe that there is a Ben Chaviva. The idea was that Chaviva is Aramaic for Uncle, and Ben is Ben. But while I probably confused many, if anybody was bothering to read it, I misled at least one person into thinking that this maamar from Ben Chaviva preceded Stan Lee.

Thus:

An aside on the source of "with great power comes great responsibility". I went looking for the source of this quote so I could properly attribute it. In his blog, Rabbi Josh Waxmanattributes it to a maamar (formal statement/discourse by a rabbi) by Rabbi ben Chaviva (details and background including an earlier reference to the Mishnas here.) My Hebrew scholarship is not good enough to find a date. There are a number of other theories as to it's origins, including references to similar statements in the New Testament (Luke and one of the Epistles.) All three of these originate in Judaism in the 3 centuries before or after the birth of Jesus, so Waxman's attribution is probably correct. The many people who attribute the original quote to Stan Lee - well they are probably wrong, even if Mr Lee is extremely talented.

Oops. My apologies to everyone, including the talented Stan Lee.

Related: See this Hirhurim post on kol haomer davar beshem omro.

Halachic Sources on visiting Kivrei Tzadikim and praying there, pt ii

There is what to discuss about this topic, but first I wanted to provide a source dump of many halachic sources on the matter. In the previous post in this series, I presented quite a number of sources on visiting and praying at kivrei tzaddikim, and whether it is a good or bad thing. Next, I might want to provide some rough translations of some of the halachic discussions. Finally, if I get around to it, my own take on it. But before starting any of this, we should have as many source texts as possible. There were two I omitted last time, and so I present them here.

The first is Aruch Hashulchan, YD chelek 3, siman 217, seif 72. It is not online either as a wikisource or at Hebrew Books, as far as I can tell, so I had to scan it in.













Another source is a halacha yomit from Rav Ovadiah Yosef:

