Interesting Posts and Articles #71

1. Achas LeMaalah asks about a real of apparent contradiction of midrashim, one which states that people were worried about marrying Rus since she was a Moabite, and then Boaz paskened Moavi velo Moavit; another which states she came from Balak (and according to some sources, patrilineally descended); and a third which states that Balak was really from Midian. If he was from Midian and Rus was a descendant, why should anyone think a prohibition should apply? He is going to offer an answer. In the comment section, I suggest that (a) they might be contradictory midrashim; (b) or that from the words of the pasuk, Balak is obviously included, and so he was considered a Moabite, having joined the Moabite people before the prohibition kicked in. Perhaps one can also come up with a slightly farfetched harmonization that since they did not yet know Boaz' diyuk of Moavi velo Moavis, they were worried about matrilineally descended Moabites as well...
   
   He follows up with his answers here.
   
   
2. The development of the gasoline pump, over at Wired.
   
   
3. Rabbi Dr. David Berger issues a clarification. The Village Voice erroneously attributed to him a statement that Judaism in general has a certain theological belief:
   

   "Judaism says that in every generation, there is a righteous person that connects the world to the divine energy," he explains. "If there is no leader, the world would actually cease to exist. So the fact that the rebbe has died and that the world continues to exist is a conundrum to them, and it leads them to believe that the rebbe must not have died. But even people who believe he did die find this to be a challenging question." They resolve it, he adds, by opining that we're living in strange times, or that the rebbe is still providing the divine connection from his grave.

   Such that people were now claiming that even he now admits to the legitimacy of this position. Daas Torah asked him for a clarification, and he notes he clarified in a comment at the newspaper's website:
   

   “I am quoted as saying the following: ‘Judaism says that in every generation, there is a righteous person that connects the world to the divine energy. If there is no leader, the world would actually cease to exist.’ I said this about Lubavitch hasidism, not about Judaism as a whole.” Ad kan.

   And he continues to clarify at length. Read it all.
   
   In the comment section of that post, someone bring up a Teshuvot Radvaz as support for looking at a picture of the Rebbe, or Baba Sali, prior to prayer. (And perhaps during?) But I would not that the teshuva explicitly is talking about a connection while the two are alive. And it seems to be used in the context of learning Torah. Anyhoo, in a subsequent post, he cites another teshuva from the Radvaz that shows the Radvaz was against making images.
   
   
4. FactCheck.org has an article debunking several smears against Palin.
   
   
5. "Idiots" at the Checkpoints, at A Soldier's Mother.
   
   
6. Muslims believe Chava is buried in Saudi Arabia, but there is of course no Biblical basis for this assertion. An interesting read. And it shows how fake kevarim can crop up, something that we should be wary of. But then, there is this:
   

   Asked if he had heard of any other final resting place for Eve, {William} Dever said, "No. There are tombs of Abraham all over the place, but I don't honestly know in Israel or the West Bank or Jordan of any Eve tomb in these places."

   He is obviously unfamiliar with the midrashim and traditions placing Adam and Chava in maarat hamachpela. And in the very same tomb as Avraham, which Dever presumably knew about. Perhaps they should have consulted a different expert.
   
   
7. Carbon dating flawed ... past 150 million years ago.
   
   
8. Wolfish Musings and Emes veEmunah on Rav Twersky's pullout, under pressure, from a task force on sexual abuse. Both wonder at the motivations of the people who pressured him to resign. Please note that this is not that I am saying that it is a good thing he resigned, but if I might venture my guess as to their motivations, I might add to the list the possibility of concern that some other members of the task force would act irresponsibly, and that having this rabbinic impremateur of Rav Twersky would then prop up those actions. Much like the Rabbinic membership in the Awareness Center, and subsequent resignation.
   
   
9. Middah Keneged Middah for Bar Lev? (hat tip: Shirat Devorah, from Arutz Sheva)
   

   Monday morning, the preparations began for demolition of a house owned by Southern District Police Commander Uri Bar-Lev. The house is to be demolished due to safety issues that arose because of a softening of the land it was built on.
   
   ...
   
   Marzel came to the site to witness the preparations. “I came to see a miracle that hasn’t happened in the land since the time of Korach,” he explained to IsraelNN TV’s Yoni Kempinski. Korach is the biblical character who, along with his house, sunk into the earth after challenging the authority of Moses.
   
   ...
   
   Bar-Lev himself, who owns a much larger house adjacent to the structure being demolished, seemed not particularly troubled. He approached the IsraelNN TV cameraman and recommended returning the next morning for better footage, as the bulldozers and tractors won’t arrive till then.

   I wonder, though, at this type of public reaction and rejoicing. This would seem to be a peshat-level application of the recommendation in Mishlei 24:17:
   בִּנְפֹל אויביך (אוֹיִבְךָ), אַל-תִּשְׂמָח; וּבִכָּשְׁלוֹ, אַל-יָגֵל לִבֶּךָ
   
   
10. A guest poster at Dreaming Of Moshiach notes that Hurricane Ike is short version of the name Isaac, and we can then connect it to Yitzchak and thus to Akeidas Yitzchak, where a ram was sacrificed in his place, symbolizing the shofar. And wonder of wonders, the path of Hurricane Ike looks just like a shofar! See the image.
    
    The problem with this assertion, to my mind, is that many, many projected paths of hurricanes are curved in exactly this way. Do a Google image search for hurricane projected path and you will see. For example, Hurricane Hannah; Hurricane Dean; Hurricane Rita; and Hurricane Katrina. Furthermore, it seems quite likely to me that the widening, which is what makes it look more like a shofar, is not the actual hurricane widening. Remember that these are pictures of the projected path. (See the note on this and other images that it is a projected path, rather than the actual path.) The further you guess the position in the future, the more uncertainty there is, for the hurricane can veer slightly to the left or the right. They therefore show it widening, to cover a larger and larger possible area, with the actual hurricane somewhere within that area.
    

Daf Yomi Gittin 62a: ואין כופלין שלום לעובדי כוכבים

An interesting gemara in today's daf (available in Rif Yomi here):

ואין כופלין שלום לעובדי כוכבים
רב חסדא הוה מקדים יהיב להו שלמא
ר"נ בר יצחק אמר להו שלמא למר
תניא לא יכנס אדם בביתו של עובדי כוכבים ביום אידו ויתן לו שלום מצאו בשוק נותן לו בשפה רפה ובכובד ראש

'Nor to give double greeting to heathens' --
Rav Chisda would give them greeting first.
Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak {our gemara: Rav Kahana} used to say: Peace {to you,} sir.

They learnt {in a brayta}: A man should not enter the house of a heathen on his feast day and give him greeting. Should he meet him in the street, he should greet him in a mumbling tone and with downcast head.'

I did not look far -- anywhere past the actual daf, but I had a thought that I did not see in Rashi or Tosafot. We know from other languages that there is sometimes a pattern in which one responding to a greeting gives a greeting that is stronger. Thus, in Yiddish, in response to "gut morgen," one would say "gut yohr."

Thus, I would suggest that Rav Chisda giving heathens greeting first is not showing his leniency in this regard, but rather a strategy in avoiding giving the double greeting of "shalom shalom." For in response to a shalom, one would double the shalom. And similarly, perhaps we can interpret Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak, of Rav Kahana's statement of shelama lemar not as Rashi gives it, that he says this and really has in mind Hashem -- something Tosafot objects is geneivas daas -- but rather also something that he says in response. That is, say that the heathen greeted Rav Kahana with shalom first, but rather than saying shalom, shalom, he one-upped it in a different way, by saying shalom leMar, calling him "master" as a way of respect.

Gittin 62b: A Woman Conveying Her Own Get, And Begging The Question

I was troubled by the following gemara, but haven't researched it deeply enough to see if there is a resolution offered by Rishonim/Acharonim, or if my question is really a question. So all this might really be amaratzus.

The following translation pulled from my Rif Yomi blog, on Gittin 62b:

פשיטא: איש הוי שליח להולכה שכן בעל מוליך גט לאשתו
אשה הויא שליח לקבלה שכן אשה מקבלת גיטה מיד בעלה
איש לקבלה ואשה להולכה מאי
ופשטינן דאיש הוי נמי שליח לקבלה שכן אב מקבל גט לבתו קטנה ואשה נמי הויא שליח להולכה שכן אשה עצמה מביאה גיטה
כדתנן האשה עצמה מביאה גיטה ובלבד שתהא צריכה למימר בפני נכתב ובפ"נ
ואוקימנא בהולכה

It is obvious that a man may be an agent for conveying, for a husband may convey a get to his wife; and that a woman may be an agent for receiving, for a woman may receive her get from the hand of her husband.
A man for receiving and a woman for conveying, what?
And we resolve that a man may also be an agent for receiving, for a father may indeed receive a get for his minor daughter. And a woman may also be an agent for conveying, for a woman may indeed herself bring her get, as we learn {in a Mishna}, "the woman herself may bring her get, except she needs to say 'before me it was written and before me it was signed."
And we establish this as conveying.

I would read the basis of the question of the gemara as follows: A person cannot be a shliach for something that he himself cannot do. And so, how could a man be an agent to receive the get? After all, Biblically, the man does the divorcing, and he is not the recipient of a get given by his wife. If so, how can he act as an agent? And the answer is that there is a paradigm for a man receiving a get, so since he can receive a get Biblically, in general he can act as an agent for this.

There is an alternative, that this is not a question of whether a man ever is the actual recipient of the get, but rather whether he can act as an agent for receiving. And in the case of accepting the get for his minor daughter, he is acting as her stand-in. Thus, we have Biblical precedent, which we can extend to other cases.

