Hi there, here is a new copyright complaint submission: Copyright Infringement Notification Confirmation
Copyright Owner Name (Company Name if applicable):
Chofetz Chaim
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Yisroel Meir Kagan
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representative
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[redacted]
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lakewood
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nj
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[redacted]
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US
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[redacted]
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Describe the work allegedly infringed:
this video is made of stillimages, to which I own the copyright to several of the images. I have successfully removed several copies of this clip, but someone keeps uploading it again. please remove asap!
URL of allegedly infringing video to be removed:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s5-AYbkaljw&eurl=&feature=player_embedded
Country where copyright applies: US
I state UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY that:
I am the owner, or an agent authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.I have a good faith belief that the use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law; and This notification is accurate.I understand that abuse of this tool will result in termination of my YouTube account.
Authorized Signature: Chofetz Chaim
Tuesday, December 09, 2008
The Text of the Fraudulent DMCA takedown notice for "I Want To Be A Rebbe"
See this post and this post on this issue. I redacted some information which could be used to identify the issuer -- I know exactly who he is, and sent him an email about this. No response so far:
What Was The Name Of The City Of Shechem? -- Now Updated To Discuss The Samaritan Variant
In Vayishlach, as a preamble to the Dinah story we are told that Yaakov arrived in the city of Shechem. Bereshit 33:
after a son:
Another possibility is that the name of the city is not actually Shechem. There is an alternate parsing which is non-obvious until it is pointed out. According to Rashi (citing Midrash), according to Ibn Ezra, according to Targum, according to Ralbag -- according to most classical sources we are used to looking at, the city was indeed named Shechem. And shalem is an adjective, describing how Yaakov arrived there -- complete, at peace, and so on. Thus, we might have thought otherwise because of the gift he gave Esav. Or this is showing that he is all settled, before the incident with Dinah.
But then we have Rashbam. He says that whoever says that shalem is an adjective, if talking on the level of peshat, is only making an error. Would we think that Yaakov would be lacking from the measley present he gave Esav? Certainly not. Rather, Shalem is the name of the city. And he points out the precedent for this form -- Cheshbon Ir Sichon. So here, Yaakov came to Shalem Ir Shechem.
Of course, what will he do with the fact that later they are grazing in Shechem, in parshat Vayeshev? He does not seem to be bothered with it -- the area can still be Shechem to him. Thus, there, he approvingly says over a peshat he heard from Rav Yosef Kara (not Karo) that "behold your brothers are grazing in Shechem" -- in a place of danger, for they killed the men of the place.
Meanwhile, Shadal obviously is familiar with this Rashbam and so, while he does not mention it explicitly, gives a strong endorsement to the opinion that it means בשלום ובלא נזק, citing Ibn Ezra, Onkelos, Rashi, Seforno and Mendelsohnn. And the purpose of this is והגיד זה לומר כי השלים חזרתו בשלום. He then states that the name of the city is Shechem.
Update: In the comment section, Mississippi Fred MacDowell of On The Main Line notes that:
Here is the relevant text. I don't "buy" this theory, but then, I've been influenced by Shadal. For example, Shadal seems to be attempting to counter precisely this, by saying it must have been redacted early, because after Yaakov's dream, he promises (apparently) to built a cultic center in Bethel. While midrashim transform this into Yerushalayim, the fact that this text would be left intact is evidence it must have been written earlier.
I also do not see the construct of Shalem Ir Shechem as particularly irregular, nor am convinced of the vector of the development of the text being suggested. For example, why did the Samaritans not then simply keep the "original" text without Shalem, rather than adapting the Rabbinic text? And that a specific party, the Samaritans, would adapt the text, does not really convince that the text was originally adapted for opposite purposes. And even the standard Rabbinic understanding is that Shalem is an adjective, meaning either complete or parallel to Shalom. All in all, it is possible, but I am not wholly convinced.
I am also reminded of the arguments between the Perushim and the Cutheans (=Samaritans), where the Perushim said that the Samaritans forged their Torah. So too about the Samaritan claim that the in various other places, if I recall correctly.
But in So Rabbi Eliezer beRabbi Shimon says to the sofrei kutim, the scribes of the Samaritans, that they have falsified their Torah. And Shechem again plays a role. In Yerushalmi Sotah 30b:
What seems to be the straightforward interpretation of this is that in sefer Deavrim, when describing Har Gerizim and Har Eval, the Torah puts it at Elonei Moreh. For the Mishna states:
Yet Rabbi Eliezer beRabbi Shimon is saying here that they falsified their Torah, but to no avail. Because we would know it anyway from the Gezeira Shava from Avraham, in Elonei Moreh, which is by Shechem. Sort of like here, even without making it שלום, the standard understanding by Chazal is that it is an adjective, and thus parallel to Shalom, but of course this is the Shechem we all know and love.
after a son:
Another possibility is that the name of the city is not actually Shechem. There is an alternate parsing which is non-obvious until it is pointed out. According to Rashi (citing Midrash), according to Ibn Ezra, according to Targum, according to Ralbag -- according to most classical sources we are used to looking at, the city was indeed named Shechem. And shalem is an adjective, describing how Yaakov arrived there -- complete, at peace, and so on. Thus, we might have thought otherwise because of the gift he gave Esav. Or this is showing that he is all settled, before the incident with Dinah.
But then we have Rashbam. He says that whoever says that shalem is an adjective, if talking on the level of peshat, is only making an error. Would we think that Yaakov would be lacking from the measley present he gave Esav? Certainly not. Rather, Shalem is the name of the city. And he points out the precedent for this form -- Cheshbon Ir Sichon. So here, Yaakov came to Shalem Ir Shechem.
Of course, what will he do with the fact that later they are grazing in Shechem, in parshat Vayeshev? He does not seem to be bothered with it -- the area can still be Shechem to him. Thus, there, he approvingly says over a peshat he heard from Rav Yosef Kara (not Karo) that "behold your brothers are grazing in Shechem" -- in a place of danger, for they killed the men of the place.
Meanwhile, Shadal obviously is familiar with this Rashbam and so, while he does not mention it explicitly, gives a strong endorsement to the opinion that it means בשלום ובלא נזק, citing Ibn Ezra, Onkelos, Rashi, Seforno and Mendelsohnn. And the purpose of this is והגיד זה לומר כי השלים חזרתו בשלום. He then states that the name of the city is Shechem.
Update: In the comment section, Mississippi Fred MacDowell of On The Main Line notes that:
It's possible Shadal wished to refute Geiger's interpretation.
See: Abraham Geiger's Liberal Judaism, By Ken Koltun-From
Search for shalem, and see pg. 48.
Note that Shadal virtually severed contact with Geiger over the publication of his Urschrift, which contained many ideas and explanations like this.
Here is the relevant text. I don't "buy" this theory, but then, I've been influenced by Shadal. For example, Shadal seems to be attempting to counter precisely this, by saying it must have been redacted early, because after Yaakov's dream, he promises (apparently) to built a cultic center in Bethel. While midrashim transform this into Yerushalayim, the fact that this text would be left intact is evidence it must have been written earlier.I also do not see the construct of Shalem Ir Shechem as particularly irregular, nor am convinced of the vector of the development of the text being suggested. For example, why did the Samaritans not then simply keep the "original" text without Shalem, rather than adapting the Rabbinic text? And that a specific party, the Samaritans, would adapt the text, does not really convince that the text was originally adapted for opposite purposes. And even the standard Rabbinic understanding is that Shalem is an adjective, meaning either complete or parallel to Shalom. All in all, it is possible, but I am not wholly convinced.
I am also reminded of the arguments between the Perushim and the Cutheans (=Samaritans), where the Perushim said that the Samaritans forged their Torah. So too about the Samaritan claim that the in various other places, if I recall correctly.
But in So Rabbi Eliezer beRabbi Shimon says to the sofrei kutim, the scribes of the Samaritans, that they have falsified their Torah. And Shechem again plays a role. In Yerushalmi Sotah 30b:
אמר ר' אלעזר בר' שמעון נמייתי לסופרי כותים זייפתם תורתכם ולא הועלתם לעצמיכם כלום. שכתבתם בתורתכם אצל אלוני מורה שכם. והלא ידוע שהוא שכם אלא שאין אתם דורשין לגזירה שוה ואנו דורשין לגזירה שוה. נאמר כאן אלוני מורה ונאמר להלן אלוני מורה. מה אלוני מורה האמור להלן שכם אף אלוני מורה האמור כאן שכם.
What seems to be the straightforward interpretation of this is that in sefer Deavrim, when describing Har Gerizim and Har Eval, the Torah puts it at Elonei Moreh. For the Mishna states:
ברכות וקללות כיצד כיון שעברו ישראל את הירדן ובאו להר גריזים ולהר עיבל שבשומרון שבצד שכם אצל אלוני מורה שנאמר (דברים יא) הלא המה בעבר הירדן ולהלן הוא אומר (בראשית יב) ויעבר אברם בארץ עד מקום שכם עד אלון מורה מה האלון מורה האמורה להלן שכם אף אלון מורה האמור כאן שכם:
Such is the Mishna. But in the gemara, another understanding of the location of Har Gerizim and Har Eval is presented.מול הגלגל אין כאן גלגל אצל אלוני מורה. אין כאן אלוני מורה. מה מקיים ר' אלעזר הר גריזים והר עיבל. שתי גבשושיות עשו וקראו זה הר גריזים וזה הר עיבל. על דעתיה דרבי יהודה מאה ועשרים מיל הלכו באותו היום. על דעתיה דרבי אלעזר לא זזו ממקומן.