הליכה לבית הקברות בערב ראש השנה ובראש השנה

יש נוהגים ללכת בערב ראש השנה לבית הקברות. ואמרו בגמרא במסכת תענית (דף טז.) למה יוצאים לבית הקברות בתענית ציבור? לומר, הרי אנו נחשבים כמו מתים, וכדי שהמתים יבקשו עלינו רחמים. ועוד אמרו רבותינו, מפני מה נסתתר קברו של משה רבינו מעיני בשר ודם? מפני שגלוי וידוע לפני הקדוש ברוך הוא שבית המקדש עתיד להחרב וישראל יגלו מארצם, ואם יבאו לקברו של משה רבינו ויעמדו בבכיה ויתחננו למשה לעמוד בתפילה בעדם, יעמוד משה ויבטל את הגזירה, מפני שחביבים צדיקים במתתם יותר מבחייהם. ולפיכך יש נוהגים להתפלל אצל קברי הצדיקים, ובפרט בערב ראש השנה. וכן כתב הרמ"א בהלכות ראש השנה, שבערב ראש השנה הולכים לבית הקברות להרבות שם בתפילות. אלא שכתב מרן הרב עובדיה יוסף שליט"א, שההולך לבית הקברות, לא ישים מגמתו נגד המתים, שכאילו הם יושיעו אותו ויעזרו לו, אלא יבקש רחמים מהשם יתברך בזכות הצדיקים שוכני עפר. ואם ירצה יוכל לבקש מן הנפטר שיהיה לו למליץ טוב, לבקש עליו רחמים מהשם יתברך. ומכל מקום צריך שיעשה הכל במידה הנכונה, כי לפעמים הנזק היוצא מכניסה לבית הקברות הוא רב על התועלת שבו, מפני שידוע על פי דברי המקובלים, שהנכנס לבית הקברות יכולות להדבק בו כל מיני טומאות רעות. וידוע שהגאון רבי אליהו מוילנא זצ"ל, היה נמנע מהליכה לבית הקברות, וכשהגיע יום האזכרה של אמו, שכנודע היה מכבדה מאד, בקשוהו שילך לקברה כנהוג ביום אזכרתה, שבודאי דבר זה יגרום לה נחת רוח, והגאון סירב ללכת לשם, באמרו, שאף שבודאי בואו לקברה יעשה לה נחת רוח, מכל מקום הוא ינזק מכך מאד. וכן נהג מרן הרב עובדיה יוסף שליט"א, שביום האזכרה של פטירת אביו ע"ה, נמנע מללכת לקברו, ואמר שטוב יותר אם ילמד יותר בביתו, ובזה יגרום יותר נחת רוח לאביו (אולם ביום האזכרה של אשתו נוהג ללכת לקברה). ומכל מקום במקום שקבורים שם רק צדיקים, כמו קבר הרמב"ם וכדומה, נראה שלא שייך כל זה, והכל כתורה יעשה. אך ביום ראש השנה עצמו, דעת מרן הרב שליט"א, שאין לאדם ללכת הרחק מביתו בכדי לשהות בסמוך לקברי צדיקים, אפילו אם נודעת סגולה לבא אצלם ביום זה, שהרי יום ראש השנה יום טוב הוא, וחייב אדם לשמוח עם בני ביתו ביום זה, ולשמח גם אותם כדין כל יום טוב, ועל כן ברור אין לדחות את פשטי הדינים ודרך הישר מפני איזו סגולה שתהיה ביום מן הימים, אפילו יפליגו בגדולתה וחשיבותה לאין קץ, וכדרכם של רוב ככל רבותינו מצוקי ארץ בכל הדורות כולם, שלא טרחו ללכת למרחקים לקברי הקדמונים בימי ראש השנה, ואף אצל עדות החסידים למקהלותם, לא נשמע כדבר הזה שיהיו ממהרים להתפלל בימי הדין על קבר צדיק. ובפרט תושבי ארץ ישראל, אשר כנודע עיקר בחינת קברי הצדיקים היא שמעלתה כמעלת ארץ ישראל, ואיככה יעזבו הם את העיקר וילכו לנדמה לו. (והנה אף על פי שמתחילה לא רצינו לגעת בנקודה זו, בכדי שלא לגרום חלילה לפגיעה באף אחד, ובפרט שבדרך כלל הנוסעים לקברי צדיקים בימים אלו עושים כן לשם שמים ועל פי הוראת רבותיהם, מכל מקום, האמת חביבה מן הכל, וזו שיטת מרן רבן של ישראל רבינו עובדיה יוסף שליט"א, וה' לא ימנע טוב להולכים בתמים).

Also, see this, from Nodah Biyhuda Umishnato.

This is certainly not comprehensive, but it is a good start. Perhaps some translation and / or discussion in later posts.

When you purchase a Hebrew slave (rc)

Mishpatim running commentary, first pass, pt ii

ב כִּי תִקְנֶה עֶבֶד עִבְרִי, שֵׁשׁ שָׁנִים יַעֲבֹד; וּבַשְּׁבִעִת--יֵצֵא לַחָפְשִׁי, חִנָּם

כִּי תִקְנֶה -- the Torah here does not make a distinction between a mocher atzmo and machruhu bet din, as the focus is on the purchasing, and thus the purchaser. Rashi contrasts different legal sections on slaves, and assumes that each must be talking about a unique case, such that since the other section explicitly states a case of poverty, this must be machruhu bet din of the case of the thief we find mentioned in passing later in Mishpatim. This legal analysis can even be called a peshat analysis, and also can be correct, and halacha. But here we state that this is not immediately apparent on the surface level, and so we will not explicitly assume otherwise. (In Kiddushin 14b, we see that Rabbi Eleazar, or perhaps it is Rabbi Eliezer, maintains via a gezera shava that these laws apply equally to one who sells himself or is sold by bet Din.) Now I see Shadal says the same as peshat.

עֶבֶד -- the context, in the narrative section, is that the Israelites have just left a lengthy slavery in Egypt. From an emotional standpoint, how could they turn around an immediately issue laws allowing for slavery?