But I would favor the former reading of the question, at least for now. And assuming the former reading, I have the following issue: The gemara asks whether women can act as shliach leholacha. And the answer is that a woman can, based on the Mishna which states that the wife may bring her own get.

But that seems to be begging the question -- proving something only by assuming as axiomatic the very thing you are trying to prove. After all, a woman bringing her own get would seem to be agency, rather than a din in and of the woman herself. As we see for example in Gittin 5a:

ותנן האשה עצמה מביאה גיטה ובלבד שצריכה לומר בפ"נ ובפ"נ שלא תחלוק בשליחות

Is there any basis for saying otherwise? If this is agency, where she is the shliach of the husband until she reaches her destination, then this is an instance of a woman working as a shliach. But we have not proven that can do it as a primary actor, for a get she is using to divorce someone else. So one can cite the Mishna, but what is the basis of that Mishna?

Perhaps we can say as above, that this is rather a matter of precedent, rather than one of whether the person is beTorat holacha of a get.

Another related issue which might also resolve it is what the definition of holacha and shliach leholacha is. Is this just traveling with a get under your control? If so, why should we need any kind of diyuk? This is a glorified postman, but one who must make sure that no one tampers with it. To coin an idiom (wink), the question should not be how we know a man, or a woman, can be a shliach leholacha. A monkey should be able to do it, or a parrot. Why not?

If, on the other hand, the shliach leholacha is also a shliach for giving the get -- such that one person or his agent, the shliach leholacha gives, and another person or her agent, the shliach lekabbalah receives -- then we are speaking of agency for giving a get. If I recall correctly, in the Jewish colony of Elephantine, women could initiate divorce. However, according to halacha, the man divorces the woman and not the other way around. If a woman cannot give a get, how could she be an agent to give a get?

I also wonder at the reason for needing to prove a man or a woman can be a shliach lekabbalah or a shliach leholacha/nesina in the first place. Why assume that they need to be betoras nesinas gittin or betoras kabbalas gittin in the first place? A woman's chatzer is koneh for her, and it is not betoras. Rather, it acquires property, and that property in this case is the get, which then has the effect of making the woman divorced. And we know from elsewhere that both men and women can acquire and transfer ownership. Let them be shluchim for this transfer of ownership, empowered by the husband or the wife, and once they are koneh or makneh, the divorce takes effect!

Perhaps we can combine all of this, and suggest that this was the question of the gemara. What is the nature of this shlichus? Do they need to be betoras nesinas/kabbalas gittin? Or even if not, such as a man for kabbalah and a woman for nesina? And the answer is given by showing precedent in all these ways, such that we know that they do not need to be betoras. And so we rely on precedent in these cases.

It may work, but I have reservations about this. Specifically, the focus on the man bringing his own, and the women bringing her own, seems to strongly suggest that the idea is agency only if you yourself can do it. Please let me know in the comment section what I am missing.

Bluish Joggers 2.0

I introduced a Jewish Blog aggregator a while back, but that had its problems. And I just recently decided to revamp it. Go to BluishJoggers.blogspot.com.

It works on a blogpost by blogpost basis, so people can submit their own, or others' blogposts, which they think are particularly deserving.

Please submit your recent blogpost. So far, I only have my own, which is boring. Let me know what you think here in the comments, or there in the comments.

Thanks,
Josh

Does Homeopathy Have A Basis In Authentic Jewish Mysticism and Thought?

Shirat Devorah links to an interesting article by Rabbi Yitzchak Ginsburgh, of his Gal Einai Institute, relating Kabbalah to the four contemporary medical methods -- Homeopathy, Allopathy, Osteopathy, and Naturopathy. The website touts itself as "Authentic Jewish Mysticism and Thought based on the teachings of Harav Yitzchak Ginsburgh."

But this does not strike by as "authentic Jewish mysticism." Rather, this is modern, New-Age kabbalah, which takes various approaches in alternative medicine and invests them with a pseudo-mystical framework. Before this article, many of these approaches already developed their own mystical frameworks, such that they are not just medicine but also spirituality and/or kishuf. For example, osteopathy. And those with Jewish leanings will try to invest these practices with "deep" kabbalistic meanings, often just reworkings of those other foreign beliefs clothed in kabbalistic terminology.

I am not claiming that homeopathy, or osteopathy, etc., does not work, nor that it does work. I am not going to address that issue in this post at all, because it is irrelevant to the topic at hand. The topic at hand is whether kabbalah, or authentic Jewish teaching, really discusses e.g. homeopathy, or whether sources are being misused and corrupted in order to lend Jewish credence to those ideas.

I'll focus on one particular paragraph, and then assess it.

Thus, Rabbi Ginsburgh writes:

The underlying principle of this healing system is known as the “law of similars,” where one paradoxically uses either the disease itself or something similar to the disease as the cure. This principle, long known to mankind, finds its explicit expression in the idiom of the sages as healing “like by like.”1 Furthermore, the sages teach that this is the method employed by God Himself, who “sweetens [that is, heals] bitterness with bitterness.”2 “Like by like” implies that the cure lies within the disease itself, meaning that the disease is merely a foreign “shell” of evil containing within it a kernel of good.

Firstly, regarding

This principle, long known to mankind, finds its explicit expression in the idiom of the sages as healing “like by like.”

I cannot find this explicit expression in the idiom of the Sages of healing "like by like." I will have to rely on the footnote provided by the author of the article (Rabbi Ginsburgh?) and assume that that is what he is referring to. In the footnote, the author writes:

See Nachmanides on Numbers 21:9.

The implication is that this will show that Ramban holds that one can cure like by like in general. But the actual Ramban, talking about the nachash henechoshet, shows Ramban saying the exact opposite:

ויעש משה נחש נחושת -

לא נאמר לו לעשותו של נחושת, אלא אמר משה הקב"ה אמר לי נחש, אני אעשנו של נחושת, לשון נופל על הלשון, זה לשון רש"י מדברי רבותינו (ב"ר לא ח).

ולא הבינותי זה, שהרי הקב"ה לא הזכיר לו "נחש" אלא "עשה לך שרף". אבל דעתם לומר כי הלך משה אחר שם העצם אשר לו.
והנראה בעיני בסוד הדבר הזה, כי הוא מדרכי התורה שכל מעשיה נס בתוך נס, תסיר הנזק במזיק ותרפא החולי במחליא, כמו שהזכירו (מכילתא ויסע א): בויורהו ה' עץ (שמות טו כה): וכן במלח אלישע במים (מ"ב ב כא). וידוע מדרכי הרפואות, שכל נשוכי בעלי הארס יסתכנו בראותם אותם או בראות דמותם, עד כי נשוכי הכלב השוטה וכן שאר הבהמות השוטות אם יביטו במים יראה להם שם בבואת הכלב או המזיק וימותו, כמו שכתוב בספרי הרפואות ומוזכר בגמרא במסכת יומא (פד א).

וכן ישמרו אותם הרופאים מהזכיר בפניהם שם הנושך, שלא יזכרו אותם כלל כי נפשם תדבק במחשבה ההיא ולא תיפרד ממנה כלל עד שתמית אותם. וכבר הזכירו דבר מנוסה מפלאות התולדה, כי נשוך הכלב השוטה אחרי שנשתטה בחוליו אם יקובל השתן שלו בכלי זכוכית יראה בשתן דמות גורי כלבים קטנים, ואם תעביר המים במטלית ותסננם לא תמצא בהם שום רושם כלל, וכשתחזירם לכלי הזכוכית וישתהו שם כשעה תחזור ותראה שם גורי הכלבים מתוארים, וזה אמת הוא בפלאי כוחות הנפש.

וכשיהיה כל זה כך, ראוי היה לישראל נשוכי הנחשים השרפים שלא יראו נחש ולא יזכרו ולא יעלו על לב כלל, וציוה הקב"ה למשה לעשות להם דמות שרף, הוא הממית אותם. וידוע כי הנחשים השרפים אדומי העיניים רחבי הראש שגופם כעין הנחושת בצווארם, ולכן לא מצא משה לקיים מצוותו בשרף בלתי שיעשה נחש נחושת כי הוא דמות נחש שרף, ואם יעשנו מדבר אחר היה דמות נחש ולא דמות שרף. ומה שאמרו מן הלשון הנופל על הלשון, כי הזכרת השם בלבד תזיק. והכלל, כי ציווה השם שיתרפאו במזיק הממית בטבע ועשו דמותו ושמו, וכשיהיה האדם מביט בכוונה אל נחש הנחושת שהוא כעין המזיק לגמרי, היה חי, להודיעם כי השם ממית ומחיה:

Thus, Ramban writes that the sod in this is that this miracle of healing people of their snake-bites is a miracle within another miracle, a nes betoch nes. Because as is well known to the doctors, the medical reality is that "like hurts like," not that "like cures like." By all rights, seeing the snake would kill them, rather than heal them. And he gives examples. And Ramban agrees with his contemporary doctors on this point.

Thus, this is not Chazal (Ramban) endorsing "like cures like." Rather, it is Chazal endorsing the opposite, but Hashem is using like to cure like which is entirely opposite the derech hateva, in order to make it more of a miracle. So Ramban does discuss the concept, but not to say it is a valid methodology. Presenting it the way he does is incredibly misleading.

Also, Ramban is a major kabbalist. If what the author presents in the rest the article is "authentic kabbalah," shouldn't Ramban the kabbalist know about homeopathy, and list it as an alternative, rather than stating the position of contemporary doctors against homeopathy as definite medical fact?

The author continues endorsing homeopathy with the statement that

Furthermore, the sages teach that this is the method employed by God Himself, who “sweetens [that is, heals] bitterness with bitterness.”2

What is his basis for this? In footnote 2, he writes:

Bereishit Rabbah 77a.

