- German scientists discover live ant of species they claim is 120 million years old.
- Chaptzem has an interesting letter from someone who thinks riding motorcycles is not appropriate Jewish conduct, and would like rabbonim to ban them so that he does not have to explain to his 7-year old that others have different values from the ones they hold. In general, the Chaptzem readership does not take kindly to his suggestion.
- Thanbook has a post on Chabad, the Rebbe, and God, and the different views from inside and outside Lubavitch.
- At A Jewish Thought, how a yeshiva in Israel persuades a kid that he is obligated to return for shana bet, and then withdraws the scholarship and thus his opportunity to attend when his family comes to Israel -- while imperiously refusing to even discuss the matter. I can understand that approach partly, but will not explain here why.
- The invention of emoticons, Sept 19, many years ago, via Wired:
1982: At precisely 11:44 a.m., Scott Fahlman posts the following electronic message to a computer-science department bulletin board at Carnegie Mellon University:
19-Sep-82 11:44 Scott E Fahlman
From: Scott E FahlmanI propose that the following character sequence for joke markers:
:-)
Read it sideways. Actually, it is probably more economical to mark things that are NOT jokes, given current trends. For this, use:
:-(
Assuming I am reading this correctly, it would thus seem that the frowny was not initially envisioned as a sad emotion, but rather the negation of the smiley, so as to show things are not intended as jokes. - Overlawyered links to an interesting post -- how after a train accident, lawyers put up a whole bunch of Google ads to try to grab clients. Thus, a bunch of sponsored links from the words "Metrolink train accident attorney lawyer Los Angeles."
- An interesting question. If someone does not believe in Torah min haShamayim, or Torah miSinai, can they get an aliyah and thus make birchas haTorah? I would have to look in context, but the application of Rav Moshe's teshuvah about an individual making a bracha for himself might not be applicable, if we are dealing with someone who is making the blessing on behalf of the tzibbur. I don't know, and have not yet read that teshuva. But I've wondered about this very question in the past.
Monday, September 22, 2008
Interesting Posts and Articles #75
Friday, September 19, 2008
Interesting Posts and Articles #74
- Danish city targets Ramadan fasting. This is unacceptable, to my mind. Still, at least they did not make it law.
- The Seforim blog gets snarky, with a new series called "The Tree Murderers" about seforim that shouldn't have been written.
- An interesting alternative to Microsoft Office and Google Docs is Zoho Docs. They have a PowerPoint, Word, and Excel clone. And the Excel clone even is controllable via VBA.
- Balashon has a writeup of the word "dod." And I posted a comment there about the relationship to the Aramaic word chaviva.
- Slashdot on the hacking of Sarah Palin's email. And more details at Michelle Malkin. I think it is awful.
Thursday, September 18, 2008
*Now* Do I Believe? Nope!
Shirat Devorah asks an excellent question. Now we see that banks are failing. For those who doubted DreamingOfMoshiach's dreams that banks would fail, and dismissed Nava as a false prophetess, now do we believe?
Why not?
1) First and foremost, today's situation is not what Nava predicted. She predicted the failure of commercial banks, which is where we deposit money and get a bit of interest. What is occurring now is the failure of certain investment banks. They both are called "banks," but it is a homonym. Of course, though there was initially a government division between ownership of these two types of banks, this is no longer the case, and so there are a few banks that do both. But for the most part, we are dealing with a homonym.
As this CNN article notes, while some are betting, in the stock market, that commercial banks will fail next, there is a difference between them:
2) Secondly, people have dreams corresponding to what they are thinking about, even in the many instances it is not prophecy. And in that same link, she bolsters her dream with the fact that an earlier fake autistic communication said the banks would fail. This is what gave her the idea, I would think. And I believe facilitated communication is a sham, for many very grounded reasons.
3) Other predictions she made did not come to pass, so even if one thing among many does, that is just playing the odds, where eventually you will get a win, or something that is interpretable as a win.
4) Even back then, the economy was starting to sour, which was why being were making dire predictions in the first place. I do not think it is impossible that eventually, the commercial banks might also fail, in which case we would all be in a very bad place. But I would not necessarily see it as a fulfillment of Nava's prophecy.
5) Nava was giving very bad and unsound financial advice. The FDIC insures accounts up to $100,000. For all these months, anyone who listened to her and withdrew their money from the banks lost hundreds or thousands of dollars in interest. And she is responsible for this tremendous loss of money. If even she had waited until now, rather than back then, to withdraw her money, she could have had her money working for her.
Furthermore, let us say all the commercial banks will fail next. If some of them fail, the FDIC will step up and reimburse people who had money in those banks. If all of them fail, perhaps they will do the same thing. But if the FDIC does not, and so everyone across America has now lost all the money in the bank, and the government is bankrupt and cannot help out, then the government has failed. Your dollars you kept stuffed in your mattress will likely be worthless.
6) Finally, there is this possible undercurrent that belief in Nava as true prophetess is a more frum position than disbelief. But this is not so. We have a religious obligation to listen to a Navi Emes, and a religious obligation to not pay heed to a Navi Sheker. We also have an obligation to distinguish between the two. Now, we happen to disagree about the metzius -- whether Nava is for real or not. I happen to think she is not for real, but is only fooling herself, and then fooling others. And Shirat Devorah presumably agrees with me on the point of the need for discernment, as a while ago, she worked to tell people not to believe a false kabbalist by the name of Jonathan Waxman (no relation). It would not be a good thing for people to be following a false kabbalist.
Update: Also, see this link. (hat tip: Reb Akiva at Mystical Paths) And this, linked from there.
To this, I would answer: Nope!and now you can read it in today's news at:http://www.cnbc.com/id/26752496
Why not?
1) First and foremost, today's situation is not what Nava predicted. She predicted the failure of commercial banks, which is where we deposit money and get a bit of interest. What is occurring now is the failure of certain investment banks. They both are called "banks," but it is a homonym. Of course, though there was initially a government division between ownership of these two types of banks, this is no longer the case, and so there are a few banks that do both. But for the most part, we are dealing with a homonym.
As this CNN article notes, while some are betting, in the stock market, that commercial banks will fail next, there is a difference between them:
But Wall Street's problems are, in some ways, just that. The vast majority of the banks that consumers rely on for simple services like checking and savings accounts didn't get caught up in complex mortgage-backed securities or gamble on the subprime segment of the housing market.So Nava's nevuah is not what is happening right now. What Nava said, then, was:Still, commercial banks are grappling with their own issues.
Numerous community banks nationwide owned preferred shares of mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that are now virtually worthless following the government's dramatic decision earlier this month to take them over.
And as the housing market continues to deteriorate and the economy remains at a standstill, banks both big and small could face higher loan delinquencies and defaults in the months ahead.
I was shown what will happen when the banks will go bankrupt; there is going to be such a mess... No one will be able to withdraw from any bank even a nickel... All previously written checks that were not yet cashed will not be honored... People will get charged for returned checks, although it's not their fault... There will be so much havoc, confusion, and anger....And she says that she was told, back then, to withdraw the kever Devorah money from the commercial bank. She is clearly talking about commercial banks here.
People were feeling very frustrated and confused, crying, 'I never saw it coming...". Everyone became so money-crazed.... People were banging on banks' doors to be let in... The workers in the bank were also petrified because they also lost all their money and the only reason they came to 'work' was not to work, but to try to save their money. Everything seemed so chaotic...
2) Secondly, people have dreams corresponding to what they are thinking about, even in the many instances it is not prophecy. And in that same link, she bolsters her dream with the fact that an earlier fake autistic communication said the banks would fail. This is what gave her the idea, I would think. And I believe facilitated communication is a sham, for many very grounded reasons.
3) Other predictions she made did not come to pass, so even if one thing among many does, that is just playing the odds, where eventually you will get a win, or something that is interpretable as a win.
4) Even back then, the economy was starting to sour, which was why being were making dire predictions in the first place. I do not think it is impossible that eventually, the commercial banks might also fail, in which case we would all be in a very bad place. But I would not necessarily see it as a fulfillment of Nava's prophecy.
5) Nava was giving very bad and unsound financial advice. The FDIC insures accounts up to $100,000. For all these months, anyone who listened to her and withdrew their money from the banks lost hundreds or thousands of dollars in interest. And she is responsible for this tremendous loss of money. If even she had waited until now, rather than back then, to withdraw her money, she could have had her money working for her.
Furthermore, let us say all the commercial banks will fail next. If some of them fail, the FDIC will step up and reimburse people who had money in those banks. If all of them fail, perhaps they will do the same thing. But if the FDIC does not, and so everyone across America has now lost all the money in the bank, and the government is bankrupt and cannot help out, then the government has failed. Your dollars you kept stuffed in your mattress will likely be worthless.
6) Finally, there is this possible undercurrent that belief in Nava as true prophetess is a more frum position than disbelief. But this is not so. We have a religious obligation to listen to a Navi Emes, and a religious obligation to not pay heed to a Navi Sheker. We also have an obligation to distinguish between the two. Now, we happen to disagree about the metzius -- whether Nava is for real or not. I happen to think she is not for real, but is only fooling herself, and then fooling others. And Shirat Devorah presumably agrees with me on the point of the need for discernment, as a while ago, she worked to tell people not to believe a false kabbalist by the name of Jonathan Waxman (no relation). It would not be a good thing for people to be following a false kabbalist.