Perhaps Geiger would say that what influences that is that the Kutim treating it as holy place, rather than the internal textual issue of אין כאן גלגל אצל אלוני מורה. At any rate, apparently the Samaritans, in their Torah, added the word Shechem in Devarim to make it clearer (apparently מול שכם, but I do not have access to an online Samaritan Torah anymore). And this (among other emendations, e.g. making the mizbeach on Har Gerizim rather than on Har Eval) caused Chazal to say about them that they falsified their Torah.Yet Rabbi Eliezer beRabbi Shimon is saying here that they falsified their Torah, but to no avail. Because we would know it anyway from the Gezeira Shava from Avraham, in Elonei Moreh, which is by Shechem. Sort of like here, even without making it שלום, the standard understanding by Chazal is that it is an adjective, and thus parallel to Shalom, but of course this is the Shechem we all know and love.
Monday, December 08, 2008
Interesting Posts and Articles #102
- Doing searches on near-matches to DNA, to find relatives of criminals, and thus find the criminals. Clever.
- I have what to say on this -- I think both sides are misguided -- but for now, just a link dump. Tomer Devorah posts about concerns with Joel Gallis and Robert Wolf's world-view and methodology (pt 1 of "things that need to be said). Shirat Devorah posts their response. (Some critical anonymous comments have led Shirat Devorah to think twice about whether she wants to continue to blog.) And Tomer Devorah posts its (fairly-short) response in turn, saying that Gallis and Wolf's response speaks for itself, in terms of highlighting troubling aspects of their approach (as it indeed does, IMHO). Pt 2 of "things that need to be said" is about the direction Chabad is taking without the Rebbe, zt"l.
- On The Main Line cites Shadal that "Oy Vey" comes from the Greek.
- Pollutants messing with evolution and making men into women and "girly men."
- Life In Israel (based on this YNet article) posts about other Rabbonim who OK the census, as against Rav Yaakov Yosef's psak against it the other week.
- Cold sore virus may be Altzheimer's smoking gun -- via Slashdot.
- The AP reports that the Supreme Court will not review Obama's eligibility. Oh well. I guess Bush is not Gog after all. :)
- Tamar Yonah posts something from the autistics, together with a video of a facilitated communication.
She writes"I am not sure how I feel about 'FC' (Facilitated Communication) and the whole idea of messages from certain 'Austistics". However, I feel it cannot hurt to cover what they are reported to be saying to us. Personally, I wonder about the 'Facilitator' and if he/she unconciously moves the person's hand. But since I have actually stated a lot of what they say below on my radio programs and on this blog, which is to make aliyah and strive to be better people through tshuvah, repentance, I am hoping that you will take these words to heart."
But there are, in truth, deeper issues. The end does not justify the means, and in this case, there are other side-effects as well -- of making Judaism into a more superstitious and less rational religion, of possible violations of tamim tihyeh im Hashem Elokecha, of raising false messianic hopes which will then be dashed, and so on.
Sunday, December 07, 2008
"With great power comes great responsibility"
So goes a famous maamar by בן חביבא.
{Update: To clarify, because I see I misled at least one person. The author of that statement is Stan Lee, who made the Spiderman comics. Peter Parker's uncle, Uncle Ben, said the statement. Chaviva is Aramaic for Uncle, and Ben is Ben, so Ben Chaviva was a joking reference to Uncle Ben. Sorry for the misunderstanding.}
But perhaps we can find an earlier echo of this in Pirkei Avot --
אבטליון אומר חכמים היזהרו בדבריכם שמא תחובו חובת גלות ותגלו למקום המים הרעים וישתו התלמידים הבאים אחריכם וימותו ונמצא שם שמים מתחלל
How could the words of a Chacham lead to Galus? Perhaps the following story can illustrate this idea. It involves Rav Avigdor Miller, zatza"l.
About a decade ago, my parents encountered a fellow who was a big follower of Rav Avigdor Miller. And he was "boasting" of how big a talmid he was. For example, Rav Miller declared in one of his lectures, about the evils of television, "I want you to take you television and throw it out of the window." Now, this fellow lived on the fifth floor of an apartment building. But he took unplugged his television, took it to his window, and literally tossed it out the window, to shatter on the pavement below. He said he looked first to make sure no one was standing below, but in the meantime, how did he really know that someone would not walk out of the apartment at that time?
Rav Avigdor Miller certainly did not mean for his listeners to take his words literally, but rather they were said for dramatic, and rhetorical effect. After all, he was a very talented orator. He wanted to drive home the point that his listeners should get rid of their televisions, and thus rid their homes of its dangerous spiritual influence. But had this overly-literal fellow actually hit someone, well then, in the good-old-days he might well be sent into galus*. And then, as per the din, his rebbe could be sent to the Ir Miklat with him. Thus, שמא תחובו חובת גלות.
Was Rav Avigdor Miller at fault for making such a statement? Of course not. He has a right to expect that his audience is not composed of overly literal "idiots," and this far-fetched concern should not have hampered his ability to deliver effective lectures. On the other hand, if this had become a pervasive problem -- if people across the country were being beamed on the head by idiots listening to his tapes, then he would likely have stopped using such rhetoric.
It is in this context that I used certain language in describing a psak of Rav Kanievsky about how one should wear his peyos down, as being at fault for breaking up a shidduch, where there was a fight between in-laws on whether the chassan should wear them up or down.
I did not really mean that he is at fault. As I said there, the fault really lies with the idiots, who took this statement of what Rav Kanievsky held, and (in my guess) tried to compel someone else to abandon his own minhag and his own poskim, and with idiots who would elevate this to such a level as to be a reason to break off a shidduch.
What Rav Kanievsky wrote is no different than what other poskim write on other matters, and is perfectly responsible. This is the role of a posek, to describe what he believes the ideal course of action is.
However, I do wish that Rav Kanievsky exercised better control of statements in his name, and also that he would take first hold of those who would seek to impose his views on others who follow other poskim. These are two separate points.
One point is that while Rav Kanievsky is a great posek, he is not the final word on all things halachic. And poskim know this, because they are knowledgable enough in halacha and in meta-halacha. (See here for an example.) But the hamon am does not know this, and this hamon am includes some idiots who would then yell at people for not following the Gadol HaDor, or else would put up kol koreis telling people they must listen to the psak, without noting that there are other poskim who disagree.
Rav Kanievsky said that "anything said in my name is false," but this is not the same, because it was in one of his sefarim. It is a halachic question of whether, once he rules one way, anyone else is a zaken mamre for ruling differently, and whether one is allowed (and should) follow other psakim. And I believe he could do more to address this issue, and take control of it. For example, he could make a declaration that he assurs anyone using his words in a kol korei. They could even make a kol korei out of it. Or he could stress, as Rav Yaakov Yosef did recently, that while this is his halachic opinion, others were entitled to hold and follow contrary opinions -- even though he (=Rav Kanievsky) personally thinks that they are dreadfully wrong and misguided. Unless he actually does believe that since his opinions are correct, everyone should follow it, and people should promulgate his positions in these ways.
Why should he have to do this? He does not. And who am I to be telling him that he should? But on the other hand, if this is indeed a pervasive problem, then perhaps he should take it in hand.
The other issue is that people are saying things in his name, which sometimes are true and sometimes are false. Rav Kanievsky said that "anything said in my name is false," and that is a good step towards a solution. But it has not proven sufficient, IMHO, as people continue to spread rumors, and attribute things to the gedolim. See here for an example of a recent rumor, which spread for a month before being quashed -- and yet the rumor is still going around. Here is another example of people using Rav Kanievsky's name.
The Sages of the Talmudic appointed "Amora"s whos job it was to be an official spokesman for them, sometimes for specific rulings or retractions of rulings. Perhaps something akin nowadays could be instituted -- a web page, or a phone hotline with recordings -- with a list of approved statements, and a way of asking whether a specific statement in his name was actually issued. As it stands, the power of a gadol is being diminished by those who misattribute to him, or take his rulings past their true intent.
_________________________
* Of course, in such a situation, it may well not be classified as shogeg because of the extreme negligence involved. But I, too, am making a rhetorical point.
About a decade ago, my parents encountered a fellow who was a big follower of Rav Avigdor Miller. And he was "boasting" of how big a talmid he was. For example, Rav Miller declared in one of his lectures, about the evils of television, "I want you to take you television and throw it out of the window." Now, this fellow lived on the fifth floor of an apartment building. But he took unplugged his television, took it to his window, and literally tossed it out the window, to shatter on the pavement below. He said he looked first to make sure no one was standing below, but in the meantime, how did he really know that someone would not walk out of the apartment at that time?
Rav Avigdor Miller certainly did not mean for his listeners to take his words literally, but rather they were said for dramatic, and rhetorical effect. After all, he was a very talented orator. He wanted to drive home the point that his listeners should get rid of their televisions, and thus rid their homes of its dangerous spiritual influence. But had this overly-literal fellow actually hit someone, well then, in the good-old-days he might well be sent into galus*. And then, as per the din, his rebbe could be sent to the Ir Miklat with him. Thus, שמא תחובו חובת גלות.