This sourcing is also somewhat disappointing. That midrash states:

דברים לג) אין כאל ישורון רוכב שמים בעזרך

ר' ברכיה בשם ר' יהודה בר' סימון אמר:
אין כאל ומי כאל ישורון, הנאים והמשובחין שבכם, אתה מוצא כל מה שהקדוש ברוך הוא עתיד לעשות לעתיד לבא, הקדים ועשה על ידי הצדיקים בעולם הזה.
הקב"ה מחיה המתים,
ואליהו מחיה את המתים.

הקדוש ב"ה עוצר גשמים,
ואליהו עוצר גשמים.

הקדוש ברוך הוא מברך את המועט,
ואליהו מברך את המועט.

הקדוש ברוך הוא מחיה את המתים,
ואלישע מחיה את המתים.

הקדוש ברוך הוא פוקד עקרות,
ואלישע פוקד עקרות.

הקדוש ברוך הוא מברך את המועט,
ואלישע מברך את המועט.

הקדוש ברוך הוא ממתיק את המר,
ואלישע ממתיק את המר.

הקדוש ברוך הוא ממתיק את המר במר,
ואלישע המתיק את המר במר.

Thus, the midrash begins with the statement that there is none like Hashem. The idea is that Hashem does things well outside of derech hateva. The midrash continues that these are things that Hashem will do in the future, but indeed, his prophets, or rather the righteous, will precede Him in performing miracles in this world. An example is resurrection of the dead. Hashem will do it in the future, but Eliyahu and Elisha already did it, as we see in Tanach. And Hashem will make the bitter sweet, and so did Elisha. And Hashem will make the bitter sweet via bitter, and so did Elisha. This, once again, is the example of the nes betoch nes, that not only did he make the bitter into sweet, but he did it in a totally miraculous way, against the derech hateva, such that it is clear it is miraculous. That is why it is listed as two separate nissim -- making bitter into sweet, and more than that, making bitter into sweet via bitter.

So yes, it is the way that Hashem will operate, and that makes it a wonderful thing. But that does not necessarily mean that "bitter" in this case is metaphorical for a general curing via the same; and it does not mean that this is the general way of the world, the derech hateva, instead of something miraculous, such that medical practitioners, rather than righteous prophets, should be engaging in it and expect to have any kind of results.

If you want to find some sort of precedent of "like cures like" and quasi-endorsement by Chazal (rather than modern interpretations of Biblical stories, based on the eigel hazahav, the nachash hanechoshet, and Moshe sweetening the bitter waters), we can look to the Mishna in Yoma (83a)

מי שאחזו בולמוס מאכילין אותו אפי' דברים טמאים עד שיאורו עיניו מי שנשכו כלב שוטה אין מאכילין אותו מחצר הכבד שלו ר' מתיה בן חרש מתיר

where the idea is to feed someone bitten by a rabid dog the liver of that rabid dog, as a cure. Rabbi Matia endorses this and permits it, but the Tanna Kamma forbids feeding him this traif food.

Rashi explains that even though the (contemporary) doctors did practice giving it, the Tanna Kamma do not consider it a refuah gemurah. But Rabbi Matia does consider it a refuah gemurah. And so this is not Chazal giving basis, based on spiritual knowledge, to homeopathic practice, but rather a dispute in the metziut, whether this cure practiced by contemporary medical practitioners, is effective.

The Yerushalmi (Yoma 41b) elaborates that this cure does not work:

גרמני עבדיה דר' יודן נשייא נשכו כלב שוטה והאכילו מחצר כבד שלו ולא נתרפא מימיו אל יאמר לך אדם שנשכו כלב שוטה וחיה שעקצו חוורבר וחיה שבעטתו פרדה וחיה ובלבד פרדה לבנה

And so this is not a very solid basis for promoting homeopathy. Again, this does not mean that it does not work, or that it does work. That is an entirely separate question.

Shadal on Shiluach HaKan

There is a famous statement in the fifth perek of Brachot:
האומר על קן ציפור יגיעו רחמיך, ועל טוב ייזכר שמך, מודים מודים--משתקין אותו
and the gemara says, in Berachot 33b:
אלא על קן צפור יגיעו רחמיך מ"ט פליגי בה תרי אמוראי במערבא רבי יוסי בר אבין ורבי יוסי בר זבידא חד אמר מפני שמטיל קנאה במעשה בראשית וחד אמר מפני שעושה מדותיו של הקדוש ברוך הוא רחמים ואינן אלא גזרות

The second reason more certainly would be that we should not be understanding it as mercy. In terms of the first reason, perhaps it is mercy, but one should not mention it because of the kinah it would arouse, or else it is not because of Hashem's mercy on the bird -- for otherwise why would He favor one animal over another?

At any rate, on the topic of sending away the mother bird, in parshat Ki Teitzei, Shadal writes:

כי יקרא קן צפור לפניך

: כשאדם קרב אל הקן , אלמלא רחמיה על בניה היתה האם נמלטת לנפשה ועוזבת אפרוחיה , אבל היא מאהבתה את בניה תשליך את נפשה מנגד ותעמוד שם להצילם ולא תברח למלט את נשפה . על כן אין ראוי לקחתה , שאם יהיה אדם לוקחה , יהיה מעשה הצדקה והאהבה שאהבה את בניה גורם לה רעה . והנה המכוון במצווה הזאת היא לכבד המידות הטובות ולקבוע בלבותינו כי לא יצא מצדקה הפסד , שאם היה מותר לקחת האם תחת אהבתה את בניה , היה מתרשם בלב האדם כי החמלה ענין גרוע ומנהג שטות הגורם רעה לבעליו , ועכשו שלקיחתה אסורה לנו , יקר תפארת מידת החמלה יוחק בלבנו חיקוי עמוק .

Shadal's explanation is related, but not exactly identical. This is not an aspect of Hashem, and people, showing mercy -- not taking the em with the banim. But it is to reinforce the idea of mercy, and to make sure that this attribute is not degraded in your eyes. Generally, a bird would flee when you approach the nest. But here, the em is rovetzet over it, in order to protect her children. You might take advantage of this, in order to capture the mother bird as well. But then, the idea would be engraved in the heart of man that mercy is a lowly matter and a silly custom, which causes evil to those who practice it. Therefore, taking the mother bird was prohibited to us, so that the attribute of chemla should be engraved deeply in our hearts.

Interesting Posts and Articles #70

1. JNUL posts Yeshuos Meshicho, from Abarbanel. This is often a source quoted to show that mashiach can arise from the dead. The place where he discusses this, within the context of discussing the Yerushalmi about Menachem ben Chizkiyah, is on pages 32-35. Has this been translated and made publically available? If not, perhaps I will put it on my queue.
   
   
2. Oh, and they also post the Kuzari.
   
   
3. Emes VeEmunah finds a heartening letter/article by a Lubavitcher about whether the Rebbe is mashiach, but swiftly becomes disheartened. One topic of the letter is how pashut peshat in the Rambam has given way to drasha, something I wrote about earlier in my post about how Ben Gurion is a better messianic candidate than the Lubavitcher Rebbe.
   
   
4. A Microsoft KnowledgeBase article on how to insert random text into your Word document.
   
   
5. Via Hirhurim, a shiur by Rabbi Willig about women rabbis. (part one and part two)
   
   
6. Over at Mystical Paths, a post responding to my earlier comment on a post about Yisurin, and whether the gemara can be read to refer to emotions rather than actions. And my comment in reply, also posted on the main blog. The discussion perhaps continues, when I get the chance...
   
   
7. Shirat Devorah excerpts Faith and Folly, about Palm reading, and whether palmistry is kosher. The conclusion: way back when, it was a real thing, transmitted to the Sages, but then the knowledge was concealed. Nowadays, palm readers have turned it into a silly thing, and Rav Shach said that it is a violation of tamim tihyeh im Hashem Elokecha.
   
   I would disagree somewhat. While I think that today it is silly and a violation of tamim tihyeh, way back when, palmistry and face reading was similarly nonsense, but it was regarded as science, just as much nonsense was regarded as science. Back then, perhaps people including Rabbis practiced it, but that was no violation of tamim tihyeh, as it was a science. Then, with kabbalah and practical mysticism, this was garbed in mysticism. Nowadays, it is not science, and it is often not practiced as part of a systematic theological system, and so it is indeed often a violation of tamim tihyeh im Hashem Elokecha.
   
   Unfortunately, she also posts something purportedly by an autistic, from a methodology, facilitated communication, which is also likely a violation of tamim tihyeh.
   

Daf Yomi Gittin 58a-b: Does ארצי ליה זוזי mean that the buyer gives money, or that the recipient counts out the money given to him?

From my Rif blog:

{Gittin 58a}
Gemara:

לקח מסיקריקון כו'. אמר רב לא שנו אלא דאמר ליה לך חזק וקנה אבל בשטר קנה
ושמואל אמר אף בשטר לא קנה עד שיכתוב לו אחריות

"IF A MAN BUYS FROM THE SICARICON...":
Rav said: They only learned this where he {the original owner} said to him {the buyer} "Go and take possession {via chazaka, by working the land} and acquire it." But with a written deed, he acquires.
And Shmuel said: Even with a deed he does not acquire until he writes for himself responsibility {for reimbursing him if the title proves invalid}.

{Gittin 58b}

ואותבינן עליה דרב מהא דתניא
רבי שמעון בן אלעזר אומר לקח מן האשה בכתובתה וחזר ולקח מן האיש מקחו קיים מן האיש וחזר ולקח מן האשה מקחו בטל עד שיכתוב אחריות
ופריק מאי אחריות נמי שטר
והלכתא כשמואל דקי"ל דכל היכא דפליגי רב ושמואל ולא איתמר הלכתא כחד מינייהו הלכתא כשמואל בדיני ועוד דתניא מסייעא ליה
ופירוקא דרב שינויא הוא ולא סמכינן אשינויא

And they object to Rav from this that they learnt {in a brayta}:

Rabbi Shimon ben Eleazar says: If one buys [a married woman's property] from the wife and then buys it again from the husband, his purchase is effective. But if he first buys from the husband and then from the wife the purchase is invalid, unless he {our gemara: she} writes responsibility.