Update: Also, see this link. (hat tip: Reb Akiva at Mystical Paths) And this, linked from there.
Rachel Wearing A Veil? And Oz VeHadar Levushah
This post is not so much critique, but bringing a comment to prominence and discussing the midrashim in Od Yosef Chai further, in the context of Oz veHadar Levusha.
On a previous post, about Rachel covering herself with sheep, based on a midrash in Od Yosef Chai, LazerA commented:
Firstly, I would like to thank LazerA for his comment.
I would guess that the quote Rabbi Falk gave about Rachel and the sheep is indeed there, though without the specific context, it will remain difficult to see if it was twisted in any way. And the comments in the previous post still apply, of course.
In terms of this other midrash about Rachel, just to elaborate on it, the pasuk in Bereishit 29:6 reads:
while the pasuk in Bereishit 29:9 reads:
You can more of less skip the next few paragraphs if you are not so interested in trup. I marked the end of this section in red, so scroll down until you see red.
Both of these pesukim have a disjunctive trup separating rachel from baah. In the case of pasuk 6, it is the zakef on bito. But I do not think he means that pasuk because of that word bito. Rather, he means pasuk 9, and the hefsek he refers to is what appears to be a pasek, that horizontal line. In fact, it would seem to me that this is not a pasek, but rather it is the same symbol associated with the munach under the word rachel, to tell us that it is a munach legarmeih, a disjunctive accent rather than the usual conjunctive accent.
The result may be the same, because a disjunctive accent also have the role of dividing, but it seems that the Ben Ish Chai may have intended to make a derash on the very name of the trup marker, pasek, as well.
At least, that is what I would say at first. However, while munach legarmeih in general serves to mark the minor dichotomy within a clause ending in revii (see here in Wickes, page 95), this is a special case (as Wickes also mentions on page 95), since the munach legarmeih marks the first word of the revii clause. And then, it functions in the second role mentioned by Wickes on page 119 -- it is a replacement for pasek, so it has the function of pasek but the musical role of munach legarmeih. Thus, we can say it is a pasek.
And indeed, in this instance, there was no syntactic reason to divide the clause וְרָחֵ֣ל ׀ בָּ֗אָה, since it consisted of two words, and one only usually divides clauses like this when they consist of three words or more.
In the section on pasek, Wickes discusses the purpose of pasek. And on page 122-123, he mentions the paseq emphaticum, and then concludes that
If we accept this to be so, then it is readily applied to this case. There is reason to stress that it is Rachel who is coming, who is important to the story, and indeed, much more so than the sheep who accompany her, as we explained in the previous post.
Still, trup such as this provides great fodder for midrash, even if the midrash was not the intent of the one who placed the trup.
End section about trup.
The Ben Ish Chai thus appears to darshen the paseik. And he says that
On a peshat level I am not sure I buy it, given the pasuk a bit later in the same perek which reads:
Putting aside the translation of rakot by Leah (weak vs. soft), the fact that Rachel was yefat Toar and yefat Mareh, and so (as we see in the continuation) Yaakov favored him, implies to me that he was able to see her face. But one can of course argue the point.
I also do not know enough about Biblical dress. The Shulamit is praised for her face within her veil, in Shir Hashirim:
zonot, or perhaps not. After all, we see in Bereishit 24 that Rivkah put on a veil.
At any rate, this is once again a midrash reading late 19th century Iraqi Jewish tznius values into the Imahos. And Rabbi Falk might -- but might not -- incorrectly state "these were our Imahos."
To maintain consistency, one would certainly expect him to. But the question is how Rabbi Falk regards veils. I also have the online text, and two or three references to veils are outside the limited preview. However, it seems to me that Rabbi Falk would have a problem with veils, as being immodest. As noted in this earlier parshablog post, Rabbi Falk forbids "very long skirts" as being immodest. His basis is the pesukim in Yeshaya, and Rashi's commentary upon it. Rashi suggests that the realot were veils with eyeholes, and that these were tachshitim because it would make people desire to see their cheeks. But Rabbi Falk has a very "novel" interpretation of that Rashi, and I critique it there. And then Rabbi Falk extends this chiddush of his to forbid very long skirts.
If so, Rabbi Falk should by all means hold that a veil is problematic and non-tzniusdik, just as a very long skirt is problematic. And so we would not expect him to say that we have an obligation to wear veils.
On the other hand, in the case of Rachel and the sheep, no women is going to surround herself with sheep. And so the application would appear to be the very long skirt, and so Rabbi Falk says (in the previous post) that obviously we cannot have women wear very long skirts, so instead the general theme of the Imahos is what is obligatory upon women. Thus, he gets the message of the midrash to be exactly what he wants it to be, and nothing more.
But here, if he would have cited the midrash about Rachel wearing a veil, he would have had to say that this is an ideal of modesty, such that women should be able to emulate that. And that might just undermine his chiddush about very long skirts. So I do not know how he would resolve this. Luckily for his thesis, he does not cite this other midrash of the Ben Ish Chai.
There is one place accessible in the online book where he mentions veils. This is in the context of Tamar, in the incident of Yehuda and Tamar. Rabbi Falk writes what is pictured to the right. Thus, he cites a Rambam that it is the way of the zonah to cover her face to hide her identity. And indeed, this may well be peshat.
But while this fits in well with his thesis elsewhere, it still is selective citing. He has no compuctions elsewhere of taking midrashim literally. And yet here he cites Ramban and not Rashi. Yet Rashi writes:
On the other hand, I can tell from the index that on page 134 in the book, he mentions the pasuk that Rivka covered face with a veil. I do not know the context, but it might be in the same context in which he cites the pasuk in his other book, Choson and Kallah During Their Engagement, on page 77.
So he would acknowledge that some of the Imahos wore veils. He does not then say we all need to wear veils, despite the fact that the Imahos did. And he does not bring this fact up when discussing "very long skirts," nor does he bring up the Mishna in Shabbos which allows Jewish women in Arabia (at the least) to go out wearing veils.
On a previous post, about Rachel covering herself with sheep, based on a midrash in Od Yosef Chai, LazerA commented:
Firstly, I would like to thank LazerA for his comment.
I would guess that the quote Rabbi Falk gave about Rachel and the sheep is indeed there, though without the specific context, it will remain difficult to see if it was twisted in any way. And the comments in the previous post still apply, of course.
In terms of this other midrash about Rachel, just to elaborate on it, the pasuk in Bereishit 29:6 reads:
וַיֹּ֥אמֶר לָהֶ֖ם הֲשָׁל֣וֹם ל֑וֹ וַיֹּֽאמְר֣וּ שָׁל֔וֹם וְהִנֵּה֙ רָחֵ֣ל בִּתּ֔וֹ בָּאָ֖ה עִם־הַצֹּֽאן
while the pasuk in Bereishit 29:9 reads:
עוֹדֶ֖נּוּ מְדַבֵּ֣ר עִמָּ֑ם וְרָחֵ֣ל ׀ בָּ֗אָה עִם־הַצֹּאן֙ אֲשֶׁ֣ר לְאָבִ֔יהָ כִּ֥י רֹעָ֖ה הִֽוא׃
You can more of less skip the next few paragraphs if you are not so interested in trup. I marked the end of this section in red, so scroll down until you see red.
Both of these pesukim have a disjunctive trup separating rachel from baah. In the case of pasuk 6, it is the zakef on bito. But I do not think he means that pasuk because of that word bito. Rather, he means pasuk 9, and the hefsek he refers to is what appears to be a pasek, that horizontal line. In fact, it would seem to me that this is not a pasek, but rather it is the same symbol associated with the munach under the word rachel, to tell us that it is a munach legarmeih, a disjunctive accent rather than the usual conjunctive accent.
The result may be the same, because a disjunctive accent also have the role of dividing, but it seems that the Ben Ish Chai may have intended to make a derash on the very name of the trup marker, pasek, as well.
At least, that is what I would say at first. However, while munach legarmeih in general serves to mark the minor dichotomy within a clause ending in revii (see here in Wickes, page 95), this is a special case (as Wickes also mentions on page 95), since the munach legarmeih marks the first word of the revii clause. And then, it functions in the second role mentioned by Wickes on page 119 -- it is a replacement for pasek, so it has the function of pasek but the musical role of munach legarmeih. Thus, we can say it is a pasek.
And indeed, in this instance, there was no syntactic reason to divide the clause וְרָחֵ֣ל ׀ בָּ֗אָה, since it consisted of two words, and one only usually divides clauses like this when they consist of three words or more.
In the section on pasek, Wickes discusses the purpose of pasek. And on page 122-123, he mentions the paseq emphaticum, and then concludes that
The examples under this head are sufficiently numerous, indeed so much so, that we may regard this emphatic use as the chief object of the ordinary paseq.The paseq emphaticum provides emphasis. Thus, Hashem | Yimloch; HaYonatan | Yamut; KaTzeil | Yameinu. See inside.
If we accept this to be so, then it is readily applied to this case. There is reason to stress that it is Rachel who is coming, who is important to the story, and indeed, much more so than the sheep who accompany her, as we explained in the previous post.