Was Rav Avigdor Miller at fault for making such a statement? Of course not. He has a right to expect that his audience is not composed of overly literal "idiots," and this far-fetched concern should not have hampered his ability to deliver effective lectures. On the other hand, if this had become a pervasive problem -- if people across the country were being beamed on the head by idiots listening to his tapes, then he would likely have stopped using such rhetoric.
It is in this context that I used certain language in describing a psak of Rav Kanievsky about how one should wear his peyos down, as being at fault for breaking up a shidduch, where there was a fight between in-laws on whether the chassan should wear them up or down.
I did not really mean that he is at fault. As I said there, the fault really lies with the idiots, who took this statement of what Rav Kanievsky held, and (in my guess) tried to compel someone else to abandon his own minhag and his own poskim, and with idiots who would elevate this to such a level as to be a reason to break off a shidduch.
What Rav Kanievsky wrote is no different than what other poskim write on other matters, and is perfectly responsible. This is the role of a posek, to describe what he believes the ideal course of action is.
However, I do wish that Rav Kanievsky exercised better control of statements in his name, and also that he would take first hold of those who would seek to impose his views on others who follow other poskim. These are two separate points.
One point is that while Rav Kanievsky is a great posek, he is not the final word on all things halachic. And poskim know this, because they are knowledgable enough in halacha and in meta-halacha. (See here for an example.) But the hamon am does not know this, and this hamon am includes some idiots who would then yell at people for not following the Gadol HaDor, or else would put up kol koreis telling people they must listen to the psak, without noting that there are other poskim who disagree.
Rav Kanievsky said that "anything said in my name is false," but this is not the same, because it was in one of his sefarim. It is a halachic question of whether, once he rules one way, anyone else is a zaken mamre for ruling differently, and whether one is allowed (and should) follow other psakim. And I believe he could do more to address this issue, and take control of it. For example, he could make a declaration that he assurs anyone using his words in a kol korei. They could even make a kol korei out of it. Or he could stress, as Rav Yaakov Yosef did recently, that while this is his halachic opinion, others were entitled to hold and follow contrary opinions -- even though he (=Rav Kanievsky) personally thinks that they are dreadfully wrong and misguided. Unless he actually does believe that since his opinions are correct, everyone should follow it, and people should promulgate his positions in these ways.
Why should he have to do this? He does not. And who am I to be telling him that he should? But on the other hand, if this is indeed a pervasive problem, then perhaps he should take it in hand.
The other issue is that people are saying things in his name, which sometimes are true and sometimes are false. Rav Kanievsky said that "anything said in my name is false," and that is a good step towards a solution. But it has not proven sufficient, IMHO, as people continue to spread rumors, and attribute things to the gedolim. See here for an example of a recent rumor, which spread for a month before being quashed -- and yet the rumor is still going around. Here is another example of people using Rav Kanievsky's name.
The Sages of the Talmudic appointed "Amora"s whos job it was to be an official spokesman for them, sometimes for specific rulings or retractions of rulings. Perhaps something akin nowadays could be instituted -- a web page, or a phone hotline with recordings -- with a list of approved statements, and a way of asking whether a specific statement in his name was actually issued. As it stands, the power of a gadol is being diminished by those who misattribute to him, or take his rulings past their true intent.
_________________________
* Of course, in such a situation, it may well not be classified as shogeg because of the extreme negligence involved. But I, too, am making a rhetorical point.
Interesting Posts and Articles #101
- Shirat Devorah on messages and dreams. I don't believe that there was anything to this particular dream from the husband, and the minyan in the house seems somewhat problematic. The message about Obama may well have just reflected the dream recipient's own concerns about him.
- Mom in Israel has a guest post at Orthonomics about girls' seminaries and the need to find Shabbos meals out, hosted by Israeli families. And she has a post on her own blog about how Takana finds against Sylvie of Megeirot.
- Burger King conducts a taste test with poor villagers who have never tasted a burger before. A commercial, and research, in quite poor taste.
- Mumbai min haTorah minayin -- a dvar Torah from a friend of the victims, at Yeshiva World. "Mum Bo." But it unfortunately is along the trend of using gematrias and such to support free association. And an anecdote of kissing the Rebbe's picture after Shema, and how that picture remained intact on the wall. The reaction of the commenters there is interesting.
- HaEmtza on producing the well-rounded Orthodox Jew.
- Achas LeMaalah claims that Lavan was the precursor for the father-in-law of the kollel learner, based on a Tiferes Yehonasan. I don't really agree, and may make it into a parshablog post. But you can see my comments, and other comments, there. And see Lion of Zion on Seforno's Work Ethic.
- Geulah Perspectives on the "end of the psak," where Rav Kanievsky denies having said anything about bomb shelters on Chanukkah. And points us to here, where is similar message is being promulgated.
- FrumSatire gets his YouTube account suspended.
- The Maggid of Bergenfield on Vayeitzei.
- Via HaMercaz, R' Cunin saying that "they will understand that it is the Rebbe who runs this world until he comes to take us out of Galus now." Presumably, this will be explained as צדיק גוזר והקדוש ברוך הוא מקיים. But regardless, it gives us misnagdim (and perhaps many chassidim) the heebie jeebies -- to ascribe divine attributes to a venerated yet deceased human being, while connecting to belief in his messiah-ship.
- And also from there, a plan to reuse Agriprocessors salt to salt the roads for snow.
Daf Yomi Kiddushin 60b: Where The Piska, And Just What Is Obvious?
When preparing Rif for my Rif Yomi blog, I noticed something a bit different in the Rif from our gemara. The Rif reads:
Can you spot the difference? It is quite subtle. It is a difference in the piska, the citation from the Mishna. In our gemara, there are two separate citations from the Mishna, where תנא לא נתכונה אלא לראות משלו goes on the first citation, and פשיטא לא צריכא דאע"ג דנקט דמי בעיסקא goes on the second. In contrast, in Rif, all the words of the citation are present, but they are present in a single, lengthy, citation.
Mai Beinayhu? Perhaps nothing. But perhaps something. Specifically, what is the peshita going on?
In our gemara, the peshitta is going on the statement of the Mishna that if he shows her money on a table, she is not betrothed. This is certainly not something obvious to me, given only the preceding words in the Mishna. Indeed, only once we understand the justification given in the brayta. Also, it is slightly awkward in our gemara how the brayta goes on ע"מ שאראך מאתים זוז וכו, which is the positive rather than negative case in the Mishna. But at any rate, in the tzricha, the idea is that in whatever {expansive} case the money is on the table, she is not betrothed.
In the Rif, the peshitta seems to be going on the brayta, which is giving the reason for the law in the Mishna. And once you see the two sides of the case in the Mishna, the brayta's elaboration indeed seems somewhat obvious. If so, the point is that the brayta, rather than the Mishna, is telling us that she expects the money to be his, and here, it is not his, even though he has the money to make more money with.
Which is correct? I don't know. I prefer the second. But on the other hand, earlier in the gemara on the daf, a different diyuk is made from the Mishna, in the same form of first asking peshitta.
It is also important to point out that these piskas are not Talmudic, or even savoraic. They are Geonic at the earliest. Originally, Mishna and gemara were separate. And the Geonim added these short quotations to show what part of the Mishna the gemara was going on. This might be a girsological difference which arose from mistaken copying, but perhaps reflects an actual machlokes in how to understand the gemara.
Kiddushin 60bWhile our gemara reads:על מנת שאראך מאתים זוז הרי זו מקודשת ויראנה הראה על השולחן אינה מקודשת:
תנא לא נתכוונה זו אלא להראותה משלו
פשיטא לא צריכא אף על גב דנקיט זוזי בעיסקא""On condition that I show you 200 zuz," she is betrothed, and he shows her. If he shows her on the table {money which is not his} she is not betrothed":A tanna taught: {For} this one {=the woman} only intended that he would show her of his own {money}.
This is obvious?!
No, it is necessary -- even though he received the money to invest.
ע"מ שאראך מאתים זוז וכו':
תנא לא נתכונה אלא לראות משלו:
ואם הראה לה על השלחן אינה מקודשת:
פשיטא לא צריכא דאע"ג דנקט דמי בעיסקא:
Mai Beinayhu? Perhaps nothing. But perhaps something. Specifically, what is the peshita going on?
In our gemara, the peshitta is going on the statement of the Mishna that if he shows her money on a table, she is not betrothed. This is certainly not something obvious to me, given only the preceding words in the Mishna. Indeed, only once we understand the justification given in the brayta. Also, it is slightly awkward in our gemara how the brayta goes on ע"מ שאראך מאתים זוז וכו, which is the positive rather than negative case in the Mishna. But at any rate, in the tzricha, the idea is that in whatever {expansive} case the money is on the table, she is not betrothed.
In the Rif, the peshitta seems to be going on the brayta, which is giving the reason for the law in the Mishna. And once you see the two sides of the case in the Mishna, the brayta's elaboration indeed seems somewhat obvious. If so, the point is that the brayta, rather than the Mishna, is telling us that she expects the money to be his, and here, it is not his, even though he has the money to make more money with.