And it resolves: What is "responsibility?" It is also a written deed.
And the halacha is like Shmuel, for we establish that wherever Rav and Shmuel argue, and the halacha is not stated like one of them, the halacha is like Shmuel in laws {dinei, such as monetary matters}. And furthermore, that there is a brayta which supports him, and resolution of Rav {that Rav could offer} is a mere shinuya {a weak retort and a way of reading his position into the brayta with difficulty}, and we do not rely on a shinuya.

ואי קשיא לך ההיא דגרסינן בחזקת הבתים אמר רב הונא תליוה וזבין זביניה זביני
ואותיב רב המנונא עליה דרב הונא מהא מתני' לקח מסיקריקון וחזר ולקח מבעל הבית מקחו בטל
ואמאי התם נמי נימא אגב אונסיה גמר ומקני
ופריק הא איתמר עלה אמר רב לא שאנו אלא דא"ל לך חזק וקנה אבל בשטר קנה
ואקשינן ולשמואל דאמר אף בשטר לא קנה מאי איכא למימר
ופריק מודה שמואל היכא דיהיב זוזי
ואסיקנא והלכתא בכולהו זביניה זביני ואפי' בשדה זו בין ארצי ליה זוזי בין לא ארצי ליה זוזי אלא בשטר בלבד קנה וכי אמר ליה בתר הכין תא שקול זוזך לא מצי למהדר ביה
למימרא דהלכתא כרב דאמר לא צריכינן לכתיבת אחריות
ההיא לא קשיא מידי דהא אמרינן מודה שמואל היכא דיהיב זוזי
ואע"ג דאיפסיקא הלכתא בין ארצי ליה זוזי בין לא ארצי ליה זוזי התם גבי תליוה וזבין דעתיה למיתן ליה זוזי ודעתיה דמוכר למישקל מיניה זוזי
אבל הכא גבי אשה וסיקריקון ליכא מאן דיהיב להו זוזי הילכך לא מהניא כתיבת שטר עלייהו עד דכתיבי אחריות:

And if it is difficult to you this that we learned in Chezkat HaBatim {the third perek of Bava Batra}:

{Bava Batra 47b}
Rav Huna said: If someone is threatened {with physical violence} and he sells, his sale is valid.
{Bava Batra 48a}
And Rav Hamnuna objects to Rav Huna from this Mishna {local to Gittin}:

'If a man buys a field from a sicarius and then buys it again from the original owner, the purchase is void.'

But why? There {in the Mishna} as well, let us say that because of compulsion he decided to sell it ?
And it resolves: Behold, Rav said upon it {=the Mishna, as we see local to Gittin}: They only learned this in the case where he said "take hold {chazaka} and acquire," but with a {written} deed, he does acquire.
And we ask: But according to Shmuel who said that even with a {written} deed, he does not acquire, what is there to say?
And they resolve: Shmuel admits in the case where he gives money.
And we conclude {Bava Batra 48b}: And the halacha in all of these is that his sale is a valid sale, even for {threats to sell} "this field" {rather than just "a field"}, and whether he counted out for him the money or did not count out for him the money -- but rather just did the acquisition with a {written} deed, and when he says to him after this "come, take your money," he is not able to retract.

That is to say that the halacha is like Rav who said that we do not require the writing of responsibility.

{This is difficult because Rif would like to rule in accordance with Shmuel, for the reasons given above. And so:}

This is no question at all, for we say that Shmuel admits in the case where he gave money. And even though we rule the halacha is whether he gives him money or does not give him mother, there, where he was pressured and sold, his intent was to give him money and the intent of the seller was to take money from him. But here, by the woman and the sicarius, there is none who gives them money. Therefore, the writing of the deed does not help them until they write responsibility.

End quote from the Rif.

The portion marked in red above is not in our gemara and seems to be Rif's gloss. Also, in our gemara we have ארצי זוזי instead of ארצי ליה זוזי. Rif, and Tosafot who happens to have ארצי ליה זוזי, understand this as giving over the money as payment. Therefore, the alternative, which Rif offers as a gloss, is that he did not give money but only had a shtar. In contrast, see Rabbenu Gershom, who understands this phrase as the recipient counting out the money after he is given it, to make sure that all is there. If so, this is different from דיהיב זוזי. And if so, this hilchesa is certainly in agreement with Shmuel, such that there is no question. Indeed, the assumption is that money was given, for otherwise, there would not be two alternatives of counting out the money or not counting it. But Rif interprets this as simply giving money, and it is valid even if no money is given, but only a shetar.

Saying Tehillim In Its Entirety While Standing

Cross-posted to Segulah Watch:

Reb Akiva at Mystical Paths analyzes a brand new segulah, perhaps some of it from Rabbi Yom Tov of Bnei Brak, of saying all of Tehillim while standing up, and finds troubling aspects of it, in terms of a "subtle deviation from Torah Judaism concepts." He finds troubling aspects of the "cleaning and preparing"; "being prepared for the coming light"; and the "surrender". See inside.

I would add that it strikes me as adding more suffering in order to improve the efficacy of the segulah, which is strange. And more than that, see Tosafot on Berachot 51b, dibbur hamatchil והלכתא בכולהו יושב ומברך, where he states that since Birchat haMazon is Biblical, they imposed a chumra that one should sit while bentching, rather than standing. I would add that sitting allows one to have increased focus and concentration, which is how I would understand this extra requirement by bentching. And indeed, that is how Aruch haShulchan, Orach Chaim, siman 183, seif 8 explains it, where he also suggests that one be machmir for al haMichya to sit.

Why, then, would it be better to stand while saying all of Tehillim, such that one is not able to focus as well? Because it is a hard thing to do, so God will reward Olympic Tehillim zugging, rather than Tehillim said with introspection, thought, and emotion? Do we not say that Rachmana liba ba'i, Hashem desires our hearts? It seems to me that the idea of saying all of Tehillim, rather than specific perakim relevant to the request or problem, such that one can channel one's bakasha through those words, also seems motivated by the idea that Hashem awards Olympic Tehillim zugging rather than intent and feeling.

At any rate, here is the segulah:

by Sara of (an unnamed Kabbalah discussion site)

The Segulah of reading the entire book of Tehilim standing up

The Story

It was ten years ago when I first learned the Segulah of reading the entire book of Tehilim standing up.

I was in Israel and was consulting Rabbi Yom Tov in Bnei Brak from time to time. Most of our communication was conducted over the phone, but he was seeing people at a small room outside his home so I went to see him sometimes for guidance and sometimes just to discuss life.

I always returned with gifts and on one very special occasion the gift was that he shared with me this Segulah that brought a lot of change into my life.

I was talking about a situation that I wasn't sure how to solve in a way that would serve everyone. I kept feeling that I was missing something and then he told me:

"You know there is something that I've learned from my Rabbi many years ago. If you read the entire book of Tehilim standing up you are able to ask for anything and your request would be granted".

I looked at him and asked the first thing I that came into my mind. It takes a long time can you stand for so long? Won't your feet hurt?

He looked back at me and said ask for help and it would be given.

The process

After cleaning and preparing for the event. Just stand in the place you feel is most suitable.

Say the prayers that are said before reading Tehilim chapters and then just start reading out loud.

It takes almost three hours including the closing prayers that are said after reading Tehilim chapters.

When you finish make your personal requests, thank for anything that comes and rest.

Be prepared for a sleepless night as the coming light is so strong that the entire body feels so much alive you might not need sleep. It varies from person to person but I know several people whose body reacted the same way.

The requests

I was planning to ask for help in some concrete situation but at the end all I could ask was for guidance and that the situation would resolve at the best way that reflected Hashem will.

I completely forgot about all the things I thought were a desirable result and it is a very good thing that I did as what happened was much beyond what I could have asked for.

The key is to surrender.

A word of advice

Don't let your set goals and desires to scare you into not surrendering in this way.

I too was concerned that the things I wanted to ask for were too ordinary to use such a strong Segulah. At the end of the reading you'll know exactly what to ask and it won't be something trivial.

Don't turn it into something you do more than you need to as there is a great wisdom in asking for just the right amount of light and blessings that you really need.

Shofetim: Capital Punishment Based On Two Or Three Witnesses, and the False vs. Failed Witness

An interesting Ramban, al derech hapeshat, and endorsed by Shadal as peshat:

The pasuk states:

ו עַל-פִּי שְׁנַיִם עֵדִים, אוֹ שְׁלֹשָׁה עֵדִים--יוּמַת הַמֵּת: לֹא יוּמַת, עַל-פִּי עֵד אֶחָד.

6 At the mouth of two witnesses, or three witnesses, shall he that is to die be put to death; at the mouth of one witness he shall not be put to death.

Ramban writes:

ו): על פי שנים עדים או שלשה עדים -

אם מתקיימת עדות בשנים למה פרט לך בשלשה, להקיש שלשה לשנים, מה שנים עדות אחת אף שלשה עדות אחת, ואין נעשין זוממין עד שיזומו כולן, לשון רש"י.

וכן אם נמצא אחד מהם קרוב או פסול העדות כולה בטלה, והם כולם נהרגים ומשלמים ממון בהזמתן, שעיקר הכתוב להקיש שלשה לשנים בכל דבריהם כדעת רבותינו (מכות ה ב).

ועל דרך הפשט אמר הגאון רב סעדיה:

שנים עדים, או שלשה מקבלי עדות השנים.