Still, trup such as this provides great fodder for midrash, even if the midrash was not the intent of the one who placed the trup.
End section about trup.
The Ben Ish Chai thus appears to darshen the paseik. And he says that
ונ"ל בס"ד כי רחל אע"ה היתה לובשת על פניה פרגוד שהוא סודר מנוקב נקבים קטנים שקורין בערבי (כיליי) שהיא רואה ואינו נראית, ובזה יובן טעם נכון שיש בכתוב הזה הפסק בין תיבת רחל ובין תיבת באה, לומר שהיה דבר מפסיק בין פניה ובין מראה עינים של האנשים
This appears to be a veil with many small holes, such that there are not even eyeholes cut out, put since the cloth is close to her face, she can see out but others cannot see in. And so there is this separation rachel and baah, to inform that there was something separating between her face and the perception of the eyes of men.On a peshat level I am not sure I buy it, given the pasuk a bit later in the same perek which reads:
| יז וְעֵינֵי לֵאָה, רַכּוֹת; וְרָחֵל, הָיְתָה, יְפַת-תֹּאַר, וִיפַת מַרְאֶה. | 17 And Leah's eyes were weak; but Rachel was of beautiful form and fair to look upon. |
I also do not know enough about Biblical dress. The Shulamit is praised for her face within her veil, in Shir Hashirim:
zonot, or perhaps not. After all, we see in Bereishit 24 that Rivkah put on a veil.
At any rate, this is once again a midrash reading late 19th century Iraqi Jewish tznius values into the Imahos. And Rabbi Falk might -- but might not -- incorrectly state "these were our Imahos."
To maintain consistency, one would certainly expect him to. But the question is how Rabbi Falk regards veils. I also have the online text, and two or three references to veils are outside the limited preview. However, it seems to me that Rabbi Falk would have a problem with veils, as being immodest. As noted in this earlier parshablog post, Rabbi Falk forbids "very long skirts" as being immodest. His basis is the pesukim in Yeshaya, and Rashi's commentary upon it. Rashi suggests that the realot were veils with eyeholes, and that these were tachshitim because it would make people desire to see their cheeks. But Rabbi Falk has a very "novel" interpretation of that Rashi, and I critique it there. And then Rabbi Falk extends this chiddush of his to forbid very long skirts.
If so, Rabbi Falk should by all means hold that a veil is problematic and non-tzniusdik, just as a very long skirt is problematic. And so we would not expect him to say that we have an obligation to wear veils.
On the other hand, in the case of Rachel and the sheep, no women is going to surround herself with sheep. And so the application would appear to be the very long skirt, and so Rabbi Falk says (in the previous post) that obviously we cannot have women wear very long skirts, so instead the general theme of the Imahos is what is obligatory upon women. Thus, he gets the message of the midrash to be exactly what he wants it to be, and nothing more.
But here, if he would have cited the midrash about Rachel wearing a veil, he would have had to say that this is an ideal of modesty, such that women should be able to emulate that. And that might just undermine his chiddush about very long skirts. So I do not know how he would resolve this. Luckily for his thesis, he does not cite this other midrash of the Ben Ish Chai.
There is one place accessible in the online book where he mentions veils. This is in the context of Tamar, in the incident of Yehuda and Tamar. Rabbi Falk writes what is pictured to the right. Thus, he cites a Rambam that it is the way of the zonah to cover her face to hide her identity. And indeed, this may well be peshat.But while this fits in well with his thesis elsewhere, it still is selective citing. He has no compuctions elsewhere of taking midrashim literally. And yet here he cites Ramban and not Rashi. Yet Rashi writes:
Or in English:(טו) ויחשבה לזונה -
לפי שיושבת בפרשת דרכים:
כי כסתה פניה -
ולא יכול לראותה ולהכירה.
ומדרש רבותינו:
כי כסתה פניה כשהיתה בבית חמיה הייתה צנועה, לפיכך לא חשדה:
because she covered her face and he could not see her and recognize her. Our Sages midrashic interpretation is: because she had covered her face when she had stayed in her father-in-law’s house and she was modest. Therefore, he did not suspect her. [From Sotah 10b]Thus, on a peshat level, Rashi differs from Ramban in that he does not say this is a mark of prostitutes in general; and he also mentions the midrash, mentioned on Sotah 10b, that this was a mark of modesty, in that she wore the veil all the time in her father-in-law's house.
On the other hand, I can tell from the index that on page 134 in the book, he mentions the pasuk that Rivka covered face with a veil. I do not know the context, but it might be in the same context in which he cites the pasuk in his other book, Choson and Kallah During Their Engagement, on page 77.So he would acknowledge that some of the Imahos wore veils. He does not then say we all need to wear veils, despite the fact that the Imahos did. And he does not bring this fact up when discussing "very long skirts," nor does he bring up the Mishna in Shabbos which allows Jewish women in Arabia (at the least) to go out wearing veils.
Wednesday, September 17, 2008
Oz VeHadar Levushah: Did Rachel Really Cover Herself With Sheep Historically, And Does This Obligate Us Nowadays In Anything?
At the end of a section called "Pritzus of the Legs: Malady of the Last Few Decades," on pages 336-337, Rabbi Falk has the text pictured to the right. (Please read it first, before proceeding.) In this instance, while I believe that Rabbi Falk is incorrect, this is not due to misunderstanding any source, but rather because of his attitude towards the historicity of midrashim, and the historicity of late midrashim. But he does then use it to promote his specific agenda.The author of Od Yosef Chai is the Ben Ish Chai, of Baghdad (1832-1909). And I do not have a copy of Od Yosef Chai in my library. But let us first analyze the pesukim in question, on a peshat level.
In Bereishit 29, in parshat Vayeitzei, we read:
rachel bito with hi, but that is not a substantive difference. The Ben Ish Chai says that from the fact that it does not say vehinei hi meviah et hatzon, "behold, she is bringing the sheep," but rather "behold she is coming with the sheep," we can derive that she sheep were neither in front of her nor behind her, but rather that she was in their midst, with the sheep surrounding her in all directions. Further, the Ben Ish Chai attributes this to a modest trait she had, that she wished to hide her beautiful footsteps, and the lower-half of her body, from people passing to and from and traveling in the desert.
On a peshat level, I do not find the Ben Ish Chai's diyuk compelling at all. We would say in English "Here she comes with the sheep," where it would not mean that she is within the sheep, but rather, that she is coming, and accompanying her are the sheep, or that she is bringing the sheep with her. Could we say "Here she brings the sheep?" We certainly could but it would sounds awkward, and slightly stilted.
Indeed, there was a reason I included the verses before and after the verse in question -- to provide some context. Yaakov was not asking about Lavan's sheep. He was asking about Lavan, and presumably also Lavan's family. Indeed, one major reason for coming to Charan was to get married to Lavan's daughter. Therefore, who is the ikkar and who is the tafel? Obviously, Rachel is the primary and the sheep are merely secondary, both within the shepherds' response and within the narrative in general. Therefore, the shepherds, and the Torah here and in verse 9, stresses that Rachel came. But with her came the sheep of her father. That is why it would be awkward to say "and behold, here Rachel brings the sheep."
So on a peshat level, the text has no problem, and indeed works better as written. Is the Ben Ish Chai treating this on a peshat level? I don't know. It reads like a midrash. Now is that midrash really compelled, and thus compelling? Many midrashim do seize upon awkwardness, and explain it away. But here, I am not really convinced that there is any textual awkwardness. Now there are (at least) two classes of midrashim. Some use the pasuk as a proof-text, and some use it as a pretext. In this instance, it seems to me that the pasuk is being used as a pretext, in order to develop a specific homiletic point about the value of tznius. This is fine, but we should keep in mind exactly how this pasuk is being used.
Rabbi Falk then writes:
"These were our Imahos. It is our obligation and privelege to live in their shadow and enrich our lives by learning from their examples. While it is not for us to wear dresses down to the ground (see 6:H:6 above) we can at least emulate the spirit of their ways."But it is really correct to respond to a late 19th-century or early 20th-century midrash with the words "These were our Imahos"? These were not our Imahos! This is the attitudes of a rabbi living in Iraq, living among Arabs who have extremes in tznius, projected onto one of our Imahos. And the Ben Ish Chai either does it consciously as homily because he thinks that these are positive Torah values and that this is a good way of promoting it; or unconsciously by assuming that 19th century Iraqi tznius accords with Biblical standards and values of tznius.
Either way, just because the Ben Ish Chai suggested this midrashic interpretation does not mean that it was historically true, and that these were our Imahos, and that therefore an obligation and privelege falls upon us to emulate them. We can consider Iraqi values and weigh whether we should adopt them, but the fact that some recent rabbi -- even as holy as the Ben Ish Chai -- retrojected his values on a Biblical character does not make these values binding in any sense.
But perhaps this is a natural chareidi attitude, in taking any and all midrashim literally.
There is what to say about "While it is not for us to wear dresses down to the ground (see 6:H:6 above)" but perhaps that is for another post, about Michal bat Shaul on page 407 in his book. For now, I will just point out that in taking this midrash so seriously, in his application he decides exactly what to draw from the midrash and what not to draw from the midrash. Thus, the midrash here says exactly what he wants it to say.