Which is correct? I don't know. I prefer the second. But on the other hand, earlier in the gemara on the daf, a different diyuk is made from the Mishna, in the same form of first asking peshitta.
It is also important to point out that these piskas are not Talmudic, or even savoraic. They are Geonic at the earliest. Originally, Mishna and gemara were separate. And the Geonim added these short quotations to show what part of the Mishna the gemara was going on. This might be a girsological difference which arose from mistaken copying, but perhaps reflects an actual machlokes in how to understand the gemara.
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Josh writes: I looked at the links above, and they have various Chanukkah gifts composed of chocolate, candy and dreidels. But there are several pages of gifts and things (on the sidebar), so thus is not a complete summary. I know that for certain other holidays, some Tannaim were accustomed to give nuts and roasted grain -- e.g. on Pesach to keep the kids up, or as the method of providing children with Simchas Yom Yov. Thus,
Pesachim 109a
ת"ר הכל חייבין בארבעה כוסות הללו אחד אנשים ואחד נשים ואחד תינוקות א"ר יהודה וכי מה תועלת יש לתינוקות ביין אלא מחלקין להן
קליות ואגוזין בערב פסח כדי שלא ישנו וישאלו אמרו עליו על רבי עקיבא שהיה מחלק קליות ואגוזין לתינוקות בערב פסח כדי שלא ישנו וישאלו
קליות ואגוזין בערב פסח כדי שלא ישנו וישאלו אמרו עליו על רבי עקיבא שהיה מחלק קליות ואגוזין לתינוקות בערב פסח כדי שלא ישנו וישאלו
דף סח, ב פרק י הלכה א גמרא: רבי יודה אומר נשים בראוי להן וקטנים בראוי להם נשים בראוי להן כגון מסנים וצוצלין וקטנים בראוי להן כגון אגוזין ולוזין
In planning, a post on the Aruch HaShulchan's take on Chanukkah, whether it is lachem or laHashem, and how the lachem can help fulfill the laShem. Also related, see my posts about egozim.
Friday, December 05, 2008
*How* Exactly Is Vayeitzei Setumah?
An interesting Baal HaTurim leading off this week's parsha. From the Mikraos Gedolos, pictured to the right. Thus, there are some who say that this parsha is setumah. And in parenthesis, an elaboration, that the entire sidra lacks petucha and setuma breaks.However, this definition is in parenthesis, which makes me wonder exactly who provided this gloss? Was it the Baal HaTurim himself, or some later author trying to clarify, since this is not the typical meaning of setuma?
I would venture that it is not from the Baal HaTurim himself. After all, if we look at earlier printed sefarim of Baal HaTurim, we find this parenthetical remark absent.And indeed, I would strongly doubt that this is the correct meaning of Baal HaTurim's statement, for several reasons.
1) Firstly, the famous instance of the parsha which is setuma is Vayechi. And people mention a masoretic note which puts specifically Vayechi and Vayeitzei together in being setuma. Though other sources argue about Vayeitzei. Now, Vayechi lacks a gap before it, in between the last pasuk of Vayigash and the first pasuk of Vayechi. So it makes sense that that is the meaning of setuma. Whether this is the case for Vayeitzei is possibly a matter of differing manuscripts.
2) Vayechi should have the same status as Vayeitzei in its setuma-ness, and if we simply examine Vayechi, we will find more than one petucha within that sidra.
3) Furthermore, we see in various sources that whether Vayeitzei is setuma or not is a matter of dispute. Yet as far as we have seen, such that "yesh omrim" that it is setuma. (e.g. see Baal HaTurim above. Yet we see no evidence of a manuscript that has petuchas or setumas within the sidra of Vayeitzei itself. On the other hand, we can turn this around and ask where we see a manuscript which lacks the gap (though something which is only "yesh omrim" may be harder to discover).
3) The masoretic notes, and all the discussions about the parsha being setuma, only mention Vayeitzei Yaakov and Vayechi. But if the definition was a lack of petucha and setuma within the sidra itself, then what about parashat Miketz? For Miketz also lacks such petuchot and setumot. From the lack of mention (and the mention is of a closed list), we may deduce that that is not the working definition. (On the other hand, we can show this to not be so, in some manuscripts, on the basis of Chizkuni in the next section.)
5) Furthermore, we have Chizkuni, who talks separately about the phenomenon of the missing gap between sidrot and the the phenomenon of no petuchot and setumot throughout the parsha.
Thus, Chizkuni writes what is pictured to the right."And why is this parsha closed up? Because he was closed up in the house of Ever. Another explanation: Because he concealed his leaving from the city because of his brother Esav.It seems clear that by parsha, Chizkuni means topic or section. And thus, the topic break between two seders would warrant a break -- a gap. And by seder, he means what we typically call today a parsha.
And the parsha is also nistam {closed} throughout the seder -- we do not find a single parsha, something which is not the case with all the other sedarim.
And furthermore, that the matter is connected to that which is above, to "And Yitzchak sent Yaakov to Padan Aram," as Rashi explains..."
And note that he says that not only is this parsha (at the beginning) nistam, but so too throughout the sidra of Vayeitzei, something not the case elsewhere. We see that Chizkuni considers this a separate phenomenon that the first one.
In terms of Miketz, perhaps he had a different version of Miketz, or perhaps he holds that the gap leading in to the sidra counts to disqualify it.
At any rate, it seems that in explaining the Baal HaTurim, the gloss interpreted parsha to mean sidra, while it very well might not have meant that at all.
I addressed this issue once before, on parshat Vayechi. In one of those posts, I put up the following clip from the Karaite scholar Aharon ben Yosef (left) and the supercommentary upon him, Yosef Shlomo Luzki (right).
Aharon ben Yosef mentions the tradition that there are two parshiyot which do not have in them a psikeither setuma or petucha, and that is Vayetze and Vayechi. Though of course, in the sidra of Vayechi we have a couple of gaps in the middle. (And don't forget Miketz which does not have!) Yosef Shlomo Luzki understands that this, not having a psik refers to not having a gap between two sidras. (And indeed, he may well be correct.) But then, he notes that there is a setuma leading into Vayeitzei. And so suggests this was in alternate manuscripts, namely in a Ben Naftali manuscript.
At the end of the day, I can see opportunities for claiming all sorts of things about what setuma and parsha meant, and how it could have meant different things in different sources. But in the end, I am leaning towards the idea that it refers to the lack of a gap leading into the sidra, which is an introduction of a new parsha, or topic, where parshiyot are typically delineated by petuchas and setumas. (Stuma here is thus an unfortunate homonym, as many meforshim say.)
Thursday, December 04, 2008
Why Did Rachel Blame Her Difficulty In Having Children on Yaakov?
I don't believe she really did on a rational level, but rather that she was frustrated, and was venting. And Yaakov was not really criticizing her in turn, but rather was frustrated and was venting as well. This is all happening on an emotional, rather than a rational level. The psukim:
Still, Ralbag (see image to the right) has a different explanation, where he seems to assume that she had some rational reason for her words and "accusation."
Thus, Ralbag first suggests that she suspected that Yaakov truly was at fault, and that he was, perhaps deliberately, holding back children from her. How so? Coitus interruptus, that is dash mibifnim vezoreh bebachutz, or something similar to this. And this is why Yaakov responded with such hostility to an accusation otherwise (I would say) simply leveled in anguish.
Indeed, I would point out that this idea is not without basis. For example, Lemech was the first with two wives, and the midrash criticizes him, saying that he had one for children and one for beauty, such that presumably practiced contraception with one of them to preserve her beauty. And indeed, IIRC, this was also what a midrash states Er was doing when he practiced the same, to preserve her beauty. Considering that the pasuk relates that Rachel was very pretty, and that he loved her more than Leah, one could argue that this is what Rachel suspected Yaakov of doing -- having children through Leah, and keeping Rachel for her beauty, and thus taking steps to preserve it. Ralbag does not suggest the above, but I am just fleshing out the idea. Indeed, according to Ralbag, Yaakov wanted Rachel more because he thought she would produce for him healthier offspring than Leah, who seemed to have some sort of eye disease (see earlier in Ralbag.)
Then Ralbag offers another suggestion, and states that he thinks this is preferable, that Rachel knew the power of Yaakov, that he could give her some advice, al tzad hachochma, via wisdom/science, about how to succeed. And then Yaakov grew angry and her and responded as he did, that it was Hashem who was withholding it from her.
Still, Ralbag (see image to the right) has a different explanation, where he seems to assume that she had some rational reason for her words and "accusation."Thus, Ralbag first suggests that she suspected that Yaakov truly was at fault, and that he was, perhaps deliberately, holding back children from her. How so? Coitus interruptus, that is dash mibifnim vezoreh bebachutz, or something similar to this. And this is why Yaakov responded with such hostility to an accusation otherwise (I would say) simply leveled in anguish.
Indeed, I would point out that this idea is not without basis. For example, Lemech was the first with two wives, and the midrash criticizes him, saying that he had one for children and one for beauty, such that presumably practiced contraception with one of them to preserve her beauty. And indeed, IIRC, this was also what a midrash states Er was doing when he practiced the same, to preserve her beauty. Considering that the pasuk relates that Rachel was very pretty, and that he loved her more than Leah, one could argue that this is what Rachel suspected Yaakov of doing -- having children through Leah, and keeping Rachel for her beauty, and thus taking steps to preserve it. Ralbag does not suggest the above, but I am just fleshing out the idea. Indeed, according to Ralbag, Yaakov wanted Rachel more because he thought she would produce for him healthier offspring than Leah, who seemed to have some sort of eye disease (see earlier in Ralbag.)