The answer is that not all slavery is created equally. Indeed, they left Egypt to serve (עבד) Hashem. And they did not sell themselves into slavery in Egypt, but it was imposed upon them. And the Egyptians worked their slaves extremely hard, such that the slavery was bitter. And it was without end.

Slavery, especially in the ancient world, had a purpose. If people ran out of money, they could starve to death, or they could suffer extreme hunger. They could hire themselves out as day laborers, but this did not guarantee the employer a steady source of work, and the pay might not be enough to support a family. This present "slavery" is for a bounded period of time -- six years -- and the master supports the servant as well as, it would seem, the servant's family.

See Ramban who associates this law of going free after 6 years with Devarim 15:15, וזכרת כי עבד היית בארץ מצרים ויפדך ה' אלוהיך על כן אנכי מצווך את הדבר הזה היום, in the context of haanek taanek. Slavery, even of your fellow Israelite, is possible and serves a purpose, but there are limits and rights, informed by this experience our people had in the land of Egypt.

While it is a separate section, the same underlying theme and motivation occurs in Vayikra -- לֹא-תַעֲבֹד בּוֹ, עֲבֹדַת עָבֶד. And also כְּשָׂכִיר כְּתוֹשָׁב יִהְיֶה עִמָּךְ.

This entire section is about the competing values of the property rights of the master, such that he can see a return on his investment, on the one hand, and the safeguarding of the rights and humanity of your brother Israelite who became a slave, on the other.

עִבְרִי -- this means Hebrew, and thus Israelite. Some try to connect this to Hapiru, and to a social class. See how Ivri is often used to refer to slaves:

וַתִּקְרָא לְאַנְשֵׁי בֵיתָהּ, וַתֹּאמֶר לָהֶם לֵאמֹר, רְאוּ הֵבִיא לָנוּ אִישׁ עִבְרִי, לְצַחֶק בָּנוּ: בָּא אֵלַי לִשְׁכַּב עִמִּי, וָאֶקְרָא בְּקוֹל גָּדוֹל.
וְשָׁם אִתָּנוּ נַעַר עִבְרִי, עֶבֶד לְשַׂר הַטַּבָּחִים, וַנְּסַפֶּר-לוֹ, וַיִּפְתָּר-לָנוּ אֶת-חֲלֹמֹתֵינוּ: אִישׁ כַּחֲלֹמוֹ, פָּתָר.
וַיָּשִׂימוּ לוֹ לְבַדּוֹ, וְלָהֶם לְבַדָּם; וְלַמִּצְרִים הָאֹכְלִים אִתּוֹ, לְבַדָּם--כִּי לֹא יוּכְלוּן הַמִּצְרִים לֶאֱכֹל אֶת-הָעִבְרִים לֶחֶם, כִּי-תוֹעֵבָה הִוא לְמִצְרָיִם.
וַיְהִי בַּיָּמִים הָהֵם, וַיִּגְדַּל מֹשֶׁה וַיֵּצֵא אֶל-אֶחָיו, וַיַּרְא, בְּסִבְלֹתָם; וַיַּרְא אִישׁ מִצְרִי, מַכֶּה אִישׁ-עִבְרִי מֵאֶחָיו.
כִּי תִקְנֶה עֶבֶד עִבְרִי, שֵׁשׁ שָׁנִים יַעֲבֹד; וּבַשְּׁבִעִת--יֵצֵא לַחָפְשִׁי, חִנָּם

but that can well be because they were Hebrews and the period was one of servitude. See Yonah state:

וַיֹּאמֶר אֲלֵיהֶם, עִבְרִי אָנֹכִי; וְאֶת-יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵי הַשָּׁמַיִם, אֲנִי יָרֵא, אֲשֶׁר-עָשָׂה אֶת-הַיָּם, וְאֶת-הַיַּבָּשָׁה.

and see how Yosef himself calls it the Eretz HaIvrim:

כִּי-גֻנֹּב גֻּנַּבְתִּי, מֵאֶרֶץ הָעִבְרִים; וְגַם-פֹּה לֹא-עָשִׂיתִי מְאוּמָה, כִּי-שָׂמוּ אֹתִי בַּבּוֹר.