Tuesday, September 16, 2008
Interesting Posts and Articles #73
- Welcome back, JRants. We've missed you. You serve an important role in the JBlogging community. {Update: Oh well, it was up for a few hours, at least.}
- Motts will help you water down your juice if you like.
- Andrew Jackson famously said "One man with courage makes a majority." Avakesh discusses "the three ways of pesak," with an Ashkenazic / Sefardic divide. And that was a comment on an interesting series of posts on Ishim veShitot on autonomy vs. precedent in pesak (see here, here and here, and the comment sections in those places.)
- Well, the mystically inclined community has been publically predicting mashiach before Rosh HaShana of this year for a while now. But now that the year is almost over, Dreaming Of Moshiach is surprised:
One word - SURPRISE. We were so sure Moshiach would arrive.
But then the recent financial woes have her hopes back up. Even so, the shift is already being made from the claim that mashiach must come in the 7th of the 7th, on shemitta, to yovel, which is next year. And they found a source to back this up. This gives them another year to hyperventilate.
And so Shirat Devorah has a nice gematria proving next year mashiach is coming. There was another post I cannot locate right now, on the same blog, saying about two years from now, 5770, being a good year for mashiach to come, because 770 is a gematria of Beis Mashiach. Of course, that term "Beis Mashiach" is a term used specifically by Chabad, and they made the gematria up because of the prominence of 770. (And chamor beli daas, an insulting expansion of the acronym Chabad, also has the gematria of 770.) But it was being touted here divorced from any meshichist connection -- she was not saying the Rebbe is mashiach.
At any rate, my point is that if, chas veshalom, mashiach does not come tomorrow, certain apocalyptic websites have a whole year to hyperventilate. And if, chas veshalom, next year passes without messianic fulfillment, they have the next year already in hand, with a nice gematria to boot. And so on and so forth. - Also at Shirat Devorah, she announced a new lecture, tomorrow, from "Redemption 5768" (I wonder what they will do in terms of their name and website in a month). Part of what will be discussed is: say:
Ezekiel 38 describes Gog as the head of Meshech and Tuval. Who in the world today represents Gog, and are Meshech and Tuval real places? How come no one over the past thousands of years could identify their location?
I guess the Torah Temimah should be miffed at being considered a no-one. After all, as we see in this Yeranen Yaakov post:Yoma 10 - Tuval - this refers to Beit Onayki. Meshech - this refers to Musia. Tiras - R' Simai and the rabbis disagree about it. One opinion says that this refers to Beit Tirayki, and the other says that this refers to "Paras".
That does not mean that the identification is necessarily the correct one, but it seems incorrect to say that no one has identified it.
The Torah Temima commentary to Bereishit (10,2) says: Tuval - this refers to Beit Onayki. In the Yerushalmi Megilla (1:9) and in Midrashim, there are various versions of the text, and instead of "Beit Onayki", the textual version is "Bitunya". In fact, there is today a portion of Asia Minor by the Black Sea (i.e. in Russia) by the name "Bitunya". Meshech - this refers to Musia, that is the land of Musia that's in Asia Minor, close to the land of Bitunia (in Russia). - Don't forget that you can follow the Rif on Daf Yomi Gittin at my Rif Yomi blog.
- Plastics linked to heart disease and diabetes? From Reuters:
A study has for the first time linked a common chemical used in everyday products such as plastic drink containers and baby bottles to health problems, specifically heart disease and diabetes.
...
Steven Hentges of the American Chemistry Council, a chemical industry group, said the design of the study did not allow for anyone to conclude BPA causes heart disease and diabetes.
Monday, September 15, 2008
Interesting Posts and Articles #72
- Chasidim don't like the bicycle lane, because the result is women biking through their neighborhoods in non-tznius clothing. At Chaptzem.
- Mike Gravel interviewed about Sarah Palin, at YouTube.
- ABC News edits out key parts of Palin interview.
- Hirhurim on davening on an airplane. Should you sit? Should you stand? And what the gedolim had to say about it. A very worthwhile post to read, to comtemplate, and to have accessible.
- The Globe and Mail with an article on how elections are scheduled in Canada on Succot. And a letter to the editor from a Jewish reader, dismissing the seriousness of the problem.
Cutting off her hand??
It is shocking. The Torah is supposed to be a moral document, yet it appears to endorse cutting off the hand of a woman for the mere offense of touching a man's testicles while in a brawl, such as to cause him embarrassment.
Yet that view is one which adopts Chazal's view of the offense and a literal view of the penalty. Chazal are the ones who say this is punishment for embarrassment (though they may also quite likely hold there was physical damage as well), and they are the same ones who say that the punishment is monetary compensation.
When we go literal, it is more than possible that the offense was crushing his testicles, thus depriving him of his ability to have children, his ability to pass on his inheritance and his name, and depriving him from being able to marry into the kahal Hashem. Indeed, I would point out there it follows directly after yibbum vs. chalitza in the parsha. Also, such greivous injury can cause death. In comparing to Ancient Near Eastern codes, we see in the code of Hanmurabi that if she crushes one testicle, she loses a finger, but if she crushes both, she is blinded in both eyes.
On a literal level, is the punishment truly so brutal when compared with the crime? Not that I am endorsing it. But Lorena Bobbit made headlines for something similar. And the Torah was given within the values of the time, such that it details reforms within the institution of slavery, for the protection of the slaves, yet keeps the institution. If in general the Torah replaces an eye for an eye with money via the ability to pay kofer (an expansion on this idea later), if here, for such a brutal crime, kofer is disallowed, perhaps as an extreme yet mostly theoretical measure so that no woman would come to do this, is it really so brutal and immoral?
And if later general society has moved past this in the general case, and has devised other suitable punishments and preventative measures, and where there is an evolving morality, would an option not to enforce this mandate in a different cultural setting really be a betrayal of what the Torah already sets out to do? I don't think so. And if the phrasing of the pasuk also lets us derive other derashot, so be it.
In a topic such as this, it is interesting to see what the Karaites have to say for themselves. For they are very frum, in considering this Torat Moshe, mipi hagevurah, yet at the same time taking it literally. To us Perushim, the ethical dilemma need not cause a crisis of faith, since we are used to taking this pasuk non-literally, in accordance with Chazal's interpretation (or rather, interpretations). But what will the Karaites do?
We could find the answers in the writings of the Karaite scholar Aharon ben Yosef, and in the super-commentary upon him, in this book from JNUL, pages 243-244. (Aharon ben Yosef above, supercommentary below.)
As far as I can make out, mevushav is a euphemism for his testicles. And your eye not sparing means that in this case, you do not take kofer. The interesting implication is that in other cases, one would take kofer. Thus, an eye for an eye means money, since people will pay the fine rather than lose their eye. Further, he seems to consider this different from the other maimings, which suggests that he indeed sees this as crushing his testicles. (Though the supercommentary may not realize this.) Why not treat it like other maimings? For she did such a grievous act and great sin to cast forth her hand in the private place. And otherwise we would think {?} that she could redeem her hand with kofer.
So they hold there is actual cutting off of the hand, but give reasons to justify why this is a reasonable punishment.
Ibn Ezra (who was earlier than Aharon ben Yosef) also interpret this pasuk similarly, yet restricts when to impose the hand-cutting even further:
Shadal endorses the idea I mentioned in another post, that she is still grabbed on, and there is danger to life, such that any passerby should chop off her hand, rather than killing her, as she has the din rodef. But then he later reverses himself and suggests something like Ibn Ezra, that this is imposed by the court, as an ayin tachat ayin, as she has no testicles, such that the hand would take the place of the testicles. (I would suggest that since one could not do a literal ayin tachat ayin, one could look instead to the offending limb, which was the hand she stretched forth.) And in connecting it to ayin tachat ayin, Shadal seems also to be enabling kofer, for he maintains there that kofer is allowed by limbs, something provable from the fact that the Torah excludes specifically taking kofer for taking a nefesh. See inside. Anyway, here is the local Shadal.
Yet that view is one which adopts Chazal's view of the offense and a literal view of the penalty. Chazal are the ones who say this is punishment for embarrassment (though they may also quite likely hold there was physical damage as well), and they are the same ones who say that the punishment is monetary compensation.
When we go literal, it is more than possible that the offense was crushing his testicles, thus depriving him of his ability to have children, his ability to pass on his inheritance and his name, and depriving him from being able to marry into the kahal Hashem. Indeed, I would point out there it follows directly after yibbum vs. chalitza in the parsha. Also, such greivous injury can cause death. In comparing to Ancient Near Eastern codes, we see in the code of Hanmurabi that if she crushes one testicle, she loses a finger, but if she crushes both, she is blinded in both eyes.
On a literal level, is the punishment truly so brutal when compared with the crime? Not that I am endorsing it. But Lorena Bobbit made headlines for something similar. And the Torah was given within the values of the time, such that it details reforms within the institution of slavery, for the protection of the slaves, yet keeps the institution. If in general the Torah replaces an eye for an eye with money via the ability to pay kofer (an expansion on this idea later), if here, for such a brutal crime, kofer is disallowed, perhaps as an extreme yet mostly theoretical measure so that no woman would come to do this, is it really so brutal and immoral?