Then Ralbag offers another suggestion, and states that he thinks this is preferable, that Rachel knew the power of Yaakov, that he could give her some advice, al tzad hachochma, via wisdom/science, about how to succeed. And then Yaakov grew angry and her and responded as he did, that it was Hashem who was withholding it from her.
How Sure Was Avraham of Hashem's Command To Bind Yitzchak?
Over at eLomdus (read it first), a presentation of Rambam's different take on Avraham during the Akeida, in parshat Vayera. The classic, famous, explanation of Avraham's nisayon (which he cites from Avi Ezri, Rav Shach's commentary on Rambam's Mishneh Torah) was that since the revelation of prophets (other than Moshe) was not panim el panim, and there is a measure of interpretation involved, in any prophecy he did not intrepret it in a more convenient manner, but rather took it at its simple, intended level.
In contrast, Rambam writes in Moreh Nevuchim that there was no doubt in what the meaning of this, and other, prophecies were, or else Avraham could not have acted as he did. Indeed Rambam takes the fact that Avraham acted as he did as proof that there was no such doubt.
Here, by the way, is someone who develops this idea earlier -- Ralbag. He writes in his commentary on the Torah, roughly, as follows:
Even if we said this, it would still be somewhat different from the Rambam. The Rambam would not read in any possibility of safek, because it was absolutely clear. And so I do not think Rambam would consider valid the idea that this was Avraham's test.
Indeed, Rambam would seem not to consider this a test at all (or any nisayon so), but rather a way of demonstrating to the nations these two facts -- of Avraham's dedication and also of the clarity of prophecy.
At any rate, in the end, Yitzchak was not slaughtered. And this was indeed, possibly, the true meaning of the original prophecy, and Avraham would have possibly arrived at that result had he engaged in a bit more iyyun into Hashem's words. But Hashem was in control, and made sure nothing, in the end, happened amiss. And Avraham passed the test by his attitude, and by not delving, because of his great eagerness to fulfill Hashem's command, even such an otherwise stunning, mind-boggling, and ethically challenging one.
Again, see eLomdus for the summary of Rambam's position. And read also the Rambam, in Moreh Nevuchim (3:24) inside -- available here. (There is a commentary on those pages I am not including, for the sake of space, but I do provide the main text here, especially since every other page there is upside down. Click on the pictures to make them larger. And while the whole perek is about nisayon, the relevant portion about the clarity of prophecy is in the last of these three images.)
In contrast, Rambam writes in Moreh Nevuchim that there was no doubt in what the meaning of this, and other, prophecies were, or else Avraham could not have acted as he did. Indeed Rambam takes the fact that Avraham acted as he did as proof that there was no such doubt.
Here, by the way, is someone who develops this idea earlier -- Ralbag. He writes in his commentary on the Torah, roughly, as follows:
Depending on how one understands this statement, there are different levels at which this conflicts with Rambam. One could try to harmonize it at some level, assuming the simple meaning was indeed the full intended meaning. It was then clear to Avraham what Hashem wanted, as it would be clear to any prophet. But even so, with the stakes so high, he might not have valued Hashem's command so much, and would have tried to rationalize it. And that would have taken him away from the clear truth. That does not mean that there really was a safek. But rather, to channel Jack Worthing from The Importance of Being Ernest, "I could deny it if I liked. I could deny anything if I liked." When one sins, one justifies all sorts of things, and (often) convinces oneself that it is the correct path. The mind is basically a machine which makes up rationalizations, and Avraham could have rationalized. But there was no real safek, and indeed the nevuah was clear.The test Hashem put to Avraham with this prophecy if it would be light in his eyes some specific thing to the honor of Hashem. And this is that if it was light in his eyes, he would not turn back from this, to interpret in this matter anything except that which one could understand from it in the beginning of delving. And if it was difficult in his eyes, and he sought for this statement a different meaning other that that which could be understood from it in the beginning of delving. And behold, Avraham understood this prophecy in accordance with what might be understood in it in the beginning of delving, and with all this he went forth with great diligence to perform that which he was commanded, according to his understanding {machshava}. And therefore, he arise early in the morning, saddled his donkey, etc..
Even if we said this, it would still be somewhat different from the Rambam. The Rambam would not read in any possibility of safek, because it was absolutely clear. And so I do not think Rambam would consider valid the idea that this was Avraham's test.
Indeed, Rambam would seem not to consider this a test at all (or any nisayon so), but rather a way of demonstrating to the nations these two facts -- of Avraham's dedication and also of the clarity of prophecy.
At any rate, in the end, Yitzchak was not slaughtered. And this was indeed, possibly, the true meaning of the original prophecy, and Avraham would have possibly arrived at that result had he engaged in a bit more iyyun into Hashem's words. But Hashem was in control, and made sure nothing, in the end, happened amiss. And Avraham passed the test by his attitude, and by not delving, because of his great eagerness to fulfill Hashem's command, even such an otherwise stunning, mind-boggling, and ethically challenging one.
Again, see eLomdus for the summary of Rambam's position. And read also the Rambam, in Moreh Nevuchim (3:24) inside -- available here. (There is a commentary on those pages I am not including, for the sake of space, but I do provide the main text here, especially since every other page there is upside down. Click on the pictures to make them larger. And while the whole perek is about nisayon, the relevant portion about the clarity of prophecy is in the last of these three images.)
When Yaakov Kissed Rachel, Was It Derech Chiba?
Over at Hirhurim, R' Gil Student cites R' Schachter who cites R' Yerucham Gorelick that when Yaakov kissed Rachel in this week's parsha, Vayeitzei, it was not derech chiba.
Indeed, despite the fact that he eventually married her, and that the pasuk a bit later says that he loved her, I would agree that pashut peshat in this pasuk is that it was not derech chiba.
Thus, for example, see Shadal on this pasuk. He writes:
See also Ralbag. He writes (see image, and get it at JNUL, pg 53, though you first need to install the plugin) that Yaakov kissed Rachel on the hand, or on the clothing, and cried -- and that this was the protocol of relatives, and he had already told her that he was a relative. (Despite the fact that this relating is mentioned in the next pasuk -- presumably he holds that this is the pluperfect, or that the order of the psukim don't necessarily reflect the exact order of events; we do not need to agree with this to still declare it a kiss of greeting a relative.)
Indeed, we see that this is the protocol of relatives (or perhaps others as well) greeting one another. For first we have:
But it is not just Yaakov and Rachel who kiss. In the very next pasuk:
on the mouth:
And then a bit later, in Vayishlach, Esav meets Yaakov after a long absence, and there is hugging, kissing, and weeping. Bereshit 33:
The fact that weeping occurs together with kissing in both stories of greeting relatives one has not seen in a long while (or at all) should inform us as to the nature of the kissing.
And then in Vayigash, when Yosef reveals his identity to his brothers, they kiss and cry. In Bereshit 45:
It is thus fairly clear to me that there was no impropriety, or derech chibba, in Yaakov's kiss, on a peshat level.
Indeed, despite the fact that he eventually married her, and that the pasuk a bit later says that he loved her, I would agree that pashut peshat in this pasuk is that it was not derech chiba.
Thus, for example, see Shadal on this pasuk. He writes:
וישק יעקב לרחל : נ"ל שהיתה נערה קטנה, ולפיכך כתוב ותרץ ותגד לאביה, ולא לבית אמה (כמו ברבקה, למעלה כ"ד כ"ח ) כי להיותה קטנה היתה עדיין מצויה בין האנשים
It would certainly not need to be derech chiba if she is such a young girl, from whom it still was tznius to hang around the men.
See also Ralbag. He writes (see image, and get it at JNUL, pg 53, though you first need to install the plugin) that Yaakov kissed Rachel on the hand, or on the clothing, and cried -- and that this was the protocol of relatives, and he had already told her that he was a relative. (Despite the fact that this relating is mentioned in the next pasuk -- presumably he holds that this is the pluperfect, or that the order of the psukim don't necessarily reflect the exact order of events; we do not need to agree with this to still declare it a kiss of greeting a relative.)Indeed, we see that this is the protocol of relatives (or perhaps others as well) greeting one another. For first we have:
But it is not just Yaakov and Rachel who kiss. In the very next pasuk:
on the mouth:
and he embraced When he (Laban) did not see anything with him (Jacob), he said, “Perhaps he has brought golden coins, and they are in his bosom.” [from Gen. Rabbah 70:13]If it is not derech chibba for these two relatives, in identical greeting situation, there is no reason to assume that it was derech chibba, just because of Rachel's gender.
and he kissed him He said,“Perhaps he has brought pearls, and they are in his mouth.” [from Gen. Rabbah 70:13]
And then a bit later, in Vayishlach, Esav meets Yaakov after a long absence, and there is hugging, kissing, and weeping. Bereshit 33:
| ד וַיָּרָץ עֵשָׂו לִקְרָאתוֹ וַיְחַבְּקֵהוּ, וַיִּפֹּל עַל-צַוָּארָו וַיִּשָּׁקֵהוּ; וַיִּבְכּוּ. | 4 And Esau ran to meet him, and embraced him, and fell on his neck, and kissed him; and they wept. |
And then in Vayigash, when Yosef reveals his identity to his brothers, they kiss and cry. In Bereshit 45:
It is thus fairly clear to me that there was no impropriety, or derech chibba, in Yaakov's kiss, on a peshat level.