How Ivri means this, I don't care. People have suggestions of descendants from Ever, or Ever HaYarden. The point is that there is a feeling of brotherhood here, and he has special rights within the fraternity of Israelite society.

שֵׁשׁ שָׁנִים יַעֲבֹד -- thus this is a limited term engagement.

וּבַשְּׁבִעִת -- as Rashbam makes clear, שביעית למכירתו ולא שביעית לשמטה. This means that it will always be six years, as opposed to a maximum of six years, depending on when shemitta falls out. Too bad, as we might have had an easier time harmonizing this local legal section with Vayikra 25, which has him go free at Yovel, implying only at Yovel. Except of course that looking at that section in Vayikra, it is "obsessed" with Yovel and how it intersects with all sorts of laws, including buying houses, and fields. As such, it might only treat it from the Yovel perspective, but other limitations could apply.

Can he sell himself for longer, and would this be legally effective? This might be an example of a fixed time, and a recommendation? Pashut peshat would suggest otherwise, that this is a maximum.

לַחָפְשִׁי -- not as a social class; rather, it means out to freedom.

חִנָּם -- you should not think that the initial sale price was selling his body to the master permanently, such that at the termination of the period of servitude, whenever it may be, he must buy himself back for full price. Rather, since he serves for this fixed amount of time, he is effectively hiring himself out as a hired laborer for these six years, and at the end of this time, he has paid off his debt with his labor.

Also, he goes out free, but if he wants any assigned wife or any children to go out, he must pay for them. That is why this is necessary to mention -- for the contrast.

ג אִם-בְּגַפּוֹ יָבֹא, בְּגַפּוֹ יֵצֵא; אִם-בַּעַל אִשָּׁה הוּא, וְיָצְאָה אִשְׁתּוֹ עִמּוֹ.

אִם-בְּגַפּוֹ יָבֹא -- this pasuk is a heading, and easy mnemonic, for the law in 4-6.

וְיָצְאָה אִשְׁתּוֹ עִמּוֹ -- this does not mean that his wife becomes a slave with him. Rather, the focus is really on the first part of the pasuk.

When an Israelite man goes into slavery, his master may make use of him in various ways. One such way is to produce more slaves for himself. But there is an emotional connection which might develop between the Israelite slave and the slave-girl the master gives him, and between the Israelite slave and any children he might have. How does one balance these competing claims?

The answer is that the only one who automatically "goes out" to freedom accompanied by his wife is the Israelite who had his wife with him initially. She and any children is supported and housed by the master, just as the slave is. This does not mean that she is forced to work. And halacha does not recognize adult married maidservants, however we might understand Vayikra 25 on a peshat level (and indeed, one may understand it that way, like Chazal). If somehow she were forced to work, she would still go out with him. The focus, though, is on what he cannot do, and who does not go out free without any payment.

If his wife went in with him, the clear implication is also that any children would also belong to him and not to his master.

ד אִם-אֲדֹנָיו יִתֶּן-לוֹ אִשָּׁה, וְיָלְדָה-לוֹ בָנִים אוֹ בָנוֹת--הָאִשָּׁה וִילָדֶיהָ, תִּהְיֶה לַאדֹנֶיהָ, וְהוּא, יֵצֵא בְגַפּוֹ.

אִם-אֲדֹנָיו יִתֶּן-לוֹ אִשָּׁה -- this would seem to be a Canaative maidservant. It is difficult to prove about the children, but perhaps we can consider it from the perspective of the woman assigned to this Israelite slave.