And if later general society has moved past this in the general case, and has devised other suitable punishments and preventative measures, and where there is an evolving morality, would an option not to enforce this mandate in a different cultural setting really be a betrayal of what the Torah already sets out to do? I don't think so. And if the phrasing of the pasuk also lets us derive other derashot, so be it.
In a topic such as this, it is interesting to see what the Karaites have to say for themselves. For they are very frum, in considering this Torat Moshe, mipi hagevurah, yet at the same time taking it literally. To us Perushim, the ethical dilemma need not cause a crisis of faith, since we are used to taking this pasuk non-literally, in accordance with Chazal's interpretation (or rather, interpretations). But what will the Karaites do?
We could find the answers in the writings of the Karaite scholar Aharon ben Yosef, and in the super-commentary upon him, in this book from JNUL, pages 243-244. (Aharon ben Yosef above, supercommentary below.)As far as I can make out, mevushav is a euphemism for his testicles. And your eye not sparing means that in this case, you do not take kofer. The interesting implication is that in other cases, one would take kofer. Thus, an eye for an eye means money, since people will pay the fine rather than lose their eye. Further, he seems to consider this different from the other maimings, which suggests that he indeed sees this as crushing his testicles. (Though the supercommentary may not realize this.) Why not treat it like other maimings? For she did such a grievous act and great sin to cast forth her hand in the private place. And otherwise we would think {?} that she could redeem her hand with kofer.
So they hold there is actual cutting off of the hand, but give reasons to justify why this is a reasonable punishment.
Ibn Ezra (who was earlier than Aharon ben Yosef) also interpret this pasuk similarly, yet restricts when to impose the hand-cutting even further:
כי ינצו -
הפך כי ישבו אחים יחדו ואלה האנשים זרים, או אחים.
במבושיו -
ביציו, מגזרת בושה והוא עזות מצח, לגלות דבר הנסתר שהוא ערוה, גם הוא מקום מסוכן.
[כה, יב]
וקצותה את כפה -
כמו: עין תחת עין אם לא תפדה, כפה תקוץ.
לא תחוס עינך -
אם היתה ענייה.
Thus, he does not seem to say explicitly that the testicles were crushed, though he does say it is a makom mesukan. Yet there is kofer even here, just like other "eye for an eye" cases. But the "eye shall not spare" would seem to be where she is poor and cannot afford kofer -- then, one would actually cut off her hand. (I could imagine then halachic workarounds in which she accepts it upon herself as a chov, such that the kofer is halachically and officially paid off, but then there is a debt.)הפך כי ישבו אחים יחדו ואלה האנשים זרים, או אחים.
במבושיו -
ביציו, מגזרת בושה והוא עזות מצח, לגלות דבר הנסתר שהוא ערוה, גם הוא מקום מסוכן.
[כה, יב]
וקצותה את כפה -
כמו: עין תחת עין אם לא תפדה, כפה תקוץ.
לא תחוס עינך -
אם היתה ענייה.
Shadal endorses the idea I mentioned in another post, that she is still grabbed on, and there is danger to life, such that any passerby should chop off her hand, rather than killing her, as she has the din rodef. But then he later reverses himself and suggests something like Ibn Ezra, that this is imposed by the court, as an ayin tachat ayin, as she has no testicles, such that the hand would take the place of the testicles. (I would suggest that since one could not do a literal ayin tachat ayin, one could look instead to the offending limb, which was the hand she stretched forth.) And in connecting it to ayin tachat ayin, Shadal seems also to be enabling kofer, for he maintains there that kofer is allowed by limbs, something provable from the fact that the Torah excludes specifically taking kofer for taking a nefesh. See inside. Anyway, here is the local Shadal.
יב ] וקצתה : מצוה על כל מי שנמצא שם ורואה האיש ההוא בסכנה , והלא היא עצמה להציל את בעלה עשתה , ולמה לא יותר לה להצילו כדרך שמותר וגם מצווה לאחרים להציל את המכה מיד ? - היא עשתה ברמייה כי אין אדם שיחשוב כזאת על אשה , שתעיז פניה כל כך , ואם היתה עושה בשאר דרכים ובלא רמייה , לא היה בזה רע . וגם תנא קמא בספרי ( כי תצא פיסקא רצ " ג ) לקח הדבר כפשוטו ולא בממון , אמנם שתשלם דמי כפה לא נהירא , ויותר היה ראוי שתשלם דמי מבושיו , ואם מת בה , תהיה חייבת מיתה . אבל אם הפחידוה ושמטה ידה , ייתכן , שתשלם דמי כפה שהיתה ראויה להיקצץ . והנה אחר שדיבר על מעשה רמייה זה , הזכיר רמייה אחרת שהיא אבן ואבן איפה ואיפה , ולחזק שנאת הרמייה הזכיר ענין עמלק , שעשה בעקבה ויזנב בך כל הנחשלים אחריך , וציוה להכריתו ולזכור המשפט הנעשה בו , וזה למען נתרחק ממעשה רמייה . והיום י' שבט תר"ב נ"ל כי " וקצתה את כפה " הוא עונש ב"ד , על דרך ( שמות כ"א כ"ז ) עין תחת עין , ולפי שאין לאשה מבושים יקצצו כפה , וקרובין לזה דברי ראב"ע.
Note: Not intended halacha lemaaseh. Heh. But also not as a final word as to the intent of the pesukim, or the theological implications of different meanings of these pesukim.
Sunday, September 14, 2008
Ki Tavo: A Beautiful Midrash about Kinas Sofrim
A commenter asks about a beautiful midrash brought down by Rashi:
pesukim stating? They saw the miracles, but Hashem did not give them the ability to know, see, or hear, until this day that Moshe was speaking to them.
On this peshat level, Shadal answers:
And see Seforno, who says that Hashem tried to give them this heart, etc., but it was not successful, because of their rebellion.
But on a midrashic level, we can focus on עַד הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה and claim that finally, on that day, something happened such that Moshe was able to say that they had attained that level.
I would guess that in terms of "I heard" that this was some midrash contemporary to Rashi, which was circulating and which he liked enough to incorporate into his commentary. But since he heard it, he could not refer to the explicit source in a text. Nor could it he leave attribution out, for then that would be claiming credit for innovating it.
In terms of the actual midrash,
all of Israel.
Nor is this a matter of infighting, and specifically begrudging the power given to the tribe of Levi. Rather, the idea is that the Torah is a gift from Hashem, and should not be the monopoly of one group. The chareidim don't have a monopoly on Torah. It belongs to the Modern Orthodox as well! But if deciding law is given to a specific group, they might turn around and say that it is only their yerushah, and that others did not receive it. Also, perhaps, the Torah does not belong only to an elite class of scholars, but rather it is accessible to anyone who wishes to devote himself to learning God's Law.
Their motivation was not begrudging others their power, but as stating towards the end of the midrash, that they feared that others would claim the Torah only for themselves. They thus loved Torah, and this marked a change in attitude towards Torah and Hashem. And this is what Moshe meant when he stated וְלֹא-נָתַן יְהוָה לָכֶם לֵב לָדַעַת, וְעֵינַיִם לִרְאוֹת וְאָזְנַיִם לִשְׁמֹעַ, עַד, הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה. Now they finally have the correct attitude.
It reminds me of the narrative towards the end of sefer Yehoshua (perek 22), where the residents across the Jordan built a mizbeach. Perhaps this narrative inspired the midrash:
This Rashi is very strange to meI think this a beautiful derash. The pesukim in question, at the end of Ki Savo, read:עד היום הזה - שמעתי שאותו היום שנתן משה ספר התורה לבני לוי כמ"ש בפ' וילך ויתנה אל הכהנים בני לוי באו כל ישראל לפני משה ואמרו לו משה רבינו אף אנו עמדנו בסיני וקבלנו את התורה וניתנה לנו ומה אתה משליט את בני שבטך עליה ויאמרו לנו יום מחר לא לכם ניתנה לנו ניתנה ושמח משה על הדבר ועל זאת אמר להם היום הזה נהיית לעם וגו' היום הזה הבנתי שאתם דבקים וחפצים במקוםFirst of all "I heard"? Second the reason Moshe was Happy is Because the Jews Where Jealous of the Levim, so essentially now you have become a Nation because of in fighting and bickering and I thought it was supposed to be "Kish Echad Blev Echad" apparently the Warring Chassidim have it right?
pesukim stating? They saw the miracles, but Hashem did not give them the ability to know, see, or hear, until this day that Moshe was speaking to them.
On this peshat level, Shadal answers:
ולא נתן ה ': ואתם התנהגתם כאילו לא ראיתם וע"כ יראתם מיושבי כנען , ולפיכך ואולך אתכם מ' שנה .
that they conducted themselves as if they did not see. And he connects it to the next pasuk, of having to travel in the desert for 40 years.And see Seforno, who says that Hashem tried to give them this heart, etc., but it was not successful, because of their rebellion.
But on a midrashic level, we can focus on עַד הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה and claim that finally, on that day, something happened such that Moshe was able to say that they had attained that level.