Interesting Posts and Articles #100
- This brings back memories. Still defenses of Dan Rather and the fake Killian memos. See here and then here.
- Bush pardons 14, and cuts prison time for 2 others. Once again a presidential term is drawing to an end, and once again, we are trying to get a commuted sentence for Jonathan Pollard. See this post at LifeOfRubin, and the Jonathan Pollard website. Apparently, written letters about this are more effective than emails, online petitions, or phone calls.
- A tale of a rabbi assaulted in shul, from a while back. But then, I recall a kohen gadol pelted with etrogim...
- At GrokLaw, the repercussions of the Lori Drew case, in which violating terms of service of a web site would be considered a felony, punishable by jail-time, effectively making any web site administrator able to write law. This will in all likelihood be overturned. And here is a related article from Wired, explaining the perspective of the jurors.
- MOChassid begins discussing the coming crisis for Jewish institutions, due to the downturn of the economy.
- BlogInDb continues his review of The Torah Is Not Hefker. See parts 4, 5 and 6.
Wednesday, December 03, 2008
Other Instances of "Malachim" - Angels or Humans?
In the previous post, which was centered on parashat Vayeira, I discussed Ralbag's assertion that the malachim who visited Avraham, and who destroyed Sedom, were actually prophets.
This brings us to this week's parsha and next week's parsha. In Vayeitzei, Yaakov has a dream and sees malachim ascending and descending a ladder. And at the end of the same parasha, Yaakov meets a camp of malachim. And at the beginning of Vayishlach, Yaakov sends malachim.
How would Ralbag handle each of these?
I will provide a Ralbag excerpt. At the end of Vayeitzei, Ralbag writes:
"And Yaakov went on his way, to return to the land of his fathers, and he encountered a few of the prophets of the generation, or else angels of God appeared to him in a prophecy. And the first explanation is more apparent, for we do not [sic] find in this place a story of prophecy. And Yaakov said, when he saw them, this is an encampment of God, and for this reason he called the name of that place Machanayim (dual of camp), for there he was another encampment, which was to God, in addition to his own encampment which was also to/for God."
Do we indeed find this idea of an encampment of prophets? I would say that indeed we do, in I Shmuel 10, when Shaul ben Kish encounters a band of prophets:
and then:
וּפָגַעְתָּ חֶבֶל נְבִאִים
Compare with וַיִּפְגְּעוּ-בוֹ מַלְאֲכֵי אֱלֹהִים at the end of Vayeitzei. But on the other hand, compare with vayifga bamakom in the beginning of the parsha, where he saw the malachim in the dream, whatever type of malachim those were. If angels, it makes for a rather nice local parallel and framing. And Ralbag does consider angels as a possibility, if not necessarily the preferred choice.
In terms of the malachim Yaakov sends to Esav in next week's parsha, Ralbag explicitly says that they are human messengers, shluchim, rather than saying that they are malachim mamash.
What about in terms of the malachim of Yaakov's dream, in the beginning of the parsha? Ralbam just calls them malachim. But he does not call them neviim, which makes me think that he considers them to be angels. And add to this that here, at the end of Vayeitzei, he has absolutely no problem with angels, assuming that these angels are not walking around in meatspace but rather perceived in a prophecy or dream. So it seems safe to say that he maintains that these were angels Yaakov perceived in his vision, which was also why they were ascending and descending the stairway to heaven.
Note: I apologize to those awaiting replies to comments. I am swamped at the moment.
This brings us to this week's parsha and next week's parsha. In Vayeitzei, Yaakov has a dream and sees malachim ascending and descending a ladder. And at the end of the same parasha, Yaakov meets a camp of malachim. And at the beginning of Vayishlach, Yaakov sends malachim.
How would Ralbag handle each of these?
I will provide a Ralbag excerpt. At the end of Vayeitzei, Ralbag writes:
"And Yaakov went on his way, to return to the land of his fathers, and he encountered a few of the prophets of the generation, or else angels of God appeared to him in a prophecy. And the first explanation is more apparent, for we do not [sic] find in this place a story of prophecy. And Yaakov said, when he saw them, this is an encampment of God, and for this reason he called the name of that place Machanayim (dual of camp), for there he was another encampment, which was to God, in addition to his own encampment which was also to/for God."Do we indeed find this idea of an encampment of prophets? I would say that indeed we do, in I Shmuel 10, when Shaul ben Kish encounters a band of prophets:
and then:
וּפָגַעְתָּ חֶבֶל נְבִאִים
Compare with וַיִּפְגְּעוּ-בוֹ מַלְאֲכֵי אֱלֹהִים at the end of Vayeitzei. But on the other hand, compare with vayifga bamakom in the beginning of the parsha, where he saw the malachim in the dream, whatever type of malachim those were. If angels, it makes for a rather nice local parallel and framing. And Ralbag does consider angels as a possibility, if not necessarily the preferred choice.
In terms of the malachim Yaakov sends to Esav in next week's parsha, Ralbag explicitly says that they are human messengers, shluchim, rather than saying that they are malachim mamash.
What about in terms of the malachim of Yaakov's dream, in the beginning of the parsha? Ralbam just calls them malachim. But he does not call them neviim, which makes me think that he considers them to be angels. And add to this that here, at the end of Vayeitzei, he has absolutely no problem with angels, assuming that these angels are not walking around in meatspace but rather perceived in a prophecy or dream. So it seems safe to say that he maintains that these were angels Yaakov perceived in his vision, which was also why they were ascending and descending the stairway to heaven.
Note: I apologize to those awaiting replies to comments. I am swamped at the moment.
The Malachim Who Met With Avraham and Lot: Angels Or Humans?
This is more appropriate for parshas Vayera, but I did not look it up and finish it until fairly recently, and so I thought I would share it now. (Much of this is my own elaboration, and ideas, but you can read Ralbag inside for yourself, using the pictures.)
Avraham sees three malachim. And two of those malachim appear to Lot in Sodom. What is the nature of those malachim? Are they malachim mamash, that is angels? Or are they malachim in the sense of messengers, in this case messengers from God, that is prophets.
Ralbag elsewhere makes various malachim into Neviim -- e.g. the one that appears to Manoach and his wife, and I saw that he did so as well in Vayera, talking about how the destruction of Sodom and Gemorrah happened at the hands of his neviim. So I thought I would look it up in Ralbag and lay out where he explains this in full. He does so in the very beginning of his commentary on Vayera.
He notes that Avraham lifts up his eyes and sees "anashim," men.
Now, we can say, as Speiser does in Anchor Bible, that of course these were really angels, but Avraham does not know this yet, and so we are not supposed to know this yet. It should be a surprise for us as well, with a gradual revelation in the story. And once the secret has been revealed, we can refer to them as angels in the story of Lot.
But that is not how Ralbag takes it. Rather, they are actually men. They are prophets, and thus messengers of God. (He suggests Shem and Ever as possible identities of these prophets.)
Saying that they are people, human beings, helps the plausibility of the narrative in several places. For example, there is the difficulty that angels to not eat, such that the midrash needs to explain that they only made it appear that they were eating, in order to give honor to Avraham. And also, a "malach" greets Hagar at some point, and she is not shocked. Ralbag says here that that malach was a human prophet. Otherwise, we are forced towards the answer provided by the midrash, that we see angels often frequent Avraham's house, such that this angel did not faze her at all.
We also see that Rivkah went to consult God. If there were indeed prophets of God running all about in those days, it makes it easier to understand how she would go to consult God on this score.
So why the difference between Lot and Avraham in terms of referring to them as malachim or anashim? Ralbag suggests that since Avraham often had prophecy, compared to him they were mere men. But to Lot, who was not accustomed to prophecy, they were malachim, prophets.
This is a great echoing and adapting of Rashi, echoing a midrash, on the sudden shift to calling them angels:
There is also the fact that God speaks to Avraham in the preceding narrative. How so? Ralbag suggests this was a Divine revelation directly to Avraham, in the middle of the conversation, or else was a revelation to one of the prophets.
But did the malachim not perform open miracles in Sodom? Thus, in Bereishit 19:
might read this that they pulled him through a closed door. But in fact, we should read it as (e.g.) that they quickly opened the door a crack, grabbed Lot, yanked him indoors, and then closed the door behind them.
But they also smote them with blindness! Surely only an angel could do that?
Not so. We have precedent of a prophet doing this, namely Elisha, in II Kings 6:18:
So a prophet can do this, and with the same malady, sanverim.
They also overturned Sodom and Amora! Well, that was with God's actions, as the psukim themselves make clear. Or else, God empowered them to bring about such actions, just as God empowered Moshe in Egypt. So they can surely be human.