ואין בכתוב קבלת עדות, רק עדים. אבל כמדומה לי שטעה הגאון בדינו, כי עדות דיני נפשות לא תקובל רק בפני סנהדרין של עשרים ושלשה:

אבל פשוטו של מקרא, לאמר שיומת המת על פי שנים עדים כשאין שם יותר, או על פי שלשה אם ימצאון שם שלשה. יאמר הכתוב כאשר הוגד לך ושמעת תדרוש הדבר היטב על פי כל העדים הנמצאים שם. והנה אם שמענו שעבר בפני שלשה, נשלח בעבורם ויבואו לב"ד ויעידו כולם, והוא הדין למאה, כי בשמענו דברי כולם יתברר האמת, ואם לא היו שם יותר או שהלכו להם ואינם נמצאים שם, בשנים די:

That is, Rashi says that this is to tell you that a set of three is the same as a set of two, such that they are not made zomemim until all three are shown to be such. While it may be halachically true and derived from this pasuk, it strikes one as derash rather than peshat.

He cites Rav Saadia Gaon as (apparently) a case of eid mipi eid, that the three heard from the two. Perhaps this hearsay is admissible because three comprise a bet din. But Ramban objects that capital cases are only heard by a Sanhedrin of 23. That may well be true as a matter of actual halacha, which incorporates derash (I am not sure how Saadia Gaon was operating), but he might have envisioned that these three hedyots were sufficient to comprise a bet din, who could then tell over the testimony to the full bet din of 23 who would render judgment. I don't know, and I don't have time this week to delve into it.

So then Ramban suggests that bet din only accepts the testimony of two witnesses when there are only two witnesses, but if there are more, such as three, they must continue investigating and accept the testimony of the third witness as well, for something so serious as a capital case.

And Shadal writes on that:
או שלשה : כרמב"ן שמצווה לחפש אחר רוב עדים , ולא נאמר : מצאנו שנים די לנו

I am not so convinced of this as a matter of peshat, that the pasuk is trying to teach an obligation to hear other witnesses. (Recall that we are bound by halacha, which encompasses derash, but the study of peshat is still a worthwhile endeavor.)

It is not so easy to argue things which are true by Biblical poetry for the stuff of law codes, but I am going to do something approaching that. The pasuk again is:

ו עַל-פִּי שְׁנַיִם עֵדִים, אוֹ שְׁלֹשָׁה עֵדִים--יוּמַת הַמֵּת: לֹא יוּמַת, עַל-פִּי עֵד אֶחָד.

6 At the mouth of two witnesses, or three witnesses, shall he that is to die be put to death; at the mouth of one witness he shall not be put to death.

and the immediately preceding context is that someone is doing idolatry, and you, the court hears of it. Then, you seek witnesses, and on the basis of eyewitness testimony, you can render a verdict of the death penalty.

Thus, fuller context is:

ג וַיֵּלֶךְ, וַיַּעֲבֹד אֱלֹהִים אֲחֵרִים, וַיִּשְׁתַּחוּ, לָהֶם; וְלַשֶּׁמֶשׁ אוֹ לַיָּרֵחַ, אוֹ לְכָל-צְבָא הַשָּׁמַיִם--אֲשֶׁר לֹא-צִוִּיתִי.	3 and hath gone and served other gods, and worshipped them, or the sun, or the moon, or any of the host of heaven, which I have commanded not;
ד וְהֻגַּד-לְךָ, וְשָׁמָעְתָּ; וְדָרַשְׁתָּ הֵיטֵב--וְהִנֵּה אֱמֶת נָכוֹן הַדָּבָר, נֶעֶשְׂתָה הַתּוֹעֵבָה הַזֹּאת בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל.	4 and it be told thee, and thou hear it, then shalt thou inquire diligently, and, behold, if it be true, and the thing certain, that such abomination is wrought in Israel;
ה וְהוֹצֵאתָ אֶת-הָאִישׁ הַהוּא אוֹ אֶת-הָאִשָּׁה הַהִוא אֲשֶׁר עָשׂוּ אֶת-הַדָּבָר הָרָע הַזֶּה, אֶל-שְׁעָרֶיךָ--אֶת-הָאִישׁ, אוֹ אֶת-הָאִשָּׁה; וּסְקַלְתָּם בָּאֲבָנִים, וָמֵתוּ.	5 then shalt thou bring forth that man or that woman, who have done this evil thing, unto thy gates, even the man or the woman; and thou shalt stone them with stones, that they die.
ו עַל-פִּי שְׁנַיִם עֵדִים, אוֹ שְׁלֹשָׁה עֵדִים--יוּמַת הַמֵּת: לֹא יוּמַת, עַל-פִּי עֵד אֶחָד.	6 At the mouth of two witnesses, or three witnesses, shall he that is to die be put to death; at the mouth of one witness he shall not be put to death.

But for such a thing, a single witness is not sufficient. For this, and other capital cases, it might be someone with a grudge. Such would become a case of the accuser's word vs. the accused's word. Why should we take this one's word over the other's, especially when such a serious penalty is involved?

On an entirely peshat level, this could be two separate people who see the same event, or two people seeing different events of idolatry with the same individual. With one person, it is X's word against Y's, but if two or three people come forward, in the process of investigating, you listen to the relevant testimony, and then act based on it.

So the focus is not necessarily three as opposed to two. Rather, it is two as opposed to one, and three as opposed to one. I would agree that the Ramban is correct that bet din, in this investigative stage, is supposed to go through the various witnesses that exist, which means listening to two, or three, or I would say even four or five witnesses. But that is the underlying assumption of the pasuk, that bet din would listen to a bunch of relevant witnesses, and then render judgment. But it is not necessarily coming out of its way, on a peshat level, to inform us that in the event there are three, listening to two is not sufficient, and this perhaps as a fulfillment of the directive two pesukim earlier of וְדָרַשְׁתָּ הֵיטֵב--וְהִנֵּה אֱמֶת נָכוֹן הַדָּבָר, with an emphasis on הֵיטֵב. In theory, it is certainly possible that a bet din might be sufficiently convinced after two witnesses, such that they deem further acceptance of testimony saying the same thing to be unnecessary. But at the same time, they might decide to hear all the relevant testimony. The contrast is to the one witness.

Indeed, this is related to something a bit later in the parsha, where on a peshat level we have the expansion of the idea that with a single witness, it is one's word against the other's. In Devarim 19, two perakim later, we hear the case of eidim zomemim. This is contentious territory, since there were disputes between the Prushim and the Tzedukim about the meaning of zamam, and so on. But just looking at these pesukim on a peshat level, we have a case of a single person arising with an accusation:

טו לֹא-יָקוּם עֵד אֶחָד בְּאִישׁ, לְכָל-עָו‍ֹן וּלְכָל-חַטָּאת, בְּכָל-חֵטְא, אֲשֶׁר יֶחֱטָא: עַל-פִּי שְׁנֵי עֵדִים, אוֹ עַל-פִּי שְׁלֹשָׁה-עֵדִים--יָקוּם דָּבָר.	15 One witness shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity, or for any sin, in any sin that he sinneth; at the mouth of two witnesses, or at the mouth of three witnesses, shall a matter be established.
טז כִּי-יָקוּם עֵד-חָמָס, בְּאִישׁ, לַעֲנוֹת בּוֹ, סָרָה.	16 If an unrighteous witness rise up against any man to bear perverted witness against him;
יז וְעָמְדוּ שְׁנֵי-הָאֲנָשִׁים אֲשֶׁר-לָהֶם הָרִיב, לִפְנֵי ה, לִפְנֵי הַכֹּהֲנִים וְהַשֹּׁפְטִים, אֲשֶׁר יִהְיוּ בַּיָּמִים הָהֵם.	17 then both the men, between whom the controversy is, shall stand before the LORD, before the priests and the judges that shall be in those days.
יח וְדָרְשׁוּ הַשֹּׁפְטִים, הֵיטֵב; וְהִנֵּה עֵד-שֶׁקֶר הָעֵד, שֶׁקֶר עָנָה בְאָחִיו.	18 And the judges shall inquire diligently; and, behold, if the witness be a false witness, and hath testified falsely against his brother;
יט וַעֲשִׂיתֶם לוֹ, כַּאֲשֶׁר זָמַם לַעֲשׂוֹת לְאָחִיו; וּבִעַרְתָּ הָרָע, מִקִּרְבֶּךָ.	19 then shall ye do unto him, as he had purposed to do unto his brother; so shalt thou put away the evil from the midst of thee.
כ וְהַנִּשְׁאָרִים, יִשְׁמְעוּ וְיִרָאוּ; וְלֹא-יֹסִפוּ לַעֲשׂוֹת עוֹד, כַּדָּבָר הָרָע הַזֶּה--בְּקִרְבֶּךָ.	20 And those that remain shall hear, and fear, and shall henceforth commit no more any such evil in the midst of thee.
כא וְלֹא תָחוֹס, עֵינֶךָ: נֶפֶשׁ בְּנֶפֶשׁ, עַיִן בְּעַיִן שֵׁן בְּשֵׁן, יָד בְּיָד, רֶגֶל בְּרָגֶל. {ס}	21 And thine eye shall not pity: life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot.

Chazal, and Rashi following them (see here), interpret these pesukim in an interesting, midrashic way. The first pasuk says eid echad, thus establishing firstly that it is talking about one witness, and establishing secondly that anywhere else where it does not qualify it with the word echad, it is talking about two witnesses. One might think that the entire context here is then a single witness, all the way until pasuk 20. But they sever pasuk 15 from the rest, and so the idea of an eid who is zomem in the subsequent pesukim is talking about a set of eidim. Then, where it says וְעָמְדוּ שְׁנֵי-הָאֲנָשִׁים אֲשֶׁר-לָהֶם הָרִיב, they separate it off and make וְעָמְדוּ שְׁנֵי-הָאֲנָשִׁים as the two witnesses, while אֲשֶׁר-לָהֶם הָרִיב refers to the litigants. This is all well and good within the system of midrash halacha.