I would guess that in terms of "I heard" that this was some midrash contemporary to Rashi, which was circulating and which he liked enough to incorporate into his commentary. But since he heard it, he could not refer to the explicit source in a text. Nor could it he leave attribution out, for then that would be claiming credit for innovating it.
In terms of the actual midrash,
שמעתי שאותו היום שנתן משה ספר התורה לבני לוי כמ"ש בפ' וילך ויתנה אל הכהנים בני לוי באו כל ישראל לפני משה ואמרו לו משה רבינו אף אנו עמדנו בסיני וקבלנו את התורה וניתנה לנו ומה אתה משליט את בני שבטך עליה ויאמרו לנו יום מחר לא לכם ניתנה לנו ניתנה ושמח משה על הדבר ועל זאת אמר להם היום הזה נהיית לעם וגו' היום הזה הבנתי שאתם דבקים וחפצים במקום
I am not going to look in depth into how it comes out of pesukim here. However, just off the cuff -- perhaps it was the contrast of אֵלֶּה דִבְרֵי הַבְּרִית אֲשֶׁר-צִוָּה יְהוָה אֶת-מֹשֶׁה לִכְרֹת אֶת-בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל in the previous pasuk, to the pesukim in Vayelech stressing the role of the kohanim. Indeed, the full pasuk here is:all of Israel.
Nor is this a matter of infighting, and specifically begrudging the power given to the tribe of Levi. Rather, the idea is that the Torah is a gift from Hashem, and should not be the monopoly of one group. The chareidim don't have a monopoly on Torah. It belongs to the Modern Orthodox as well! But if deciding law is given to a specific group, they might turn around and say that it is only their yerushah, and that others did not receive it. Also, perhaps, the Torah does not belong only to an elite class of scholars, but rather it is accessible to anyone who wishes to devote himself to learning God's Law.
Their motivation was not begrudging others their power, but as stating towards the end of the midrash, that they feared that others would claim the Torah only for themselves. They thus loved Torah, and this marked a change in attitude towards Torah and Hashem. And this is what Moshe meant when he stated וְלֹא-נָתַן יְהוָה לָכֶם לֵב לָדַעַת, וְעֵינַיִם לִרְאוֹת וְאָזְנַיִם לִשְׁמֹעַ, עַד, הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה. Now they finally have the correct attitude.
It reminds me of the narrative towards the end of sefer Yehoshua (perek 22), where the residents across the Jordan built a mizbeach. Perhaps this narrative inspired the midrash:
Friday, September 12, 2008
Shadal on The Betrothed Naarah
Another interesting Shadal in Ki Teitzei, on perek 22, about the laws of the naarah hameorasa. There are all sorts of features that a pashtan like him would like to take literally, but on the other hand, this would then be contrary to halacha, as well perhaps to one's ethical sensibilities -- halachically guided ethical sensibilities, perhaps. Up front, his peirush, and afterwards, my summary.
יז ] ופרשו השמלה : דברים ככתבן (דברי רבי אליעזר בן יעקב כתובות מ"ו ע" א) אם כן איך ייתכן שיוציא אדם שם רע , מאחר שיודע שהשמלה מוכחת ? אבל כוונת התורה להרחיק שלא יהיה איש מוציא שם רע על אשתו , והאמינה ראיית הדמים , אף על פי שאולי יהיו מזוייפים , כדי לתת שלום בבית ולהציל ממיתה נערה שזינתה בבית אביה , אשר לפי התורה אין לה עונש , רק לפי מראה עיני אנשי הדורות ההם , אם היתה נישאת בחזקת בתולה , היתה זו מרמה שחייבים עליה מיתה , והתחכמה התורה להמתיק המידה הקשה הזאת בצוותה שנאמין לדמים , אעפ"י שהיא ראיה שיש אחריה פיקפוק .
[ כא ] לזנות בית אביה : לפי הפשט זינתה בבית אביה קודם אירוסין , ואחר שזינתה היה לה להודיעו שאיננה בתולה , והנה רימתה אותו בדבר שהיה גדול כל כך בעיניהם בימים ההם שהיה משפטה למות . ואם כדברי רבותינו ( ספרי כי תצא פיסקא ר " מ ) היה לו לומר לנאוף . ( עיין בכורי העתים תקפ " ז עמוד ר"ב ). ועוד הנה אם יש שם עדים שראוה מנאפת , אין ספק גם כן שראו עם מי ניאפה , והנה התורה לא הזכירה דבר על אודות הנואף , והיה לה לומר שגם את הנואף יהרוגו .
[ כא ] לזנות בית אביה : לפי הפשט זינתה בבית אביה קודם אירוסין , ואחר שזינתה היה לה להודיעו שאיננה בתולה , והנה רימתה אותו בדבר שהיה גדול כל כך בעיניהם בימים ההם שהיה משפטה למות . ואם כדברי רבותינו ( ספרי כי תצא פיסקא ר " מ ) היה לו לומר לנאוף . ( עיין בכורי העתים תקפ " ז עמוד ר"ב ). ועוד הנה אם יש שם עדים שראוה מנאפת , אין ספק גם כן שראו עם מי ניאפה , והנה התורה לא הזכירה דבר על אודות הנואף , והיה לה לומר שגם את הנואף יהרוגו .
And so Shadal would like to take the spreading out of the sheet literally. (Indeed, the Muslims have such a practice.) And as such, the false accuser would surely be immediately exposed, so knowing there is this evidence, why would he make this charge? The answer is that, for reasons to become clear, the Torah does not want him to be laying out this charge. Furthermore, perhaps the blood is fake. The gemara speaks of instances in which she smuggles in stains in order to make it appear that there was dam besulim. So how can we lay this punishment upon him, based on possibly forged evidence. Again, Shadal claims that it is because the Torah does not want him to be laying the charge against her.
Why not? Well, this intersects with his second point. Shadal would claim that the naarah who had intercourse in her beit aviha was not a betrothed maiden, such that it was adultery, as per Chazal. For then it would say lin`of rather than liznos. Rather, she was an unmarried girl. And I would add the problem that there does not seem to be a death penalty elsewhere in Torah for a single girl who was seduced. Perhaps one can construct that the difference there is that she is not then trying to trick someone about whether she is a virgin or not. But without this explanation, it is hard to understand why a penuya should receive the death penalty here. Shadal has a further problem that if it means witnesses, then the witnesses also presumably saw the adulterer, and then the Torah should mention the execution of adulterer as well.
Shadal's answer is that the Torah does not want her to be executed. It is rather the tribal custom of those backwards people. And rather than declaring that there is no death penalty in such a case, the Torah is surreptitiously imposing legal conditions such that it is unlikely to ever come to pass. Thus, the husband will be reluctant to accuse, in case he was wrong, or in case she forged the evidence. But if he does, then the Torah will not be able to do anything as the people of that generation, with their value system in place, condemns to death a single woman who lied to her husband about the status of her virginity. But the Torah itself does not command it.
I could actually see this as plausible, just looking at modern-day Arab/Muslim culture, and the virginity tests and the honor killings. Considering that many dinim in the Torah are easily read as measures of reformation, we can read this in a similar vein, moving the Jewish culture towards a more civilized society as idealized by the Torah.
However, I have reasons to doubt this explanation. And if we remove the explanations, we could either revert to Chazal's explanation, or else not revert and be left with some difficult questions. My reasons to doubt this resolution:
1) There is nothing explicit in the pasuk to suggest that this is just what is happening -- וְהוֹצִיאוּ אֶת-הַנַּעֲרָ אֶל-פֶּתַח בֵּית-אָבִיהָ, וּסְקָלוּהָ אַנְשֵׁי עִירָהּ בָּאֲבָנִים וָמֵתָה -- rather than being a prescription for action.
2) כִּי-עָשְׂתָה נְבָלָה בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל, לִזְנוֹת בֵּית אָבִיהָ would seem to be a value judgement, that she did a nevalah.
3) There was the suggestion that the evil deed in the minds of the backward folk of that day was lying about the status of her virginity, rather than the intercourse outside the bounds of marriage. But כִּי-עָשְׂתָה נְבָלָה בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל, לִזְנוֹת בֵּית אָבִיהָ suggests that the nevalah was the zenus rather than the lying.
4) Finally, וּבִעַרְתָּ הָרָע מִקִּרְבֶּךָ certainly sounds like instruction; and it also seems to represent a value judgement, that this is indeed evil, which should be eliminated.
Update: See also Vesom Sechel's take on the issue.
Why not? Well, this intersects with his second point. Shadal would claim that the naarah who had intercourse in her beit aviha was not a betrothed maiden, such that it was adultery, as per Chazal. For then it would say lin`of rather than liznos. Rather, she was an unmarried girl. And I would add the problem that there does not seem to be a death penalty elsewhere in Torah for a single girl who was seduced. Perhaps one can construct that the difference there is that she is not then trying to trick someone about whether she is a virgin or not. But without this explanation, it is hard to understand why a penuya should receive the death penalty here. Shadal has a further problem that if it means witnesses, then the witnesses also presumably saw the adulterer, and then the Torah should mention the execution of adulterer as well.