This might also go a long way to explaining the lack of power these angels seem to have. Lot brings them into the house because he is fearful for them, and he shuts the door behind the crowd. They let him initially offer his virgin daughters to the crowd, which the crowd rejects. One can certainly read this as them being in physical danger, and see that theme of palpable danger in the text, even though they were able to mount a defense of the house by smiting the people by the door with blindness.
So too the need to flee, and not delay to look back. They could not, apparently, provide a force field, as angels e.g. protected Chananiah, Mishael and Azarya, or Daniel, (or Avraham) in the furnace.
In terms of the dropping out of one of the anashim, he explains it similarly to the midrash, that one of them was only commanded about informing Sarah, and so his particular mission was over. This has to do with the limitation of these prophets' prophecy.
Despite all this, I am not entirely convinced that that is the meaning of malachim here. It makes it more palatable for rationalists who don't like the idea of angels walking around doing things. And perhaps the likes of Rambam would not need to see it all as an inspired day-dream. But on the other hand, who says that we must read our own biases into the Biblical text? And indeed, if one wants to read the meeting of the malachim with Avraham as one in which one of the "anashim" was Hashem himself (see other posts on this topic here), it would make more sense for Hashem to be accompanied by angels rather than prophets.
Avraham sees three malachim. And two of those malachim appear to Lot in Sodom. What is the nature of those malachim? Are they malachim mamash, that is angels? Or are they malachim in the sense of messengers, in this case messengers from God, that is prophets.
Ralbag elsewhere makes various malachim into Neviim -- e.g. the one that appears to Manoach and his wife, and I saw that he did so as well in Vayera, talking about how the destruction of Sodom and Gemorrah happened at the hands of his neviim. So I thought I would look it up in Ralbag and lay out where he explains this in full. He does so in the very beginning of his commentary on Vayera.
He notes that Avraham lifts up his eyes and sees "anashim," men.Now, we can say, as Speiser does in Anchor Bible, that of course these were really angels, but Avraham does not know this yet, and so we are not supposed to know this yet. It should be a surprise for us as well, with a gradual revelation in the story. And once the secret has been revealed, we can refer to them as angels in the story of Lot.
But that is not how Ralbag takes it. Rather, they are actually men. They are prophets, and thus messengers of God. (He suggests Shem and Ever as possible identities of these prophets.)
Saying that they are people, human beings, helps the plausibility of the narrative in several places. For example, there is the difficulty that angels to not eat, such that the midrash needs to explain that they only made it appear that they were eating, in order to give honor to Avraham. And also, a "malach" greets Hagar at some point, and she is not shocked. Ralbag says here that that malach was a human prophet. Otherwise, we are forced towards the answer provided by the midrash, that we see angels often frequent Avraham's house, such that this angel did not faze her at all.
We also see that Rivkah went to consult God. If there were indeed prophets of God running all about in those days, it makes it easier to understand how she would go to consult God on this score.So why the difference between Lot and Avraham in terms of referring to them as malachim or anashim? Ralbag suggests that since Avraham often had prophecy, compared to him they were mere men. But to Lot, who was not accustomed to prophecy, they were malachim, prophets.
This is a great echoing and adapting of Rashi, echoing a midrash, on the sudden shift to calling them angels:
the…angels But elsewhere (18:2) Scripture calls them men! When the Shechinah was with them, it calls them men. Another explanation: In connection with Abraham, whose power was great, and the angels were as frequently with him as men, it calls them men, but in connection with Lot, it calls them angels. — [from Gen. Rabbah 52; Tan. Buber, Vayera 20]We would need, perhaps to explain the shift to men in the narrative with Lot. But that is clear from the fact that the men of Sodom are talking about these humans in their own speech, and so the shift is accomplished. And so the men -- and indeed they are men -- take hold of his hand and the hands of his wife and two daughters, and bring them out of Sodom.
There is also the fact that God speaks to Avraham in the preceding narrative. How so? Ralbag suggests this was a Divine revelation directly to Avraham, in the middle of the conversation, or else was a revelation to one of the prophets.
But did the malachim not perform open miracles in Sodom? Thus, in Bereishit 19:
might read this that they pulled him through a closed door. But in fact, we should read it as (e.g.) that they quickly opened the door a crack, grabbed Lot, yanked him indoors, and then closed the door behind them.
But they also smote them with blindness! Surely only an angel could do that?
Not so. We have precedent of a prophet doing this, namely Elisha, in II Kings 6:18:
So a prophet can do this, and with the same malady, sanverim.
They also overturned Sodom and Amora! Well, that was with God's actions, as the psukim themselves make clear. Or else, God empowered them to bring about such actions, just as God empowered Moshe in Egypt. So they can surely be human.
This might also go a long way to explaining the lack of power these angels seem to have. Lot brings them into the house because he is fearful for them, and he shuts the door behind the crowd. They let him initially offer his virgin daughters to the crowd, which the crowd rejects. One can certainly read this as them being in physical danger, and see that theme of palpable danger in the text, even though they were able to mount a defense of the house by smiting the people by the door with blindness.
So too the need to flee, and not delay to look back. They could not, apparently, provide a force field, as angels e.g. protected Chananiah, Mishael and Azarya, or Daniel, (or Avraham) in the furnace.
In terms of the dropping out of one of the anashim, he explains it similarly to the midrash, that one of them was only commanded about informing Sarah, and so his particular mission was over. This has to do with the limitation of these prophets' prophecy.
Despite all this, I am not entirely convinced that that is the meaning of malachim here. It makes it more palatable for rationalists who don't like the idea of angels walking around doing things. And perhaps the likes of Rambam would not need to see it all as an inspired day-dream. But on the other hand, who says that we must read our own biases into the Biblical text? And indeed, if one wants to read the meeting of the malachim with Avraham as one in which one of the "anashim" was Hashem himself (see other posts on this topic here), it would make more sense for Hashem to be accompanied by angels rather than prophets.
Tuesday, December 02, 2008
Interesting Posts and Articles #99
- On Tuesday, December 2nd, 8:00 PM, at Lander College: Nobel Laureate Prof. Robert Aumann will speak on Economics and Torah.
- Rabbi Ari Enkin discusses the custom of pouring out water in the proximity of someone who was niftar. I think some of the presentation is over the top, though it is all in the sources.
- A Mother in Israel discusses the importance of correcting others, in certain cases, based on this article by Rabbi Ginsberg on the same topic. And at Beyond BT, on the same topic, about how to instruct others on the proper course of action, in the particular case, sifting flour for kashrut purposes. Of course, one step to take is to make sure that others are indeed in need of correcting. See the comments there, also.
- At the Seforim blog, a discussion of two editions of Rabbi Chaim Berlin's Responsa. Some interesting responsa, and some interesting things which have been edited out.
- At Chaptzem, a note from the person who made the "Ich Vil Zain a Rebbe" ("I Want To Be A Rebbe") video, explaining his motivations. (Originally posted on an earlier Chaptzem post.) He also claims that he just made the song, but someone else made the images (and translation) which accompany the song. This could have some real repercussions on how to interpret the song, where it may have been intended somewhat differently. Thus, for example, when he sings that the Rebbe is busy, the Rebbe is meeting with the president, the image shows Rabbi Yisroel Dovid Weiss of Neturei Karta meeting with Ahmadinejad. To see the video, and a discussion of how it was taken down due to fraudulent DMCA notices, see this post on parshablog.
Monday, December 01, 2008
Peyos Up Or Down?
A post from SemGirl from a month ago got me thinking. It was already fodder for one post here on parshablog, in terms of the tzavaah of Rabbi Yehuda haChassid and the practice of not marrying someone with the same name as your parent. But there is also:
At first glance, it seems like a triviality. And indeed it is. Who cares whether the long peyos are up or down?!
But then I thought about it some more, and I can see in it a dispute which is happening over and over again in modern society. It is a contention between mimetic tradition vs. book learning, and between certain poskim (and kol korei writers who champion said poskim) vs. established Jewish practice.
Indeed, it is quite possible that we can lay the blame for breaking up this shidduch at the doorstep of Rav Chaim Kanievsky, shlita.
How did it develop that the peyos in some communities are worn up, and in others down? There are different theories, but it may be a valid question whether those theories are ex-post-facto rationalizations, or whether they are in sync with the facts.
For example, wear peyos up, based on a Zohar and thus a kabbalistic idea that the peyos of the head should not touch the peyos of the beard. Or one should really wear the peyos down, but people used to hide their peyos because of decrees from the Czar that they should not go about with long peyos. Or it is more convenient to have them back, so that they don't get caught in the heavy machinery. ;)
Apparently, Rav Kanievsky wrote in a sefer (see here) that the reason was the decrees. And nowadays there is no decree, and so the proper thing to do is be proud you are a Jew and wear them down.
Fine. That is a wonderful psak, and many rabbonim the world-over make similar declarations about major or minor things for their constituents.
However, IMHO, it would be a good thing to keep in mind that not everyone is Rav Kanievsky's constituent. Many people in other communities follow other rabbonim and poskim, and they might not suddenly drop the practice of their community, which their rabbis and poskim themselves practice, at the mention of Rav Kanievsky's opinion in the matter. And at the same time, some of Rav Kanievsky's constituents are idiots who do not realize this, and think that Rav Kanievsky and Rav Elyashiv are the gedolei hador, such that anyone who acts otherwise to their opinion is a mechutzef and an apikores.