On a peshat level, however, what these verses are saying is that two witnesses or more comprise the testimony of witnesses, which are accepted in court. Though not stated, of course one might be able to show that these are evil witnesses who are lying, in which case certainly the punishment of eidim zomemim would be appropriate. Nothing in the verses contradicts this, and is goes along with the spirit of the law inherent here.

But what the pesukim are saying on a peshat level is that when one witness arises, he is to be considered as just someone contending with the other person with an accusation. So we do not automatically trust him. Rather, bet din must do further investigation. And so, וְעָמְדוּ שְׁנֵי-הָאֲנָשִׁים אֲשֶׁר-לָהֶם הָרִיב, they stand in court, the two who have the dispute. This is the one accusing witness and the accused, who are considered now to have a riv, a dispute, between them.

The full pasuk is:
וְעָמְדוּ שְׁנֵי-הָאֲנָשִׁים אֲשֶׁר-לָהֶם הָרִיב, לִפְנֵי ה, לִפְנֵי הַכֹּהֲנִים וְהַשֹּׁפְטִים, אֲשֶׁר יִהְיוּ בַּיָּמִים הָהֵם
What is the meaning of lifnei Hashem here? Especially when afterwards we have "before the priests and the judges?" The two possibilities is that there is some divination based on the Urim veTumim here, such that they are doresh Hashem in court to determine who is telling the truth. Perhaps we can read this into וְדָרְשׁוּ הַשֹּׁפְטִים הֵיטֵב. But what seems at the moment more correct, as a matter of peshat, is that the kohanim imposed or interpreted law, and at other times it might be another shofet, bayamim hahem. And standing before these people judging Torah law is like standing before God. This is exceptionally relevant for the other pasuk of ad haElohim yavo devar sheneihim. We need not say that Elohim is chol and means judges, or that some divination is deciding it. Rather, before God means before judges. Rashi on this perek approaches this idea, when he interprets lifnei Hashem with the juxtaposition to judges as:

It should seem to them as though they are standing before the Omnipresent, as it says:“in the midst of the judges He will judge"

Perhaps they impose an oath. Perhaps they do derisha and chakirah of the accuser and the accused to see who is telling the truth. Or perhaps they seek out other witnesses to back up the one witness's accusation, or at least one other witness to back of the claim, such that it is really a kat edut.

Then, sometimes, the one witness will be determined to have been a false accuser. I do not think that, as a matter of peshat, a failed witness is the same as a false witness. The imposition of kaasher zamam is only where they determine, based on וְדָרְשׁוּ הַשֹּׁפְטִים הֵיטֵב, that he is an eid sheker.

After coming to this reading myself, I see that Shadal writes something similar on perek 19:

כי יקום עד חמס באיש : והנה עד שקר העד , אולי מדין תורה היו מקבלין עד אחד וכותבים דבריו וממתינים , אם יבוא עד שני ויצטרפו לעדות . גם נראה שעד שקר היה נענש גם אם לא בא עד אחר להצטרף עמו ( תלמידי מוהר"ר הל ברוך קנטוני ).

Thus, he agrees that we are talking throughout about a single witness. And he suggests that Biblically one witness's words will be written down, and then they would wait. And then a later single witness could come and combine. This, I would suggest, is the function of the derisha, that they try to establish the edut. But on the other hand, it might not be established. He writes that perhaps a false witness would be punished as an eid zomem even if they don't combine to two. I would agree with that assessment, on a peshat level, though it would be of course a matter of establishing that he was lying, rather than just that his testimony failed in absence of supporting evidence or testimony.

Shofetim: How does לִשְׁבָטֶיךָ bind?

Though he may later retract from this position, here is an interesting Shadal on parshat Shoftim involving Rashi, deviating from trup, and a unique reading into a pasuk.

The pasuk states

יח שֹׁפְטִים וְשֹׁטְרִים, תִּתֶּן-לְךָ בְּכָל-שְׁעָרֶיךָ, אֲשֶׁר ה אֱלֹהֶיךָ נֹתֵן לְךָ, לִשְׁבָטֶיךָ; וְשָׁפְטוּ אֶת-הָעָם, מִשְׁפַּט-צֶדֶק.

18 Judges and officers shalt thou make thee in all thy gates, which the LORD thy God giveth thee, tribe by tribe; and they shall judge the people with righteous judgment.

and Shadal writes:

לשבטיך : מוסב על תתן לך ( רש"י ) , והיא נגד הטעמים , ועם כל זה נכון הוא בעיני , והכוונה שהשופטים והשוטרים יהיו מאותו שבט , כי יקשה בעיני הממון להיות משועבדים לאנשים שהם משבט אחר

The trup reads:

שֹֽׁפְטִ֣ים וְשֹֽׁטְרִ֗ים תִּֽתֶּן־לְךָ֙ בְּכָל־שְׁעָרֶ֔יךָ אֲשֶׁ֨ר יְהוָ֧ה אֱלֹהֶ֛יךָ נֹתֵ֥ן לְךָ֖ לִשְׁבָטֶ֑יךָ

Which means that the division in terms of trup is:
שֹׁפְטִים וְשֹׁטְרִים, תִּתֶּן-לְךָ בְּכָל-שְׁעָרֶיךָ, אֲשֶׁר ה אֱלֹהֶיךָ נֹתֵן לְךָ, לִשְׁבָטֶיךָ
becomes:
שֹׁפְטִים וְשֹׁטְרִים, תִּתֶּן-לְךָ בְּכָל-שְׁעָרֶיךָ,
אֲשֶׁר ה אֱלֹהֶיךָ נֹתֵן לְךָ, לִשְׁבָטֶיךָ

I think that this would mean that the shearim were given by Hashem to all the various tribes. And in each of these shearim you have a command to appoint shofetim and shoterim.

In contrast, if we would have a division like
שֹׁפְטִים וְשֹׁטְרִים, תִּתֶּן-לְךָ בְּכָל-שְׁעָרֶיךָ, אֲשֶׁר ה אֱלֹהֶיךָ נֹתֵן לְךָ, לִשְׁבָטֶיךָ
becomes
שֹׁפְטִים וְשֹׁטְרִים, תִּתֶּן-לְךָ בְּכָל-שְׁעָרֶיךָ, אֲשֶׁר ה אֱלֹהֶיךָ נֹתֵן לְךָ
לִשְׁבָטֶיךָ

then the command to place shoftim and shotrim is in accordance with your tribes, which Shadal at this point interprets as because people would not like someone from another shevet judging them.

Rashi notes this application, but does not make the same diyuk as Shadal.

for your tribes [This phrase] refers back to “You shall set up… for yourself.” Thus, the understanding of the verse is “You shall set up judges and law-enforcement officials for yourself, for your tribes, in all your cities that the Lord, your God, is giving you.”

for your tribes This teaches us that judges must be appointed for every tribe, and for every city. — [Sifrei, San. 16b]

Interesting Posts and Articles #69

1. Lion of Zion on the idea that Aramaic developed, and the krei and ketiv in Daniel is used to move the earlier Biblical Aramaic to a more modern Aramaic.
   
   
2. 
   
   At Little Green Footballs, a posting of the British show "Undercover Mosque -- The Return" in which they go undercover to a mosque and see the extremist views being taught there. I saw the first segment and I was not so impressed. (The full show is there, not just the segment above.) There is a disconnect in which I think your average secular viewer (but not your Orthodox Jewish viewer) does not understand religious concepts -- such as that when they said that it was not practiced nowadays, but in the future when Islam is dominant, the idea is not necessarily that they will therefore fight Jihad, impose Islamic law, and then kill all heretical Muslims and homosexuals. Rather, it is theoretical, and we can put implementation out of our heads until some future surreal time. For us, we talk about implementing the korbanos, but PETA need not worry -- it is when mashiach comes. Though the troubling thing is that they have implemented it, and might well try to implement it.
   
   And yes, they feel that they are right and others are therefore wrong. Islam is not a pluralistic religion. Though of course in actually interacting with others, one makes nice and tries to foster good will. (Though they do this in an extremely misleading -- lying -- way.) There were indeed worrisome parts of it, but I think that there is something lost in cultural translation.
   
   
3. I see DovBear has a similar take to my own on the "segulah" used to try to find the location of the drowning victim.
   Meanwhile, Rabbi Harry Maryles actually knew the deceased.
   
   
4. Barzilai on modesty police.
   
   
5. Hirhurim has a post on how working for a living is a mitzvah. In 2007, I posted something related, from Aruch haShulchan.
   
   
6. Jerusalem Post: Bet Din recognizes ketubah of wife who stripped. While it makes sensationalist headlines, it is sensible application of halacha.
   
   
7. The latest attempt to ban certain types of music.
   
   
8. Over at Dixie Yid, keeping track of the horse:
   

   But, as she later told Rav Weinberger, when she met with the Menaheles, the Principal, before the event, she said that there was something important that she hoped that this young woman could fit into the performance. She wanted to make sure that before the end of the night, if she could somehow fit into her speaking or music something about... ... knee highs (!), that this would be very meaningful to the girls there.
   
   She came to Rav Weinberger for advice after the event feeling confused. She didn't understand. She sang and spoke with these girls for a couple of hours and they had so many issues and they were struggling with so many things in Emunah and personally, that knee-highs were so so far from what they needed to hear about. Needless to say, she didn't get around to cheppering them about knee-highs at the event.