Shadal's answer is that the Torah does not want her to be executed. It is rather the tribal custom of those backwards people. And rather than declaring that there is no death penalty in such a case, the Torah is surreptitiously imposing legal conditions such that it is unlikely to ever come to pass. Thus, the husband will be reluctant to accuse, in case he was wrong, or in case she forged the evidence. But if he does, then the Torah will not be able to do anything as the people of that generation, with their value system in place, condemns to death a single woman who lied to her husband about the status of her virginity. But the Torah itself does not command it.
I could actually see this as plausible, just looking at modern-day Arab/Muslim culture, and the virginity tests and the honor killings. Considering that many dinim in the Torah are easily read as measures of reformation, we can read this in a similar vein, moving the Jewish culture towards a more civilized society as idealized by the Torah.
However, I have reasons to doubt this explanation. And if we remove the explanations, we could either revert to Chazal's explanation, or else not revert and be left with some difficult questions. My reasons to doubt this resolution:
1) There is nothing explicit in the pasuk to suggest that this is just what is happening -- וְהוֹצִיאוּ אֶת-הַנַּעֲרָ אֶל-פֶּתַח בֵּית-אָבִיהָ, וּסְקָלוּהָ אַנְשֵׁי עִירָהּ בָּאֲבָנִים וָמֵתָה -- rather than being a prescription for action.
2) כִּי-עָשְׂתָה נְבָלָה בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל, לִזְנוֹת בֵּית אָבִיהָ would seem to be a value judgement, that she did a nevalah.
3) There was the suggestion that the evil deed in the minds of the backward folk of that day was lying about the status of her virginity, rather than the intercourse outside the bounds of marriage. But כִּי-עָשְׂתָה נְבָלָה בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל, לִזְנוֹת בֵּית אָבִיהָ suggests that the nevalah was the zenus rather than the lying.
4) Finally, וּבִעַרְתָּ הָרָע מִקִּרְבֶּךָ certainly sounds like instruction; and it also seems to represent a value judgement, that this is indeed evil, which should be eliminated.
Update: See also Vesom Sechel's take on the issue.
Thursday, September 11, 2008
Interesting Posts and Articles #71
- Achas LeMaalah asks about a real of apparent contradiction of midrashim, one which states that people were worried about marrying Rus since she was a Moabite, and then Boaz paskened Moavi velo Moavit; another which states she came from Balak (and according to some sources, patrilineally descended); and a third which states that Balak was really from Midian. If he was from Midian and Rus was a descendant, why should anyone think a prohibition should apply? He is going to offer an answer. In the comment section, I suggest that (a) they might be contradictory midrashim; (b) or that from the words of the pasuk, Balak is obviously included, and so he was considered a Moabite, having joined the Moabite people before the prohibition kicked in. Perhaps one can also come up with a slightly farfetched harmonization that since they did not yet know Boaz' diyuk of Moavi velo Moavis, they were worried about matrilineally descended Moabites as well...
He follows up with his answers here. - The development of the gasoline pump, over at Wired.
- Rabbi Dr. David Berger issues a clarification. The Village Voice erroneously attributed to him a statement that Judaism in general has a certain theological belief:
"Judaism says that in every generation, there is a righteous person that connects the world to the divine energy," he explains. "If there is no leader, the world would actually cease to exist. So the fact that the rebbe has died and that the world continues to exist is a conundrum to them, and it leads them to believe that the rebbe must not have died. But even people who believe he did die find this to be a challenging question." They resolve it, he adds, by opining that we're living in strange times, or that the rebbe is still providing the divine connection from his grave.
Such that people were now claiming that even he now admits to the legitimacy of this position. Daas Torah asked him for a clarification, and he notes he clarified in a comment at the newspaper's website:“I am quoted as saying the following: ‘Judaism says that in every generation, there is a righteous person that connects the world to the divine energy. If there is no leader, the world would actually cease to exist.’ I said this about Lubavitch hasidism, not about Judaism as a whole.” Ad kan.
And he continues to clarify at length. Read it all.
In the comment section of that post, someone bring up a Teshuvot Radvaz as support for looking at a picture of the Rebbe, or Baba Sali, prior to prayer. (And perhaps during?) But I would not that the teshuva explicitly is talking about a connection while the two are alive. And it seems to be used in the context of learning Torah. Anyhoo, in a subsequent post, he cites another teshuva from the Radvaz that shows the Radvaz was against making images. - FactCheck.org has an article debunking several smears against Palin.
- "Idiots" at the Checkpoints, at A Soldier's Mother.
- Muslims believe Chava is buried in Saudi Arabia, but there is of course no Biblical basis for this assertion. An interesting read. And it shows how fake kevarim can crop up, something that we should be wary of. But then, there is this:
Asked if he had heard of any other final resting place for Eve, {William} Dever said, "No. There are tombs of Abraham all over the place, but I don't honestly know in Israel or the West Bank or Jordan of any Eve tomb in these places."
He is obviously unfamiliar with the midrashim and traditions placing Adam and Chava in maarat hamachpela. And in the very same tomb as Avraham, which Dever presumably knew about. Perhaps they should have consulted a different expert. - Carbon dating flawed ... past 150 million years ago.
- Wolfish Musings and Emes veEmunah on Rav Twersky's pullout, under pressure, from a task force on sexual abuse. Both wonder at the motivations of the people who pressured him to resign. Please note that this is not that I am saying that it is a good thing he resigned, but if I might venture my guess as to their motivations, I might add to the list the possibility of concern that some other members of the task force would act irresponsibly, and that having this rabbinic impremateur of Rav Twersky would then prop up those actions. Much like the Rabbinic membership in the Awareness Center, and subsequent resignation.
- Middah Keneged Middah for Bar Lev? (hat tip: Shirat Devorah, from Arutz Sheva)
Monday morning, the preparations began for demolition of a house owned by Southern District Police Commander Uri Bar-Lev. The house is to be demolished due to safety issues that arose because of a softening of the land it was built on.
I wonder, though, at this type of public reaction and rejoicing. This would seem to be a peshat-level application of the recommendation in Mishlei 24:17:
...
Marzel came to the site to witness the preparations. “I came to see a miracle that hasn’t happened in the land since the time of Korach,” he explained to IsraelNN TV’s Yoni Kempinski. Korach is the biblical character who, along with his house, sunk into the earth after challenging the authority of Moses.
...
Bar-Lev himself, who owns a much larger house adjacent to the structure being demolished, seemed not particularly troubled. He approached the IsraelNN TV cameraman and recommended returning the next morning for better footage, as the bulldozers and tractors won’t arrive till then.
בִּנְפֹל אויביך (אוֹיִבְךָ), אַל-תִּשְׂמָח; וּבִכָּשְׁלוֹ, אַל-יָגֵל לִבֶּךָ 
A guest poster at Dreaming Of Moshiach notes that Hurricane Ike is short version of the name Isaac, and we can then connect it to Yitzchak and thus to Akeidas Yitzchak, where a ram was sacrificed in his place, symbolizing the shofar. And wonder of wonders, the path of Hurricane Ike looks just like a shofar! See the image.
The problem with this assertion, to my mind, is that many, many projected paths of hurricanes are curved in exactly this way. Do a Google image search for hurricane projected path and you will see. For example, Hurricane Hannah; Hurricane Dean; Hurricane Rita; and Hurricane Katrina. Furthermore, it seems quite likely to me that the widening, which is what makes it look more like a shofar, is not the actual hurricane widening. Remember that these are pictures of the projected path. (See the note on this and other images that it is a projected path, rather than the actual path.) The further you guess the position in the future, the more uncertainty there is, for the hurricane can veer slightly to the left or the right. They therefore show it widening, to cover a larger and larger possible area, with the actual hurricane somewhere within that area.
Daf Yomi Gittin 62a: ואין כופלין שלום לעובדי כוכבים
An interesting gemara in today's daf (available in Rif Yomi here):
Thus, I would suggest that Rav Chisda giving heathens greeting first is not showing his leniency in this regard, but rather a strategy in avoiding giving the double greeting of "shalom shalom." For in response to a shalom, one would double the shalom. And similarly, perhaps we can interpret Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak, of Rav Kahana's statement of shelama lemar not as Rashi gives it, that he says this and really has in mind Hashem -- something Tosafot objects is geneivas daas -- but rather also something that he says in response. That is, say that the heathen greeted Rav Kahana with shalom first, but rather than saying shalom, shalom, he one-upped it in a different way, by saying shalom leMar, calling him "master" as a way of respect.
I did not look far -- anywhere past the actual daf, but I had a thought that I did not see in Rashi or Tosafot. We know from other languages that there is sometimes a pattern in which one responding to a greeting gives a greeting that is stronger. Thus, in Yiddish, in response to "gut morgen," one would say "gut yohr."ואין כופלין שלום לעובדי כוכבים'Nor to give double greeting to heathens' --
רב חסדא הוה מקדים יהיב להו שלמא
ר"נ בר יצחק אמר להו שלמא למר
תניא לא יכנס אדם בביתו של עובדי כוכבים ביום אידו ויתן לו שלום מצאו בשוק נותן לו בשפה רפה ובכובד ראש
Rav Chisda would give them greeting first.
Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak {our gemara: Rav Kahana} used to say: Peace {to you,} sir.