The next section is וְכִי-יִמְכֹּר אִישׁ אֶת-בִּתּוֹ לְאָמָה, where based on context, and the protections offered, we are talking about an Israelite man selling his Israelite daughter into this servitude. Part of these protections appear to be that this is not a sexual servitude. He cannot even sell her, for working and perhaps for marriage, leAm nochri. Only the master or his son (and perhaps other family members) can marry her, and in such an instance that they do marry her, she is no longer a servant, but a free woman with all the rights any other wife has. I cannot imagine in the context of these protections that the master would be able to assign her to sleep with one of his Hebrew slaves. It must be someone without this special status and protections, and that would then be the Shifcha Kenaanit.

וְהוּא, יֵצֵא בְגַפּוֹ -- because from a monetary standpoint, this woman is owned by his master and these children as yelid bayit, and belong to his master. Only he goes free without money.

From a legal perspective, maybe there is no family unit, and he might cavelierly walk away. However, it is cruel to break a family apart, assuming they formed a family bond. And so he can perhaps purchase them, or purchase their freedom. If he was poor enough to sell himself or be sold into slavery, he likely does not have such funds. Therefore,

ה וְאִם-אָמֹר יֹאמַר, הָעֶבֶד, אָהַבְתִּי אֶת-אֲדֹנִי, אֶת-אִשְׁתִּי וְאֶת-בָּנָי; לֹא אֵצֵא, חָפְשִׁי

וְאִם-אָמֹר יֹאמַר, הָעֶבֶד -- even though it was a servitude for a fixed period of time, it can be extended. But this is at the discretion of the Israelite slave, not (it would seem) the choice of the master. On the other hand, can we force a master to accept a perpetual servant? Perhaps not, and it is only if the position is offered. Either way, the emphasis on this pasuk is that there is this option available to the slave, and he can choose it or not choose it. And thus he is not sold into perpetual slavery, as per pasuk 2.

אָהַבְתִּי אֶת-אֲדֹנִי -- no one would choose slavery just because of personal affection for his master. The import here is that his master was a good employer and did not mistreat him, such that he is willing to continue on as a slave, given the benefit of being able to remain with his family.

אֶת-אִשְׁתִּי וְאֶת-בָּנָי -- they are primary.

It would be a tremendous betrayal to subsequently sell the wife or the children as slaves to another person, but from a legal standpoint, this could well be possible.

ו וְהִגִּישׁוֹ אֲדֹנָיו, אֶל-הָאֱלֹהִים, וְהִגִּישׁוֹ אֶל-הַדֶּלֶת, אוֹ אֶל-הַמְּזוּזָה; וְרָצַע אֲדֹנָיו אֶת-אָזְנוֹ בַּמַּרְצֵעַ, וַעֲבָדוֹ לְעֹלָם

אֶל-הָאֱלֹהִים -- some modern scholars understand this, particularly with the definite article, as house-gods -- stored by the door -- and a carry-over from pre-monotheistic law. I would understand this as bringing in law into the picture to witness and certify this. Whether this means Hashem as Urim veTumim or Navi as early source for law, and by extension judges, or whether this word Elohim can mean judges (there is a big discussion about this), or whether it means something else, it does not matter to me. This is a method of granting legal force, legitimacy, and permanance to the proceedings -- to notarize it.

וְהִגִּישׁוֹ אֶל-הַדֶּלֶת -- as he now will be attached to the household.

וְרָצַע אֲדֹנָיו אֶת-אָזְנוֹ בַּמַּרְצֵעַ -- this is not necessarily a means of dissuading him, or a means of punishment for not listening to ki Li benei Yisrael avadim. Rather, this is a physical slave-mark, denoting his change in status and making him recognizable as such to others.

וַעֲבָדוֹ לְעֹלָם -- from the perspective of the local sugya, forever. This is good, because he gets to stay permanantly with his family.