9. Why not learn some Rif Yomi?
   

Use of a floating wooden plate to find a corpse, in Taamei Haminhagim

As a followup to my previous post about "A Miracle Worthy of Elisha," it seems that there is a similar segulah mentioned in Taamei Haminhagim, by Rabbi Avraham Yitzchak Sperling (1851-1921) and accessible at HebrewBooks.org on this page here (page 582 in the pdf pager, or 569 if you have the physical book). The image to the right is the relevant selection.

In this accounting of the segulah, it seems that they do not use a flat bread with a lit candle on it. Rather, "if they throw a wooden plate upon the face of the waters and leave it, it floats of its own accord to the place where it stops of its own accord. Then, in that place, that is where he drowned." He cited Yosef Ometz, page 205, though I cannot at the moment track the specific sefer and the specific page.

But written there is: "I have heard that via this segulah they found a certain man whose name was Meir, the father-in-law of Tevlin {?} David, who is near Pidkap {?}. And if the matter is true, it is a segulah and a wondrous matter to permit the wife of the one drowned, such that she does not need to dwell as an agunah."

Thus, they came up with the same idea I did -- why not use this in general to be mattir agunot, whether in a body of water that has an end, or does not have an end? I am not sure if he meant this specifically where they find the body in this location, or if one is so confident in the efficacy of the segulah that one could use this. If the latter, it would be an interesting intersection between miracles and halacha, something discussed here earlier.

There is a difference here in what they did, from the practice mentioned in Taamei HaMinhagim. All sorts of additions to the practice as mentioned in taamei haminhagim. Here, they baked a bread with the meis in mind, and put a candle on it. And after they found the "spot," they dropped a stone with writing attached to it, to get the body to come up. And they had a bunch of rabbis saying tehillim and tefillot. This frums it up a bit, but at the same time makes it into greater sorcery. And I still do not think that it works, or worked.

A Miracle Worthy of Elisha

Over at The Yeshiva World, a miracle worthy of Elishah. Unfortunately, a Jewish man drowned on Monday, August 25th. One week later, on Monday, Sept 1, the following happened.

Sources told YWN that approximately 5:00AM on Monday morning, a group of 10 Rabbonim gathered on a boat on the lake, and performed a Segula in the hope of finding the body of Naftali Z”L. Apparently, a flat bread was baked in his Zechus, and the bread was set afloat on the lake with a lit candle on it.

Certain Tehillim and other Tefillos were then said until the bread stopped moving. At that precise location a stone was dropped into the water, and shortly later the body rose to the surface!

May his family be comforted, and the fact that the body was found and may now be buried give them closure.

This calls to mind the story in which Elisha, a miracle worker empowered because he was a Navi Hashem, brought up an axe-head from the water. In II Melachim 6:

א וַיֹּאמְרוּ בְנֵי-הַנְּבִיאִים, אֶל-אֱלִישָׁע: הִנֵּה-נָא הַמָּקוֹם, אֲשֶׁר אֲנַחְנוּ יֹשְׁבִים שָׁם לְפָנֶיךָ--צַר מִמֶּנּוּ.	1 And the sons of the prophets said unto Elisha: 'Behold now, the place where we dwell before thee is too strait for us.
ב נֵלְכָה-נָּא עַד-הַיַּרְדֵּן, וְנִקְחָה מִשָּׁם אִישׁ קוֹרָה אֶחָת, וְנַעֲשֶׂה-לָּנוּ שָׁם מָקוֹם, לָשֶׁבֶת שָׁם; וַיֹּאמֶר, לֵכוּ.	2 Let us go, we pray thee, unto the Jordan, and take thence every man a beam, and let us make us a place there, where we may dwell.' And he answered: 'Go ye.'
ג וַיֹּאמֶר, הָאֶחָד, הוֹאֶל נָא, וְלֵךְ אֶת-עֲבָדֶיךָ; וַיֹּאמֶר, אֲנִי אֵלֵךְ.	3 And one said: 'Be content, I pray thee, and go with thy servants.' And he answered: 'I will go.'
ד וַיֵּלֶךְ, אִתָּם; וַיָּבֹאוּ, הַיַּרְדֵּנָה, וַיִּגְזְרוּ, הָעֵצִים.	4 So he went with them. And when they came to the Jordan, they cut down wood.
ה וַיְהִי הָאֶחָד מַפִּיל הַקּוֹרָה, וְאֶת-הַבַּרְזֶל נָפַל אֶל-הַמָּיִם; וַיִּצְעַק וַיֹּאמֶר אֲהָהּ אֲדֹנִי, וְהוּא שָׁאוּל.	5 But as one was felling a beam, the axe-head fell into the water; and he cried, and said: 'Alas, my master! for it was borrowed.'
ו וַיֹּאמֶר אִישׁ-הָאֱלֹהִים, אָנָה נָפָל; וַיַּרְאֵהוּ, אֶת-הַמָּקוֹם, וַיִּקְצָב-עֵץ וַיַּשְׁלֶךְ-שָׁמָּה, וַיָּצֶף הַבַּרְזֶל.	6 And the man of God said: 'Where fell it?' And he showed him the place. And he cut down a stick, and cast it in thither, and made the iron to swim.
ז וַיֹּאמֶר, הָרֶם לָךְ; וַיִּשְׁלַח יָדוֹ, וַיִּקָּחֵהוּ. {פ}	7 And he said: 'Take it up to thee.' So he put out his hand, and took it. {P}

However, the way this "segulah" was performed today strikes me as practical magic, perhaps within applied kabbalah. But it is not a good thing. It approaches witchcraft and divination. There was the divination to find the place of the body and the sinking of the stone (which does sink, unlike a stick) to bring up the body.

This does not seem like my Judaism.

What about the particulars of the case? It truly seems miraculous, no?

Well, they are leaving out or glossing over a bunch of details, which are revealed in the comment section.

1) The park ranger said that it takes about 1 week to 13 days for a body to come to the surface. This was 1 week later, so it is entirely within derech hateva for the body to have come up yesterday.

2) This was not the first time they tried this segulah. They tried it on previous days, with no results. This was the third time they tried it. And I guess, the third time was the "charm."

3) This was kept secret until success, at which point someone leaked it. Had it not succeeded, we would have heard nothing about it. Which means we will only hear success stories to bolster the belief in the segulah, and no contrary evidence. Indeed, even when it worked the first time, the published story made no mention of the previous attempts.

4) The body did not immediately float up. They left the lake at 8 AM and the body was found at about 11:30 AM, which is 3 and 1/2 hours later.

5) They did not find the exact spot. Depending on which comment you are relying upon, the body was spotted floating about 150, or else 300 yards away from where they dropped the rock with the message attached. That is either 3, or 1 and a half, football fields away. If the flat bread segulah was supposed to divine the spot the body was, why did it not float an additional 150 t0 300 yards?

6) Also, Chazal talk about agunah situations involving a body lost in and mayim sheyesh lahem sof and mayim sheain lahem sof. See e.g. Yevamot 115a. Why didn't they use this segulah to simply find the body?

So we have a segulah which looks like divination and witchcraft, and the particulars, when you actually examine them closely, are none too impressive. Of course, when it is told over years from now, these particulars will likely not be mentioned, and it will be much more difficult to discover them. I don't think that this kind of inspirational story is the type that should be spread.

Cross-posted to my new blog, segulahwatch.

Update: In the comment section, moshe points out that this is a mistaken pseudo-scientific belief, based on the properties of quicksilver, and is mentioned in Huck Finn and covered in the New York Times.

Thanks!

Further Update: See DovBear's take.

The Role of the Shoter and the Shofet

Quite a few interesting chiddushim in Shadal on parshat Shofetim. Here is one.

יח ] שופטים ושוטרים : אין ספק כי השוטרים אינם שליחי ב"ד הרודים במקל , כי במצרים הרודים במקל היו נקראים נוגשים לא שוטרים , ולמעלה ( א', ט"ו ) אמר : ואקח את ראשי שבטיכם אנשים חכמים וידועים ואתן אותם ראשים עליכם וגו ' ושוטרים , ובדברי הימים ב ' י"ט י"א : והנה אמריה כהן הראש וגו ' וזבדיהו הנגיד וגו ' ושוטרים הלוים לפניכם , וביהושע ח' ל"ג : וכל ישראל וזקניו ושטרים ושופטיו . - והנה השופטים היו דנים במה שבין אדם לחברו או בבוא עדים על איש שחטא , והשוטרים היו משגיחים על שלום המדינה וגוזרים גזרות והנהגות על העם

Shadal concludes that a shoteir is not an agent of the court who imposes the ruling with a staff. Rather, he is of the opinion that the shofet were the judicial branch, judging case between man and fellow man, or where witnesses came testifying about that certain man sinned. Meanwhile, the shoterim were the political branch, involving both the executive and legislative branch -- they were in charge of the security of the state, and they decreed edicts and practices upon the people.

His proof for this role of shoterim is two-fold. First, a different word is used elsewhere for the role traditionally assigned to the shotrim. I am not so persuaded by that. Secondly, the word shoter is used in various places where is has the implication Shadal assigns.

On to the particulars. In Shemot 5:6, we read:

ו וַיְצַו פַּרְעֹה, בַּיּוֹם הַהוּא, אֶת-הַנֹּגְשִׂים בָּעָם, וְאֶת-שֹׁטְרָיו לֵאמֹר.