They learnt {in a brayta}: A man should not enter the house of a heathen on his feast day and give him greeting. Should he meet him in the street, he should greet him in a mumbling tone and with downcast head.'
Thus, I would suggest that Rav Chisda giving heathens greeting first is not showing his leniency in this regard, but rather a strategy in avoiding giving the double greeting of "shalom shalom." For in response to a shalom, one would double the shalom. And similarly, perhaps we can interpret Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak, of Rav Kahana's statement of shelama lemar not as Rashi gives it, that he says this and really has in mind Hashem -- something Tosafot objects is geneivas daas -- but rather also something that he says in response. That is, say that the heathen greeted Rav Kahana with shalom first, but rather than saying shalom, shalom, he one-upped it in a different way, by saying shalom leMar, calling him "master" as a way of respect.
Gittin 62b: A Woman Conveying Her Own Get, And Begging The Question
I was troubled by the following gemara, but haven't researched it deeply enough to see if there is a resolution offered by Rishonim/Acharonim, or if my question is really a question. So all this might really be amaratzus.
The following translation pulled from my Rif Yomi blog, on Gittin 62b:
There is an alternative, that this is not a question of whether a man ever is the actual recipient of the get, but rather whether he can act as an agent for receiving. And in the case of accepting the get for his minor daughter, he is acting as her stand-in. Thus, we have Biblical precedent, which we can extend to other cases.
But I would favor the former reading of the question, at least for now. And assuming the former reading, I have the following issue: The gemara asks whether women can act as shliach leholacha. And the answer is that a woman can, based on the Mishna which states that the wife may bring her own get.
But that seems to be begging the question -- proving something only by assuming as axiomatic the very thing you are trying to prove. After all, a woman bringing her own get would seem to be agency, rather than a din in and of the woman herself. As we see for example in Gittin 5a:
Perhaps we can say as above, that this is rather a matter of precedent, rather than one of whether the person is beTorat holacha of a get.
Another related issue which might also resolve it is what the definition of holacha and shliach leholacha is. Is this just traveling with a get under your control? If so, why should we need any kind of diyuk? This is a glorified postman, but one who must make sure that no one tampers with it. To coin an idiom (wink), the question should not be how we know a man, or a woman, can be a shliach leholacha. A monkey should be able to do it, or a parrot. Why not?
If, on the other hand, the shliach leholacha is also a shliach for giving the get -- such that one person or his agent, the shliach leholacha gives, and another person or her agent, the shliach lekabbalah receives -- then we are speaking of agency for giving a get. If I recall correctly, in the Jewish colony of Elephantine, women could initiate divorce. However, according to halacha, the man divorces the woman and not the other way around. If a woman cannot give a get, how could she be an agent to give a get?
I also wonder at the reason for needing to prove a man or a woman can be a shliach lekabbalah or a shliach leholacha/nesina in the first place. Why assume that they need to be betoras nesinas gittin or betoras kabbalas gittin in the first place? A woman's chatzer is koneh for her, and it is not betoras. Rather, it acquires property, and that property in this case is the get, which then has the effect of making the woman divorced. And we know from elsewhere that both men and women can acquire and transfer ownership. Let them be shluchim for this transfer of ownership, empowered by the husband or the wife, and once they are koneh or makneh, the divorce takes effect!
Perhaps we can combine all of this, and suggest that this was the question of the gemara. What is the nature of this shlichus? Do they need to be betoras nesinas/kabbalas gittin? Or even if not, such as a man for kabbalah and a woman for nesina? And the answer is given by showing precedent in all these ways, such that we know that they do not need to be betoras. And so we rely on precedent in these cases.
It may work, but I have reservations about this. Specifically, the focus on the man bringing his own, and the women bringing her own, seems to strongly suggest that the idea is agency only if you yourself can do it. Please let me know in the comment section what I am missing.
The following translation pulled from my Rif Yomi blog, on Gittin 62b:
I would read the basis of the question of the gemara as follows: A person cannot be a shliach for something that he himself cannot do. And so, how could a man be an agent to receive the get? After all, Biblically, the man does the divorcing, and he is not the recipient of a get given by his wife. If so, how can he act as an agent? And the answer is that there is a paradigm for a man receiving a get, so since he can receive a get Biblically, in general he can act as an agent for this.פשיטא: איש הוי שליח להולכה שכן בעל מוליך גט לאשתוIt is obvious that a man may be an agent for conveying, for a husband may convey a get to his wife; and that a woman may be an agent for receiving, for a woman may receive her get from the hand of her husband.
אשה הויא שליח לקבלה שכן אשה מקבלת גיטה מיד בעלה
איש לקבלה ואשה להולכה מאי
ופשטינן דאיש הוי נמי שליח לקבלה שכן אב מקבל גט לבתו קטנה ואשה נמי הויא שליח להולכה שכן אשה עצמה מביאה גיטה
כדתנן האשה עצמה מביאה גיטה ובלבד שתהא צריכה למימר בפני נכתב ובפ"נ
ואוקימנא בהולכה
A man for receiving and a woman for conveying, what?
And we resolve that a man may also be an agent for receiving, for a father may indeed receive a get for his minor daughter. And a woman may also be an agent for conveying, for a woman may indeed herself bring her get, as we learn {in a Mishna}, "the woman herself may bring her get, except she needs to say 'before me it was written and before me it was signed."
And we establish this as conveying.
There is an alternative, that this is not a question of whether a man ever is the actual recipient of the get, but rather whether he can act as an agent for receiving. And in the case of accepting the get for his minor daughter, he is acting as her stand-in. Thus, we have Biblical precedent, which we can extend to other cases.
But I would favor the former reading of the question, at least for now. And assuming the former reading, I have the following issue: The gemara asks whether women can act as shliach leholacha. And the answer is that a woman can, based on the Mishna which states that the wife may bring her own get.
But that seems to be begging the question -- proving something only by assuming as axiomatic the very thing you are trying to prove. After all, a woman bringing her own get would seem to be agency, rather than a din in and of the woman herself. As we see for example in Gittin 5a:
ותנן האשה עצמה מביאה גיטה ובלבד שצריכה לומר בפ"נ ובפ"נ שלא תחלוק בשליחות
Is there any basis for saying otherwise? If this is agency, where she is the shliach of the husband until she reaches her destination, then this is an instance of a woman working as a shliach. But we have not proven that can do it as a primary actor, for a get she is using to divorce someone else. So one can cite the Mishna, but what is the basis of that Mishna?Perhaps we can say as above, that this is rather a matter of precedent, rather than one of whether the person is beTorat holacha of a get.
Another related issue which might also resolve it is what the definition of holacha and shliach leholacha is. Is this just traveling with a get under your control? If so, why should we need any kind of diyuk? This is a glorified postman, but one who must make sure that no one tampers with it. To coin an idiom (wink), the question should not be how we know a man, or a woman, can be a shliach leholacha. A monkey should be able to do it, or a parrot. Why not?
If, on the other hand, the shliach leholacha is also a shliach for giving the get -- such that one person or his agent, the shliach leholacha gives, and another person or her agent, the shliach lekabbalah receives -- then we are speaking of agency for giving a get. If I recall correctly, in the Jewish colony of Elephantine, women could initiate divorce. However, according to halacha, the man divorces the woman and not the other way around. If a woman cannot give a get, how could she be an agent to give a get?
I also wonder at the reason for needing to prove a man or a woman can be a shliach lekabbalah or a shliach leholacha/nesina in the first place. Why assume that they need to be betoras nesinas gittin or betoras kabbalas gittin in the first place? A woman's chatzer is koneh for her, and it is not betoras. Rather, it acquires property, and that property in this case is the get, which then has the effect of making the woman divorced. And we know from elsewhere that both men and women can acquire and transfer ownership. Let them be shluchim for this transfer of ownership, empowered by the husband or the wife, and once they are koneh or makneh, the divorce takes effect!
Perhaps we can combine all of this, and suggest that this was the question of the gemara. What is the nature of this shlichus? Do they need to be betoras nesinas/kabbalas gittin? Or even if not, such as a man for kabbalah and a woman for nesina? And the answer is given by showing precedent in all these ways, such that we know that they do not need to be betoras. And so we rely on precedent in these cases.
It may work, but I have reservations about this. Specifically, the focus on the man bringing his own, and the women bringing her own, seems to strongly suggest that the idea is agency only if you yourself can do it. Please let me know in the comment section what I am missing.
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I do have a copy of Od Yosef Chai, and he does discuss this pasuk, however, I cannot find the statement that Rabbi Falk cites.
On the other hand, while I don't see Rabbi Falk's quote, the Ben Ish Chai does use the pasuk to prove that Rachel Imeinu wore a veil:
It's a cute drosha, and it is actually quite possible, given the cultural environs, that she was wearing a veil.
In any case, given Rabbi Falk's methodology, does this drosha prove that all Jewish women should be donning veils? After all, "These were our Imahos. It is our obligation and privilege to live in their shadow and enrich our lives by learning from their examples."
Incidentally, from what the Ben Ish Chai writes in his sefer Chukei Nashim (ch. 17), it seems that in his community, normal practice was for women to wear veils when going out of the home. However, he explicitly describes this as "minhageinu bzos ireinu." Earlier in the chapter he says that a woman's face may be exposed.