Now, this may intersect with non-local sugyas, such as in Vayikra 25, where a slave goes out at Yovel. One may answer that these different sugyas are contradictory; or that that sugya was discussing a regular eved ivri but not an eved nirtza; or that leOlam means "for a time." Thus, Ibn Ezra:

ועבדו לעלם -
ידענו כי מלת לעולם בלשון הקודש הוא זמן. כמו: כבר היה לעולמים. זמנים.
וישב שם עד עולם, עד זמן שיהיה גדול.
וכן: ועבדו לעולם - לזמנו של יובל, שאין זמן מועדי ישראל ארוך ממנו ויציאת חירות כאילו עולם מתחדש, או יהיה פירש שישוב לזמנו הראשון שהיה חפשי

See Rashbam:

לעולם -
לפי הפשט:
כל ימי חייו, כמו שנאמר בשמואל: וישב שם עד עולם.

I would maintain more along the lines of Shadal:

ועבדו לעולם : כמשמעו, אלא שאח"כ נאמרה פרשת היובל ופסלה במקצת מה שנאמר קודם לכן, ע' למעלה ב' ג

I would put it this way. He does serve forever, rather than a fixed time such as six years. Assuming that somehow Yovel were canceled, he would continue to serve. But then this other law comes in and imposes other rules on top of it. Each speaks "as if" the other laws don't exist, but they apply in cascading layers.

Yovel is not a concern, and is not discussed, in this local sugya. The idea is that he gets to stay permanantly with his family, and it is no longer the fixed six-year period.

But then, what happens at Yovel, given the convergence of these laws? He must abandon his family then, if they are not going free!

Now these are the laws... Is there room and legitimacy for a peshat commentary? (rc)

Parshat Mishpatim, running commentary, part i

א וְאֵלֶּה, הַמִּשְׁפָּטִים, אֲשֶׁר תָּשִׂים, לִפְנֵיהֶם.

As we turn to parshat Mishpatim, what do we do? Is there room for a peshat-based interpretation of legal sections of Torah? How can we put forth such a commentary? If it is identical to the (often midrashic) interpretation of Chazal, then it is superfluous. If it differs from the interpretation of Chazal, is it heretical? Is it Karaitic to do so?

I know others face this difficulty for narrative sections. Some major figures (e.g. Ran, Alshich) maintain that it is heretical to diverge from midrash aggadah. And others maintain, based on a Rashi that ואני לא באתי אלא לפשוטו של מקרא coupled with declarations that Rashi's commentary was written with Ruach HaKodesh, that Rashi is by definition peshat, such that there can be no other true peshat commentary. For midrash aggadah and even peshat interpretations, this does not trouble me at all. We have greats such as Shmuel Hanaggid upon whom to rely. Shmuel Hanaggid declares that one, even post-Talmudically, may argue on midrash aggadah in interpretation of pesukim, as this is not mipi hagevurah but the private opinions of those who said it. We have those who will allegorize midrashim (including some I feel were not intended allegorically). We can point out that there is even dispute within the midrash aggada, such that one was not decided upon firmly. And we can follow the lead of the classic medieval commentators, for we may readily demonstrate that they will give commentaries at odds with traditional midrashim, such that the peshat and the midrash could not be physically true simultaneously. For example, the midrashic interpretation of kubata as womb, that Pinechas pierced Zimri and Cosbi's private parts simultaneously, while they were engaged in the act, when compared with Ibn Ezra's explanation as Kubata as Cosbi's tent, such that he killed her in her tent after killing Zimri. And not only that of medieval pashtanim, but even darshanim, who suggest midrashic explanations which are at odds with the existing and established midrashim. By that, I intend medieval midrashic works such as Bereishit Rabbati by Rav Moshe Hadarshan. Indeed, on narrative sections, there is ample precedent. (On the other hand, a certain prominent YU Rosh Yeshiva who shall remain nameless reacted to an argument similar to this with "who says I am so happy with the medieval pashtanim?")

But what about legal sections? Especially as many have a tendency nowadays to equate "peshat" with "truth" and "midrash" with "misguided nonsense," how can we advance a peshat commentary if it is at odds with Chazal's interpretation, and if it is at odds with established halachah?