6 And the same day Pharaoh commanded the taskmasters of the people, and their officers, saying:

and then a bit later:

י וַיֵּצְאוּ נֹגְשֵׂי הָעָם, וְשֹׁטְרָיו, וַיֹּאמְרוּ אֶל-הָעָם, לֵאמֹר: כֹּה אָמַר פַּרְעֹה, אֵינֶנִּי נֹתֵן לָכֶם תֶּבֶן.	10 And the taskmasters of the people went out, and their officers, and they spoke to the people, saying: 'Thus saith Pharaoh: I will not give you straw.
יא אַתֶּם, לְכוּ קְחוּ לָכֶם תֶּבֶן, מֵאֲשֶׁר, תִּמְצָאוּ: כִּי אֵין נִגְרָע מֵעֲבֹדַתְכֶם, דָּבָר.	11 Go yourselves, get you straw where ye can find it; for nought of your work shall be diminished.'
יב וַיָּפֶץ הָעָם, בְּכָל-אֶרֶץ מִצְרָיִם, לְקֹשֵׁשׁ קַשׁ, לַתֶּבֶן.	12 So the people were scattered abroad throughout all the land of Egypt to gather stubble for straw.
יג וְהַנֹּגְשִׂים, אָצִים לֵאמֹר: כַּלּוּ מַעֲשֵׂיכֶם דְּבַר-יוֹם בְּיוֹמוֹ, כַּאֲשֶׁר בִּהְיוֹת הַתֶּבֶן.	13 And the taskmasters were urgent, saying: 'Fulfil your work, your daily task, as when there was straw.'
יד וַיֻּכּוּ, שֹׁטְרֵי בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, אֲשֶׁר-שָׂמוּ עֲלֵהֶם, נֹגְשֵׂי פַרְעֹה לֵאמֹר: מַדּוּעַ לֹא כִלִּיתֶם חָקְכֶם לִלְבֹּן, כִּתְמוֹל שִׁלְשֹׁם--גַּם-תְּמוֹל, גַּם-הַיּוֹם.	14 And the officers of the children of Israel, whom Pharaoh's taskmasters had set over them, were beaten, saying: 'Wherefore have ye not fulfilled your appointed task in making brick both yesterday and today as heretofore?'
טו וַיָּבֹאוּ, שֹׁטְרֵי בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, וַיִּצְעֲקוּ אֶל-פַּרְעֹה, לֵאמֹר: לָמָּה תַעֲשֶׂה כֹה, לַעֲבָדֶיךָ.	15 Then the officers of the children of Israel came and cried unto Pharaoh, saying: 'Wherefore dealest thou thus with thy servants?

Thus, the nogshim were those of Pharaoh, and they did the beating of the shotrim, who were Israelite officers.

Rashi on those pesukim writes:

the taskmasters They {the nogshim} were Egyptians, and the officers {shotrim} were Israelites. The taskmaster was appointed over many officers, and the officer was appointed to drive the workers.

And later, it is the taskmasters who beat the officers who {according to Rashi} do not wish to drive the Israelite slaves.

But that does not, to my mind, mean that shoterim cannot mean enforcers in this context, even if this enforcing means with a rod. I see what he is saying, though.

How is shoter used throughout Tanach? For that is Shadal's second point.

We have an occurrence in Devarim 1:15:

טו וָאֶקַּח אֶת-רָאשֵׁי שִׁבְטֵיכֶם, אֲנָשִׁים חֲכָמִים וִידֻעִים, וָאֶתֵּן אוֹתָם רָאשִׁים, עֲלֵיכֶם: שָׂרֵי אֲלָפִים וְשָׂרֵי מֵאוֹת, וְשָׂרֵי חֲמִשִּׁים וְשָׂרֵי עֲשָׂרֹת, וְשֹׁטְרִים, לְשִׁבְטֵיכֶם.

15 So I took the heads of your tribes, wise men, and full of knowledge, and made them heads over you, captains of thousands, and captains of hundreds, and captains of fifties, and captains of tens, and officers, tribe by tribe.

And in Divrei Hayamim II 19:11:

יא וְהִנֵּה אֲמַרְיָהוּ כֹהֵן הָרֹאשׁ עֲלֵיכֶם לְכֹל דְּבַר-ה, וּזְבַדְיָהוּ בֶן-יִשְׁמָעֵאל הַנָּגִיד לְבֵית-יְהוּדָה לְכֹל דְּבַר-הַמֶּלֶךְ, וְשֹׁטְרִים הַלְוִיִּם, לִפְנֵיכֶם: חִזְקוּ וַעֲשׂוּ, וִיהִי ה עִם-הַטּוֹב. {פ}

11 And, behold, Amariah the chief priest is over you in all matters of the LORD; and Zebadiah the son of Ishmael, the ruler of the house of Judah, in all the king's matters; also the officers of the Levites before you. Deal courageously, and the LORD be with the good.' {P}

and finally in Yehoshua 8:33:

לג וְכָל-יִשְׂרָאֵל וּזְקֵנָיו וְשֹׁטְרִים וְשֹׁפְטָיו עֹמְדִים מִזֶּה וּמִזֶּה לָאָרוֹן נֶגֶד הַכֹּהֲנִים הַלְוִיִּם נֹשְׂאֵי אֲרוֹן בְּרִית-יְהוָה, כַּגֵּר כָּאֶזְרָח--חֶצְיוֹ אֶל-מוּל הַר-גְּרִזִים, וְהַחֶצְיוֹ אֶל-מוּל הַר-עֵיבָל: כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוָּה מֹשֶׁה עֶבֶד-ה, לְבָרֵךְ אֶת-הָעָם יִשְׂרָאֵל--בָּרִאשֹׁנָה.

33 And all Israel, and their elders and officers, and their judges, stood on this side the ark and on that side before the priests the Levites, that bore the ark of the covenant of the LORD, as well the stranger as the home-born; half of them in front of mount Gerizim and half of them in front of mount Ebal; as Moses the servant of the LORD had commanded at the first, that they should bless the people of Israel.

Interesting Posts and Articles #68

1. Over at LGF, anatomy of a video.
   
   
2. The Republican Convention may be delayed because of Hurricane Gustav. I find that ironic, given that when Obama was planning on having the Democratic convention out in the open, people were questioning whether this was a wise move, and wondering what would happen if it would rain.
   
   
3. Over at Hirhurim, taking responsibility to provide for a family before starting one and continuing to grow it. I believe we find basis for this in the story of the Dodecagamist, in Yerushalmi Yevamos, who was unwilling to take twelve yevamot to wife, because he could not support them and the inevitable children. And also the idea that there was a difference in Eretz Yisrael and Bavel in whether they learned first or married first, given the differing situations -- and where they would have to support their families, they learned first (for a limited time). The idea is that of course one has an obligation to support his family, and cannot just learn and cast himself upon others to support him.
   
   
4. A Democrat apologizes for suggesting, in jest, that Hurricane Gustav at the time of the Republican convention shows that God is on the Democrats' side. Yet people suggest similar things, in all seriousness.
   
   
5. The obsession with Sarah Palin's pregnancy, for political reasons.
   
   
6. Not allowing children into a religious school because their grandmother wears pants.
   
   
7. The Village Voice's article on Chabad messianism. And Emes VeEmunah's take on it. In Shabbetai Tzvi's day, he also transformed Shiva Asar BeTammuz and Tisha BeAv into feasts, in accordance with Zechariah. I've been discussing the parameters of Shivasar BeTammuz, and the possibility that it may be permitted to eat nowadays, or perhaps prohibited to fast, in an ongoing series which has temporarily derailed due to other focuses. But that would be al pi halacha (and no one will listen to me anyway) not based on messianic delusions.
   
   
8. More on Modesty squads over at HaAretz.
   

Does Rabbi Falk Conceal From His Readers Rav Moshe's Teshuva Permitting Flesh-Colored Tights?

On page 341 of Oz veHadar Levushah, Rabbi Pesach Eliyahu Falk appears to make the claim the skin-colored tights are prohibited unanimously by all poskim.

He writes

"Since it is unanimously agreed by all Poskim that legs must be covered so that they do not attract attention, skin-colored tights are obviously assur, as they attract attention and defeat the purpose of covering the legs."

If you read the sentence a few times extremely carefully, you might note that he does not say that all Poskim unanimously prohibit flesh-colored tights. Rather, he claims that they all unanimously agree that X is true, that "legs must be covered so that they do not attract attention." And the "obviously assur" part is his own extrapolation based on his understanding of reality and how it interacts with X. (And one perhaps senses that he was deliberately careful with his language to convey the impression that they are unanimous about Y, without actually making this false statement.)

I am not going to look into X in this post, to see whether poskim are indeed unanimous about X. Let us just accept that as a given. But do poskim unanimously agree to Y, that therefore flesh-colored tights are obviously assur?

In fact, there is a major posek who offers a reason for the practice of those who are makpid that their daughters and wives wear stockings, but are not makpid that they not be flesh-colored. (The questioner was asking about sheer stockings, but the posek moved the question to flesh-colored stockings.) This posek was Rav Moshe Feinstein, in Igros Moshe, Even haEzer chelek 4, siman 100, seif 6. A while back, I translated this seif on parshablog, and so it is available here.

If so, Rabbi Falk cannot claim that all poskim are unanimous about Y.

Now, perhaps Rabbi Falk was simply unaware of this teshuva. After all, it is one late seif in a larger teshuva. However, we know that Rabbi Falk is aware of this teshuva. On page 329, where he introduces the entire issue of tights, he mentions this teshuva explicitly, and claims (or seems to claim) that Rav Moshe is requiring tights because it is an area which is usually covered. I discussed Rabbi Falks characterization of the teshuva in this earlier post -- I am quite unhappy with his characterization, but read that post and decide for yourself.

Regardless, Rabbi Falk obviously knows about the existence of this teshuva from Rav Moshe. And the very purpose of that teshuva was to give a reason in favor of flesh-covered tights. To not mention this teshuva here, where it is most directly relevant, seems to me like misleading by omission. And especially where he leaves it out and then appears to state that it is the unanimous position of all poskim that skin-colored tights are forbidden.