When people from other communities wear their peyos up behind their ears, they are most certainly not stating that they are embarrassed about being a Jew. Quite likely, they are growing a long beard at the same time, chassidishe malbush, and so on, such that they are clearly identifiable as Jews. Indeed, they may keep their peyos up for convenience, or because they believe that this is a holy minhag of their community, perhaps based on kabbalistic reasons. And even if a great Rabbi from Eretz Yisrael declares that the optimal course of action is otherwise, they have their own mehalech, and own mimetic tradition on the matter.
I wonder whether Rav Kanievsky is aware that when he makes such a statement verbally or in print, some people might then try to impose this as psak on other unwilling groups of frum Jews -- and if he is aware of this, whether he should hedge his remarks to make it clear that he is not condemning those who continue in their own practice. (Just as Rav Yaakov Yosef recently opposed the census in Israel but made clear that he was not protesting against those who follow other positions.)
My guess -- the SemGirl post is not specific on this point -- is that the chassan wore his peyos up behind his ears. Meanwhile, the girl's parents were from a community that wore their peyos down, and or they encountered the statement from Rav Kanievsky, or some other modern posek, that the ideal was wearing them down, so as not to be ashamed of one's Judaism.
The girl's parents told the boy about this, expecting him to comply with the words of the Gedoylim, namely the "psak" of Rav Kanievsky. But should the chassan abandon something he considers an important practice, and minhag of his community, because he has been told that a certain Rav has paskened otherwise? Perhaps he has his own poskim. Should he deligitimize the minhag of his community, when Minhag Yisrael Torah Hi?
The sensible answer is that of course he should cave. Pru eRevu is a Biblical commandment, and whatever kabbalistic reasons, or whatever status of this minhag, in pales in comparison. Plus there is also the consideration of shalom, and of shalom bayis.
In some families, they make a potato kugel and a lukshen kugel, with the second kugel being called the shalom bayis kugel. Because the wife's family's minhag was potato kugel and the
husband's family's minhag was lukshen kugel, and so they make both to preserve both minhagim and to maintain shalom bayis. Perhaps the same should apply here, and the chassan should have caved. (The compromise of one-up and one-down would not have worked, because besides looking silly, it would be a violation on one side, since quote unquote "al pi din," the peyos had to be down.)
But of course, people are people. And the reaction was probably "How dare they say that our minhag is invalid, worse than theirs, and a practice based on shmad? We are not going to cave? We are holy Jews, with holy minhagim, and we are not going to change because of someone ignorantly spouting that our minhag is wrong." And as the personalities on both sides, of both in-laws got into the picture, the fight escalated until finally the shidduch was broken off - at least until it was resurrected.
And they may have had a point. This particular case, or whether the peyos are up or down, is just silly. But in general, what is going to happen in the marriage when the chassan's community has one halachically-grounded practice, which is his minhag, and his in-laws come at him with some psak from Rav Kanievsky or Rav Eliashiv?? To take some examples from Rav Eliashiv, Rav Elyashiv holds that one must wait six hours between yellow cheese and meat (see here), and perhaps he does not hold of this. Or Rav Elyashiv is against modern sheitels. And Rav Eliashiv is apparently against using psychiatrists and psychologists. And against heter mechira. Not to argue against these particular psakim, but the point is that there are certainly other great rabbis who take contrary opinions, which this chassan and his community might well hold of. Is this peyos dispute, and resolution, a good precedent, and a good template for interactions in their marriage in the future? The establishing of such boundaries seems critical.
A friend of mine really worked overtime, laboriously for months, making a Shidduch. Boy likes girl, girl likes boy , blaaaa blaa, blaaa. Wonderful, they get engaged. Dont say Mazal Tov, just yet. One set of in-laws was adamant that the Choson wear his payos up, the other was just as adamant that he wear them down. Ultimately, it proved to be such a bone of contention that the engagement was called off. After much heated negotiation and mediation, they got back together. Even though, the Shadchan was in Israel on business, they were cajoled into proceding , as its such a volatile situation, it was too risky to wait . I kid you not. I thought of the perfect compromise. How about, one payos up, and one payos down..And see the discussion at WolfishMusings.
At first glance, it seems like a triviality. And indeed it is. Who cares whether the long peyos are up or down?!
But then I thought about it some more, and I can see in it a dispute which is happening over and over again in modern society. It is a contention between mimetic tradition vs. book learning, and between certain poskim (and kol korei writers who champion said poskim) vs. established Jewish practice.
Indeed, it is quite possible that we can lay the blame for breaking up this shidduch at the doorstep of Rav Chaim Kanievsky, shlita.
How did it develop that the peyos in some communities are worn up, and in others down? There are different theories, but it may be a valid question whether those theories are ex-post-facto rationalizations, or whether they are in sync with the facts.
For example, wear peyos up, based on a Zohar and thus a kabbalistic idea that the peyos of the head should not touch the peyos of the beard. Or one should really wear the peyos down, but people used to hide their peyos because of decrees from the Czar that they should not go about with long peyos. Or it is more convenient to have them back, so that they don't get caught in the heavy machinery. ;)
Apparently, Rav Kanievsky wrote in a sefer (see here) that the reason was the decrees. And nowadays there is no decree, and so the proper thing to do is be proud you are a Jew and wear them down.
Fine. That is a wonderful psak, and many rabbonim the world-over make similar declarations about major or minor things for their constituents.
However, IMHO, it would be a good thing to keep in mind that not everyone is Rav Kanievsky's constituent. Many people in other communities follow other rabbonim and poskim, and they might not suddenly drop the practice of their community, which their rabbis and poskim themselves practice, at the mention of Rav Kanievsky's opinion in the matter. And at the same time, some of Rav Kanievsky's constituents are idiots who do not realize this, and think that Rav Kanievsky and Rav Elyashiv are the gedolei hador, such that anyone who acts otherwise to their opinion is a mechutzef and an apikores.
When people from other communities wear their peyos up behind their ears, they are most certainly not stating that they are embarrassed about being a Jew. Quite likely, they are growing a long beard at the same time, chassidishe malbush, and so on, such that they are clearly identifiable as Jews. Indeed, they may keep their peyos up for convenience, or because they believe that this is a holy minhag of their community, perhaps based on kabbalistic reasons. And even if a great Rabbi from Eretz Yisrael declares that the optimal course of action is otherwise, they have their own mehalech, and own mimetic tradition on the matter.
I wonder whether Rav Kanievsky is aware that when he makes such a statement verbally or in print, some people might then try to impose this as psak on other unwilling groups of frum Jews -- and if he is aware of this, whether he should hedge his remarks to make it clear that he is not condemning those who continue in their own practice. (Just as Rav Yaakov Yosef recently opposed the census in Israel but made clear that he was not protesting against those who follow other positions.)
My guess -- the SemGirl post is not specific on this point -- is that the chassan wore his peyos up behind his ears. Meanwhile, the girl's parents were from a community that wore their peyos down, and or they encountered the statement from Rav Kanievsky, or some other modern posek, that the ideal was wearing them down, so as not to be ashamed of one's Judaism.
The girl's parents told the boy about this, expecting him to comply with the words of the Gedoylim, namely the "psak" of Rav Kanievsky. But should the chassan abandon something he considers an important practice, and minhag of his community, because he has been told that a certain Rav has paskened otherwise? Perhaps he has his own poskim. Should he deligitimize the minhag of his community, when Minhag Yisrael Torah Hi?
The sensible answer is that of course he should cave. Pru eRevu is a Biblical commandment, and whatever kabbalistic reasons, or whatever status of this minhag, in pales in comparison. Plus there is also the consideration of shalom, and of shalom bayis.
In some families, they make a potato kugel and a lukshen kugel, with the second kugel being called the shalom bayis kugel. Because the wife's family's minhag was potato kugel and the
husband's family's minhag was lukshen kugel, and so they make both to preserve both minhagim and to maintain shalom bayis. Perhaps the same should apply here, and the chassan should have caved. (The compromise of one-up and one-down would not have worked, because besides looking silly, it would be a violation on one side, since quote unquote "al pi din," the peyos had to be down.)
But of course, people are people. And the reaction was probably "How dare they say that our minhag is invalid, worse than theirs, and a practice based on shmad? We are not going to cave? We are holy Jews, with holy minhagim, and we are not going to change because of someone ignorantly spouting that our minhag is wrong." And as the personalities on both sides, of both in-laws got into the picture, the fight escalated until finally the shidduch was broken off - at least until it was resurrected.
And they may have had a point. This particular case, or whether the peyos are up or down, is just silly. But in general, what is going to happen in the marriage when the chassan's community has one halachically-grounded practice, which is his minhag, and his in-laws come at him with some psak from Rav Kanievsky or Rav Eliashiv?? To take some examples from Rav Eliashiv, Rav Elyashiv holds that one must wait six hours between yellow cheese and meat (see here), and perhaps he does not hold of this. Or Rav Elyashiv is against modern sheitels. And Rav Eliashiv is apparently against using psychiatrists and psychologists. And against heter mechira. Not to argue against these particular psakim, but the point is that there are certainly other great rabbis who take contrary opinions, which this chassan and his community might well hold of. Is this peyos dispute, and resolution, a good precedent, and a good template for interactions in their marriage in the future? The establishing of such boundaries seems critical.
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