My answer is that, while it may make us feel uncomfortable, of course we can. First of all, we have precedent in e.g. Rashbam, who explains vayhi erev vayhi voker as night following day, and yet of course he kept normative halacha, including Shabbos, like a frum Jew. We have Ibn Ezra explaining legal sections at odds with Chazal (see e.g. "cutting off her hand"), yet arriving at more or less the same conclusions practically. We have Rashi sometimes (IMHO and IIRC) choosing the legal interpretation of a pasuk which works better on the level of peshat, rather than the one that we decide upon lehalacha.

See what Rashbam writes in his introduction to Mishpatim, and consider what is "bothering him":

ואלה המשפטים -
ידעו ויבינו יודעי שכל כי לא באתי לפרש הלכות אף על פי שהם עיקר כמו שפירשתי בבראשית, כי מיתור המקראות נשמעים ההגדות והלכות ומקצתן ימצאו בפירושי רבינו שלמה אבי אמי זצ"ל.
ואני לפרש פשוטן של מקראות באתי ואפשר הדינים וההלכות לפי דרך ארץ. ואעפ"כ ההלכות עיקר, כמו שאמרו רבותינו: הלכה עוקרת משנה

I have several "excuses" for engaging in a peshat commentary with fresh eyes, aside from the aforementioned idea that some medieval commentators engaged in it.

1. "Peshat" is different from "truth". Peshat is a methodology, just as derash is a methodology. There might be several different peshat interpretations of a given text, and several different derash interpretations of a given text. One might (or might not) argue that only one ultimately reflects Authorial intent, but regardless, all of these are peshat, by my definition.
   
   
2. Such analysis, even if it does not result in practical halachah, might be considered Talmud Torah. What sort of message does the text convey to us when we look at it from this perspective and using this methodology? How about from that perspective and that methodology?
   
   
3. Indeed, not only Karaites and Sadducees engaged in interpretation contrary to what is decided halacha. Tannaim and in some cases Amoraim engaged in this as well. And their interpretations sometimes occur on a peshat level and sometimes on a derash level. While these interpretations might not form practical halacha, there is a value in these interpretations, of Elu veElu Divrei Elokim Chaim, in that one is engaging in Talmud Torah when learning those opinions. Perhaps by extension, our own grappling with the text, from the same perspective the Tannaim (or earlier sages) engaged with the text, is also considered Talmud Torah, even if ultimately these interpretations are not to be taken as halacha.
   
   
4. Considering the theme/message of the text from this other perspective can yield some interesting religious insights, even if ultimately the interpretation is not lehalacha.
   
   
5. On the other hand, perhaps one can argue this is being megaleh panim baTorah shelo keHalachah. But there are different interpretations of this prohibition. And see below for a partial treatment.
   
   
6. If I claim that something is "peshat," does that mean that I am stating it is true and the traditional halacha is false? No. Firstly because there may be multiple "peshat" interpretations, as above. And secondly, because who says that "peshat" determines halachah? There is a famous statement that אין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו. But I believe that this is a general belief that this is the case, while in any specific case, if "the" peshat was deemed to be against what was known to be the halacha, then this is an exception to the rule, and the mikra was yotzei miydei peshuto. And they did not know these exceptions via halacha leMoshe miSinai (as was suggested to me by Rav Schachter in interpreting these various gemaras) but rather if one gives a peshat level which differs from the midrashic level and undermines it, then it is an exception. Thus, if we claim that "lehakim shem hames al nachalaso" refers to actually naming, then the gezeira shava comes and undermines that peshat entirely. In most cases, the peshat was understood in line with the derash. But, if we suddenly argue on the traditional peshat and say that some other interpretation is the peshat, and that peshat is not in line with normative halacha, we say that מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו, even as this is the "peshat".
   
   
7. Furthermore, as we find on occassion in Shadal, the non-traditional peshat interpretation can lead to the same practical halacha, just via a slightly different means.
   
   
8. Also, from my own experiences, I find that even where Chazal offer what seem farfetched dershot to derive certain halachot -- (some midrashic methods are almost peshat-based, while others may seem like quite a stretch) -- a close analysis of the underlying text, or sometimes of a nonlocal text, can yield the same results using a peshat methodology. Not necessarily is it the only possible peshat interpretation, but it often is a quite plausible reading in the text that I would not have thought of otherwise. That does not mean that the derasha is an asmachta, with the result of it being deRabbanan rather that deOraysa. Rather, it is a useful mnemonic for extracting the DeOraysa, which otherwise might be difficult (though not impossible) to arrive at using peshat methodology.
   
   
9. In some cases, demonstrating how one can arrive at these same conclusions from a peshat perspective is interesting, can strengthen Emunas Chachamim, and may be Talmud Torah.
   
   
10. And some of these peshat interpretations may be surprising, but I believe are true. It is an involved discussion, but as an example, I believe that the peshat interpretation of ayin tachas ayin is monetary payment; that this is quite likely the Authorial intent, and does not reflect any attempt by Chazal to overturn stringent Biblical law. This because "peshat" is not always the most literal reading -- an overly literal reading is usually derash -- and because we must recognize idioms where they occur and understand their meaning based on how they are used in various contexts.
    
    
11. Finally, even if I were to claim my "peshat" was "true", normative halacha in interpreting these is decided via the classic interpretations of the Tannaim and Amoraim. This because of pesukim which state this:
    
    ח כִּי יִפָּלֵא מִמְּךָ דָבָר לַמִּשְׁפָּט, בֵּין-דָּם לְדָם בֵּין-דִּין לְדִין וּבֵין נֶגַע לָנֶגַע--דִּבְרֵי רִיבֹת, בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ: וְקַמְתָּ וְעָלִיתָ--אֶל-הַמָּקוֹם, אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בּוֹ. ט וּבָאתָ, אֶל-הַכֹּהֲנִים הַלְוִיִּם, וְאֶל-הַשֹּׁפֵט, אֲשֶׁר יִהְיֶה בַּיָּמִים הָהֵם; וְדָרַשְׁתָּ וְהִגִּידוּ לְךָ, אֵת דְּבַר הַמִּשְׁפָּט. יוְעָשִׂיתָ, עַל-פִּי הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר יַגִּידוּ לְךָ, מִן-הַמָּקוֹם הַהוּא, אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר יְהוָה; וְשָׁמַרְתָּ לַעֲשׂוֹת, כְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר יוֹרוּךָ. יא עַל-פִּי הַתּוֹרָה אֲשֶׁר יוֹרוּךָ, וְעַל-הַמִּשְׁפָּט אֲשֶׁר-יֹאמְרוּ לְךָ--תַּעֲשֶׂה: לֹא תָסוּר, מִן-הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר-יַגִּידוּ לְךָ--יָמִין וּשְׂמֹאל.
    
    See the case of the Tannur shel Achnai.
    

With this lengthy introduction, who knows if this year we will even get to any interpretations! And this is a first run. Perhaps later I will go back and revise. There is plenty to read in Rashbam, in Ibn Ezra, and in Aharon ben Yosef the Karaite. My intent here is to give a peshat commentary as it strikes me.

To begin,

א וְאֵלֶּה, הַמִּשְׁפָּטִים, אֲשֶׁר תָּשִׂים, לִפְנֵיהֶם.

וְאֵלֶּה -- this is a continuation of the previous, as per Rashi. Not only the 10 commandments were said at Sinai, as previously discussed at the end of Yisro, but also the laws of making the altar, within the araphel. And these could include the "dry" laws as well. Indeed, more than וְאֵלֶּה, the word תָּשִׂים conveys to me an act of law-giving.

Still, it is somewhat strange that these particular laws are given at Har Sinai? Mah inyan avdut etzel har Sinai? Well, we can come up with some answers for that, and there are even midrashim dealing with the relationship here. But even the theme of the Aseres Hadibros was respecting other people's property as well as other people's humanity. Many of these laws are not dry, but reflect the balancing act between these different values. And accepting the Torah is not just the big, exciting mitzvos, but even the dry material which extends to monetary laws.